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Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel Towards Peaceful Coexistence Higazi, A.; Abubakar Ali, S.
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Download date:07 Oct 2021 Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel
Towards Peaceful Coexistence
UNOWAS ISSUE PAPER August 2018
1 2 Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel
Towards Peaceful Coexistence
UNOWAS ISSUE PAPER August 2018
3 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abbreviations p.8 Chapter 3: THE REPUBLIC OF MALI p.39-48 Acknowledgements p.9 Introduction Foreword p.10 a. Pastoralism and transhumance UNOWAS Mandate p.11 Pastoral Transhumance Methodology and Unit of Analysis of the b. Challenges facing pastoralists Paper p.11 A weak state with institutional constraints Executive Summaryp.12 Reduced access to pasture and water Introductionp.19 c. Security challenges and the causes and Pastoralism and Transhumance p.21 drivers of conflict Rebellion, terrorism, and the Malian state Chapter 1: BURKINA FASO p.23-30 Communal violence and farmer-herder Introduction conflicts a. Pastoralism, transhumance and migration d. Conflict prevention and resolution b. Challenges facing pastoralists Recommendations Loss of pasture land and blockage of transhumance routes Chapter 4: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF Political (under-)representation and passivity MAURITANIA p.49-57 Climate change and adaptation Introduction Veterinary services a. Pastoralism and transhumance in Education Mauritania c. Security challenges and the causes and b. Challenges facing pastoralists drivers of conflict Water scarcity Farmer-herder relations Shortages of pasture and animal feed in the Cattle rustling dry season The spread of terrorism to Burkina Faso Challenges relating to cross-border d. Conflict prevention and resolution transhumance: Recommendations Mauritania-Mali Pastoralists and forest guards in Mali Chapter 2: THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA p.31-38 Mauritania-Senegal Introduction c. Security challenges and the causes and a. Pastoralism and transhumance in Guinea drivers of conflict b. Challenges facing pastoralists in Guinea The terrorist threat Blockage of transhumance routes Armed robbery Water shortages Farmer-herder relations Cattle theft d. Conflict prevention and resolution Veterinary services in Guinea Recommendations Dairy production c. Security challenges and the causes and Chapter 5: THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER p.58-66 drivers of conflict Introduction Farmer-herder relations a. Pastoralism and transhumance d. Conflict prevention and resolution b. Challenges facing pastoralists Conflict management committees Loss of pasture and blockage of transhumance Recommendations routes Depletion of livestock
5 Insufficient animal feed in the dry season Access to education and health services c. Security challenges and the causes and drivers of conflict Insurgency and cross-border attacks Cattle rustling, banditry and conflicts between pastoralists Farmer-herder conflicts in Niger and during international transhumance d. Conflict prevention and resolution Recommendations
Chapter 6: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA p.67-84 Introduction a. Pastoralism and transhumance in Nigeria Fulani and non-Fulani pastoralists Migratory trends Pastoral lifestyles Transhumance patterns b. Challenges facing pastoralists Blocked transhumance routes and loss of grazing reserves Banditry and cattle rustling The Boko Haram insurgency and the Lake Chad Basin Social problems c. Security challenges and causes and drivers of conflict d. Conflict prevention and resolution Responses to herder-farmer conflicts at the federal and state levels: Federal responses State responses UN Responses Recommendations
Overall Recommendations p.85 Bibliography and Further Reading p.88
6 List of Maps
Figure 1: Transhumance Patterns in West Africa and the Sahel Figure 2: Map of Burkina Faso Figure 3: Map of Guinea Figure 4: Map of Mali Figure 5: Eco-climatic zones in Mali and area of the Inner Niger Delta Figure 6: Map of Mauritania Figure 7: Map of Niger Figure 8: The main eco-climatic zones in Niger Figure 9: Map of Nigeria
7 ABBREVIATIONS
APESS - Association pour la promotion de l’Élevage au Sahel et en Savane CFA – West African Franc (XOF); (30/1/2018: US$1 = CFA 529 / EUR1 = CFA 655) CVD - Conseil Villageois de Développement CILSS - Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel ECCAS – Economic Community of Central African States ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States FAO – United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation FARS - Forces armées révolutionnaires du Sahara FDR - Front démocratique révolutionnaire FDS – Forces de Défense et de Sécurité GDP – Gross Domestic Product GNAP - Federation of Cooperative Pastoral Associations in Mauritania IDP – Internally Displaced Person LGA – Local Government Area MNLA – The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad MUJAO - The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa PRAPS - Projet Régional d’Appui au Pastoralisme au Sahel (Regional Project to Support Pastoralism) - World Bank-funded, ECOWAS-WAEMU led project with CILSS coordination. RECOPA - Communication Network on Pastoralism UNHCR – United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNOWAS – United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel
8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This Paper has been prepared by UNOWAS based on field research conducted by Dr. Adam Higazi (affiliated with the University of Cambridge, the University of Amsterdam and MAUTECH, the Federal University of Technology, Yola, Nigeria) together with Mr. Shidiki Abubakar Ali (University of Bamenda, Cameroon). For the six countries covered in this Paper, we wish to thank national and local administrations and ministries; national pastoralists’ and farmers’ associations; UN Country Teams in West Africa; civil society organizations, think tanks and other external partners. We are grateful for the in-depth knowledge and guidance shared by FAO, MINUSMA’s Joint Mission Analysis Centre, UN Country Team/Nigeria, UNDSS, UNESCO, UNOWAS’ Liaison Cell in Nouakchott, UN Women, the World Bank, Le Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la Sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS), the regional center of AGRHYMET (a specialized agency of CILSS), the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and the International Crisis Group (ICG). Special thanks to the ECOWAS Commission, particularly the Department of Agriculture, Environment and Water Resources, and the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security. The following colleagues reviewed and commented on several drafts of the Paper. We are especially grateful for their insights and support. Dr. Vivian Iwar (ECOWAS Commission) Dr. Roger Blench (Cambridge University) Dr. Philippe Frowd (University of York) Dr. Penda Diallo (Exeter University) Mr. Christian Berger and Ms. Catalina Quintero (PRAPS-World Bank) Mr. Koffi Alinon (CILSS-Ouagadougou) Mr. Abdourahmane Ndiaye and Mr. Patrick Smith (USAID-Dakar) Dr. Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni (ISS-Dakar) Mr. Malick Faye (FAO-Dakar) Mr. Philippe Prevost (JMAC MINUSMA) Ms. Akemi Yonemura (UNESCO – Dakar) Ms. Salamatu Kemokai (UN Women – Abuja) UNOWAS, Dakar
9 FOREWORD Recent years have witnessed an increase in violent conflicts involving pastoralists in parts of West Africa and the Sahel. They often take the form of clashes between herders and farmers, impacting human, national and regional security. As such, they are of increasing concern to ECOWAS and its Member States. UNOWAS has been working closely with ECOWAS during the past year to examine the causes and possible solutions to pastoralism-related conflicts. UNOWAS Issue Paper on Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel confirms that growing competition between herders and farmers over access to water and pasture is a primary driver of these conflicts. This tension is often aggravated by a weak enforcement of the rule of law, political manipulation, demographic pressure, climate change, and the prevalence of weapons in the region. The Paper recognizes two main areas of response. First, urgent action is needed to resolve conflict in countries currently experiencing high levels of violence between herders and farmers. Secondly, sustained conflict prevention efforts are needed to stop violence from taking root elsewhere in region. Some ECOWAS countries have developed strong pastoral codes and local mechanisms to resolve disputes through dialogue and mutual arrangements. There is therefore good practice to draw from in terms of conflict prevention and peaceful coexistence, and we must capitalize on these lessons. The Paper emphasizes the importance of engaging affected communities, including women and youth, in finding sustainable solutions. It stresses the need to review, amend and implement national and regional laws relating to transhumance - and to support initiatives that promote peaceful co-existence among all populations: pastoralists and farmers and other groups throughout the region. At the regional level, ECOWAS is an essential partner for this purpose. UNOWAS is committed, together with the UN system in the region, to support ECOWAS and national governments in these efforts.
Mohamed Ibn Chambas UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel
10 UNOWAS MANDATE The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) works to enhance the contributions of the United Nations towards the achievement of peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel, promoting an integrated regional approach to addressing issues that impact stability in the region. METHODOLOGY AND UNIT OF ANALYSIS OF THE PAPER UNOWAS Issue Paper on Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel is based on field research in six countries: Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria. In each country, interviews were conducted with pastoralists, farmers, other members of communities, government and non- government officials, at both the local and national level. The Paper focuses on pastoralism as the main unit of analysis, attempting to understand why conflicts involving pastoralists appear to have escalated in the region in recent years. What are the causes and drivers of these conflicts and how can they be resolved?
11 Executive Summary
UNOWAS Issue Paper on Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel
Violent conflicts involving pastoralists1 have increased in West Africa and the Sahel, but not uniformly
1. Violent conflicts involving pastoral- apply to all ECOWAS countries. The ists have escalated in parts of West scale and frequency of farmer-herder Africa and the Sahel in recent years, conflicts varies greatly between and claiming thousands of lives across the within West African states. Violent region. These conflicts are primar- conflicts often occur at known flash- ily driven by a competition for land, points, in zones of insecurity (e.g. water and forage, but there are also parts of Nigeria and Mali). However, political and socio-economic factors in many other areas, farmers and pas- involved. The main issue is about how toralists manage their relationship these natural resources are managed peacefully and mutually benefit from and allocated. Pastoralists are both economic exchange and cooperation. victims and actors in these conflicts. In addition, these conflicts can some- times be between pastoralist groups Addressing pastoralist-related themselves, or involve other actors conflicts from a prevention such as fishermen and illegal miners. perspective As pastoralists are mobile, these con- flicts can be difficult to contain and 3. The main aim of UNOWAS Issue spill across borders. Paper on Pastoralism and Security in West Africa and the Sahel is to assess 2. Although the general trend is of in- the causes and drivers of conflicts creasing violence, especially between involving pastoralists, and to recom- pastoralists and farmers, this does not mend conflict prevention strategies.
1 Pastoralism refers to extensive livestock breeding, which in West Africa means different breeds of cattle, sheep, goats, and camels, depending on the ecological zone. Pastoralism generally requires some form of mobility of herders and their animals, often on a seasonal basis between dry and rainy seasons, and day-to- day between pastures and water points. The migration of pastoralists and their livestock between seasonal pastures is called transhumance. There is a diversity of pastoralists in West Africa; they are not homogene- ous. Patterns of life among pastoralists range from nomadic and transhumant pastoralism to settled or semi- settled agro-pastoralism. Agro-pastoralism combines farming and livestock breeding and requires settlement to cultivate crops, but the mobility of livestock for transhumance is maintained.
12 A clear understanding of issues sur- tocol recognizes the importance of rounding pastoralism and security cross-border pastoral mobility and at the national and regional level is aims to reduce problems that can needed to promote effective public arise when livestock are on the move, policies and impartial media report- including farmer-herder conflicts and ing. the spread of animal diseases (epiz- ootics). Encroachment into protected areas such as national parks, and pos- sible poaching of wildlife, is another Pastoralism and transhumance issue identified. In agro-pastoral- ar 4. Pastoralists rear livestock not only eas – where pastoralism and farming as a main economic activity but also co-exist - transhumance is meant to as an intrinsic part of their culture.2 occur along routes or cattle tracks In West Africa, the largest pastoralist defined decades ago. However, main- group are the Fulani, a diverse popu- tenance of these traditional routes is lation that is spread across the sa- now challenged by land use and pop- vanna and Sahel and increasingly the ulation growth. Where transhumance humid zone. The contribution of pas- routes are blocked, the movement of toralism to West African economies livestock is curtailed and encroach- and to the agrarian sector is consid- ment onto farms often results, trig- erable. Pastoral lifestyles vary, from gering conflict. nomads who have no permanent abode and migrate with their families and herds, to settled agro-pastoralists Causes and drivers of pastoralist- who have houses and farms but move related conflicts their herds between grazing areas to 6. Growing demographic and ecologi- access patchy resources. cal pressures are regional phenome- 5. Transhumance - the movement of na. The area of land under cultivation herders and their livestock from are- in West Africa and the Sahel has dra- as of scarcity to available pasture and matically increased over time, while water, usually on a seasonal basis - is available grazing land has decreased. particularly important for those with This is partly because pastoralists larger herds of livestock. In West Af- rarely own land on an individual or rica, cross-border transhumance is collective basis, but instead rely on regulated by the ECOWAS Protocol access to pasture and water as com- on Transhumance (1998). This Pro- mon resources, in agreement with local communities. As demographic 2 They rear different breeds of cattle, sheep, goats, and camels, depending on the ecological zone, and pressure increases, and without good own much of the region’s livestock. management of these resources,
13 competition between herders and political or ethnic violence, or ban- farmers over access to water and ditry. In such situations state author- pasture has intensified. The ability of ity is usually weak, dispute resolution pastoralists to adapt to these chal- mechanisms may have broken down, lenges is also compromised by weak and weapons are readily available. state engagement, insecurity, and Examples are central and north- often limited rights to access natural ern Mali, where armed groups have resources. gained access to Libyan weaponry af- ter the overthrow of President Gadd- 7. Climate change and acute vari- afi in 2011, and in parts of central and ability and unpredictability in rain- northern Nigeria. The proliferation of fall patterns also exerts pressure on small arms is a regional issue, which pastoralists in West Africa and the has made traditional conflicts dead- Sahel. In most of the countries under lier, fueling cycles of revenge killings review, pastoralists and farmers re- between communities. ported that climatic conditions have 9. Violent extremists and other armed become more adverse. Typically, this groups equates with a longer dry season and operating in parts of the Sahel a shorter rainy season. Even where and West Africa have added to the the total volume of rainfall has not disruption of traditional pastoralism. decreased, it fluctuates more year The United Nations High Commis- on year and can come in short bursts sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) notes (which can cause flash floods) rather increasing and significant population than steadily throughout the season. displacement in the region caused The fluctuation in rainfall, with great- by herder-farmer clashes, including er annual variability over the past de- refugees and internally displaced per- 3 cade, is confirmed by scientific data sons (IDPs). Boko Haram has been on the Sahel. Pastoralists and farmers attacking and raiding pastoralists and need support to maximize adaptation farmers in the Lake Chad Basin, steal- and resilience. ing livestock and crops, killing and displacing people. The relationship between pastoralists and terrorist 8. Increased use of firearms has in- groups in Mali and some bordering tensified rural conflicts. This is partic- areas of Burkina Faso and Niger var- ularly the case where farmer-herder conflicts occur on top of other con- 3 According to information received from UNHCR’s regional office based in Dakar (August 2018): it flicts, where they are compounded is estimated that 62,000 persons were internally by the prevailing insecurity. This has displaced in Nigeria in 2017 as a result of farmer- herder conflicts, and 3000 persons in the northern happened in rural areas that have part of Benin (country) in June/July 2018 for the been destabilized by insurgency, war, same reasons.
14 ies depending on the group. There communities. The proliferation of has been some recruitment among small arms and light weapons have pastoralists into jihadi groups in Mali, amplified the level of casualties. Their allegedly for self-defense against oth- cumulative death toll currently runs er armed groups. into thousands each year in Nigeria, and curbing wide-spread impunity 10. Local and national politics have remains a challenge. Beyond height- a strong influence on the frequency ened competition for rural resources and scale of conflicts involving and space, the situation is aggravated pastoralists. Where the state tries by local politics, frequently along eth- to accommodate the interests no-religious lines. Increased south- and needs of both farmers and ward movement of pastoralists from pastoralists, conflict is less likely to northern Nigeria to the southeast occur. If the state shows a strong and southwest of the country has fu- bias towards one group and fails to eled new waves of clashes between be inclusive, or if it neglects all or predominantly Muslim pastoralists one section of the rural population, and Christian farmers.4 conflicts are more likely to emerge. ‘Land grabs’ by powerful political 12. In Mali, insurgency and lawless- or business elites often negatively ness have pushed more pastoralists impact both pastoralists and farmers. south of the Niger River, and con- The introduction of national pastoral flicts in northern Mali and the Inner codes has helped address this Niger Delta have increased tensions challenge in some countries in the between farmers and herders. Pasto- region (e.g. enshrining the rights and responsibilities of pastoralists in law). ralists are both affected by and impli- cated in armed groups, with poten- 4 In recent years, pastoralists in Nigeria have 11. Over the last years, Nigeria has increasingly been migrating permanently or on had more fatalities in farmer-herder seasonal transhumance southward from northern conflicts than the rest of the ECOW- states in search of more favourable grazing condi- tions. This has increased pressure on farmers AS region combined. However, not not only in the Middle Belt but also in places in all states are affected, and there southeast and southwest Nigeria, which previ- ously had low populations of pastoralists. Deadly are sharp contrasts even between confrontations have ensued between herdsmen neighboring states (eg. Sokoto and and farmers when animals trespass on farmland. Zamfara, Gombe and Taraba). In the Tensions are further reinforced by differences in ethnicity, culture and religion: the Fulani herders most affected areas, violence often are Muslim while the populations in the South and extends beyond clashes between in- in the Middle Belt are majority Christian. States and judicial authorities have been slow in mediat- dividual herders and crop farmers ing and resolving disputes before they spiral out and engulfs whole settlements and of control.
15 tial regional outreach. Cross-border attacks and banditry are common from the Gao region, northern Mali, Towards peaceful coexistence and into Tillabéri in Niger. In the Lake conflict prevention Chad Basin, farmer-herder conflicts 14. Conflicts between herders and have been aggravated by population farmers are of increasing concern to displacements due the Boko Haram ECOWAS Member States. They have insurgency. There are also seasonal a devastating impact on human, conflicts between farmers and pasto- national and regional security. They ralists in different parts of the agro- destroy the economic and social pastoral zone in Niger and cases of fabric of rural communities - and disputes between pastoralist groups compromise traditional governance in dryland areas. and dispute resolution mechanisms. Coupled with other phenomenon 13. Conversely, in Mauritania, Guinea such as violent extremism, traditional and most of Burkina Faso, violent ways of life are being threatened. conflicts between farmers and herd- The fate of farmers and herders ers are less pronounced, but tensions who have fled violence as refugees do exist. In these countries, and also or displaced people is also a cause in Niger, there are local conflict man- for concern, including in the Lake agement committees comprised of Chad Basin and Mali among other pastoralists and farmers, traditional places. Food insecurity on the leaders, and sometimes state authori- heels of new droughts in the Sahel ties. Such committees do exist in parts further aggravate the situation. of Nigeria but seem less frequent. Ni- In response to the latter, the UN ger and Burkina Faso have also drawn System is scaling up its effort to up local conventions, which stipu- cover food needs and build resilience late the rights and responsibilities of for those most affected.5 Conflicts farmers and pastoralists and establish between pastoralists and farmers mutually-agreed enforcement proce- are thus closely intertwined with dures, that are sanctioned by local multiple other security, economic, state authorities. All this is helping environmental and political factors to promote conflict prevention, me- that impact both groups. diation and resolution, ensuring that farmland and pastureland are both 5 https://www.devex.com/news/nexus-of-climate- and-conflict-exacerbates-sahel-food-security- protected. crisis-93160 http://www.fao.org/africa/news/detail-news/ en/c/1128039/
16 15. Going forward, more attention is change on pastoralists and farmers. needed on issues relating to land rights Conflict resolution committees could and natural resource management. be formalized and supported at local The 1998 ECOWAS Protocol on levels in all ECOWAS Member States. Transhumance, along with existing Lessons learned could be drawn from national transhumance protocols, those countries, such as Guinea, should be reviewed, updated and Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal, enforced. A regional communications which already have such committees strategy is needed to raise awareness in place. about herder-farmer relations and ways to promote peaceful 16. Above all, conflict prevention co-existence. Concrete actions to measures should be developed in prevent human rights abuses and close consultation with pastoralists promote justice should be taken. and farmers and strive to protect The role and participation of women the livelihoods of both. UN and and youth as peacebuilders should non-UN partners have an important be strengthened. Finally, longer- role to play to accompany ECOWAS term strategies should be devised and national governments in these to address the effects of climate efforts.
17 Figure 1: Transhumance Patterns in West Africa West in Patterns Figure 1: Transhumance
18 INTRODUCTION
West Africa and the Sahel region trade in the region, as the two sec- is experiencing a surge in violent tors reinforce and complement each conflicts between pastoralists and other. farmers. These conflicts are primar- ily driven by competition for land, Although the general trend is of in- water, and forage, but there are also creased conflict, between pastoralists political and socio-economic factors and farmers, this does not apply in all ECOWAS countries. The scale and involved, as the main issue is about frequency of farmer-herder conflicts how these essential natural resources varies greatly between and within are managed and allocated. Conflicts West African states. Nigeria and Mali between pastoralists and farmers are are currently the most severely affect- often triggered by and contributing ed, due to ongoing instability in both to communal tensions; they are often countries. However, in other coun- instrumentalized along ethnic and tries (e.g. Guinea and Mauritania), religious lines. Pastoralists are both farmer-pastoralist cooperation has victims and actors, which can be be- been reinforced through the adop- tween pastoralist groups themselves tion of local pastoral codes, dispute or between pastoralists and farmers. resolution mechanisms and good Sometimes there are also conflicts management of natural resources. with fishermen, illegal miners and others. As pastoralists are mobile, The aim of this Paper is to examine tensions can be difficult to contain the causes and drivers of pastoral- and can spill across borders. In agro- ist-related conflicts in six countries pastoral areas this insecurity also in West Africa and the Sahel: Mau- negatively affects farmers and - agri ritania, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, cultural production. Banditry and cat- Niger and Nigeria. These countries tle rustling are also part of the prob- were selected as they form an inter- lem, especially in areas where the connected transhumance belt across state is weak or where state officials the region. They were also chosen for are linked to armed groups. In conflict comparative purposes. Pastoralism is hotspots, there has been heavy loss important in each of these countries, of life and displacement among both but the scale and dynamics of conflict farmers and pastoralists. Conversely, involving pastoralists vary. There are where there is peace and good natu- variations in state policies towards ral resource management, there are pastoralists across these cases, and mutual benefits to productivity and in local conflict prevention practices.
19 One of the aims of the comparison is sive solutions for both farmers and to identify examples of good practice herders and other groups in the re- and, conversely, to highlight factors gion, from both national and regional that contribute to violent conflict. perspectives. While addressing the specific chal- UNOWAS is committed, together with lenges relating to pastoralism in each country, the Paper underscores the the United Nations system in the re- need to prioritize responses that gion, to support ECOWAS and nation- could lead to sustainable and inclu- al governments in these efforts.
20 PASTORALISM AND TRANSHUMANCE
Pastoralism refers to extensive live- area of land can support the livestock stock breeding, which in West Africa all year, especially in the dry season, and the Sahel means different breeds without heavy investment in infra- of cattle, sheep, goats, and camels, structure, water and animal feed. depending on the ecological zone. The actual number of pastoralists, Pastoralism generally requires some farmers and livestock in the six coun- form of mobility of herders and their tries covered in this Paper, and more animals, often on a seasonal basis widely in the ECOWAS region, is not between dry and rainy seasons, and clear due to lack of available data. day-to-day between pastures and wa- However, keeping these caveats in ter points. Pastoralists have different mind, FAO statistics for 2016 give herding practices and different types approximations of 62 million cattle, of migration.6 The migration of pas- 227 million small ruminants (sheep toralists and their livestock between and goats), and 4.6 million camels in seasonal pastures is called tran- the six countries concerned. For the shumance. ECOWAS region, plus Mauritania, FAO There is a diversity of pastoralists in statistics approximate a total of 73 West Africa; they are not a homoge- million cattle, 4.6 million camels, 110 neous group. Patterns of life among million sheep, 157 million goats (a to- pastoralists range from nomadic and tal of 267 million small ruminants).7 transhumant pastoralism to settled The number of pastoralists is likely to or semi-settled agro-pastoralism. be in the tens of millions. Agro-pastoralism combines farming There are different types of routes and livestock breeding and requires to facilitate the movement of cattle settlement to cultivate crops, but the between pastures and water points.8 mobility of livestock for transhumance Pastoralism works best as a part of is maintained. Transhumance is nec- a regulated system, where space for essary, especially in the savannah and 7 FAOSTAT, Food and Agricultural Organisation of Sahel, because unless the herd size is the United Nations. Data on Live Animals in Wes- very small or rainfall is plenty, no one tern Africa, 2016. Data accessed at http://www.fao. org/faostat/en/#data/QA, 22 March 2018. 6 In some cases, when herders move their lives- tock on transhumance they are accompanied by 8 These routes include: principal routes, including their wives and children, while the aged and young international routes; network of routes, which may children stay in a permanent settlement or camp. link up to the international routes; daily herding In other cases, the livestock are taken on transhu- routes that connect camps and villages to grazing mance by men and teenage boys only, without any areas; routes leading down from the daily herding women, girls or elderly people. routes or larger routes to rivers and streams.
21 livestock and pastoralists is demar- infrastructure and regulations are put cated and protected from encroach- in place to assist farming and pasto- ment (herding routes, grazing areas, ralist communities, and if their rights access to water), while farmers’ fields and responsibilities are enshrined at and crops are also protected from the community level, according to herders and their livestock, accord- agreed legislation or traditions, and ing to pastoral codes. Farmer-herder implemented through local authori- conflicts may be reduced if sufficient ties.
22 CHAPTER 1: BURKINA FASO
tion linked to the Mali-based terrorist group Katiba Macina. Introduction Despite challenges and frequent dis- putes in some areas, violent conflicts a. Pastoralism, Transhumance, and between farmers and pastoralists in Migration Burkina Faso9 are at a relatively low In Burkina Faso, pastoralism, agro- level10. There are however acute pres- sures on land, water, and livelihoods pastoralism and transhumance are in rural areas. As a result, many pas- not limited to one ethnic group. Pas- toralists have left Burkina Faso for toralism forms a significant part of the neighbouring countries further south, rural economy, and there are estimat- increasing pressures and tensions in ed to be 9.3 million cattle, 9.8 million sheep, 14.7 million goats, and some other parts of West Africa.11 The main 12 challenge throughout Burkina Faso 19,000 camels. The Fulani (Peul) are is natural resource access. Security the dominant pastoralist group in the in the northern part of the country country, but the Mossi (the majority – especially in Soum, Oudalan, and ethnic group in Burkina) and several Séno provinces – is complicated by other groups also rear livestock, often the conflict in Mali (with refugees as agro-pastoralists. In Burkina Faso and armed groups spilling over from there is cross-border transhumance Douentza and Gao) and the presence and internal transhumance between of Ansarul Islam, a militant organisa- different regions and provinces. In the dry season pastoralists tend to move southwards from semi-arid northern 9 Fieldwork in Burkina Faso was carried out in the following regions: Central-North, Sahel, and Hauts- areas of the Sahel into the savanna Bassins, in addition to meetings in Ouagadougou zone, or to more humid zones of which gave a national perspective. neighbouring countries. They return 10 Even if generally limited, the killing of livestock northwards at the start of the rainy has become frequent in Guinée forestière (Beyla, season, but it appears the length of Lola, Gueckédou). From 2014 to 2015 at least 2.533 cattle was reportedly killed in conflicts between the transhumance period is increas- farmers and herders. Sources: http://afrique.le360. ing in many cases, due to the scarcity ma/guinee/societe/2017/05/16/11852-guinee-au- sud-les-eleveurs-ne-sont-toujours-pas-les-bienve- of pasture and water in the Sahel. nus-11852. Transhumance in Burkina Faso is de- http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20140218-guinee-conflit- termined by the availability of pas- chasseurs-eleveurs-lele-guekedou- ture and water, but also by access to 11 There is no available data on the actual number of pastoralists who have left Burkina 12 According to FAOSTAT approximations for 2016. Faso for neighbouring countries, but it was widely Data accessed at http://www.fao.org/faostat/ acknowledged to be a significant trend. en/#data/QA, 22 March 2018.
23 Figure 2: Map of Burkina Faso. Source: United Nations. it, which is a function of local politics, agriculture and plantations. Popula- economics, and social relations con- tion growth combined with adverse nected to land tenure and land use, environmental and climatic condi- as much as local ecology. tions have also reduced the area of usable land. There is a system of tran- In Burkina Faso there is private, com- shumance routes and access routes munal, and state land. The state des- to water points such as rivers and ignated areas of land for specific ac- dams, but many of these have been tivities, including agriculture, forestry, blocked or narrowed by crop fields. pastoralism, and wildlife conserva- Pressures on pastoral livelihoods and tion. This system was reported to on farmers have therefore increased. have worked quite effectively during the administration of Thomas Sanka- These constraints in Burkina Faso ra, but in the past three decades are pushing many pastoralists south- enforcement has been weak. Much wards into neighbouring countries, land that was allocated for pastoral- particularly to Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, ists has been cultivated or taken over Togo and Benin. Pastoralists in Bur- by other developments, including kina Faso confirmed this trend of
24 ‘migratory drift’ from the drylands to cussions on Burkina Faso’s livestock (sub-)humid areas, resulting in -per industry, resulting in lost revenue for manent relocation.13 Most pastoral- the state.15 ists with large herds were reported As more pastoralists and their ani- to have already left Burkina. Togo was mals move permanently from the Sa- cited as having formulated policies to hel and savannah into sub-humid and benefit from this influx, with a quota humid areas towards the West African of 50,000 animals per year permit- coast, it is also creating pressures on ted to enter from other West African natural resources in those areas and countries, and a tax of 5,000 FCFA therefore, a risk of conflict. Most of per head of cattle when pastoralists these southern fringes of West Africa cross the border. Reportedly, local were historically beyond the range of authorities in Togo and Benin also transhumant pastoralists.16 It is the impose charges in the communes combination of ecological/vegetation pastoralists pass through while on change due to deforestation in the hu- 14 transhumance. Charges reportedly mid zone and improvement in veteri- exist in Ghana as well, where chiefs nary medicine, protecting zebu cattle sometimes demand payment in live- against trypanosomiasis, that enables stock for passing through or staying migration and/or transhumance that in their territory. Government of- far south. ficials in Ouagadougou emphasised that the permanent movement of Many pastoralists in northern Burkina so much livestock southwards out of Faso have national and international the country is having negative reper- ECOWAS certificates of transhumance and are aware of the regulations. They 13 The term ‘migratory drift’ was formulated by anthropologist Derrick Stenning in the 1950s: ‘Mi- obtain the certificates by present- gratory drift may be said to have occurred when a ing livestock vaccination cards and stated range of seasonal grazing grounds has given way piecemeal to a completely new range. This proof of identity. They present their may occur within the lifetime of a herdowner, or ECOWAS transhumance certificates within two or more generations, depending upon at international borders and, when the urgency of the environmental factors involved.’ (Stenning, 1957: 67-68). It can for example mean 15 Discussions at the Ministère des Ressources a lengthening or change in the direction of the Animales et Halieutiques, Ouagadougou, 12 April dry season or wet season transhumance track, in 2017. a southerly or northerly direction, in response to political or environmental conditions. See ‘Sten- 16 Tensions are already apparent in southern Nige- ning, D. J. (1957), ‘Transhumance, Migratory Drift, ria, for example, as a new wave of pastoralists has Migration: Patterns of Pastoral Fulani Nomadism’, moved in with their cattle into agricultural areas, The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute destroying crops and disrupting the relationship of Great Britain and Ireland, 87 (1): 57-73. between farmers and longer-established pastoral groups. The migration has occurred from northern 14 Interview with the Directeur Provincial des Nigeria and across the border from Benin. Commu- Ressources Animales et Halieutiques du Seno, 14 nication with Dr. Roger Blench, during his fieldwork April 2017. in south-west Nigeria, November 2017.
25 on transhumance, forest guards and Political representation veterinarians often ask to see their documents. In Burkina Faso, pastoralists’ politi- cal representation is weak or non- existent. One of the aims of pastoral- b. Challenges facing pastoralists ist associations in Burkina Faso is to give pastoralists a voice in civil soci- Loss of pasture land and blockage of ety and politics, so they can influence transhumance routes decision-making on issues that affect them. This is also a stated aim of the Pastoral land in Burkina Faso is not World Bank-funded projects and oth- protected: much has been culti- er programmes.18 vated by small-scale farmers, taken for plantation agriculture, acquired Climate change and adaptation by elites, or built on. Transhumance There is heavy pressure on water and routes and access routes to water are pasture in Burkina Faso, especially frequently blocked or narrowed by during the dry season. The late dry farms and settlements, constraining season, around March to June, is the pastoral mobility and leading to the most difficult period for pastoralists, destruction of crops by cattle. The as water is scarce, especially in the laws governing the rural space, in- Sahel Region. This necessitates tran- cluding Burkina Faso’s 2002 Pastoral shumance and underlines the need to Policy Act, are not widely enforced. sustain dry season grazing areas and Awareness of this legal framework, watering points for pastoralists (es- even among local authorities, is often tatives of the Cotton Producers Union of Burkina lacking. Faso, national headquarters, Bobo Dioulasso, 18 April 2017. According to some farmers in Burkina 18 Regional Sahel Pastoralism Support Project Faso, the challenges facing pastoral- (Projet Régional d'Appui au Pastoralisme au ists also affects them, for two main Sahel, PRAPS) (the World Bank-funded, ECOWAS- reasons. First, the blockage of tran- WAEMU led project with CILSS coordination). A regional pastoralist organisation headquartered shumance routes and reduction in in Ouagadougou and with a strong presence in pastoral land increases the encroach- northern Burkina Faso is APESS, l’Association pour ment of livestock onto farmland. Sec- la promotion de l’Élevage au Sahel et en Savane, founded in 1989. A pastoralist civil society network ond, some farmers in Burkina Faso with good links in other areas of Burkina Faso is buy livestock with the profits from RECOPA, le Réseau de Communication sur le Pasto- ralisme – Burkina Faso. APESS and RECOPA partner their farming activities. This is the with development agencies and are involved in case among cotton farmers around implementing projects related to pastoralism. Bobo Dioulasso, for example.17 They are active but there is a need to support such organisations to implement projects and deepen 17 Group interview with leaders and represen- their outreach among pastoralists.
26 pecially dams/ponds and bore holes). this as a problem. There are few As rainfall patterns in the Sahel have government policies with regard to become more unpredictable, adapta- nomadic and semi-nomadic culture. tion to annual fluctuations in rainfall In addition, schools that used to be and therefore pasture is important. available for pastoralists, for example in Oudalan and Soum Provinces, have In northern Burkina Faso, “Forage been closed. Christine” is frequently cited as being a vital dry season water resource (with bore holes and water points) This is a major hydraulic system in northern c. Security challenges and the Oudalan Province that was opened causes and drivers of conflict in 1972 to provide pastoralists and their herds with water during the dry Farmer-herder relations season. Pastoralists from a wide area, including Mali and Niger, congregate There are farmers and pastoralists there during the dry season. Forage in most regions of Burkina Faso, and Christine therefore enables some of due to the multiple pressures they the pastoralists in northern Burkina face, disputes frequently occur. The and surroundings to stay in the Sahel main cause of conflict is the destruc- Region throughout the year rather tion of crops by pastoralists’ livestock than migrating southwards. and the cultivation of transhumance routes or grazing areas by farmers. Veterinary services These are common problems across West Africa, but in Burkina Faso it There are veterinary personnel and is less common for such conflicts to services in Burkina Faso, but they are lead to heavy loss of life. Violence under-resourced, often lacking the does occur, but generally not on equipment and materials they need the large scale seen in neighbouring for work. Furthermore, pastoralists countries. For example, government and agro-pastoralists are not suffi- records indicate that from 2005-2011 ciently trained or sensitized on the there were 12,071 conflicts in -Bur importance of animal sanitary care. kina Faso involving pastoralists, with 55 deaths.19 Conflicts range from rela- Education tively minor cases to violent scenar- ios with fatalities. Eighteen of those Pastoralist youth in Burkina Faso, as killed in the recorded period were in elsewhere in the Sahel, tend to have 19 Government statistics viewed at the regional livestock department for North-Central Region, low levels of school attendance. The Kaya, 13 April 2017. This record was not disaggre- main pastoralist associations view gated by age or gender.
27 Poni Province, South-West Region, reported missing and it is unlikely all in 2008. There is no indication of an the victims were accounted for. Pas- increase in violence since 2011, and toralists in Bobo Dioulasso stated that some respondents thought the level more than 100 Fulani were killed in of violence between farmers and the Bouna violence, including men, herders may have decreased. women and children.21 Some were resident in Bouna, while others were Part of the reason for the lower level there on seasonal transhumance. Ten- of violence compared to other West sions had built up over time and were African countries is that pastoralism and agro-pastoralism are not activi- reportedly linked to local chieftaincy ties of one ethnic group; even though politics between Lobi and Koulango the Fulani are the dominant pastoral communities, with the Lobi disput- group, the Mossi and others also rear ing the right of the Koulango to grant livestock. Moreover, it is believed that Fulani pastoralists access to land in many pastoralists with large herds of Bouna.22 Accumulated grievances of cattle have left Burkina Faso due to Lobi farmers towards migrant Fulani limited availability of pasture and herders were therefore entangled in water and the constraints on pasto- local politics. This was likely a factor ral space and transhumance routes. in pushing dozo hunters from the Lobi This has possibly reduced some of the to launch attacks on Fulani communi- pressure on farmland. Another factor ties. The Fulani in southern Burkina is that there are organised conflict Faso indicated that smaller conflicts management committees in place in existed most monthsin border ar- most villages. Conflicts are usually ad- eas between Burkina Faso and Côte dressed at the local level, before they d’Ivoire. become violent. Cattle rustling The more recent violent pastoralist- related conflicts reported in Burkina Pastoralists in Burkina Faso frequently Faso were external and involved cite livestock theft (especially of cat- pastoralists who were caught up in tle) as a security challenge, particu- violence after crossing borders into Le Figaro with AFP, 21 April 2016. neighbouring countries. There was http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash- mass violence in March 2016 at Bou- actu/2016/04/21/97001-20160421FILWWW00332- cote-d-ivoire-le-conflit-a-bouna-fait-33-morts.php, na, north-east Côte d’Ivoire, near the accessed 27 November 2017. border with Burkina Faso. At least 21 Group interview with pastoralists from south- 33 people were killed, with more west Burkina Faso in Bobo Dioulasso, 17 April than 50 injured and more than 3000 2017. displaced.20 Many people were also 22 ‘Au Burkina Faso, avec les déplacés du conflit 20 ‘Côte d’Ivoire: le conflit à Bouna fait 33 morts’, entre Peul et Lobi’, Le Monde Afrique, 6 April 2016.
28 larly in the border areas when they go on transhumance. The border area between Burkina Faso and Ghana is d. Conflict prevention and known for cattle rustling. Most of the resolution gangs are reported to be Burkinabé, There are formal and informal con- operating on the Ghanaian side of flict prevention and resolution mech- the border, allegedly in complicity anisms at the local level in Burkina with local officials. Cattle theft is also Faso. These help to minimise violent a problem in parts of Burkina Faso conflicts between pastoralists and itself, including in the Sahel Region farmers and keep such conflicts at where armed robbers operate. An of- a low level. In the field, the Conseil ficial in Kaya in the Centre North re- Villageois de Developpement (CVDs) gion of Burkina Faso claimed that cat- were cited as playing the main role in tle rustling had considerably reduced conflict mediation and resolution and in most parts of Burkina due to the in addressing land tenure disputes. mobilisation of local vigilante groups against the rustlers. These are self- In the case of Firka village (Central- defence committees such as “Kogl- North Region), the CVD was said to Wéeogo” (a Mossi name), which work consist of 12 representatives, includ- against cattle theft and other crimes. ing traditional leaders, local adminis- However, cattle rustling continues to tration, a women’s leader, and repre- be a problem, including for pastoral- sentatives from traders, farmers and ists passing through Burkina Faso on pastoralists.23 Most farmer-herder transhumance. disputes are resolved between the parties themselves, without going to The spread of terrorism to Burkina the CVD, but if the dispute needs for- Faso mal mediation they take it to the CVD. In Dori, in the Sahel Region of north- Throughout West Africa and the Sa- ern Burkina, more informal types of hel, terrorism represents an increas- mediation are also used, involving ingly acute challenge for pastoralists, religious authorities (the local imam) farmers and other groups. In Burkina and other local leaders – mainly men; Faso, the terrorist group Ansarul Is- women are rarely involved.24 The lam emerged in 2016 in the Djibo CVDs are linked to the 2004 Decen- area of Soum Province, Sahel Region tralization Code, the Code General of northern Burkina Faso. Established des Collectivites Territoriales, which by a Mali-trained local preacher, 23 Group interviews with farmers and pastoralists Malam Ibrahim Dicko, Ansar Islam in Firka village, Pissila Commune, Sanmatenga has close links to Katiba Macina, a ter- Province, Central-North Region. rorist group operating in central Mali, 24 Interviews in Dori, Séno Province, Sahel Region, led by Hamadoun Kouffa, 14 April 2017.
29 sought to give local bodies a larger mutually beneficial solutions. 28 role in land management.25 There are also village-level representative com- mittees responsible for land manage- Recommendations ment (Commissions Villageoises de Gestion des Terroirs, CVGTs). How- • To sensitize populations regarding legal texts governing land, including ever, these government and donor pastoral land and transhumance; linked committees appear to be su- perseded by more customary forms • To encourage rotational systems of of land management.26 Nonetheless, land use between farmers and pas- the law in Burkina Faso stipulates that toralists – rotating land between sea- all untitled land is owned by the state. sons or years – for the benefit of all; This is according to the 1984 law, • To increase investments in both the Reorganisation Agraire et Foncière, livestock and agricultural sectors in amended in 1991 and 1996. There is Burkina Faso, to assist the national also a nationalCommission du Concili- economy and reduce the number of ation Foncier,charged with regulating livestock being moved southwards conflicts in pastoral zones. into coastal West African States; The relative integration of pastoral • To protect and preserve local veg- and agricultural systems in Burkina etation and soil ecologies;29 Faso is a key reason for lower levels • To protect and maintain the exist- of violent conflict there. There seems ing pastoral areas; to be more sharing of land and more accommodation between groups • To invest in rural education, for all compared to countries where popu- children, particularly targeting under- lations exercise more exclusive sys- represented pastoralists, including tems of territorial control.27 In Burkina in northern Burkina Faso. This would Faso, many farmers not only discuss help pastoralists and farmers diversi- their own challenges, but also the fy their livelihoods and become more problems faced by pastoralists to find politically engaged; 25 Oliver Hughes, Catholic Relief Services Niger, • To promote community conflict Literature Review of Land Tenure in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali: Context and Opportunities. March resolution mechanisms and sup- 2014. Accessed online, 28 November 2017. port the participation of women and youth. 26 Ibid. 28 Group Interview with Union of cotton farmers, 27 See Dafinger, Andreas, and Michaela Pelican national headquarters, Bobo Dioulasso, 19 April (2006), ‘Sharing or Dividing the Land? Land Rights 2017 and Farmer-Herder Relations in Burkina Faso and Northwest Cameroon’, Canadian Journal of African 29 Interview with Modibo Oumarou, APESS, Dori Studies, 40 (1): 127-151. (Séno Province, Sahel Region), 14 April 2017.
30 CHAPTER 2: THE REPUBLIC OF GUINEA
conflicts which may increase in the coming years over access to water. Introduction When disputes arise, conflict man- Guinea has relatively low levels of agement committees have played violent conflict between farmers and an important role by bringing com- pastoralists.30 There is competition for munity leaders together for dialogue increasingly scarce land and water alongside state officials. These com- and disputes occur in some places, mittees include elders from the- af such as in Beyla in the forest region fected communities, religious leaders, or Boké/Boffa areas in the maritime and representatives from pastoralist region, but violent farmer-herder and farmer associations. There are clashes that result in heavy loss of life women’s cooperatives among pasto- ralists in Guinea, but women are still are rare.31 However there is a growing concern about the impact of climate unrepresented or under-represented change and subsequent additional in conflict management committees. hydric stress32 on pastoralists-farmers While the Government of Guinea has 30 Guinea has however known recent cases of publicly sought to rebuild state insti- serious inter-ethnic violence in which hundreds were killed. See McGovern, Mike and Alexis Arieff. tutions after years of neglect, the leg- 2013. “History is stubborn”: Talking about Truth, acy of colonial and post-colonial state Justice, and National Reconciliation in the Republic policies that fostered ethnic divisions of Guinea’, Comparative Studies in Society and History: 50 (1): 198-225; Posthumus, Bram. 2016. can still be felt.33 This is particularly Guinea: Masks, Music and Minerals. London: Hurst the case between the two largest eth- & Company. nic groups in the country: the Fulani 31 Fieldwork for this study was carried out in five and Maninké, which together make of Guinea’s eight administrative regions: Kindia, Mamou, Labé, Boké, and Conakry. No fieldwork up two-thirds of the population. How- was carried out in Faranah, Kankan, and Nzérékoré ever, such ethnic divisions do not ap- administrative regions. The focus was therefore on the western half of Guinea: the regions of pear to have translated into conflicts Moyenne Guinée and Guinée Maritime. This is a between Fulani pastoralists and the major transhumance zone, but there are pastoral activities throughout the country. Information Maninké, or farmers of other ethnic on transhumance and farmer-herder relations in groups. In Guinea, most pastoralists Haute Guinée and Guinée Forestière was gathered are Fulani, and farmers (outside of from secondary sources and from veterinarians and other government officials in neighbouring Moyenne Guinée) are most likely to regions and in Conakry. be of another ethnic group. 32 Peacebuilding Fund Secretariat Focus Groups 33 McGovern, Mike and Alexis Arieff. 2013. “His- held in Tougué, Koubia, Dinguiraye, Siguiri, Man- tory is stubborn”, op. cit. diana, March-April 2018
31 National livestock estimates in 2012 included 5.5 million cattle.34 These are a. Pastoralism and Transhumance in Guinea projections and not based on a com- prehensive recent survey. FAOSTAT, Pastoralism is the fourth largest sec- also using imputed figures, give ap- tor in the economy of Guinea and is crucial for local livelihoods. Economic proximations of 6.4 million cattle, 2.6 data on pastoralism is not compre- million sheep, and 2.8 million goats hensive, partly because it contributes
Figure 3: Map of Guinea. Source: United Nations. to what may be termed the ‘infor- for 2016.35 mal economy’ as well as to official 34 And 1.8 million sheep, 2.2 million goats, GDP. According to the Ministry of 105,000 pigs, and 24 million chickens. Livestock’s 2012 figures, pastoralism 35 FAOSTAT, Food and Agricultural Organisation of accounted for 4.5% of Guinea’s GDP the United Nations. Data on Live Animals in Gui- nea, 2016. Data accessed at http://www.fao.org/ and 20.9% of agricultural production. faostat/en/#data/QA, 22 March 2018.
32 Pastoralism is spread across all four northern border into Senegal. This geographical regions of Guinea. transhumance occurs to and from the There are different types of pastoral- area around Télimélé (in the central ism and transhumance, and differ- highlands, south-west Futa Jallon). ences in the level of conflict between Reportedly, due to pressure on dry farmers and herders in the four re- season pastures around Boké and gions. According to the Ministry of Boffa, fewer pastoralists now go on Livestock, Moyenne Guinée has the transhumance to the maritime areas highest number of pastoralists and and more go to Gaoual and Koundara livestock, followed by Haute Guinée.36 or across the border into Guinea Bis- There is transhumance on a north- sau. However, fieldwork in Boké and south basis between these regions Boffa confirmed there are still large and Guinée Maritime to the west numbers of pastoralists there with and Guinée Forestière to the south. their trypano-tolerant N’Dama cattle. Not all transhumance in Guinea is on a north-south basis, as there is also Not all pastoralists in Guinea go on transhumance on a highland-lowland transhumance. In general, this is basis and along rivers. only necessary for those with larger herds. In the Futa Jallon, for example, The main transhumance zone in which is predominantly Fulani, most Guinea in terms of the number of of the population is sedentary and cattle moved during the dry season in the rural areas agro-pastoralism is from the highlands of the central is the norm. A distinctive feature of Plateau (adjoining the Futa Jallon) their system is that the livestock are to surrounding lowland areas. Tran- left to roam freely, without herders. shumance occurs westwards from As per Guinea’s pastoral code, it is Middle Guinea to Guinea Maritime the responsibility of farmers to fence and eastwards from Middle Guinea their fields (using natural fencing) so to Upper Guinea. On the western that cattle cannot enter and to survey side of the highlands there are two their farms during the day to ensure main transhumance zones: south- livestock do not encroach. Similarly, it west down to Boké and Boffa, near is the responsibility of herders to put the Atlantic coast, and north-west to their livestock in paddocks at night Gaoual and Koundara, towards the if they are near farms.37 Land is al- borders with Senegal and Guinea Bis- located for farming and pastoralism sau. There is significant cross-border and may be rotated from year to year. transhumance into Guinea-Bissau This is made easier because the Futa and to a lesser extent across the Jallon has a large Fulani majority and 36 Group interview with senior officials at the 37 LOI L/95/51/CTRN du 29 août 1995, portant Ministère d’Élevage, Conakry, 28/2/2017. Code Pastoral. Republic of Guinea.
33 such arrangements over land use may routes are blocked, the greater the even take place within the same fam- risk of cattle encroaching onto farms ily. For pastoralists with larger herds and destroying crops. who do need to retain their mobility, Cross-border transhumance into especially between the dry and rainy Guinea-Bissau is partly to avoid cot- seasons, Guinea has both internal ton farms in bordering lowland areas transhumance and external, cross- of the Republic of Guinea. Pastoralists border transhumance. Internal tran- report that the cotton farmers often shumance can be for only 20-30 kilo- cultivate their transhumance routes metres within one locality, or longer while they are in Guinea-Bissau, pre- distances of 100 kilometres or more venting them from returning before between regions. Cross-border tran- the harvest. In other areas, pastoral- shumance occurs in both directions ists claim they have trouble herding between Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sen- their livestock to streams and water- egal, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Mali, and ways during the dry season because Côte d’Ivoire. Both are critical for pas- the access routes have been culti- toral production and resilience, but vated with vegetables, by farmers in some parts of Guinea (e.g. along doing irrigated farming. Reduced or the border with Guinea-Bissau) cross- loss of access to water points and riv- border transhumance is driven by erine grazing areas due to cultivation land scarcity, with insufficient protec- by dry season farmers has become tion of grazing land. a common problem for pastoralists throughout West Africa. b. Challenges facing pastoralists in Water shortages Guinea There are acute water shortages in the Blockage of transhumance routes dry season, both in grazing areas and along the routes. Villages, whether There are widespread complaints they are farming and/or rearing live- by pastoralists in Guinea of tran- stock, also face acute water shortag- shumance routes being blocked by es. Women sometimes walk miles to farms. This happens most often -be access clean pumped water, or more cause the routes are not properly often communities drink untreated demarcated. There are some initia- water from local sources. Water scar- tives to protect the routes, including city is also one of the main factors donor projects to locate and demar- 2014/15. Projet Régional de Gestion Durable du cate them with beacons.38 The more Bétail Ruminant Endémique en Afrique de l'Ouest PROGEBE-Guinée. Conakry: Ministère d'Élevage et 38 Gestion de la Transhumance: une approche des Productions Animales. communautaire de gestion des parcours à bétail.
34 encouraging transhumance during drugs. The limited mobility makes it the dry season in Guinea. The cattle difficult for veterinarians to access need water and herders have to rear pastoralists in dispersed rural areas. the animals close to water sources, Dairy production whether natural or man-made. Cattle theft N’Dama cattle produce a maximum of only about a litre of milk a day (com- Cattle theft is a problem in some parts pared to more than 20 litres in Eu- of Guinea but it is relatively low inten- ropean dairy farms, where they use sity, with between 1-5 cows stolen at special breeds that are difficult to rear a time, not the large-scale organised in the Tropics). Although the quantity rustling seen in other parts of West of milk produced is low, a key prob- Africa, such as in Nigeria and parts lem faced is the lack of refrigeration of Niger and Mali. Cattle thieves are and other production facilities for a of different types - at times they are functioning dairy industry. Dairy pro- described as opportunists who steal duction in Guinea is mainly the pre- cows that are unattended (as in the serve of women, some of whom have Futa Jallon during the dry season), formed dairy cooperatives. while others are labelled as bandits, armed with guns, who shoot cattle along transhumance routes and then c. Security challenges and the sell the meat. Guinea has a well-de- causes and drivers of conflict veloped system of marking animals for security purposes, so that the Farmer-herder relations owners can be easily traced. Violent conflicts involving pastoral- Veterinary services in Guinea ists are less pronounced in Guinea compared to other countries in West There are qualified veterinary doctors Africa and the Sahel (such as Mali, working in many prefectures. How- Niger, and Nigeria). However, violent ever, a constraint expressed by them conflicts do sometimes occur, and is the relatively limited support they non-violent disputes between farm- receive from the state. In the sous- ers and pastoralists are relatively fre- prefectures (sub-divisions), the chefs quent. There are significant pressures des postes and veterinarians working on the livelihoods of pastoralists in for the Ministry of Livestock – who most parts of the country, mainly due are responsible for treatment and to shortages of water and pasture in livestock production – are not usually the dry season and inadequate access supplied with vehicles, office equip- to veterinary drugs and services in ru- ment, or veterinary instruments and ral areas.
35 There are several flashpoints where and spiritual beliefs of forest peoples farmer-herder conflicts have oc- in relation to the natural environment curred. One is in the Forest region may not always be known to or re- around Beyla, where Fulani herd- spected by pastoralists who are pre- ers move with their zebu cattle from dominantly Muslim, for example. The Mali, often with the intention of per- role of the judiciary and local admin- manent relocation. The farmers in the istration in managing farmer-herder forest zone are of different ethnicities relations may also be contentious and view Fulani pastoralists as non- in circumstances where community autochthonous without land rights. trust in the state is limited. Where provisions for transhumance are absent or if routes are blocked, In the area between Boffa and Boké, the destruction of crops by cattle can near the Atlantic coast, there was easily occur. The response of farmers communal violence around 2002 in Beyla and in the forest zone has that led to loss of life in two districts: 40 often been to shoot cattle -that en Mankountan and Diogoya. These ter their fields, or to cut them with two communities are mainly Baga machetes. Pastoralists are reported by ethnicity, belonging to different to have retaliated by burning houses subgroups: Baga Sitemu and Baga and with physical violence against Monchon respectively, who speak dif- farmers. This has led to some loss of ferent dialects that local respondents life in the past and significant loss of said were hardly mutually intelligible. assets on both sides, in terms of live- The Baga Sitemu in Mankountan are stock killed and farms destroyed. It mainly Catholic, while the Baga Mon- appears such conflicts around Beyla chon are mainly Muslim. The two Baga have reduced in recent years but the communities came into conflict with issue has not been fully resolved. each other over the issue of granting access rights to their land for Fulani In general, it is in Guinée Forestière pastoralists. It appears there was con- where farmer-herder conflicts ap- flict between the Fulani and Baga at pear to be most recurrent in Guinea, Mankountan. Subsequently, the Baga with clashes reported in 2016 and Sitemu stopped the Fulani herders 2017 resulting in significant material from entering Mankountan, while the damage and human casualties.39 The Baga Monchon in Diogoya allowed disputes are not simply caused by transhumance and cattle rearing to transhumance; some of the problems continue in their area. The people of arise due to cultural differences in Diogoya claim that in reaction they resource management. The religious were attacked by the inhabitants of 39 United Nations Country Office, Conakry. June 40 Group interview with local leaders in Diogoya, 2018. 17 March 2017.
36 Mankountan, necessitating an inter- the communities themselves, either vention by the military. Nevertheless, local leaders and/or union members local respondents deny religion was from pastoralist or farming associa- a factor in the conflict. To date, the tions. As the institution of chieftaincy Baga farmers in Mankountan refuse does not formally exist in Guinea, to allow any Fulani pastoralists into having been abolished during the pe- their district with livestock (but Fulani riod of Sekou Touré, officials from the can go and stay there without cattle). local administration preside over the It is claimed the Mankountan people conflict management committees. As are split over the issue; the other side well as farmers’ and pastoralists’ as- argues that their farms have suffered, sociations, religious leaders may be as the absence of cattle has led to involved in arbitration – notably the grasses becoming overgrown, lack of local imam wherever the dispute oc- manure, and an infestation of snakes curs – to give an Islamic solution to and rats. For other farming communi- the problem. Women appear to be ties in Boké and Boffa, organised sys- under-represented. tems are in place where farmers are Pastoralist and farming unions or paid by pastoralists for access to their groupings in Guinea are their official 41 land after the harvest. This includes organisational structures. For exam- compensation, so they can rebuild ple, in Mali prefecture (part of the the ridges of rice paddies after the Futa Jallon of Guinea), there are 58 residues have been grazed by cattle. pastoralist groupings covering differ- ent villages.42 Above the village level there are sub-prefectures and these d. Conflict prevention and have coordination committees that resolution oversee the activities of groups in the villages. At the level of the pre- Conflict management committees fecture there is a pastoralist union, Local conflict management commit- and at the regional level there is a tees exist in most prefectural, sub- federation of pastoralists that brings prefectural, and village levels in ar- together unions from different pre- eas of Guinea where pastoralists and fectures. At the national level there farmers cohabit, and they are instru- is a confederation intended to rep- mental in preventing and resolving resent pastoralists’ interests at the conflicts between farmers and pasto- national level. Comparable structures 43 ralists. These committees are gener- exist for farmers, in different sectors. ally made up of representatives from 42 Fieldwork in Mali prefecture, Futa Djallon, 7 March 2017. 41 This was reported by farmers and pastoralists to be 500 CFA per month, per cow. 43 In Mali prefecture, for example, there were also
37 These groups form a line of commu- • To strengthen the provision of es- nication between communities and sential services to farmers and pasto- state officials and are used as a basis ralists, with contributions from each for conflict management committees. group, and from partners; In Koundara, meetings are convened between farmers and pastoralists • To provide continuous technical through Conflict Management Com- and financial support for women’s mittees 2-3 times a year, just before income-generating activities such as the planting season and just before dairy production cooperatives; the harvest, to coordinate their ac- • To support and strengthen inclusive tivities. Cattle are restricted to certain dialogue processes and conflict pre- areas while farming activities take vention and resolution structures in place and owners may be fined if they places where farmer-herder disputes break these rules. Crops also have to are most frequent – including in Gui- be harvested by an agreed time, after née Maritime and Guinée Forestière. which restrictions on the movement of livestock are lifted.44 In general in Guinea, when cattle encroach onto farms and destroy crops, the owners can easily be traced because the live- stock are marked.45
Recommendations • To increase support to the Ministry of Livestock and the Ministry of Agri- culture, to improve livestock produc- tion systems and protection of the ecosystem in which pastoralism takes place, including by marking tran- shumance routes; said to be 23 village groupings for bee-keepers.
44 Fieldwork in Koundara, 13-14 March 2017.
45 If the owner is from within Guinea and not on international transhumance, the markings on the cattle indicate the village of origin and the specific owner. Otherwise, transhumance documents may be demanded, according to ECOWAS regulations.
38 CHAPTER 3: THE REPUBLIC OF MALI
Government figures suggest Mali has among the largest livestock sectors in Introduction West Africa.48 The figures do not con- Continuous instability has afflicted sider the impact of war and continu- Mali since the January 2012 seces- ing insecurity in Mali or the increased sionist rebellion in the northern part pressures on rural resources and live- of the country. The number of ter- stock holdings. rorist attacks and armed groups has The main areas of conflict in north- increased and the threat has spread ern and central Mali are important from northern to central Mali and pastoral zones with large numbers spilled over into bordering regions of of livestock. The figures indicate that Burkina Faso and Niger. Pastoralists of Mali’s nine regions, Mopti has by are allegedly the main constituencies far the highest number of cattle, with of the resurgence of terrorist activity 28% of the total. There are substan- in central Mali. The feeling of aban- tial numbers of cattle in all regions donment among the Fulani people, of Mali except Kidal, which due to its and more generally the population aridity has an estimated 52% of Mali’s 46 residing in the Mopti region , has camels. Sheep and goats are present contributed to this worrisome phe- in all regions, but Gao was estimated nomenon. to have the highest number, with over 20% of sheep and over 19% of goats, followed by Mopti with 18% a. Pastoralism and Transhumance and 19% respectively.49 In the north, cattle are concentrated around the Pastoralism is a crucial economic sec- rivers, while camels and to some ex- tor in Mali. The 2015 Annual Report tent sheep and goats also survive of the Ministry of Livestock Breeding from wells and bore holes in the arid and Fisheries estimated that pasto- interior. Cattle rustling, banditry, and ralism and the related livestock trade resulting inter-communal tensions and products made up 15.2% of Ma- existed prior to 2012, and the col- li’s GDP – behind agriculture at 16.2%, lapse of state authority and the pro- 47 but ahead of gold mining at 7.2%. liferation of armed groups since then 46 The Mopti region was not involved in the peace have exacerbated these problems in talks in Algeria which led to the signing of the Peace Agreement in May and June 2015. Exchange 48 The 2015 Annual Report estimated the number with JMAC/MINUSMA May 2018. of livestock in Mali at 10.6 million heads of cattle, 15.1 million sheep, 21.1 million goats, 538,500 47 Rapport Annuel 2015. Direction Nationale des horses, 979,600 donkeys, 1.0 million camels, Productions et des Industries Animales, Ministère 82,425 pigs, and 38.6 million poultry. de l’Élevage et Pêche. Bamako, Republic of Mali. January 2016. 49 Ibid., p.25.
39 Figure 4: Map of Mali. Source: United Nations. many parts of central and northern across the country50: Mali. During the Tuareg rebellion, there was a southwards displacement • Saharan zone (desert) in the north, of pastoralists from the Tombouctou with mean annual rainfall of less than and Gao regions into the Mopti area 200mm; and the Inner Delta of the River Niger. • Sahelian zone across the centre, This has increased pressure on natu- with mean annual rainfall of 200mm ral resources in central Mali and trig- - 600mm; gered conflict with agricultural com- munities. • Sudan or northern savanna zone, with mean annual rainfall of 600mm- Pastoralism and transhumance in Mali are strongly influenced by the 1000mm; country’s topography and the distri- 50 The eco-climatic zones and rainfall data are cited in Programme d’Action National d’Adapta- bution of rainfall across its different tion au changement climatique (PANA), Ministère ecological zones. There are four main de l’Equipement et des transports – Direction Nationale de la Météorologie. Republic of Mali, ecological zones, extending laterally July 2007.
40 Figure 5: Eco-climatic zones in Mali and area of the Inner Niger Delta. Source: Programme d’Action National d’Adaptation au changement climatique (PANA), 2007, p.7. • Sudan-Guinea savanna in the south, of groundwater as well as rainfall. with mean annual rainfall above Geology is also key as this affects 1000mm. the hydrology and determines soil types, which in turn affects the dis- There are many microclimates within tribution of grasses and therefore each zone: rainfall patterns are not transhumance patterns. Pastoralists uniform across any one zone, and in Mali use and manage the natural the level of rainfall varies from year resources of this varied and unstable to year. Local climate is affected by ecological situation by being mobile topography, such as by the many pla- and flexible.51 teaux in Mali. The availability of wa- 51 Van Dijk, Han. 1999. ‘Ecological Insecurity and ter and pasture is also determined Fulbe Pastoral Society in the Niger Bend’, in V. Azarya, A. Breedveld, M. de Bruijn, H. Van Dijk by other hydrological conditions (Eds.) Pastoralists under Pressure? Fulbe Societies – the presence of rivers and depth Confronting Change in West Africa, Leiden: Brill.
41 Rivers and streams support cattle and descended from former slaves), Fu- other livestock in northern Mali, but lani and others, while agro-pastoral also agricultural activities. Access to zones in central Mali and along the pasture and water are determined Niger Bend include cultivators from not just by environmental conditions different parts of the country. In but also by political, social and demo- Mopti region, Fulani pastoralism- ex graphic factors. The specific issues of ists alongside a productive fishing access vary depending on the ecolog- economy and farming activities of ical pressure exerted by people and Dogon, Bambara, Songhai, and Fulani livestock, inter- and intra-community farmers (and others); in Segou region, relations, social hierarchies and pow- which is predominantly Bambara, er, and whether it is an agro-pastoral farming is the dominant activity and zone or a purely pastoral zone. Com- pastoralism is more constrained but petition for pasture is greatest along still an important part of the econo- the River Niger and in the Inner Niger my there. Delta. Central and southern Mali, cor- responding with the Sahel and savan- Pastoral Transhumance na zones, are the most densely popu- Mali borders seven different coun- lated parts of the country, with farm- tries and there is international tran- ing and pastoralism. The spread of shumance across all its borders, violent conflict from northern to cen- though in the vast desert areas bor- tral Mali since January 2015 therefore dering Mauritania, Algeria and north has implications for pastoralism and Niger transhumance is severely agriculture and potentially affects circumscribed. In the main pasto- a larger number of people than the ral zones of the Sahel and savanna more sparsely populated north. there are strong cross-border links There is variation in the distribution and two-way movements, in dry and of pastoralist groups in Mali between rainy seasons, with pastoralists mov- regions and eco-climatic zones. Pas- ing into Mali as well. Cross-border toralists in Timbuktu and Gao regions transhumance into northern regions consist mainly of Tuareg, Bella, Arab, of Mali has been interrupted by the and Fulani (all of whom are internally prevailing insecurity, but in south- variegated in different groups and lin- ern Mali it still occurs without much eages). Kidal region is predominantly interruption – as research findings Tuareg and Arab, while most pastoral- in Mauritania demonstrate. Internal ists in Mopti region are Fulani. Even transhumance within Mali is espe- the areas claimed as Azawad by Tuar- cially important and happens on a eg separatists are ethnically diverse, north-south axis between dry and with Songhai, Bella (‘black’ Tuaregs, rainy seasons, between highlands
42 and lowlands, and along the Niger Aamadu, with its capital at Hamdal- Bend. The Inner Niger Delta is the laye - access to burgu was regulated key dry season transhumance zone by the Islamic authorities.53 The Diina in Mali, covering an area of some encompassed the Inner Delta and the 50,000 km2, from Ke Macina circle in adjacent drylands, which form part of Segou region to Mopti and the circles the transhumance orbit of pastoral- of Niafunké, Diré, and Goundam in ists when the river floods. Nineteenth Tombouktou region. The Delta is a re- century Fulani hegemony and ‘ar- gional resource, especially during the rangements with respect to resource dry season, but transhumance there tenure, livestock movements, and has been interrupted by conflict. The economic organisation’54 was brought Delta is of vital importance for rice to an end by French colonial rule. It is cultivation, pastoralism, and fishing. still referred back to by some Fulani Transhumance movements in the In- pastoralists as a model system which ner Niger Delta have historically been regulated the use of land and water determined by the advance and re- between different user groups.55 treat of flood waters, with as many as 40% of Mali’s cattle taken there each year on transhumance, as well as b. Challenges facing pastoralists some cattle from neighbouring coun- tries.52 Of particular importance are A weak state with institutional con- the bourgoutières, the alluvial flood straints plains of the Inner Delta on which 53 See Mirjam de Bruijn and Han van Dijk (1995) a nutritious aquatic grass known as Arid Ways: Cultural Understandings of Insecurity in Fulbe Society, Central Mali, Amsterdam: Thela burgu (Echinochloa stagnina) grows. Publishers (online); pp. 52-63 are on the Diina of Large tracts of burgu emerge and be- Seeku Aamadu. A classic text on the Diina is Bâ, Amadou Hampaté and Jean Daget (1984) L'empire come accessible to livestock as the peul du Macina (1818-1853). Abidjan, les Nouvelles River Niger’s flood waters retreat at Éditions Africaines, (first edition 1962). the end of the rainy season. 54 Van Dijk, Han. 1999. ‘Ecological Insecurity and Fulbe Pastoral Society in the Niger Bend’, op. cit., Historically, social contracts and polit- p. 246. ical hierarchies determined pastoral- 55 Hamadoun Kouffa – presumed leader of Ansar ists’ access to the burgu. During the Dine Katibat Macina (see below) - referred back period of the Diina – the Islamic state to the period of the Diina and Seeku Amadou as a model for Islamic government in central Mali. also known as the Maasina Empire Some pastoralists are attracted to a message which established during the nineteenth says natural resource access (pasture and water) century (from around 1818) by Seeku should be regulated according to Islamic rules. Where the Malian state has failed to secure pasto- 52 Fieldwork interviews in Mopti region, 3-4 April ralists’ livelihoods, local history can be called upon 2017. for alternative models of governance.
43 Investment in pastoralism and ru- drought, the number of livestock in ral areas has generally been weak in the Tombouctou region has dimin- Mali and further complicated by the ished, a situation worsened by the conflict in the central and northern lack of education and professional regions. Farming and pastoralist com- training for nomads (whether men munities are affected, with the im- or women) and limited state support pacts of this insecurity cutting across for pastoralism. Consequently, a large gender lines. According to Mali’s pas- number of pastoralists has left the toral code, the authorities are meant Tombouctou region (70% according to have a role in managing natural to informal estimates).56 resources to prevent competition and conflict. Yet, efforts seem to have In the Inner Niger Delta the system been lacking in this area. There is lim- regulating access toburgu has broken ited provision of basic infrastructure down or traditional authorities re- and services to rural areas, including strict such access. There is currently the livestock sector, limited technical acute competition between groups expertise available and few policy in- of pastoralists and between pastoral- terventions promoted. Corruption is ists, rice farmers and fishermen. As also perceived to be part of the prob- the conditions for pastoralism have lem with negative impacts on both deteriorated in surrounding regions farmers and pastoralists. (on the plateaux and in drylands of Reduced access to pasture and water the Seeno, Gurma, and Mema) more pastoralists now move to the Inner Many pastoralists report difficulties Delta during the dry season than can in accessing pasture and water in the support them.57 As the demands on regions of Mopti and Tombouctou, natural resources have increased, in addition to the blockage of tran- available pasture has decreased and shumance routes by farmers. In the conflicts over land and political au- Tombouctou region, tensions often thority have ensued. arise between farmers and pastoral- ists along the River Niger. The major- The pastoral system in the Inner Del- ity of farmers are Songhai and seden- ta depends on interconnections in tary Tuareg, while the pastoralists are the region as a whole – between ar- Tuareg, Arab and Fulani. The avail- eas of central Mali that surround the ability of grazing land along rivers has Delta and the wetlands of the Delta decreased as the area under cultiva- 56 Interview with a pastoralist representative in tion has expanded, including for irri- Timbuktu, 5 April 2017. gated dry season farming. 57 See Van Dijk, Han. 1999. ‘Ecological Insecurity and Fulbe Pastoral Society in the Niger Bend’, op. It is perceived that since the 1984 cit.
44 itself.58 Access to pasture and water 1970s and 1980s, underpinned Tu- in all these areas is now constrained: areg rebellions in Mali from 1990 and due to a reduction in the land area Niger from 1992. that the river floods, increased rice cultivation, political and economic The foundations for the rebellions of restrictions on pastoralists including the 1990s and the renewed rebellions from 2012 were laid by the teshu- privatisation ofbourgouti ères, and in- mara, a movement of unemployed creased competition among pastoral- intellectuals (ishumar) many of ists (the majority of whom are Fulani) whom had been affected by drought for remaining pasture. Many pasto- and became urban migrants in the ralists in central Mali are reported to Maghreb.59 They sought revolutionary have lost their herds, or at least some alternatives (through an independent of their livestock, as a result of these Tuareg nation state to be called Aza- adverse conditions. This has contrib- wad) from the traditional pastoral life uted to the spread of violent conflict that had to a large extent collapsed. into central Mali. Some have left pas- Especially among the small group of toralism and others see no future in contemporaneous Western-educated pastoralism. Tuareg intellectuals, the droughts led to a rethinking of pastoral life. Many reached the conclusion that a pasto- c. Security challenges and the ral existence had no future.60 causes and drivers of conflict From 2012 up to the present there Rebellion, terrorism have been different groups and - fac tions of rebels in northern Mali,- af Pastoral livelihoods in Mali have be- fecting pastoralism and patterns of come precarious and insecure for po- security in the region.61 Throughout litical, demographic, and ecological the conflict, pastoralists themselves reasons. This applies to all the pas- have had shifting alliances. Much of toralist groups (including Fulani, Tu- the revenue of terrorist groups and areg and Arab), particularly in central 59 One of the ishumar was Iyad Ag Ghali, who later and northern Mali which are the ar- became an Islamist and then leader of Ansar Dine. eas most affected by armed conflict. 60 Lecocq, Baz. 2004. ‘Unemployed Intellectuals in Socio-political and economic trans- the Sahara: The Teshumara Nationalist Movement formations in Tuareg society brought and the Revolutions in Tuareg Society’,Internatio - about by the two droughts of the nal Review of Social History, 49: 87-109. p. 94. 58 The most detailed study of pastoralism in this 61 An important overview of the different armed area is: de Bruijn, Mirjam, and van Dijk, Han. 1995. groups is given by Ibrahim Maiga (June 2016). Arid Ways: Cultural Understandings of Insecurity Armed Groups in Mali: Beyond the Labels. West in Fulbe Society, Central Mali. Amsterdam: Thela Africa Report, Issue 17, Institute of Security Studies Publishers (openly accessible online). (ISS), Dakar (Online).
45 of some of the armed groups comes then either demobilised or joined An- from smuggling across the Sahara. sar Dine or other armed groups. With These networks compete against the formation of Ansar Dine’s Katibat each other to control smuggling Macina, some former MUJAO fighters routes, or otherwise have defined joined (MUJAO had recruited among routes where they control the illicit the Fulani). Many combatants joined traffic.62 In this context, pastoralists for reasons of self-defence – in the have formed alliances or cooperated case of MUJAO, against the Tuareg- with those groups controlling the ar- dominated National Movement for eas they reside in or pass through on the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), transhumance. who were raiding Fulani cattle and looting from the local population in In parts of central Mali, Ansar Dine areas they captured in 2012. One of Katiba Macina (or Katibat Macina, the the motivations for pastoralists to join Macina Battalions), a group preach- or cooperate with the Katibat Mac- ing violent jihad, has gained followers ina is to protect their cattle, due to mainly among the Fulani from Mopti threats from banditry and communal region and to a lesser extent Segou violence.65 But this rebellion against and Koulikoro regions. (The Katibat the state goes beyond the immedi- Macina was declared in a video in ate insecurity and includes a struggle, May 2016 as the Macina extension of according to them, to change a situa- Ansar Dine).63 The reasons for joining tion where pastoralists feel they have the movement are diverse and have been undermined by local power dy- been well investigated. 64 Some Fu- namics and state neglect. lani had participated as combatants Banditry, cattle rustling in The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), but Banditry and cattle rustling are a 62 The smuggling draws on a longer history of problem in parts of central and north- Saharan trade networks. See Scheele, Judith (2012) ern Mali. The terrorist groups, how- Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara: Regional Connectivity in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: ever, were rarely accused of stealing Cambridge University Press. cattle or other livestock. In some cas-
63 Thiam, Adam (March 2017), Centre du Mali: es, they actively pursued the bandits Enjeux Et Dangers D’Une Crise Négligée, Bamako: and recovered livestock for pastoral- Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue; ICG (July 2016), ists.66 Cattle rustlers in Mopti region Central Mali…op. cit. 65 See Théroux-Bénoni, Lori-Anne, and William 64 See Théroux-Bénoni, Lori-Anne, and William Assanvo. 2016 (August). Mali’s Young Jihadists, op. Assanvo. 2016 (August). Mali’s Young Jihadists: cit. p. 4 and p. 7 (footnote 13). This was also stated Fuelled by Faith or Circumstance? Policy Brief, during our fieldwork in Mopti and Bamako, March- Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), Dakar; and April 2017. Thiam, Adam (March 2017), Centre du Mali: Enjeux Et Dangers... op. cit. 66 Interviews in Mopti, 4 April 2017.
46 are called Ntéréré; they are mainly areas where the state was already Fulani and raid the cattle of other Fu- weak. lani pastoralists. Some Ntéréré were recruited into armed groups and pos- In the past, however, Fulani, Bam- sibly terrorist groups in the region, bara, and Dogon communities had a but former Ntéréré have also had a good relationship. Inter-ethnic vio- role in protecting Fulani camps during lence between Fulani-Bambara and communal violence with Dogon and Fulani-Dogon was not on a large Bambara militias (in the form of do- scale prior to the spread of the war to Douentza circle in 2012. Trust that zos, traditional hunting fraternities).67 With armed conflict in central and previously existed between commu- northern Mali, rural banditry ap- nities have been undermined. With peared to be more closely linked to the withdrawal of the state from the proliferation of different non- many areas, communities set up self- state armed groups than to terrorist defence militias, generally along eth- Dozo groups specifically. nic lines. hunters have acted as a militia to protect the Bambara and Communal violence and farmer-herd- Dogon against armed bandits and ter- er conflicts rorists, but they also stand accused of attacking Fulani civilians. Inevita- Attacks by terrorist groups in central bly this communal violence has also Mali, targeting state officials and- re made farmer-herder relations more ligious and civilian opponents, has conflictual and difficult to manage. In led to an increase in inter-communal many cases they are directly related violence. These deadly conflicts are to land issues and the management of relatively localised and run along eth- rural resources. An important devel- nic lines, mainly between Fulani and opment, however, as reported by the Bambara and Fulani and Dogon. The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, general pattern is of Bambara and is the signing on 28 August 2018 of Dogon militias launching retaliatory an intercommunal peace agreement attacks against Fulani pastoralist com- between Fulani and Dogon commu- munities in response to the wave of nities from the area (‘circle’) of Koro attacks on local authorities by Katiba in Sevare, in the region of Mopti. The Macina followers, most of whom are accord was signed by 30 Dogon and Fulani. Terrorist attacks led to a- re Fulani village leaders from the mu- treat of state authority from parts of nicipalities of the area affected by the central Mali (Mopti region being the conflict.68 worst affected), notably from rural 68 https://www.hdcentre.org/fr/updates/fulani- 67 International Crisis Group (July 2016), Central and-dogon-communities-from-koro-sign-a-peace- Mali: An Uprising in the Making? Africa Report no. agreement-in-the-mopti-region-of-mali 238.
47 • To address the root causes of the recruitment of pastoralists into d. Conflict prevention and insurgent groups, including cross- resolution border dynamics of this phenomenon; Given the magnitude of threats fac- • To double efforts to support and ing the Malian state, particularly in preserve local conflict resolution the central and northern regions, mechanisms and promote dialogue the Malian authorities are severely between those groups most affected constrained in their ability to ad- by conflict, including farmers and dress growing pastoralism-related herders; challenges. Yet, an essential part of restoring state authority on the Ma- • The conflicts in Mali have gender- lian territory involves addressing specific impacts, therefore gender- the grievances of communities that responsive policy interventions in have taken up arms. Local authorities the livestock and farming sectors are need to rebuild their legitimacy and needed for conflict prevention and restore a social contract with alien- resolution processes to be effective ated sections of the population if the and to preserve human rights; multitude of conflicts are to - bere solved. This will require dialogue and • To undertake concrete actions to targeted development interventions, prevent and address human rights not least in pastoral and farming com- abuses and violations relating to munities. conflicts between farmers and herders and other groups; to strengthen efforts to identify and hold accountable perpetrators of Recommendations such crimes. • To increase investments in both the agricultural and livestock sectors in Mali to support the livelihoods of local populations – and boost the national economy; • To restore state authority and strengthen the provision of basic infrastructure and social services to rural areas, addressing long-term grievances of communities that have taken up arms;
48 CHAPTER 4: THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA
in their cross-border transhumance into Mali, are affected by banditry. Introduction Mauritania’s pastoral code regulates Pastoralism is a fundamental aspect pastoral activities and conflict- pre of life and culture in Mauritania, both vention between farmers and pasto- historically and in the present day. ralists and between different groups The rearing of domestic livestock of pastoralists. on a sedentary basis or larger herds through transhumance is practised by a majority of the rural population. Ag- a. Pastoralism and Transhumance in riculture accounts for about a quarter Mauritania of the Mauritanian economy, and about 70% of this involves livestock Pastoralism in Mauritania is deter- rearing of one type or another. 69 mined by rainfall patterns and the dis- tribution of water and pasture, which Presently, Mauritania generally has varies seasonally and between differ- low levels of violent conflict between ent regions of the country. The aridity farmers and herders and between increases moving northwards where, pastoralists. At times tensions arise except in scattered oases, agriculture due to competition for pasture and is impossible; the only livestock that water, blockage of transhumance survive in the desert are camels and, routes, and the destruction of crops in some areas, a few domestic sheep by livestock. There are problems with and goats. The main pastoral zone in natural resource management and Mauritania, with the highest number the allocation of space for pastoral- of livestock, is in the south.70 The riv- ists and farmers in the agro-pastoral erine areas are especially important, zone. In areas too arid for agriculture, but this is an agro-pastoral zone and challenges involve how to manage that is where conflicts between farm- rangeland and relationships between ers and pastoralists can arise. Mauri- pastoralist groups. tania’s long southern border is also its While terrorism has not been a regu- most important transhumance zone, lar threat to them, some pastoralists, with nomadic groups moving their cattle, sheep, goats and camels- be 69 Fieldwork for this study was carried out both in northern and southern Mauritania, with more 70 FAOSTAT imputes that in 2016 there were 18.4 focus on the south, as that is where the majority of million cattle, 9.6 million sheep, 6.2 million goats, pastoralists and livestock are, including large herds and 1.5 million camels in Mauritania. Data retrie- of cattle, which cannot survive further north due to ved from http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL, the greater aridity. 22 March 2018.
49 tween Mauritania, Senegal and Mali, The Senegal valley, including the Futa on a seasonal basis. The Mauritania- Toro, is the most fertile part of Mau- Senegal border is marked by the Sen- ritania and is a key water and agro- egal River (the right bank belongs to pastoral resource for both Mauritania Mauritania, the left bank to Senegal). and Senegal. Meanwhile the eastern On the Mauritanian side, the Senegal half of Mauritania’s southern frontier, River flows approximately 600 kilo- bordering Mali and stretching across metres from Gouray (near Sélibabi, Assaba, Hodh El-Gharbi, and Hodh Guidimaka Region), to Rosso and El-Chargui regions, has less water beyond in Trarza Region, near the At- but fewer farms. This is a key pasto- lantic coast (across the border from ral zone, with a large number of live- Saint Louis, Senegal). stock and predominantly Moor pas-
Figure 6: Map of Mauritania. Source: https://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/af- rica/mauritania_rel95.jpg.
50 toralists. They have permanent set- the river are generally agro-pastoral- tlements on the Mauritanian side of ists but moving northwards or east the border but the herders are highly away from the agricultural areas they mobile, moving on cross-border tran- are only concentrated on pastoralism, shumance into the Kayes, Koulikoro, often with large herds. and Segou regions of Mali during the The rearing of camels and goats is dry season and then returning north- important for people in Mauritania’s wards with the rains. desert areas, but if disputes arise it All the large towns in southern Mau- is between pastoralists themselves, ritania are mixed in population. competing for available water or pas- Smaller dispersed villages, hamlets ture. Central and northern Maurita- and pastoralist camps are often more nia are well beyond the limit of agri- homogenous. The majority of pasto- culture, except in oases where irrigat- ralists in Mauritania are Moor (white ed farming in palmeries is a valuable and black) and Haalpulaar (also re- economic activity. Some camels are ferred to as Peul or Fulani/Fulbe).71 owned by pastoralists, but the larger The Haalpulaaren are concentrated in herds usually belong to elites living the Futa Toro – where they tend to be in town (usually white Moors). Herd- sedentary or semi-sedentary; while ers are then employed to look after the Mbororo or nomadic Fulbe are them. Their transhumance tracks can also present further east along the range from southern Mauritania all southern border with Mali. the way across long desert routes to Tiris Zemmour region, near the Alge- Another major group in the Senegal rian border in the north. Sometimes valley is the Soninké, particularly good pasture for camels is also found around Sélibabi, and they are predom- around Zouérat (near the border with inantly farmers. There are also Wolof Western Sahara, see map). The mo- farmers with their origins in Senegal. bility of transhumant pastoralists only The Haalpulaar and Moors living near has the potential to trigger conflict in 71 Leservoisier (2012: 159) notes that Haalpulaa- agro-pastoral zones where there are ren is the self-ascribed name of the Fulbe in this farming activities. Till now, no large- region. It means “Pulaar-speakers”. See Leservoi- sier, Olivier (2012), ‘Ethnicity and Interdependence: scale violent conflicts between farm- Moors and Haalpulaaren in the Senegal Valley’, ers and herders were reported in in James McDougall and Judith Scheele (eds.), Saharan Frontiers: Space and Mobility in Northwest Mauritania, but smaller disputes oc- Africa. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana cur on a regular basis. University Press. Pulaar exhibits marked dialectical differences to the Fulfulde spoken further east: Pastoralism and the livestock trade they are essentially variants of the same language, with the same linguistic roots, but now they are between Mauritania, Mali and Sen- hardly mutually intelligible. egal are vital economic activities, in
51 which mobility is fundamental. It was throughout the dry season. And in ar- claimed that 400,000 sheep are sent eas where there is good pasture (from annually from Kiffa to Senegal for the grasses and trees) there tends to be Tabaski festival (Eid el-Adha or ‘Festi- more pressure from large numbers val of Sacrifice’).72 There is more tran- of livestock. Shortage of pasture (or shumance of pastoralists from Mau- water) necessitates transhumance, ritania to Senegal than the other way but the conditions could be improved around.73 if animal feed distribution was better organised, especially in the late dry season. b. Challenges facing pastoralists Challenges relating to cross-border Water scarcity transhumance
Access to water is a challenge for pas- Mauritania-Mali toralists throughout Mauritania, due There is a high level of pastoral mo- to the country’s low rainfall. This can bility across Mauritania’s southern lead to competition around water border with Mali. There is also trade points (wells or bore holes). Water across the border. The movement points can be community run or pri- is two-way but cross-border tran- vately owned and access usually has shumance of pastoralists based in to be paid for. A general demand in Mauritania outpaces that of Malians Mauritania is for more wells and bore moving north. As compared to Mau- holes to be constructed in villages ritania, pasture and water are more and along transhumance routes. The accessible further south in Mali. bore holes work well with solar pan- When the rains come in Mauritania, els, and some have already been built pastoralists spend the grazing period in this way, variously funded via DFID there; conversely, during the dry sea- and World Bank programmes, for ex- son, they walk with their livestock to ample. Water retention and storage Mali. could also be improved. Until 2016, pastoralists from Mauri- Shortages of pasture and animal feed tania could graze their animals freely in the dry season in Mali; since then, some limits seem Mauritania is a highly arid country to have been placed on their move- where pasture does not tend to last ments. Today, Mauritanian pastoral- 72 Interview with GNAP representative in Kiffa, 19 ists herd alongside Malian pastoral- February 2017. ists (most of whom are Fulani, where-
73 Interview at the Ministry of Livestock, Kaédi, as a majority of the Mauritanians on Gorgol Region, 14 February 2017. the same transhumance route are
52 Moor, with some Fulani). They ap- guards impose heavy fines on them pear to have a reciprocal relationship: for using trees to feed their livestock. when Malian pastoralists go on tran- Some Mauritanian pastoralists re- shumance to Mauritania at the end of portedly cut down whole trees or up- the dry season, they migrate together rooted them, triggering tensions with with the Mauritanians, who then look forest guards. after them on the other side of the The relationship between forest border. There is inter-marriage be- guards and pastoralists seems to be tween Fulani communities on each difficult in other parts of Mali as well. side of the border.74 Significantly, non-state armed groups There is no state support for security (assumed to be linked to the Katibat cooperation between pastoralists on Macina) operating in Mopti and Segou the Malian and Mauritanian sides regions of central Mali have reported- of the border, so pastoralists rely on ly assassinated several forest guards, their vigilante groups for surveillance singling them out as targets along and to prevent theft and other crimes with the local administration and se- around the livestock trade. Overall, curity agencies, such as the police and the Malians and Mauritanians seem army. No such violent incidents have to have a good relationship. Yet, pas- been recorded in Kayes and Koulikoro toral mobility between Mauritania regions, which to date have been less and Mali presents particular challeng- affected by the insurgencies in cen- es for farmers in the Kayes and Kou- tral and northern Mali.76 Incidents of likoro regions of Mali. Problems arise cattle theft are also reportedly rare in when pastoralists move their herds Kayes and Koulikoro, unlike in Senegal southwards in the dry season be- where cattle theft is said to be more fore the crops have been harvested. common. For pastoralists crossing This can cause substantial damage to Mauritania’s southern border with farmland and trigger local conflicts.75 Mali from Hodh El-Gharbi, they seem not to be affected by the conflict in Pastoralists and forest guards in Mali northern Mali or Mopti and Segou in central Mali. Mauritanians in Hodh El-Gharbi (mainly Moor and Haalpulaar’en Mauritania-Senegal (Fulani) pastoralists) who cross into Mali have reported that Malian forest Transhumance between Mauritania and Senegal occurs on a large scale 74 This was evident in the village of Goupou Modi, a Fulani village 9km from Sélibabi. 15 February 76 The town of Nara, Koulikoro region, is an excep- 2017. tion, as the KatibatMacina has attacked Malian security forces there (as in June 2016). However, 75 Conversation with livestock specialists at the the generalised insecurity in Mopti has not reached PRAPS office in Bamako, 23 March 2017. Koulikoro.
53 but is seasonal, Pastoralists need to across the eastern border with the obtain transhumance permits certify- Tombouctou region of Mali is cur- ing that their livestock is vaccinated, tailed, but this hardly affects pasto- pay customs duty on their livestock ralism as the main pastoral zone is to when they cross the border, and de- the south. clare their length of stay in Senegal. Fulani pastoralists in Senegal tend to Mauritania’s eastern border with stay in villages at night, not with their Mali is mainly desert, with few pas- livestock in the bush. Herders cross- toralists. It is a militarised zone and ing from Mauritania are made to do according to the former governor of the same, which is facilitated by so- Hodh El Charghi77, pastoralists are for- cial connections between families bidden from coming close to it. Large and communities of pastoralists from stretches of the border between each side of the border and contact Hodh El-Chargui and the Timbuktu with the local administration in Sen- region of Mali are not navigable by egal. They bring their livestock to vehicle due to soft sand and rolling fields near the villages to watch over dunes, but there are entry points them there. There is no reported used by smugglers. As the border is blockage of transhumance routes be- not a large transhumance zone, its tween Mauritania and Senegal. Wa- official closure has not seriously- af ter scarcity is the main challenge, and fected pastoralism in either Maurita- sometimes herders are prevented nia or Mali. from accessing privately owned bore The long borders between Maurita- holes (often owned by other pastoral- nia and Mali have received the most ists). international concern, with fears that terrorist groups from Mali could pen- etrate into Mauritania. The main risk c. Security challenges and the in southern Mauritania is from the causes and drivers of conflicts area around the Wagadou forest in Terrorism Mali and around Nampala, which are known militant hotspots bordering With terrorist groups operating in south-east Hodh El-Chargui region. Mali, there is concern that they could The M’Bera refugee camp near Bassik- cross the border either to launch at- ounou, also south-east Mauritania, is tacks or to use Mauritania as a rear close to volatile areas of Segou and base. The Mauritanian security forces Timbuktu regions in Mali. There are are mobilised in strategic border ar- an estimated 50,000 refugees in the eas to try and prevent this, and secu- 77 Who during fieldwork for this study in February rity along the roads is tight. Mobility 2017 was governor of AdrarRegion.
54 camp, mainly from Timbuktu region, herders and cultivators mainly occur assisted by UNHCR. The Malian refu- in the rainy season. These conflicts gees move in and out of the camp but can be violent and people are some- it remains open, as conditions for the times injured, but no fatalities were refugees in their places of origin are reported.79 Disputes are generally set- still insecure. Presently, disputes over tled by community leaders (generally water and grazing land are at a low older men); only for serious cases are level between the refugees and host local authorities and the gendarmerie communities. brought in. According to the Ministry of Livestock in Brakna, pastoralists Armed robbery face serious pressures in the river- A main security concern appears to be ine areas. Access to water can be a problem because the river banks are the frequent armed robbery around heavily cultivated, blocking routes for the town of Nara, in the Koulikoro livestock, and pasture land along the region of Mali.78Timbedra is 200 km river is often not respected. That is a from Nara, which is a major regional trigger for conflict, as it means- cat livestock market attracting traders tle are more likely to encroach onto from different ECOWAS countries (it is farms. The Haalpulaar (Peul/Fulani) estimated a minimum of 10,000 cattle were reportedly the majority in Brak- and 100,000 small ruminants are sold na, followed by the Moors. Disputes at Nara every week). The robbers are can take an inter-ethnic dimension reportedly armed with Kalashnikovs or be within the same group that is and attack traders on the roads to or engaged in both farming and pasto- from Nara market, every 2-4 weeks. It ralism. is thought those involved are Moors, from both sides of the border. The Prominent pastoralists in Kaédi, capi- economy of Timbedra and its esti- tal of the Gorgol region, report that if mated 80,000 inhabitants depend on there is drought or low rainfall in the pastoralism and the livestock trade. north, large numbers of animals come down, and if the crops have not yet Farmer-herder relations been harvested there can be damage The main area in Mauritania where to farms.80 This is inter-regional tran- tensions between farmers and herd- shumance and the southward move- ers arise is in the Senegal Valley. It ment can include camel herders from was reported in Aleg, at the Ministry the Adrar region or Tagant, as well as of Livestock in the Regional Delega- cattle from adjoining regions. It can tion of Brakna, that conflicts between 79 Fieldwork interviews in Aleg, 14 February 2017. 78 This problem was discussed during research at 80 Interview with Ba AlhassanAmadou and Bachir- Timbedra cattle market in Hodh El-Chargui. Bellal Diallo, Kaédi, 14 February 2017.
55 be a source of conflict if such tran- shumance is not coordinated with farmers or local authorities, as the vil- d. Conflict prevention and resolution lage authorities would be expected to determine a corridor for the livestock Some of the reasons given for the to use. In cases of conflict, traditional peaceful resolution of conflicts be- leaders and local authorities inter- tween farmers and pastoralists in vene. Mauritania include: i) agro-pastoral- ism, in which farmers and pastoralists According to officials at the Ministry do not necessarily pursue exclusive of Livestock, pastoralists do not usu- livelihoods – many people farm and ally let their cattle or other livestock have livestock, creating interconnec- wander onto farms and violent con- tions; ii) common religious affiliation, flicts between farmers and pastoral- as most of the population is Muslim; ists are rare. One of the reasons given iii) inter-marriage between groups. was the prevalence of agro-pastoral- There were no reported problems ism, where much of the local popu- of transhumance routes between lation is involved in both activities Mauritania and Mali being blocked, (farming and rearing livestock). Farm- as these are rangelands. Blockage of ing communities in Gorgol include transhumance routes occurs prima- Wolof, Soninké, Moor, and Haal- rily in agro-pastoral zones and this pulaar, while pastoralism is mainly was reported to be a problem in the practised by Moors and Haalpulaar. Senegal valley. These are not homogenous groups – they are internally variegated by line- Outside the agro-pastoral zone, the age, social background, and in some competition is not between farmers cases inter-marriage – but latent and herders, but between pastoralists inter-ethnic tensions are also weak- themselves. There is a great deal of ened by overlaps in economic activi- cooperation and not always competi- ties. This is particularly the case with tion, but in some circumstances pres- sedentarised Haalpulaar and Moor sure on pasture and water creates agro-pastoralists and potentially less tension between user groups over ac- so with Soninké and Wolof, who tend cess rights. This is an issue in different to farm more than herd. But Pulaar- pastoral zones – among Moor and Fu- speakers reportedly form a substan- lani cattle herders in southern Mauri- tial majority in Gorgol and they tend tania and Moor camel herders further to be agro-pastoralists. north. However, there are established traditions and practises of natural -re source management, many of which
56 have been enshrined in Mauritania’s timing of transhumance and, where Pastoral Code. necessary, an official identification of the transhumance routes – to prevent The Pastoral Code (July 2000) in Mau- damage to farmers’ crops and to ritania is an important tool for con- address the needs of pastoralists; flict prevention and natural resource management. In agro-pastoral zones • To construct more water points (notably the Senegal River valley) the along transhumance routes, both in challenge is to manage the relation- Mauritania and in Mali and northern ship between mobile pastoralists and Senegal. As well as providing water sedentary farmers. In parts of the wherever possible in areas of scarcity, country that are beyond the limit of the sustainable consumption of water agriculture (about 400mm isohyets should also be encouraged; for rain fed crops) the challenge is to effectively manage the rangeland • To establish or strengthen existing environment and the use of avail- operations of customary courts able water and pasture among pas- and reinforce traditional and toralists themselves. The relationship administrative mechanisms for non- between nomadic pastoralist groups violent dispute resolution; themselves and between pastoralists • To enforce Mauritania’s Pastoral and farmers is addressed in the Pas- Code and raise awareness within civil toral Code, prioritising local conflict society, at the grassroots, and among prevention and management as the farmers and herders on their rights first stage, before involving state au- and duties in relation to the pastoral thorities or courts.81 code.
Recommendations • To establish permanent cross border commissions between Mauritania and Senegal, and Mauritania and Mali, to help co-ordinate and facilitate cross-border transhumance. Inter- state cooperation could focus on issues such as rights of passage, the
81 Wabnitz, Hans-Werner (2009) “Return to the Sources: Revival of Traditional Nomads’ Rights to Common Property Resources in the Code Pastoral of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania”, Natural Resources Journal, 49: 191-218.
57 CHAPTER 5: THE REPUBLIC OF NIGER
Introduction
Pastoralism forms an essential part of lent in some parts of the country. Ni- ger, while relatively politically stable, Niger’s economy and is adapted to the is surrounded by countries with on- different climatic and ecological con- going insurgencies or other forms of ditions in the country, most of which insecurity (Nigeria, Mali, Chad, Libya, falls within the Sahara and Sahel. Ni- Burkina Faso, and Benin). In analysing ger faces difficult environmental chal- pastoralism and security in Niger, it is lenges that affect pastoralists. These therefore necessary to look closely at challenges are in turn compounded the cross-border impacts of wider re- by the civil insecurity that is preva- gional security challenges.
Figure 7: Map of Niger. Source: United Nations.
58 4. In part of south-west of Niger, the ecology marks an intersection be- a. Pastoralism and Transhumance tween Sahel and savanna environ- Pastoral systems in Niger are deter- ments and accommodates both farm- mined by the country’s climate and ers and pastoralists. ecology, and by political factors, in- Pastoralists in Niger are mobile, mov- cluding patterns of insecurity. There ing their herds on a seasonal basis in are four broad eco-climatic zones in search of available pasture and wa- Niger that heavily influence the pat- ter. There is internal transhumance tern of pastoral production (see Fig- within Niger and cross-border tran- ure 8 below):82 shumance into neighbouring coun- tries: Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali 1. The largest and most sparsely popu- to the west, Nigeria to the south, and lated is the Saharan zone, where pas- northern Cameroon and Chad to the toralism exists at oases and around east. wells, and is mostly limited to camels and some goats; The main ethno-linguistic groups as- sociated with pastoralism in Niger are 2. The second eco-climatic zone is the Fulani, Tuareg, Arab, Tubu (Teda), Sahelo-Saharan, which is also arid but and Buduma (Yedina). There are clan on average receives slightly more rain- differences within each group, and fall and can therefore support more land tenure and access to pasture pastoralists. Limited rainfall means vary between them and can be locally this zone is largely above the limit of specific, defined by family, lineage agriculture, except where there are and history rather than ethnicity per ground water sources, such as around se. There are differences in the dis- Lake Chad in the south-east. tribution and specialisation of pasto- ral groups, as well as some overlaps. 3. Third is the Sahelian zone, much of Fulani and Tuareg communities have which is agro-pastoral, with a pres- the widest distribution in Niger; the ence of farmers and pastoralists. Tubu are more limited to desert areas There are indications that in some ar- bordering Chad and Libya, while the eas farmers have moved northwards, Buduma are concentrated in the Lake to cultivate areas for rainfed agricul- Chad area. There is interaction -be ture that some years ago were the tween groups, and for example mixed preserve of pastoralists. Fulani and Tuareg villages in central 82 Ministère de l‘Élevage, Direction des Statis- Niger. Traditionally, Tuareg and Tubu tiques, SIM Bétail. Atlas Sur L’élevage au Niger. Tome 1: L‘Élevage au Niger, une richesse sans fin. are more specialised in camels and 2014. occupy more arid areas, while the
59 Figure 8: The main eco-climatic zones in Niger. Source: Ministère de l‘Élevage, Niamey, 2014. various Fulani clans own most of the Niger and general problems affecting cattle stock and are in more semi-arid pastoral livelihoods in the country as areas. There is however considerable a whole. contact and they interact and some- Loss of pasture and blockage of tran- times compete and fight for common shumance routes resources. One of the main difficulties pasto- ralists report in Niger is insufficient b. Challenges facing pastoralists pasture, especially during the long dry season. This is possibly linked to Pastoral livelihoods in Niger have diminishing rainfall – with reportedly become insecure due to adverse po- shorter rainy seasons – and increased litical, economic and ecological con- population pressure. The pressure ditions, and due to physical insecu- on pasture comes from pastoralists rity caused by insurgency, inter-group themselves and from farmers. There conflict, and banditry. There are- re has been some movement of pasto- gionally specific forms of insecurity in ralists away from arid areas where
60 pasture is lacking, to parts of the Sa- eas before the harvest. This can lead helian zone where at least some pas- to the destruction of crops if tran- ture is available. This has increased shumance routes and grazing land the burden on pastoralist communi- are inadequate. ties in southern Niger, in what are al- ready strained ecological conditions. Depletion of livestock Where there is land with high poten- Some pastoralists in Tillaberi region tial for farming, migrant farmers have and around Dakoro in Maradi region also moved in and increased the area report that they have fewer cattle of land under cultivation, competing now than a decade ago because of with pastoralists and agro-pastoral- insufficient pasture, caused by the ists. expansion of agriculture, overgrazing, Another trend in the pastoral zone has and shorter rainy seasons. In most of been for farmers (men and women) Niger there is no longer enough pas- to collect and store forage (including ture to sustain the livestock, so dur- grasses), reducing what is available ing the dry season part of the herds for resident and transhumant herd- must either be taken out of the coun- ers during the dry season. They may try on transhumance or they must be then sell such fodder to pastoral- given animal feed. Pastoralists often ists, whereas previously pastoralists have to sell some of their livestock to would graze their animals on it direct- buy animal feed, gradually depleting ly. Competition among pastoralists their wealth. There are concerns over and between pastoralists and farmers whether pastoralism could be sus- around water sources is also an issue tained for the next generation. in some areas. Insufficient animal feed in the dry In Niger, pressure on pasture is a more season serious concern than the blockage of transhumance routes. In some areas, As pasture land is not well protected the transhumance routes are report- and is affected by erratic rainfall, ani- edly kept open, but in other areas an- mal feed is necessary to sustain the imal grazing areas and transhumant pastoral economy, especially in the routes are reportedly blocked or nar- late dry season. There is, however, rowed by farms. This constitutes a a large discrepancy between supply source of farmer-herder conflicts in and demand. The shortage of animal agro-pastoral areas. The other chal- feed also pushes the price up above lenge is the timing of transhumance: the government subsidised rate. The if there is scarcity of pasture further market is taken over by middle men north, pastoralists will sometimes in many cases, who sell subsidised move southwards into agricultural ar- feed to pastoralists at a profit.
61 Access to education and health Insurgency and cross-border attacks services In most regions of Niger violent con- With ecological, political, and - de flict is at a low level, but since the mographic constraints on pastoral- overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011 and the ists and the livestock sector in Niger, ensuing war and civil insecurity, the some of the younger generation spill-over effects of the conflict in Lib- seeking opportunities outside pasto- ya, and of terrorism in Mali and Nige- ralism. Yet one challenge in the rural ria, are evident along Niger’s borders. areas of Niger is the lack of educa- tional, health and other services. This Militant groups operating in border is also a gender issue, as currently areas of Niger tend to emanate from many women from pastoralist fami- neighbouring countries, but they lies in Niger migrate to towns and draw on some local support. There cities in other West African countries are currently two main zones of in- during the long dry season, to supple- surgent violence affecting pastoralists ment household incomes. Elders in in Niger. The first zone spans northern their communities complain that the Tillaberi and parts of western Tahoua women usually return with very few region in south-west Niger, where savings, even after six months away. there have been periodic cross-bor- Some can be seen begging in Niamey der attacks and raids from Gao- re and other towns. gion in Mali. This zone includes part of the Liptako-Gourma area (broadly, where the borders of Niger, Mali, and c. Security challenges and the Burkina Faso meet) and extends to ar- causes and drivers of conflict eas of Mali and Niger to the east and north-east. The second zone affected In some parts of Niger, the pressures by insurgency is the Lake Chad Basin, on pastoral livelihoods outlined above south-east Niger, where Boko Haram are accentuated by various kinds of attacks and the military campaign to physical insecurity. The security situa- counter Boko Haram have had severe tion for pastoralists is generally better impacts on the Diffa region. in Niger than in neighbouring Nigeria, central/northern Mali, and even parts The Boko Haram insurgency has had of Burkina Faso and Benin. There are destructive impacts on many of the however zones of insecurity and lo- pastoralist communities around Lake cally specific problems that have se- Chad and south-east Diffa. The lake verely disrupted pastoral production is a vital resource for pastoralism, and uprooted people. The dynam- farming, and fishing, and the combi- ics of these particular conflicts and nation of insurgency and government threats are outlined below. measures to combat it have severely
62 compromised food security and the to the mid-1970s, when drought de- economy of the Lake Chad Basin.83 pleted pastoralists’ herds and pushed There has been large-scale displace- some to raid the cattle of their neigh- ment within and into Diffa and a ma- bours. Violent conflict between the jor humanitarian crisis that persists Daoussahak and Fulani resurfaced today. In both these zones of insecu- with the Tuareg rebellions in Mali and rity there has been a degree of local Niger from 1990, when many Daous- recruitment and collaboration with sahak joined the rebellions and again terrorist groups – out of necessity, started raiding Fulani cattle. This led opportunistically, or due to ideologi- the Fulani to form a self-defence mi- cal commitment – and some opposi- litia in 1997 to protect themselves tion. The areas of Niger affected by against Tuareg, and especially Daous- cross-border attacks and insurgency 86 have been put under a state of emer- sahak, raiders. The attacks contin- gency. In Tillaberi region, the affect- ued even after the Tuareg rebellions ed departments are Abala, Ouallam, of the early to mid-1990s in Mali Bankilaré, and Ayorou.84 The Nigerien and Niger had ended. According to military is deployed in these areas the International Institute for Secu- and a curfew and restrictions on mo- rity Studies (ISS), the fighters in “mé- bility have been imposed, including a harist” units (“nomadic brigades”) ban on motorcycles. of the Malian army deployed in the area, “often recruited from the ranks The larger-scale violence since 2012 of former rebels integrated into the has been between Daoussahak (part army following the peace accords, of Tuareg society) and Fulani com- [and] have been accused of either munities on both sides of the porous ignoring the criminal activities plagu- Mali-Niger border.85 This conflict dates ing the region, including cattle theft, 83 Attacks by Boko Haram spread from Borno and Yobe States in north-east Nigeria – where the sect munity’ within Tuareg society, specifically part of originates – across the border into Diffa in 2013, the Kel-Ataram (“people of the west”). They were then escalated in 2014-16. herdsmen for the nobility of the Iwellemmedan Tuareg and performed religious duties as a Mara- 84 Interviews in the prefecture of Tillaberi, 26 April boutic tribe. The Daoussahak have participated in 2017, and Ouallam, 27 April 2017. most of the Tuareg rebellions. See: Christiansen- Bolli, Regula (2010), A grammar of Tadaksahak, 85 The Daoussahak, or Idaksahak (their self-ascri- a northern Songhay language of Mali, doctoral the- bed name), are nomadic pastoralists living mainly sis, Leiden University Centre for Linguistics (LUCL), in the administrative circles of Menaka and nor- Leiden University. Online. thern Ansongo, Gao region of Mali. Their language is called Tadaksahak, a Songhay language that has 86 Interview with Boubacar Diallo at GAJEL offices, completely different origins to Tamasheq but which Niamey, 25 April 2017. The formation of a Fulani exhibits heavy lexical borrowings. The Daoussahak self-defence militia in March 1997 is also noted in have distinct geographical and linguistic origins ‘Liptako-Gourma: epicentre of the Sahel crisis?’ to the Kel Tamasheq, but they are regarded as a Institute for Security Studies. Peace and Security ‘distinct ethnic group and a dependent social com- Council Report, Dakar, 30 June 2017.
63 or colluding with the criminals.”87 The Boko Haram’s violence in south-east Pastoralists’ Association of North Diffa is on a larger scale to that being Tillaberi has documented many at- perpetrated by militant groups along tacks carried out by Tuareg (mainly the borders of Tillaberi and Tahoua. Daoussahak) raiders on pastoral Fu- The violence in both regions has ad- lani camps from 1990 to 2016, with versely affected pastoralists; it has their records indicating that cumula- also to some extent involved them. tively, for the period 1990-2007, the There is some level of recruitment Tuareg and the Malian security forces of Fulani pastoralists in the Liptako- killed 316 Fulani pastoralists and stole Gourma area and along the Niger- thousands of livestock.88 The attacks Mali border, whereas in the Lake Chad occurred in Gao region of Mali and as Basin the pastoral Fulani have not cross-border raids into northern Til- tended to join Boko Haram. In east- laberi region of Niger.89 A 2007 agree- ern Diffa region, certain Fulani clans ment reached to stop fighting lasted have collaborated with the insurgents only three years, until April 2010.90 It to gain access to pasture, after other is in this zone that reports are made Fulani (notably the Wodaabe) were about the recruitment of pastoral Fu- forcibly displaced by Boko Haram. lanis into terrorist groups.91 Raiding between pastoralists – re- 87 ‘Liptako-Gourma: epicentre of the Sahel crisis?’ portedly Tubu raiding camels owned Institute for Security Studies. Peace and Security by the Fulani in eastern Diffa – is also Council Report, Dakar, 30 June 2017. Online. occurring, as the Boko Haram insur- 88 ‘Bilan non-exhaustive des attaques Touaregs et gency has encouraged an illicit live- des FDS maliens sur les éleveurs Peulhs nigériens 92 de 1990 à 2007, du 21 avril 2010 au 10 aout 2016’, stock trade. Conseil des Éleveurs Nord Tillabéri. List obtained from Boubacar Diallo at GAJEL offices, Niamey, 25 Cattle rustling, banditry and conflicts April 2017. between pastoralists 89 The reality of cross-border attacks by the Daoussahaq Tuareg was confirmed by pastoralists For pastoralists in Niger, banditry and who were directly affected. For example, Hauwa livestock theft pose risks along - sec Aliou, a Bodejo (Wodaabe) woman interviewed in tions of the borders with Mali, Burki- Niamey, was from Abala (north Tillaberi) and her family had been impoverished by Daoussahaq raids na Faso, Nigeria and Chad. Moreover, in the 1990s. She was begging for alms in Niamey Fulani pastoralists in Tamou – south- with her niece. Niamey, 29 April 2017. ern Tillaberi region – which is relative- 90 Fulani representatives list the names of 13 ly peaceful, stated that banditry was people killed in a Tuareg attack on a Fulani camp in Innabaguel, Niger, on 21 April 2010. It is unclear a significant problem to them during what triggered this attack. their transhumance between Niger, Burkina Faso and Benin, more so 91 Cocks, Tim and David Lewis, ‘Why Niger and Mali’s cattle herders turned to jihad’,Reuters , 12 92 Interview with Abdou Nino, a leader of the November 2017. Accessed online, 13 November National Federation of Agro-Pastoralism in Niger, 2017. Niamey, 29 April 2017.
64 than the narrowing of transhumance Farmer-herder conflicts in Niger and routes.93 In other contexts, raiding during international transhumance occurs between pastoral groups (or between farmers and pastoralists) Violence between farmers and pasto- during armed conflicts over control ralists in Niger is relatively common, of land and water, or over local or with loss of life reported in many regional politics. As discussed above, of the clashes. The level of farmer- the Tuareg rebellions in Niger and herder violence is much lower than in Mali in the 1990s led to raids on Fulani neighbouring northern Nigeria, but it cattle. Rebellions by groups of Tubu in is still a major security concern in Ni- 96 eastern Niger also led to clashes with ger. The trigger for conflict is usually the Fulani, in Diffa region. 94 This con- the destruction of crops by livestock, flict was partially resolved through a sometimes due to cattle and small ru- peace accord, but the Boko Haram minants moving southwards on tran- insurgency precipitated renewed vio- shumance into agro-pastoral areas lence between the Tubu and Fulani. before crops have been harvested Armed groups of Tubu are reported or just after they have been planted. to have been raiding Fulani cattle and Most conflicts are seasonal in nature even to have clashed with the Fulani and therefore somewhat predict- in Kabelawa IDP camp (a UNHCR-run able. They usually stem from disputes camp in south-east Niger, near the over land rights and natural resource border with Chad).95 acces. The most common herder- farmer conflicts in Niger are between Fulani pastoralists and farmers from 93 The majority of Fulani in Tamou are agro-pasto- different ethnic backgrounds, espe- ralists, from different clans (lenyi), the Bariɓe and Soneɓe reportedly the largest. Most have cross- cially Zarma, Hausa, and Mawri. All border kinship links into neighbouring countries of them are Muslim. Serious disputes (lenyol such as Gao’oɓe and Jelgoɓe, with a strong sometimes occur within Fulani agro- presence in northern Mali and northern Burkina Faso respectively were also present). Interviews in pastoral communities in Niger as Tamou, 29 April 2017. well, between farmers and herders. 94 Interview with a leader of the National Federa- These rarely become violent but oc- tion of Agro-Pastoralism in Niger, Niamey, 29 April casionally cases have to be taken to 2017. 96 Farmer-herder conflicts have been reported as a 95 Discussions with a senior UN official who had significant issue in Niger for at least three decades. been on mission in Diffa region during a major See Gado, Boureima Alpha (2002), ‘Arbitration & Boko Haram attack on Bosso on 3 June 2016. This Resolving Tenure Conflict in Boboye, Niger’, pp. displaced an estimated 50,000 people from Bosso 157-169, in Toulin, C., P. L. Delville, & S. Traouré to Diffa town. He also reported on the Tubu-Fulani (eds.), The Dynamics of Resource Tenure in West conflict. Niamey, 21 April 2017. The information Africa. International Institute for Environment and on the Tubu raids was confirmed by pastoralist Development (IIED, London) in association with associations. James Currey publishers, Oxford.
65 the local authorities for resolution.97 mediation is often required (e.g. pas- toralist associations and/or the state authorities). Fair judicial processes d. Conflict prevention and and access to justice are other impor- resolution tant elements. Although periodic farmer-herder clashes exist – some of them very Recommendations violent – most disputes of this type in Niger are resolved peacefully through • To secure the remaining pasture mediation between the communities land and transhumance routes, and involved. There are also land commis- secure pastoralists’ tenure rights; sions, which intervene where there are disputes to establish who owns a • To review and support the commit- certain land and for natural resource tees that manage natural resource ac- management. These are meant to cess for farmers and herders, with the be community based, chaired by the aim to reduce conflict; mayor and with representatives from • To promote women’s participation concerned parties – including -farm in conflict resolution; ers, pastoralists, and traditional lead- ers.98 In cases of crop damage caused • To produce and better distribute by livestock, the commission will ask animal feed for pastoralists during the conflicting parties to provide evi- the dry season, at an affordable rate; dence of the value of the crops that • To construct more watering points were destroyed. Disputes are usually (small dams, ponds or reservoirs) settled with the payment of compen- and wells and bore holes in pastoral sation by the herder. and agro-pastoral areas, and address Conflicts between pastoral groups water storage problems; can be particularly difficult to medi- • To formulate policies, with farmers, ate, especially where these involve pastoralists and local communities, to cross-border attacks and there is a combat banditry and cattle rustling. need to identify leaders from each side who are representative of those involved in the fighting (for example, Fulani and Daoussahak). Third party
97 Interviews with Fulani agro-pastoralists in Tamou, Tillaberi region, 29 April 2017.
98 Interview at the Mayor’s office in Ouallam, northern Tillaberi region, 27 April 2017.
66 CHAPTER 6: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA
Note: Field research for this Chapter herders and crop farmers and engulfs was carried out at intervals between whole settlements and communities. July and September 2017 in the The proliferation of small arms and following states: Plateau, Kaduna, light weapons have rendered these Kebbi, Katsina, Zamfara, Kwara, conflicts deadlier in recent years99. Niger, Bauchi and Gombe. Additional Their cumulative death toll currently field research was conducted runs into thousands each year in Ni- in February 2018 in Taraba and geria, often with hundreds killed in Adamawa. Developments that single episodes of violence. At the took place in these and other root of these conflicts is increased states after February 2018 are not competition for rural resources and covered. The Chapter, however, space. Pressure on land has increased makes some reference to federal mainly due to exponential popula- and state initiatives that have been tion growth in Nigeria. With demo- introduced since February 2018 to graphic increase, there is less land address conflicts between herders available to people even as more and farmers. These references draw land is being brought into cultivation on consultations with government throughout the country, including and non-government officials in in the far North. The Government’s Nigeria, with ECOWAS, UN and non- presence is not felt in many rural ar- UN partners in Nigeria. As with the eas and there is limited accountabil- overall Issue Paper, field research ity in the management of rural space. in Nigeria focused on pastoralism Moreover, states have often failed to as the main unit of analysis, with address the needs of the population the aim to understand why conflicts in an inclusive way, and conflicts be- involving pastoralists have escalated tween herders and farmers are often in Nigeria in recent years. mixed up with local politics, frequent- ly along ethno-religious lines. Land grabs – of communal land, farmland and what had been grazing land – by Introduction elites and agro-business also cause The relationship between farmers problems for small farmers and pas- and pastoralists has deteriorated toralists in some states. In central in most of Nigeria. Farmer-herder and northern Nigeria, pastoralists conflicts are claiming more lives in have lost access to much land they Nigeria than in the rest of West Af- 99 Presentation by the ECOWAS Commission at the ECOWAS Ministerial Meeting on Herders-Farmers rica combined. The violence extends Conflicts in West Africa held in Abuja on 26 April beyond clashes between individual 2018.
67 previously used for grazing. In addi- and its resources.100 Proponents of tion, transhumance routes are- fre this standpoint argue that the alien- quently blocked by the expansion of ation of indigenous land for open and farmland. But even with the general unregulated grazing may constitute increase in farmer-herder conflicts in a violation of indigenous rights to Nigeria, the situation varies between property and culture, especially in ar- states. In some areas the relationship eas where pastoralism is not a major is peaceful, usually due to local efforts traditional occupation. Responding to to manage access to land and water, the position that freedom of move- ecological and demographic condi- ment under the Nigerian Constitution tions and the history of pastoralism allows pastoralists access to all and in specific states.In recent years, everywhere, they posit that freedom pastoralists in Nigeria have increas- of movement is not an absolute right but is moderated, as permitted by ingly been migrating permanently law101. These stakeholders also argue or on seasonal transhumance south- that the pressure to establish graz- ward from northern states in search ing reserves in non-cattle producing of more favourable grazing condi- states is an attempt by pastoralists to tions. This has increased pressure on secure the land. As is the case in many farmers not only in the Middle Belt other ECOWAS countries, the debate but also in places in southeast and around access to land and free move- southwest Nigeria, which previously ment is one of the most contentious had low populations of pastoralists. issues in Nigeria. Deadly confrontations have ensued between herdsmen and farmers Given that animal movement across when animals trespass on farmland. states is a central feature of farmer- Tensions are further reinforced by dif- herder conflicts in Nigeria, addressing ferences in ethnicity, culture and re- these conflicts will require construc- ligion: the Fulani herders are Muslim tive responses and policies at both while the populations in the South federal and state levels. In some states and in the Middle Belt are majority urgent conflict resolution measures Christian. States and judicial authori- 100 Information provided to UNOWAS by the ties have been slow in mediating and UNCT/Nigeria. resolving disputes before they spiral 101 Information provided to UNOWAS by the out of control. UNCT/Nigeria: While Section 41 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of movement, Section 43 provides for a right to property, particularly land In this context, human rights advo- and its resources. The freedom of movement is limited by the requirement to respect private and/ cates are increasingly emphasizing or communal property rights and the responsibility the right of indigenous people to land not to trespass.
68 are needed; in other states, initiatives Fulani by ethnicity, but Fulani pasto- to prevent the emergence of conflict ralists are not a homogenous group. are essential. Overall, robust efforts In Nigeria there are many different are needed to address the rampant Fulani clans, sub-clans, local Fulani impunity of herder-farmer conflicts cultures and dialects, and variations in the country. Despite years of at- in herding practices. tacks and widespread carnage, few perpetrators have been arrested and There is lack of documentation regard- brought to account. Moreover, the ing nomadic pastoralism and tran- United Nations High Commissioner shumance in Nigeria. Consequently, for Refugees (UNHCR) notes increas- there are no adequate records of ing and significant population dis- nomadic pastoralists or of those in- placements caused by herder-farmer volved in cross border transhumance. clashes, including refugees and inter- There is lack of information about the nally displaced persons (IDPs). It esti- carrying capacities of their destina- mates that over 62,000 persons were tion areas. As a result, it is difficult to internally displaced in Nigeria in 2017 recognize when the carrying capaci- as a result of such clashes. ties of these areas have been reached or overstretched.
Fulani and non-Fulani pastoralists a. Pastoralism and Transhumance in Nigeria While the majority of pastoralists in Nigeria are Fulani, there are varia- According to available data, Nigeria tions within the Fulani population. has the highest number of livestock There are different herding practices, in West Africa, with the number of such as between family-based pas- 102 cattle estimated at 20.5 million . It is toralists and hired herders who rear also likely that Nigeria has the high- other people’s cattle. Pastoral mobili- est number of pastoralists in West Af- ty involving small family units centred rica, as colonial-era census data indi- on the rearing and reproduction of 103 cates . Most Nigerian pastoralists are the family herd may be less conflict- 102 Accurate data on current livestock numbers in prone, as relations are maintained Nigeria does not exist. It has been decades since a comprehensive livestock survey was carried out ethnicity or religion, but population censuses in in the country. FAOSTAT figures are imputed from 1951-3 recorded 3.6 million Fulani in Nigeria and old surveys. However, the approximation is that British Cameroon. Not all these were pastoralists in 2016 there were 20.5 million cattle, 42 million but they accounted for more than half the Fulani sheep, 74 million goats, and 279,802 camels in population in West Africa at that time. See Sten- Nigeria. http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/QL, ning, Derrick (1959), Savannah Nomads: A Study accessed 22 March 2018. of the Wodaabe Pastoral Fulani of Western Bornu Province, Northern Region, Nigeria. International 103 The Nigerian census no longer records data on African Institute, London: Oxford University Press.
69 Figure 9: Map of Nigeria. Source: United Nations. with local agricultural communities Fulani communities that keep cattle across family lines. In contrast, where and other livestock. Some have their young men are given control of live- own traditions of livestock rearing, stock and they migrate without their notably the diverse pastoralist group families or supervision from elders, in Borno and Yobe States – while oth- they are more prone to destroying ers acquired cattle through associa- crops without seeking redress. They tion with the pastoral Fulani usually often fail to negotiate access to pas- by working as herdsmen of boys and ture with agricultural communities or getting paid in cattle. Most of the con- even with local Fulani populations. flict is experienced with nomadic pas- These are challenges that have dra- toralism not pastoralism as such. matically increased in recent years104.
It is not only the Fulani who rear ani- Migratory trends mals on an extensive basis. In differ- ent parts of Nigeria there are non- Nigeria’s sizeable livestock economy can be explained by the country’s 104 Yet family-based pastoralism and transhu- mance still exist in Nigeria. large population - currently estimat-
70 ed at about 190 million (and expected the military used to eject the Udawa to double by 2050)105 - and its ecologi- Fulani pastoralists from states of the cal conditions, as most of the country North like Gombe from where they is suitable for livestock rearing. His- entered states of the Middle Belt107. torically, pastoralism was more con- centrated in northern Nigeria, in the Pastoral lifestyles savannah zones, but there has been a growing ‘migratory drift’ of pastoral- In Nigeria, as elsewhere in West Af- ists southwards into sub-humid and rica, pastoral lifestyles vary, from no- humid zones of central and southern madic pastoralists to settled or semi Nigeria. This process has been go- settled agro-pastoralists. Those with ing on for decades, with pastoralists purely nomadic lifestyle are now a reaching tropical parts of the coun- minority among pastoralists in Ni- try along the Atlantic seaboard at geria. Nomadic pastoralists typically least half a century ago106. However, have no permanent settlement and this trend has accelerated over the do not own land, although some past decade, and with the southward are now starting to buy land. More extension of pastoralism, new pres- common in Nigeria are semi-settled, sures have emerged in the South. transhumant pastoralists. They tend Consequently, pastoralism has be- to have settlements or camps on the come a national issue. It tends to be edge of villages or their own houses more recent Fulani migrants into the in villages, but they retain a level of South collectively labelled Mbororo mobility and move the livestock be- that are associated with the upsurge tween pastures for daily grazing and in conflict. Some observers note that on seasonal transhumance. Even for the Udawa Fulani who have been agro-pastoralists who combine farm- steadily entering Nigeria from other ing and livestock rearing, part of the West African countries were the first family remains in a permanent camp Fulani pastoralists to carry military or village, while herdsmen or boys grade weapons and also retain militia take the cattle and sheep out for graz- to guard them and fight against crop ing. In general, pastoralism depends farmers. These observers note that on good relations with farming com- 105 Census data in Nigeria has a high margin of munities, upon whom they rely for error. Hence, population estimates and projections access to land and water. In Nigeria, for Nigeria need to be treated with caution. UN World Population Prospects 2017, https://esa. however, this has become more dif- un.org/unpd/wpp/. ficult due to demographic pressures, 106 Blench, Roger (1994) ‘The expansion and adap- 107 R. Blench, S. Longtau, U. Hassan and M. Walsh tation of Fulbe Pastoralism to subhumid and humid (2006) The Role of Traditional Rulers in Conflict conditions in Nigeria’. Cahiers d'Études africaines, Prevention and Mediation in Nigeria. (DFID 133-135: 197-212. Report).
71 more land being brought into culti- dering the lake including Niger, Chad, vation and increased civil insecurity and Cameroon. (communal violence, banditry, insur- gency). There is cross-border transhumance between Nigeria and neighbouring countries. In the ECOWAS region, Transhumance patterns there is significant pastoral mobil- ity from the western axis of Nigeria Most of the transhumance occurs into the Republic of Benin and to within Nigeria’s borders, but there Togo, Ghana and beyond. In some is also cross-border transhumance. cases, this is a permanent move due Pastoralists tend to move southwards to pressures in Nigeria rather than during the dry season and northwards seasonal transhumance, but there is during the rainy season, often within reportedly migration into south-west an orbit of about 100-200 kilometres. Nigeria108. There is pastoral mobility in Most transhumance occurs within both directions across the northern northern Nigeria - it is not necessar- border between Nigeria and Niger, ily between northern and southern usually between dry and rainy sea- Nigeria – but transhumance and per- sons. However, there is anecdotal evi- manent migration from the far North dence to suggest that at least some to the far South has increased in the pastoralists in Niger are no longer past few years. There are exceptions crossing the border because of the to this north-south movement, no- widespread insecurity in Nigeria and tably when transhumance is towards the devaluation of the Naira. The lat- rivers or other water points, which ter has reduced the attractiveness of are dry season resources that attract Nigerian livestock markets for pas- pastoralists from different directions. toralists from the Republic of Niger The River Benue and River Niger and seeking to sell livestock in Nigeria. their various tributaries are key wa- Cross-border transhumance from Ni- ter sources, and, alongside the rivers, ger now appears to be more limited there is good pasture. The Hadejia- to certain states and routes, depend- Nguru wetlands in Jigawa and Yobe ing on security, and therefore avoid- States and Lake Chad in Borno State ing the insurgency in Borno State are also important water resources and the rampant banditry in Zamfara for farmers and pastoralists in north- State. ern Nigeria. The desiccation of Lake Chad over the past half-century has Some pastoralists do still move had an adverse effect on pastoral 108 This movement was recorded during fieldwork livelihoods in northeast Nigeria and for this study in Kwara and Kebbi States, for for pastoralists in other countries bor- example.
72 southwards from Niger into north- routes are in practice not well pro- ern Nigeria during the dry season. tected and are often cultivated or There is some coordination between blocked. This includes the cattle specific states like Katsina and their routes used by herders on a day-to- counterparts in Niger regarding tran- day basis when they are taking the shumance movements, which run in animals for grazing in the morning both directions. There is also tran- and returning to the camp or village shumance between Nigeria and Cam- in the evening. In the South, the infra- eroon, but patterns vary depending structure to regulate the relationship on the security situation (see below) between pastoralists and farmers and the section of the border, which does not exist. runs all the way from the Atlantic sea- board to Lake Chad. Cameroon is part The 1965 law establishing grazing re- of the Economic Community of Cen- serves in the then Northern Region tral African States (ECCAS) and there- was ‘inherited’ by individual states fore the ECOWAS Transhumance Pro- in northern Nigeria after the regions tocol does not govern this movement. were divided into states in 1967. The grazing reserves are therefore under the jurisdiction of northern states, not of the Federal Government. Most b. Challenges facing pastoralists grazing reserves in northern Nigeria now only exist on paper109. An exam- Note: Field research for this Chap- ter on Nigeria does not cover the ple, which has regional implications southern part of Nigeria and Benue for south-west Nigeria, is the loss of State in the North Central/Middle much of the Bobi Grazing Reserve in Belt, which has witnessed significant Niger State, which was a major graz- 110 violence in the first half of 2018; ing area . The Bobi Grazing Reserve fieldwork was carried out at intervals was equipped by the Federal Govern- between July and September 2017 ment with facilities for pastoralists, in Plateau, Kaduna, Kebbi, Katsina, but most of it has been turned into 111 Zamfara, Kwara, Niger, Bauchi and farmland. The UNCT/Nigeria, on Gombe states. Additional field re- 109 The Grazing Reserves Law, 1965. Enacted by the Legislature of Northern Nigeria. The document search was conducted in February is reproduced in Journal of Nomadic Studies: An 2018 in Taraba and Adamawa. Interdisciplinary Journal on Migrant Groups, No. 4, 2001, pp. 85–91. National Commission for Noma- dic Education, Kaduna, Nigeria. Blocked transhumance routes and loss of grazing reserves 110 Fieldwork was carried in Niger State, including in Bobi Grazing Reserve, for this study in August There are many challenges facing 2017. pastoralists in Nigeria. Transhumance 111 Fieldwork was carried in Niger State, including
73 the other hand, notes that the Bobi and robbery. The local bandits and Grazing Reserve was abandoned by victims were mainly Fulani, and in re- pastoralists due to deteriorating in- sponse Fulani pastoralists set up vigi- frastructure; as a result some part of lante groups. These groups have been it were converted into farmland. The combatting rural banditry in Taraba loss of grazing reserves and other and Adamawa States, often working pastoral land in northern Nigeria also with local authorities. They reduced explains why more pastoralists have the incidents of banditry in much of moved to southern parts of the coun- Taraba and Adamawa, but banditry try, where grazing reserves never ex- persists in other parts of northern isted but where ecological changes Nigeria. The North-West is now the now mean the South is more acces- worst affected zone, notably Zamfara sible than a generation ago. and Kaduna States. In Katsina State, the government managed to contain Banditry and cattle rustling the problem. The state government is also reported to have re-opened and Banditry is a serious form of insecu- secured some of the transhumance rity in parts of central and northern routes and grazing areas for pasto- Nigeria that has cost many lives. The ralists and to be seeking to increase modern history of banditry in north- ern Nigeria allegedly goes back to the nomadic education for boys and 114 early 1990s, as armed bandits from girls . Consequently, violence is now Chad entered the country across relatively low in Katsina. the north-eastern border112. The first In contrast, there has been endemic, bandits and rustlers of cattle were the large-scale violence in Zamfara State militia retained by the Udawa113. The that forced the pastoralist popula- Nigerian government played a vital tion to leave large areas of the state. role in controlling the flow of ban- Gangs of armed bandits have occu- ditry from Chad, as Nigerian security pied swathes of southern Zamfara. agencies tightened security along the The violence reached a high level in border in the mid- to late 1990s. Af- 2012-2013 and has persisted inter- ter the Chadian banditry declined, mittently since then, with frequent some locals stepped into this space large-scale attacks on villages. The and took up banditry, cattle rustling number of fatalities in the Zamfara in Bobi Grazing Reserve, for this study in August violence is likely to run into the thou- 2017. sands. The violence also spread to 112 Interviews with a Fulani (Wodaabe) leader Kaduna State, with bandits occupying residing in Mubi, northern Adamawa State, and with a senior leader of the vigilante group Tabital 114 In nomadic communities, parents are some- Pulaaku, Adamawa State, September 2017. times more reluctant to send their boys than girls to school, because boys of school age are expected 113 Blench et.al (2006). to help rear the cattle and/or sheep.
74 part of bordering Birnin Gwari LGA. around Gusau. The government of The bandits are organised and heav- Zamfara State has directed that land ily armed; their criminal activities belonging to pastoralists who fled be include the stealing of cattle, kidnap- returned to them. ping for ransom, and armed robbery. Many of the bandits were identified The Boko Haram insurgency and the as being Fulani while victims were Fu- Lake Chad Basin lani and Hausa. Some of the political Unlike armed groups in Mali, Boko elites in Zamfara sponsored vigilante Haram does not have a strong social groups to confront the bandits but base among pastoralists. Boko Haram they mobilised these groups against is ethnically mixed, but the main so- the local Fulani population, creating cial base of the sect is Kanuri, who are generalised violence between Fulani often rivals to the pastoralist Shuwa pastoralists and Hausa farmers that Arab and Fulani communities. How- 115 has claimed many lives .Fulani pas- ever, there are Kanuri subgroups that toralists claim they do not support are pastoralists, many of whom have the bandits, as they are also victims been raided by Boko Haram. Borno of such banditry, provoking their State has the highest ethno-linguistic exodus from southern Zamfara to diversity among pastoralist groups in other parts of Nigeria, especially to Nigeria, including Shuwa Arab, Fulani, central and northern states. The stir- Buduma (Yedina), Koyam (or Kway- ring up of inter-ethnic, farmer-herder am), Badawi, and Tubu. In Borno, the violence in reaction to the banditry two largest of these, in terms of the ended up scattering ‘innocent’ and human population and cattle owner- ‘criminal’ elements from within the ship, are the Shuwa Arabs and pas- Fulani population; thus, the problem toral Fulani: they speak different lan- of banditry expanded beyond Zam- guages (Shuwa Arabic and Fulfulde) fara. Subsequently, pastoralists who but have a close relationship, with were displaced by the conflict and intermarriage and mixed settlements then returned to Zamfara discovered in some areas116. In the waters and their grazing land being cultivated by marshes around Lake Chad the Budu- farmers and their homes destroyed. ma (Yedina) are substantial in number This became a source of tension. and rear a type of cattle adapted to Some pastoralists were accommo- 116 Census data in Nigeria no longer captures dated as internally displaced persons ethnicity or religion, so the exact pastoralist popu- lation is difficult to estimate. In 1996 Braukämper 115 Presentation by Senator Saidu Mohammed estimated the Shuwa Arabs at half a million in Dansadau, who explained how he sponsored and Nigeria in an informative study of their history and mobilised the vigilantes. Conference on Rural mode of life: Braukämper, Ulrich “Strategies of Banditry organised by the Centre for Democratic Environmental Adaptation and Patterns of Trans- Development and Training (CEDDERT), Ahmadu humance of the Shuwa Arabs in the Nigerian Chad Bello University, Zaria, 14 September 2017. Basin”, Nomadic Peoples 39 (1996): 53-68.
75 the lacustrine environment, the Kuri Chad wetlands. Some pastoralists al- breed. legedly collaborated with Boko Har- am for protection and unhindered Northeast Nigeria, including the Lake access to pastures, while also paying Chad Basin, is an important agricul- for this access with livestock. While tural and pastoral zone, and farmers Boko Haram has been weakened in and pastoralists have been badly af- most areas of northeastern Nigeria, fected by the violence. Fighting -be serious insecurity persists in rural ar- tween Boko Haram and the Nigerian eas of Borno State. Pastoralists and and regional armed forces rendered farmers have been returning to areas many farming and grazing areas un- liberated from Boko Haram (notably safe. Boko Haram became predato- in Adamawa and Yobe, and parts of ry, raiding pastoralists for cattle and southern Borno) but the displace- sheep and farmers for grains and oth- ment crisis continues as many rural er food supplies. Ethnic groups such areas of Borno are still too dangerous as the Shuwa Arabs and some Fu- to return to. lani clans were in direct conflict with Boko Haram and sustained casualties Social problems while fighting the insurgents. Report- edly, several thousand pastoralists There are also social problems facing have been killed in the conflict, tens pastoralists in Nigeria. The behav- of thousands have been displaced, iour of herdsmen has been noted as many losing their livestock and end- a problem in some areas, particu- ing up destitute, often as IDPs or larly where young men or children refugees. Those who were attacked are given responsibility for rearing by Boko Haram tended to lose their large herds of cattle that they cannot wealth, but others were able to move properly control. Reportedly, there out of the conflict zone with their are challenges with drug and alcohol livestock into neighbouring coun- abuse by some of the herders when tries, including Cameroon or nearby they go into town, particularly in states in Nigeria such as Gombe, Ad- southern and central Nigeria. This of- amawa, and Taraba, thus generating ten happens when the young men are pressures on resources in those areas migrating individually, without their and elsewhere. While most pastoral- families or community leaders. When ists in the conflict zone were affected the herdsmen are in town they may adversely by the Boko Haram insur- leave the livestock with young boys, gency, a minority did profit from it. often leading to the destruction of Pastureland that became available crops, as the animals are not properly as other pastoralists left was seized tended and therefore encroach onto by groups willing to cooperate with farms. Reports of rape by migratory Boko Haram, particularly in the Lake herdsmen of female farmers in their
76 fields have also become common. are now acute tensions between In some cases, these young men are pastoralists and farmers in south- rearing their family herds, taking ern Nigeria and low-level violence is the livestock on long distance tran- widespread. This is generally caused shumance, while in other cases they by herdsmen driving their cattle onto are hired herdsmen. farms and destroying crops, often de- liberately. It seems to be migratory Fulani who are doing this, generally c. Security challenges and causes young men, not the Fulani pastoral- and drivers of conflict ists already resident in the South. At times the problem is caused by the Most farmer-herder conflicts in Ni- blockage of national transhumance geria are two-way: both pastoralists routes and lack of grazing land, but in and farmers have been adversely af- non-traditional grazing areas where fected. The large-scale violence that the population is agricultural, these is now prevalent between the two may not exist. In such cases access to communities is the result of a more pasture has to be negotiated with lo- complex dynamic with variations in cal communities, who the new waves each case. Understanding local his- of pastoralists to the South have no tories and political and social con- prior connection or contact with. As texts is vital if these conflicts are to already discussed, there are report- be resolved. Farmer-herder conflicts edly social problems among some of in contemporary Nigeria often merge the herdsmen involved in these con- into inter-ethnic or ethno-religious flicts, including alcohol and drug con- violence, as in Adamawa, Benue, sumption in town when they are sup- Kwara, Kaduna, Nassarawa, Niger, posed to be caring for the livestock. Plateau, Taraba, Zamfara, and other states. This generalises the violence The recent wave of Fulani herdsmen between communities, taking it be- into southern Nigeria are collectively yond clashes between cattle herders called ‘Mbororo’, but that is a general and crop farmers in the fields to wider term for transhumant Fulani pastoral- ethnic or ethno-religious conflagra- of trypanosomiases, a disease carried by the tsetse tions.Severe pressure on traditional fly that kills zebu cattle. The southward movement grazing lands in northern Nigeria and of pastoralists had also been constrained because tropical vegetation, particularly tropical forest, insecurity across large areas of the was largely unsuitable for cattle that were adapted North have encouraged more pasto- to savanna environments. These conditions have ralists to move southwards117. There changed because there is now easy access to veterinary drugs – nearly all pastoralists in Nigeria 117 The expansion of pastoralism from the now self-medicate their cattle, including against savanna into humid zones towards the coast trypanosomiases – and large-scale deforestation has occurred even in areas that were previously has degraded the vegetation cover in much of unfavourable to pastoralists due to the prevalence southern Nigeria.
77 ists. They come from different clans in bbi, Kano, Jigawa). Nonetheless, ten- the North, but they generally migrate sions are present, pastoral livelihoods if pasture is limited in their areas of are under pressure, and violence origin or if they are denied access due does occur. The difference is that lo- to insecurity or local politics. In the cal authorities may be more proactive case of south-western Nigeria, the or- in conflict prevention and less divid- igins of the Mbororo tend to be in the ed along sectional lines. The Katsina North-West. Their movement into the State government, for example, is at- South-West in significant numbers tempting to regulate pastoralism by began only about a decade ago, but identifying grazing land and main- they were preceded by earlier waves taining transhumance routes. It has of Fulani pastoralists, beginning in the also clamped down on banditry. In mid-twentieth century, who success- contrast, banditry, cattle rustling, and fully integrated with local communi- farmer-herder conflicts are still caus- ties. In southwest Nigeria (including ing serious problems in neighbouring Kwara State) the earlier groups of Zamfara. Fulani pastoralists are widely referred to as Borgu’en, and they are by now In the North-East, the highest levels socially integrated and speak Yoruba of violence between pastoralists and and other local languages. There is farmers are in Adamawa and Taraba therefore a need to recognise the di- States. There are lower levels of vio- versity of pastoralists in Nigeria and lence in Gombe, Bauchi, and Yobe, identify different patterns of mobility. but pressures on pastoral livelihoods The level of herder-farmer violence in are still acute in these states. The sit- the South is still at a much lower level uation in Borno is somewhat distinct; than in northern Nigeria. More field although there have been farmer- research is needed on the situation in herder clashes in the past, the main the southern part of Nigeria and re- problem is the destructive impacts cent clashes recorded there between of the Boko Haram insurgency, which herders and farmers. has devastated herding and farming activities in Borno and the Lake Chad In the North-West, the highest levels Basin. Parts of northern Adamawa of farmer-herder violence are in Zam- and Yobe have also been affected by fara and Kaduna States, areas that Boko Haram, with knock-on effects in have been devastated by extremely other parts of the North-East as pas- vicious clashes between communi- toralists and farmers are blocked from ties and by banditry, and ensuing loss the conflict zone or displaced. of life. There are currently lower lev- els of violence in other parts of the Government policies make a differ- North-West (e.g. Sokoto, Katsina, Ke- ence and clearly affect community
78 relations on the ground, as the cases There has already been serious dev- of neighbouring Gombe and Taraba astating violence in Benue State since States suggest. In Gombe, the state 2013. When the State Government government and local authorities are passed legislation to regulate open more inclined to dialogue with pasto- grazing, pastoralists opposed to it ralists and farmers. Traditional lead- threatened to attack Benue and in ers attempt to coordinate farming one case in January 2018 killed over and pastoralism, such as by announc- 73 persons. There have also been ing dates for when transhumance clashes in other parts of Benue State, may begin and when crops have to be notably in Agatu between the Idoma harvested by. Violence is at a low lev- and Fulani. Heavily armed militia as- el in Gombe and traditional leaders sociated with Fulani herdsmen at- and some state officials are actively tacked farming communities in Agatu involved in conflict prevention. This in February 2016 and committed contrasts with the situation in Taraba atrocities, killing over 300 and dis- State, where there is more polarisa- placing whole villages some of which tion along ethnic lines, with high lev- are now occupied by pastoralists. els of violence. There is an ethno-re- ligious aspect to conflicts in southern In November and December 2017 Taraba, between Tiv, Jukun, Fulani, there was also mass violence in vil- and Kuteb, with farmer-herder con- lages near Numan, Adamawa State. flicts intertwined with local politics. It reportedly started with a homi- In general, both farmers and pasto- cide in which a Bachama farmer was ralists are severely affected by violent murdered, allegedly during a dispute conflict. In conflict flashpoints, villag- with a Fulani herdsman. The case es are vulnerable to attack by herds- was reportedly not resolved by the men during sustained periods of vio- police or state authorities. Several lence. At the same time, it is not un- Bachama villages then mobilised en common for pastoralists to be killed masse against the resident Fulani by hostile farmers and their livestock population in the area, attacking either stolen or shot. Furthermore, camps and settlements and killing where farmer-herder disputes esca- more than 70 Fulani people, most of late, pastoralist camps have been at- them children118. Two weeks later the tacked by villagers resulting in heavy Fulani launched a reprisal attack on casualties. Sexual and gender-based Bachama villages and killed scores of violence has become frequent and people. more extreme on both sides, with a high death toll among women and In northcentral Nigeria, the highest children in some of the attacks on 118 Documentary records and photographic evi- pastoralists and farmers alike. dence, November 2017.
79 levels of farmer-herder violence are tries have modernized, transformed in Plateau and Benue States, but high and regulated their livestock sector levels of violence have also been re- and animal movement for the benefit corded in parts of Nassarawa, Niger, of both pastoralist and farming com- and Kwara States. In parts of central munities (e.g. Brazil). Nigeria mass violence has become endemic, leading to social dislocation While a security approach is essential and widespread instability. The areas at first to stop the violence and- re worst affected by farmer-herder vio- store rule of law, significant attention lence are among the most violent parts needs to be placed on understanding of Nigeria. However, even in zones of the political, historical, economic, hu- conflict there are examples of peace- man rights, ethnic, religious, and de- ful coexistence between farmers and mographic drivers and dynamics of pastoralists, due to proactive con- conflicts between herders and farm- flict prevention measures in specific ers. communities. In other areas, efforts at conflict resolution have failed or not existed. Providing more effective and structured avenues for conflict Responses to herder-farmer conflicts prevention at the local level would at the federal and state levels be important, but fundamentally the Federal responses livelihoods of farmers and pastoral- ists need to be supported in a more Over the years, the Federal Govern- constructive and balanced way. ment of Nigeria has taken several measures to address the escalat- ing situation between farmers and herders in the country. In 2014, the d. Conflict prevention and Government established an inter- resolution ministerial committee to recommend Urgent efforts are needed at the measures for the restoration of graz- federal and state levels, in close co- ing reserves. In 2015, a committee ordination with local populations, set up by the Federal Ministry of to respond to heightened conflicts Agriculture to formulate a compre- between pastoralists and farmers in hensive livestock development plan Nigeria. Lessons from how similar recommended, among other things, conflicts have been prevented or re- the development of grazing reserves solved in other countries in the re- as a means of reducing the conflicts gion, and across Africa, could inform between herders and farmers. In Nigeria’s response. This can also in- 2016, the Government announced clude lessons from how other coun- plans to appropriate land across
80 states for the grazing of cattle. How- lative initiatives by some Nigerian ever, these plans did not materialize states to enact laws preventing open due to fierce opposition from some grazing to address the farmer-herder interest groups. In May 2018, in ad- conflicts and curb violence. Four Ni- dition to security-focused measures, gerian states – Benue, Edo, Ekiti and the Federal Government announced Taraba120 – have so far enacted laws or a support package for reconstructing are in the process of finalizing bills for destroyed infrastructures and a ten- this purpose. There is however disa- year National Livestock Transforma- greement between the Federal Gov- tion Plan in 10 pilot states119. ernment and the states concerned in Yet, the impact of the Government’s terms of the implementation of such efforts to address herder-farmer con- legislation. flicts is yet to be felt. Moreover, im- In 2017, the Benue State parliament punity remains rampant: few of the passed the Open Grazing Prohibition perpetrators of these conflicts, and and Establishment of Ranching Bill, the massive killings recorded, have signed into law by the Governor on been prosecuted or punished. This 22 May 2017121. A six-month grace general impunity has made both the period was given for further sensitiza- farmers and pastoralists lose faith in tion before the Law was operational- the legal system and take the law into their own hands. Government com- ized on 1 November 2017. The Law mittees set up to address the conflict, was resisted by the Fulani-dominated as well as independent researchers Cattle Breeders Socio-Cultural Associ- and experts, have put forward various ation Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore, which recommendations. These recommen- demanded its suspension. The Asso- dations focus on the re-establishment ciation claimed that the law required of security in the rural areas through a change in culture and way of life more effective control of arms circu- practiced by Fulani populations for lation; the establishment of pastures 120 Benue State: A Law to Prohibit Open Rearing and/or grazing reserves; the banning and Grazing of Livestock and Provide for the Establishment of Ranches and Livestock Admi- of open grazing; and the enhance- nistration, Regulation and Control and for Other ment of conflict resolution measures. Matters Connected Therewith, 2017’; Edo State: A Bill for A Law to Establish the Edo State Control of Nomadic Cattle Rearing/Grazing Law and for Other State responses Purposes; Ekiti State: The Prohibition of Cattel and Other Ruminants Grazing in Ekiti 2016 Law; Taraba Since 2016, there have been legis- State: Anti-Open Grazing Prohibition and Ranches Establishment Bill 2017. 119 According to the Federal Government, Naira 10 billion has been allocated for rehabilitation in 121 According to the Benue State Government, the states affected by the herders-farmers conflict, law to prohibit open rearing and grazing of lives- while about Naira 180 billion will be devoted to the tock also makes provision for the establishment of ten-year National Livestock Transformation Plan. ranches and livestock administration.
81 centuries. Some civil society organi- nantly Muslim Fulani). zations also criticized some clauses of the Law that limited or compromised As fieldwork for this Chapter on Ni- access to land for livestock purpos- geria was only carried out in one of es. The resistance to the Benue Law the four states concerned with the prompted violent attacks by herds- anti-grazing laws (Taraba), more - re men on farming communities along search and analysis are needed with the Benue Valley on 1 January 2018, regard to these laws. While some resulting in loss of lives and prop- commentators argue that the enact- erty. Continued clashes continued in ment of regulations against open- Benue State throughout the months grazing prevent violence, others un- of January and February of 2018. Ac- derscore the opposite. cording to the Governor of Benue State, the crisis has resulted in the United Nations responses displacement of about 200 000 indi- In late February 2018, a UN inter- 122 viduals . The implication of this and agency rapid assessment mission broader responses to the crisis are deployed to some of the affected currently being assessed. areas in Benue and Nasarawa states. The mission found that the humani- The Taraba State government an- tarian response across all sites was nouncement of its own anti-open inadequate. Beyond longer-term grazing law was followed by mass development concerns, it identified violence on the Mambilla Plateau in sexual and gender-based violence June 2017, in south-east Taraba State, (SGBV) and food insecurity as serious near the border with Cameroon. Eth- issues. Women and children repre- nic Mambilla, Kaka, and Kambu farm- sent about 80% of the internally dis- ers attacked Fulani settlements in an placed (IDP) population, with many attempt to expel them from the area female-headed households devoid of after more than a century of resi- any form of income- generating activ- dence, killing hundreds of people and ity. Sexual violence, transactional sex, forcing many across the border into early marriages and physical violence Cameroon as refugees. The violence were identified as some of the threats was allegedly politically motivated, to faced by displaced women and girls. seize land, and occurred along ethnic rather than religious lines (there were Drawing on the February 2018 mis- reportedly Muslims and Christians in- sion, the UN Country Team in Nigeria volved in the attacks on the predomi- (UNDP, UNHCR and FAO) has solic- ited funding to support the Govern- 122 Presentation to UNCT and International Partners by Governor Ortom of Benue in Abuja, ment’s efforts to design and imple- February 2018. ment measures that promote peace
82 and development in conflict affected ernment has proposed ranching as a communities in Benue and Nasarawa response to stop transhumance and States, primarily in four areas: protec- thereby reduce violent clashes be- tion, monitoring and response; eco- tween herders and farmers.124 nomic empowerment; peacebuilding; regional dimension. Farmers and pastoralists alike suffer from the lack of enforcement of ex- Conflicts between herders and farm- isting laws. Without clear directives ers in Nigeria raise questions about regulating the management of land, the applicability of national, regional water, and transhumance, disputes and international instruments relat- and violence between herders and ing to human rights and the rule of farmers intensify. law; about state versus federal pow- ers; and about the extent to which certain national responses are con- Recommendations sistent with regional instruments. All the recommendations listed should One recommendation of this Paper is take into consideration gender issues for in-depth analysis to be conducted and women’s representation in terms on the legal and constitutional is- of policy-making and practical inter- sues linked to herder-farmer con- ventions on herder-farmer conflicts in flicts and the applicability in Nigeria Nigeria. Women and girls face related of the ECOWAS Protocol on Tran- but also specific challenges within shumance, as well as other relevant their communities; they can some- instruments. There is great attention times have influence over the youths placed on these issues in Nigeria now, who are the main protagonists of the with increased pressure on the Fed- conflicts. eral Government to enforce the rule of law, stop violence and bring perpe- Short to medium term trators to justice. • To support efforts at the federal and One question that has been tabled by state levels to stop the violence asso- the Nigerian Government is whether ciated with herders-farmers clashes, transhumance, in its current form, is zone, hence measures are needed to explore ways sustainable in a country like Nigeria to address this in northern Nigeria, thereby curbing the current southward movement of transhu- where the population is set to double mance. by 2050 and where desert encroach- ment persists in the North123. The Gov- 124 Presentation by the Nigerian Government at the ECOWAS Ministerial Meeting on Herders-Far- 123 There are concerns that pastoralism and mers Conflicts in West Africa held in Abuja on 26 transhumance drive desertification in the Sahelian April 2018.
83 by reinforcing security, community Long-term dialogue and accountability, while respecting national and international • To study and propose different human rights obligations; options for modernizing, transforming and regulating the livestock sector • To undertake further field-research and animal production movement on pastoralism-related security and in Nigeria that are beneficial to human rights issues in affected states both farmers and herders and in the Middle Belt, South-East and other communities concerned; to South-West, documenting current assess what technical, financial and challenges and proposing immediate infrastructure needs and partnerships and long-term options for addressing are required for each option, in the them; short, medium and long-term; to draw lessons from other countries • To establish capacity for early that have experience in this area warning analysis and human rights (e.g. Brazil). The study should also risk assessment to better understand consider best practice from managing the trends and dynamics of conflict pastoralists-farmers relations in some and to inform policy development Nigerian states (e.g. Gombe, Katsina) and responses; as well as in other ECOWAS Member States; • To establish or reinforce conflict management committees in all Local • To study the impact of conflicts Government Areas (LGAs) where between herders and farmers in tensions or disputes arise between Nigeria on (i) women and their pastoralists and farmers. These economic empowerment, and (ii) on committees should include male and indigenous communities’ rights to female representatives of farmers land and culture; to propose actions and pastoralists and be tasked with and options; preventing, mediating, and resolving conflicts. Federal oversight, or some • To support the Nigerian authorities type of neutral arbitration, may be in organizing consultations with beneficial at the state level; government and non-governmental stakeholders, and external actors • To analyze the legal and as needed, to deliberate on the constitutional issues linked to herders- options emanating from the studies farmers conflicts and the applicability mentioned in the previous two to Nigeria of the ECOWAS Protocol on recommendations. Transhumance, and other relevant instruments.
84 OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Review, implement, and update 6. Facilitate the coordination of as necessary, the 1998 ECOWAS pastoralist activities with those of Protocol on Transhumance and the crop farmers to mitigate conflicts 2013 Nouakchott Declaration on by establishing or strengthening Pastoralism (Member States that are local community committees on signatories to it). conflict prevention and resolution as provided for in the ECOWAS Protocol 2. Sensitize populations to existing on Transhumance; provide training transhumance regulation in ECOWAS and education for these committees Member States for the purpose of on conflict resolution and natural national implementation. resources governance.
3. Support ECOWAS in developing a 7. Undertake concrete actions to regional communications strategy prevent and address the human to raise awareness about herders- rights abuses and violations farmers relations and ways to occurring within the context of promote peaceful co-existence, herders-farmers conflict through including training for journalists the use of a human rights-based in ECOWAS Member States on fair approach in all preventive and reporting of these issues. response efforts. Ensure systematic accountability for perpetrators of 4. Review and/or adjust existing crimes and reparations to victims in national and regional transhumance line with national and international routes. Identify and demarcate human rights standards. transhumance routes with beacons and legally protect them, utilizing 8. Strengthen the role and technology (such as GPS) and participation of women and youth as deploying rangers or security peacebuilders for community-driven personnel to secure the routes, when development; strengthen the roles of feasible. women in agricultural and pastoral production. 5. Promote cross-border cooperation among security services in countries 9. Strengthen national livestock in West Africa and the Sahel to movement governance, including promote synergy, intelligence- identification and traceability sharing and joint action. mechanisms, and establish or re-
85 energize local and national networks d’Appui au Pastoralisme au Sahel, or committees to manage, monitor PRAPS, the World Bank-funded, and appraise transhumance. ECOWAS-WAEMU-led project with CILSS coordination) and comparable 10. Identify, develop and implement pastoralism support projects to cross-border regional programs on Nigeria, which has the largest transhumance infrastructure along pastoralist population and the identified transhumance corridors highest number of farmer-herder (e.g. bore holes and transhumance conflicts in West Africa. cluster parks to provide animal feed, water, resting points, veterinary and 14. Encourage ECOWAS Member observatory services). States to allocate 3% of the 10% agreement on agriculture budgeting 11. Explore partnerships with the of the Maputo Declaration to the international community and the livestock sector. private sector to drill more bore holes (solar powered) in strategic 15. Within the framework of the locations in West Africa and the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms Sahel, to improve the dry season and Light Weapons, undertake resilience of pastoralists, thereby an analysis of the impact of coordinating transhumance weapons circulation in the region movements with the farming cycle to on farmer-herder conflicts and avoid damaging crops. recommendations for addressing this challenge. 12. Devise a long-term strategy for addressing the effect of climate 16. Make available to and encourage change - including water scarcity, UN Country Teams to translate the deforestation and soil erosion - findings of UNOWAS’ Paper into their on the livelihoods and peaceful programmatic work in support of the coexistence of pastoralists and UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel farmers in West Africa and the (UNISS), relating to cross-border Sahel; review existing studies on this issues. topic and/or produce an updated assessment with recommended 17. Facilitate, in collaboration with action. ECOWAS, Member States, civil society and concerned partners, 13. Boost and extend the reach experience-sharing exercises of the Regional Sahel Pastoralism between ECOWAS countries with the Support Project (Projet Régional aim to share good practice from one
86 country to another on the prevention of farmer-herder conflicts.
18. Raise awareness about the need for livelihood assistance for farmers and pastoralists affected by conflict, especially in areas of insurgency, including in central and northern Mali and the Lake Chad Basin.
19. Explore private sector development of ICT coverage in rural areas to facilitate distance learning (e.g. literacy, numeracy, general education) and for further inclusion of pastoralist communities in the overall regional economic framework.
20. In collaboration with ECOWAS, undertake an assessment and feasibility study of rural schools and nomadic education for both children and adults in the region (e.g. the creation of boarding schools and virtual educational courses via radio and mobile phones).
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