Final Report

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G-3 SECTION Headquarters, 6T" Army Group

WORLD WAR II

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ý Final Report of G-3 Section HEriDQQUARTS 6TH rRII'Y GROUP 1 July 1945

CM": TEl`; T5 CHr_PiER PxGES __ý O1dE BIRTH OF 6TH hI'Iff GROUP 1-4 5-c T '!0 SEVEhTH ARMY CONTROLSDR-GOO IT, FORCES

THREE HEnDQURTaMS 6TH aFMY GROUPA SSUL::i CO1:1iý"ND 10-18 19-27 FOUR i41EURTHETO THE RHI1E

FIVE THE GEl",.' h COUidTE -OFFEi 3IVE 2 -36

SIX REDUCTION OF THE COU,,ý-MFR POCKET 37-41

SEVEN BREACHINGTHE SIEGFRIED LINE aND OV.ýRRL'N11IIVTG 42-48 OF THE SAý-ýý

FIGHT CROSSINGTHE RHINE hND xDt J11 IüCINGEýM4dl-. RD 49-52

NINE EXPLOITti.T10N TO, THE SOUTH " 53-60

TEN REDUCINGTHE G'ý?r: ý,T N,xTIOFJxL REDOUBT 61-78

ELEVEN POST-HOSTILITIES ACTIVITIES 79-82

T4ELVE OCC'UPxiION OF GER;ii;rJ.lY- 83-88

THIRTEEN EFFECT Oll+' ORTILLýtiY fiIý,lý`::UIýTTION SUPPLY 89-108

F'OUF,T:E; Er', 1 A.LE,CooPEl,nTIOIýT . 109-113

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CHAPTER,ONE

RRTH OF ýI`rTiI rýRýY rýoUP At the r,uadrant Confere_, ce, ý,, in AuE,,ust 1943 the Com--, tebec, the bi ri.ed C'Diefs of Staff decided that a landing should r.e inac'e on south coast of rrance, to assist a? ýlain assault aý;einst tue Frech west coast by holding German formations in the south and s:Ut3:7ýct:isz additional format-ions to the area from I:orthern and Central Frar.-ice. This operation was ,,co oe i:lounuedý,,. in the .;ecaterrean Theaterýr a.ror:i res 'irces- available and, in addition to a linaited nxýi;:?er of r^v-_rit: riCan ilab-le divisions, was to be composed of all Prench troops avs. under the French Rearmament ProZralm.

General Dwight D. Eisenho-:,,er, -U. S. A. then Supreme 1":.1lied Co.il:iander Theater of Operations, was requested to --resent his vievTs _?i:iediterranean concerning this operation to the Combined Chiefs of äta "'f with the least possible delay. Accordir_ý; l;yr, a strate ,i_c study was prepared at Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers e embodying11*General Ei_sen.hos-er's vi. ez^,ýs reUarcýýý,ý; v', e feasibility and CesiralýilitýT of tlý.is operation from t'ýe viewpoint of operations in the 7edite. rrai? ean Theater, from the viewpoint of future operations in northwest Europe, and from. the of the c-):. Allied plans for the complete des-, viewpoint German :ü_Lned truction of the ý-,Tar ý.ýachine, Tý,.is study was tr^-n s-^,itted to tile Co_'z'_iI-edChiefs of "ta _f7f on 30 October l9!:3 by cable dd on 31 October 1;943 by officer courier. Poth' the U.;'-3. Joint C'J_efs-'-.-,,.of -nd tl,. e ??ri_-tish. C'iefs of Staff in the by Ge11er. .,isenhoti^aer. s,greed principle with vien:.rs expressed al , These views formed the "Lases for later discussions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff the SextantConference held in Cairo in late, rToverzber 1943. At tI-. i_s- conference the Combined C'niefs of Staff confirmed their former posit-Lon -tl:z.,.t an assault against the south coast of France should he undertc-_:'ýen from the _ editerranean T:ýeý.ter and presented their views to President Roosevelt end Prime ý.'inister Churchill, who agreed,

Äolloz°: ing 1odiý: t ly upon the heels of tr. Cextant Conforc. Co was the Teheran Conference of ?Uhe Big Three", President P,oos,etr lt, Prime: "mister Churchill Stalin. At this conference end _ arsh, °ýl , º,The Dig Treeº, sgr, ed that ty,,o-pronged by the A1.liý; s against Fortress Furopo was theys soundest methodassault of opening second front. - The a. -reed strategic plan of !'"Ch Pig Three', called afor main assault aainst T''estcrn France launched from in a iTl. s 'strengththe pritish Isles and. s co:. dary effort of xe lli11 possible}gas SOUthcrn in the 1 ed tsrranoan against , Frence laui. chod from bases Theater ,.,as this southern force, composed initia: l.ly of the infantry Seventh Amy, consisting of one U.,--). corps of three (laterdivisions and one provisional airborne division, and French Army redesir ated as First French Army) of two corps of seven divisions, that was destined to become the 6th Army Group, freo-iently referred to in dispatches as the, Southern Group of RESTRICTED ; ý.. ý.... ý..... _... traceable Hence the ' origin ' of the . 6th Army Group is directly" to the three conferences which probably, more. than any others,, the German had the greatest influence upon the final destruction of liberation Europe the ru, di-_. war machine and upon the of -- ." nt Conference at Quebec, the ; yet^nt Conference at Cairo, and the - To icr n Conference of "The Big" Three".

Initial planning for the invasion of Southern France began at Allied Force Headquarters, Algiers, in December 1943 Headquarters Seventh Army, then at Palermo, Sicily, was nominated to command the invasion force0 It was. moved to Algiers early in 1944 to facili- Alexander M. tate planning of the operation. Lieutenant General Patch (then Major General) was subsequently announced as commanding in Algiers, general and joined his new command soon after its arrival

General Jacob L. De"vers, USA, (then? Lieutenant General) joined. Deputy Supreme Allied AFHQ in - January 1944 in the dual capacity of. Commander and Commanding General of North African Theater of Operations, , S. Army. He influenced the planning and _U. materially launching of the* operation he was later to direct as Commanding General of 6th Army Group. ý-ý. Many obstacles had to'be overcome in planning and launching the Southern France invasion. These obstacles were largely ,

occasioned by the keen competition, for. resource-s available-in the

Mediterranean Theater. The bulk of men and materiel required had to come from Mediterranean resources. Consequently, prospects of

continuing vigorously the Italian Campaign were not aided by diverting a portion of the available means to the Southern France front.

The original target dato for the invasion was mid-June 1944. Resources required had boon ' earmarked from NATOUSAstocks c But these resources . were transferred to the Italian Campaign in order break the -in. Cossin. in the Ivlay. 11 to stalemate o and Anzio . offensive. This occasioned an indefinite postponement of the Southern France operations, known at first as "mvil but later changed to Dragoöýi for security reason's. Despite this, planningi for operation iragoon pate in definitely , to out continued o June it was decided carry the invasion and D-Day was se.t 'for- 15 August 1944. 'l under A small advance detachment of AFHQ, command of General'. Devers, established in Bästia, Corsica in "July 1944 to coordi- . was nato the employment of medium bombers, whose primary mission was to support Operation Dragoon, From this detachment, Wandin accordance with instructions received from General Marshall, Chief 'of Staff

United States Army, and from General Sir'Henry Maitland. " Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theater, 'General Devers organized the, nucleus of Headquarters 6th Army Group whose training was initiated at once.. In accordance with the provisions of the 14a=41 'for Commanders' of Lärge Units, it was envisaged. that the functions of Headquarters 6th Army, Group would be almost wholly tactical and that it would perform a minimum of administrative functions consistent, with its mission. For this reason, except for Engineers and Signal, no special staff sections of the combat arms and supply services such as normally operate in an army headquarters were organized. ' Special representation. of the remaining arms and services. wore, however,

included in the G-3 and G-4 Sections of the, general staff. A

functional chart showing initial organization of G-3 Section is shown in-Figure 10

The fact that Headquarters 6th Army Group was being. organized was kept secret for a considerable length of time for very, obvious . reasons, and it continued to be known as Advance Detachment AFHQ.

Although the, Chief 'of Staff and heads-of the general staff sections wore appointed in late July and early August, they were not announced until 27 August, four days before the initial echelon of the headquarters moved to the mainland of Franco. They were: \ Chief of Staff: Major General David G.. Barr, GSC Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1:. Major General Ben M. Sawbridgo,; GSC Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2: Brigadier General Frank A. Allen, Jr., GSC Assistant Chief of Staff, G--3: Brigadier-, General Reuben E. Jenkins, GSC Assistant Chief-of Staff, G'-4: Brigadier General Clarence ' L. Adcock, GSC

This staff remained unchanged except for Brigadier General Allen who on 27 September was ordered to SHAEF and replaced by. Brigadier General (then Colonel) Eugene L. Harrison, GSC; .Brigadier General Whitfield P. later the duty Shepard who assumed . of Deputy Chief of Staff; and 'Colonel Henry J. Parkman, GSC, who was later appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, 'G-5o

As scheduled, the arnphibious-airborne assault on the, soüthorn US. coast of France began on 15 August' under command, of Seventh Army, It achieved complete tactical surprise Light opposition, was encountered initially and as Headquarters 6th Army. Group pre=- pared to, move to the mainland. American and French forces were rapidly. pursuing the fleeing' Germans up the Rhone Valley,

The first echelon of the Headquarters moved to Ste Tropcz, France, 30 miles southwest of Cannes on the French Riviera,, on 31 Augu3t and established headquarters' in Hotel'Latitude 43a The remaining elements'of the headquarters arrived from Naples. and

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ý ýi t RESTRICTED At this time no definite date. for assumption of command had boon decided upon but it was generally agreed that-Headquarters 6th Army. Group would become operational sometime in mid-September. To effect a smooth change over, Headquarters 6th Army Group maintained close liaison with Seventh Army and French Army "B" during the northward advance. Liaison officers of the'-G-3 Section operated with the corresponding section of both Armies, keeping the tactical situation up to date at headquarters. Later, French officers wore attached to the G-3 Section from French-Army "B" to make liaison easier. Added to this was the permanent contact with the French Army slain-, tained by the Allied Liaison Service working under direction of Seventh Army.

Movement of Headquarters from St. Tropez to Lyon began on. 9 September 15 September. The Palais do Foire and was completed on , on the eastern banks of the Rhone River was the site of the first operational headquarters of 6th Army Group.

On the afternoon of 14 September, while the Headquarters was in, process of moving, orders were received from AFHQ placing Seventh US Army and French Army "B" under command of Headquarters 6th Army Group as of 0001B hours, 15 September. At the same time tactical control was transferred from AFHQ to SHAEF. Responsibility for supply and administrative functions and for civil affairs within the area overrun wore retained by AFHQ pending further developments.

By organizing from a nucleus of personnel thoroughly familiar with the planning phase of the operations and by maintaining closest liaison with all commands and agencies concerned, Headquarters 6th Army Group could become operational, assume command and pass to the operational control of S 'EF in a single stride on extremely short. notice and experience no'difficulty or confusion

Thus, with initial instructions already on the way- to Armies 6th by radio, Army Group carne into being promptly at 0001' hours, 15 September 1944. It was destined for an eventful, historic and magnificent future.

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SEVENTHAP, Y CONTROLSD: ^ A.G00T1 FORCE ES

In Corsica and later in France, Headc'uarters 6th Army Group labored through its period of growing pains and kept abreast-of the,

tactical and administrative situations of Dragoon, Forces during July, August and early September. ý'. T,eanwhile, Seventh Army had added final touches to plans for operation Dragoon and conducted the amphibious-airborne assault on the Southern French coast as scheduled. From Italy was assembled

the American contingent of the invading force which went ashore in. the initial waves- To carry 'out the amphibious part of this gigantic task, ' Lieutenant General Patch employed the e ptrinced~ VI Corps com-- (then Lucien Truscott Thnd,.',d by Lie ütc, n^nt Gon :ral Guznoral) which was composed of the veteran 3rd,. 36th and 45th Ti. S. Infantry., 'Divisions with one combat command of the French 1 DB' attached, The lst Airborne-Division (prov), the bulk'of which had been in. battle in Italy, was assigned to the airborne assault; Backing, these assault forces was French Army "B'1 commanded by General D'Armee de Lattre de Tassigny, which was composed of two corps, of seven divisions. Three of the French divisions had seen service in the Italian campaign and one in the assault of the Island of Elba. The two armored divisions and the other infantry division had not seen service in Italy as such but individuals of all had been hardened in'fighting in Tunisia. Thus, the entire assault force under Lt. Gen. patch was composed of battle tried veterans, hardened bar actual experience in fighting the German.

Under a blanket of aerial and'naval bombardment, VI Corps assaulted the scenic French' Riviera at 080OB-hours, 15 August 1944, between Cannes and Toulon.:. This assault was preceded by an attack the on the fortified islands of Levant and Port. Cros, just off coast between St., Tropez and Toulon, by the First Special Service Force. ' See Figure 2.

Meeting light initial the "ýniericans advanced, . resistwnce, 'rapidly inland to establish a firm beachhead; The tactical. plan called for tvrin drives-westward towards the mouth of the Rhone River and north up the Rhone Valley. The only major resistance encountered on ýD-Day eras in the 36th` Division- sector in front, of 36th St. Raphael, This was soon overcome, * however, when the Div-

ision, ' on' the alert for just such 'contingency, diverted forces to another beach,. outflanked the' resistanc and captured. St, Raphael. ' In the center, the 45th' Division landed near St-. Maximo and the 3rd Division, on the left, landed on the St. Tropez penin_ irborno (Prow), ' sulao The, First A, Task Force composed of one British Brigade and U. ,S. units equiv . lent to two regiments, under

command of Major Genera? (then. Brigadier General) Robert T Frederick, dropped in the Le 7.-uy sector and 'St. Tropez Peninsula, Encountering only light opposition, the airborne units soon had m ý-r -r rr+iý

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In the wake of the rapid advan ce of the VI Corps, French _.rmyr

11B' bean lending over the ne. Tly' von beaches 16 :;u ;ust. The 1D "I and 3 DI. cane ashore first, followed in rapid order by CC2 of 1 DD, , 9 DIC 'and two groups of Tabors. Br 18 ugust, the French force began , ,, along the on VI Corps' 'left.,. This pushing westward coast . maneuver was designed initially to venture Toulon, natural Mediterranean sort, 2 lles, larger to the Due to and surround -Tarsei. artificial port west. the liE-,ht resistance encountered in the longer shin towards tarseilles . were. sand the speed of the VI Corps advance, both Marseilles and Toulon: reached simult^. ýeously on 22 ,august. ' The eastern section of Toulon surrendered 24 August to 1`91!1 but the German garrison fought bitterly in the western, section of the DIC completely over- city against .'9 until run on 2(2'August. iarseilles surrendered to 3 DIA and elements of I DB on 28 August.

Driving v,r.ith relentle-s fury, Ariericaan divisions pushed ra; pidly northward on the. heels of the "disorglanized, retre4. ting Germc:.ns, After Durance forcinE the ß,ivar 'Zine on 19-20 1ý,,uýgust, VI Corps pushed. Butler Task Force northeastward along the Route de Napoleon. , Composed of one' infantry battalion (motorized), reconnaissance squadron. armored field artillery bat',, --lion, tank destroyer corrl-1any, two tank companies, and an the Task Force the engineer . company, advanced rapidly along; narrow, . winding route meeting only token resistance, 'After occupying Sisteron and Gap and, blocking the route from Grenoble on 20 ,`august, the Task Force, on VI Corps orders, swung z°restward to seize the hi ,,h, round. north- vest of Tfontelim-: r, 0n, 22 ,ugiist, this lir ht Task Force: attempted to': block the Rhone River escape route of the hard pressed' Germans in the south and ran head-on into the hard hitting German llth Panzer. Division together wit? elements of three German infantry divisions. Shý.r fighting ensued in which heavy ca utilities in ec ipment and rýen were inflicted on the fleein Germians. Outnuiiibered, the Task Force withdrew e.astuard to positions where it could still cover a portion of trio valley by, fire, On-23 Au ust, two RCTts of the : 36th Division caught up with the Task to the Force. " nother, ,attempt va`s made close Ger-an- escape route but this ti_, lly due to the forces the on?_y pa succeeded preponderance of on German side. However, the Gem an retreat northward relentlessly pounded from the air on the- main jam-packed, road, was slowed and heavy losses in v:, lu. ý.ble equipment and p.-ersonnel" killed, wounded and captuured were inflicted upon the disorg, -nizý d enemy.

As the fighting in the Rhona Výýý-1ey proÜresstcý, e1ý_e:ilonýýs of the 36th 45tki . . Division occupied Grenoble md th, -- Inf, -iYtry Division f..-loved r^pidly northni: rd through the French resort city. The "3rd Division continu,. d to push nbrthTrrara un the ;?hone Valley and through the il--igh-' boring foothills of the Dauphine Alps to join TJTitn.'the -36th Division in the capture of ';.ionteli:: 1Ir on 28, August. Valence wý s captured on 31 August' and the pursuit of the. enemy continucd nortlai. "iard. I -" ýt , "TRT : TTD 1lý2,11-While, French elements', aft or capturing Toulon: ýnd 1:ý;,: rs,: z_lles, con fries 29 crossed the Rhone River at . 1; vignon, Tars: ^, and on "11u(,ust s By 30 August, Nir.les and .;Iontnellior h^.d 'been occupied-and recorin : is- s,ance elements had scoured the country as far as Sete,, *Beziors ý,ndM_, rbonne? "Tithout contacting, the m.Ze:ny.

On 2 lýugust, Sevýnth Army diroctod Fre: ých Army lip,'? C.ft. er occulpyý ra- ing , lont-.rpollier and Nr,.ibonne, to advance ýidly ncrt'z; °rard c1ozzE-;the b, tho Rhone Riwr in the. capture of Lyon. For west -,n-lc of, and ctssist this mission, the II Corn-s. composed of 1 DIU and 1 DB was designated and sent racing north? w<ýrd.

To, take advent ge of the exploitation possibilities opened up Seventh by the rapid adv : nce inland of its forces, :army initi. lly had employed its troops as` they became available in the most a tageous places. This h-,.d placed the French II Corps on the left and the VI Ut S. Corps on the right. It was seen th7t the most sui -able lineup of forces for future opor. ti. -ns would be for the French to occupy the right and the American forces to' oper2te on the loft, Thus, as French eluaimnts completed clea. rinr tine ports of 11-.rscilles Toulon, Seventh Amy directed French Army r1BT'to. follow the VI and . Corps? adv-.nce through Grenoble and take up positions on the right. I Corps took co nand of 3 DI_-. nd 9 DIC and by 1 September h!id st: rted carrying out the assigned mission. * At -this time, 'II French Corps tas moving rapidly north ti-o, rds Lyon.

On 1 Sept e giber, first elements of the 36th Division reached the highground to the south of and overlooking Lyon. The next day the remainder of the Division arrived, ;t the s-one time, 1 DB ap proached the city frQ, -.i the south. One d::y lat _.r, 1 DMMI, fplloiA-ng closely be'_--rind1 DB, occupied the city.

After the occupation of Lyon on 3 September, the' race north-- VI Bourg Lons Le ward continued with Corps c ,pturin`. :.nd occupying Saunior on September while II French Corps d"-!,shod through l con. For front lines4 sec Figure 3. Spectacular `dvances. ' continued on both sides of the Rhone River and by 10 Seltember, French forces had occupied Dijon while the VI Corps had ý1re -.c?y taken Besancon and an and French units, Tire h6ldinr a wide Croft extc,. ndiiir; c'o thy. Swiss border just south of Bl^, rilont.

l, AS Sý:veizth Army adv:: ced l_orth -ý-ndnorth 3 opposition, Third Army, 'c.fter breaking out of the Norr,.i-.ndy beachhead St Lo, fouZht On 12 ; first cont ýct at . rwpidly ;;.ý. sttr,. rd. . eptembýr; between Third liriny and SevurAth Army w--s made at C11^tillon sur ; einn:: by two iss^. ficers. Gne: the ýý:ýýs Frý;nch rýconn^. _ce of. of officcr. s from 1 D?'TI of the southern forces. and the othl:: r'l! -r:,.s 'from 2 DE, the French Armored Division ?ý': iich had landed in Normandy and tý.r:.s operating &iri-, -Lhý with the 1;V Corps of Third Army. Spotty contact existed T, 14 firm next two days. On Sý)ptcýib,_, r contý. ct was established south' Chaumont, thereby Southwestern F ývrhere 12.r, e . of s. aU1; off ranc(; numbers of German troops, unable to f'ollovr their comrades tlZrough' the

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RESTRICTED closod escapo g--,te, vrero tr:, ýned. Const',. ntiy iýwrrassod by FFI units, m.r.y of th:: so forces finally surrondored whilo tho romaindor c?uc, in J_on, th_- in th, ý Ford<; ^ux : ron. to s.?r. it &s truction at th: : -% co,ast . ý h<,nds of Fr;. ^.ch units at a1 ^t:; r date.

Follo"Tin plans alre. 'y instituted, Seventh Army directed French Army, ' B" on 14 ept: mb r to move II Corps to the right zone. This Corps, had been pinc', ed out öf ` ction after contact, :ith Third hIa:c'. be,'-;n est '>blished at Chaumont. I Corps already had gong into she line along the Svtiss border. +_Zoven2entof II Corps and He;c.cýaua tern French Army MMB!?to the east fl. nlc would now ni co all Fr. nch units in the _ This rted inimedi, same zone; of ction. move . was st - atoly _ nd although it reouired the crossing of slain supply routes over which all supplies for front-line units flowed from the beaches, little difficulty encountered.

th thý bat`t: in the north 'i. ". jo. Gen- _c; progressing rapidly, r ;: ral Frederick swung his Airborne Taslx_ Forco (F.:FTF, proviously ?cno;ý: ýn as Ist A/B Division (prov) ) eýnstti^r,rd to block avenues of approach into Fr :rce from It, -:l_y and protect the right flank of Süv:: ftýr islands just the nth ý^ýrrýýy.'' 'zý:vir! ^ reduced the two off Frk,ýr.chýRivier^, the First Sp. cia1. Service Force relieved by French troors. Assembling on the. mainland it ýýv:,s cssigncd to the FABTF on 19 11uyust to replace the British pa-r-ý.chu-'L.:;Brig-. da which was being ý:ithdr.: -:vmI. Relief of the British Brigade was accomplished on 21 August and it w::s assembled in TL-.s?c, Förcc reserve to await transportation back It 1y. For front lines 14 S,,. LO . on ptoýmbcr Soo Figure 4. err! ý: ill_^s c,l'?. ý.'.: o; l were c,.., ýL_i red. or 28- laýlls;;, the r'ouý.. . . i-: -,ntic t; "-s'L of r--p) P---rt z1ciliti-s b. ci1, rlý.. c.: (' to :. da.e sup-. of sä or t; _ dv,. ý.cý_ný ?)r. ýýoon forces; 'ý`" rs, ý illes _i,ä lo-. oýý for li:. it tr-if. ci build .. ä01_1 - .. ;rý ;d -ic on u1->to peý._c ca,Dcciiýýr 1rý:s ro. pid. During the entire to 15 Soptember, all supplies period up , had boon hauled overland by motor transport to the froni, line units, is the period was ending, the turn around trip vr-s 900 miles and the transportation facilities had been stretched a7n ost to the liru6.

t1zý The -prisoner 'on,- durin ýýa fir. -,t month of the operation ýýras: French '_. "BIT, 47,717; S(: ; 32,23-1. French :;rmy {T" suf- . may venth- rriy, fered 1,146 c,?.su-.:iti,; s in kil], f--d, eap-'kurA and missirr; and 4,346 wound,:d. Seventh Army had 3,00o., ic-illcd, captured ^xid missing and 4,419 .%: ounded.

Durino- plmr_inz; sc ý.;es of the Southorn" Frmco oper, tion, it týr^.s agrced that initi^1 t-. ctic.,. 1 control of Dr., ý oon , forces should becý,.uso of the ^.nd supply res-., rest with :_FHr.. -)l^. nning, ecuip.! Ding ponsibilities. This äva's also n,,;CeSSitZt,, -d by difficulty, of coi.-Taunic,: tion initially '; etý:teý; ýz the Dr-. goon forces And'the Over=- lord Forces in the west. But at some time during the. oper^tion, it was roa ]_iz: _:d that . ll forcýs op:, r_ ting in Fr-I.nck.) must conic under

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one commander --- Supreme Corm-Iia.nder, Allied 7_.,)pe dition.,. ry. For c,: s. ?':Tith the joining of Allied Forces ^.t Chaumont and the opcnin£; of direct tion býAvrecn the two forces, ti-nie ^. - comrrunic . routes 11,11'as I, for Dr, pro^clling for the cl.::nge over. But sii-,.ce supplies --.Eoon forces raust still come through Toulon and 1.:arsüillc: s, it t",r^s seen that administrative control must remain lonr; t,r with :ýýFI-iCý,th: n tact, ic,. 1 ccxatrol. Thus on 14 Scptemb.; r; when firm contact botv,T,.:en Third and Sev:;nth .',mies, was C:sta.blishec?, the stare was set for the first stcp in turning over control of Dragoon Forces to the Rcfl,:; cti_ng months of car., ful study and plannine, ý';llic; d invasion of South,ýrn Frc::lce was ^.cco: .nlisln,,, d with machino-like precision. Ca.r:. ful guardiný; of plans and sccrecýr of ýss,;rzbly of ' Tith forces -.z.d suppli. _ýs-resulted in complete t:. ctic al surprise. this in their fý var, ^.'. d Fr, r_ch Forces were able; to break tl. "ýý. ini-fiý^. 1 G; dcfensý; lin:: d start an cý.rploit:,: ýioll rou. ýh ýýý rý:,..,.la.n, ai. r. to that cý,.rri,: d 4,j0 1_ýlles nos^.:ý:con pjoi, -_cc?ý.o.rcc: s n Overlord to cut off tlýcusý: °_c's of r; ri:ýýrls ir1 ; outnra;rst .ý'r,..,co and inflicted C'. SU_'. t1.: S in `): 'sr°0; 1:'! 1 on l heavy _, v';.lu. '.'D_'L;; the rrý: il r,.?ýr. The ; ti_:, s c.r : vý:lý d.. such rate r Iýý.lý_. _'. exploit : .,,ýý p]1:_. :; of speed that : 1_1 -.ýrn.in ;d tUo IL ý,J, to, 10 L?t. Os'V t0 ''J up; S1O'1C'O? '. 1 ý'i.:'.Cý to Jv acc.: pt;. 3d 1, Jcn', he lin This aýTer- "t s14um-)lics c. .ýt up ?°IitI 1" front : :ý `_, in r: just '1ý f:: lt as XL sera . of ýT ,. .ci, ýiti.:, s ,.-,-.s cor , to relinquish control of Dragoon Forces to lx:.,.c'cu^.rters 6th Group. Long loud be the tnl. irir: uner- , 1r:nzT "::. c: will praise of able brilliant ý::a:.euvers of ')oth American and French units in the camlD>>.irr_ up the Rhone Vu1c: ý -.r.din` out for its timeliness =C' c'.-,.ring is'th. -, r,ý,a-;ýuver of the Butler Task Force. As an ov-; r- theý, the c`'..11 operation, Southern Fr-., cc ph_,.s ;' o�ý the dcf: ^._ý oý of by two C;:r!,nan:., r far outstri--p,: d tjxp,:;ct^t, i o1.s, outdoing .:.onths the time se"i, ini"i, i^. 1.1ýr.

During th. `: on.tire '-o,,.;-'-horn Frýnco, op: r-tion, inwlu: alo assist-

ýnce tivns rv ý.c'.;r ; c' 3iy tlhoý '+'re;-,ch i iýacuis, loyal underground rr_. nch' orp.;,;.^iz::. tion to lifc; throughout country on 'ý--D^.yT. tors ,1.y inst.,. of FFI c.. y;turiný i ýýlaort, r)t comriiunic -tior, ". --ces tn thý; l ',1_1L-;. d -nd holding off G_rý-. n countor-.: i, -Ksc' until ýrriv,, of troops vr.: rJ rcorcý; d, lýot only in this "ý'raýTdid tho F-TI ^saist. lOC . ';:l3rc tho (',: r-1^m troops üd.;r:;. `1'hý_,y knotrr iý11, 'ý1oi"'_ of `i'hcy "Tý e+ý ý-, C'-'e. ý j. ''ý ý_ý r"'. ý ý' .c" 'ý'ýýý. 1C Cýor n aýf :.:.ýY! -hý r.; j1Ch;'.'. lýd , ';lliýd ýýoops roL_. ýýa. kinc t ,.. iro: th:; ] ýh r,: r. 71an nlc^.. i OSSibli; ý"ttýck '1 rt::: r isto nCJ. Of ca h_,ý.il-on collision. By thý, ir dring :'_d f :-.ithful. ýZ.:ss, ý".c'v -.r.cos of dý 'cly junction slliod troops rý°. .:^sur : o^sior. " .1uh of Alliod forcos portion of ; outllur,.ýst Fr^.i: c:; ýr:s isol. -.tod. In this c'o.:lin, tud by tho mount.'.inous '.,.csif th;: FFI 1_lýr a_olpful d ir lu,,. blo id in ti..".s oýcoptiolý<-. ..r provA of sr; :: round- irlu u; ) ro:,. nts of 'T<:zi ýl, ',;nts thnt ;'Toro un'". to sc^lý to . 1, th : northow si, th.: tr np i.,,(-,.s closod !c. Chnu1"Zorlt.

ýSTRIC T.'.]D ýý __ ýIAM iJA; TEM 6TH ARMYGRCUP ASSUi,'ýS CCý

To gain a trt0,. picture of the ' overall situation when Headquartisrs;

6th Army Group assumed commanä of Dragoon. Förces, it is, necessary, tA review planning and preparatory actions'taken prior to 15 Septemwei. Even though inoperative, Headquarters 6th army. Group was far from idle during the Seventh Army's spectacular drive up the Rhone, River Valley. ' Direct liaison had been maintained with Seventh Army 'and French Army, "B" throughout the operation. The Headquarters was completely "in the picture" as ' far as the tactical and administrative situations were c9ncernec.. As a result, at least one problem to fae the newly born Army Group Headquarters had already been. scrutinised.. That problem dealt with tho Franco-Italian frontier.

Realizing that Seventh Army should be relieved of responsibility

for a front. so, far" to "its roar, a conference was held 'ith, f:Iajor. Gen- eral Frederick on 12 September, lookini; to a more foasibl,,, command ` Outcome to General -set up, of the conference was a recoz cndation Devers, that:

Seventh army be relieved of responsibility. for this ''semi- front, static -' be i separate, comriandunder i:TaVca General Frederick estab. lished to control the southern soctor and to operate directly under Headquarters 6th *armr Group,

The French retain responsibility for the northern sector of the front.

This recommendation was approved by the Commanding General., Details of the plan, wore forwarded ' to Sevonth Army. It vas 'not until 6th_ into after Headquarters Array Group carne officially. the picture, Ný however, that orders were issued 25 Septeinbor. to implement the plan.

strategy SH.,sEF's in early September called for, one knife-like, narrow thrust into Germany to capture the industrial Ruhr, followed into by exploitation, the innor. rreaches 'of the Nazi homeland. Concur- of rently, the secondary effort ras aimed at clearing the ports Brost, ant a. Cherbourg and erp. This view was outlined in. cable ,4 Soptem- ber, to those the time. ;: hen 6th elements under S hý,. F control at . Army, Group came under tactical control of SEE, the Supreme Comrnan-,' der's appreciation of. the situation and proposed pldn of act ion was repeated to this Headquarters.

Following this plan meant teat the bulk of Allied logistical be ' behind 21st Group the support must concentrated the' Umy on -north . for. the all-out drive since the supply situation'at that time did not. permit continued pursuit oper ations by the entire Overlord force. With the 21st Army Group making, t; ho main effort, the remainder, of rS

ST,:II CTED RESTRICTED

the-front took on an offensive-defensive attitude. After the break thrcugh at St. Lo, the Third-Army had raced eastward to join'the Seventh Army at Chaumont'on 14, September. This rapid advance soon thereafter, when logistical support was shifted to the north, slowed and gave the Germans opportunity to form some semblance of organized resistance which later took very definite shape. The same situation prevailed in front of Seventh Army, whcre it became to the to could necessary . slow up pursuit supplies catch up. with front .line elements, 'which were then 480 miles from their beach- _ . head supply, points.

Thus as Headquarters 6th Army Group assiamed connand of Dragoon Forces at 0001. B., 15 September, the enemy, which hitherto had been reeling drunkenly backwards, was beginning to stabilize his defenses., The Allies in. the north were mainly committed to clearing ports along the west of France and Belgium and attacking in the direction. of the German Ruhr, Gn the front of Dragoon Forces, the enemy was fighting back fiercely and withdrawal .to'the . making afoot-by-foot Vosges-Bolfort Gap defensive position.

At this time the G-2 tstimate of the Situation was that the Germans would attempt to hold a line running generally', west of Bel- .fort, and tying into. the easily defended Vosges mountains to the , North. This borne by increasing- the was , out resistance . along entire front' especially in front of Belfort Gapewhere the French . had reached to within 20 miles of the key bastion of Belfort. Numerous reports were received of defensive 'positions being constructed along this general line. 'The Estimate read:

"Defensive works, terrain, a large number of second rate troops and the possible arrival of reinforcements seem to satisfy him as . . to his ability to hold this area. The Vosges Mountains offer. natu ral positions for defense which the enemy has built up considerably. to form the center of his line. The build-up of armored strength, which'is continuing along the German'First and Nineteenth Army'. boundary (Luneville. -Sarrebourg area) shows that the enemy -is obvi-- ously aware of the-. danger to his forces should any penetration in the Luneville area. open the road net to Strasbourg and'the Rhine. "..

6th Army Group. held two fronts. One front faced. north and northeast in front of the BelfQrt Gap and generally west of the Moselle; River. Cn Seventh army's immediate left, the XV Corps of Third Army had closed to the Moselle at Epinal and northward, holding a-bridgehead at Charmes while-its. right flank tied 'in with VI Corps at Chaumont. For front lines 'see Figure - 3. French Army, "B's. was, in the process of-regrouping on the right of .VI Corps. The other front along the Franco-Italian frontier faced east. General Frederick's First Airborne Task Force held the southern sector: of. .this front as far north as Larche Pass while the French`°2'DIM held, the northern portion of. the front. - See Figure`' 1..

SHtiEFt directive Group s-first . of 14. Septeraber to the Southern ,,: pf. ArMies, as 6th Army Group was. designated,. was received"prior to the receipt later in the day of the directive. from AFHQ transferring RESTýa C^LD

tactical control of Dragoon Forces to the Allied Supreme Commander in, France.. This directive instructed 6th Army Group-to "destroy the" enemy in the Rhine, the , zone. west. of secure crossings over Rhine and breach the Siegfried Line between Basle and Strasbourg. " The first boundary between 6th Army Group and 12th Army Group was: Langres-Epinal-Strasbourg, all to 6th Army Group.

Upon'assuming command, Headquarters 6th Army Group issued Oper- which ational Memorandum Number One, dated 15 September, resume' of went over radio immediately upon receipt of AFHQ's cable. Major items in the.. instructions were the-new command channels and details. concerning reports required by this and higher headquarters. Since 6th Army Group officially 'came into the picture in the midst of operations already initiated under direction of Seventh Army and, which had not been completed, there was little in the way of tactical directives. 'to be issued at this time. To cover this contingency., the Operational Memorandum directed both Seventh Army and French Army 'VB" to continue operations in accordance with Seventh Army's last operational instructions. The last instructions dir- French Army "B" Belfert Seventh Army Epinal. This ected on and on . operation was underway and good progress was being made in the Sev- enth Army sector while the French were encountering stiffening resistance the nearer they the Belfort gate to the Rhino. . approached vital A. minor change in -the the Southern Group of Armies missibn of . was. embodied in a SHAEF cable of 16 Septembor'vhich moved northward'' slightly the inter-army group boundary to: Langres-Epinal'-Saarbourg- Landau-Speyer-Hockenheim, all to 6th Army Group, .This was -'the first shftt northward 'of the inter-army group boundary.. Later -numerous shifts were. made, playing a vital part in: the operations not only of this Army Group but `also of the 12th Army Group on the left,

Regrouping of French forces was completed on-18 September when. , final-elements-of II French Corps closed in the now French zoneýon the right of VI US Corps, At this time official. announcement was redesignation. made of the - of. French Army "B", as First French Army. , As the French went into ' the line, they prepared-for an all-out-attack on Belfort, while VI Corps continued its progress towards Epinal and the Moselle River.. Epinal and Remiremont were captured on 23 and September and crossings over the, Moselle- secured -by the 45th 36th Divisions.

From the outset of operations in Southern France, ' it had boon assumed that sometime after a junction of Allied forces in Franco had been effected a second US, Corps would pass to the-control of Headquarters 6th Army Group, This thought wwas'crystallized in`a' conf3rence at SHAEF on 22 September when General Devers requested attachment of XV Corps to his command. The proposal was approved but on September 23 SHAEF dispatched a, cable ' to General*Devers off- , ering .an alternate solution. This cable was two days 'enroute' and arrived on 25 Septern er ,after 6th Army Group had forwarded recommendations of to SHABF asking for attachment :of XV Corps as 29 September, In 'this same cable, 6th Army Group also recommended attachment of the 44th Infantry Division as soon as it arrived in Normandy to RESTRICTED

bolster the two-division XV Corps' - 79th Division and French 2'DBo. SH.&EF's alternate proposal was studied., but 6th Army Group adhered to its-former recommendations since'contact-had already been estab. - lished with XV Corps.

SHAEF acquiesced-to 6th Army 'Group's request and on 27 Septem-. ber a cable was received stating that XV Corps .,ould be att; ched to

6th Army Group as ' of 0001 B, 29 September, - confirming verbal infor-

mation received earlier. SHAEF also agreed to the: attachment of. one other infantry division, 'the movement of which "will be given lower priority to other moves presently contemplated by CG,. 12th Army Group for reinforcing center and left of his sector. " -

The mission of, 6th Army Group. was not changed but the boundary northward to include the XV Corps zone The new was moved existing , boundary: Chaumont-Luneville-Saarbourg-Landau-Heidelberg, all to 6th Army Group.

Headquarters 6th Army Group issued Letter of-Instructions Num- ber, One on 28 September, redefining missions of the two armies and passing therwl. y acquired XV Corps to control of Seventh Army.. (. The boundar between armies was: Lure -Melisey-Le Thillot to First French Army - Erstein-Offenburg (to Seventh Army). This Letter of Instructions bears the date of 26 September because it was prepared

on that date; however, it was not formally approved and issued'until' the 28th.

Seventh Army had already captured its previous objective of Epinal and had bridgeheads over the Moselle River. Hence, the, scheme of maneuver was designed to carry both armies to the Rhine River. Seventh Army was directed on Luneville and then on Strasbourg, First French Army was directed to breach the Belfort Gap and capturo . Mulhouse and Colmar. The divergent main efforts of the two armies

were designed_to by-pass the easily defended Vosges mountains. It. , that the the Saverne Gap, " was realized key terrain features of gateway to Strasbourg, and the Belfort Gap would be heavily defended.. But it was believed that drives through these better avenues'of approach would be easier and'less'costly than to attempt to force. the Vosges mountain. positions, especially, since the approaching win-. ' ter season heralded the advent of snow clogged rods and sub-zero in the high weather reaches of -the. mountains. The maneuver as designed to have those, two forces close to the Rhine in the Mulhouse and Strasbourg areas and then join in the Rhine plain to isolate the Vosges position.

Both armies were directed to take advantage of any opportunity to seize a bridgehead across the Rhino. Seventh Army was instructed to Make suitable arrangements with.. First"French 'Army for the ' latter 's participation in the capture of politically important Strasbourg.

When the instructions reached the armies to continue the current offensive, heavy fighting had developed along the entire front with the right-flank of the French hrmy being com-olet. y stopped. Small',

gains were made on the remainder 'of the front as 'the enemy fought

wýw RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

desperately for every foot of ground in order to-gain time to strengthen the Vosges-Belfort Gap position. Short in artillery and artillery ammunition, 6th Army Group forces slugged it out with the enemy over difficult terrain and in increasingly bad wecthcr, with infantry carrying the entire load of the advances. On 29 September Seventh Army had captured Lure, Luxouil and Ramber- villers and reached. the western fringes of the Forot de Paroy.

In late. September, the German troops in the Bordeaux area gave some indication of surrendering their forces, numbering approximately 20,000. It was decided that the only unit, other than the FFI who were containing the German force, available to, receive the surrender was the 31st AAA Brigade commanded by Brigadier General' Chapinnwhich was located in Marseilles. General Chapin was issued instructions on 29 September to prepare a plan for a parly of officers and 400 enlisted men to proceed to Bordeaux to receive the surrender and escort the prisoners to Marseilles by rail.. Necessary arrangements were made for transporting and messing the escort,. truck transportation being provided as the rail lines. were not completely operative between the two areas. The German forces elected to form "redoubt" in the tips land the . a of surrounding mouth of the'Gironde River, however, and operations were postponed until'ade

quate, well equipped forces could be spared from other fronts.

Throughout Octobc.r, hampered by serious shortages in-ammunition and supplies, Seventh Array and First French Army attempted to keep the offensive rolling at full speed. But fighting grew fieroer as the days passed and the enemy had more time to dig into his new positions. However, the supply situation was getting better with railroads open from Frejus via Aix, Sisteron and Grenoble to railheads in the Pologny-Mouchard area. Another rail line from Mar- seilles through Lyon and Dijon to the Vesoul-Besancon area was also open. With the opening these two lines, truck transportation , of rail which had been employed in shuttling supplies from the beaches was being withdrawn. Previously the two armies lived on a'day, by day delivery of supplies but-this improvement of the railroad situation forecast possibility of building up reserves in the army areas, beý ginning not later than mid-October.

Despite the small gains, heavy fighting was encountered on every side. In the Foret do Paroy and the, battle for Le Tholy,, Allied troops slugged doggedly through German defenses in depth to finally take theso important objectives.

In the Foret de Paroy battle,, the 79th Infantry Division, seek- ing to continue its sustained drive,.. ran up against its first major opposition. Entrenched in the heavily foliaged forest, the enemy, hurled back attack after attack of the US, infantrymen. Gathering its forces, the 79th Livision struck from the west-and north to overcome the strongpoint centered around a 'road junction deep within the forest. The Americans had entered'. the forest on 30 September, but it was not until 15 October that they emerged victorious on the eastern fringes of the bloody battleground. In the final this . stages of action, the 44th Infantry Division began arriving from Normandjand started relief of the exhausted 79th Division on 18 October. *

" 14 "RF.. CZTF RESTRICTED

In the south, the 3 DIA had been shifted from its south flank position northward to launch an attack on heavily defended Gcrard- mer area, key to the southern Vosges. This attack started 5 October. After 12 slow, grinding days of fierce fighting the French had made only small progress, capturing Rochesson and Corniront and approaching Le Tholy, another strong German defense point. To assist in the, attack, the 36th US Division, on the left of the 3 DIh, launched an attack southeastward toward the high ground in the vicinity of Gerardiner on 16 October. Hampered by rough, wooded terrain, the attack progressed slowly. Bruyeres was captured, 19 October.

On about 15 October G-3 submitted to the Commanding General a broad plan of operations which envisaged a main attack by First, French Army on its left on or about 25 October to capture Colmar while the weather would still permit a main thrust through the Vosges. Furthermore, the main German strength at this time was in the Belfort Gap. This attack was to be supported by almost the -whole of the medium and heavy artillery with the Group. It was felt that this weight of artillery plus the possible aur:prise element would permit the French to gain the eastern slopes of the Vosges in three drys and Colmar in five days. The plan further provided for the rapid movement of the bulk of the artillery back to the VI Corps of Seventh Army beginning the night of the third day and completing the night of the fifth day of the attack. Then Seventh Army would launch its main attack with VI Corps directed on Stras- bourg on the morning of the sixth day.

It was the view of G-3 that, since we lacked the artillery and other resources necess_, ry to keep strong attacks by two armies going successfully, we should mass our means behind first one army and then the other in rapid succession in an effort to break the very obvious stalemate that was developing on our front. The Army Group Commander approved the plan in principle and directed that its feasibility be examined in detail. Detailed examination of its logistical impli- cations disclosed that, although our supply situation was improving considerably, the ammunition and other supplies required for execution of the plan could not be accumulated. before early November with our meager transportation facilities. Hence, logistics, and not terrain or the German, continued to be our most formidable opponent for the moment. Accordingly, the plan was hold in-abeyance while G-4 continued to bend his energies to improve our supply position. ' The plan was eventually abandoned in favor of the plan of 28 -October since by early November weather in the high Vosges would prove to be a very decisive, factor in the. selection of a plan cf maneuver.

By month's end the 36th Division had battled its way through the woods north of Gerardmer' and was in a position to outflank the strong Gerardmer. position. Farther to the north, the 3rd US Division had fought through the Vosges foothills to the highgrourd overlooking terrain St. Die and on 26 October cleared the wooded south of Raon L'Etape, The French 2 DB, operating with the XV Corps, captured Baccarat on 30 Gctober- and opened the. way tn Raon L 'Etape from the northwest.

.. 15 ..

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Cý WW P4 RESTRICTED

On 28 October a new SHAEF directive ordered the Southern Group

of. krmies to:

Continue. the offensive to breach the Siegfried Line cast of the Rhine, destroy the encry in zone and deploy in strength. acrosa the Rhino with a view to a later advance in a northern direction; and

Launch a strong attack west of the Pfalzerwrald in conjunction with the southern flank of the Central Group of Armies to breach the Siegfired Line.

This overall mission was too broad to be passed on to the Armies at this time. Hence, Headquarters 6th Army Group divided the mission into two phases. The initial phase to "capture Strasbourg and clear

the area west of the Rhine" was incorporated in Letter of Instruc tioris Number 2, issued 28 October. The second phase was left for a later date when developments could better point the best plan for accomplishing the assigned mission.

Twin drives towards the Rhine were envisaged by these latest instructions to the Armies. Seventh Army's main effort was directed

on the axis Epinal-Strasbourg. First French Army was directed to

launch a strong attack to breach the Belfort Gap. As a prelude to the general attack, Seventh Army was directed to seize a line of

departure along the high ground north of'Gerardmer by 5-November. First French Army was to launch a local attack, by-passing Gerardmer, not later than 1 November to assist the Seventh Army's attack.

No date for the co-ordinated attack was announced. Army plans for their offensives directed submitted to Headr . were prepared and quarters 'bth army Group for approval not later than- 4 November,

Prespeeta of carrying the new directive to a successful conclu- sion appeared brighter with the arrival in Marseilles on 25 October of the 100th and 103rd Infantry Divisions. These divisions had been diverted from western France to 6th Army Group. The 14th 1Irmored Division was expected to%begnn arriving in Marseilles during the firs-. part of November.

Thus as the month approached its final stages, First French Army was facing the heavily fortified Belfort Gap; Gerardmer, guardian of the Schlucht Pass through the Southern Vosges, was in danger of being encircled; and. Seventh Army, was approaching' St. Die, Raon L 1Etape, B :donviller and -Blamont. This placed 6th Army Group forces face to face with -the prepared Vosges--Belfort Gap, defense position, last stop short of the Rhine River. For front lines see Figure, 5

Fighting during the period 15 September -1 November had been a continuation of the pursuit of a defeated enemy who was falling back on his bases, reserves and prepared positions, while our pursuing, forces were outrunning their supply lines. During the later part of Cctober, German defenses had begun tv crystalize as a result of the necessary slackening of the Allied pace due to the supply situation. ' After reaching the Moselle River it hid been necessary

- a.6 - RESTRICTED

for allied forces to slacken their speed due to the distance. they had

advanced from. their supply bases. ' It was not until mid-0ctober, that supply points moved into the army areas and the 900-mile turn around with truck transportation was partially eliminated. Whilo from a, purely tactical standpoint the rapid advances could have been main tained, the supply situation did not permit it due to destroyed .railroads and limited truck transport. Thus it was emphatically brought out that any offensive force can advance only as rapidly as its supply situation permits and that a retreating enemy, given any- breathing spell, can marshall his forces and quickly organize a defensive position that will require months of hard fighting to break.

Another 6th Army Group front - the Franco-Italian Border demanded attention during this period.

Detailed study by G-3 planrers on 24 September had pointed to the advisability of turning over the entire Franco-Italian Frontier to the French. " This plan had not materialized. Orders were received from SHaEF to relieve elements of the American First Airborne Task Force (FABTF), occupying the southern sector,. for another mission. This relief was originally ordered to be accomplished by 10 November but this date was later changed by SHAEF. On 11 October, First French Army was directed to relieve the FABTF in zone and assume responsibility for the entire front.. The French countered that it was impossible for them to assume this added responsibility due to lack of troops and equipment.. Plans were worked out in an effort to put the French in a position to take over this front, but no satisfactory solution was found. Later the 44th AriA Brigade'was established as a separate command under Headquar" ters 6th Army Group and ordered to relieve the FABTF (Prov).

Battle casualties during this period numbered 6,994 for First French Army and 12,849 for Seventh Army. The First French Army took 11,785 prisoners while Seventh Army counted 12,327 through its cages., the Realizing need for coordinated advanced planning o'AC of S, G-3, recommended formation of -a. Joint Planning Staff, which w,as destined to play a big part in operations of the Army Group throughout the entire war, The recommendation was approved and organization of the Joint Planning Staff Group was announced on 10 October 1944a

Functioning under the supervision of the A. C. of S, G-3 and responsible to the Chief of Staff through A. C. of S, G-3, the Joint Planning Staff was composed of Deputy A, C. of S, -G-3, Plans and Operations, Director; representatives appointed by A. C. of S, G- and A. C. of S, G-2, Chief of G-3 Plans, Chief, of G-4 Plans, the Chief Air Advisor to the Army Group Commander, and recorder from G-3 Plans. In addition, the Directdr was authorized to coopt the services of representatives of other general and special staff

4-o17 ow RESTRICTED I sections when their assistance was required. Representatives of. ' A. C. Of S, G-5,. the Engineer and the Chief Signal Officer were appointed about 25 November 1944 on oral direction of the Chief of Staff.

The function of the Joint Planning Staff was to provide the information necessary to form an integrated plan and mold, such information into feasible operational plans, with, recommendations to the Chief of Staff. The directive which established the Joint Planning Staff specified that 'the facts furnished by' the members were. to be in accord with those known to the Chiefs of Staff. Sections but that plans and studies prepared need not necessarily represent. the personal views of the Section. Chiefs. Completed. plans represented majority opinion. Minority reports were sub mitted in the event of non-concurrence, A. C. of S, -G-3 was charged with-reconciling conflicts of opinion insofar as possible prior to submission of plans to the Chief of Staff. Copies of all JPS papers were circulated to staff sections-concerned, as soon as,, possible) upon completion.

Thus the JPS did the "pick and shovel" work and provided the correlated information fore consideration by the General Staff. Establishment of the JPS provided an authorized means of direct contact between individuals of the various staff sections on the planning level and obviated delay due to processing plans or. requests for data or information through channels.

- 3,8 - 11,L,, RTHE TO THE RHINE

Unable to launch an all-out offensive to close to the Rhine "due to the lack of supplies, 6th ;;rmy: Group began building reserves of arluni=- tion, gasoline and food in-army rear areas during the'latter part of., October, it the same time, limited objective attacks were being carried out to gain a suitable line of departure for the offensive; alrea ordered: l.,Tid-November vas set by G-4 as the earliest an all-out coordi-ý- nated attack could be fully 'supported, logistically.

plans for the attack were prepared in detail by armies and 'submitte to Headquarters 6th Army Group for approval. Coordination of details'df these plans was worked out with Third Army. -Headquarters '6th Army Group Sevcnth. Army and Third Arr_ýy"had studied the German habits. One of the enemy characteristics recalled was the habitual timing of his ust of general reserves. Almost "vrithout fail, the German moved his general reserves on the-evening of the second'day or the morning of the third day of our attack. We decided to make this trait pay dividends. There- fore, it was agreed initially that Third Arty would attack. in the ;: etz area between 10-15 November, and 6th Army Group would attack not earlier, than three days and not later than five days after Third Ar: y 's attack.:

py this it was hoped that th second, attack would catch the, Gerrian general reserves on the move, thus confronting the enemy commander :with decision them. the difficult ýý..... of t'ahýýt then to-do' ýý tiýý:tith _. . - Seventh to ke the r!: y Group _'rmyt s plan' required XV Corps in -ý; main effort on the xis Sarrobourg--Stra sbourr This 44th and'79th Infantry : . Divisions were to mnlce the initial. assault with the inch 2 nD in , reserve, alerted to cxploit a breakthrouüh. ' One ? CT of each infantry

division was motorized to ' exploit any favorable situation. ' The :.rýýorcd

Division was not to be 'employed until infantry had penetrated deeply into enemy defenses and gainý: d suitable terrwin 'for, armored action. '45th Division, in ur1ccd for by The Infantry ý";rrlly, reservo, was earrn. use, the XV Corps and placod on 12-hour alert when the attack commonced.

,-, ivu dl on First French rr for a the id ontbclliar ., J' s plan called _ :,, _"ulhouso, by--pa ssiný; strongly defendcd Telfort to the soizth. I Corps

on the south was to make the. Array ;i nin effort. .,.. ,

Tho onerLy situation was studicd continuously. ' G-2, rcvort,.: d that 6th ' th:: Gcrrý. n Fifth Panzcr and FinAconth 'lln-aics worc facing .irlnly Group, - along the Vosges-^elfort Gap line. Total strength of those two arr.-Lies vvost of the Rhinc znr":s' cstiriatcd at 77,500 comb^t. cffüctivos, 410 artillery piocos and 120 tc. nl: s. 'ýcpl^c :ý. cnt of ccrtc, in mobilc elo. lcnts,

of tho Fifth panzer-. r.ay on the north flank by now fortress and other static units indicatcd that thc cr_c..y fclt his ftorth flank -was 'rc; ^. Son-

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Forc ;s of 6th irr.nýT Group ..: d b,.;: n holst:: rod by tInj ,.rriv:,. l of 100th znf: ltrýT Division in S;:v,.:Yith ý:rj1y rca on 2 i?ov,:; iý , r. On 9 i. o thý103rd Inf,. r.tr; T Division ':ýý; c:iý ý.rriviný in thc two di. ýýv- h tho 'irrny .. rc;:. '"ith n,. Trvl;T : rrivd vi. ýia: s, ý;rl. iy bo^st.; d ^ total on idivlslOl. S, oil ; of which via s: r,ý,:or-; d.

1,"oýmahl_lo, th,: Dýth T)ivi-sion closý; aý.in ; °.rs, i7.1: s oiý 2 r,rovor. lb.: r and z,rýs bjinü ý;auinp: d r,. pidly pr;; p.. r^tory to ; ový. ý: nt

?lor-U. h;1^rd. .' ivisi. h. b:.: cý: d First Fr;;.-ich , ri. 1y now h,-d six _c? ons, -vin, 7, m ^L?ý'1r',ý, by tho 5 from i_:'_lýs 2 TýIä: durir.; C)ctob: r arrival of DB .: ^.rs,; ýýid fro--n tho rrc. co-It in border vyrh--rothe 1^tt, ý)r °ra rol.. iw ,d by the4 D? ias This ' ^da'ý,ýd strength L; vo t' ýo Soutiz:; rn Group of r: % 14 " ý. ý,.: divisions, thre,: ý of -:-r'-tich "z,,oro ar:morcd. One anoro armored division, the 14th, wasin sight. As plans for the attack to close to the Rhiný v,mr0 'a'- ^ final polish_inr, Hcadcuartors 6th :,.rr: ly Group was directed o in Southwest liquid-Ito Gen-L^n :a merits astride the Gironde Estuary Franco. In addition to FFI units currontly in the ^re°:, use of

one French Corps of not to exceed two divisions i-,ras -, uthorizA.

French General do Barrýiinat was selected to cor:n.ýýand the forces for the operation: ; H: EF directed- that the operation 1ýý;conrýl, A, ýA by 1 January 1945. purpose of the op.; ra tion tiýa.^.s to cý_ýýr -L111,.Gironde Estuary Z-,enich controlled the important and b: dly Yleed:;d port of Bord:; cux.

,t this tiro, 4 NTov,;r.bcr, it yr s that thýro ^pproyim^. týly 25,000 ýZ:my in the pock is north of Bordc : ux Zvitýl 35 t-nks subl«rin:; ini th, ts 270, suns, .nd thrc ; s. Cor=t i ii pock,; tir;:rc 22,000 poorly t'.rr_i.: d -nc tr,. inod i'FI troops. Th -se F 'I, troops tiý;orc to used in the Ott cý, lönýwith the tivo divisions, to' bc; rithdi^azd from F'irs Fr,; nch Array, y,

plans v,cro iº_Liacdi^t,: ly drawn to us D the F-r nch 1 DB end 1 D---'I ts for to conduct the opor^ti-on. l,t this tine, d-: their withdr wal from the front ranged from 7-30 Dec'nber. No action, ; resent liime. this other than planning, was taken ,

To take advl-ntaro of f

-2D _ RClCTal ICT: ýD Pýr.,$Tý-.1CTiD _ý. _ , , upproachcd, tho r 6th Army Group ks : ti, *ne for the attack . vrcathc. on front grwi Progres, jvel, ý . ",,orsc., Blinding rain or snovýstorns ragcd through the whole area. In 'thc Vosgos areas roads ýr:crc ülrcady, clogged by snovi drifts 'and temperatures dropped bclo7; frccz. ng. ýý Streams and rivers through the loner areas riact ovcrs-)illc ci their b4.nks.

Becausc -)f this ýüd T-aeathcr, First FrE:nch Army rcquc stucý 12 Povembor mission to postpone D-Day. -- Ho:;evcr, on .;aord ýýý,s received - that the. French attack would be as schcdizlc, d. But cn 13 -launched Aovember the French did not attück, post: oning opening of, their , 13 as offensive one day., Scvcnth hrmy set 0700 hours, i ovcmbcr H-Hour. ý.. ýýýý. ý' . .., ýýý Gc:neral' Devcrs. considered the:. possibility. of, postponing the attack in an effort. to got better weathcr -,,hen air support ,:ould

bo possible But at about 2300 hours, 12 Novombor, ho informed G-3 that the attack would not be postponed, remarking in cffc ct: "....; "The Gormans ;7i11 not cxpCct us to attack in such %. lcý-, thc:r. Wo aill get surprise. " ütt, 9700 As schcdulcd, Sovcr, th iirmy launched ýts ýclt at hours, 13 r"ovcmbcr, in ü sno .; storm. ' Artilicry fire throughout the, pre - vious night hid -pounded enemy ba ttcrio s, culmina trog in ashort,

violent barrage on cnomy front line positions just before H--hour. Thc . Scventh Army, being out by XV Corps, . main cffort of carried vas supported by üpproximate: ly 350 ý,rtillcrýr piccosv cxclusivc

of tho guns of tc::nks ý.nd tank. dcstroycrs. In Lddition, ü' majority of VI Corps artillery 17",s sighted to fire in support- orT the

mein effort., See Figure 6.

Little resistance from troops w,.s rcnortc; d on Scvcnth army front

during the first day,.- indicating complctc sur i.sc. Tho-- German-, (XV tronchos in. front of the right division of the maä.n effort Largo Corps) : ýcrc not occupied, -.nd they. :-iorc quickly. overrun; . num- bcrs of anti-tank mincs, ' anti-personnel mines, ;ooby tr4 ps, _.nd' I bo-ggy ground T,aero encountcrcd, 'hovcver, ceusing rclativcly progross lni ýý«. i.ly.

Fir Frc. Beginning at 1200 hours, 14 I ovembcr,, st - nch -.rrriy. launched ith I . . south the 'm effort. 1ni- its attack', " Corps on to making .,-in tial progrcs3 vat-:s &; tisfactory.,. As in front of Scvcnth army, num- crous : minc s, and booby trýps :-ucrc cncounte: rcd. ý: ýý,.. ý"-.:. ýý. ýý".. ýýý". ý`1ý. Dospito sno $ boggy torrain and cncmy obstüclcs, the attack progresscd rapidly. On 16 Novcmbcr, First Frc:nch,, xrmy broke through the Bclfört G-ý,p dofcnsc. s in u triplc pcnotrz.: tion on a. 27-mi1c 't:ýido

front, 'cxtcr_ding north and -:ac.st from thc:. STjiss bord,:: r. G..ins up to 10 miles ;-jcre reportcd thc VI Corps ; captürE: d thc'"high D--c, d R-on, LtEtapc. By-pwssing grcund southwast of -St. --nd c1cLr. r. Blümont,, Xr. Corps had "dv"nccd thrc: c inilc s to,, thc., cast of, the, to. an.

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1 fý? ýlJ ý i / ý ý rý t ii Pushing with unab,; tcd detcrrlination, clcments ' of I French Corps broke through to the Rhino River on 20 November, capturing Huningen Kerbs between and and reducing all enemy resistance the two -towns. Farther west, Bclfart was captured. Meanwhile, VI Corps forced crossings of the Mourtho River in the St. Die R; On L'Etapo sector. Having broken through enemy defenses, 'XV Corps infantry captured Sarrcbourg and the French 2 DB was rushed through the hole to exploit to the ; ,east and northeast. After following the doughboys to Sýrrcbourg, the French armor, took the lead., stringing north and south of the mein ' route through the Vosges. mountains -, - the Savorne. G. p -- to the Rhino 'Plain. Little resistance was met and the armor rushed headlong for Saverno, outflanking the key from the . communication center south and north. On 22 November, French armor captured S^vcrnc and cut the main east- west route from Nancy to Strasbourg cast of the Vosges. In this maneuver the. armor had already opened two routes into the Als, '- ce Plain; over which infantry. clemonts. wore rushing 'to take full advan tage of the iarmored drive. On VI Corps front, St Die was. entered. The French' took hM:ulhouse and advanced eight miles northward.

After capturing Saverne, 2 DB momentarily halted its eastward ad tance to clear the rain highway through the Vosges via the Saverne :Pass. Then doing an about f. cc, the, armor sped towards Strasbourg, entering the city on 23 November after mooting-littlo resistance., Much by from the front that . excitement Was, occasioned reports''. XV Corps had captured a bridge over the Rhine River intact in this action and that elements of 2 DB :wore already deployed ea st of the Rhino in Germany. Later reports, however, proved this wishful thinking.

On our extreme right as the two'French, armored divisions 1 DB and 5 DB turned north in pursuit of the completely disorganized fate took enemy, a hand in the proceedings. Trying to utilize the , same route which was already, in use by other traffic, 'combat commands of. 5 DB became hopelessly in traffic jams, during counter ensncrlcd which a serious German attack was launched towards Delle but repulsed. G-3 and two other officers. of Headquarters 6th Army. Group witnessed' this traffic tic-up. during of the night 20-21 Novcribcr. It wß;8' prob ablyy the worst ev;:;r 1vitncssed, ' for which the Chief of, Staff of 5 DB was reported to have been relieved by, General 'do L ttro. Unfortunately this ; relief- was accomplished only after- the damage vas done c nd not before 5 DB initiated its movement, It required 48 hours to straighten the traffic jams,. out and by that time the enemy had reorganized suff iciently to defensive . establish a position -long the Dollar River and north of Mulhouse, hinged on the Hardt Forest ' and Rhino River., French elements were unable to break through this line. And with thi_:t) advances-dv, don the Rhino Plain northward ended for several weeks to come.

By 25 November, enemy positions in thy northern Vosges, on VI Corps front, had completely collapsed and elements of 2, M wore driv- iug soutin up tino xcnanc r. kiin, soutn or 6trusbourg: 'and PTulshoiM'. RESTRICTED

At this time, 6th Army Group had 'three possible lines of- action. ' One was to hold on the north and divert forces to the south to assist to the Rhine. follow' the French in completely closing -Another Was to exactly S11EFts directive and launch an attack to the north in conjunction with Third army to breach the Siegfried Line., awhile leaving the French to complete the job in the south.

Seventh army and planners of Headquarters 6th Army Group posed ,a third course of action. During the time the 13 November attack as being planned and executed, Seventh Army-had made detailed plan; for crossing the Rhine in stride. Crossing sites had been selected between Strasbourg and Karlsruhe. Now Seventh army wanted to cross the Rhino and breach the Siegfried Line in a single operation, tying its bridgehead initially to the northern tip of, the Black Forest.

JPS agreed with Seventh xrmy. and recommended that linc of action on 19 November.

This was the situation and "behind the scene thinking'? as 6th Army Group came to the cross reds of its battle

In a conference in Vittol on '24 November, a ttende'd by General

Eisenhower and General lic.. utenant general) Bradley, Commanding General of 12th Army Group,_(then the situation was discussed. Following the conference, Seventh army eras directed to swing the bulk of its forces northward in an attack to breach the Siegfried Line. Seventh Army's secondary mission .,ras to assist the First French Army in closing to the Rhino. First French Army was instructed to destroy the cnömy .crest of the Rhine and close to the River in zone. By these tactics, 6th Army Group continued to protect the southern flank of the 12th Army Group and assist its northern neighbor in closing to the Rhino in zone.

Accordingly, on 28 November, XV Corps launched an attack northward. in the direction of Hagcnau, In three days, gains up to 10 miles had been made and the Modor River reached at several points. Ho ever, heavy fighting developed around Hagenau and Bitcho, slo.; ing' the north- -wwardmarch of the American units. See Figure 7.

BMeanwtwhile,activity on the Franco-Italian front had boon limited. to patrol action and rolief of units by both American and French clcmcnts.

by Hcadquartcrs 6th in As ordered - Army Group Operational f oo-ir ! rndum Number Three on 8 Novombor, the newly constituted 44th AAA Brigade Commandbegan relieving elements of the FABTF on ' 15 November. Brigadier General Ralph Tobin, Commanding Gcncral, 44th AAA Brig. -.-,.do assumäd command,of the southern sector on 21 Novcmbcr, following rclief of elements of FABTF.

At this time the 19th and 68th Armorcd Infantry B tta. ions tho', November,: of 14th Armorcd Division, which had arrived on 10 were holding.

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r-- -T' t, ' ': IJlToýsO nri ' *(!;. 1 ,: i., l . ".: tnbCý 'r / ý r:; o r-ý ý uunin{fu., _f , `'ý r--- ý____, r- .,` -,, -ýJ ýý ý- ý. ýý_-.. c"ý.5ýýý.:.. ;` ll:; plan. on'bý) ýý º\ý.., ý ý r CýY t tr7-"e+-ý rý T". ''ý'" T'i 7 ry _;. '., i ý,urc: Lý sectors in-the line. These units voro needed on the main front to operate their parent unit. The 442d Infantryy less the 100th ; with . . Infantry Battalion' which had arrived on the hlp's sector on 13 November, withdrawn from the Seventh Army front and assigned to 44th Ate was . Brigade to relieve these Armored Infantry Battalions. On 23 November the 442d Infantry, (-100th Bn) arrived, and, the 19th, Armored Infantry. 899th Battalion was relieved. -On 25 November the AAA Battalion arrived und the First Special Service Force and the 68th Armored Infantry Battalion were relieved on 28 November and 1 December, respectively. On 6. December the 65th Infantry Regiment (-2 Battalions) arrived on the Alps front. By 15 December the composition of tho' . was front line troops of the 44th AAABrigade as follows: 4l,.2d, Infüntry . (-2 65th Ir. R:mtry Bns) ,And 899th 'AAA Battalion (acting as infcntry).

As äcvcnth krm; Tts attL. ck progrr.. ssc.d northwc, rd during the first of Deccmb-"r, First French xrr7j ts attempt to "close the Co1r.1"r Poc': c.t. from the, soüth and wcst tiýL.s meeting. increa sin; difficultic: s. Onl; r minor gains' -ocre being mac?c. .,, 5cvonth Army To bolstor Fix st Fronch Army #-Andrelicvo of rr s- ponsibility for tivoging a-duäl-front b., ttlc, Hc&dquý,rtc: rs 6th Army Group issü. cd Lcttor of 1nstructions Numbcr Four, 2 Dcccmb,::r.

Seventh army Yawsdirected to c".pturc Sc1estüt in, manouvor designr. d to pinch out `two VI Corps divisions fighting in the of .t French Zone and make 'them available for use in the north. Two Seventh Army divisions--French 2 DB and 36th-US' Infantryr Division--tiicrc. ordered passed to control of First French krmy as soon :s, c lc st:: t ýüs cüpturea.

Ono day 1ý:tcr, 3 DecFnber, VI Corps ccpturcd _6c:le st at'.;: nd brc.. French Ribcauvillc after . king through thc. Vosgcs Mountains. -The at the s-nc ti. mc had penctratc. d farthcr into thc, Vosgc s rlountý: in$ - and captured the Bussang Pss, .. ,ý...... ,,

After 4ccomplishing its mission" in the French aonc:, Seventh Army, began :ýýithdrý. -,Ang the VI Corps minus the. 36th Infantry Division. The, VI Corps swung northtaard down the Fýhinc' Plain to ssist XV Corps in , , I-. brc"ching. the, äic. gfried Lino. On 5 Doccmbc-:r, 12th Armorcd vivision to 6th Group subscqucntly under vjüs L,s signcd army and, came . control of XV Corps., By this time, thc:. entiro ,kvonth xrmy ';a: s pushing northwµrld towards the Siegfried-Lino- XV Corps on thr 1Fft and VI Corps'on the ri

looked forý7.. ill tho'' ;;cventh Army _rc'. to rccciving roinforcoments' form 'of thrcc ncta divisions coming ovcr from thc -Sti; tc: s. Initially, tho' thr-eo divisions -ý,jcrc to bc ý:ssignfd to 6th army Group but Sii.:,FF, acquioscing to rcquosts from 12th army Group, L:grr ed for :onE, of thc ; divisions. to- go to Third ixmy and. tho othc r. t, ao to acvcnt'a ;rmy. Tho 63rd nd 70th Inf,: Divisions to to Scvcnth`, thc3. ;., ntry wc:ro comc army -nd '42nd '; r,: s; to eo to. Third j, r my;

Mý,:TRICTLD Thý: Divisions cý.me piecc: mcr.:l, First units to ý.rrivc týýcrc the infantry clcmcnts. Thcao units rore cqu-i:Pped 4ýs r.E.pidly z:s 63rd possible L,:nd shippcd to the krrr:y ürcü. The, ý:nd 70th Divisions : crc : ssignvd to Seventh hrmy on 8 December but did not bre,,in in the sometime l,. tc: r. -It felt -Lrriving crmy rcýa'until vräs not thc; t the divisions as such : could be rc"dy for employment until mid-February.

1 the irJhilc ý ,--iting the ar of supporting, arms rd services, Seventh army decided to the in_te ntry components front line give' , .n(v, experience on quiet sector, along the thine hivcr front. The nc'.a, infantry regiments tivcrc to replace regiments of -divisions L,,lrcady been fighting in the lino, permitting, those units th. tt h4:d almost to taaze breathing -continousl T sincc lunding in Southorn Franco - a speil

On 11, Dcccmbcr, VI Corps cleýred -Haqcn::,u .-ihilc XY Corps

cLpturcd Pctit-Ric? erching' on' tho 14zaginot -Line, old Frcnch. bordcr by First Frpnch dcfcr. ýses. Only minor .C.,dvar. ces wore r; portcd t,rm4r. ,. ";, ,,. Breaking north, -;ý:. rd. -,ftcr capturing Hýgeriýmu, äý.vc=nth ..r*nýr clc, ýýrcd the Hügcnau Forest on 13 Dece,mbEr üna -m.s fighting in 6eltz ý'nd Soultz-SOus-Forots. On 15 Dccembcr oovc.nth ,jrmY c, -:Dturcd Ltutcrbourg, noý,r the Germ;.:n border, but -other (',v,,. nccs, ospeci 11y in the Bitcho

ürE;a; :ýcrc limitcd .

Elcrn nts of VI Corps crossed the Gomm border in the F.hinc PlAn 16 Dcccnb;; r to Cain bridgehc-: ds over thc, L^..üter F.iycr c.nd capture ýisscmbourg. i,., -. Bý c.-:uso the need for , 11 'c lcmc nts of, the First Frrrich -arnly in

the -currc, nt bý.ttle was prsssing, SHhEF ag-rced ön 14 Dcccmbc;r to 'n Opcr, Indcpcndencc. pos,tponc.mc>ntof tion Howevcr, 1 DDII had r--1xc,-.dy movcd tho bulk of its clcmcnts to :ücst. -,rn Fmnce.

'hs ,,, Scvcnth army "rý." s entering the Sicgfried acfenscs öri 16 struck December, the Gcrr.i::.n countcr offensive in 'the Ardcnnc s No . _.. _., .... immcdiý,- -- tc ch:;.ngc tiJ!-,s rm:ctc, in 6rventn armytis mission. .I For short timo ' longc. i,rrmJ continucd its . a, r, novcnth north-; j°-:rd driva- "gn.inst stiffcning resist::: nce s'thc far.led Sic;gfricd Linc: tu.xs rcz.:chcd C;nd pE:netr: ted at sc;ver-: 1 points.C: On 19 Dcecýbcr, US infantry fighting in dcfensc in the and (:;r mor vicrc the SZcgfricd s "flis scmbourg arc,.: and to thti: 'oust and in thc convcrtc: d btaginot dcfc: nscs in thc: i-c: on Bitchc ': xrt:. -Minor c.dv-.nccs ':vcr;,.' portfýd First French xrmy front. ' at this tiý' with the capturý of :. aisersbere by tho' 36th Uý Division Mittcl: and tho occup.:.tion'. of aihr. army' to be livcd Thc But ;;cventh s drive north,, -'. rd w%i ::s short .. GtrmLn offc. nsivc, of 16'Uccc; mbcr was on. Hc;<:dquý;rtürs 6th j;rmir Group from SH,, F . Third rccoived -ordcrs F, to relicvc elements of ' 'jitny covcring ý the., front t: corps on, tho imrnc:diatc loft of vcnth. to . f)f ao 6c, xrmy and iramc:diätely on the dcfe. For front lin4, s of äd. go, , . greatest vanccs, sco Figure 6. ''. RE"TRICT`D

There may be sons ou;. stion to wh,-; thcr it ;' oulc? h .ve been 'batter to permit äe:vcnth Army to .:scontinuo its offensivej through the S'iegfrie>d Line, -w-,which ' as progrcäsing ra,pidlzr, rather th:.,n to assume the defensive. Brczching of the Siegfried Lino in the ;Jisscmbourg area would hc:ve opcncd the northern Ehinc plain to allied troops and outflanked th strong defenses in front of Third Army. `Iha:t influence, this would h. vc h.: ,.d on the Germ,: n's but Ardennes offensive is manly conjecture, it' is within the realm of possibility that some Gcrrnc.n elements c: "rmarkc; d. for Eunc:stcdt's drive would have bcc n diverted southw" rd to count .r tht-: Scvt nth army with rc. sult,.. nt weakening of the m, in' Gcrm:.ýn effort in the north.

As an overall oper-a:tion, the offensive beginning on the h:.c.urthc and in front of Bclfort G".:p on 13 November proved highly successful. From the planning standpoint, it t9:.is well conceived and coordinated in every minor detail.. This planning and coordination netted results beyond cxpc cta: tion. By G-2ing that the Garman would commit his general reserves in front of the Metz offensive proved correct. Thus, when Seventh army opcncd its big guns and drove for the Rhine `:rd

$trc. sbourg, ' the.. enemy had little except local reserves, to throw in the tray of the fr-st moving armor and motorized inf::, ntry.

The main effort. of äcvcnth. nrmy, c,: rri; -d out by :V Corps, was an exemplary instance of the utilization of armor in its min role.,

exploitation after 'the outer enemy dcfonscs have been penetr;; tcd.. The 2 DB was held in reserve, after being passed through in the-, l attack until the main ene my* defenses 'h...d bcen penetrated nd It .. suitable terra in for the: employment of armor rc:e:.cht;d " SJ..;3 brilliant maneuver that sent th French armored division around thc, to in from both to tho Savcrnc Pass come north . ncl south outflank st-. ong, e` sily defended position, resulting in opening of multi--routes

into the "ls '.ce Plain. Motorized infantry followed closely the barely h:.:d the before French armor, and ermor stopped running; , infantry was on the ground to hold whet h-. d lrý. a'y been gained, or to e ssist in reduction of final enemy strong oints.

The initia l Frcnch drive through thc Bclfort G,--p cr,lployc'd thc. s:-rýc. principi::: s---making ho.lcs in the cncmy line with iný:`ý_ntry, fo11owWd by c;,-pliting r*aor. This brrý.-ichc:d the Bolfort G,:pý: nd Fhinc pturc: BTulhousv. pc.rmittcd thý z-.rmor to c?_.sh to thc. and c4-. k in thr! Our ir_ý Thc.ý pr incipcl bonc: of contc: ntion opr rtýor. , Novcanbcr thc. first p,.rt of Dcccmbc:r hingcs round. the Col; n_,r .:nd "--. . Pockcta To say that it týý:ctic,.: lly unsound to swing thc, bulk of , to Third in brc th, d Sc:vc: nth Army north%,wrc -,:ssist' Army ,:.chinP" -. Liný. when the enemy was on thc;, ruiý and ýahilc tho Colmar Pockct still in e: istcncc. is without bc:sis. Th<-. Frcnch h.-.d drivcn brilliantly to the Lhinc and through strongly defended Bclfort. AW il,.:, blc. to the French to r-c.ducc the pocket r-atc.rc four Frcnch Infý:. ntr-Divisions, throe Divisions, US Inf,:, Division, the Frcnch ., r-morcd one ntry .:nd equivalent of another infantry division in srý^.llo. r Frc.nchlýunits`

- 26 -

R S TT- LU 1. VTY, 1J . RESTf TCTED ..._ý_. _.._.,._ There was no indic-.: tion that the French would not be able to their to the I. hine the from accomplish mission and close all .ýýy. Bctslcc to Strasbourg with little difficult; T. Mary considerations be t '; into in the f ilurc of the Fri to rust . en ccount . nch carry this out. Initially, the traffic jam of armored units, when the in hot enemy WL-.s on the run and French "..rmor was pursuit, definitely influenced the action. This g...ve the German time to regroup end prcp-: ra now defenses. This is what stonpc. d the French in the south. jam Vhon the traffic was finally straightened out and in attempt to crack the hastily thrown up enemy defense line f"_.iled, little progress was r :.tco on this front until many vicoks later., Too, French c:asu-alties, especially in officers in colonial outfits, h been heavy. No for the .d rcplaccmon is were available sc Men familiar with handling colonial troops. This resulted in lo; th, t had iuring of morale end cfficicnc; in divisions _, c,:a,rried the brunt of fighting for the French forces since landing in Southern France. This T,a"..s the principal contributing factor to failure, h:.. been tad by Headquarters 6th end could not vc anticip . ixny Group.

As far as the. 5c:vcnth i.rmyl s'drive northward w-s concerned, the proof of the pudding is in th, -, eating. Since thc-eSiegfried Line h...d br on penetrated in scvcr,. l plL, ces and xmcrica: n units tirere fighting in Gcrm..ny gc:n,'. relly all along the VI Corps front, results to the. this oper. iti. Seventh shinc as r_lonurront success of on. 'array felt it could either cross the Rhine and ostL

During the period covered by this report, short age of infa: rtry began to be felt Casualties hd roplacemcnts seriously. 14 not bEct too hc..vy in comparison -;pith results obtaincd but the short age rc-_;ultcd from a lack of men in reinforcements pools.

At the beginning of November, Scventh army w- s short 2,602 infantry; rcpl.:. ccmcnts. By 15 Dcdcmbcr this short-}-o h!-,d reached 6,782. But still the situation h,-.-. d not become critical.

Ca=alt--' cs suffered by Scvöntli tray from 1 November to 15 December were: killed, 2,441; wounded, 13,658; missing, 2,079.

French ca swtltic s over th , same p: rind totaled 14,881 killed, wounded 1.!nd missing

Seventh army counted 25,066 prisonc; rs through its c: gcs during this pc'riod while First French i:rmy capturod c total of, 9,726 prisoncrs. 27 - RESTRICTED r RESTRICTED ý,

CHAPTERFIVE

THE GERMANCOUNTER OFFENSIVE

As Seventh Army's offensive rolled northward through the strong Siegfried defenses, word reached TAG Headquarters 6th Army Group at Pfalsbourg, France, of the German counter offensive in the Ardennes. First reports on 17 December were fragmentary and far from satisfactory. Several days elapsed before the course of the Nazi breakthrough could be followed with accuracy. During this period dý-My liaison was maintained with 12th Army Group at Luxembourg.

, But the German offensive did not stop Seventh Army at the time. The doughboys and tankers of VI Corps plowed through the German Wostwwaall in at least three places, north and cast of 4issembourg. The French Maginot Line, which had been reversed in rkany places to serve as a long range outpost for the Germain frontier fortifications, w` s receiving the same treatment farther to the west. iVhile slowed by the prepared defenses, Seventh Army's offensive was by no moans stopped and the feeling was prevalent throughout the Army that VI Corps would soon be in the clear, north of the defenses in the Vissembourg area.

The German drive continued westward in the Ardennes. It was obvious that this enemy effort was not on a penny-ante scale but the magnitude of the German thrust was not, known for several days. However, the offensive did recall to mind immediately the famous last desperate German gamble in World 'Jar I to seize victory while, on the very brink of defc. at. By 19 December, three days after the Panzer armies struck, some idea of the ambitious German plan had been gained. Captured documents, and propaganda boasts over the radio revealed the enemy intended to split Allied forces by driving through the Ardennes to capture the important deep water port of Antwerp.

With this background of German plans and knowledge of the current situation, General Eisenhower assembled selected members of his staff and his commanders at Verdun, main headquarters of 12th. Army Group, to work out a plan to turn the desperate German gamble into 'decisive defeat. for the enemy and victory: for the Allies. The conference convened in a solemn atmosphere. General Eisenhower, flanked by his staff, presided. Sitting around the conference table were Air Chief Marshal Tedder (deputy SCAEF), General Devers, General Bradley, General (then Lieutenant General) George S. Patton, ` Jr., Commanding General of Third army. and members of their staffs. Representatives of 21st army Group present arc', not recalled. The current situation, tactical and logistical, and lines, of action open to the allies were discussed in detail. Piece by piece the Allied plan was fitted together. It was announced orally by General Eisenhower to the assembled officers.

As far as overall strategy was concernudl the Allied objective remained unchanged --- capture of the industrially important Rhur

--28-

RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

districts But to meet the presont emergency, the approved immediate plan called for:

6th Army Group to halt Seventh, Army's cf. fensivc and pass it at the . a to the defensive at once, and same time take over forty - mile sector of Third Army's front with our present forces augmented by the addition of only one infantry division -- the 87th. In addition, 6th Army Group was told to be prepared to lose one infantry division and possibly more to assist in stemming the'German drive.

12th Army Group and 21st Army Group were assigned the job of reducing the 'German penetration. All troops north of the penetration had been placed under bporational control of, the British 21st Army Group. Those south of the bulge remained under command of General Bradley. Twin attacks from the north and south with'all available troops against the shoulders of the bulge were ordered.

To include the now sector formerly hold, by the XX and XII Corps of Third Army, the bound.:'ry between 6th-and 12th Army Groups was- changed to: Dombasle-Chateau Salins-Baronvillo-F, alquemont-St. Avold- (to Carling-Bous 12th Army Group) - Neunkirchen-L, ndstuhl Kaisers- lautern (to 6th Army Group). See Figure S.

L`Jith 'those instructions, 6th Army Group passed from -a successful offensive to the defensive-with one 'of its armies in what was destined to become our most hectic period of the war. Smarting from the blow to its ambitions and dreams of continuing non-stop into Germany proper- 6th Army Group, nevertheless, tackled its new assignment with vigor and &termination. For front lines see Figure 8. 'But the offensive was 'not forgotten. It was temporarily sidetracked to be. picked up at the earliest opportunity. upon ,. Promptly his return from the conference, oral instructions issued by General Devers to General Patch to SCAEF's were . carry out directive. The speed with which those instructions were put into effect is attested to by the fact that Seventh Army began relieving Third Army elements in its newly acquired sector on 20 December. At the same time, relief of the 36th Division by the 3d Division was directed, placing 3d Division under operational control of First French Army and returning 36th Division to Seventh Army.

On 21 December, "G-2 warned of an imminent German attack in the Homburg area. It was pointed out that the enemy continued to'bolster his strength in this. aroaa Atrthis. time, the enemy was definitely conducting an aggressive defense with the possibility of turning to the offensive within the next 10däys,

Confirming oral instruction previously issued and revealing the still. prosent offensive -mindedness of ill concerned, Headquarters 6th Instructions irmy, Group issued Letters of Numbers Five and Six on 21 and 22 December, respectively.

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Letter of Instruction Number Five was addressed to Seventh Army. It- ordered immediate abandonment of the offensive and relief of certain Third Army units as far west as Saarlautern. To assist in taking over this new area, Seventh Army was to take command of 87th Division, and infantry elements of 42nd Division which had been 63rd assigned to Third Army at the same time and 70th Division infantry units were assigned to 6th Army Group. Seventh Army was instructed to defensive organization the submit a complete of .rmy area to Headquarters 6th Army Group and to institute immediately reconnaissance for rearward positions to meet a possible hostile penetration from the front or either flank.

One infantry division :;as carmarked for movemont ' t:. 12th Army Group Ts assistance on short notice, anytime after 23 Dcccmbor. The Seventh army nominated the nowly, acquired 87th Division, which was subsequently lost to the Central Group of Krmies on 22 December.

In order to deceive the Germans as to our intentions and to hold troops in the area east of the Rhine, Seventh krmy was instructed to dispose, its troops bridging along the banks , and material western of the Rhino north of Strasbourg in such a way as to facilitate an attack across the Rhine at any time.

Letter of Instructions Number Six was addressed to the First French army, ordering an attack not later than 5 January to destroy the German forces west of the Rhine. The attack was to be a two- pronged offensive from north and south. The French were instructed to be prepared to take over the Strasbourg area and defend the line of the Rhine to the Swiss border aft- r closing to the Rhino. hil

sectors not engaged in the offensive were to be immediately wired in and strong defensive works constructed.

These instructions were issued because 1 DMII had begun its *movo- ment back to First French hrmy-from Southwest France and with its help it was felt that the First French army should bo able to ©limi,; te the sore-spot Colmar pocket

Previously, while Seventh army's offensive was rolling north. ward, General Devers had foreseen the need of an additional Carps Headquarters for Seventh i-,rr_ly. On 15 December, he requested, in a letter to SHhEF, assignment of an additional corps headquarters with necessary supporting troops to this command. The request was approved and Headquarters XXI Corps, then arriving in Normandy from England, was ordered to 6th i.ri y Group.

Meanwhile, infantry elements of the three new divisions one of which had been diverted from Third Army to Seventh 'Army began arriving in the tirmy area. Because of the-pressing need for additional troops, Seventh army immediately organized the new and untried infantry regiments into task forces under command of the assistant division commanders. 'These tasib forces wore placed in line along the Rhine River to gain their promised battle indoctrination. 30 RESTRICTED

On 23 December, Task Force Harris (63rd Division) took over a sector'

north of Strasbourg. The next day, Task Force Linden (4'2nd Division) which had been turned over to Seventh Army'by Third Army, relieved 36th Division in Strasbourg. The 36th Division was assembled in Army reserve in the Sarrebourg area. On 25'December, 12th Armored Division was relieved from the line and assembled in the Sarrebourg

area in Army reserve. On 27 December, Task Force Herren (70th Division) went into the line along the Rhine River. All three task' forces were assigned to VI Corps.

The German offensive continued to move westward in the Ardennes. From SHAEF on 26 December came instructions for 6th Army Group to fall back to the line of the Vosges Mountains, giving up Alsace and Strasbourg. This action was apparently directed in order, to shorten 6th Army Groupts line and make additional units available to ' SHLEF to combat the northern German threat. Upon receiving these instrue tions, General Devors called a conference of his staff with Lieu- tenant General Patch and his Corps Commanders at Pfalsbourg to dis-' cuss in detail the nee turn events. At this conference, G-2 . of reiterated his convictions of an imminent German attack in the Homburg area and estimated the attack could be. launched by 1 'ý- 3 January.

On. 27 December TAC Headquarters 6th Army Group moved back, to Vittel.. To cover this move, the newly arrived HeadquartersI Corps moved into the old headquarters set up at Pfalsbourg and maintained necessary signal traffic,,

As 6th-army Group assumed the defensive, JPS was busy studying this new turn of events with a view to developing the most cohesive plan to meet an attempted enemy penetration".

First to. come under the JPS microscope was the possibility of. 6th Army Group having to assume responsibility for defense of the ., 1 entire sector from the Moselle south and east to Switzerland. Planners considered an attack on the' Trier-Merzig front aimed at the key communication centers of Metz and Nancy a strong enemy capability. The terrain was favorable and the prize well worth the risk involved. outside 6th A majority of this corridor was Army Group is zone of responsibility and therefore coordination and conduct of the defense, in the event difficult Yet 6th Army Group of attack, was made more . would be most concerned should-tan attack be launched on this front by the Germans.

Since 6th Army Group might-be called upon to assume responsibi. lity for this entire 'front JPS on 23 Docomöer examined its implication; The planners at this time limited their recommendations to 'an immod- into request to SIEF for a corps composed of two infantry divisions and one armored division should this added responsibility be placed on 6th Army Group

- 33.- RESTRICTED

Two days later after the JPS had delved deeply into-this problem, they recommended that SHaEF be requested to turn over the 6th entire defensive sector south of the Moselle to Army Group. This request, with a recommended inter-army group boundary, was submitted to S ^EF.

Going further into the possibilities of enemy penetrations, JPS recommended a. complete defensive set-up for the entire current sector. At" the same time it was recommended that a decision to launch an offensive to close the: Colmar Pocket be postponed until the krdennes situation cleared. These recommendations -were later.

embodiod. in instructions to the hrmies.

Following closely on the heels of the order to withdraw, SHAEF directed 6th Army Group on 28 December to assemble a corps of one infantry division and one armored division in SHtEF reserve. To the" defense accomplish this, and button up final "plans for all along the front., Headquarters 6th Army Group issued Letter of Instructions Number Seven, 28 December.,

These instructions placed both Seventh Army and First French Army on the defensive. The main battle position was outlined. In addition intermediate battle positions were outlined for both armies. See Figure 8. Seventh Army was again warned against possible German- penetrations along the axes of: Homburg-Nancy; Homburg-Sarrobourg; Colmar -Ramiro court; and ColmarrSt. Die. First French army was

warned against penetrations on the axes: Colmar Remirecourt; Colmar- St. Die; and against a penetration of the Belfort Gap. Detailed plans for coordination of the defenses of both armies and with Third the left laid down, including blocks, preparation .army on were road of bridges, dumps, equipment and roads for destruction.

Seventh Army was ordered to assemble the XXI Corps, composed of one infantry division and one armored division, in the Sarrobourg area as SHAEF reserve. The two divisions -.noninatod by Seventh t r.my were 36th Infantry Division and 12th Armored Division, both of which were in +rmy reserve.

First French Army was instructed to pass 2 DB to control of Seventh Army in the Strasbourg area not later than 3 January. 1 DIII was assigned to First French army upon its arrival from Southwest France, This unit closed in the First French lirny area on. 31 December

ülith those actions, Headquarters 6th Army Group had carried out SHtiEF !s directive, in which there was no idea of falling back to the Vosges until forced to by, enemy action.

On 3Ö December, G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation again warned of possible German attack on to axis Homburg-Sarrobourg by an estimated three to five divisions as the main German capability. G-2 pointed to the aggressive attitude of the enemy on our front, to 'ý. 32 _ RESTRICTED , RESTRICTED

his build up of strength, and to the overall strategic advantage of forcing Seventh Army to commit its forces on this front.. Should the enemy be able -to reach S. rrebourg, a withdrawal from hlsacc would be necessary. This would be a groat moral as well as politi. cal victory for the German.

G--2 also pointed out that a diversionary attack might be launched in either the Mulhouse, Colmar or Strasbourg area at the same time,

that 6th Army Group Upon receipt of information .was to orgarnize a defensive position running along the eastern edge of the Vosges Mountains, the French Government thought that an immediate evacuation of Alsace had been ordered. As a result, General do Gaulle is reported to have dispatched a letter to General Eisonhouer urging him to make every effort to hold Strasbourg because of its political significance to the French. On 2 January, General Devers-received letter from General de L ttre. a similar . The French government offered services of three FFI divisions to 6th Army Group to insure retention of Strasbourg. Inspection teams wore sent immediately to determine the state of readiness of these divisions. After the inspection it was decided to use only one the 10th (Billotte) Division, which was rated the best of the three.

(In spite of the refusal of 6th army Group to employ the other divisions, the French government ordered six additional infantry, regiments into the First French army area týwithout coordinating the movement with this headquarters. The arrival of those new units would overtax the available supply facilities and overcrowded transportation which was being used to maximum extent in supplying troops by Headquarters 6th. currently in the area. SHLiEFwas asked ',clrm;r, Group 8 January to make representations to the French Government against the movement of any troops into 6th -army Group area without prior approval of this headquarters. )

The sixth paragraph, page 33, should read as. follows

About an hour before midnight, December 31/1 Jan- uary, the Germans launched a series of strong probing attacks. with two divisions in the Hardt Mountains of east Bitche on the front of VI Corps. The brunt struck Task Force Huddleston, composed of elements of 14th Armored Division and 117th Cavalry'Squadron, in the,. . '- -- - -ý e_ .

RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

As the Hardt Mountain attack was reaching the height of its intensity on 5'January, the Germans established a small bridgehead in the Gambesheim area, north of Strasbourg, after crossing the river undetected. This was apparently thought by VI Corps to be only a small force and a nuisance raid. Only a small force was dispatched to eliminate the bridgehead. Initial attacks agoainst' the bridgehead failed and the Germans became firmly entrenched in the marshy, flat ground around Gambesheim and Herrlisheim.

Elements of 14th Armored Division were hurled at the bridgehead on 8 January but were unable to reduce this stronghold west of the Rhine.

At about this time the German Ardennes offensive, had shot its bolt% Seeing 6th Army Group being attacked fr :mt-. -;o directions the Bitche area and at Gambsheim -- SHAEFagreed to release XXI Corps composed of 36th Infantry Division and 12th Armored Division to 6th Army Group on 7 January. The Headquarters XXI Corps was given a sector on the left by Seventh Army. The. divisions were placed in reserve initially.

As the fighting blazed on Seventh Army's front and the 10th (Billotte) French Infantry Division arrived in First French Army area, Headquarters 6th Army Group sought to tighten its defenses. Letter of Instructions Number Eight was issued 7 January, Seventh Army was instructed to organize additional defensive positions. 8), (see Figure but to withdraw only in the face of strong enemy pressure, The. 36th Infantry Division and 12th Armored Division were released to Seventh Army but were to be used only on authority of 6th Army Group. For new boundary sob Figure 9.

To shorten Seventh Army 1s front, the First French Armyt s .zone was extended to include Strasbourg. The 10th (Billotte) Division French was assigned to First Army upon its closing in the Army area,

The entire defensive was built along aggressive lines. Frequent raids on the front of both armies were directed, to keep' the enemy confused as to our intentions. Especially was this to be true in the Colmar Pocket area, where already the eyes of the ; commanding cihile general had been turned, searching for means with. vihich to eliminate this bulge in his lines.

While VI Corps was fully engrossed with the Gambsheim bridgehead, the Germans hurled an attack down from the north on Hatten. divisions PGR 21st Panzer Employing two --- 25-th and --. - the Germans captured Hatten and penetrated, as "far as Rittershoffon on 11 January. Counterattacks on 12 January stopped the German advances, retook Rittershoffen, and brought American elements back-to the outskirts 14th Armored of Hatten. One combat command of Division was employed on 13 January in an attempt to regain Hatten; at the same time the Germans reneged their attacks. Bitter fighting ensued around Hatten for 'made,, the next six days but no appreciable , gains were by either sides

_34-

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'ý'1r:,'Lti''.L RESTRICTED . Meanwhile, the Gambshcim bridgehead continued to grow. Piece- meal attacks by American armored and infantry elements wore making no headway against it. On 17th January, 12th Armored Division was thrown into the battle. The next day it succeeded in gaining a foothold in the town of Herrlisheim. This foothold was short lived, however, as'Gorman attacks from the north and a. continuation of attacks from the east cut off almost the whole of a CC and forced

the withdrawal of the remainder: In this action almost an entire infantry battalion and tank battalion were lost. Germans advancing from the north joined at Herrlisheim with the Gambsheim bridgehead and the enemy now held a long corridor between the Rhino and Moder Rivers. Realizing, that its available units could not now reduce the bridgehead, the VI Corps put the 36th Infantry Division into line to contain the bridgehead. See Figure, 10.

This strong German position-west of the"Rhine was now a serious threat to the VI Corps position in the Hatten - Hardt Mountain ' area. Should the German penetrations continue westward, its present positions would become untenable.

In line with SHAEFts directive not to risk the integrity of his forces General Devers ordered VI Corps to be withdrawn to a previously prepared position along the Moder River.. This withdraTiral was effected during the. night of 20-21 January without incident. For line, see Figure 11.

With the withdrawal of VI Corps to the Moder River and the . stabilizing of the XV Corps lines south of Bitcho, a serious German threat to 6th Army Group came to an end. For front lines see Fig- ure 11: ' The Allied position was improving in the north. The Ardennes bulge was being gradually reduced. First French Army, assisted by the XXI Corps composed of three American infantry divisions and one armored division initiated action to eliminate the Colmar Pocket. Seventh Army, meanwhile, spent the time on the. defensive, rotating units in line, carrying out limited objective attacks to gain a suitable line of departure for the renewal of the offensive, and planning the second penetration of the German West- wall,

By 5 February, remaining elements of the three division whoso task forces had infantry had boon acting as - , arrived in the Seventh Army area, The 101st Airborne Division was assigned to 6th Army Group just, after its release from the Bastogne trap 'to bolster our position north of Strasbourg.

American elements of. 6th Army Group never fought harder for their existence than from the time Seventh Army's offensive was stopped on 20 December until the line vowsfinally stabilized along the Mcdor 'River and thence westward south of Bitcho. The disappoint- mont of everyone, especially of tho doughboys, at having to halt'a successful offensive against 'the Germans on 20 December was evident on evory hcando " r ý' ý rý ý_l .,. "., :. 0 O ü) 0 "ri 41 G "r-ý _ý", ý ;,ý ý 0 " y rCi U) G`) i-1 'i. 1 SIL 0 -1ýý (: iý! ý ur J :. "r-j .ý S-r r', O ý-{ :--I ;"-: "r.; . Cý ý! --I i:.' r--1 Cý? U !: ý

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The First French Army r. emain.3d unable to close the Colmar Pocket with its own means. Practically the same state of morale existed amongst the Colonial troops as prevailed during the latter stages of the proceeding period; and the only important gains made on that front were by the 3rd U. S. Infantry Division, advancing slowly, doggedly southward through snow covered rough terrain.

Although Headquarters 6th Army Group "did 'not fail to evaluate correctly the Germants potentialities, we failed to appreciate our own weakness. At first we had hoped to go on the defensive in the north while at the same time renew the offensive with the French on the south to close the Colmar Pocket. This plan failed. Hence, we were forced on the defensive throughout the entire sector.

Comprehensive and continuous study of the terrain and enemy capabilities had lcd this headquarters to believe that the entire area south of the 1Vosolle should be the responsibility of one commander. Study of the terrain corridors in the area shows that" the Moselle avenue 'of approach leads directly into 6th Army Group's back door. But this avenue was not a 6th Army Group responsibility until the back door was reached. :dith divided responsibility, coordination of defenses of the sector was difficult. -Under these conditions, conduct of a defense against an attack in the Trier NIerzig sector would have been immeasurably retarded. Although no such attack materialized, Headquarters 6th Army Group experienced many uneasy hours during this defensive, phase.

The fourth paragraph, page 36, should read as

follovs; A

Ample warning had been given both XV and VI Corps of the imminence of German attacks in the actual areas in which they came. After staggering backwards initially XV Corps recovered quickly and threw back the German attack with heavy losses., except in the Rimling area, where hard fighting continued fr three days.. However, on its right in the-Bitche area hard won ground had to be surrendered as a security measure in holding the

forces the woak of wrong composition. - ,a, 36

RESTRICTED 1-ý.:;`I'FICTIý.D

CfLLFTFR S'IX

REDUCTIONOF THE COLLAR PCCiL T

ihile on the defensive, never once did the Commanding General, 6th amy Group ontcrtainany idea other than one of resuming the offensive at the earliest opportunity. During the hectic days �hen Seventh army vas repulsing attempted German penetrations on three sides, the offensive was the chief topic of conversation. General Devers directed that liquidation of the Colmar Pocket must be accor: plished at the earliest possible date, and that before an all out offensive to breach the Siegfried line commenced.

After buttoning up defensive plans frorii all angles, JPS turned . its attention to the south. As a result, Operation "Cheerful'" was presented for approval. It was felt that since the French to date had been unable to eliminate the Colmar Pocket, additional troops : could be necessary. For this purpose. -our planners recommended employment of an American Corps of two infantry divisions and one armored division. One of the infantry divisions - 3rd - already was under operational control of the First French Army. The planners' recomr3endcd drives from north and south. The attack in the south would precede the northern push, which was to be the main effort by the ii ucrican corps, by at least two days. A maximum of seven days was estimated for the operation and it was recommended that it be started prior to 20 February, before the spring thaws made ,the Rhine Plain a sea of mud.

Early in January, General de Lattre visited General Devers

and, proposed a plan for liquidation of the Pocket with forces available to him at that time. General Devers, however, did not think the French had strength enough to accomplish the mission, and held off giving his approval.

On 14 January, Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, Chief of Force, 6th Staff, Allied -Expeditionary visited Headquarters Army Group. The entire situation was aired. General Smith was asked for two divisions, one infantry division to be employed, in'the Colmar Pocket operation and one :armored division to replace 2, DB behind XV Corps when the former was shifted east of the Vosges to take part in the French attack. On 15 January, a SHAEF cable attached 10th Armored Division and 28th Infantry Division to 6th Army Group. It was understood that 28th Division was not to be used in- a full-scale offensive-because of its depleted condition. It had been badly battered in. 'the Ardennes breakthrough and was relieved from the line. to refit and assimilate large numbers of reinforcements. announced General Devers that the Colmar Pocket offensive would be launched 20 January in order to make maximum use of the best predicted period of weather prior to the spring thaws. Jlith these two newly assigned divisions already on the way, Headquarters 6th

-- 37 RESTRICTED

Army Group issued Letter of Instructions Number Nine, 18 January, calling for a coordinated offensive to eliminate the Colmar Pocket. The southern attack by I French Corps, beginning 20 January, was to be on the axis Cernay-Guebwiller, thereafter exploiting in the direction of the Brisäch Bridge., The main effort by II French Colmar Corps was to be launched 22 January between and Selestat

directed southeast. For scheme of maneuver, see Figure 12. The

28th Division was placed under operational control of First French Army for the operation.

Seventh Army was directed to pass 2 DB to operational control of First French Army in time for the northern operation. A second

armored, division Seventh Army nominated the 12th -- was to be -- assembled south of Saverno, by 22 January for possible use by the French. 10th Armored Division was attached to the Seventh Army upon its arrival in the Sarrebourg area.

Beginning on 18 January, 28th Division moved into the line on the right of 3rd U. Si Division in II French Corps sector. 10th Armored Division began "arriving in Seventh Army area-on the same date.

Plans for the operation were worked out in minutest detail, For the operation, which was expected to last seven days, sufficient artillery ammunition for 10 days of battle was provided, from 6th Army Group's small reserve. Warnings were issued that more artillery ammunition might not be available and that great care must be exer- cised in the expenditure of amounts allocated for the operation.

The enemy situation was closely scrutinized. By the r_iiddlo of January 269 Gorman Infantry and 30 SS Divisions had moved out of the Pocket. It seas-estimated that 15,000 combat effectives remained in But' for the pocket2 any of them second rate troops. weeks replace- . Pocket ments had'been arriving in the and the Germans wore contin; uously strengthening their defenses.

The importance attached by the Germans to holding their bridgehead west of the Rhine can be inferred from the fact that Himmlor was placed in direct command of. the sector. G-2 reported that the Germans could launch an attack through the Pocket towards either St. Die or Remiremont in conjunction with a strong attack in. the north. This double-attack., if successful, would make Seventh Army's positions in the Rhine Plain to the north of Strasbourg untenable to the:. the Vosges Mountains. 'Re- and force a withdrawal -line. of . capture of 'Strasbourg and Alsace would have been a valuable victory for the Germans and would have-strengthened their propaganda cam- it have taken the Rundstedt paign. Also, might .some of pressure off in the Ardennes area. So great was the Germans t apparent 'confidence in accomplishing this that Himmler is reported to have promised Strasbourg to Hitler by 30 January, anniversary of National Socialism. a I - 38 .. RESTRICTED Scale 11500,000 ; i/' %. Strasbourg "!!Iý% ' Frort Lim3 intijrnationcl Boundcrius aý iZivurs 1ýý %ý ý-ý Cities ,!

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As scheduled, I Corps' attack on the south jumped off on 20 January during a snow storm with the 2 DIM, 9 DIC, 4 DMM and elements of 1 DB making the attack. Tactical surprise was gained, and initially the French elements made rapid, progress. By nightfall of the first day the Bois do Nonnebruch and the Cernay-Mulhouse railroad had been reachedo However, I Corps failed to continue the exploitation that night. It halted its advance. As was to be expected,. Germans reacted rapidly the next morning. and vigorous counterattacks were launched against I Corps. Hence, small progress was made the second day as the French hurled back repeated counter- the front. See Figure 13. attacks all along . Carrying out the second phase of the operations, II French Corps attacked on 22 January using the 1 DMI, 2 DB and 3rd U. S.

Division backed by elements of-5 DB in the' main assault. ' After infilträting through the Föret Communal do Colmar during the night, 3rd U. S. Division reached the eastern edge just at-daylight and

jumped off in its attack while the 3 DIx spent the' night repulsing

'a counterattack at Kilstett. Slow progross was made across the

entire front initially.. duo to thick mine fields.

By 24 January I Corps attack had begun to slacken while the 3rd U. S. Division in II Corps continued to make progress. The Ill River was cleared. from Selestat to Illhaeusern and the Forot Communal de Colmar was freed of enemy.

While only local gains were being made on I Corps front, 3rd U. S. Division of II Corps reached the Colmar Canal at three points on 26 Janaury. Farther to the north a bridgehead was established

by I DMI across the Ill River at Huttonheim.

Not satisfied with the progress of the attack, General Dovers requested an additional infantry division from SHAEF. The request was approved, resulting in 75th Infantry Division moving into the First French Army sector on 27 January. On 29 January, Headquarters XXI Corps assumed command of American units --- 3rd, 28th and 75th Infantry, Divisions -- in addition to elements of 5 DB. Hission Corps to. continue the attack 'Brisach. of MCI. was. and capture The attack was renewed, both from the north and south.

By 29 January,,. I Corps was fighting in the outskirts of Cornay the and the Foret do Nonnenbruck. In north, XXI Corps established a bridgehead south of the. Colmar Canal and was advancing on Colmar from the north.

Slow progress was male on the south,, By 3 February 3rd U. S. Division had 'reached Neuf . 'Brisach and 28th Division had taken Colmar. Elements of 2 DB relieved 5 DB units fighting with, the 3rd Division and continued to drive up the Rhine.

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On 5 February, 12th Armored Division, which had been recently 28th Division assigned to XXI Corps, passed through in the Colmar Coimer-Ruf-ch. area and drove southward on the axis Resistencc . in hours encountered was, quickly overrun and 24 the iýmoricans had contacted elements of 1 DB driving from-the--south. This isolated 10th (Billette) the entire Vosges sector in front of Division.

At the same time, 3rd Division stormed Neuf Brisach and 2 DB drove southward to join elements of 1 DBat Fessenheim on 7 February. The Colmar Pocket was completely sealed off and only mopping up

operations remained. For advances by phase, see Figure 13. the During the entire battle, weather had been worst recorded in that part of the Rhine Plain in 10 years. Battle casualties of both French and American units were heavy as also were the non- battle casualties resulting mainly from the abnormal weather. Battle casualties for XXI Corps during the entire operations numbered

2y961 while non-battle casualties took the heavier toll 3$228. The

French casualties were even heavier. A total of 5,067 battle casualties were suffered as against 11,963 non-battle casualties.

From 28 January to 10 February, XXI Corps captured a total of

6,420 Germans, while during the entire operation, from 20 January, other elements of First French army counted a. total of 10,018 prisoners.

With the reduction of the Pocket, French units took up defensive positions along the Rhino from north of Strasbourg to Basle, relieving American elements which had played a major part in the operation.

First French Army had assumed responsibility for defense of Strasbourg on 7 January.

Everyone felt elated when word spread that the German no longer

held territory west of the Rhine south of Strasbourg. But there was no time for leisurely adjustments. American units had to be redeployed. Two of the divisions used -- 28th and 75th ---had boon borrowed from SIkEF for the job. They had to be returned. Too, the defense the Rhine the French sector had to be coordinated of . within now that the front lines had been moved up.

To accomplish this, Headquarters 6th Army Group issued Lotter of Instructions Number Ten, 12 February, telling Seventh Army and First French Army to defend along thair' present'litie; 'pointing out the Vosgos Mountain Line as the main battle position to be used only in case of necessity. Intermediate and switch positions wore delineated for First French Army in the Rhine Plain. See Figure 13. Both Armies were instructed to rotate units in line and institute immediately intensive training programs designed to prepare all units for resumption of the offensive. '

The weather was still bad. The spring thaw had set in and in many places roads had completely c'ctcriorated. " In other places, in the mountains, roads were almost impassable due to snow, and deteriora-

.w40 - FETMIC7'ED

tion during, the: wintcr months iahcn rcpf..irs Sucre impossible. This fc. the -. s they st to head situation ccd .mc.ric. -n units arted north- w,-, rd out of the, pocket ^rc:r.. On 11 Fcbrmr -, 75th Division started Two days 1^ to 28th Division I movcrmnt out of the pocket . stcrtc. northward. both divisions n.: sscd through the rcmr:indor of 6th Army Group :. rca with only a slight pause, ho.-.ding for the 12th Army Group: 12th armored ý'.nd 3rd infantry Divisions movc,4, into Seventh' Army arc_ beg nr_ing 18 Febru.: rr, in Army rr. scrvo, to got Jacll deserved period of rst.

Proof of the ; oundnc: ss of t"h°. T)1,-.n is found in results obtained, and had thc: entire Corps, :..s rc cor,li: ic: ndcd by. JPS, bccn c:v.. ilc: ble on 20 J...nü:. ry, there is little doubt but th: ý.t the opcr: tion :aoulc, hý..vc>- bccn in the scvc: . ov;. r n The Co-1!-.nding Gcncr<.,l, 6th ;,.rm; r Group, wa,s in thorough 'ccord

with the J!, ':') from the outset in the, m.ttor of additionc. l troop., bl`v to th, Frcnch in out the. Col! prob,:. needed =assist - wiping .-,:r Pocket. But it looked". --.s if only one...more inf_. ntr division, - it hý.d -28th -- could b(-. rý:: v...il, 'olc for the job, ý;nd to bc: done.. The good wac:,. r rc. riod, bc.ginning 20 J.Anu,:rlr, :s dr.. wi.r_g nc r, _thc: full Corps . ,.nd thus -the z.tt-ck was or dc:rcd before. the: rc coln::ncndcd by J; -S bc: bled rut thc: division d the could ; sc. e other rr-s m- il: b�' 6haEF thrown into the ý.vc. äblc, c.s soon ws .possibly, and Faction, s v, s 12th armorcd Division which opcr-,.t, 7cl with XXI Corps during ' of the PririarilfT, it America the latter st: gcs ction . ti-r..s :..n n show in the : i:.in ctt. _.ek on the north flank with 3rd Division carrying t he brunt of the fighting initi: ally <_,nd thcn XX1 Corp s with its three argcrio:..n inf: ntr-, divisions, one French arriorcd division and ono Ti. ,. . x-iored division fin_! llty settling: the issue..

The cntirc supply of, :. rtillcry :.:ru:, unition sct up for thc; Frc:nch for thc:., opcr.:.tion in thr south w., s shot up dur. n,1ý73,the fir ,t fivcý d,:.'-vs of b-ý:ttlr,. üoi.vc:vcr, L.::Zpl<, wcrnil. zg of thc, sc.-: rcit`, of all ttrpcs of artillory'. ctr:l:nunition had bccn issuc: dy ý:nc? thc: blý''1cý for t"j. is unvrc.rru. ntr; d c:xtrt: v,-. Ecncc rests squarcl' on thc: shouldcrs of thosc. controlling the cxpc nditurc in First 1`rcnch trmy. hddi. tioný :l c,r. mnunition to cor^plc:tc: thc. opcr,: tion -vc.s providcd f.rot-I our", c.lmost c:x h<:.ustc d re sc:rvc .

Closing of thc. Colm.: Pockct put r: nc; a light on th( ý:uholcý 6th _r irm;. r Group ps.cturc. M-. Frc.nch could no-,v take ovcr morc of the. troops b+,: dc. 11i nc:9 ýnd Ldditior. al could m,. c,vc: ilc: b1c. to ýc:vcnthý ýrmy the vc; thc: for resumption of offc. =: o In fic;,.ntimc , those troops could bc used to rclic. vc: others for rest : nd refit in rc,.: r re-s,", pending the green light. on th.: big -rush ý:ahich we knc:.-r ,uý. s soon to co;;Ic. .

-41-. RESTRICTED

CiU,PTER SEVEN

ß'ýE«C1IIINGTI-M SIEGFRIED LIPJE i, I?D OVERRUNNINGTUE SLiR

Long before the German counter offensive started in the i rdennes, 6th had planners of Headquarters irmy Group turned their attention to plans for crossing the Rhine River. Ls Seventh 1,rr, 1y and. First French Lrmy relentlessly battered German forces enroute to capture Strasbourg and 1iulhouse, JtSts first recoriraendation was made. - On 19 November, the Chief of Staff was presented 'a paper proposin, S an assault crossing north of Strasbourg, aimed at a bridgehead tied to the northern tip of the 6th Black forest. i1t that time, ; rmy Group's long ra-rioe mission was to occupy the Nuremberg Regensberg unich h,-. s been - . .area. is previously recorded, Seventh 1.rmy was turned northward after re aching the Rhine and nothing' came of this plan.

planners were so busily en3aged in defensive planninb during the latter part of December and early January that offensive thoughts went into hibernation. In mid-January S E.', EF's predicted operations of 17 December for 1945, in three phases, 'were studied in detail.

First JPS thought was a recommendation on 17 January that upon resumption of the offensive, the main effort be along the Blois River Valley. It recommended that plans for the operation be drawn with a view to employing the available armored means in mass.

On 2G January JPS prepared a report on S L',EF Planner ts paper on 'Future Operations in 1945', ', 17 December. Our planners did not agree with the idea of closing to the Rhine throughout its length prior to making an assault crossing with the main effort in the North. Our planners contended that the Germans would be expecting a main effort against the Ruhr and therefore would have their forces disposed behind already prepared positions to meet the att4 ck. 1'. crossing of the River in the south as soon as possible with a subsequent drive on the Frank- furt-Kassel axis was the JPS plan to soften up the Ruhr by pulling; Ger- an troops to the south. With i; merican forces moving on the Kassel area. three important sectors of Germany -- the Ruhr, Hanover and Leipzig- threatened. Berlin -- would be

After the Colrl, -,r Pocket operations wore underway and the German being 25 Tanuary, TPS 1';rdennes-bulge was reduced, on completed a study in hich on "Operations In The Immediate Future'-' v they recommonded that following completion of the C.elmiar operations, all American Divisions for be given a two wcehs period rest, refitting and rehabilitation before launched. During this ti . e, 6th Army Group a now offensive was . could be building up its artillery ammunition supply to the level ' ro-

quired for operations against the Siegfried Line.

Early in February the Colmar Pocket was eliminated and Seventh Army was still on the defensive. In the north., SFLEF directed 21st Army Grow;

- 42 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

with TTinth U. S. Lrmy attached to institute operations to close to the Rhino in, the Emmorich--Ijesel area not later than 10 February. 12th hrmy , Group was instructed to continue its present attacks east of the l,,rdonnes, 6th Regrouping Of 1;rmy Group corlmonced 15 February when 75th and 79th Infantry Divisions were released. XXI Corps reverted to control of left. Seventh ýrmy and was given a sector on the 3rd Infantry Division was withdrawn from the French sector and placed in SIL EF reserve in the Pont a-ý; ousson area-. 18 February. The same'day 20th Division began departing 6th army Group area. On 20 February, 12th irniored Division went into STIF F reserve in the St, "sold area and 2 DB beg n movement from the ared to Western France to come under control of the French Llinistry of War,

Continuing perusal of all possible lines of action, JPS completed 19 February -'Operations to Close to the Rhine far i a study on as north as its confluence with the Foselle'". It was deemed possible that all or part of Third Lrmy might be withdrawn from operations north of the r: osel- Target to be le to assist. date for. the operation was assumed any time after 13 March.

The JPS plan called for the mein effort up the valley bf the Bleis Worms River on the axis Saarg)uemines - Kaiserlautern - with a secondary effort through the Hardt Mountains on the axis Neiderbronn-'Hinterweidon- thal. The secondary effort was to be launched 48 hours prior to the main attack. Looking to the relief of all Lmericcn elements on the Franco; Italian frontier, tin lupine Front Commendwas established effective .1 Larch. General de Corps dt�rmec Doycn was placed in command of the front, ijt that time, the 27th French Alpine Division and Loth L morican Brigade were holding the front. 1 DII.I was relieved from First French ;rmy and completed the relief of [nth .tA Brigade. in the, southern sector about 18. March.

On 4 March, SHLEF advised all subordinate conýnands that operations to the Rhine in of 21st Army. Group to close zone wore making excellent instructed 12th «rny Group to be, progress. The same rýnssage prepared to to the Rhine the Mosollo as launch an offensive to close north of soon 6th Army as success of the British effort -was assured. Group, the mes- defense and for sage said, was !^ i_rtaining ar. aggressive preparing plans operations in the Saar.

12th Lrmy Group met brilliant success in its attack to close to the continuing, S&'EF called for 6th army Rhine. 11Sthe operations wore.: Group's for operations in the. SALR. Since this was purely an army plan its 5 rmy job, Seventh frrgy was asked for plan. On Iü rch, -Seventh j, submitted a plan generally in line with recommendations previously made by JPS--broach the Siegfried Line in the Bleis River Valley and. advance on the axis Saarguemines-Kiiserlautern-ti'Jorms. Plans celled for seizing a bridgehead east of the Rhine as soon as possible after reaching the river. The main effort was to be the job of XV Corps.

.., 43 - FýSTRICTED RESTRICTED

ijr support, beginning D-10, was planned in detail. Prior to the attack, road, rail and supply installations in the Saar tiwere to be pounded continuously. During the attack phase, bombers wore scheduled to blast Siegfried defenses in front of XV Corps while fighter bombers were attacking all known enemy CP's. Close support was planned throughout the operations with first priority to XV Corps.

To these additional infantry divisions, carry out operations, _three one additional armored division and a few additional smaller combat and service units were requested. The plan was approved by General Devers with only minor changes.

On 6 March, the approved plan was submitted to S ',EF. The next day, SKEF informed G-3 that the plan` had been approved and that General

Eisenhower was enroute to 12th Army Group then to discuss rapid transfer of troops needed for the operation. 5th On ß March a cable from SIL EF directed that Army Group launch operations in the Saar as soon as 12th Army Group was assured of closing to the Rhine north 'of the Moselle, It was. pointed out that the ob-

ject of tbo operation was to hold as many German forces away from the the establish bridgeheads over the main effort in north as possible and . Rhine River in the Mainz-Mannheim area. To assist in the attack, 12 IXriy : in the, Gr::upy'ras to strike northeast from the Herzig area rear of enemy, The inter-army group boundary was set as: Conflans-Saarlautern (to new Krueznach- 6th ,, rmy Group)-Birdenfeld-Oberstein-Kirn-Sobernheim-Bad Bingen (to 12th LrmY Group). Detailed adjustment of the boundary was left to Army Group commanders. this time but No definite date for the attack was set at it was the target date be around mid-March. Thus generally agreed that must 6th tiaitrý' the gigantic task of moving in'newly ac- Group výr.ýs saddled «rmy its quired combat and service units, polishing attack plans and arrang behind the in a matter of seven days ing supply installations main effort

The target date for Seventh Army's offensive was set as 15 March in just two days 9th Armored Division a SI11,EF cable on 10 March, after seiz- the Remagen. bridge and, established the first bridgehead east of the ed Rhine, with this official date : set, the race to meet it was in full divisions allotted wore to be in the swing. Two of the additional used . Infantry Division 6th Armored Division� initial attack* They -- 71st and in Seventh Lz'my area on the night of ]4 1.1arch. The other two closed in Army divisions--4th Infantry-and 13th Armored--wore _reserve and closed. All troadway, the offensive got underti! ty. minor units, except one after, in Seventh Army to bridge company coming from. England, closed area prior credit: the attack, to 12th Army Group's everlasting

upon receipt of the official target date for the opera- Immediately Letter Number tion, Headquarters 6th ,rmy Group issued of-Instruction Eleven on 10 MMiarch. ý

44 w -

RESTRICTED RCSTRICLED

Seventh 1;rmy was instructed to assume Operational control of north (3 flank First French Lrmy Division DI.. '.) and use it in the operations. until the line of the Lauter River was reached. This was done in line with the idea of extending First French lirrlyts boundary northward to include better crossing sites. over the Rhine. River. See Figure 14

The main effort of Seventh hrmy was directed along the valley of the Bleis River on the axis Saarguemines--Kaiserslautern-Torras. French elements along the Rhine were kept on the defensive with the added mission of conducting strong raids nightly across the river to test enemy strengtl , and verify identification of hostile units. This effort was to be concentrated in the Brisach area..

Tust prior to D-day for Seventh lrmy, Third lxmy turned south, " crossed the Moselle River in the Coblenz area, Cnd started pushing south- eastvward. Seventh lrmy jumped off on 15 N"'rch The attack started on the' front of XV CorpsI at 0100 hours. By:.0715 hours all elements of Seventh , L L.rmy were attacking, having opened their assaults on a carefully worked out time table. First TLC12 flew 1670 sorties, an unprecedented number with the rm.ans available, in the initial attack, in perfect , support of weather.

Initial resistance was light are. spotty. XV Corps reached the outskirts of Bitche and by-passed the strong point which had held out agairet frontal assaults in December prior to the defensive period, ma Corps advanced up to five kilometers and VI Corps crossed the Zintzel River and captured, Baerenthal in the Hardt mountains. More than 2,000 prisoners were taken by Seventh Yzmy during the first day.

On 17 March, ) Corps had broken into the Siegfried Line east of Saarbrucken and XV Corps reached the first bolt of fortifications. VI Corps continued to advance. On the north, Third army's offensive had gained momentum. across the l;losello and the Siegfried Line south of Trier was being rolled back as 12th Armored Division was rushed from Seventh , _ LLrmy to Third , xmy to take of the breakthrough and. come in be- . "advantage hind the Siegfried Line defenses.

on i8 March, 3rd Division penetrated the main Siegfried defenses south of Zweibrucken, and Gth rmorcd Division in XV Corps reserve, was alerted to pass through the infantry end exploit toyrards I aiscrlautorn. VI Corps had the Hagenau Forest XXI Corps was embroiled outflanked -and in heavy fighting in the Siegfried Line.

To strengthen the VI Corps attack,, G-3 consulted with G-3 Seventh of releasing the remainder of 5 DB from Lrrly Group .iAlrmy on advantages reserve cnd attaching it to 3, DIL, which was fighting with VI Corps. it by General Dovers. Seventh :"army wanted this done, and was approved Groupement 1-,7ontsabert was formed of 3 DID, and 5 DB and placed unor VI

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Figure u. RESTRICTED

Corps control, The Grouper cat wos to rcm^in under Seventh Lrmy until it ruched the line of, the Erlen River, when its offcrisivc mission for the nonce would be completed c nd it would revert, to control of First French 1army,

By 20 MMiarch, VI Corpst attack had reached into the Siegfried Line and had been measurably slowed. But XV and XXI Corps broke completely through the Westwall and started exploitation towards the Rhine. Third I:.rmy elements were working 'iii the Kaiserlautern area and wore headed for Worms after reaching Mainz. On 21 March, )O Corps was pinched out and took responsibility for mopping up the area in the Saarluturn area.

Boundary changes between Third and Seventh ,"Xny occurred almost daily during the exploitation phase in the Saar. As Third ;',.rmy, adva ac- ing east and southeast in the face of light opposition, reached points along the agreed operational boundary, `, other chalige would take place, Wit h the arrival of Sevent h Army units in the area, the boundary would be changed back,

SVIeeping across the' rolling country through the gap in Siegfried defers es ryade by Third ;army, 12th :armored Division swung in behind the defenses in the route through the Siegfried .d assisted opening pill box the front. . area all along On 23,1jcrch, VI Carps broke through the thick defenses in the Riillo Plcin while XV Corps rushed divisions to the Rhino to relieve Third Lrmy elements elre dy clone the River. Corps which w;-s now in Seventh Ixmy's continued to mop up energy pockets of resistance tile . center -Ilong Rhine River.

With Seventh and. Third i,.rmies making rapid progress towards clearing the Saar, SI- 'sEF on 22 March outlined plans for operations east of the Rhine. ' -fission of units fighting south of the Moselle was set as es- tablishing "- bridgehead in the Frankfurt area generally delineated by, a line along the Neckar River to Freibach-morbach-lain River-to Hanau- Giessen-Siegen-Siegen River to its junction with the Rhino. Main advance from this bridgehead was to be towards Kassel, 6th SI REF directed that eventually, limy Group would control the area 12th Lrmy Group the south of the Main River .d area north of ;the Main River. As soon as agreed between the two "Lrmy Group cor enders, the in ter boundary would be cho.:iged to: SaarbruclLen-IýTeur_kirchen- array -group Nohfelden-Nahe River to Bad Nreuzr_ach-P,Linz-Yain River-to Mnau-Freid- berg-Geissen (to 12th A",rmy Group).

ins the instructions were received, Seventh Army vas regrouping and . so bringing up bridging rind assdult oquipment in accordur_ce with plans to tho opportunity. XV Corps to cross the Rhine at earliest possible , was malm this main effort, too. Thus on 24 March, one clay after Third "army crossed t1 Rhine, XV Corps relieved elen ants o Third Army in the Worms area. The next day Seventh t.,rmy, emp loiir. g the vetora. 3rd and 45th 46 RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

Infantry Divisions v:hich hcd r.icde the main assault rgainst the Siegfried Line, crossed the Rhine. There wore still few pockets of en eriy resistance west of the Rhine but those were being taken care of by troops as they regrouped. For situation, see Figure 15.

Seventh ýrriy captured 30,000 prisoners in this action, including many high ranking Germa officers, in. addition to inflicting heavy ., losses on the ciýe~iy in materiel. The Air arm°aas pdrticulairly effect- ivc co. clishing 1L:rgd conveys and : akin E, dý;ylight movericnt for the. impossible. Reads throughout the droa wore enc: y al^_ st . checkered with craters z:nd dcttod -,,with hundreds of destroyed vehicles z:nd gun 6th had long headquarters ; rmy Group and Seventh ýýrmy planed this offensive, and when the order came, were ready. But the short notice In was felt in the'movement of new troops into the area. less than seven days time, it was necessary to move approximately 130,000 troops into Seventh Lrmy area in addition to some 14,000 tons of artillery am mutual munition. working with a precision that exuded concern, 12th hrmy Group and Conad pushed their facilities to the limit to help the 6th overstrained *facilities, of arny Group. -aid as a result, everything of major import was in place when H-hour struck. 6th Some doubtless may wonder at the decision of 1,rmy Group to make instead its main effort up the valley of the Blois River of up the Rhino Plain. Looking at it purely from a tactical standpoint, it would appear to Third Army lemonts that a drive dawn the Rhine Plain contact c advancing from the north would have encircled the entire Saar and sot the stage to bag oil German elements in the area. But the corridor was narrow; it was within range of big guns east of . the Rhine and the road net out, of range of these guns for supplying a main effort was not adequate; at least 15 strearmmscut across the plain between the Siegfried Line and Worms; chances for exploiting rapidly with armor wore limited because of the narrcri.. corridor and obstacles those streams provided. Too; the here it Siegfried Line vj.--s thickest - 20 kilometers - nd ,i "bcliovod in breaking through that sufficient time would be consumed those do-, fenses to give the German opportunity to withdraw his forces cast of the Rhine.

the On the other hc_nd, Bleis River corridor was wide enough to take enemy defenses maximum ^dvartage of azzlored exploitation; were not as the support strong in this area; and road not would a major effort. the Siegfried Line in the Saar- We reasoned that a rapid penetration of for guemines area would open the way speedy exploitation and overrunning before they withdraw; behind the Rhine., In this of Gelman forces could . blow could be dealt to the German Army. way it was felt a more dcn, aging The Siegfried Line This we believe proved to be the case. was penetrat- between Seventh Third ed, quickly in the Saarguemines area, Änd and before the heavy Siegfricd Armies the entire Saar-Palatinate was overrun Rhine Plain h(; been completely reduced. defenses is the --d

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15 RESTRICTED

outs t and irg in the operation was the close cooperation and coordi- Third 1, in nation between Seventh and . xrzies cn extremely fluid situation. Operational boundaxios wore changed elmost daily to permit unrestricted exploitation by either unit in a position to do so, regardless of whether 'the area was originally assigned as en objective or not,, This period the in between two bent represented ultimate cooperation ^ rmies _on dc- stroying the enemy regardless of who received credit for the job.

'tor the Gaiubsheim action, 12th Armored Division had polished its technique in the Colmar Pocket fighting and it CUmc into. its, own in the Saar battle. Moving rapidly, from Seventh Army to Third Army, the division plunged through the prepared gap in onoray defenses and' swept rapidly eastward to open the back door of the Siegfried defenses, halting only when it reached the Rhine.

w . _4g iý:.. ).,,, V 1..: +ý-ý. -.. -r. -. _ý. ý... -ý.... -+... r'i ý. r . .

CM1'TER EIGHT

CROSSING Tý-'ý 1ýIIII+,` JUM i;DV1'.Tý ITIG_E.,"1S1: T"ý'ýD

Operations to breach the Siegfried Line and cross the Rhine River had always been considered as one continuous operation by planners of 6th Army Group. When plans were polished for defeating the enemy in the Saar-Palatinate the contemplated river crossing operations were scruti-

nized and needed materiel assembled. As Seventh Army moved along the Bleis' River Valley this materiel was pushed forward, close to the front lines, and necessary instructions issued to XV Corps to sustain operations through seizure of a bridgehead between the Main and Neckar Rivers. Thus as Seventh Army closed to the Rhine on 24 March, the stage was set stepping barrier for the next move -- across the final major protecting the Nazi homeland.

Facing 6th Army Group were the German First and Nineteonth Armies, both depleted from staggering ' defeats suffered in the Saar-Palatinate and Colmar Pocket operations. On the south, the Nineteenth Army had been In unable to reinforce materially its decimated units. ' the north, the First Army was still punch-drunk from its recent drubbing in the Saar-- Palatinate. 6th On 25 I; arch, lmny Group tivas along the Rhine from the Swiss bord- had er to north' of ! Dorms. Third Array on the. left crossed the, Rhino on 24 March at Op?enheim urd had advanced rapidly eastward with an armored driving to its spearhead threatening Darmstadt. First Army was expand

Remagen bridgehead and link up with Third Army in the Frankfurt. Area.

The British 21st Army Group vacs in the process of crossing the Rhine 25 March. north of fiesel. The actual' crossing was -effected

6th Army Group was ready to cross the Rhine with Seventh Army at Army for in tho I;:Torms and was readying First French an assault crossing the Saar' Speyer area. Due to strict conservation measures preceding Seventh Army to the Rhine, battle and the speed with which the closed bright. Railheads had boon. the artillery ammunition picture was already lines through the advanced to Strasbourg and work was undemay on rail, to the Rhine Frank- Saar. It was estimated that railheads could move at enthal by 3 April. 12th limy, to On 25 Marc", SIT"EF directed 21st. and Groups effect a junctiolq in the M ssol-Padcrborn area and then mop-up and occupy the to the flan: encircled area. 6th Army Group was directed pr6tect right

12th Army Croup as far north -as the Hohe Rhon hill mass. 1,'Q were of two directed to be prepared to reloase one or divisions to the 12th Army Group. The inter-army group boundary was established as: Saar- brucken-NNleunkirchen-Nohfelden=-I1a1ne River to. Bad Yreuznach-Mainz-I lain eirºingen (to 6th River, to Frankfurt (to 12th Army Group) -I-lü.nau-Fulda-I, . Army Group.

-49.. ESTRTCTED Seventh Army was ready to. cross the'Rhine. The'plan called for XV Corps to make the assault crossing. XV Corps put 3rd'and 45th Infantry Divisions in the assault. after a bridgehead had been established other divisions would be crossed and used. to drive east'and south to establish the desired bridgehead. See Figure 16.

As VI` and 'XXI Corps continued ;regrouping and mopping up : vest of the Rhine, XV Corps made its assault crossing at 0230 hour's' 26 IN-hrch, Reasonably heavy resistance was encountered, especially from multi-gun

anti-aircraft weapons, mortars and self-propelled guns. Initial. . resistance was soon overcome, and by mid-morning 3rd Division held a bridgehead four miles long and two miles deep, while north of 'orms, 45th Division's bridgehead was four miles deep and six miles long.

JJithin 24 hours of the jump-off the two bridgeheads had joined and XV Corps held a front along the line Sandhofen-Sandtorf and thence along, the autobahn from webt of. Hidtenfeld to east of Gernsheim. See Figure 17,

By 27 March, 45 Division had broken out of the bridgehead and con tacted Third Army elements in the vicinity of hschaffenburg, 30 miles east of the Rhine. ' 3rd Division and 44th Division, which were moved ,:, east. of the Rhine 26 March, were making rapid advances against heavy opposition in the Odenwald and in the Rhine Plain.

I On 29 March., XXI Corps assumed responsibility for the southern sector of the bridgehead and Seventh Army was in process of moving the remainder of its forces across the river. At 1200 hours PNZannheim surrendered. Seventh army held a line generally along the Nectar River to Everbach to Amorbach. and along the Main to Aschaffenburg with', reconnaissance. elements beyond.

To carry out SHHEFis directive of 25 11arch, Headquarters 6th Army Group issued Letter of Instruction Number Twelve, 27 March. Seventh Army was directed to advance rapidly northeast, seize the Hohe Rhon hill mass and protect the right flank of Third Army. Afterwards, Seventh Army was to extend reconnaissance to Graben-Bruschal-Heilbronn-Crailsheim Rothenburg-Neustadt-Bamberg-Coburg-Ilmenau. The Army was instructed to utilize highly mobile reconnaisance elements and retain strong reserves to to as mobile striking forces, prepared exploit the northeast, east or-: southeast.

First French army vas in; 3tructed. to regroup räpidly and provide and a corps composed'®f two, infantry, divisions one armored division fora crossing of the Rhine in the Germersheim area and seize Karlsruhe, Pforzheim and Stuttgart. The' inter-army boundary was moved northward to give the Speyer crossing sites to First French Army, .ý

General Devers dispatched a cable to General de Lattre on'33 t:'Iarch instructing speed in preparations for crossing the Rhine. The same evening the Chief, 'of Staff, First French Army visited Headquarters 6th Army 50 ýý!ý`ýTLICT'D

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Group. He informed General Dovers that First French Army would make an assault crossing of the Rhine at 0500 hours 31 March.. General Devers was agreeably surprised at the speed with which the French had regrouped and made preparations for crossing the Rhine. After sharp fighting the bridgehead was established as scheduled. By 1 April build- up of forces was progressing rapidly and contact had been established with VI Corps.

On 31 March, Seventh Army was lined up with XV Corps on the North, XXI Corps in the center and VI Corps on the right. Mission of XV Corps was to capture the Hohe Rhon hill mass; XXI Corps to capture ffurzburg; and VI Corps to advance south and east to the designated reconnaissance line. , On 2 April, Seventh Army had by-passed Aschaffenborg and. advanced 12 miles to the east. Elements of 100th Division in the south were advancing on Heilbronn. 12th Army Group had completed its encircle-' ment of the Ruhr. Throughout Germany enemy forces were falling back before gathering Allied pressure with little hope of being able to position. establish a defensive

SHAEFts instructions of 2 April directed-the dividing of enemy forces by a powerful thrust eastward on the axis Kassel-Leipzig and destruction of the German army. The main thrust was 12th Army Group's mission. 6th Army Group was directed to protect the southern flank of 12th Army Group as far as the Bayreuth area. In addition, 6th Army Group was ordered to be prepared to launch a strong offensive on the, axis Nurnberg Regensberg-Linz but not at the expense of, its primary mission. The inter-Army Group boundary was extended from Meinengon to Bayreuth.

Headquarters 6th Army Group extended the, objective . and reconnaissance lines of both Armies. Seventh Army was instructed to seize the line : Ludwigsburg-Crailsheim-Nurnborg-Bayreuth and extend reconnaissance to: Stuttgart-Aalen-Wo issenborg-Sulzbach Rosenberg-N7atred Weitz. First French'Army's objective line was: Lichtenau-Pforzhoim- Ltidwigsburg with reconnaissance to Kehl and Stuttgart.

Seventh Army was to be prepared to advance southeast on Linz and First French Army was instructed to be prepared to seize the Black Forest and clear the eastern bank of the Rhine River.

On 4 April, Kcrlsruhe fell to the French. and Seventh Army ran into strong opposition in Heilbronn: - On 9 April, XV Corps captured the Hohe Rhon hill mass after VI Corps had thrust a long armored spearhead to Crailsheim and the French had taken Pforzheim.

Advances continued toward Bayreuth in the north while the center of Seventh Army pushed towards Nurnberg. On 12 xpril,, VI Corps' armored spearhead at Crailsheim was forced to withdraw after repeated counterattacks while Heilbronn was finally cleared of the enemy«only after three

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daiTs house to house figting. The French jr,. the south h ad roa, ciacd of tiZ'11'liE. a ,..)07 It opposite >jtraSbOUrg On ' =d T`ji; rc: i cýlEtl'c: tlllg i, 11Z north- --, r ýie Forest. -? 'lr, ?ý edges t_ ee ý ex of Lýl, ýc1L , f ýv. t SL"ý-', ý-ý, prisoýzerst poured into .4 1;ýrr: y; o,,, ý enclosures býr t-_eý, t_ýousc.ý. ýlds. Y:pproxiraately 113,937 prisoners were ta,: er_ du rin3 the )eriocý ý;x-. SE y, . cG-pt in i1 ghtinýý in ý'Lsc'ý.ý:ffO: bur; ý1cilbroiý whore vc; 11ti1 t; ir: ljT r^_Zý into tough house-to-house fighting, -if. casualties were not he av3r,

6th crossed the During this - period - ý' y Group 1üiille or, the nd Little heels of retreating, disorganized eneny. opposition ,,,,as c: s- countered the after the initial crust and a period of exploitation started

t:ihic tivas to, carry to the Brenner Pass.

Seventh Clay did a nc; týMif icent job of regrouping on the run and bringing forward necessary brid ins; and assault c;cuipi nt. The 1ý,riayQs before advance hardly stopped the length of a deep breath doughboys the i'lino to . the With the were paddling -. Cross dOb.: enel°y. The gained the advantage in Sacar-i'a latinate was rover-S-ill relinquished. Each Army dýa_yte pressure became stronger until finally German Group G began.LLto fall c_lart.

Only two instances of heavy fighting were en,.countered, and both Seventh. could have been partially, ifý not -wholly, avoided. was disorganized It did to dashir, madly after t-lo enemy. _not c: -,)Oct en- in Aschaffenburg, counter strong -resistance, especially JT.h.ere it , Jas tracts Third Conseque actually fclloýwiný the of i'ýrm eler efts. thy, the to-um found it -when seventh 1y troops rushed or and strop ly c fended they had gore too far to- redeploy and by-pass the strong point immediately. AA.pitched battle ensued against fanatical I, azi resistance The think happested resultin ire lost tir^ and heavy casualties. s sre In Seventh army formations were not in in 'Heilbronn. -both cases, a posi initially becalm embroiled in frog; t tion to maneuver C-1,11dconsequently a defended al attack a gainst a strongly city.

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CHAPTER.NINE

EXPLOITATION TO THE SOUTH

The opening of this chapter finds the enemy lines in a highly Front. fluid condition along the entire gestern The most pronounced the U. S. 6th Army semblance of order is on the front of Group. 1Tith a relatively large rear area still under his command in this Zone, the enemy has been able to maintain fairly good organizational control of his dwindling troops. Facing 6th Army Group are the remnants of Army Group "G" which is composed of the German First and Nineteenth Armies. but All enemy line divisions are receiving reinforcements, the rate of attrition keeps their actual strength at a fairly constant figure with diminishing quality. Our enemy can retreat gradually and concentrically behind natural terrain barriers along their entire front, with both flanks and rear protected. As long as the rate 'of withdrawal is by the he will be able to maintain a cohesive front; I controlled enemy, line the strength of which can, for a period, actually be increased. Although there is as yet no positive evidence of a prepared National Redoubt, the turn of military events is forcing our enemy to concentrate all his resources in'Southeastern Germany. It'is not believed that German Army Group G as a whole will surrender. Its only capability forces is still that of retreat and consolidation of along a gradually constricting perimeter; a capability which it can continue to exercise for considerable length of time, unless it is cut up and defeated a orderly retreat. too rapidly, to permit its

The 21st Army Group is continuing its operations to destroy, the' Germans in the North. The 12th Army Group is acting defensively on its left and center, but is poised ready to launch a powerful thrust with the Third Army to join hands with the Russians. 6th Army Group is anxious to go all out in pursuit of the enemy who has boen. badly beaten west of the Rhine River and who is retreating all along the front east of the Rhine; but we have a mission which prevents it, for the moment..: We must keep close control of our armies.

On 14 April, G-3,6th Army Group went to 12th Army Group to talk over the situation and plans with General Bradley, his Chief of Staff, General Allen, and his G-3, General Kibler. During that visit G-3 learned that General Bradley had. been warned that the Third Army would change its direction about the time it hit the important Bayreuth communications center and would move to the-'Southeast toward the Danube Valley and Salzburg;, that- Third Army would be composed initially of about 11 divisions and would be. raised eventually to 15. Those

divisions plus the expected strength of Seventh-Army and the strength of the First French Army would. bring the total number of divisions to 34. to be used in South Germany . about

On the morning of 15 April., after a general staff conference on results of this visit with 12th Army Group, General Dovers announced that he and G-3 would visit SHi EF the. nett day for a conference.

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SHAEF G-3 called during the 15th saying that a directive which would set out the course of our next operation was then in the course of preparation for approval by General Eisenhower., It would include initially the operation to destroy the Nineteenth Gorman Army, clear the Black Forest'area and the area south of Stuttgart and get the First French Army East the Rhine.. Later in the entire of . afternoon of the 15th, G-3 SHAEF,advised by phone that the directive had been approved and was on its way. The directive did, not arrive prior to the time General Devers left for SHAEF on the 16th. 'Upon arrival at SH EF a copy of the directive was secured from the Deputy G-3. The . _ directive, 281, assigned the 6th Army Group the mission of protecting the South (right) of 12th Army Group and of occupying Western Austria and that part of Germany within its zone of action. Its advance: on the left was to conform to that of the main offensive 'of the 12th Army., Group. It set forth, among other things, the new boundary between Army Groups, which meant that the overextended Seventh Army would have about 50iß as much front as it was then holding. In addition, General Eisenhower gave Seventh Army two more divisions. All this, of course, gave the Seventh Army probably more offensive power and greater depth to its deployment than it had over enjoyed. During the conference, General. Eisenhower agreed with General Devers that 6th Army Group should undertake the operation against the German Nineteenth Army rear as soon as possible. `lays and means of getting it under gay at top speed were discussed. General Eisenhower was very anxious to accomplish the relief. of Seventh Army elements in the Third Army's now zone of action as early as possible in order that'the operations to the Southeast from the Nurnberg area could be launched quickly... Bringing Seventh Army within its new boundaries involved moving all troops of the XV Corps and approximately one-third of XXI Corps... General Devers told General Eisenhower that he would depart immediately for General Bradleyts headquarters and arrange the details with General Bradley..

General Devers and G-3 left SHkEF by plane for General Bradley's, headquarters they fortunate in finding General , where were Bradley, General Patton, and General Hodges discussing this relief.. Jithin about 30 minutes the two Army Group Commanders had completed their General Patton had received necessary instruct- , arrangements, and oral ions from the 12th Army Group commander regarding his part'of the his relief. General Devers, '-in the meantime, had directed aide to arrange to have General Patch moot him at Headquarters 6th Army Group when ho, returned to'Heidolbcrg at about 1730 hours., After completing 12th Group hearing -the the arrangements with Army and directive given to General Patton orally about the rollezr, General Devers and his GT3 left for Heidelberg, arriving by 1700 hours. Shortly thereafter p General Patch with his G-3 and G-4 arrived.

General Devers hold in the . a conference war room with General Patch giving'oral directives concerning the operation and particularly the launching of the effort on the right of Seventh Army to cut off the German Nineteenth army as quickly as possible. General Deverst instructions to his staff and to Genera l. Patch on the afternoon of the 16th are reflected in Letter of Instructions Number 14 iwhich was 54 w

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published that night. Copies of Letter of. Instructions Number 14 were delivered to Seventh Army on the morning of the 17th and to First French Army on the afternoon of the 17th.

On 16 April 1945 the 6th Army Group was disposed along the e st bank of the Rhine from Basel to Strasbourg thence to the vicinity of Bayreuth, with the cities of Bden-Baden, Pforzheim, Heilbronn and Bamberg in our hands (see Figure 19) and salionts in the line in the First French Army zone extending as far south as Appcnweir southeast of Strasbourg and Forbach southeast of Baden-Baden. Operations now permitted a'shifting of our forces to the south. Rapid regrouping of 6th Army Group units, and changing of direction coupled with a dash to the mountain area at the Swiss and Austrian borders offered an excellent chance to destroy the enemy, now occupied in a series of delaying actions all along the front. The German Nineteenth Army was the first target.

To effect the destruction of German Nineteenth Army the Seventh Army was, in Letter of Instructions Number 14, directed to complete regrouping rapidly and launch its initial main effort on its right, southwest up the Neckar River with a Corps, strong in armor and of high mobility, seize the communications center formed by the triangle Tubingen-Ballingen-Sigmaringen; thereafter exploiting to the west and south as far as the Swiss Border, and assist the First French Army in destroying that portion of the German Nineteenth Army in the Black Forest area. (See Figure 20). The First French Army was directed to continue strong action between the Rhine and the Black Forest and clear the east bank of the Rhine, conform action in the Stuttgart area. to the advance of the right of the Seventh Army, enveloping Stuttgart from the west, coordinating this action with the Seventh Army, and protecting the right flank of the Seventh Army. The First French Army was further directed to destroy elements of the German Nineteenth Army in the Black Forest area, seal the Swiss Border in its zone, complete regrouping and be prepared for further advance to the southeast in a

new zone of action. The original concept of this operation (Figure 20) was that the initial effort by the First French. Army would be on its right, southward down the east bank of the Rhino. The, thrust south. rard, directed down the east bank of the Rhine, would be in the nature of a holding effort indicating weakness and eras intended to encourage the German Nineteenth Army to stay in position until VI (which Corps was employed for the main effort on the right of the Seventh army) was in position to go all out up the valley of the Neckar and to the south scaling up the German- NinÖtecnth'xrmy between the VI U. S. Corps and the First French Army. However, a premature main effort southeast through the center of the First French Army nullified this plan. The Germans, already jumpy from their recent defeat west of the Rhine, started running to the rear, to a great extent clearing the trap set for them before the blow of the VI U. S. Corps had scaled them off. This premature and misdirected thrust the First French on part of the Army was most embarrassing -- especially in the light of the f ct that-Far. x of Lettcr of Instruct- ions Number 14 clearly indicated that a premature advance by First

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French Army in the Stuttgart area would be prevented by the Commanding General, First French Army, who would maintain close liaison with. Seventh Army in order to accomplish proper timing, The plan for employment of the First French Army was explained in considerable detail by G-3 to General do Lattre personally at a conference in his office on the afternoon of 17 April. However, General do Lattro apparently did not accept the 6th Army Group concept of the maneuver. his troops This action south, . nest of Stuttgart, carried, across the Neckar where they turned east into the zone of action of the VI U. S. Corps, which was the main attack corps of 6th Army Group. Several cables were sent attempting to hold General do Lattrots center back and get the proper timing in the maneuver, but they were without result. Consequently, a goodly portion of the German Nineteenth Army escaped to the southeast. As the First French Army advanced farther to the-east it became apparent that the VI U. S. Corps would soon be headed into the left flank of the First French Army. It also became apparent, that, with the headlong retreat of the German Nineteenth Army, another action to cut off this army before it reached the Austrian border was in order. Accordingly, on 22 April the main effort of the Seventh Army was directed to the Southeast on Ulm and a new (see boundary Figure 21) to conform to the abortive thrust to the east by First French Army, was set between that ' rmy and the Seventh U. S. Army.

6th'Army Meanwhile, in the northwestern part of the Group sector the attack in conjunction with the Third Army (which was directed southeast toward the Danube) was progressing rapidly. The change in direction of advance of XV Corps and the. shift of this Corps as well as approximately one third of XXI Corps to conform to the new inter- Army Group boundary established in the 15 April directive of SCAF

were effected smoothly. In this case it was desirable to continue the advance, with pressure on the enemy and avoid blocking by cross traffic the roads in our rear which , were needed for supply and for units of the Third Army moving into their new zone. The inter Army Group boundary (Figure 20) extended in a southeasterly direction.

With the exception of 14th Armored Division, units of XV Corps continued their advance to the south and southwest, and shortly found themselves in their now zone of action. 14th Armored. Division was heavily engaged at the moment on the extreme left. By mutual agreement this division was assigned to the Third Army and replaced in the

6th Army Group by a new arrival, 20th Armored Division. The advance in the zones of action'of XXI andXV Corps progressed rapidly from 15 April, with daily advances along the line ranging from 2 to 17 miles. Nurnburg in the zone of advance of the XV Corps offered. stubborn resistance, requiring the combined efforts of elements 'of three divisions for its capture.; the city finally falling on 21 April.

By 22 April 6th Army Group had advanced to an irregular line (Figure 21) from Basel through Freiburg, Routingen, Goppingen, with E'llwangen, Cunzen, Hilpolstcin to Newmarket three salients extending into the enemy held area, one to Lako. Constnnce', another to within 20 miles of Ulm, and the third to the Danube, 25 miles short of Augsburg, '

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All along the 6th Arny Group front, German Army Group G continued to show signs of complete disintegration on its left. Enemy reinforcements, already conspicuous by their absence, were considered few and to The enemy could only hope to delay at the .next unobtainable. Danube before yielding Upper Bavaria. A helter-skelter headlong dash for the high ground in western Austria appeared to be his only hope of saving those remnants still possessing some semblance of organiza- tiono

It was obvious, then, -that the most expeditious way to prevent the elements of the German Army Group G from entering the high country and to bring the war in the 'south to as early a close as possible was to beat -the enemy to the entrances to western Austria. Salzburg and Berchtesgaden were in the zone of advance of the Third Army in the 12th Army Group'Sector. Like Bregenz, Iandeck and Innsbruck, the cities of Rosenheim and Salzburg controlled the remaining vital routes into the southern mountain-area, The race for those all important escape routes was on:

In the midst of this dash to seal the entrances to tho'mountain country, an incident occurred which delayed the execution'of the mission, and, at one stage, threatened to throw a major portion of the entire Army Group into confusion akin to that of, our frantic enemy.

During the period 23-25 April a serious sitUL. tion developed in the zone of action of VI Corps, which had powerful armored and infantry forces moving in a rapid drive to the south and southeast. On the afternoon of the 23rd, Seventh Army reported that elements of First (Figure French Army were moving east on-Ulm across VI Corps Zone : 22). Orders were issued at once by the Commanding General 6th Army Group

directing prompt withdrawal of the French units into their own, zone so that the roads required at full capacity by VI Corps would not be blocked. Nevertheless on the following afternoon, 24 April, VI'Corps' reported elements of the ist DB were then in Ulm and in the Ulm area astride the axis of advance of VI Corps. Ulm was situated about 40 miles (east the First French Army zone; so that outside of) no . clear routes to the south remained to VI Corps.

During the 24th, General do Lattro is Chief of Staff arrived for a conference with General Devers and reported that General de Lattro

had told him that he, General do Lattro, had received 'instructions from General do Gaulle to conduct: the advance on Ulm and to retain control of üll territory captured by the First French Army until the final for French troops ;had boon determined . zone of occupation -by the governments concerned. This surprising report was promptly 'relayed to SHAEF with appropriate objections. French compliance began on the 25th but this interference in violation of an order received through (Headquarters the one and `only official command channel 6th Army, I (VI Group) cost General Brooks Corps) at least 24 hours delay in pushing his key drives to the south.

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This because Seventh was a very sorious nutter ,rt:iy was cn a ed in a race t seal the passes into austri`. before ' the retiring Genial. Forces could occupy and defend. the i:lount ; in area, 1s it turned out, the sealinG of the passes vas accor: plishod in spite of the delay. However, the tirlo lost nay 71011 have prolonC; od the fi for hopelessness a corresponain% period before the Of 1'irL1T Groupghting GIs position forced its surrender. It is observed that, contrary to usual custori, no copy of General do LCttro, orders to his I and II Corps based Headquarters 6th Lrmy Group -Lotter of Instructions Number 14 wason furnished our headquarters.

For the drive southward the supply of artillery crmiunition was plentiful. There was, however, the task of tr ýnspcrtinG the armuni- tior. to the distances. guns over oxtc nded .

Thc r4ýiý. adv. _..nce of tho Irr. lics crcatcýý a tro ý:sl)ort ýtion lýrobler. ý of the first nr_gnituc. c. Railhoads wore securec. at tho Rrinc but east of the Talillc exto. _sivc 01l01-y c.cr.lclitions of'koy bri:. ý;cs c.claycc. the t,: i.iunich Lakc opening of railway sorvicos ýtiaarý 1'Turzburg, and Constancc so that c'eDcnüence u; cn truck haul sul, lcrlciýtc : by airlift a necessary,

brjuný týlc The groat distance between the roar ary of Sevorýt, i Lrr.: y and its front lines necossitýjtec'. the cstablisluicnt of an ".rl: ly Intcr- medic; te bcunCary behina which CONI'.D could c:ssui: 7c responsibility for It lcýistical support of the fýr. varc: troops. was a; rccc? on 28 i3.pril that the Danube River was an approxir. mte intcrncdiate roar bounc'. ary f.. r the Sot,roljt, 'L,.

?'i', er the I1 tcr-ý'irrly Group boundary w^s shiftc to the south a Seventh ", rti^ jr revision of the slain supply routes servin rr1y was for necessito. tecd and required the establisIzIo It of now priorities rehabilitation of railways. Certain running rights on highways in to Sevc The First First French r.iy area were allocate nt : A'xri:1y. - f to to the French lxr. iy roar boundary was r]K.rc, rvaarc. conforli raid 6th advance of '.rr. 1y Group forces.

Zone of the Rhino ,River The part of the Scvc.. th lrr.1y' wort was transferred to the Fiftoonth ýrr1y, releasing 36th Infantry Division I for operation cast of the Raine.

Stuttgart. was sorlcthiir of a problcri for a' few days after its occupation on 23 In the first placethis city had by iica d L F, bcon officially dosiC natod Sulpror:ic quarters, as the headquarters for the Western, U. S. Military District union its botwoon t! First French. cajjturo. Stuttaart was c?,, the bcund^ry lc U. S. inclusive first to the French ,'xriy a, --C,the Seventh ý'lrr.iy and but with joint use of routes through later the Sevonthý"rroy the in bou, For the cityto both boforo a, 10. aftcr clianGe _c'^ry. a tine botl: ý the 100th U. S. Division of the VI Corps ur_d'the 3rO. MY, d in tho The of the Fist French . rr:zy wore ropresc'atý; city. natter

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First French Army was settled amicably. - However, refused to vacate Stuttgart and remained in the city pending delineation of occupational zones.

The DA ALP was responsible for, an important sector. which extended from Switzerland along the France-Italian border to the Mediterranean Sea (Figure 23)

In view of major operations to commence in Italy about 15 April 1945, AFHQ requested SHAEF to conduct diversionary operations along the 'Franco-Italian border for the purpose of containing the enemy forces in that sector and makinga show of force on this front.

Such activity fell. to the Alpine Front Commandunder Headquarters 6th Army Group control. Plans were prepared by DA ALP and approved by Headquarters 6th Army Group. The outline plan included clearing Pass, clearance LýLrche Pass including the of -Mont-Gents . - of , capture : of fortifications of St Ours Bos and St Ours Haut. 'It was also to the Petit St Bernard toward Susa planned clear . with attacks and along the axis Mont Genevre Pass - Oulx.

These. operations were executed as planned with action'-starting 4 April. Considering the- rugged terrain, weather, and problems , of transportation, the. operations were conducted most successfully under not too favorable conditions.. Gains were made -chiefly at the passes (Figure all along the line 23) until-28 April when Headquarters 6th Army Group cabled DA ALP to halt their troops and withdraw into France , . "as the military- situation permits ". The Germans in Italy were completely disorganized at this time and further diversionary action by

DA ALP was deemed not necessary., This withdrawal was accomplished with some delay incident to reluctance on the part of the. F`rench to give up territory gained in Italy; but with its execution, fighting

on the France-Italian border virtually ceased. ' ,... In the meantime, the Army Detachment of the Atlantic was making - (previously important preparations for Operation Venerable designated Operation Independence) to reduce the Royan Pocket and open the as ; (estimated Port of Bordeaux. This stubborn enemy garrison at 13,000) . which had controlled the entrance to the Gironde River sinco the liberation of. southern France, had long boon a literal thorn in our side during the whole of our carýpaigns. Plans to reduce the pocket, ha4, been set back from 1 Jan 1915, in view of the urgent need for all French (some troops on the' main front. < Nov sufficient forces; 55,000 Non-Rearmament Program) and elements of the 2 DB, recently from their training, area, under the command of Gonoral. do ..released Larminat., ore assembled and prepared to reduce the stronghold,

On 10 April 1945 General do Lurminat moved his command post of the Army Detachment of tho-ktIantic from Cognac to Vill&neuvo. - Arrangements for air support by. the Ist Tactical Air Force (Provisional) , as well as French Naval. support for the action wore worked out very satisfactorily. '- The action was planned pnd executed in two stages (Figure, 24). "

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The first stage., the reduction of Royan redoubt and the Point do Grave stronghold was commenced 14 April 1945 with attacks to scizo lines of departure for main assaults to be launched 15 April. By the evening of 15 April Royan was completely occupied while the enemy outpost positions in the Point do Grave area were penetrated. By lg April the entire Arvort peninsula was cleared and the German Commander was taken prisoner� On 20 April the remaining enemy in the Point do Grave area surrendered.

It was time for stage two, reduction of Oloron Island. The operation was started on 30 April with multiple landings in force on Oleron 'and diversionary action in the vicinity of In Rochelle. U,,S0 landing craft were used to supplement means of the French Navy. Providence lent a hand during the night proceeding the attack in the form of a most helpful fog. The landing, like the entire operation, later was carried off successfully. Forty-eight hours all enemy forces on the island as well as the few remaining on the mainland, had surrendered. The Port of Bordeaux' after many troublesome months of blockade, was finally opened on 2 May.

a %. - 60 ý RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

CHAPTERTEN

REDUCTION OF THE GEFýNrANNATIONAL REDOUBT

The idea of a German National Redoubt based on the mountainous terrain of west Austria took shape gradually. Small bits of information gathered from all sources added credence to the story tha t German forces in the south would fall back to this rugged terrain, there to make a last ditch stand. Stories eminating from German sources indicated that large underground depots were well stocked

and that elaborate plans had been prepared to defend the area based on the lateral communication afforded by the valleys of the Rhine.

Ill, Inn and Salzach Rivers. None of this information appeared authorative but the volume of it indicated that gomething was up, calling for plans to counteract' such a move should the Germans attempt it.

As early as-02 April SHAEF directed 6th Army Group to be prepared to launch a thrust on;,the axis Nurnburg - Regensburg - Linz to prevent consolidation of German resistance in thF south;

Until after the crossing of-the Rhine, the occupation of Austria had been considered an AFHQ undertaking. 'With the continued advance of 6th Army Group forces towards the south and southeast, it became apparent that German forces in Italy were not to be withdrawn -to bolster the crumbling western front. This clearly indicated that the-initial force entering Central and ;Iestorn Austria might well

,be composed of ETO rather than MTO troops.

About 22 April Lieutenant Colonel Stromberg from, SHAEF, G-3 6th Plans section arrived at Headquarters Army Group with SHAEF's latest thinking in the form of a staff study which had not yet been

formally approved by SCAEF. A hasty meeting 'of the J. P. S. was called at which he presented orally the contents of the paper answering questions as they arose. The object of his visit was to assist planning in the'6th Army Group designed to prevent, if possible, a protracted defense in the National Redoubt. We did not, believe in the theory of a completed National Redoubt. What we did consider as a possibility was that the German forces being, driven south by' the French and U. S. Armies, and west by the Russians would be forced into Austria where, if given time, they could put up formidable resistance. Our principal aim was to destroy completely German Army Gröup-G'before it could reach. the National Redoubt area in our zone of action. How, aucce'ssful we would be in this was' soon to be disclosed.

The enemy's disorganization as'of 28 April is well described in the Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 32 bearing that date, the essence of -which follows: (Nineteenth That. portion of CinC West's command German Army and First German Army) opposite 6th Army Group failed to receivo

,. 61- RESTRI CTiD RESTF,_ICTED

sufficient reinforcements'during the week to aid in either the

reestablishment of a front line or even to replace the approximately 78,650-odd troops lost as prisoners of war during the period 21-26 April, casualties. The inability the . exclusive of permanent of enemy to halt the eastward drive toward Ulm and Kempten rolled up the Suabian'ourtain positions and turned the Danube River line. This

drive coupled with advances to the south through the places mentioned above effectively disorganized and practically destroyed Nineteenth Army. Farther to the east, frieddly armor has broken contact between Seventh and First. German Armies. This was the situation most to be avoided by Army Group G. The result is that First Army is practically isolated and must fight an independent action with exposed flanks for the defence of Munich.

First German Army was unable to find suitable connected terrain features upon which it could reestablish a front line against unre- lenting Allied pressure. Its rearward progress h--,s continued for the second successive week. The appearance of Vlassov Russians and Hungarian troops in front line positions could not effect the'very great need_for artillery pieces, ammunition, motor transport and tanks. The position forced upon First German Army, isolated by the deep wedge driven into its right flank ant' disintegration of the Nineteenth Army on its loft flank, will compel its early withdrawal to the Austrian Border. The Army ý,aill be forcr d back to cover the Munich, but. duo to the unavailability of any cite of - cross corridors of strong natural defensive positions in the vicinity, the city will fall rapidly. However 9 Himmlcr, who is reported in Munich, may urge

a final German "Sacräfice" for this-town..

iýýineteenth German Army suffered a tremendous and overwhelming defeat at the hands of the fast moving First French Army. The ranks of the enemy were cut into numerous pockets and then individually mopped up. The rate of attrition was so high that the enemy's capability of restoring its ranks was not possible of fulfillment. 11ineteenth Army will probably have the doubtful honor of being the first enemy army to arrive in the so called "Redoubt" area. It will probably have the mission of manning the few defensive positions already constructed in the Bregenz-Innsbruck area, as well as that of constructing new defenses. The remnants of 14inetcenth Army, after having lost approximQtely 50,000 prisoners of war during the' past week, can only hope to delay their day of capitulation.

Capabilities

two capabilities: The enemy may be alloyed only actual

(1) He can surrender unconditionally.

(2) rye can continue his scnselcss imMolation, fighting hopelessly from isoL ted'strongpoints as his lines disintcgratc.

a 62 r

RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

The overwhelming military defeat. of the German armies north of the Danube and in the Black Forest, the dwindling resources both of the the increasingly'obvious men and material remaining to enemy, and of the civilian population all combine to make a politic- war-weariness the Nazi al capitulation imminent. The hold of- overlords upon the Wehrmacht and the people is definitely weakening, particularly in Bavaria. The civilian finds himself in a position of fighting ;for the the protection of his home and possessions not against Allie but against the fanatics who will not or may not accept defeat, As for the German soldier, " prisoner of war status has become certainly more inviting, than the prospect of further resistance under conditions of extreme privation.

Should the Nazis. choose to resist, whether' through a blind but monumental faith in ultimate victory or through simple acceptance of their own fate, their resistance will be 'short lived. The north- south valleys of Bavaria offer no tenable defensive positions and will serve as avenues into Austria. His inferiority in guns) supplies, mobility and total lack of air support are so complete that oven field losses cannot be replaced. Feverish activity now in the development of dofensivo positions in Austria denotes a realization that, he

waited too long to make the "National Redoubt" ; fact. The enemy is militarily completely defeated; ho will be allowed neither respite nor truce, choose whichever he will. xxk As a result of Lt. Col. Stromberg's visit, G-3 directed the JPS. to propare'a. plan to forestall, if possible, organized resistance in Austria by destroying Army Group G and blocking the passes into that country in our zone of action. Prior to receipt of this information from SHAE.r our mission had been to seize and occupy that part of Austria and Germany in ' our zone., This new information and the directive which followed later, gave us specific critical , confirming areas in the Redoubt Area as physical objectives against. which we should concentrate our effort. We found that it was. necessary for in us to have Rosenheim in our zone of action order. to give us free leading into the valley of the Inn from the use of the roads . east. This was incorporated in the SHAEF directive which did not arrive until 27 April. The JPS-".plan, which was approved by General Devers 24 April, resulted in. the dispatch of a. cable to Seventh and First French Armies at once. A pardphri-Ase or the cable follows:

First French Army will advance with strong mobile forces 'to rapidly seize Bregenz, Feldkirch area, sealing the Austrian-Swiss Border and, thereafter be prepared to continue the advance to capture Landeck.

Army. rapidly with main on the Seventh will advance . effort . right, with strong mobile forces to block the. passes into Austria along the German border in zone preventing the 'escape of the withdrawing enemy from the north, and thereafter. dispatch strong mobile forces to seize Innsbruck-Brenner Pass area'cnd thereafter be prepared to assist in the- capture of Landeck by Fir French Army. .-t w - 63 RESTRICTED ____ý Armies will prepare plans for resupply by air.

On 25 April General 'Devers held .ü Command and Staff conference Headquarters 6th Army Group at 11 otclock attended by General at G-2, Chief Patch, his G-3 and G-4 and by the of Staff, Assistant G-3 and G-4 of First French Army. The object of the conference Tý ; discuss the outlined in the cable dispatched to ýarýs to operation the Armies the day before. The Armor Group Commander's idea was to have the First French army drive to the south while the Seventh hrmy pivoted on its left and swung east in order to close the exits of ` the-passes leading into Austria. At this time, no official directive had been received from SHAEF other than the informal information that had been given by Lt. Col. Stromberg. General Patch agreed Dovcrs with the concept of the maneuver and told General that the Seventh Army part of it was already under way based on our cable

received the day before. The Chief of Staff, First French Arriy, was in agreement but was in doubt about their ability to got through the defense-of the Bregenz area rapidly.

By 28 April it had become apparent that Army Group, G had been badly up. Prisoners were being taken in tremendous numbers, cut . and VI Corps and the right of the XXI Corps mot practically, no opposition other than. so :e isolated groups' as they rapidlr started their ; ri,n its ht bec, to~ turn. its VI Corps headed . outh,, with_ ri a; id ý.n center and its left to yard the east which, o+, course, had the curet of swinging First French XXI Corps' - right which was also. free . The krmy, in the meantime, was having its difficulties with logisticcl and infantry support of its armor. It had failed to get the proper infantry support behind its 'armor and was not making the progress hoped for. By the time. it got its infantry up VI Corps was well toýthe south. it By the, evening of 29 April, was definitely clear that' Seventh' Army could got to Landeck with VI Corps', right much before First French Army could reach the area. Therefore, on 30 April the boundary between Armies was extended south from Hefen. so as to give Landeck and the communication routes thereto to Seventh Army.. At this time, VI Corps' right was well into the Alps. It was now apparent that Germans. to the that they be- we had beaten the area, , , could not able to into the area by using routes west of Salzburg. XXI Corp' Vrus gct' by moving its armor rapidly, backing it up motorized infantry, swinging i",;s, right along the. edge of the Alps. south of Munich. '- It seeded. assured of reaching the entrance. to the pass at Rosonheim leading up to the valley of the Inn and cutting the retreating Germans :off. So it 1;.j--.s simply on.quostion of time before the Innsbruck-Bronnen Pass the area would fall. This left enemy only ono route into the mountain ürci: through the pass in the ä,-lzburg area. ., +. 1. flI Corps i maneuver ,eraspinching out XV Corps .,which. ht-Ad boon the pivot of the Army maneuver. XV Corps, instead of facing south, vas facing the gap at Salzburg from the northeast' on XXI Corpst left. now . The, boundary between Army Groupsat. this time Was just to the west of Chiom. in tho of action the "Third Army, Ira ko . Salzburg was zone of .. 64 a 1: ý , r. T.. ý T, "'"D ..ý,. ý ý, :, Third. which was still north ný:rtl lcast of Corps loft. irmy and htl h ld loft flank . with its long, ores(; d and li.. was unwilling to advance on the 7,alzach rLiv coin clor until sufficient infantrir had been brought up to assist its arm,--r and adequately protect its loft flank. It became qua-to, apparent thl-t the, boundary between that Corps :1-armyGroups should b.:- ch`n: d and .W should head for Corps. Both oalzbýýrg along; with the left of 11 ere much closer' to it than Third Army. The Salzburg Pass had to be scaled off qui c'cly.

7F.vE�r_th army was anxious to get the Ar.my Group b Fund_iTyrc. h,: n..cd. in order to got `iV Corps into :; : lzburg. ' General Dc:vc rs dIrc ctcd to take th,c- necessary action to offs- ct the, change in army Group bound would make possible the contc: maplated maneuver. The whole a,ry , which 6th tr-an. saction was handled by telephone between Army Group, 12th SHA£F in ono day. It is interestin Army Group and and cleared up' . to note that within 24 hours all arrangements necessary to eh.-enggc, of h been the principal ma:ncuvür two Army Groups .d completed arid the action to implement them had been taken, ev;: n dot-an to the all divisions in most cases. This was fast ýaork. It was possible: because intcrest(d pr rsons were able to talk over the secret telephone: in jidoublc talk in a -v-,ay that anyone not thoroug. hlyr.

familiar with the conversation could, not undc,-rste"nd. P:.ny details

wore handled by cub piano.

6th army Group's mission ',,.-is ch, ngcd in ans-,wer to the above: oýE1l by a 6-1-iE ' cable date-..d 3 1945, giving to the Southern agreement Group of Armies the fission of seizing the Lc.ndcck and Innsbruck

areas, scaling thr; Brcn. ýc:r Pass, c .pturin^" :Dalzburg, soi zing the

Bruck-Ladstadt aromaand occupying that portion of austric in zone:-

of action. The. boundary was 'revised eastward as follows (to As before: to Frei. sing 12th army Group) tuhldorf - thence, (to along Inns I ivcr to its 'junction with $alzc..ch Fiver 6th Army (to 12th Group) Bad Isch Group) -- . traz. 7aichcn Ar. rly - - ochlndming (to 6th army Group). k .ntc%rn_d.orf vill-ých . From thei point of view,-] of 6th army Group, the decision %;h1ch bly the decision gave the alzbur-g arc::: to cvcnth Armar.? ras -prob._: which brought about the; imnediatc collapse of the Germans in southern

Gormýny. and.a ': T Corps , ac:re abl. to r:.ov into the forrnc'r zone äülzburg of action of Third army by an open flank ý:nd block Pass this decision, -th<, Germans' in with great rapidity. ,tithout front Third right flank -:would have pour°c:d into the riles area of 'Arriy's . tough through the Salzburg 'Pass :pd wo might have had ti rc c.tt?. ng them out.

:;'hilc the ýýbovcsmý. ncuvc: r. Tý-:s undcrvxv; T, Vl Corps ý:dv-Lnc;;d' rc, ynid1Tr south,, i,---.rd z.r. d cut thc; main orLst ,o st routc: through tha. F.cdoubt by --. on c(. pturlng Innsbruck «nd Iý.nd?ock, ä nd' mov:.ýd south throLiý h tho Drcr; ncr and s

-65'- RESTRICTED

With all passes into the mountain country sealed and German Army Group G completely slashed into a state of disorganization (Figure 25) the Commander was read;. to confer with General Devers regarding surrender.

On the afternoon of 3 May, General Devers was informed by SHAEF lolf that General Kesselring had asked General who was in command of the surrendered SS Troops in Northern Italy, to find out with whom he should deal reagarding a, surrender of the German forces in the .Austrian area. General Barr was directed to send a cable to AFHQ asking them to have Kesselring informed that he should deal with General Devers, Commanding General, 6th Army Group. In the cable Kesselring was told how his representatives should approach and where they should come through the Allied lines. It was later discovered that Schulz. CG Army Group G, and not Kesselring, was surrendering. General Devers, in the meantime, had directed General Barr and G-3, to draw up the instrument of surrender. This was done on the night of the 3rd, being presented to the General Staff for consideration the next morning. In the meantime, General Devers, took a copy of the terms and went forward to the CommandPost of the XV Corps situated at Haar, Bavaria. At about 1500 4 April, G-3 was directed to proceed to the Headquarters VI Corps with a copy, of the terms as agreed upon by the Staff. These terms were to be used by General Brooks as a guide for the terms of surrender that he should use in'current negotiations 'with representatives of the German Nineteenth Army. The 6th Army Group's terms were delivered to General Brooks' Headquarters at 0150,5 May by G-3 who later proceeded to Haar to join General Devers.

General Devers, General Patch. -General Haislip, General' O'Daniels General Ott, General Nenoher, General Jenkins and Lieutenant Colonel Cabot Lodge were assembled at Headquarters XV Corps, Haar, Bavaria, at about 11: 30 A. M. 5 l'Zay. About 12: 45 P. M. General Devers was informed that a German delegation headed by the Commanding General, lst German Army, Lieutenant General-Foertsch, representing General Schulz, Commander of army Group G, had arrived at the meeting place *at the edge of town. General Devers directed his party to, proceed at once'by automobile to the meeting place to receive the'German delegation. The meeting place; was in a German sculptor's studio in a very beautiful setting at the edge of town.. The studio had several large beautiful rooms, one. of which had been prepared for the occasion by the Chief of Staff, XV Corps. , Upon arrival of the party. at the meeting place, the Geri: an delega- , tion could be seen standing in a group off to the right in the yard in front of the building. As'the U. S. party dismounted the German delegation came to attention. No salutes ; sere exchanged. General Deverst party entered the building, and went directly to the room which had been arranged. Shortly after entering,. General D`vers handed a copy of the terms of surrender to Chief of Staff XV Corps and asked him to deliver it to the Chief-of the German delegation.

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General Monoher delivered the copy to General Foertsch'who requested 30 minutes in which to study the document. This request was granted. '

Shortly after 1: 30 P. M. General Devcrs took the seat at the head of the table and the officers of his party were arranged on his right in order, General Patch, General Haislip, GeneralO'Daniel, General Jenkins; General Ott and General Monoher. The Lieutenant interpreter introduced by entered with General Foertsch who was General Monoher. General Foertsch stcod at attention and bowed-from the hips. There exchange of salutes or other greetings. General Foortsch , was no took seat at the end of the table opposite General Devcrs., The

interpreter sat bet eon General Menoher and General Foertsch.

General Mancher then requested that General Foertschts staff

which consisted of approximately eight officers be brought, in and seated. Six of them took scats on the right of. General Foertsch at the table. Two junior officers took seats along the wall of the room on the German side of the table. General Monoher then introduced the U. S. party in the order of their seating, beginning with General Dcvers. The American representatives remained seated as they were introduced. General Foertsch was then invited to intro- duce his'own staff. He rose and introduced his staff, apparently

in order of rank. Each German officer rose and bowed as he was introduced.

Formalities completed, General Devers opened tho discussion by asking General Foortsch if he had read and undcrstood the terms of surrender. It .was brought out that some minunderstanding of " the word "term" was prevalent in the: German party. The German equivalent implies Since this an . of "term" conditions. _ was unconditional General Devers directed that the "specifications" surrender, word be , substituted for "term" in the instrument of surrender to avoid any misunderstanding. the bulk is included The -conference was recorded and hero with a view to giving an'idoa of the state of collapse of Gorman Army Group G and the attitude of General Focrtsch, representing its commander.

Gen. Devors: It is understood that this is unconditional surrender.

Gen. Foertsch: I understand.

Gen. Devers: This is a specification as to how wo will carry out that conditißri:

Gen. Foertsch: ' I understand. . Gen. Devers: The first part of, this instrument to be filled in is what territory is covered by this'instrument. ',Vill you give us that? ý"

- 67 - RESTRICTED

Gen. Foortsch: May I say this: I have the order and authorization to talk for the whole Army Group This ` group forces. the First Army the comprises all of . and of Nineteenth Army, and the whole territory which has been marked on those maps by a line on the East South and lost. I assuuno that the Northern demarka- tion line will be the one which is in force at the moment the truce becomes effective.

Gen. fevers: 'What is the Northern line which is in force now?

Gen. Foertsch: The present front line is correct. This ;would moan the ifliti ll--' there that from the time of 'truce . -;i11 be no movements by Allied forces into the territory which is at present hold by the Gorman forces. ; Jill it be necessary to mark this Northern boundary on the map or will it be sufficient if a certain small zone will separate the two front lines?

Gen. fevers: You mean on the North?

Gen. Jonkins: * The North boundary of the Germans is the present Allied front line,. Sir.

Gen. Dovors: I don't see how it affects us in the Northern boundary. sý 1 Gen. Haislip: It gives them four boundaries.

Gen. Jenkins: It would include troops in certain areas. On the South by the Italian-Swiss frontier., on the West by the Rhine River, and on the North by our front line.

Gen. Revers: Why do vie need a space?

There be space I Gen. Focrtsch: would not P^- any , +,,, needed.+, would consider 21 1. .Lº.. w1.....

-68, - RESTRICTED

Z Gen. Dovcrs: I assume that none of the other forces of Field Marshal Kesselring s'o within the boundary of the territory just given mc.

Gen. Focrtsch: This is correct, for Field Marshal i cssclring besidc; s commands a territory in the Southeast;, Ho.rever, in this territory there are no forces which actually belong in the territory of the Southeast. In other words, all forces which are now in this territory would come under the provisions of this instrument. What we want is to chango the name of Field 1 rshal. Kesselring to the name of the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group "G", General Schulz.

Gen. Devers: It is agreed to the change: to use Army Group "G"1and the name of General Schulz.

Gen. Foortsch: No, instead of the name of Ficld Marshal Kosselring the name of the Commandcr of Army Group "G ", General Schulz.

Gen. Dcvcrs: In any case Field Nhrshcl Kessolring and his staff and other forces in this area must also surrender unconditionally.

Gen. Foertsch: It is something which'I would have to find out because I cannot decide regarding the person of Field Marshal Kesselring or his personal staff but'only all forces in Army Group "G ".

Gen. Dcvers: Vo will close this instrumc, nt out on the basis' f Army Group "G I"

Gen. Focrtsch: Yes, Commander, General. ächulz. Questions regarding tho staff of Field Marshal Kesselring will still have' to be clarified. To clcur this up 'might take a certain time, depending on the means, of communication. I ask that independent of this question the time, the , of , armisiticc will be settled. I guarantee that .Field Marshal Kesselring, will in no case give other directiong A n______1111 1} rogaraing army croup . Will gin. Devers.. There will be no armistice. ýJc sot the time, and that is ruhcn.this instrument tii11 be cffoctive. If wo should during that time run across anybody that is in this area, they will simply bccome'prisoners of war.

Gen.. Foortsch: Up to the time of the truce.

Gern. Dc:vers:. How long , dill it take to notify tho troops?

--69- RESTRICTED REäTRICTED

if Gen. Foortsch: I "Tjgill welcome it, the truce according to paragraph 2 could be put into effect as soon as possible. 6. I propose tomorrow) 12 noon, Dilay

Gcn. Dcvcrss Satisfactory.

Gen. Foertsch: I would apprcciatc it if for the announcement of this time limit I could have the support of General Dcvcrs to be able to. got the effective time to my troops as quickly as possible.

Gen. Dcvcrs TJcwill assist in every way possible.

Gen. Focrtsch: I ask regarding paragraph 3, until further notice, officers and such personnel which are necessary to maintain order will be permitted to keep their small, arms for reason of discipline. I am talking about officers, MPs and roving MPis which are to keep order in the territory, and I think that it will be to our mutual interest because in only this way can we guarantee discipline and order.

Gcn. Devcrs: Small arms?

Gen. Foortsch: This includes pistols, rifles and machine pistols ý no macnino guns.

Gen. Dcvers: How many troops are involvcd?

Gen.. Foertsch: I cannot give an exact number. Normally within a division there is one company of flPs. That would be about 100 men in a division. Those 100 men do not include the officers. It would be very difficult for no to give any definite number, but I believe honestly that from this measure will never result

any threat to the strong i}llicd forces.

Gen. Dcvcrs: Granted.

Gen. Focrtsch: The reason for my asking this is the following: Wo have difficulties regarding food. In this territory there arc very many evacuees which have gone there on account of air attacks. For this reason there would be a possibility that riots or looting by some soldiers inight occur. I think that it is also- in the interest of the Allied forces that such dangers should be supresscd right from the start, and this is the actual reason for this request. I am. particular- 1:r grateful to you for accecding to my request.

Gen. Dcvcrs: h otiwcan the bearers of arms be distinguished? IN 1* 70 .»

RESTRICTED RESTRICTED

P.Ts form Gen. Focrtsch: All the wear some metal shield ,- some of plaquctto. Roving patrols wcar some kind of fourrager©. They can be very easily distinguished from other troops, for reasons of discipline in the German army.

Gen. O'Daniel: They should all wear a 3-inch white brassard on their loft arm.

Gen. Dovers: If they wore to wear some vhite brassard there would be no trouble - officers and men.

Gcn. Foortsch: I think that every officer could be very easily I distinguished oven without it by his shoulder straps.

Gen. Devcrs: Our soldiers wonft see then in the distance.

Gen. Focrtsch: The officers would carry only pistols - nothing else. If however an officer for reasons of order Carries More than a pistol, he too has to wear a white brassard.

Gen. fevers: It is up to the officer if he wants to take the chance oil 1. U.

Gen. Fcertsch: I dontt think anybody would shoot at an officer who carries a pistol just like that. I would propose to talk this over in detail. e will not -cause any difficulties. I would propose re paragraph 4, concentration of equipment and personnel, a period of 48 hours after the truce.

Gen. Dcvers: That is granted. -- beginning noon tomorrow.

Gen. Foertsch: In other words, it would be the 8th of May -'noon 12 o tclock. (watches Gen. Davers: That is alright. were checked for coordination

Gen. Foertsch: Yby I bring up the following question in reference t paragraph 4. - In the Annex it says that all arms, weapons and ammunition should be put in dumps'by troops, companies and batteries. Do we understand that each troops company or, battery puts all its arms in their own dump or do you want one big dump for a division?

Gen. Devers: 'Ne prefer one dump.

Gen. Foertsch: In this case I- would need a little more 'time to collect them all in one aump.

Gen. Devers: 'Wemean to collect them in as big dump as possible in the time given. 04

RESTRICTED __ RESTRICTED

Gen. Focrtsch: The size ofthe dumps will depend largely on the, means of transport we have available. To collect thorn in any larger dumps would be very difficult for the following reasons: We have very little fuel, if any, and the road. conditions in the territory are very difficult.

Gen'. Devors: That is the reason we set it in this form. You can put it in large or smaller dumps, as you want - not bolo a a' company.

Gen. Foertsch: It is O. K. Regarding the sentence that. all those

dumps should be guarded by unarmed sentries, I doubt very much that it would be practicable. There are very many foreign laborers in the region.

Gen. Deve;rs: The guards can have arms for that purpose, and when we take over, the guards can turn in their arms.

Gen. Foortsch: It is quite alright. In reference to the sentence

that all military equipment 'such as radio, telephone, telegraph and motor vehicles will have to be assembled and guatddd, I assume it will be permitted to keep such transport as is needed to regulate traffic and. bring up supplies; also to keep such means of communi- catign ncedod by the, staff to give orders to their troops. Otherwise no staff would have the necossary means of transporting the arms from one place to the. other. This would include a few radio stations and, to allay any suspicion,, all orders-would be given in the clear.

Gen. Dever. s: Tho.t is approved so long as you are carrying out the

administrative fcatures of this instrument. After 'in. that they will be turned etc. Gen. Foortsch: That is 'clear. To get food,, fuel, ' to the troops, especially food, we will need a certain number of motor vehicles as well as horse--drawn vehicles for a certain length of tiro.

Gen. Jenkins: That is taken care of in paragraph 3.

Gen. Focrtsch: Referring to the Annex, paragraph 3, where you desire that all our troops collect away from and keep clear of highways, -railroads, etc., I don't think this is practicably possible. This, because they are in a ds. mountainous territory with very few 'roa If the troops dre to keep alive and to got any provisions have. to the whatsoever, they will use roads .

- 72 - RESTRICTED RESTRICTED , ý' ýA Gen. Devers: You will have to give us a troop list and. pin-point where your units are, and we will put liaison officers the Where they need to the with units. , use roads, we will provide for it.

Gen. Foortsch: What kind of movement of Allied troops do you contem- plate :ýrhen you say that routes of advance may be required by Allied forces?

Devers: Just freedom of 'roads 'in, the area for. mOvercnt of _Gen. troops - for concentration or war.

Gen. Foertsch: According to that ;ve would have to figure on the possibility that in this territory which you are talking about an American division might appear some day,

Gen. Devcrs: They will appear.

Gen; Focrtsch: Yes, liaison staffs and controlling .,:you will send commissions, Will this territory also be occupied by American troops immediately?

Gen. Devcrs: Yes, because we are going to establish military government therein.

Gen. Focrtsch: Could you give an idea when your troops would move in -starting from the time of the truce?

Gcn. Devers: Probably two. days.

Gen. Foertsch: I consider it my duty to point out that it would be very difficult to billet any troops on account of tho present over-cro-wding.

Gen. Devers: go have that problem already. Wo propose to handle it quickly and firmly, and I don, 't anticipate any rlore trouble than wo have had alrc(-- dy.

Gen. Foertsch: . The terrain is of Alpine character, has very few towns' Cand.village s, and few means of communication, and is very badly off as far as any food is concerned. Even now there are ,places , vhere you cannot find a piece of bread�

Gen. Devers: o realize the difficulties.

Gen. Foortsch: In paragraph 4"of the Annex you give us 72 hours to render, you an order of battle of all m jor units. I

do not know exactly how detailed "you tivill 'grant this list. but in any case the time is very brief. In 72 hours wo could easily give you a list which, for

- 73 - RESTRICTED

instance, would give the 1182ndRegiment with three companies", or something like it but if you wish a more detailed list, additional time will be required.

Gen. Patch. If you have radio communication and use it in the

clear, why should you need more than 72 hours;

Gen. Foortsch: Duo to the present fighting, all thoso. units have boon so'mixod up that it is impossible for us to have an exact strength report. I want to stress this as I consider it my duty to be honest so that no one can

say lc ter on that we did not act in good faith.

Gen. Devers: le accept. Do the best you can in that time and then continue to make the list more complete.

Gen. Foertsch: This is all I have to say regarding this document.

" However, I have a few things of importance I desire

to bring out. I mentioned before the great difficulties,; in the food problei:. Our troops have food for about 6 to 8 days. There has never boon sufficient food within this territory to feed the troops which are in there now. ' I therefore deem it necessary to come to an agreement, the details to be worked out later, according to which wo would be able to continue buying food also farther to the Forth, outside of this territory.

Gen., Dovcrs: I think you. must understand that your army will be it moved, that .moved just as soon as we can get and they to subsist where they are forever. are not going I don it there is going to be any difficulty anticipate . in making arrangements whereby your troops will have enough food, but we cannot authorize you to leave this territory to go North into soý:iebody else's territory. to buy food because wc` control all the food in all the territory which we occupy.

Gen. Focrtsch: I would like to know when you say that our troops would be moved from the area as soon as possible'. whether you mean that they will be used again in civilian occupation or whether they will -be sent away as prisoners of war.

Gen. Devors : They will all be- prisoners of war. If you, mean ' ro we going to send them out of the country, that is something beyond my pale. No will abide by the rules of war.

Gen. Foertschs In other words, this would rncün eve would have to . consider ourselves Prisoners of dar within c, very short time?

-74 RE6TRICTED . __...._.__ý_ý. RESTRICTED

Gen. Devers: Yes, there is no armistice. This is a complete surrender.

Gen. Foertsch: In this connection I would like to csk another question. If I underst. nd you right on this, the prisoners of war will be. used in a capacity beneficial to the German people as soon as possible. However, will -the other Allies avoid that these German prisoners fall into the hands of the Russians.

Gen. Revers: That is somcthing -on the level I h^ve nothing to do ,-pith. W'lill you state that question more clc: ýrly?

Gen. Focrtsch: Does the American High Commandintend to hand over any 4ti;' prisoners made by the American troops to Soviet Russia?

Gen. Devcrs: I can't answer that question for the higher copmrnand.

Gen. Foertsch: I am very grateful to General Devcrs; especially I want to thank him in the name of my comrades who are now prisoners of war and who, esI hope, arc and will in the, hands remain . of gentlemen.. I Gen. Dcvcrs: fVe abide by the rules of war., Wo will have the , will papers retyped to conform to the suggested changes. I will sign and you can sign later.

Gen. Foertsch: I think it might be good idea to immcdiatcly advise

my command of the time,a of the truce so that no time be lost.. I to advise my by will went _highcr Commcommand all moans which will be put at my disposal.

Gen. Dovors: Perfectly alright. How, do you propose doing that?

Gen. Foortsch: In "any way which suits you will be suitable to us. I would prefer a marked plane of a cub typo to fly advise High Command. over and the i,

Gen. Devers: v'lhat you want to do is to notify your 'comm`tnd?

Gen. Foertsch: It would be good if ono of my officcrs went by cub plane, and Ivoould like to send word by radio to my CP which is at 5aalfclden, near *Zell Am Sec. There is no regular ` irficld nearby. On my part,, I; ýýrould like to do everything possible to, prevcnt any further bloodshed.

(It rr:s suggestcd th,_tt Gcncral Focrtsch mýko usc, of tho 3rd Division facilities for this purposo). '

Gen. Devers M ko arrüngcmonts for this. Undcrstýnd' this is unconaizuorn"1 sui-i-uiluui . .ý

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Gcn: Focrtých: I have no power to do anything :g ainst this. I have one request in this connection. You arc also the Commander of the troops of do Gaulle. The- Gcrman people would be greatly indebted to you, Sir, if you would be able to give some attention to the behavior' of the. French troops. Ono of my officers yesterday had an experience which I do not want to mention hero in detail.

Gen. Dcvcrs: The French troops undor ray corr: ind, gill obey the °rules of tiwa,r.

The instrument of surrender follows:

Specifications of Surrender, presented by General Jacob L. Devcrs, U. S. Army, Commanding 6th Army Group, on behalf of Gcncral Dwight

D. Eisenhower, U. S. Army, Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary

Forces, and acccptcd by General Schulz, Conr. ndcr-in-Chief, 'Army Group "G", Army of the German Reich.

. +ý

i. It is agreed that the territory covered by this instrument

includes the areas bounded on the East generally by the lino: Kirchberg (inclusive) Ried (inclusive) Frankenmarkt (inclusive), - - .Froudcnthal (inclusive) South Corner Zeller Soc - Rcdstadt (inclu- - (exclusive), Obcrdrauburg (exclusive) - Plockcn Pass on the sive) - , South by the Italian and S:viss frontiers, on the Ecst' by the River front line, Rhino, and on the North by the present Allied which are All Ger,! under the jurisdiction of General Schulz. n military and in this ^re General Schulz. pars:.-military forces area under command of All these forces, including General Schulz, are bound by this instru-

ment and shall be subject to such` other specifications as ray be

applied hereafter by the authorities of the United Nations.

29 All forces, including all pare-military forces, under command of General Schulz, shall cease unconditionally all acts of hostilities towards forces of the United Nations not later than 1200B hours, 6 iLy 1945.

3. All such forces under command of General Schulz, except as indicated in Annex .,,; shall disarm themselves immediately and remain in=their, present areas retaining all moss and transportation equipment, ', food and forage necessary for self 'maintcn,. nce and subsistence until directed by of the Armed Forces of the United otherwise _authorities Nations.

4, Concontration of all cquipnc nt and 'personnel as prescribed in 1200B 1945, Annex A will be effected not 1`ter than hours, 8 Piny after which time offensive ground and air action will be takon by the Allicd Forces against all unauthorized r:iovemcnt. of forces affected by this instrument. Other. instructions indic--4tcd in Annex A will, be carried out promptly.

- 76 - Fi.ESTR.CTED7_. _ 5. This instrument is, indopcndont of, without prejudice to, &nd will' be supcrccdcd by any gcnor, l instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to Gcrm-.ny and the Gorman Armed Forces as ä whole.

6. The official language of this instrument shall. be tho English text.

Signed and , greed at Haar, Buvarila, this 5 &-.y of. 1.9,ay 1945..

For Gcncral Schulze

ý commanding Gcncrall First Gcncral Jacob L. Dcvcrs Gorman Army. Unitcd Sta tc s Army

ANNEX "A 11

1. Pending further orders all officers and not to exceed one division their rifle, hundred other ranks -pcr may retain . machine pistol, pistol, or other sidearm for internal security purposes. All such armed personnel will wear a 3-inch white arm band above the left clbow for easy, identification. All other arms, weapons and ammunition of whatever nature will be placed in dumps of appropriate size in convenient locations in areas occupied by companies, troops, batteries; and other dctzchments of a comparable' or smaller size. Appropriate guards will be posted on all such dumps to insure their security pending further disposition as directed by authorities of the Armed Forces of the United Nations. All military equipment such as tole horse-drawn phone, telegraph and radio equipment, motor vehicles, (both vehicles and other moans of transport ground and air), and military impedimenta not needed for execution of these other movable , ; specifications will be similarly assembled and guarded in convenient locations pending their further disposition. All such dumps will be' kept clear of lines of communication and axes of advance required by the Allied Forces.

2. All vicc.pons and equipment 'will, be deposited in dimps with breech blocks, bolts, sights -nd/or other operating mechanisms intact.,

3e Having disposed of all weapons, ammunition and combat equip- mont of ' whatever nature, all forces under- corlm nd of Gcncr"l Schulz will stand fast in their respective areas until given further direction by authorities of, the Armed Forces of the United Nations, hligh and will keep clear of all lays, railroads, trails and other routes of advanco which ray be required by Allied Forces.

4. By hour and date indicated in par-graph 2 this instrument, Goner: l Schulz shall furnish the Commanding General, Sixth Army -,. Group, order of b`. ttlc. of all major units, including Allied Prisoner

- 77 .. F'ýESTRICTED RESTRICTED

furnish the command, end as soon as possible shall Commanding General, Sixth Army Group, with a complete troop list showing by unit designa- tion, typo, strength and location, all elements of his command affected by this instrument.

5. All minefields within areas controlled by General Schulz shall be plainly marked immediately by signs and shall be outlined with white tape or other suitable means which arc rcedily idcntifi" blo of demolition . All mines, booby traps and other types charges shall be bridges, tunnels, removed from all highways and railroad overpasses from all and underpasses on all lines of communication and buildings means of transport, highway, rail and air, within the areas and booby controlled by General Schulz, and all such mines, traps and be harmless; other means of demolitions so removed shall rendered demolitions hich those mines, booby traps and other means of ý-; cannot be be removed and rendered harmless immediately shall plainly marked and placed under guards.

The conference broke up promptly. The terms were rewritten to include the minor changes agreed upon in the discussion, while the American and German officers had lunch separately. Shortly after 1500,5 May, General Dcvers signed the original and one copy of the Gcncral Patch Gcncral revised instrument, and directed that and Haislip do likewise. Thereafter, in the presence of General Pncnoher General Focrtsch's and General Jenkins, as well as the members of the document signed the staff, General Foortsch re-read and original. General Foortsch. The German A copy was then handed to staff, which had been standing, immediately came to rigid attention; and the the General and his staff literally bowed out of picture. 6th Thus the single purpose of Army Group, destruction of the German Armies opposing it, was completed in dramatic fashion. This But news was flashed to the world at once, we wore replaced in the important that spotlight two days later by the all announcement the entire German war machine on the fronts to our cast and to our north, had following the example of Army Group "G",, also surrendered unconditionally to our Supreme Commander and to our Russian allies. ýSTRIC'1 aD ..,...,.._...... a.. _.... _.

C 'EI, iitn 1 i� v. L',ld

POST HOSTILITIES !

The terms of surrender viere fulfilled anL hostilities ceased on the Seventh iirny front as soon as orders could be ' disser. linated through- SomE. and resistarice by isolc ted out Gýer.7ran lower echelons, confusion . front First lch Arn. y. This Gerrýti^n units occurrec' in of lF-rc. .opposition battles. Gerr: ilivolved v.as soon overcome after several-pitched wn units were from TTtýTenty-l---+ ourtll , ýýý,1rry.

ýth iýyilitary T>lissior_s to hi,,; 'äcr Gerr, ,icadquarters army Croup 4s . ýü11 General ierýsy C. 6'?c lfe I:i eadqua. rters tigere established. BriC; adier L of rth C2oup Central hotel in Ell 11 r,k: 'rie.- dquarters 1°ýrztir arrived at or. y of lieadqu^: Gerr. IXpiy to talie charge the I.; ilitary T.ýission to i"ters lan set up by S-)eventh Ylri; liaison 'C-roup ; IC,7 which had previously been a ly i.'. S. xi-,adquarters r 6th Ari, iy Group det aclim t. Colonel Jýildersson of ien Army Pfunds headed the r,iission to Gýir: aýlýiý.inetee. ýtlz -nd arrived at l.ýilitary I. issions tine carryir,. -- out of the on 11 T:1^y. 1111-e supervisea instructions to iznplei: lont the surrender; tr^nsr: littcd_. additioiZal formed liaison iloadýcluarters for tr . ýzsi:iittal. occupa, tiorýul policies aild HcLadquarters for dc;cisioii such requests a_:.d to t', e higher 1,llied be dealt itl ofý tý. ", surf ý,ý. i.dered C-efýý^1ý.^rý forces as could , >1ot Y? z, -fýl_ýoblerýs l, the on the snot. '1"r1emissions also facilitated r:iovcraent of occupatioizal th. of the surrendered Gerr:ti^n forces. forces into areas , by S:, Arr: !':'irst Frcnch Advanco to the south t?:.s resulned vcath y a.nd I. to the occuýý.^tiorý of tlýir respective Army at moon on j y coiý: ý, Italian pletc Swiss Frontiers nc' the ýiu1s River zoncs 11ustria. 111ýý ý and z, . the limits liLlc; on t. 1e east were set as of ac.va_: ce. nic'1 requirac' coordir: ^ tio. a by 'ii,; 'ler The )roblcv .1s i..,, d those of a_r: lliirl ; tlle 1, ýT'sG illiod '?ýC- fecdirýý ý. maint, +ý.... oýu^rtors vJero 1 ,". coi_contratec? in tlle- districts. Initz ,l nurýlber of :,'-err: l^n forces Jn-Llpine to be suff iciemnt for -bottt' six G-crraan food su ppli6s ti'?crc ostimýýtod 1.:' ý^ y. It was reýýorted on 11 Pic_y that to daýys or u,ýtil about -1ý ý cig'_it from the sout'1c: ^st tovJard the rth 200,000 G.erran troops Vere moving La tor tl: group ai)pCarCd tO be I Ger,,, C: arc; a i-ii. ýýustri_a. , l-S la.11 ýý.rý'7'. f Z'OUjJ disclmr"cc? by T3ritish forces. Cavalry Corps t-?hich cla i.1Ai. ed to havo beef. ý; intercept t tlie L1 1y1: `-" ýýrev.;:: movüýýe?lt of z!oj)orted , ýý ,r ,7l. ý,, quested to r^_nd1 ý. Before thc; situý tiorj tiv^s troops -rom its arý ý of res,.ý)or_sibilitýý ýýý. ! tl? e xýospuiýsibility for tllc arcas settled coiýtrol of "Scvelith n.'.ýy a-=-d t0 Tic 12t'1 A'r1y Group. üwolvecýý' re ý^SSß Cý. adquarters' ti forces forul,r. t In to t' =cilita te reýýzstiý"", i.bt. o.ý of ^ r1d ^. o a order 'iic'i 'ý of by the '=ý"Gqu:: rtcrü ti? ýcýa-:ulci vc coordi:. fated pl^r=_ occuoatioý. L Cz%no l ýý,;vers -nd Cener .1 Br, dlcy res-)orsibility for tlle U. S: ý ý"ie, r.: ', ileic! lbcr^ or 1ý iý,^y 1ý`; that 3cvcntll ^ rleetiný, ý liold i°, e; -ýj . ^ grecd ý. to L:. Cý. ý.. QýýialLCil_ý L.G Ull till. y' `^1-V uiJ Ld1 UliVU U ý. .._t lic^. Lss , ý+ý, 1r. r 1ý. y ý Co11t1'Ol ---,o1 - --- _4--_^r ` should ^ý_1', ' l1 :^, r" ý and ýrou7 T T. 1 1lý oýýýioc tlýc; ýý1ý y. this ý..nt; rv ý,rlciit _12t1.1ýrrrly TESTRICTED

to o.ssu; e command of Seventh Army on 1rb 1:^y l)45. General Brodley, however, did not ,jl---. responsibility for Firstý Frcnch Army durinG thc interim period ofnt settler. lont of the French Zoize of Occupation by wssutllption of responsibility therefor the r'ronch Government. .and .: G1;r1eral Bradley's reason`s for, this wore the uafemiliý_rity of

;Headquarters 12th Army Croup with problems of French or3a:., iz,-tior_ ý3,d sup p13r, the lack of provious ,personal contact lacý- of familiarity with the establishod communications andýnd liaison tiýahich, öth , headquarters 1'-ý-rr:y Croup had with First French' iirriy. It was betti"aee_1 Commanders that therefore LaGrecd, the 1--rr,1y Group First Frerlcli Army, ; xr. ly would remain under command of headquarters Sth Group until ST1'IEFshould release FrenchArmy to control of French Coverýli. ýeýýt. First the

June ýID'_JEF that ý^d 01i,21 iildic, -t,, _d by cable aýrce. lc;it bee ; cor_cludcd on fin` l delirliýt4tio_ä. of the Fýre.ýcli Tý-tio?ýa1 Lon e of Cccuýeation in Germany transfer of respoiisibility rn ý f7( of areas tiaas ý; rrrýIT ^, ý,,,, ý, irýrýli}ýýlýt. ýI_,e ýiýurc;, ýoý iý1it:, 1 dir., ctý: c t,.1 t plai_,,ýý for transfer . _o: of areas be prep arcd to become effccti ve on or about 1 Tuly but t.-.. t^ First French iirr:. y could not bcon tactec' or, the matter for the time beiný. I1 preliminary plCm prepared and approved by the June. was that with tYCa Chief of ;3taff 23rd a.u? discussed on day d, uartors 12th Lrrtir Group and SILTiF

Sth Croul) P conference tiaas held at Iee: c?q»arters lirmy 2 Jul; o ,,. EF, COT.;LOiý, iicacl. nuartcrs 12t. attended by represe? ltatives of 1 Group, Third, :; eve4r_th, Fifteenth lies, 'Co. ad, Adsoc, Oiso .Lrrny 1'irr. Ii_terrlediate ;ýoctioand Ninth Air Force. The tentativetent plan 11;s discussed at the rieetiiand approved after sliýit i;lodifications. llr, Group The plan was submitted to IJiilil. F with 12tiZ vT concurrence the follo11irý de.y.

On 27th Jt;.rlc, 5ý1LTF authorized discussion tait11 First French First French Zolo;: c;scntatives of '1'yrr,ly° conferred with staff "'t? Group. On 30th Junc, officers at Fie"adquartErs 0 1 Arrn;r SWF be indicated over t;'.ze telephone that thw plan uould approved except to the for the phasing which must bc; spccdGd up corz,.)lctE operation that directive within 10 c_ýüSTs, iýýý-»tead of 21 days and c. to effect immediate transfer Wouldr- fcllotia shortly. It was - obvious that ' ý. to fulfill the additional coordination would be ccossc: r7T Sür,,ý±F limit tin,., directive aitj'jin\ thý syýccified of

? %F i: to Utý'' in rý;spollse to tho l-ttcr ts iýýquiry of ý1, ýdic-tcd of 12 I:ýy 1; 45 thý;.t 0P0--"t' onal control of týrrly Dct : cllr: e.zt th:) kips drcu titould not be rolcascd urLtil riciic'_i troops ýaitl. fron Italýr. . fron territory C-c,ZCra1 Do,ý,rLly had refused to tivitýydrctia any occupied to do by, tllý iý. GoverrL, lc_"Lt. was u-,.til authcrizod so L-ench ýý diffi- particularly colcerýýed bocausc tiýý likelihood of ;politiccl i6' It"7lvr 11'd loilý been forCäccl. cultii: S ý ris]. n; in _;ortiiTýý3GstG:L'n " by ý?ý4Iý;FPF t. t =Tcac'cýuürtel°s ýtlz rroup ti°a=s iýotii'icd ý.a aý_ La rccr,. cl: t , ýý+ forces fro;, >cýý. ýý,,c, bcý;1ý i°cacý_ýa, to eý ý_n_ýct tivi ý,ýýlrý c.,, ý1ý:-1 OfOf ý-ýýý_ r,i ýs ýl %P l,_i; ý. _ i7ý_. ' fýt i, ,...... _ý`. . _.. __. ,.. -, -,,"CU7 "T'IT " T ý` ýý" . ºýZ 'ýi ' ": ý r... r-i-- I 'ý 1_ 3oi 5 ;, .,. :.., ....,._l ..ý -/.-4-

ý`ý

rý I ,ý

Trier n ., ý / , ýa Al

/%. ý

Tý l I ý<<ýýrl:.ý, ý.cý pfýa_z

T'ou_.ci^ries

"ý }---- .i, 4.o ' one Tot:ý.ý.c,.ýý.ries 7 it crl" t)istric t. U; Zoe x)(Mn Tix:ýitc of occupation '-ýý-F: T,r:: Ch ^rr:1Tr ýý_ýriýý; 1 itiý l o;, ý, ý: ýý.ý ý;^; g�re :2ä RESTRICT-LD J0 oast of l'rýrco-Italic: ý boundý; T of 1;;35 by Tuly. It is prG sur,lod ýtil Group relieved t'_Züt ilooc?gvý rt:; rs i=}rrly will .bo of res;.)orsibility for trw .`ý-rl; r üotac. ar,leýlt of t'ý..,a 1ýýlps at that tithe control of C-0,1=11.10"t. This<"kld SUCil forci. S t7i11 puss to ti. -. 'GaCl": 11; iýtý C'ý tE: ' colilC]. G.os datetG for Fr Ci1 zolic i- Grow with the a. turnovor of 'he Tjlus, ü°ý'1.^, il ro17. GVGd of all operütior^l ros-por_sibilit-ýr, the mission of vt'i 2,. ''1. bc: d" i:iC^dquaz'tG_s rr', 1' Group vill V^ ý:il COi1ClUdC:

Rc:deploymeit "TraininS üttcl. tion as early d-Tti: r:; ceivod as .. ^.rc? i. tl at ti rle, infornka ti on -iaas receiv;: d by the Chief of Staff that a training conr.=d would be established i11 this thoator for the to be directly purpose of trail, iE; units that were redeployed to tllo ýi:. It'll- Pacific or i:, directly. tllrou3'1 the Unitod r1tates. s expectcd rt`1 Group be ass it r. the f?cadquie: rters 1"znrjy would "'11CCº M1S31012, W. Bý^czýster, On 25 j,::ý..rch, at Pllalsbourä, Colonel I:iiles G-3 Plans his Theater Sectio. -- of briefed Goner--l D.-vors and staff on Rcdoýýlcyracýýt Plaýa^irlý and stated t! -. t the Theater Tentative Ba.sic the Training of °1a n assigned mission Of yxiý%lit all units, except those assir, ýIled or atta cl, to USSTAF, as a responsibility -ed of Y,.eadquartors Otll lirrly G0 oup.

It was decided that a small Group of officers from i%ade1uartors 5th ý: Group be sent to rlea_cýcluartcrs LTOUSýýin Paris to read . riý.y would into the picture and to prepare plans and necessary directives for ýtll Army Group the «c;ta 1ýrobleY:y which would confront the on VE Day.,. . General ccordilýgly, the Deputy Chi.: f of Staff, BriSa.clicr VTizitfiold ,, , P. Sliopard, and five other officers vicro selected Lrld ordcrcd to ETOUS, 'ý.

tU; arrival i. Paris 11.1)ril, study of tlio rcdop3. oyriont trfc-inir. E; _)oý-, irplicüti(D', s corl:: clýcýd. Jr. Cnalysis of th: 1ZcdeyJl0yLlez:t problems -nd ýtli ý lo-.: Chart, datod ý j-pril 1ýL;.), iy,c?ic^, tccý that" ý1Gýdc;,u-rtcrs xrrlSr ;; 3 b'0 Group vould bý3-res^)onsiblc for tli: -ý of units varying 1 detachments size a. d typo from divisions to 'small siý? of only a fev-r1en. yrr, Ground 1'orccs : r ýýrvice Forces ýolDrosc Ltütivvs of . ýy .:. -_d irr, t', totý ý1,ý0U3'1"=d T;cre coýsultca , on thý; problems oy had r,lot in cýracýý ± TI,,., various bt^ff 1.?1 ti! o vol'iS of'tllE Intl: rlor. . Zone ü'JGrc: co: ýslkltcd. Sections of. tlosC'. Cýluü.rtorS GorliriulriCütiUý S 150 ý 'ýs plans began to sý.s')o up d('itiol^1 sj)ccializOd off'icer norsclincl ts for trsilzi: ýýýý reýs ýýcrc ýc. Výýosr cýcýuircc: ý ý_",ý. studios of requirmoý:. ?r., 6t:' APnY C:ý c P1sL or ý,-u,ýsrt�qc,.ý �rs rüu, -pysT ýssi to 11dqusrtor, s -:TO on 10 Iü^y -110 Vass y)rovcd. Pl ; ns 711--ssubmitted _-,. ti1c; finl ýrsft of ýýcadqusrtcrs v crc proýressiiýg nýjst fsvorý:: bly ý i-d n_r ' c I4o'l 1 tiaý.s comýý t' d. This r,.Gr10- C:-rou? l �"", ,, l ýr"loz, ý,, u:. .. _ d *sr Dc;, trniýjiizc, rc-ndur. was bo.sad oll. hCF, 2:,äF, C:-, : )a_tr. icnt ýroý; i".^, rLs La_nd dircctivcýs. t FloTjý C: c.rt clý: ted 14 T,.:uy 1c1y-5ti''as On 1ý I:t Sr ü IIO%JlýoC! oýJlOyiüý. l. . t1Zchart i r_dý.cc. t:; d týa tho total nuaYýibcr r;: ccivjcý, 1u1 ^iiclysis of . at

81 - FfESZU10 l= a____.__...ý ''. Cý COT.^ý 1ýl1?dl° CO ýti'07_ of I.ý,cC: CLlta1'tCrS J t+ý1 r?r!.. ' ',7 of U.-its i, tiJGUl : _ý il lt i7i'GUyJ iOr tr, -a'; 1: ''üJOS 0ý?Z�ý' 72 ý -AD Ot of iJý.11C'1 i1C,rc; ýýC:1'STiU_;CO iý `l�ii Jii? L1Siyr CýGtcri: llý? GC:. ; i'ÜCtI'CtlOýi 1: i units , of .. t ., ry frC, wL? =ýu tý ä?u__ý:;:;; s: u) Of l_i_ .,j_: ý.z ý1 .ý , ._ .. . t'it U;.iit5 $C.:?.-'',Lilo: :E'C)i Sl+i'~aý:; p,, t .. C, U.^ý" " C'ý; Ci.. ; 1C ý'J"'1.1., >iC):.. UCCU'): t_1G :.. Äýr U1of tl0i; , f_. 1ci'. CC_xti'Ol of ýr'i: :" _1: to tii tGS COi't:. "": =1ý_ý1 ii'ý f01" 1.'"tL' ; NtC: I7c:,ä +..ýiC -ý'Gi =S W1.111 . , vC«. l-blc : .

ýt ho ° t; t ,. `.Li1. iý. ýýi Of Ui1itO a result of rc:ductio:. s of ý il tl-'ain, C: -:,. 1o-ýor ý: t, ý;ý. t týýý; cst:. 'aliu. ýýa,::ýt for i`_"jý,ý, -"-'^1 r- ( ociüoc'. \iC iý ý.. ry ýfý. , n;, " ' R, '�. %i.: ?^ n 1r. , ri 7 C" J Of 5ý)ýCi,. J- . t :i : jOi' CO:ia: ^.:__G `4CU1Cý' ; t.:., ý.nTC:.. .ý`i:= ;;:. C:.""1 . ". y _:u 'C1 tS "Sip"5`..: 1ýý''ý'ý:4 oi' ttý C'ý:, d ?1:. iCA1 tiJv 1'3S-po: "_S1.'(Jlc'% for ti'ai= ih'" t'2o^' dLdL: _i :. .. . ý`, ý ,.. , /1Cci T f on J-L i ý"ý% ý, ý" il ... i l...- C"f>::` vl'v:., 1'. 'ý'1ýJ ýn T' -1 13r. `J- 2 «. i7c1ý. ýýccore..lý..,, ý ý co oý.ýýý1.,,,ý? ý.,,,,., ý. , "a ý-'. ý, ",,. atr.to at iý. at ý, 1 ýYciG t h1old c"_, all r. ^jo!.t:.. ý. 011 t, ý",.. -rfl /(ý Zrý "ý % ýT policyJllCJ JýL)llýiý)lýýlü+ý ý: ý ýI' C VLL1VvL. 1i. 1. ý '7 ý1oýJ'_itl _. v the /^tý: . Tnr ii.... ü. to ý-Ur tv ý,.., r. 1 'v�"1:;.'" ý,ýrv': ý. rcd l' ýl liyý" l' v lýll , "-ý over . 1ý`t+C'...:ý1ý.: ! Ari-T rto: cs Dtýýl U! other ^ ?"O1'_tC. " q'? ÄrtC: rS, CaeCylir:. to ld:; l'J: hc°Qolti':: C'. Q "i: 1',; : 11t ?'Jý: S uý" y-" ,

- 82 -

_.ý. ý-)IRRICT:, D _». ý-__ ý...... ,_.ý,..., R; STRTCTý.ýD

CH2. TER T.TLiTE

OCCUý".TIOT; OF ýýP: ýY

Gti2 1iYr: t'_i. S" iy Croup for j oCcup ation t' 1. , Gfcrr., i. c.. ýe 1 . _. 15ý- it on .o of .. c...ýy iý lýtc )t^ !-ýbea.ý and carriec_ until torr«ina- tio1i of its is , ioiz July lýýrj. The uidiilr principles -ard the ,,, iiýGt: ý; missions aSSigi_l"'iC' to i Zxmy Group t7CrC; sot fort-': t:. io_ In llul: ý '1"V. for Oýýer`ýtioýý l.t. lý tions Cnc?outline plans 1ssu;; c?.by eT^ ýý,?, 'cnd t: ýe Second °Talisrraizt' y)1^n, d_-tcýd-71 October 1ý4,z,- O.aor ; tio. 12clipso4; dated lv I

Tli: ; 7'ü"ýL+'F that Hcc.ýquý rtWrs Stýz 1-rrV Group "ould p1= spccifiod . be v.iicl_ZC1rü-va,from C-c:rria_. v 1.c1 control of 1zlliocý forces in tl: o U. S.. ,:. Army Grou-. Zorýýctýýculd bo cor_solic' atc..d ur.c7.or 7Ioc.c:clu-z°tors 12th Ros-), for tio.. ülý rest;; c'. =ýýitli rýco,dqu : rtcrs . ollsibility coordiý <:. of yn1-rk 12th i;xny Grou;.ý,

The first dry ft ,11an1 of tho Joint Plan- ýir. Sty ff of 25 Ivovcrlbor 1ýý, , cor.forned to t. l:, pri: zci,,, ý iif' LlläsiU. i s 1^ id domn by ...., _)lcs and tho oporatio_lal situ^tioýý- csc.: ssurý.cd by, 12th Armyiy Groun. plans tii1U tllo PL? "Eclipse was cG?^ s1. CiC:r:; Ci t0' bý a CC1: ; t10_7Olof , currý; l. t' eratiors .1 tt ýt'c; ý nrý: nr ., ret. ýr ý' LJ.1tüýý .. rýiliý- ýary op., tioýýs, It waswas ý.ý.ý,ý: lýu. tý7.ý:. ýý. oTcr�tiol;ýu should ý Gtrri^r or cc: I'orccs "tiaould be . u, -.. surrc_? c?cr coll^,,-, nsc, ý--1ý- cor^ý:....zonco ýo. , -.... -- -...... dis. posed in pI'Gloiiatio : oý.' ' the currcrý. t zol. QS 01 ýc G1oý1 ZýlZli 'tt1:.

bulk of forces in bridýeý'ýc^e': ýýroýs c` sL or TI-IGrc::11i.o, have. iLd ^;.Iýr col: sidcr, - b1c 1)c,rtir,: _, Russianý. ) --.. of forces...... vou1d not cccu;, .. .ý.. ._ Co rmc:._Y. s lýrr. First Frcýc:. Tn c±esiP,iyotir_ý Tý1issý.c;1; of iy -,-d i cuilýr.q uiýt fcrccs -XI-ay the tücticcl cýýrütiöýls;tý,c strer.: ýtli, of ýýý ýli jýrny %JS tiic su? A7lVr lines yýJercccýý.sidcrcd. Scvc.. ýssi6ýIc; c' r:iissio; l into the I: : ild S tJi711G of 1cIiin-s c deep thrust Urii'ýý1'ý reL'. rOtcctod flank Lino Communic.. First French ;xr; Y l) its soutla and of. - ticus by blocki: action cthe east bank of tl: o F'"1111C, jr. tlic : The lo. -i- icr: tcd Black Forcst, and c-st in the StuttL; art rean. 1 l c' to ITuri^bcrý; d t11;: turzillý a sin -lo is oi s.ý'vünc:; lcccýij? ý; first :ý.. 41: tý. i -provido -, south ý`ýiL1..;:iiC1i iýý ordor t:ý - occur! TSTItýC'Y:. D

t iC}ý_, lo,: ia'. i::.y UiýO._ C Gi.,ii1L ""ý - ' C' still tTc;" --t'1 ..: F ., r, C) ý. i: tý. : r°c`ý tc cc-)'. -."it-'z ;,..saiýaillty of c: yccu?:toý'iý ;, ^lc_;: ' ýo ýic -, N, ý - i, of ý" ,ýi. ý. T", so ý.. i:. J-: CF. ý.:ý ; v_t Itý,..ly" _.... to, }ýýii "-a "Sül ý i, St li'iC ä: C: 2 -Gi:. ý GC '^,. t - /fGtiY l. - cCJlý 0f I' ]..`ýLý./. ý..: S: CtlY t. lÜ ý7ý, c: 1 tJ:; ý.. ..

i. l a- c" ý C1or 1ý C.11Cc 1! e- ý r, ^. CjLl rtý'viý%<,aL1l -. ýV:.; : Clt: ý-.. ý.;. i.. Z., Vic, 1- t],.: rý 1 A:J.. '1liJ. i (.l1'r"^'i_1Gý'. i. '.:. ý` `'/ 21, On ('{ ý.., 1 C! --,, f, , "' rý ": rý Ll....'.? VJ -, `... .. ' .-".. -ý" i, ýiýi '. -ýýM. ýG -i_J. lj . l _ý1 . 1ý ') it ; Ujr'.s clarif 1GG to Vic) eYtü. t 'ý'ýat J: eLý.

ticca suýý'?ort, but t: f.:ulc y üi'ýility.

to ät^ii 7_ S 1'C 'vlä(.; Ci C.: --c' C: 11^- , cd r�LiC TCl a ýýlü: 11'` Cý.'

S 10ý}-ý..! Lýi. _ in S° IýiLi"ý . _ ? 7a11V'1 1ýJ ^LVfl-TM 1;"1. M C; . i.a 1ý+-. 'j. a .... - ,. , M'ý1...to by t-Clc: 1.51tý.: 1)rOVLCo 1:.GlG i_ý C ýSS2 i. ýV i ]. its OLýtl]. äýc:y)1_.: _LS Sulc cxýý ý, 'ä."ý. ý.ý ý _:.cýs .,ýý ,, : Lý fr. ýi° ti"?Oi'ýý Tu_ '01 7 ý;? -t ý?1 1;i11_it :: r j GC,VC) il. ' t_LO j; ',... ý" ý i. �`^. C;CC LL"1)':ýj- '. of 1.: "ý_si.: " i" 0. , %YT" tiý t.. ý" . tL+ of r" 'ý, ý. 1/-i 1.1'ý", CVý-""; Wirst : ii }.l"+ ll: tJS7 ý.. )s of ý. t.i ,, _c. ý.. 1; ý ;" ;ýýv", t`ý tlýo u": _ ,, ýI -ý . 1vi'ccS I"y ^bovýo t'_ý; I'oC'. 7.StiibUt: iOýi of ""^ i" v. ý'Ei i livýýi ý ion.nU_ ý"1-+, of UC t' )c. ý ý 1S1rý: týOt" I ý 1,/- -S. ý' ý,, iu, Lc.c cý:.ý ý: Of , ýý , " d,i thc lr L v c. i1 i. ý. ". i Jt! ".. lý 1. f. 1 ~ý''"". )ý-ri.. L 4Jýý .Llý". J ý V T, t. (+ ", 4ý7^J .. �ý r+ 4, .. L i. U -J 11", - -; _Att_. C'. ' iJ. l: Grc:uy) V': ý. Ül ýJt^--ý-=- i C. ý ýý _ c_. ,j"ýý. ý1C; --J ^ "ý ^"ý-ýrev a to Ci'ý: Su" 1 1 1 )l'C bUt11 "J 'O3`1C! rtlý1. L. VVl. 1ý t'_ ý ý'Z'tý. ; i: of, .. i;?. Clt C7C.). Lrý tT1J lý'_.11_;: lt, 1'IT 1:,'ct OýJ'GI' sll. a'. ^..ý,ýc;.usl`, ý ,; --_ tl ýSTG it: "' ý1"l.ti' tO be i.,. Tit i'-3 trL? C :; . ýr corps r":: lv4jiý sw 3j G :.:. t, 1.�vJ. i. - �, , .,i_C t ,- "- .,,-''., ý'+ý. ', ").. ýC. '. Stý! ý_'. d.'.1.. =lýr 'ýlu;. t. r3,, '?;i Z7Ca . ý CC.3''ýS G1 ilC. ý. C.. ü _LZ. ý ý' n r, "" !'ý..:. -1.:. lI Pf ,ý. :v ý.. i2. t, s". ý N v. 11. .1 :JL: ý Aý"1J'J+ ý v_.: z. ail. _ ý -_°cý btf ýýlc to a: ýoll. )ttýa 1A_ý ti^11_r ý 1'. l:: t t, Lt iVL 1` C_il'.: Ctivo tithe i:1G 'ý11ý ,N _.; ýJ.. l irýýliýry ý v- 1. ýJ.... 1t)1'CL' of '_ý: J"'a, t. .: _tl'JT .

1 t3 c:l Iý^' C. co, ?foL? lc'. c2.'ý ,s ` , sý., ý, ý1 ý .: t'_i: i)i. rý it; __ l +.A71 ss fr!: 1Gi t 7+ in tvi C1 r. r Ui 1%Gt:ýý; 1C' CrUSN f-2 as 1stl'i. iAL ý. _" -1.: J.: ý )1ý", -", ^J' .ý ný. ý7 ^ C. ''}} ý. L_,. VLt. ' 1'_AJ AJt "`: rJly l1 t^ ^CL ý; c'ý_ý, vý_ý.1".. ,. t .ýýý ý. - '' ._ . _g4 - FüwSTRICTLD

th,; Black Forest as far aort. l CS Iäarlsrullc. ' Ot: ': cr provisioý-s tacrc that o:7-c; ;; r::. orocL division, and o-. c infantry division Of First Froncli y Group i"..rr. ry sllould cross tlzý, R'.1ir, u on ,,,rr. i, urdcr bc. -di,_d tlrc rijSl, t 1iarlsruhc-StuttSa Corps of Suvcr, t':. to' occupy t, '-.Lc rt ^ rca a:ýa ruliuT, rc ýýrr.,y il., ýeTurttui: lbÜrS, 'r:: IY c:lc~lol; ts to jilt. B.: Thu : Of týtilizi:: to r.iovu -.' varia. pýssiblý occssity C Frc.. c?1 c1ivisiu'rs to occupy Saar to ruliutic: Suvu,: th jlrr.. y as also includcd.

Specific instructions to cover r.1ore detnailod aspects of the t.Eclipso= Oporation. vac.ro issued as a1.:.-x0s to tll:; ori ; i.. a1 outline .Plan, dated 5 Fýbru ary 1945. Thu e...ncxc; s vacro i rc;pared by the staff sections prinary interest and. coordinutcd by, G-3 Sc;ction.

li Pcvisud Outlilau Plan for Operc.tio. ti, cliPsc ' t>>asissued by 'irmy Headquarters rot11 Group (:, 22 =l,".)ril 1545. This revision " ai,. ted " riaintaind the rlýix; s in effect, unless superseded at that and, rescinded the j"Lltornto Plans prc'ýviously issu(; d. Sug-cstions frur. SILEF d Col. ico, tions Zone ETOUS: dcsia.. cc' to received . 1 ^i: lr.lu.. ý clarify carto. i. z of the nissions of Cor.ä:.u_:ic atic. ls Lone and the use and provision of specialist personnel for )Ost-. tigere incorporated in the revised plan. Tlhu outsta.. dir. g 1)oints of by t,.,,.. in 12t'z rrly Group's plcýrevision r, tiwcrý �_uccssit, ctod cý.ý Suar � l i, 12th Ysrr.ý,y Group adopted thc 1ulicy of tro... sforrii. g between 1'"rr.ly troop headquarters responsibility for ürcas, a_.d coi. u.,and of units fron the located therein in order to effect the transition opcra tion1 to thc: tionc-1 leaving tl"? 7. 7lc. C(,3. It was OCCUpL^.ý. phase while ý"y)ý -': hoped t'-ýat t: trool? installations alrcucly cnga,.; cd ir. r.,otiror. -aon .of s anl,: occuraticnal duties muld thc-reby b;; hL;ld to a r.1l. hir. lUr1.

The r.1^ jcr cl1ü.. ýo i_ lýrga. ýization for occulof the U. S. for Zone was that Headquarters S,ýve.it'_. .'Lrr.iy vould be responsible the 11cstcrn lviilitary District which included all the U. S. Goilc except Bavaria, instead of _t'1c Eastc; r. i Military District . which would bo organized by Third lirý: '-y Hcadquartcrs. ' Other new conceptions fron "12tz lýrr.ly Group which were incorporated in the revised 1alüý_s to forr. tö tical were the 'ad j. ustr: cnt of ; crslsrois boundürics co.. i, 'pt)li. izatio.;, if subdivisions and reconstitution of idollrl: rcis crga.. necessary Forces. TO to control, rti^int aii:. disband the Gcrriai. iz,rrled

cc;ntr` lize control cf r.lilitary gover.,mor: t alor_, tho,. lines of ferner to be fron Ger;-;:al: adriinistrat"ion, corps +.cadquartc; rs were clir. ii: atod idninistr : tivc the clmin of command for rlilitary Govcrr..-1u1-tand ýn-; as possibld. purpo. ýý s asý cý.^rlJ

Tactically, thL; crücutio: " of tllo tLcli,; )se+ 11ün was vcry r.luch l)lu.. of all ob jcctivcs in as antici; ýýatcc? rýcc1., ý"ýcccil1ýlis1: i:lCsLt C" d trol of occupied areas va..s, i. ot as the disarlmrlor. t of o rr.:, i..y ar, coi. t1CiýatCd It cc.T.li7lütC and Sr1.oCt! 1 in all CaSCS as ^:. and GXp%CtOd. that failurý vr.1.c:re it occurrcd is not thc fault of is believed such , tho troop uilits i,.. vcAvod, but is duo to of tir. loly disser.. irat ioil their bc;ilýý of +ho extc:. sivc dctailed instructions to jporrlit stuýlicd

r 85 .. M `'TRICýýD

and u;..c:orstooc2 by units preoccupied with combat opjrjti ors and to the 1` cýc of aC1:11.Iýistrativo '_act-:dqL1nrters to control the occupätioral forces in. rar aras the ýýiiý:icr tactical hoadgLk rtcrs focused ta_ýyi ti: ý thetý.,,., uofýaýýr t of t ý, Gorl: ForCCS. onb: ý coi; 1ýý1.,, :, _,., «,.: lý..r. c.i^1_1cC?

for i1,: dc. to tr01 T'ac: s'i:, ý;CL ý_ ý c'1istrativG ý yua rtCrS CCý? ^roas ýi; _ r :; xr of the CGIl1b arraics in tho ovcl. yt that cor.ib<:;t o-;; rati o :t Gorr. had bc.::; f'oreswc.;. viorc carried cný:do,.ýp irsidc; of _a:ry _ I,: res so to Y1.inquiry ýliýýF i; _farrecý iL;adquartc; r s Crcuyý o,ý_ 21 T^ýuo.. ry 5 that S= could not furnishfur-, a hcaaquartcrs for 6ta - occupational control of roar aroas of -lrr: T Group such as 12th 1,ri. lv Group had in Fifteenth l. ri: Iy. Thoroforo, i: col;ilAia; _co with ;'ý`-, iF : Irtorir: l Directive for the Occup^tiol_ of Gý;r%_a__y-'of 13 , '4-- headgtýý..rtcrs was requested to January 1ý ý an^n ýýu^"r^c, t; .ý _tocý cory"ýs oxocuto tý_e to coordination in c'.ctailcc? pl^: _?:ýi__ý cýrc? provide oCCU_ ý7ÜjÜV patio; _ of rear e.roas iý_ Cý.;rlýýary. 'ý,; lýF raossc.r; o dated 11 February indicated that this request could not be favorably co_. sic? ei°ed.

CtmCC, r:? iI1'' S-,)ccia liSt iý:: l'SOr1:. 01 for provisionS 'post- 0. i:. 1il)SCtt ilostilitiuS functions : 9xlic`1 ti"icrc iT: Cludý: thc 1J1^.. s socricd to provido for adequato control of toccu. p«tio, l in those In practice llotij;;ver, t'.;;. static li^is ýi. staffs taore ý reslDects. ýý n 1.ý. r. ý ý" ý 1, distiýýct failure. This was cýuý; l. -ý.ruýt to tlýý fý..ilL. rc of .. ýýe^c'r.1Lýarters to authorize c.,. üýprcvcý T/0 ýý L for týlcsc staffs in be f-sufficicnt. tlicir sufficient tir. 1o for tllo,: l to soi. a: _c'. porfcri. l fu_lctioZl; ^_: d the trc.. iliiiij tjhicil t: 137' rOci.; j, vo trUl bo. c,:, ti',: Car1J cc ncc;, )tiC'. al' C11Saric]ýýr. 1GIýt Co:; LIST'-v ý TiJ(aS sýýcl - . dual ut-z^f orý^: ýizý tio? ý ýýit! ý Ono Starr to cGr: t2°ol -iý: rr.ýcý Activitics for týlc illistrütiol. lotlcr trooy '-nd t? ic i; orrl^1 Staff rýýul^r ý cL; of tllý:: for t hus Huchoaf V1. lliýrZ. CtýG1.ý.".. sS7. stC?: cv cyo,rlb:, %C1i01G1iS ýý CL: laUlýi " tliýi' tl. l. : ilnot L. ý%ýý. T. ýuvlllts O`. Jýl offs`uý. /"; ýtrGlll: Co, ' VU7cý..: J. u-Lý-Y ý]. Y'fillilý -+ýj roquircd.

d to '_%-tic fro;. Th ;ý cliscrcýýujýcics tiahic'_1c)ccurr.., rosultcc: 1 bGt? 'Jý;:: -i 0ý 1'C:t] 0110_l : CctiSSitJ ý: 1C' GLai-:. istr2t1vC; t. 'Lli; conflict : , )b1Cns of ci d ý1. ir, ýi"1ý Coz11ý1cxitJ of i:1`^= ,pr cccttyk^ti_: tllc y ccublc , t. iýoc, ýri t ýT zýfor ýý_ý orýý. ftiizctio_l of 1ýVý°YýO-_1101 of lL 1cr.1 ý. ýý ý: fron b. in ordcr to offoat C sýioot" transition cor.:.-t oy);;rctiolls to r.; t. lo dr. Gccuýý tio141 control of ^s vas ^býr c. lir_istrý tivc : '1Gr I: ilOTJ: ti: i) li_ th op r- t10i: ': 1 vlct C1'S -t th 11 ; ýVC1S" 1'Sc. 'ý_ý1 Iýb1G jr! tllý rýliSSiO ý all Gr{; ^ýý1Zations ý1ot bo tin ý t'1; ýcrrýTl lc;t :icr cos wcý coulc? sl)- rod for, of ci0foý arr. tll tý1:. ýrýý. tiC tr: ý1=11iý; vl' CiCt U1. 2'1ä.1: i:11SSlOi OCCU"7t'. "'11. : ' Th: C:lt:: lo: 7ýh : lc. bOr::: t0 C'tütý ilc: c? iJl^11ä 'la d Coi: 1"7] - rofCý. ':: ý 1--no.. t1. lc; vc ls, tim for th:; ir --_C' 17Gl1ClvSý lc ýiC'_'_51012 T:' »S 1'.C't ý.ti'"^..llwbly to lOt'JCr Gc}1C:10: _S CGIi-)a i; tC Study ý1'-C= Ctýi: l; ýri: Thus tl: until }lostilitios -jo'ro d. z 1iý,;11d;: ti0:. ' til:: 0O0Uk. tlOl_ VJC;ro fOllO: 'CC'_ c_nC1C0 S171 of ciliVvlo; 7ý,d ftl' CÜý , SýG . hýStilitioS w - 86 - IýST. ýIClýD

t. ', tLat tyý.. Ga ý. ,r, 1.: , -^ l... '. liý`j ý ý", mt1ýno1n1,. ý c"ar f. 11.; 1dTC. " yý:. iC.: Viýý. ý.... +.. º1CVa.lJ . _a... `J1v.. F`1tzr

, ýv, r'JJtýý. ' ý"". ý. l.:. vl. ýýý ý)rLýý. ý'. �y^S SILýly. p, V, L% ý_y 111vý ll ticOi ý lc: Sv i'VC! L?ii'ý Cý. c. Z'G.11ý'Jl:. 'l t1, G.t ý CGUrci_w_tec _; .: " 1C tU COV: >i t.?, C v.. t: ý1C-ý;C'_ ir ol'tS t ll ý?ý: Uýi1tS CC t? i:: üätE i .;

'.. l "i ^ .J siý1-7"" oýý t , _' ar., s .:. c L!I JýTlt C'<;t^C'1.. '. __ýG `'+ (', --, ýf... llýii Cý 1C,: S iýc: 'il. .. ; L, l' ý : SC S GL ý"U

+"f 1-, ý [+ . ý1 ý_: y Jt? ii trol V1ý , ý uI:; oýc?ýL.. ý::lv il[t:. ýt coý, . -ý- , _. -._ S ,'ý li. i... 1. iý, l , Olof týlýI t, 1f; 000L? ýai0= Gf urLtý 1-7k: _.,, .- ý. ^. C.' CovrCýlýý- ^t " _ t! O J:,:. '`. tii. S i, `JG1L1t101i Y lCil L-ýCtl CoZ1b"'-t ='. c=.1"dc%S v, L:. Uf Jt'L ýr ., . L_1-, r; ., -. -.. 11. L`,... )ý. ý.+ 1 L11iC G_ L U111ý,. 1 .. 1ý ý; t_:;.. iýi'C)blýt". ý ý tiI.., t t.::ý" 1ý,. ý, .V -'7 scý.. / f1 _, ^ r-rf-, 1721; 22 Jt? 1 blc. r_»n� 'ý ' . ý., .,. t.., +, ^ "nr ,�r nn,,,, --" ii. l'iwr --tiJOU1l. --i ý_ 1U1,1i. i Vli V u.:.co i 11J�l. y """l'JI. Cy/ VJ. l. ýa\, l. tý ycý, c1Ly^1tr,ý n t; aý ýý1i+°c. '1'_lis sýsiUiliti:: s ti.;:st of . ,^tJ. r,1_ý by r" ü t' ]..C: b;: C1': cctýccl T succ: ssiv. -. ., c, - .r..1biliti0^a vJ ý Lt:: brýU-ý_:. 1'ZT as t, CC:SS<-rl's .. _., to .} [ ir, `t t'ilit�j Z. S 12tý: saý' -.- a'. by i-c'C1. rti:: rS i ^r n -iv, "'iS°1.a ýý^ J :i. l':ý' t: Jul, .; 1 ' ý lüli u-ý ýý Výý,S t i t_ý c tcl Of:; ýc ;1 týL'Lý ý sts. Ulisýlýc. . l ,:ý ýu11 .ý ý't. ! 'iiSJG ti its `' Li fist i1'i r' TO'ý T'; V+ 1' J: 1v ý. ll to ý_ýCý 1'ia1L S C.: Cý Jvv]' ý .,.. lnli_ý. j Vý. lrlt rl? 12'G ln Cý t ý_. J_ CC; a1'171 " . - lr. ui lY"C1.2 w, ýr -ý", ý. ý_ý: 1 a_1ý .? ýý"-ý -rI'' týl t1: t ý ý 1i1ý 27 IO1 1 "... ý fi , --. -C! r^c'. iý, cýrc;ýs Y:cst icýr _ ý u li ýY'ý.(' CvD voll G,..1 its Jv !. 'I. _ -^ C. "v-C: ,ýll . . v. itý.. ý i1ý.. J., . _ý% tiv.r1: all C "'S'72 Gi CUlC t ý. ý 11 1' . 1';ýS Uý!slbill t, l. t 1C'-1 xt. :i rc? r,.; ubur; c:: tý.c -' ^r Castr ýS 1n_ J..:ý_ ", ný, ý.: 'ccl'c:LCa^ Lc. l?JCSt to tilc v1ciýlitý' ý. ýýubc> scut.

/ni', : `^"'ý' OCCll. )"'t1Q TT7 ý of ý1. 1 1v1. 1. 71 .. ý. 1 , ý1. l. "" -, cut J J, i, 1tý. 1 "ý.. nlVý.. 7_ _I of mUV1_lJ tlJ-="ý äýC11 L 'Clý`.. _ VU 1°q sJl'1. Cü,."ý1J f :'a' ýt? on ; fiýcýcucl lýtai-'It"' ü: iv ?d' ý. 1: 'atl't1C- control of 11 ýy-t j. "J 1 J"vl: t Jylý: Cý. 111 .iJ; '. i J `ill 1 J. 1ýITW 1! ý V ivý .. ý 1 . lv Cý I. 7. r -'r ý- -ý. _\. . Vltl, by to jri:; lCi ;'.:'-y t. "r'1toi'j ir. itiý:. 11y'GcCt. '{)lcd

87 r -

üýJl.: l. LV1L'L liZICi'lTL-: D .. ý.... _ ý_. ý

fl-. S)tuttý,. thý cý. t'ý.: te of 'Pro--,c.!- rcos. rt, )itýl of 0tc. :'urttu.. burý biT t: io 1ýrý'']. c.ýusly' ýi; r.,_, tt:;clý � dn, , ý- i_ý. 11 tl; cso ý yýlC_ýs i^r _..::,. ucrtcrs icl! TJCUlcýc, trol t'-K; st -r--- 1ý. ryr District of tU. S. ý.ýy.o. ., lilitý. (S oo i i3 uri: s 2b a-, c! 27) _istrýti eý, t: oro býs:; d o__ co: _trcl suy)ý;ri:: 1;,ýeýsuc: uy)%)?;ý "c' f: 11cLJ 'I c ý. ý_ ý7 "=1... t' ý .1(. 1:. l: fli r_. ^ ýl .. +, ýtC..: ý,. .-.., V-_t Lý l. i. L V 1ý I iiýi 1. sc, I _ , iý. _.. . forces tir, f ýr rodistributio_.. of z.-. " tr:, l tº_.., tic. of G; rl. ý :: yr T. cý.- seliý=^üG_ý ef' c , _, of GCCU,)ý 7ore c"ý;; 1. cýofiitio,, cs cý: co tdocisi ;., r:f t', iv ý lt^ y TT 1, nT... r, -, n"i.,. ý C:. tl,,-, . Z7oL1?111. ti, ýýý.1 z.ý ciof occu tic_l llýre_ýco 1 ro: . c. _ ýý. . _ý ýý boon ?lýc.ý `ý-__oLtýcod.

ýý ir°l.:L thc, forcos 11 "1 JU it b-cL. ^i yý t our : . 11"'lt ýl ti? frGi. tlýT ý.lloýcl of fOic0 S U; ýi?: r TcýacC: i J 1rýL1StrJ-irxCTli~ý. ýýtitlýQ, aý, ". ý +v, ,,,. i_. `; ": ý. ;,,, s Oz,, tic_:. c i t. iZos1 ., Sibill týr lur -�vul<, _, .... . ýaza _ ilc ýlý. b.:, to . - -ý1: It occu1ýýtio'- týi ýýustriý c? _. ýt, ta:s ar-rocO, `-ý-' .-ssiý_=o<< rý ý,UZuit t ,ýL"ýý_u. , ý,'-'-, ý.+ý r, _ r ,,. TJulcý c:; ý-ti"uo , ýýa. of -.ýt ý ýýrc.. ý t'-, llcta:, i tLC111ýSC liitiJ ýý CCCUy)Sr at 1:. C:000rc? . JLti'_ t 1lustrlý c. _ ýro^ ý...co ýt i.,ocý ý "lz icc.-'tr. l:; ott:. "ý; 1oc-. 1 situýi_- rsyaoct ! ýý. was CýC.S? tC' to 1-il 11 tc 1'" ýrya'ýTT:;r_i::? i: iýt. ý?ClL? art:; i'S rr-C 1'-ý' Cr-5 tý; to CýDOTC?3: t(: %71t'15t'. ... ýr-ý' L; lý" ; i.;ü _... by _,t ýTr`: il~blo tlio c.., )lli_: -:? gct-rtc rs cculc? 4: r'.. ýtr: ý; _ t. 'ýclilý;; oý rly sos f t-ýý occul)sti1: ý:.. :)f ofý , oct, lc o ý ý t_ij fro:. tiýr t; lß L'.Toý : ý; ývT t1 c)i: ýrlc s C- across S Cf ýUätri^ f'-rc:; V. eccu1ýo: tiýý:, lýuutri occuiAi. cl by t?: V Sýü'"ýý s, --C1 as such -."C; of : tli tl. bull. tlýL: fürcc;; ui: -cjuo c ý: ýditi uýis cýcco ýt :t o Of t by Gi; ý}I '-r. y ä"ri: uiý C T1ý;i'i; loo-. i:. =-ýLustriü" surrý_, deroc? rr . -.,

ý.

- 88 ESTRIC TEED RTSTRICTEn National Zones of occupation in Gerl:ianyI end Qrý;ý.nizý. tion, of' U. S. Zone Under iýýcliýseýý Flýn.

emer:ic; a r,reclc?enbur, ý einen Hamburg . Us/ Enclave i�rark ...ý 10 BrTndenburý_ Hannover

. Hamzovor tl'aeýü1:, F, r l,lunster ic . Brunsz? XýBerlin w ý. Tripartite I Magdeburg -

Halle-lerseburp; I";TestfLllen «Leipzig K Kurhessen

% ý Sachsen Rhein Theater Thuringen Nassau ý'" Provinz ! _ý. ý'ý ..

Frankfurt ý....- iý I ý westmark i,+IaruAheim

i rt Stuttgý. fý /^ ý Bavaria ýý .... _..,.ýý.. ý. ý;Pý District

- PIurtt emburg District ._. ý..---.------Munich ý ýýý

ý1 / I I AAýv I Boundaries) ._..ý... __...... -- ....International . .. National Zone Boundaries Figure 27 lit:: District, 'U. S. Zone ý T:rr ry -'M')TRICTED ý ILSTRICTEDT I ý...... _. . ____._.. _... C_I:1PT'' TrEIß LMT . .____ý __...... -_._. _ LFIT]C T OF 1iPTILLE"LY ýýT,l: UT ITI Oiä SUPPLY ý ----_...... _

1. G'L_lc;ral.

T'1o av^il` bility_ ;;f artillery nxI.rlu _ition -plc:ys c?ccisivc ralc iii CiCtýrr21ý ; VIi'l.at oý)ý:%ratio'_: s b:; ül_CiGl'taýLC%:. Duri. iý thG Gy)Or^tl0ils 6th sf i==ýy Gxcul), tllc laclc of adorluatc c.rzriundtio; su1)yýly h^0 ir. ýlxýrtaat cffcct on thk) ol~)<;r^tivns. t'l-t tiac-ýc u+ý4crta?, c:ý. TilO C1:louiit ivcr, of cxý.::luiýitiur, t?ZC.t c^.Vý b.; cxcc? in any ý; o;ýc rý. ý tio.,,y is c'ircctl c?o,-)cmdcýwt o:._ iuturo r.; su_ýýly ossibili tics. : fielci ü i ha: to the best cannot cx,ýc. _d t: 1ü ar.ir. ýlu_ýitic, lý On ýcý .^.. c'vý... t^ uiýlcss hc This is assured of a_. adcquato arýd. tir. ioly resul; )ly. clýal)tcr will discuss in detail the effect of the C.i: ll'iu-nition su. )ý)ly. situatlOl: on ti1G urldort^'x-n by 6t'? Yrriy Grou, ). , o-ýe'r^tioiýs

2. D-D, y to 0 Sel)tcr. lber 113ý.

Tha artillery ar-munitio-, for this ph^sc of the oyx,rctioi: s vans set u;ý in the". i'Dragoou; ' plaýý vaýs into Southern lýr.. c;, t1lrotlS: 1- tý:,: the. b, ccý,heý.ýcýs th: ports-nd, in ccorL `'ýco ti:ýita ` a.. ticipý tocý in ath.;. 3ull list.

thu iiCluC-1irL; ^. To provic'c this su,.-); )ly roSGUrcos, rescrvcs, of list b-sis bctvýc: er tll:; I;kTO vacre c'iviýLoc: oa ýu. - Dragoon troop list.

fo,-r t. ýý, Dr^. noo. 7"lcrý.,^ tio., b. 1,i.u:Iu. _ýtior1 requisitions ýc; _ _ vucro also Statcs f= loo, ii. i.: to bc discharý; 1ý1^cc;d i.: thc. United c? shills oc; in Southcr. ý Frýr_cc.

ürL: for thv hý c. ` Tl1e ü,r:ieu::ts of ýunitiýý: 1)1^r-. ecý oar1y i ses of talc ýlýrutio_a wore cýdcquýte, oi d, The rc:;,)id c.clvc:. cc of tl. u trc: s difficult tr-. _s- n traelýs did tizo y)orto. tiol. lý;'qbl:; ý ýýd thi, not rccvivý; all of iýýýlit r...vý used. ar,;::1uýýitiozý thý t they r. "'ý Sc7t; c, Lurly the latter half of rabcr, resist--cc stiffolcd for itivr- 7-^usir13 increased crtillcry ^l: u.iu2: , so that tlýc tol1:_aSQ of o.l: u: litio. ro roaclýiýýü t. ic front- lira uäits 11^s it barely sufl i.civ1-t to suy).Dert thc l)ressurc r;as desired to ist thý cizer.ýy. irG ýx.ýýu.litieýl to""--SO tiaos '^vý.ilaUla iiairtai-- "'.. 110 c to CrCü. ti: StOC:: S L. GrVaal'd rocaS ..,: SGtipý t: f. Prior to 15 Sol tLlýbi; r 1; - ,ý+, . i js1:.y ti;as of the _ ircluc, i?.; French u: its. ih.: artillery officcr ýe-i:tire o;7: 'rü.tiu:. tr611ed t'_lc o.llccatiý5., öf_ iu__iti; bctviccn of tLo Sc '- 1':s:: -ly co;., _' arir: r , xic-.dpul: rtcrs Gt'ý ':; rr: y Group ryssur.lco- U. ý" ,,

n a- tj PCSTRICTiýD bccalac cccssary cor.r. r,.: Zd, it' ijmrodictoly ;: to aloc. tc ' ^rtillcry tho Scvcnth r: ^a.rml. itiorz bctl"jecrL c'.r sriy j:11 ordor to insurc canequito. blc- distribution of corab:t resourccs -, yd to facilitate orderly transportation ürr ä; . ts. lit this 1e tilc Linc of Cor.r.lunicatio_is cxtc_ldcd from thc Scuthcrjl ti:: French port. of iI..^rscillo 'ý r_d the beaches cast of Toulon to the 1ý.; distance of foothills of the Voss "untýins, ', ý 425 to 500 r.iilcs.

rn 0 it is to 1L1oyi: t:, To a11oc:to r.iiriüllitio-n. n0cossarZr (1) Tiil^t quattitics --Lrc irýr.lcdiutcly availablc:

(2) tho resupply rcto will be fcr sovcr"Il rýontns ilZ the futurc;,.

'. (3) Tho of erutions, curi°c:.. t -and future, tlic. t nrc pl c_ýýcd.

(l) d (2) i: Cý..^ýiý lc te fr,or:: utiol. ýý.,", tir^s k.. ,, cýt u v^il^Ulc ý. ý,, 1,-.to 1944, t. icc, rccorc? s of rro. Seýtcribcr cue '-) n;ýlotc -cli u`.ýits, u_,loadia; rocords i. Ic: ",löto L.r, ulaoo uncl issue

h. " Thu atirýLL, of artillery arýt:LLlitiýýi. far th,; lýcriocL26 basoc' Sc;yýtc;r. lber to 15 Octöbor vas on. the 'best iý,Lfornµtio: ý t h^ýýd oil availu. blo o.rtillury Biese dtL-. tircrc fur-nishcd by Vic; Ixtiliery Officer äcve?1t: i l,xlly. It includcc: all UccL to . artillc: ry thw is cad the söut`icr. 1 ports ', Positive ^l: d sor.c; of it il. ships in tho l,crts. assurý aces fron the tc: " yJliGthcr could not bo obt^ i'ýod sul): ýly acu:: cics :s it fron thv in tina. could all be unloaded shins tý kcý_- illtc t: C;1Jýl'ý tiýl_ý1 füctcýrs vicrý üccou::

(1) Mission of 6tr iirr. ýy Grculý: To i::^iýitüiiý c,-,, ist=it l ressurý: on tho c: ýcrly.

(Z) 1:;issioý_s assiý-ýcc' to 5ýý-ýýýtii,:«rr.; ý c.ý: 1 First Pr cl-. 1;rny ti. tivO O]ff]. . wore cqual '17L,ý. rýýortýý_cc an c- c, rel:: CÜ1tJ. CS : Tyý two to bo 1. resista. =cc flacing tho ; Tacrc c.:-)!:!siu. crcc cclu :

{ýý Futuro plans for crossi: r; thc. Rlii�c -, -,cl br02 cllir: g t1l1c Si, ýgfricd Lilnc.

TIzý)rosult -v.j^s as follei, asi,

Uso of s--r.10 rütt-; Ur Sur per d^y in. qu`: ltitios .y ._, fr o.ý c?ý cliti, -.ýýýý ý rrivaý ý c;urir_G -Cl.,C) lýoriocl_

woro consic'cml .,. ý"iC: iil t}1G' jý} i}1-ýliJUi>yi ý LU. i C'ý jý` T- 3'1ý^.S UäCCý CC1:li)Utl - ., ý... ý... tin; furý islLVcý t: .; qualititics, tha totý: 'ls c, ýly

llrl. (3) iy corr.ianc? ors t-rcro i-nstructod tl,,at thoy. bust croato t.. cir own- resorvos ^i: d build u,-) o,r.: ý::u:.itio", stocks for futuro o;.x; rý tic,,l s fror.: ta:; allocatio : s, -

i, Bocc. the dituro duri_. c; t1hu f3. rst' th use c,-. l)oi, r.io: ýef, tthe o)erý - iu, ticilý^. tcc'., tliý ý had boc;: lQss than "l: cuý. day rütcs uscdl in calculating. tl: c nllcccatiu-. for )criod 26 Selitc.: ibcr to 15 October fx. thu 105 Ho, were the highest ever possible r.z. rl -vi and 155 ru:i Hov,i. They vere :

Typo Rc1s p, /cd^,y 64 105 rin. How 155 r.1r.i How 43 1ýrº 5. ran Gun 23 Iiow 11

j. rlhen this allocation was published, tho_ supply aýcýýcies than stated that mro anr.mnitiow, had bun allocatocl vas availablo. Howovor, th. supply aguncies were unable to fur _ish any definite fiGuros on available rnnunit ion so the allocation stood,

3. Period 1 October qdLJ o ll T3c)Trcnbcr 1

a`, Ir, ediatcly aft:; r az:ý_ouncirýg tho allocation for tho 7crioc? 26 to 15 October l; yy-, the ly Se--tcr.iber 1944 suýi aScI:cics wore lets dctailoc? data asked for more cor.ýý and on anrlu: iitib. l .' `vailability. jýbout 10 Octcbcr. it became a71 careý",It th,'It no data would be forthcoming in tir. ^lc to compute the allocation for tho Section, G-3, hurrioü. next period. The 2=.rtill, _;ry unc?ortoöl, a ll firing axic1.feveris'a research of o. availablo records, 1r,Sp reports and sYii,ýl!. ýadirýg data and by 14 October had arrivc,. -I at . 6t_i cý.;.-al ýroxir. k^tion of the o1ýoul.t of arli. u.. itic. ý still duo lýrr.ly Gr, under thý: allocations mado to Dra , co = Forces by Ti:,TOUS: )u2 s . This infýrr. latiýý. was usocC,in making an allc, c'ati. ).., for the 31 Octobor. In this llocdtio.. ýýeriod 16 October to r.valýi.. g a the the two missions and difficültics of s;rnics vuor(; considered to be c;qus. l, Vwrefore, equal gun day ratcs wore used in' ccr.i1)utir. g for Vac; First 'Airbornc: thc allxations for both Arr.lics a?-Id. Task Force o", the Fra. ýce-Italian bare?cr. "

b. During carly Octobor studics of th,. artillory aru-.u'. itioll Phi:-'c brcae': i. tho Siugfricd rcquironwnts fur crossi: z tho c,_ýd ýg Irlforzk^. tion furnishod to SOS T?Y,TOUSIý Li,,-,.o vCrc ci, rlplcted. vjas r: during N6vcr. tý. t it caas aýlticiýatcu, that, at s: o lýcriod ýbcr. ýt'i d. thirty days -,f suj)l--)ly of c.r.u-lu:. liticn, Group would cxjýc'.f_ n 1 ,rrly _ t. rmn rr cti ý. _... -- nm Lý'_ A at the" %,ý`'0 düy of suý;,Dly ý5c; c 1yý.Lv L ul a ýuiur: liý ýý^plo 4ý This information furnis. 'wd in 0 during a period of to. -I d,-ys. vj

oxpor-ditums duriý, ý; tho ton clay .;)Or-icd "JOuld not create C, itim ir. lodia. toly thorccftc. 'r. critica-l ar:u. ýlu. n. shorta; o ýrý: _91- '.ttiý ý:ý'IC1i 1ý:D w...... __...... t'. ýc?qLý:^ý: týl's l. TGUS2 c Uuriý M t`ýc lattoz" rt of 1ý r.iýrtý1 ý Vic; : ta, 1t:i!: ; of tl{c rt'1 1.1'r:iy t Drý..ýJý'1: " `' C`~1'GL? 1 ý' r-S, ):: Ct to _ý iý :: yTOT;, ý" ý '-. c. :. ý VtI.. 'il "ý .. ctý; ý rrivals Of Jf1S. ý.. is: -, , -r "" - it 'i: Jäslblý: t(: lar_ýLý3 C.C' jL15t:: tS U. TI '- SC C:"-ýa`= f 1' l r' '__u ýJ ý . " , C 'i J. 1 t:: lO ", Dir : b,ýr Lli' 1, " a" ý, c^ti rioý ., ocýu^ cra_ egt1-1 CýifficL1lties oi t-.,, ti -; w; .: tl ' L?s C1 u"tl: '. 11^C . 11.1011.10u . b. 'ý, ü(i., -`jj 1"'tl. S n-ýý". ý uäv +" ý. tll; oY-, ý;ctec:.... ý _ as: it f I V.: s. 'v: C '4°?i; r:; l: ýSLi1ilC1 i:, s ýr:.o c-1ib;; rs, a:1C, ) tia::s ýý titiCs ^rrl'J'i?: -"1' ý ' ýi 1ý1._v C'LLý:: iý; i_i GCtýýber CvJs ºýylvca, __ rý'ý"d. ý+ .. _v .'*l!'d,.....: Ü C'. 1.. 1: v V'_a:i Cta' " . _L J

d1-1:. by ait11l, ri\: G:tl: ý^' j1ü Oct�bý; ý. l1,1- 0: tlly 2,,, 1ý, ý-+ ý" i ýa 7. ý .ý^.. t`'t1Vi.. är of tliz.: '. iL. j 'v11 Cvrä *,,lt.: S ý' ,J4 Ct 1r -'U-,,. ý .; .::. nnýý i '. 1-11i j;,: itiý. )_ý Oi 1icC t,l EMUS., ý.c:v: ýcý Or ^c;: , -.ico St ?ic i;ýu?. " cý ^ ýfý .._ý:. 1C tu.. : ti1: C:G, ttl:: 0 c:; rý;. ýýr tt '1S 1:ý. ýr, ,týcils t°ý-rc ;;; 11:.. b1G t:?d, t'1C; ý1 1t7. C: 1 ý`T,: -. 6 4 L' C 11.1: ^' "tf'.: ^r. lxýu1: %J tl'. lallot, i. ` '`i. jr. ...,, of c Vu7" sjYstc.d... ý _;

1., n to to rý. 1S. t1... lýr l.. l )rl., tl >. _ý C1ý-S 1L, A \: . . tJý:: c su;,ý)l, ý ý'J-`- Lv 1'ä .i... ý, u;) o:. t': G;^v-.v ýc 1 . . ..,. vi: ," "I i 'titioLl^.: ,ý1-_^ of c r.: ý::. ', Uri" "-ý' ,. f i; t, f-: 7 .: "ý'_. ;S G.i: ',ý' týlý :;: i"iti2S " t1zCs SL1CCjý: --' its ý r ry rý-y'ýýt,.to 'ý ts ýs crý" it. (2) l ý,,,t.. c: i_r,:, t_J., ) est"'lý"-ý ls c`ý11(.-c: _ti..,,. _.._s ý , - ýtr .ý it:. i: T0Uä1: s ý.ý,d f�ý'cc; s t: S lýfor l tý cricLls r'C'1 ý Iil S 1'_vdý`ýý _ ý , '. r ý1 T " ý+- _1:i_. c col_,.:y 'ay JY Group. rtcrs t' ,, rr.1y '. t. i iý re s 11 1"": ý i rý 1. ý1",S 1' ,ýtc 1j.! ýiv i.. , "1' ^s. rüC'jl'_lr: %'"""

rt y 4ax il ra3 Gxr'uLt)ý cyuý-rtc)r(' VL l 1J-, Y_ týti:, 1,s cr S;;;eCic. tý ,ý lur.,ti i oi: byby .ý, it ,b cG,3,ä\., ý-. be 7";u1Cb, -, -rjý'' Luý"i:..,, Üctý'ýor iit cC libcrs c by r , "":ý"ýý.ctivý c:.: " Lý' 1t1Cdi t, ,_,. rri `, ll c.''toýc lt jýlctilc ., ýl. l ý'! teJ t1101,ý. ; 1' i1. _ ý: 4" cistr i'ýutOf `ý 1ý .r S"^\_V I: ýr1'r frl 1)rcý 1ä: 1.V', ' iu"ý/ ýil , . . ., f S, '.. ' ýi S! uscý ý-' "x__ 1 i-,"'? c i.. Lý.1 `-' .: 1-' i'r, ) istribut3 c jllst ;,_ts r CuC+:ýýýr, " ri ct_s ra- c': + -ýuv tya"' i:.:.. : llýc^ti: ý: s J_ .csL1ý-ýý t)orc rý^;." "ý_i..: ýS,. 11-ý t r trl tj lÜ Vu::ib-, i' . f ý Cý"V: SC. ;, C. i) cit., ' Oct: I)or 1;:. i 1, ý. ý.; 1-.vl. ý for tlGi ofr'' ýL1 itlý-- i_ ll, 1tiU ý `f.. ý __,, 1 11Lý-L'"'ý t CN. -I -ý1. ý .{, ",. llJdý./ý _j.. 'G ýý '. .,LI. i,. ). "ý- q" ýý.. +ý. .. r ý,-::Cýr ý .. -ll . ", , "11 ýý TV.. C: J. """. .ý.,. ' "ý .i,, ý: tý b:: 1- u i: , w ý2 .. - ý"jSTi,.SC=D tC.STRIC TED

^,.I:raunitian c ulc' b;: accu, rlul^tcc' ii the fcrvacrc? C'.rc-, s dGt the dato vjhcu this rk, j,: r co..rdi . atcc: ^ttcch c: ulc'. be, l-u:. ichc01. ýlthougll cc: ast"71:-ýt -)rossure s,: °in'st ' C1;r;:n:: Fcrc(, bei: hc1C' th.. -s vics' I-; mint- Z7crc to th;; i: Ox, to aituresitL th. bu1. lC, )C; riUd -- 'Jr(Ii3r cYi)cCt -ui).

Duri:: i; this. )crioý, Hcwdqu^rtcT:; Group hole? true resc; rve f ý.. ý._u. '. iti, ý, vaoru : -.--, t ^llý c : tc, d, but _ i: _st i:.:^ccur^_ ci:: s i:. v^il^bility fiýures. The crcýtic. r of ^. ý Gr..u; .;, t" t, _is ti:. ýL ýaýs ir.:;ýr^ctic ablu bc

~~(1) 1;11 t:, Gut c;f tahcr_: . cv^ilcblD rs; -c ,3-: I)crts va^s ýllocý tec' t;;. thc ýr::: ics to build ul) supplies f: r current arýc, ir.ulediütc future :..cc;c?s.~~

...., iry ,... (2) bei: sul))liýcý of the Ports . s. nics vjerc; -,)S vut ýoutýýu-ra ý: ICý o Ccrx~u:aicýtio:. Zone Scctio: l. stocl: s hoc' yet -beclý. built ü' i:: the forva:,rc? No ^could, yct be sj)crcd for builc? iljý; such fortiý-rc? c'v.r:I;. )s.

(j) iý:, y roscrvc; by tho iir:: ly Group could cýlly hr, vo boon tr^vcl x?,.ýlc' i: j tho souti.: 3r:I Parts [1110tiaith tir,. c of to tl, it lk^vc bccýi u: ýtiýi:: lc? to 7 10 ^ys .rrýios tiaýulcý y ý'Lhr Gr, 1ýGSCrJC. sLrotc -17 _iUi)

~~(4) bý c': lo af z;._lýcc'.oc' -t this tir: l;, iý,. cffoct i r,:: 4i: cc' c roscrTlc:~~

~~12 17,ovc. abor to 15, Docwabcr lgg-.~~

f t'_:,is ^1-ý'.u: iticn l: ^c'. bccýý built ; tý borin-ninýr,; t) criýý :. " Lt laUw"cLi.: f týý tccl, uu,-) i,,-. fortiv^1°c'. `roas C; ;:; cccrfd; w. this b^ ttlc Cff c"sivo st-". i't as fs, ; ý: r ýicco, tir^s c.výilblo t: ý t! ý: iýý. ics. Llýýau_ýiticýj- Typo Pcr Picco R:.u; 7.ý?s Per Piece l{irü t l0r; =x1''-y. -:.._c. _

r Y1 ') "'"vý/^i 152j 117; ý " 5 C4-(; 1J ýi'll: l Hotir] i; 155ý.r.1 Gun ý20 >>-0 u ýlow 42v 715 "_ r_ll of this iti rct yc;t roc. c'. c:e t'z,, f, -nJ^rc? src t:: fom, by t'ýoýtir. but it was 11017ý?cssiblb, tu c; ^r%, c it woulc'_ cobe roquiroc:. ý ," . ýý

is t: r. ýtc ^t t'ýis: t1k^t, ulý u_,ti1 tho rccc il t b. It ti-,JOll Tý `', rcr r i. l.. u+. .. ýiJsne-ýLý ý.... Gý3 a.. + ýn ýl)Iirý nsc f Ii V ýý1L. ý . ^11 ltiJiý 0f Vac i ýrý c, ý, ilSCl boVii ^ii tllO aSSUI'1)ti!ýJ6 )ii tik^. t ti1: : ^r EXic-C? 1tLlZ'G iýlý. `ý..ii? j

~~-ý 93 NESThICTLD M STRICTE, D~~

Depart-ac.-,-I t was c4-- able of suy); )JrtinJ th-' ol)eration with Department 41ýlýroved 1:1T0 c'sy of Suhlly per Sco Cýlul, u: (2) in T` blc 4. The authcrizecl level of cýr.ýrluý, itio_ý for r;iTO V1,s 75 (Icýys of su.P. ly. SulI: %ly aý;":? ýcics requisitioned On this the basis uýýo thý ýh Sonic-rally stýc: actually on Sr, ýu"c'_" in the 'theater did not reach this 4'.r.ic.tult. This was c?uc to delays cüuscd by tlzc not- ic:d of subi:littiýý4- OLoditil ý rcquisi- the tiol's. The result was, that 1)---rt uf 7' c'-Ys of supply was ýcýaerülly aflo at. «bý)ut this time this situ, -.ti o: was relieved t by th:: supply services t, rerýuisitir):. s-mewä`, j)ernitting iV11,4. - on cVl1su1l +thc anticipated ýt rd. thus fill the wýto 1)ýrt of

1)i. -,)L' -linc, On 11 November of l::css^ýe j11, C. a paraphrase -S rccciTJC,d. This nossc. Sc indicated that in J:. u^ry the ammunition sui).port available from the Jar Department would be considerably less the ZTO or the I:ITO dr-:y of su;.)->ly, rr. ýý.i äj: t'7 L''Ji.icil ýý.^^":. rticulýrly iýý t'11ýý 1GFr°1 ri0TF7 C?1d the 1'ýý t^, constitute the bull: of the artillery su; )l)Ci, t. This r-icssaC; c was received ýýhc I, first with i,_ycrqc? ulity and t1ý: 1., trit: l srýzcr. iclýt . rr. iicaý ýt_ý' ri5. Grýü7 ,. just b,: rcv : a:., tý.=::rcý of c: _ rui. -f:; fully c'e,)loyec' 1 re;; ürýd to stril= y ovacrful blovs at the c1G;,ly. The available resupply ýrci ictec? for the first four iýc_-I. of ýr1rod e. is tabulated l51ý5 as c, to the i"TO and MTO -YS of supply as follows: Rcsuyýl)ly Ty,-:)o ETO Düy Tý.ýTO D^y yýotc.aicl Sul)yýly Sup. ly* to of Gi ") 30 .t;)ri 1. .._.... ý.

~~105r.un How 40 50 lü How 155r"rI 25 35 15- 155r:yý cxulý - 25 30 15 8,º How 20 25, 13 24orIr1 7 15 5"ýý il. o* c7u,- 15 15 14 A, ry5-5 for J..^ iuury, "iobru, ry, 11.0 narcl,, -)ril.~~

tl: It bo soe ý frýýr1 ýbrýve th4t c j, ossiblc ý:rtillcýýY , b,., re^t1Sr rcaucccý Lu:dcr tlrosc resul»ly r-tos. su; );.)ort tiýaoulcý ý; e#, ;? s t-ý: to f tý1o 105r.r.1 ýiCýtia,57iä for tl. o 155M, c, uctio. 'ffýCtpf tllcsc drastic How fOr tiiC; 155:: ÜLli1.1110 C; -a1'_Cý50% tir1 1-- ---' nÄc: a tiror..--- ciýc. - -- _1,.pua - -- roc'uctiorls ill C;j.,, ýc; ctcC'.: 'CraiuI-Atiün su; ).-, aly S. cffoct c-- thc of c-ýorütio}

23 Ijovcribor Til.jor &ýl_vr` 1 Bull, G-3 SIHUM ý._.,d hi^ jor cý"ý, on ^ G1wY, visit.: a ýýý'ýuýrtors )t_1 to col. fcr on r, C' 1'111lli:1t1Z'GSüjl 1ST. ti 1c; 1ý1i)] 1CGt10T1S : '1 v11G Cýx'üSt1C^11Y CýLICC; i. Clay fürillSi. C'': Tll]. t;. i n StUiýjTý ýýC;ü : CtLýrtC; Z'S GL?ýcrls Bull * V]C;rc' w -94- :.

~~iüý iýCi äý U'li HL OT.-' -,ZIC `T D~~

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~~ý --95- ýý,ST,RIC'. Ci; D H'r +týIV 1ýD J!; ....º. ý.. ý-... r. ý-... ýý~~

j_ 1. i G'1ý First Fro. its ^11 1<{. , at o.c:ý r: sý""7 *lcl. " li i:::; Ciatüly a 11ý.. ý lc . ýc'.: M'_, 11 1m<; ^ft. r t:, C;ä^ ýtL.: ý_tircrtTv ratc; , c ý, of ,"^ý, ".ý i 'li ", r", ý '1"" ' ýý) ýv Lw.Vl,. t'1i tr Gi, 5 11`':: St . ý1 of iC t]. U1.1w,ýatGc. until 21 l, oiTC)1::bCr 1ý1r5t',. ý_'ýtit^C' htly. ",.t t'__lr i: it t'1ý'_ it 1^C'_ýo: G:":ly Slir; .. 1t bcC: '.1._ý: ý : lcý , 'T 1-t t -)c, to i'iC;:. "iC:'; r;: v..iý. '"10yiL: sSý: rsT li:: ý,lý-ri:: t. _G First-, �_, - , ti r:ll t!: it for cum',. t '_L_ý'1t1C; _ tr:, ^t couldcould Uý; Sui)11: . `.:ý. _,.._.. t'. 1Ct it uns 1'.: ýý:;S31:;-,-, 1u to t, b';;::1: -ý,. a'v7.il'ý: blc, .ý )t su :a)ý'rt .ý_ tt. ýBy it ,ý-, "-, ')ý: "�"yý.,r cý..tý ,,._".., _, 'ac C ý1ti: 1LlýýL? SljT SLiC:. Ü. > -_ _i, ý. ,ý c, {lLýl 1 ý.. 1 t; t 1' :l. , '1.: l ý.. V-, ) t, : li. T 1aýr r, 1 ý., ý, "- c. 1l/ ;,,r. . ,,L 1,. y7: J_ a 1 l.eccssý. to ft_l_ iý-_ s 11._c _i _rýT hol: by 11C;ý.' l'tG1's ýt'. -, ,: , _, ,". Tý, ý ý^ 'cr 1'cýSoi'Vü5 Uns /a 1... vlivSc: ,.7ýv 'tr r-7""L1, )" It als,:: L'J: _5 _rýT ...1.. _ - T'7_ 1. ,., e"" l:if l ý--':.=1:'_UL1t1'ýý°^ .` '7 7'ý /1 .. " 7'jý J': t11 t_a, i.! ýý:. "iýý THüZCUrGrt_1 L-_:: 1JvVLii.: DC1' ° ', , SJLiC:.. °'" ,..,rU 1_)')1y Jl 1ý'ý!1: y:_rt ;ýi i'ýr .. I'i.. jT S; )C: C111C

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/LLV L: ii1' C;xcý; y)t 1 CC; y_ Jt-'' ýý ýq'ý, rt. ?'s Grc llccý bbe i2c1ýr:;scrýtctivcs Gf f" u;) ?.crc cr: 20 ý_ %1Cvtii'_ý c: Dccc_.1'b,ýr 1ýýº1ýý til?iicýý tiýac it ;! üý. ^". ýä. f v tý ýl 1Jr 1a f iTT rý7T nCn fý Cý ... ý n11 .ý... ý Ü tý1t aaý LZi:ll... C_ý_tlnl ý' t7 yqaS ý�;. ýcý: »VJu. J+ ý ^t ý. :. =ou: . -ý 1''Z4. . tý . in Fran-n'-CO Of 1 Aý%Cý%Z:bý:: r that t'_'`_].`"ý ?1^S rGSýurCC; s as thc in, ccrly DL;cc::ibcr Until /1 cu1C: by r"Tiý"T, Tý L"": ". -rctrocctivc.{"rls". Sl =V" '. aLr; ac ntiý "f iý, ^ liLo 1',, n..rtorS +)C :. +. ý a. J J_... 'a Crr^'uýý1 , . _",ýsJ . ct:.1 1,ý ýý1 ý' all " 1.,,'' 1t?; 1ti `J:: C.,,.. ''' lý.; a 1t: i'_ ' SuütlluI'_ llýrt, 5 CO:: S1C: er %:i_^_v ý. Jtllartillery ., ".; �-, -, l^bli: to '.rl, C,r; L1-7.11: r! ý^+SLLrll'., _, CCU1trG1 ti^lý:S blisliii" _-V^1. b. ^. `li.. l ä11.1I_,.(1 C, r"'^. by 7 c... ý: to t1ýiC tl'i'1 c ý,; ýr1, ýýsýw cxcrci. ýc ý -f. ý r+ "ý ý '^f for i..s^CtI . ,Zlyný ?'1ýfn..c_.A C.l`tr Sui^, -^1.`yr " ý- in litýr ,yý ilc. bl:, rýt is C"^tT ofý sty; ý,ýl vJwas l'-"^..../ý ýi_c; r".,T"ý'.'ý cý.n.3' L? ,Y This im of Tl:: So supply for 'C^ cli L7C: intC: _.:.r.c;. Sul')13r 16 1l býr ýi1 ab ý st:, c'-u'i" c ýlculü ..ýý tV' the fLlturC sL1liýs frGi; 1 t 0i Q: SOLOC cxy.uc , G ý -ýc' tV1 an'{*' 1J tv ý' ^"" i, r'lll: L.ýt: ýýlý/vrýt i .ý^: Otý.. "tEiJ iý, In ý', I': 1 Z?ýitt, ýp .J"* t_! ^r.lrlunitia.: tiJ::s i/rGrý: tuC f:: r t"c ?°JOý s list, -C) ^ýr^il^rle 19,44 to 1 i: 1945 irlto t"o c-tctSorics: :)cric>a 1 c-y to tü Cacil bo CC}iitrCllti: (.,1 by ýl} 1L : Cýýy reserve for r", ýr ýTT+, t>ý. llýi- ""-.

ý for cý c'. trco,ýczl. (2) 11.Ii1y suD1)ly ` , tý b ttcl ., ", tai; , -:,r 1).)I,,ýr ra .1ýictiý:. zs n,, 2ctir_.^ 4 rr: tes vrcrc a. ýoti 5C, S33 iý-ra L ý.' lýýýso s! in " th:; cablo 'iscussý. ubovo l? thG oXi ; tl? 1r stocks i.,,. the t'1c-tcx This t'r^S C:UB to S:ýi't; ^t'. ý out t'-, i: SOI.OC ý;a.'..ica I1L.c., b -;-ýÜ"7ticul: C' ;ýtc: cks by tý.. 2 - ý *rly It _ ýi üi: %+ýi '.ltl'. `".1 gU. . ilr, blo _, . cý"_titios 1 C-ýz: 1 Dullts visit, 0:11t-1,10subject, -, s^ result of orc. x, Do-)crtricy_t . Züp ZuiýrýSGýt^ tl`v'JS :ýD C` i. in l^t0 7r0I: l' t'_*� 1 r,to,.; 'Di; o:: i_i rT'. Cii 1 20 '1'COr rs üti this ^i o? ;, er: quý+rt;;ýPýris t tb. l):'oýý^ ^_-ý trer:; tole' t'ýý e , b;; ..k,.: o for 'zo ir. l:; bcir3. ttý`_t tilci t7c:1'i; , CS7 r: S ttý: i_S ir;1^; 1Z' GUi)ä :, ýht: recý_.ý. of V too l-r- too (1) Is the or r-, beczý built too f^. st? (2) 1us thc T ccator r,; s:; rc u;.)

~~_ ,.,,, t) ýýýýi t, ly " (%ý juýih ' rLC". Jii ili: ýý~ .t] , aýti a+r. iy rý. : i...ýt'ýät%. -iJ_. r :, .,u+)s týosirc riakc to i 1~~

~~- 97 r+'STRICT"E.D~~

YalcinS the - assusr1ption of cor.trol' retroactivo to 1-Dcceribor 6th 1944 placecl thc. ý'=7 Grcul) in the ,j osition of already havin.,, overciraVrn its sir-re of arý.r:uzAtion for pocer.iber. Hcuýquartcrs 6th Group had allocatoc' ^r:ýr.. uiziticn to the l, rr.:ý.es for Deccr.:ber and this aitionr: h--.-' boon larý; cly consuricd, ' The ui. cx1 cnc'ed -" balý lýces wr.:ereiu.:.:required to execute the ssiGnoa r._issions: In .a o: res-Dcnse. to the infernal request for recor. ý~. 1c'.atiöLs '11Io;,: quartcrs 6th «rr.ýy Group concurred in the Gor:ora1 schone vaith cxcel)tiorýs in substance as follows:

~~(1) The bulk of Thenater reserve should be hole: n i i.r'1'1y Gr%-u, level.~~

~~(2) Creation of Theater reserve was too abrupt, causilzg iz:..r_eccssary dislocation in tactical am. u, a:_uliition~~

~~(3) ý'ce1ýiz1ýc;, r..lýuta tic-, of rates il"' tia.lcýlo l. urbcrs of 'rounds resulted i~~

(4) Heec'.qu^rters 6th ý,rr. y Group h^c; allocatcci enc'. 1^r ; oly expor_ý.ed Dccoribor ^r:u_unitior.. It UJJuld be placed in the ýositioý of being overdrawn on its share initially. ' The difference was roqucsted fron the proý7osed STIF reserve 6th as an irnediate allocation to j rcvcnt :xr.?y. Grcu7 fror.: bei*_lg. cverc'.raYt?. on 1 January 1545 " from c. The request for n si ccil : llcc-tion tho prop osec'. aI7Er EF 'sc1octcc, i;ýaýýuniticn Reserve was not `C;rk-_ntca. SFL'. C:.othcr , the solution. : The calculctions v,; re roviseul ^sZC, systcn ; )ut into than 1 Dcccriber effect üs of 1_Jcw: uary 1945 rcthör as of 1%4. The revised rates ,,Toro cl.,ý._cunccc: - i.-- S=F I:icss^i-o S-73227,31 Dc,ccr.:ber. 1944 vJSich Plý ced t`io. systcr. i in,. effect. The ; )lcr: ' ta"s in

~~substanco Cs~~

(1} ýs i_nintoý.l^ý.ýcc c,uy of supply for each vaeýj on In -tho Tiaeater. This r.1^illtencnce O.`y of supply is ("cnor^-lly This rcforrc' to ns'the SIT'.FF rmintcizaiicc rate. ' r,-to is on tYic exl-)ci.O.iturc ch ýrts at th.; end of this clr-l)tor 'plotted (SC ltUle ýir. ýrlccc? SM. FF r-to. O -L) .

~~(2) 1; SILUEF^rrmnitio. l rosorvc of sc "7on C'ys of r.w inton^i. co su;.)_)ly for c- ch ýJCýI o;i in th '1'llcatcr w-s ostablishcd.~~

(3ý L rosorvo of', 27-r.iaiutcr, =co d^ ys cf suýy)ly für cý ch -., -. This 27 wc^ .30., 7 in tlu; irr..y Grouýs. c'.^ ys of suy ýly wýs to bo . . C. to iýcccssary ccýitrollcý by -tIý ý'lrl.y Groups ; )ro; cýc thc Amy reservcs . '_lwObcon cc, by l. The r:Cilltelý--l-lcc c'.-y af, su, ),-)ly r..putoc, t` in8. ý t ý11 the o.i:ü. aui. ition.. in; lsr.. y :: SPts as of 31 Dcccrýbcr, iLt:, ýcccui. ý iý ýý ý ýý ýýý 'E'STRICTEll all CL:lu? ýitio__ ill- Cor:ü°ýL".ýicýti, ýL" JQäýL c.: SOLOC Lstallctions, t'_'iý -eýDý: ^''C1 t! ' ' ýcC'X' 1:,ýLr'(ý Z.^SU;' ý: )ly fror_ ý) ýh?iC: S«i ý ._. .ý L) c,; ýýy ci sL?+)lýlsr, f: , týýo rwst Critically s.z<:-rt tyý); s, .... ý .., 'ýý... 7 ^^.. ^ , ^. 1 ^S fÜ1lo-v! .SJ,, ý:.:ý1ýýy 1';ý;: vms s:

~~, .ý~~

ý711i 0 ar i, ' .7 u11ä. r1 I:'::oi't^r Lt. HE 0 : Hou Ea 10j:: r-1 ^ IT7,1. i 2,0.0 12{ }, J 1.0! J: L:1 i].__Jti'1 lTCr'ýi if, ], li. 155-U.1 155-nliYl 1 13.0 výr I3ot1 Iý üýt Gun Iý 11.5.5 r% 24,Or',1-1-Ho-viIý ýý"5

d. Thc estsbliszýý. ýcýt of this 1 ir cf-'cct rccayýtL?r: ^11 systcr. .: 1 1lfý ivl:. ýcý i. 1 t1ý ý+ J., lý;. r. i: i, l r", . ý1Z lU:.. a 'ü:'is ý.:1 11. Liu rý.: C. ýL i_, LJ.. . LU _y .i _: ý,. ýtl iý _ ' `.L-'"_ý.: 1t;: tiUt : 't basis. "11i: ']iT :1- Y ý^.ýi '-. _C^ V!,; 'ý, ý.nýl 1? r r1 .'r' f, ýrn~tliVý, rJ. II C.fiý; ".. l.;. ý:tC Ln af su;-,.)ly _ý._. ct i'csu; to thý Grcu: ilc tý? tiüs )--)ly y )s. c .. rý ?acre ;._Jt as li, asas 'L7. C>ýälrC; Lý tii_ y Z:lý: rü b: ýttOl' SLiý, y x2i{; -rJ ý iatas ctC; t)rcdl. Lý by t'i,: t lr I`'O b` This J 'ý_ rt tiltil: x'" S'rSt::r.l r"ýnr. ý. ý ^1 il. C 1,, r,. iý. l. i. lJ1. .11.. ý/li �i ý+ l+nn of ýy. L: _ý. t.. Jý.. 7L{. 1...: _lili JL? 1. Ily% ,vac;uld, b:; fr; ý.l 1 Jc_, u^ry to 1 I'^y, ^rýr", lýrnYridcý ý' soua?c, basis for 1 to týýl;: t11-: v bliSill.: ti1+; `~I, Prior rGcCl; ýt f 'i.lcss^2; Gst. ^_. ":-ý r.'. 'üF ..,,.c, it C' bi :i 'i:: CL; s,.`"-ýcry I. t: J:.-. '1'C)ir'd C-7 'S :L Ztý"Ci;? rCtC: _I1`. . f-:. url. r: ),:: st 1bCi t- , tc r- it i<;:. cz 1 t,; 10 rü _ -ý . _ of T. t This b,: b, t= üý -%r _ucry. _lE::? %:,._ -sc; c? of su; ýlly fur_ýis'uýL. ý t, I3oýý'quürtOrs iLrily Gr( üi ^t t? lc' 20 Cý%11i:; r_Cý: f,: '_ 1ý, Cý; i' 1-- Tý`=riS. Eci,, 1-j --U- L: in t> b:.th justr:. ts usc:c' .c"üý L:: tJCro f, th:; 11 i: tla(; 11.; 1 Jl.. a. v, l' macl0 r sm rwtcýs -ý ý cý:t r , ý" f . j)criod 21 - 31 Ts tuý r3r

,^, lc Vic; Iýl to mal-co n__ ýjustr. ý11i 1. ýý in its 1ll 1 ", f. o-rý.s ýl. ._. ýý _:; crcLý ."J_lic lle,a bocý.:. stý. blis. 1cý zýJit'1 SOLOC it T,'J-s. LC; c,: ssary to ýetýrl: liitýl cf C, liti ü: '- in t.,. 13Ptis C'.ý ýý ir., tý'oýýsit to ýä of tllÜ close of cbusiý ýss 31 17ýCýl:lbc; r., Those t^ T':7CrE; CTTC;11-^ the . V' ri. ; C: to by t uý lly coll .ý::.ctccý 1cL:",'ü ,'": '-!,ý ,- r:; s C;:.,

~~_ Cl.9-~~

. Ito --ýr-~rýRI Ci1= 11. l, 'ý-J . ý1i ...... r .._...... ,.,.,._.. g. ?ith r:: si)cct to' the distribution of the 27 c1.-Ys of r.uýi11--, ter^_'ce supply con.stitü. tin; ' the..,,irrly Group Reserve the following CZc,Cic mi11tJi clays of SUI)>>ly. tiV.- s ed " Twelve ". LLCv for the TiJeC1)oi1 2. Force in the %SPs. In of each rLly or wi; rE: steckGd =`yi'r:1y the (Fr SctTcýtýL ilrr. ly and tiý. ýth Brigc. de ^: ic c, - �_ Borl ) c^sc of e -It^li ý.ý cr I this a;: au:ýiticll was released t, -, the cor.,ý:l^lýdci's as their colltiii- First, ge ; c; r reservc. In the case. of FrLi1C.1111,my, the 12 rü illte- iýai co days ý-jere st-,st-, cl:cl:-,.-,.e..e.. in First Fro-ca 1-ýrr.iy ".Sl's but control , ý%CrZI^1": Go::.: ýýh Of the ai: li: lUliltlGr renamed Tr'71ti1 Cýliý`, ý' erý lý l. Y'i:ly GrGU. '7" h, On 20 December, rth Y.rry Grous) 1.,;-5 defir. itcly y lcccd on the Tefonsivo and troo2 distributions wore ad justcC in doDth accordingly. This called for reducticrs in the stý-,cl,--s of ition in tho ferward The relocation of =Zýur-itior. amau?. areas. , stocks vaas carried out ' by the ýxl. iics ur_cýcr instructicas issued by Heaüquartcrs 6th ýýnmy Grou1).

1 January the Ger, lýu: in the i'. on -ja=_s. ýcl.cd a-cour-teroffensivo vicinity of the r2^.rdt lvictin.tains. Exl)endztures by Seventh t'zr.ly ir.:rlediately reached high levels durinjS the first 15 0-Y s .ýf Ja, -uary, Sc;ventil ýsZr oxýcnded ür_u.luiniticý. in excess of the clc:ily i:1întonance rate for its weapons and was forccd to dip heavily into the reservcs. In. cor: ncctiolý witli the cou. ltcr- ' offonsivc by the Gc;rAmans in the vicinity of tllc aardt lacuntîns, it Is tiâcll to note trat ar'U.lunitior_ ex- )or_ü.iturc caz be controlled ., Tjhon we are or, the offo. ýsive or ýJhcn on the dofonsivo if the does but ttacks, oncny not attack, , when the c:,-,,c:riy ^. artillery fire. is necessary ar, d must bo, doliver;: d. The oncny forces ti-ic: expenditures be -firi, lLo,and cc.. _.ot restrictod.

Duri1-G 1ato Doccr. Tan losýs for j, lbor and carly u.- ry i tiýicrc ricdo The tý.:; rcduction c.f Colr. °,ar Pcckct. - 14ditio:. al cr.iour:,ts of 5th ar:li.lui: iti o_1 had to bo :mdc avail^ble fron "1rrly Group reserve to týýe First Frcnch lkri: ly order to no 't the Colr. lar Pocket T. reducti cr:. lý aumbor of S(jvo: _th jLrr,,;; tr jo_)s participated ir* this opor-tic ,.ý under opcratiýýNal control of the First French 1ýrr, T; vicai cas of tliosc troops wore supplied fron the Ly. ýo resources of 'Seventh . lrrly. lair::iu:: itic: 1 'Was -vaiLablo to the First French lxr. iy aiýd to -Seventh ;rr. ly for the reductionof the Coh: -nr Pocket as follows:

105r.li:Z liov_12-2 700 rounds nor tiic^l)cr: 155r-.:i Fiow 400 rOunds. ý-55r.1:ý Gu.=ý 250, rourds Ü`e C,U_1 100 rounds 'r ' ce k, riT:lilullitior_ oxy)cac?ituros 0-urilý,o this l)i; riod vioro -loss th-..a: äurinE; ' Soo ttaclýed Tablc 1, -tho previ-bus l;: sicd, a cxpcl_diturc chart, It nust bc rlotcc: that effc nsivc action stýyýj ccý shortly

~~- 100 -~~

~~Ri STRICTDD iE iJrl: LL Ii l. i:iD~~

ftýr 1cj D;; 1. /ý; J-" l tý.ý,e �,,., cý.l.ýr -. ,,ý. /ýZC_tuics r i;,,,,, 1 J_ 1. c-,,tiý_ýuýýýý,... n .n^.ýbcr )4L.-.-. ý ýt Jýc.: n"; ýzclcý . t i... ";.. itures Gc;rr. u.ýý ý. C 0L t; s t.L,e, jývi Z JCý wcT'V l^r; cly aec, u,ýtý.;c' by tj st w> täis -. ,ýý.. ý_.,!_n1. -_, ý..-'-'., -, +-ýzr , v-ý -ti. ý- ý"�r ,. -+- 50'ýj c. U11tC; iü ý_c;1iS1Vv =ýý'."": .; t.., C,.ýjýý,:: C:C.C_ i. ýl"_111. ý _ý__ r _ ýcýly in t', t:. of its s w^1'i; of 27 C':'s'SJ r; sc: rtiýc ' iC :iýýii1toIlCc i'ýt i ]7 TLi'1LiC: tU J. 1'y

s t, ^rý. t1 Ci S? lC r0 U'. ýrtle_yr t: ý r:; CLLc;:ý 4.. i_iS jDvZ'iCC. ut: "ý_L i)roi, _C. til: (iC3. P: ti ]. tl'UOiýS ^1'tlllcl'r lý. r jýCýCý7. : ý_lC.. ^. z?ol'L __1C: ý+: /jcicvt.'' R t: .. R.., ý .!ý,tý_Ct7 a Jti, ,'.. i.. ly ý: -ý , f. ", r. "tnCC_ C. Lýýý l. UC_ i I. ,u(.. .. t ")itl Jy1. R. YR C, :7:: C, bcCL sot u, ) f, --,r t: lý t'. 1'CC.C?CC "i,i1C C1. ^Y' '-Jt 5 j} TLt Zji S "ý VTL'. lilt. Zr 1_ PGCtý ýS StCýt C_ PýPara Vo .j k; x"bo ý. ý'rr,. b ttý: r.,,.ýl ýýllýT in tccý e-. "^ wi _ý ý: cti,c:c_ rc; sti'ic crýascý ý:ulc. SaVo Mid its ýrCSOrVC. b

~~b. `'i'1_1":;iiýý sicc ^^"^i, St thý Co1i.ý.r 20~~

al _b1. .i.. il-) , butti_t_ C':: c Ui C' tl"k: S.: Sýt Uý x or t: 1G i'1'C: was CýOZ`Iw on tltll, ü ^,. aL:týl't1Lý:. _C''_ tyiý\i-;_r;;1 First C1'ý", ý-, ý qýZC1171ý _., 1_1f, 'n. ^ ýjýJT '} ,, fvtý CV 1ýJ-I. 1^ýtZc1LLVS. wiii 2ý,.rý c'. I1 %. the rv Cll ir ýU o., Giwv lrr': }1. JU ýL1Lýr"ý iL_lt ý .: ýJ:. ý: y . J; 1 S Cýý ýi '..%C1ý;vt s:ýC; 1ý:i.i; 'L J. ýI11: 1ý'Jti'] ý ý" for J ý n nt "ýý; T(ý.. n.. ý.. ý 1"il. ", L ci rlZ ý> ý. ,L ý. ý ýý" ýl,. it Yýtý.. 1^, ý`; o_:' 25ý r> . i t; It :i.. "w. > till%. 'ýý7 tV t ý. Group fr. 1ý7Jý.'1. , i.. i; -ilnbl.. U_y)iSlt1ýý. " L1'ýJl_i t/ý: li ýtii lirl. ýr J1.1 ' _s . . ;,ý�sorvc st:;c?týc'. i-ý tl, ý'irst 1'Zis -(,-ms cýoyýo o tli ^ý. 'l: in OfO týj i_'sur o_ýdT-i1aLilitS ýf r 3aý cC_soý or r Tý'n (,,, ,.:S ^Výc' l/yY, L+ýyýllýilý 1 ýryf. irl".li i1'....: i l. L J. i _ý... '_ 'by `^ ý" ýclýs.--c, ut.t tt ^ ut1zJ_ity- tt. l..

. c. -tt^ch f1-: ýý_ 'G'ý; ý' ;c'-:; t Tj.:.s rÜiz_ý by 2r; J", _,uary by t; ýc U. ý. 1ý'? Cýýrjýs r.1.;i°ýý U. ý. rýillor; ý iz. r jýus. _ tl1;: tta to orc'c; c. _ ti11S it tij^ t tho o SýD L?-) üYI U. ;S. y)s :):ý:;rctiz_; ý i_= ýl Cýýrjýs. 1L? t:, iil'iiir C`i^y', iýi; Ti. iS rLClul. rGC'" rtiiý; l' `,Lli) SC1ýVý: " +(; t'ý.; iýC:C,,"-'t it TY'j^.S t j)ýS. `'ilý 'lc ^. to set lý S iv .. ý it1! iCi' til: t'1ý: Uj) ý': 1 ý{ý:.r3t ._C'_": äc-i].:; t'_ýcy tiavrc of thc: rclcascd for` ý ) T!. u;.; i'y sGV sl1bý)(:: r. ^ý= -'l)OV(:; j)lus t11C L5 -: j)il b at tiýc .cc: rý. tc L.:l' ti, e ýcricd 1- 10 Tý;bru"-ry.

1-D'I Cury. its ý", t'. d. 1'!, o s s?-illfully 1-cccr. _1ýlis'zcd 1_issioý.:.ý ritlý Yaciýot ^ý:ý ýLtlýiticý: res_; urcos s:: t u for twa job a ti, o Z..s (, -ft. ü11F11_;'.tvCý by hcbruc. ry.

t` ý' ýV , tý l t G I ý lv 1 rýrý" 1? rv ý. ý"ý f+ ") ci ýJ 1. i 1tJ. ýý:: 1: ACJýi " .IJ .iti 1.ý:...: .... :v..:. iJ ;: ýT tS by t-'-,o GoL: ý.r P;=c1L:tc. `ý"ý:i'ýt :_ý: by i r'; ýric:us lýoý'.ii ýr b.ccý7i_oc: rbout t'io cluiciL

~~- 101 -~~

~~I D 1LýSlR V= I ESýIZIC'I''uD ý._._...... _. _,...,.,...~~

; T; t, 1n `"T n": ý" T_ý ". ý, r'ýRl l of h°LL'it].t1ý{... cýý. ý li. cýý1.:.c.iti. r 1 ýýrsicý. "'+, ^, tli ý ... lir }' ýýý ý ý VCV_litZl '1 ^ nýýý ýý."ý ZT .ý^'ý' _. T" ý ýn 1l%1n-^, Mýý:. ý ý ý. lil ý»ýý ýýYr -, ^1 vn i't Itzlýý:. . -n n r"ý .tf.::. i. iJ1', il. ..ý . fýý: . T^ý( Vcý ; ý 5.11E c. l-ý. 1 C....yS 1ý1 al ý; ý _. ý" J1,, , i:.,, týl' ýL1, llSt ir ii. l t: 1ý ýý+.':: 'yr ý+1° 'U.yý i2.; Sv1 ,ýTG , "...ýý, I'ý: S ýC'C;. iiZ i.ý`; zr,. _ý ý ý"Cý auI", tC : t �1°: ýy iýYp: i" ý;f; ýi; i, i 3tLlrý: T!:ýS yýI'"'_.':liýJJ. 'C<: CÜY: ^ii ':: ut'iOrity Of' Jt.. ý. (ýýr. ýý ^ ý: l'. ý t, " `~ ý tý. 1S -ý iý. t^, Yiý ' , ý3ti,.....ý"' CýU: __t ý ,, : i i" "'y. wrtGrS _. . - .. ._ý _'L. .w1 ýxlvl: t by Sý: t' ir IF, ;; ru t. x7.iSr ýY fs... t l;^ y^ý by ruc?: ýo: . y:xz_y .... ý, s. . jýy Jcr,. ly ý. iti 'z, 'ýcý, ý.°, ý^rly u.ýry : .,.. vý::ry s_.ý11 ý.:: ý. ý_, c'.c1ýýtü ; c. ýý built UP il! COI-,.,%D. III Qrc':Dr to locate for -, tilat it ': =C: I t: 1v 0.(:;fCY"_sivC C'c;1)1vy-'a0: ü.:.. C' i: sL1c. ac ti','aJT c:; uld b;; r.. --t St-'I forward uy)oý_t^! ýi:. ý, the offcrsivc, IIc :, qu'=rtýrs Gr--U.) S=F' CýýrS rcquLstcc, t-L-c-t CO?`:Y.D stoc'ý. ,0 of SL?y).)15r ^t rc This t in or ' other f,: =arc! 1CCatl-, ns" i'C,: ýL1c.St Z'Jý:.s not ::?(; . fact t! ic stccýag.,;: j at L; -,;.,ý; r:: c'c:crcas:: c:.

fUttirC C,, is C1,U°ýtUCý fr: T! ýL: IL?ý: it1G1: ýtýý su; study fur. ýis; loc iic:r..ý quýrtc; rs Grou1} J''=irt i: =E; t ff by t'_io G-3 i, Ofiicur-c:. bruý.ry: ;; -- rtillc: ry. .lF;: ýCoýýclusic. ý. Tllcrc "c"ýill b%-,iý: st?ificicý. t '^ý:ý:". u. ýtio__ uvr. il- U1D to O;)crlyr suý-1)3rt if -,-sivc; by Sýrctwt ý1. . i rL]'%1y L,ýýtil :t lc; -st c'cýrs ý ft.; r týzc ýlir. lir. ; tir. c ý0 ti'.t -,.o 30 l v:. ý. t'1v ' Col-mar Pcckct" T'1V.. ý a. .. blü irl ii: avy, cL-lib:; rs taill b;; i"sL: fficic:: lt u__lcss c.u`;:: ic. ýtcc: frcrl rr Ü t:: üUt51C'C i7ti2 i. m1S' l1I''ýL? j)" )ý: +'4^.t7 "ir=S E:Ui'li: ý l. ^. S: ývý. ý: ý; itioýl i: " c.. ^^ý' of 1/2 i;; ri~ýc' _lust . '_,_)t rýquirý; ýr.u, u?, c1. ý,ý i.ý. ýi w" Fts rac

~~11=_cýtý. Vic; ilccrdi:, T , :: u: ýitiý: _ vac., ý o-~, 1° r tyyý 1ýýri ; c, 1 11"%,ü-ruc_r; T t: ) 10 :l°c~~

~~ýý 1/2 rv-- t --, -n -1.. "F-. týý "ýý ",. ý1°ýý: >,:±ýý:ýý .:;ý. : ýi: ýst "clý ýsý:ly~~

~~/ L. r, ' ýý !JL: i .F Z^tu u- Gýýtll 12 : ý j,riý, ý.c...~~

~~VTT -""1'j'1 1"1ý' t Jý-li`1ä 1" _tl:~~

~~', 1d Hca U?ýýllcccoc? ,:...,A t;,- s c: ur-c'".::: r qu^rters r r.i; y' Gi°o up cc,: tr, T tc r,. bLii1, t', c 1Lrr:y Grrup. "2oservo cr.c^tc; stocks for futurc ,;ffc, sivu- ü.cti:: l_.~~

1,1 ý-ftLz° t1.:; cc-clusic.: t. _c CcLrcr POc:ýi�t ýi.. 1 tlý,11 'ý1" L' 1-, ,, ý. ýi.1., t' ný l3r 1- v liýl:. týri ltLýI , ý^ýS of . ý. rý rvý". , C. i. r: r" v_. iýr± ý ýbruý..: Jýfi ) _.: ýti .. .ýi.. li.. . , to r': iý'r::: 1, ay' rUrS' lcc'a lcvclS. 1C 1`irst '..C; 1 rä: y' l7^! 3 ablý t: ý s`_v:: , builcý u;,) ccA:sic'::: rc1alc st , cl.-.: f 1"rcr.i its rcc. ucct,C'ý:llccati . Isýuri t', ýýriccý 11 ý{; bru^rvr to 30 . yc=,t,ic výr, it ti:as :;c:; ssarSr t,,--, forbie. :. rtillcry ttý:; 'Z'llý: _ t?:; äý:; C"uý:.t i. 1]. iýý, ^cr: )SS _ý i`':'ý e11 QXlýi: nditurcýs Zi; r. '.; actic..."'s.

~~--102-~~

~~PZ'ýSTRIC flD RESTIZIC=D~~

~~ti i Thc itioýý i1ab1o to vci. th Ixl. for its `.r: ý:. u : avý. -Sc; ly attack .v.. " 15 Iti. rcýý,. äs lollot: � s:~~

~~Ty,-L)o I-:u;abýr ýf 1ý:ý;uz_C. s Pcr C-up. / iliý. Dcsircý lLv: il^blc~~

~~105. �:?Hctýa 017 1200 lljj 1551ml Hov, 33ý 600n 892 irýcL Gu_ý 800 500 155i:.5 u. Guý. 126 Ob0, 578 24or.u:.i Hov 10 00 2ý5 ý,ý IiUva 72 S00 346 Ulf Gui, 4 500 664.~~

In order to ilu'",; this r.luch .. vailablc all of t, _;; .ri: ly IS ] 11 11ý tCtý 0.1-1c; t'"aý; my Cfr': Lli) Groul) süV ,- ''ýS -d ý Ll: ý^ C :. 1iýL1:-tS 31 h, tcc: tý r'ýý-t'_ ýý'r. " It L, to inc, ýlu ý ý.�,_.1 c_`ýý, r:; ý.11 r' cr. .ýý ýý_._ 1 y. va s ust i;-.i^ tod that a 20-c ý_y battio taouiý h^.ýTc t-, bc fý)uý;J.l.t It lcu_lts . was cý:.lsidcr;; d tat the abýjvc al: )f a.amnitio. _ vaould be t for this b suffici.:.. : ttlo, . »ulcý ;; rovic'o suffý, ciont C'.I':li: Lunition f. )r ca_. ir. ',i. lodiatc crC: ssi_i; of t"',:; as s'JG:. 1 as it vaas rcoýc'_:,.d and for def;; nsc ol^ bricý,,,chc;a0.. In tho event a_= a tl; t'_ý.c Gcr... resist^ : co crur. lblcd Tý;ost of tl. o inc C..,_,u tllo cdva:ataco bccarý,ý; raid aft ;;r ; )assi.: ý tllc; fricd Line the ar.u:luý, itio. '- , aýu1d be sufficient t_: ;ýr: vidý f ý)r ccl_sic: orablc f iý'. tiýýiý boyýnc' the Rhi.: e. The amounts of litý, '.lt and rýcC:iurl artillcry ar.li:ýu_itie. wore suf-Arlieiu. -.t. T,1C,az:.cu.. ts ;f heavy rlýýu. desired but they artillery ý_. litie.. týýorý __rt as ýrc; at as viüs ^ccur: ulatoCL se slwily that it vaas unprofitable to delay thc accu.. lul` t:: the '_.ýavy artillcry, t1c.,. arü.luni . j. Thc First Frc_lch lyrTýy hc,d. scvccl c«:: uý'i ^ý.1ý1LUýitioý. fr.. -,ii its to tilc Task ý'ýOI°CC ac TEiJ_'_Sabert that l:lc` r Al1JCGt1Gý. 7S SUlý_)Ort t'_2c ýCVG. tiiC t'1ý. 5 SSiStiiiý ltil 1.I'i: 1y in '_iG!^t1ýtiVCrCt rush 1-i; Xt to t! _c ýRI, ii. c, Cýý still 11--vo -. i^vorablc rescrvc.

?;. In Scr,uary tia`,e_, the 5Týýý+',rc.tc ti-aasjut into affect tl, e i=c^c: 6-Iv-r_ ý.rtillory Scctiot, G-3, quartcX-s "r: y Crrr:u1), estahlis-': e; ý;. the ý`ýrouýý. _, r,aster Su- 't of pOstec:. -COtills list ad fnDr.l it the i, ur.lbcr of SILZF x.lc.irltc.: ^ilcc clays of su. due oth lýrr.-jy Groul) for any [-,ivc,, -)crioa. could tDrr. L>>ly a ti, list. be C, i: illCCi. Ci, i, C;Cs i c `U-11 faitiZ ý atLu w7G1°C LUi'ý11Siiýü to FTOUýI and C0T'., D. At the each h, ^ rcca; tic_Z, of it _)itulc. tütal sun cLýys,,, allecas- i.,adc the t- d sl, ývair_g cýuri� ýý no- a_ ar. ouiits c;f arnun itioJ., duc lýrr:ly Croui tlt had not beeil allocatod by it ti; its suborOLi:. yato cýr_üaý.: s, tiae,s furnished to COi.."D. Ir: I"l.ýrc'1, S=U,FF, ct tir, sti-ý. tic; rý clla,: ýý.c' tlle syster: effective 20 i.ýrci,. The c_`,^ýýýcs ivere.

~~- 103-. IRESUM= D TfCSTRICTIED~~

(I) STI;EF rµtc t,a :s to bc still dctori: zi: accý but tia^s to be rcC,/arc?od by COT:GGP e-s -- ymcdiction of avail^, blc supply ilanbility in forca^rG andas ý.targot for "-v: tlik: ', c.rc(--, s. (2) COT,iZOi ýýras t luz"_. is': t?, c Ixi: ry Grc)ubý i t' lr tý1 sic7 27th oi cacli r.lo: _tl. actuý. l luri1) Sun quý _ýtitics of Cla ss V for itcas üvtiil`blc to tilcl. 1 i11 fCrtiT^rG c'ciots tl. C,' ;) cricc: s tý. 0a. c.. J 1.:... l.. Cý], 1 to 10,11 tc 20, ^ý... . Lý,a c'. 21 1ý^t y of týcI'ý .. "a.. ^.ý. I' ýt tot-ýý f CO1.2OI`112 vaL--sto fur+,, islý l)-ro4icti, )ns of or4a--rc? area availability ft,.:-r rco succco: '. inE; 10 ý-ys l)criuc? i-i^ro

~~r Zv.."r. t.. ? 1S ,. "~~

(3) The ! ]: y Groups w: re then to cci:,"putc: t1-1cir all c^ti: u ' COi.:ZOTTz- f t::. 11 ti t' :. _-."tify ý : c. __s COi+aZOI7was then to ostc. blis'_i chcdits at its wrious forva, rcý depots for l: farc.: tlk; Groups area the r.:, ics aý2c' s .f ayný. ^-vise th,; Lrl: iics Of "thoir locaction.. ' lzl: iä.es could then r:: qüc;'st t tlir sistence of ?'I:... '. q.u^rtörs Gth l,xl-;y jý. ',St- I Gr::up, COiýZOiýý: tat -11 credits fL,r. d,rýr Group lxrýic; b:; blisl._3roLý tlý CO1,7410 would cstý od with Col,--,.., ID, alýd -t vioüld direct l: fron arrango shi7r. lcý_ts tc -tho rr. lics depots in other advance Sccticns. Thus 6th l. rray Group's ls;: lics ha d o.ý1Sr c to , _itio., oil C01ý0Iý' LL '^ ý,,t'cnc y c:cal wit. i cý. ..1:-,;.ýu, ý..

This systcn t"ýus -: )t sat isfact;; ry f: >r tho c.; -rditi o?s of Gth yýri:ýy Crüuyý ' f: ýr th: f:; llctiýýliýý rý; aso: s : (1) COT.mP 7L h` c' no" forward c1c;y)cts ith:; tar.,-as i.n roar of Gth Urcup . 35 .. r. ýy o:lIf, cr.ýrýuýniticý stocks t;.Lct =jorc tiritlniýý hours rail tin, of thu 13.rr. nics wcrc vory s_.::..11.

~~(2) EXI)criGncE. ' lac.O. s! _Uvir_ that ur'iCý;'r cxistii7-[-; conditions and crSaýýiýaticýý tlZe c_ ly vay to insurc forLV`rd rlJvci:. ýilt~~

Lf a: u:.uiýiticýl was to all-, cats cc-to it to t«c .Lrr.lics sc t?ý..t they it foxvaard toi, vaould call in their -naC;c. , 1. In dctcrrlinii. g form-rd availability to i:.c'. C; tho allocation 21r31 Eh: ý c'isrcý; tho credit systor. for tin j)oricdin, rc'_Z ardcd l in force ortil 1'Lrl:-tr Crou,-) COZ.an.ý,2OZ', rc(, amlcd cxU:unition as obliý; atüciý . if by Y trai. sýýcrto. tiolý, When the only covered an : re0uest.y ý data on, the allocation ý,rri.to Gtli Y.rr. iy, Grou1) for the period 21-31. receiv:, ý c1 it ., ,-^'',_ýýt tiJýCtýlür t.. l::ürc, L1.was . vas_s .. clear c quantities Crou;, 'a. ^. ui. ts included -ilri:: y )fs reserve _d c)týZOr unallocatoýl i:.:) u_:rotlac'cr the ST. 1:12 ßAtc; or lnic)t. ' If the quantitics --iv ciz accrued Gt`--, did include

C ~ýfl t1ý. tit1. ti SJlLOTýi Cýu,: C35 vi ' u's_ ýt1 on C%ýLl:: Jt1. S''7 C'LL;. LL°ý_ 1. "-t"T T'1', ,ý1... (. . ý ... _ 1ý)J. 1LJr. ý Jr tý:ý; to 1..ý 1 to 31 CUT:ýý\0ý:i, 1ýý: "y its ýl1GC:; ti tc; rý, sult }ft': 'cýiý. ti t, ý'. it týJitl. t_lý: or L,,. +.''": 1 1r:; 1 1i1. L1v lAtV. f. ý ,D L1,3 1J1. Y1Cý: CO:.ýýG"siý, tl oc_ itý; t: i CUl' it ,ý- by iblc t a;,::,..: c výl ýc 1. ý cjuýuý' ^ t... t: ý- 'f t.. ^ ý, t- t1ýli... ý.. J ý rý_.ýý l_ ý ý /a 'ý''1., l. ý '. i ýrv --: i L�^'. l.: . 1. t.. i-J1! \: ']. u_lli ]. 1.ý uJt -ili C]. ý. S _

~~1 ý.~~

'-is ' iý fU_.: iý::. t". tic f r:; 'v"isG. systo.: 1 ;.)t Ct ca:; _ .^_Ct t. 1C:t ^11. c-aticr-s Gt: Torý j lo}"' ttl_; t'_il ', C1'vC. lts ý 1r..: i; ' '. ý IL' t. l: i:, tot-".. Uillti+t, io'_ r1CVG'. crC r'1'%US" Crýär 'SUr::surl. "o r_GvC":novcrýc,, Gýlt--t ^.: i. U: Oli U:: iýti: : ltlü ; LvaýýCýUartvrS ýtý. txr1y Group of _lt] r C1, _`; n: fJL1ii(ý it 'ýc; COSS^ý'ý' t'- rE; c.n... rU_:CC)1 Us t,l - 1 its lli, tl rý JlirYCi to C_ý/'ff ü"lý. J. tc l1 'Ci... .. ýT in L. l, vl; LSIýiý il'.. . .. " cw:; r t'.,. ý; crký: its ostc. 'clis: ýoc'..

~~ý 7" to T ___wý_ ^. Iý. oý r1Sr l:ýrc' i 5, :--ý'ýT~~

'."" _i Oi: tý1c . ý)ril, ýti:: __ s: ut?;t1ýs rt oi -r'`ux. r- Cl?li'ý: výlts f, r t1l.is o1-) )._. ý. "f 1 orc_-G. t1'..... ^1... ýii__ -. R "' `[Y 1...... /'f Tý71 . il ``,7 /1 ý+ .1ý l ä/1 L:...... iýVV1". SLl1f... Lý"iL_1 1. L lvl-c4 V'Jl. J l: 1 _ LýSlv- Crilýlý.: P': St1TTý"iS L : oStor: i'rýC__ '; rcos `a 1,1Zbtli'J Cii? `ýZý ý '"_ ,. 1.1 1..4 . .ý RG11/ '.t t., is ::toti ý t_..ý cýur, ýiti:; s of crtillcrtr ,°oo ý.tu: ýis. ýýý. :ýrtillorýr Oi"ýic:; r c_1,ft;, i Ci,. rL1. y St"r__ .Lr.,. laý; o lvý^ 1,. _.. -. l.. c'_ý it 1ýS iti Tý; Vi ': t: 1J ; 1.'CGý qLlt -)1'O ý: .. u__t lt ?. ,. 5, ýr,ýý. -ý. .1,.,t.. C.; 11t ý.,.., +1 t_ I.R,1y .._J __ýC: ýy ý., .;;; 1r1. 1. 1_'. t_; iS cO. liboC c;"Gj'::c;i^ cal. i(JrS to ti .,; u-t this ý'Xorý __, titics, 1/2 b CL1:._, ý:výr . vor.,; lur:: _ ý:rtillc: ry _is: _L, i' 2 .

~~nn by rtii.. ;."_ LLPtS ''-. SlJý: ý t r, 1: 11. r. ' -"ý, , ,: l,:? . k. _.._ It^1y CLýriý-ý t'Lc 10-20 L"ýy)ri1.~~

Li'ý co is ST `7 V ihr t.. 1\i V; ý.iii1 J iý1 ýrL C": St b;-10 ru- -t(-: -: CsC C;:ýCý11.; .; ýS _ ý. .. 1 _t Tý _L, ý Ccr_. tcýýico YV VU t' t:, itL. ýa. t: 1C! k t_ r. )sis rt f " r. , ý-G-. .. qua-_ titi:; sJi bo _ý,., _:C'u- ý?'ý 5ti, f ...: .: " ý. ., ý_ý ý1 "ý t.: iý i.. -_ý;t cct..rx cý, c"r ý: l l. l y, {. }4 ýt `ý ýr -} o1. vLi. I ms ý:. . 1i. Vl :..%v ._ý.: . ýJl. _Gi L: -L: -,. "ý_... yýi. __U1 ýý__ -t''1

ll 1-10 t, -,)ril vi; ry t :,l;; -io5- : ESTzuCTTD 1-r2; D 1.=-T. cIC _-.rý. _. r_,..,,.. _...... t'ý or lrarrlS'T ý :.First Frc_nch vas ;ivc: _ t'ic full r-to fOr its rýL':ä list ýs it 1..! s SC'?C;ýU1oC: to C1'''SS t': ý:; iýl]11C ^ý. Cý aCýV'ü:"'Cý; tl'. i tS:: Llti ý: '_(I C:'. st frS1 i ýTi; r-Ci, x`i:1C; 1'SýýClI3 iil'Cüý i_Jltý ti'l,-S Uý.": ý yr rC:: ü--) C:3_1trG1 i':. it S t l__ _S1:1L?c? = ti7:. _": CE';1'tý:

bc; bC, ' 1ý:.C' C: ýt'"' , rl: ýy' ür iýIrs_`uý 2"c: -Cl, caS . . `,,1ýeuvtý _ý% c^r )i' by ti)-k-,t'ý üýýý .,.. vz y ý11. li L. V 1... ýýin ,,'-....�_c,-ýý-". _f. . t', , ýý.^llýc^tiý__s fý'r 1-10

Yý ý. _'- y)1'ý. l tý"ý ýýTý i1ý. S to ia. -. i_"cC: lil'1: üýý. ý. 1.JUr7. ý ý_li ý, ý. of bot", lý rý. )1C., . t.ýä.ý. . , 1'ýr ;V:. il. b1C :: 7i:lLL_1ti'ý:: Cý Ulr-,. casily 'Jü ;. -. ijt " 1'. truc'_: _C ti°r^soi tr` ýýs )cl'tý. - tl.; tl1o j';: ti01' i.1CýiTi: 'rC; gl? irC;: iitä ):ý.'"v^.:i^ý.. 1'r"l: i rail}: ý CýýS"ý: ýC : t: grC: ti0f tt? ý Gt;r1_.;: i'CGuirCi:. C;:;tS i' this 1. u«til ±r r ti ('1 ýliy L: litiý: ltlxl týC : va S ly G1. t; ý lý:: r 1ýGr1 GC7 r Tý " . to C. t l) 1 ý. l)i'il ( 1:1C,t,r OCr : SC; O 1<^. -SCi. l _blC .

~~SStatistics.~~

~~lu <.:ý ,~~

ýýý ilý ox 'i turC; s ,: .i 10 ji: L.:l 1Jý-- il-_Cý: ? ý, -" .. 1, i-- ti'Jý 1Jý::::_ .. 1L:rý L Gun.y, " ULýý: ý ýý;; -ý L for iS 1: JtTý lii'qr C--l:`, Ui) i wl1 vJý;ý _ frCi: lj u; uSt lýt; to 7 i:'.^Zr 1ý4J ^rý, b,r t,.ý.; : i1c-Cation 1'. Tý1v ýýý_ t'1C C'_lý ttý. Cl_i; t.'. 1^'lýli% 1" tu a'oS taro tVJ tt 1':: l Gy);;r 3s. -.. f-_ctuý. Lati ý GroL? ). ý^C`_ C'iýrt tý: i:: s C' Sui:; ý::C: ýY_`iýLSS::: ' in r, ---.u y)_rýý7' ' _ ý.,

~~tc:. 1. Clo _, ., t-. «g basis).~~

~~(b) Jth~~

L'1:1T Cii' ;:,,-. Cl' .. '`dC.ll--b1C; '^y of SU,, -)l3T i'ýCju11, t. yUll"4 tl'^ ,. l; f-,. 1.1 U"f il. _: , '. C{rcýuýý-- ýýescrve) : ýl::y ., I (1_ÜC)1'. iý.r7P ^_v:: G1." ^. V^i 1^') 1C (C) i)ýrt -. L1.:. f' tr Ul su; 'J")ly rz; Cjuir3C' tý_: buiY. t=ý' f13P ýý ýC3 -ChstC: Ci:.,. `; C wý: i)1'ý: Vl cistributiý, __),

~~C L) t ý. t`ýI y C. it vjýL.. _U 1 S.'ý to t., 0 ZnZ''.. i_.. ý c.;S Ltl.: l'. ý ou y.. 1' `L, 1 "'G'? ý i ýýtc. to ?T~~

~~ýý ý-.. v'. 5', 'ý. i ý. Lý"1_ `'V+. ý li ný., ýi, f ý: ýý-ý ý,. ý I4ý.."-__ ý1 (. 1. _' 1r1. ýJT I.LI ý 1ý"ý`i"_ j. / J .~~

~~-l0ro -'ý,~~

~~IZ , ýTRIO ýf? ) MSTi2IC=1 D~~

Fr: lr7. this quantity, -,: r: ur. itio n. via s*, --11. oc^tcc' tthc, La.r.iivs, ot'_. . XI-ay Grou. ) ßoscrvc V-1.s fillet? -: -c: 1)ipclLfrýDl: l COILMIT" Dt?.Il, s -r-cl Southcrn P ---rts to 2OP4s fillod} ,I (2) a, ily -;x;. ý,ri'iturs ' -. s, ), Aýir; -)lrjtto; On charts ro. ýlatL,. ", of thc .... llstc; l ctsoraSctl lv Tabý. ýý rc t fi4, _ ý ti ý ,, ^rý in ;ý ýs Table ;,ý2.1ý1c liures s Z.:,irý sur.ý: i^r5 0ý:. c,-c.?,, c'^ arb liste iý,. tlv.; tabul^. tiü_-. , ttc'o(: 'I;; rct-) rt - -ýs Tab l., ý ;,3.

~~b. D^Y of Suy)-)ly.~~

tilv týýt jtt. I cýä. lDüriF'+Cü of various days of sul)y)l'Tr 1 ýlri: ly týrcC: C;rGUy) C:ilcLL.: %altj-, tily; -CtU-l CjUC.i_t1t1CS SU; )yý11CCý cI'C '5) ü TL j; ýy.. is tr. bulatl t1iC S'1-VJi1 in blo T^blG 1, o.. of S1111F týi^t none 'r. 1:ýýiýstcaciýco r^týs. It vill bo zzotccl-c- of thc c?ý-ys ýf suy, ly tirrarc -ctua-lly i. l.; t.

~~5. C,:; 1:r2o, t5.~~

~~uý., ;,Pffc; ct 6fl. r.ü: _u«itio __ S'_aý-'i~~

Ot: ý:X c:,: ibat r.. s_-urccs cLircctly afl"cct tlý; r.r ; , ituc1;;, scoyýc, tirji ; ý; of o7cr that caI1 be c,,.;"_c?uctoO. arc s!_crt Iias the ffcct c; of it net `)ýssiblc t: ) i: iiJlGy a 11 the '11, troop, sir. lultai_c:; usly in an offý__sivc: r-7)lc; it restricts the til: lil_C; . ;f opyrati .ýs bccaus:; must be cccur.iulatce- launch t, ii--': to a l:,µ actio__; it rcc'uccs the p-)ssibility of ir. ü:lcciatc T'70al-rcSSCS tili.: ý): 1Cr1ytS C'.isp: `Sitiüi s; it has ,_dvantagc iýi. ble 1 troops ^?ý und:: sirc. "f i syCiica CffCCt on and CO;', i: l sýC'.CrS; - it 1 rccluc'cs the use of artillery i. _ c?cc)tivc r.i^_ncuvcrs

~~ar-c' rustricts its usc to su; ý)crt of the actual attack only,~~

The nost critical factor in rogard to expenditures is future sup; )ly. If th e resu, )y)ly rate is low then ol>cýýüti s must bc; , slýuccd far apart whereby the cýýcr._y gains tin;; to diý lark ai:l:; u:_t bf erlrýur. iti:; __ is always rcquireý tc z^.ý,c a brco. '_Ä- Group .: t,,.lrcuýa, 6th -I'lrr.ly c1ýlýeýieý_cc; all those effects during tilei CLof the Operations. 1Lprecise quantitative valuation pcrio, the inadequate ccänot of the effect Of cýsu-r)ly 11 be 1.1adC but it isr,, t. , cpiLiGý_ tr, .G of ýis a,: 1uartcrs that a, supy)ly ir_ gcllcral approýi:. l:.tcly 1/3 grcatcr ti_an that furndsilý: c would 1_avc s---cd ;:ý. _y, livs and sýiortcr_cü. the výar.

~~b. Day of SuL)_?ly.~~

It äc-i t. th.; will .. ot,:: c' nt ^v "y ilcýUlo to 6t.z ý'+.ri: 1 - Gr.ýulý for tl. Pori() c' of to o1)c;r-tio_l, 2r- days, c:icl ?ýot equal ^: 1y of t. l+_:clays of sul)l)ly. t'_.t vor:; %At.ac:r : 1ý>>ravcc'.or' rocoxli~1i:.ýdcd 107.. R2STRICTL'D ý ýTýýICTt,D

tllo by or ýTO, YTO, or ': Dc1)ýrtý. c,at. T': fact tho cit'_! "r ý, ýiC ^t -i C+ ý , "raa ý1P, r, ". - .ýsýL, týý;.;. L. V t, t',t v)r1ý succossful r..uat :: ot bc i; oof ý_. tlýc it io_ý urýý. T: 1cru be sui yýly of crtillory. ür.ý1LLý: üJC.s :-my ic ssibility for discussiu:, c:s t:; tiJ:ýc. t' Dro; ý,c; r of supply '? t-! is cl`=y Sýit+Lllýý b,. but t'lc; 1St :ý: 'y of 1--J C^i: lýxn7 S iblo -. ý "1-11; .n" ý'ur_.7^ iv_ýcc. r''+ ýý". t__ý..t ; :ýuJ:_t ýJs ot e,_., 1ý. ý. 1ý_ ý°-: rtill. ý'y su_ý:;ly in of "Ur S! ill-" list . A'.rt7.11: %i'ýrTiJ':;Lllcl v r:: ucc.:,. oui' cýSL'.:lty , 'ýillc. ' _-,.orü Cýrl_lc.ns, broujit c fiLtil_- t: a cjuic'c:; r To t,,.;.ýc ti1u v1cT'J ti1^t tj1iý supplytL; fUr-"-ish%"C7 Was is t.. l: ý CLc1lrrs -: _d s? i)_1 C1o.?4S ll vLs. il'1Cc; -J':ý,. ^t . -,. I_ 0 10. List of Charts, ý'iabul^tic. as ý_.ý. '. t: r D^t^ ý... ý .,..,, ý...... , -+-...... º .. _.... " .: I;:;.. -ý.,...... -... ý.. »ý ...... ý-...... ý...... ,..,... Uturý Cl'-rts 1 for c,--c-'., Of t'ýw sovon cc.libcrs...... 2,1t7 2'ý. 1JZU U E1ý'i). :: ý ]. ýL? 1°üS.

~~nr" {ý^ ýJl.: ýý i....,. 1' 1 ti ýlL.. Yý''" l+ ý' r iT"trl _1., ý'. , i..:,.. "~~

~~'G. Inc.blc 4, C:nlý`. risc_. of ys f~~

~~r, r-c-r ý -ý, ;-, 0. , 'wblc 5, ,ý;: ýrr ýý^iz.t0 1-1^._cc R^tcs. / arc filot i? _ý't. l:; Dc.cv1ýc:nt Filo.~~

~~i: :! "0 C1Lllrc: l'ZC::ýtS" ; ^] ýTSiS, C..`--'4c71U^.Y'tCrS 23 N:. trer: bcr19t4. I~~

b t: C/S, Sub j SU. ly tý; C. 2 4 , = ýct ý c:^ ý frý_ C-3 . tý: J: t Ph'''_ý i'. Stý:. co lý. ^.., ý )i" ý..ý ä fi, Sub jcct 'tPýýssibility, .ý, itiUü ýuý)yý1yýi. ýr, G-3 i: 4iiiCUr: . ýrý rtillcrý- 1anatitL i° ä'1Cc1'Iqu^. 6t: Group a. Jýxl c, rtcrü l ,,xr.:y . stillcry l, xu:.unitiail ßccorýws.

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~~n .ý ti ý ý (+i ý r , ýr- "' xºý"ý ý. r -ý >Ü!ý W ý" º1. 1-+.. ý ý ý ý"~~

~~`ý C"ý ý. ' .. . ºýi . l2 O O LI-\ LCý " tYJ -Co -It(12 REýaTRTCTED~~

~~CO'_*.T, ".RI S011 OF THE V, 'ýRIOJS D-",YS OF STi.JI'i LY ITH L: BLE i:: THE ýiCiU.. :+V3JLt, . I: UNITI0IT~~

12 gip 6 Gp ETO ETO D ß.1T0 . ETO aver age D/S DIS Desired Desired D/S D/S -; pprvd rate Rds/ Rds/ Rate Rate Rds/ Rds/ 1)/S Supplied Gun Gun D/S D/S Gun Gun Rds/ to6 a`Lrrr.y Nov Nov Rds/Gun Rds/Gun Nov Jan 2; .;pr Grp 44 44 Nov44 Nov44 44 45 15-,ug4% 7 Ma.K_4)

~~105mra How, C0.0 ý:,ý,ýý? tý0.50. 50.40.0 45.0 41.0 30.1 105m-" Tr 20.20.10.0 20.2C. 0 15.0 4.0 . 10.0 4.5 Inch Gun 28.36.30.0 40.28.0 23.0 26.0 22.0~~

~~155:mHow 25.35.40.0 40.25.0 33.0 25.0 20.4 155'.'= Gun -25.30.2.0 35.25.0 25.0 22.2 13,7~~

~~3 Inch How 20.25.25.0 30.20.0 25.0 25.0 8.2~~

~~3 Inch Gun 15.15.12.0 20.15.0 10.0 15.0 11.0~~

~~240m;n How 7.15.15.0 25.7-0 15.0 13.0 6c~~

~~Table. 4 ýTRIýTED RESTRICTED~~

~~Ai IvIUNITIONIIAINTEVIS-lTCERATES ETO (SH4EF RATE)~~

~~ITEM JliN 1 FEB 1 ý.L;RCH 1 APRIL ------ý 57mmGun, AT (4.3) (13.2) (4.6) (1.0) HE 1.0 .79.6 1,0 SABOT ---- APC 3.6 3.6 3.6~~

60mm (4-76) (4.96) (4-96) ý.jTortar - HE 4.6 4.6 4.6 - I11 .3 :.3- ? ..l 06 06 06 wP . - $1mr.i Mortar (11" 2) (10.9) (10.0) (8.o) HE (Lt) 6.0 5.7 5.0 5: 0 HE (Hv) 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.0 Zr: 2.3 2.3 2.2 1.0

75mmHow (27-7) (27-7) (27-7) w HE w/1.248A2 25.0 25.0 25.0 HE w/1254 -- -- .7 HE-AT .7 .7 rnp 2.0 2.0 2.0 (6.9) (6.9) (6.9) 75mmGun - 4.3 HE w/1;148A2 4.3 4.3 - APC 2: 1 2: 1 2,1 - ýý'ý .5 .5 .5- 76mmGun, T& AT (13'4) (13.4) (13-4) HE w/Iý..2ýý1'ý2 8.3 8.3 8.3 /I! HE w, j4$1,j2 --- APC 5.1 5.1 5.1 TIP --- (19.0) (19.0) 3Iº Gun, AT (19.0) - Mt12 8.9 8.9 8.9 HE vi/r, - HE 3.3 3.3 3.3 6.8 6.8 6.8 - APC - T".,m ---

~~90mmGun AA (6.5) (6.5) (6.5) HE w/T74 HE 1.2 1.2 1.2 _ HE 4.8 4'8 4. $ T APC .5.5''.. 5 Table 5 (Sheet 1)~~

~~RESTRICTED RESTRICTrD Maint Rate Cönt rd......~~

~~ITEIi JAN 1 FEB 1 IUARCH1 APRIL~~

~~(21.8) (21'8) (21.8) 90mm Gun T& AT & Ground - HE vi/M81,2 1ýrC 15.0 15.0 15.0 HE vT%l,Z48A2 ---- 11PC 6. $ 6. $ 6.8 1ý' ...~~

~~4.5" Gun (17: 2) (20: 0) -(15: 0) (20.0) HE 17.2 20.0 15.0 20.0 IT ýý~~

105mm How M2 (30; 0) (30; 6) (26; 7) (2140) HE w/ý/!48A2 26,0 26.6 23.5 23.5 HE w/M54 -- 1.1 vv-p 107- "3 .5 HC 1.7 1: 7 1; 7 - Cird Smoke ; 1+ .ý- - HE-AT .$ .8;4 .8 105mmHow 1.13 (19; 7) (16; 5) (9; 4) (7; 8) HE w/M1+8A2 17.7 14.5 7.5 7.5 HE w/L.154 : HE-tiT .7 *7 .7 ýýýP :8 ;$ ;7 .3 HC .5 .5 .5- 155mmHow (23: 2) (22; 0) (19.7) (18; 2) HE 19.5 1$: 3 17.5 17.5 2: 7 1.2 VIT 2.7 .7 HC 1.0 1.0 1.0 - 155 Gun (13:3) (15:3) (14.3)' (12: 7) HE 13.0 15: 0 14.1 12.0 :2 :1 PIP .2 .7 HC .1 .1 .1- 81, flow (5.5) (9: 9) (9: 5) (12; 0) 9.9 9.5 HE 5.5 -. 12.0 $11Gun (11%9) (10; 0) C13:0) (16.0) HE 11.9 10.0 13.0 16.0 (4.5) (4 (12; 240mm How .5) o) HE 4.5 $. 0 4.5 12.0

~~Table 5 (Sheet 2) a~~

~~RESTRICTED RESTRICTED -~~

~~CT.L= R FOURliU, 71~~

~~ILIP ^OOPLPL11O1'i~~

No cff :-rt Will be r.ý. c'e in this sl+::rt sur.lý ýati:::! to c:; vcr in detail tl. c; extent of air c, ratio. - ',,,jitýz Grýunc'. f_ýrccs u.rc? c; r of Ilcaclclu^xters 6th Array Group in the successful c^ýLjýaiýns in Frr.: _cc, Ccrr.ka.zy ulýd Lustria. Details of the j)art the Air Lrr-1 in t'zc b^tteri?: final defeat Gerrlý^. ý>rccs ;)l^ycCL " r arýc: .. ^f" _'ý 1x_:ý' CC: t: f^ci_ak- 6th i'xmy Greuj) will be found in Histories of Sevc_, t..: (Provisio,. First French ý"x. ay, First Tactical Air Force al) : 110. TuJClfta Air F;, rce. Hero it is desired c'. ly to cover briefly the it 6t:.. Grcujý overall air 'Acture as affc; ctcd cw)jDrýticr_s üf 1"ý.r: ly aý-.lc? t� 111LL`:liiýý: tý S----10 vf the bi'. ^. C'C:r results

Pl` =--in ; fur air coolyuruti-ý. _. ic; r: uý.d assaults ý., thý Lxr.1y Grcuý level was c arriccl Cut. at the Cci:v. a_ýclin; GLncral4s 0,aily Cxntcrlýlatc(fL discussed Cora. c,.:nferc: -nicc, rr:, u:, c' llans wore with :^lZCliý.; General, First T.,.C. L. i+ (Prey. ) or his ro ýrese_. tativo al cl the overall air plan ti'jcr:"-cd out. Cl, cc--e-:oration between air ground units the Amy -)so level. ý'iheroforc, andthis ti"aaseffected at . records of office lil: thetlýu "" rýrcý.,,. ý?arc litec onvýl actual^ .,4. cCý-)rljýlis?. t,, ý;-nl_tr ý -A'. 1ý11, ,

ýýir aiýd Gr,;ur d Forces litcr, -lly liv:: a ^ý:d lctoýscthcr. With (--ach r.iissieii f lcVa.:, thc tic bEtti"Joc. th.: two ý',rrL, bcccrlc closcr clcsor until well bofcrý the latter of the c^rilýý iUil, front lino c:: iLr+:^. i_dCrs cý11sidGrcd the closc CCeix-r at1, U: 1)l... i1Cu ^lI: i'ýst riucli 'a )art:, f thoir col. b taa. i tho su1,ýortii_ý crtillcry. . at Itas was this fccliilS of i-;,iü. tual undcrstaý-_diý,as ý coý].fidc: lcc that lent ir.ii ý.cc, surably t;; tlio actual results obtThroughout1-111,6 the the lýir Force rcia entire .; daily and a fcolir, 13of i ridc in its around units as they advanced over Sr-. Und littered with jcstrCyec; vC'liclCSp `; u:. ýs) bridL-; trains ^iýd cs .

~~In thill this 'Lrr. CTr use tiil. :: ly ý-u7 was La--acdr-c; rý"unO.~~

brvurlat over fr.;. It.. ly, initially o t t' v VL. systc; l.l i which ýýr`sý. .ý: S02, either or Grouwlc', Bccc-use it woriseC. so of the sr.lüotllly, Llt; ht «ir cooy tialý, lioviotiTcr, dct-ils III-VO ýbr_,, closcr i er-. of . "ýca '1_ r' 'l r1ý"1 'ý h »h bu rl in ic on the jcct. si1cc .V ýy y sub system -vi,--,s fus ter, safer DOM C1'fCCtiV:;, ^SSL?ri:? S 1ý:ri: 2] CS of dcsired air cJv1crctic): ', i-Jit_1-1a r.dn L. lur: of dOlý.y. IG,-) far as this C;f'CiCC is able to dcterl: lire, tilcrc was 1_,.;t c: 'i.; soldicr in foth°Arr. iy G`r; Ltbý1Lillec' as t11;: result bci:l'ail. b�r ýui? .'ýi-r Force. In ^ few cf the cxtroi. loly fluid situations cl furicýus, s`,-Ylc i:. stü: _c::s of c:::ýoAýc: r^ti: i".ir Forces strý fY: ýC; cur 11. bac; ci1ur: L,s -vo I

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