The 2008 Battle of Sadr City Reimagining Urban Combat

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The 2008 Battle of Sadr City Reimagining Urban Combat CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND Arroyo Center View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This report is part of the RAND Corporation research report series. RAND reports present research findings and objective analysis that ad- dress the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND reports undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for re- search quality and objectivity. ARROYO CENTER The 2008 Battle of Sadr City Reimagining Urban Combat David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, Brian Shannon Prepared for the United States Army Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Johnson, David E. (David Eugene), 1950- The 2008 battle of Sadr City : reimagining urban combat / David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, Brian Shannon. pages cm Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-0-8330-8028-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Sadr City, Battle of, Baghdad, Iraq, 2008. 2. Iraq War, 2003-2011—Campaigns— Iraq—Baghdad. 3. Iraq War, 2003-2011—Urban warfare. 4. Counterinsurgency— Iraq—Baghdad. I. Markel, M. Wade. II. Shannon, Brian. III. Title. DS79.764.B35J643 2013 956.7044'34—dc23 2013048090 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND—make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute.html R® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2013 RAND Corporation This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see the RAND permissions page (www.rand.org/pubs/permissions.html). RAND OFFICES SANTA MONICA, CA • WASHINGTON, DC PITTSBURGH, PA • NEW ORLEANS, LA • JACKSON, MS • BOSTON, MA DOHA, QA • CAMBRIDGE, UK • BRUSSELS, BE www.rand.org Summary Background In late March 2008 a key battle took place in Sadr City, a Shia area of Baghdad with an estimated 2.4 million residents. This battle solidified the authority of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and enabled him to extend government control to the whole of Baghdad. Thus, the battle helped create conditions in which U.S. forces could real- ize important contemporary operational objectives in Iraq. The U.S. and Iraqi security forces that fought the battle had as their objective the stopping of enemy activity, rather than clearing insurgents from Sadr City. Their methods and success provide lessons for how U.S. forces might reimagine the conduct of urban operations, particularly in large cities that will likely be a key challenge in the future. This monograph adds to a small but growing body of literature on the Battle of Sadr City. The action did attract some journalistic attention, mostly because of the extensive use of unmanned drones and other high-technology assets. Indeed, 60 Minutes aired a segment on the battle. Within U.S. military circles, such debate as has occurred has centered on the relative value of lethal force and reconstruction in counterinsurgency. In spite of the battle’s importance, relatively little has been written about it. RAND Arroyo Center’s study was designed to provide a more complete descrip- tion of the battle (based on primary-source material), to analyze its outcome, and to derive implications for the U.S. Army’s future conduct of land operations. This mono- graph describes our findings. Methodology The Arroyo team used after-action reports, briefings, and other primary sources and secondary sources to research this monograph. Our most valuable sources, however, were interviews conducted between August 2009 and April 2011 with a broad range of participants from the units involved in the following phases: the pre-battle surge in the vicinity of Sadr City; the Battle of Sadr City; and the post-battle stabilization and xi xii The 2008 Battle of Sadr City: Reimagining Urban Combat reconstruction efforts. These participants ranged from lieutenants to the commanding general of the 4th Infantry Division. Our interviews were mostly with U.S. Army offi- cers but also included a U.S. Air Force officer, a former Iraqi intelligence official, and U.S. government officials. These interviews provided critical information about not only what happened, but also why it happened. Our understanding of the Sadrist militia comes from contemporary analyses by the International Crisis Group and other, similar organizations; from journalis- tic accounts; and from internal U.S. Army assessments. That said, this monograph largely reflects the perceptions of U.S. combatants and is naturally colored by their conscious and unconscious biases. To the extent that the research team could verify these accounts using other sources, we did so. Nonetheless, there is little in the way of objective data available on the battle and its aftermath. Within the time frame of this study, we could find little from the adversary’s perspective. Additionally, we consciously decided, in conjunction with our sponsor, to write this monograph at an unclassified level to enable its broad distribution. Unless other- wise noted, the information contained herein is derived from our interviews. Finally, note that some portions of this monograph draw heavily on an earlier paper on the topic published by the authors in 2011.1 Setting Conditions The 2008 Battle of Sadr City took place nearly 15 months after the beginning of the U.S. “surge” in Iraq. President George W. Bush stated the mission of U.S. forces when he announced the surge in a January 10, 2007, speech: “to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.”2 The “Baghdad Security Plan” was a key element of the surge. Its purpose was announced by Major General Joseph Fil, Jr., commander of the Multi-National Division–Baghdad (MND-B), on February 16, 2007: This new plan involves three basic parts: clear, control and retain. The first objective within each of the security districts in the Iraqi capital is to clear out extremist elements neighborhood by neighborhood in an effort to protect the population. And after an area is cleared, we’re moving to what we call the con- trol operation. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, we’ll maintain a full-time presence on the streets, and we’ll do this by building and maintaining joint 1 That work is David E. Johnson, M. Wade Markel, and Brian Shannon, The 2008 Battle of Sadr City, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, OP-335-A, 2011. 2 President George W. Bush, quoted in Kimberly Kagan, “Enforcing the Law: The Baghdad Security Plan Begins,” The Weekly Standard, February 10, 2007–March 5, 2007, p. 2. Summary xiii security stations throughout the city. This effort to reestablish the joint secu- rity stations is well under way. The number of stations in each district will be determined by the commanders on the ground who control that area. An area moves into the retain phase when the Iraqi security forces are fully responsible for the day-to-day security mission. At this point, coalition forces begin to move out of the neighborhood and into locations where they can respond to requests for assistance as needed. During these three phrases, efforts will be ongoing to stimulate local economies by creating employment opportunities, initiating reconstruction projects and improving the infrastructure. These efforts will be spearheaded by neighborhood advisory councils, district advisory councils and the government of Iraq.3 By March 2008, implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan had achieved sev- eral results that set conditions for the battle in Sadr City. First, al-Qaeda in Iraq had been badly hurt, and its ability to create mass-casualty events significantly reduced. This allowed coalition forces to turn their attention to other destabilizing elements, such as the movement led by and identified with Moqtada al-Sadr. Second, the plan had significantly strengthened the position of the government led by Prime Minister al-Maliki, enabling it to survive a rupture with the Sadrists. Indeed, al-Maliki was moving to confront the Sadrist militias in Basra, and preparations were well under way by March 2008.
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