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Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War

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Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War DOCUMENTS AND ESSAYS SECOND EDITION EDITED BY ROBERT J. McMAHON UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY Lexington, Massachusetts Toronto Contents CHAPTER 1 Vietnam and America: An Introduction Page 1 ESSAYS Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts • The System Worked 2 Norman Podhoretz • A Moral and Necessary Intervention 14 Gabriel Kolko • The Limits of American Power 21 CHAPTER 2 The Development of Vietnamese Nationalism Page 30 DOCUMENTS Phan Boi Chau's Prison Reflections, 1914 31 Ho Chi Minh Deplores "Imperalist Crimes," 1920 33 Ho's Appeal at the Founding of the Communist Party of Indochina, 1930 33 A Vietnamese Writer Recalls the 1944-1945 Famine, 1956 35 The Vietnamese Declaration of Independence, 1945 36 ESSAYS John T. McAlister, Jr. • Vietnam: An Historical Overview 39 David G. Man • The Colonial Impact 50 William J. Duiker • Communism and Nationalism 64 CHAPTER 3 The Roots of the American Commitment Page 72 DOCUMENTS George C. Marshall on the Indochina Dispute, 1947 73 Statement of U.S. Policy Toward Indochina, 1948 75 The United States Praises the Elys£e Agreements, 1949 78 XI Xll Contents The State Department Recommends Military Aid to the French, 1950 78 National Security Council Paper No. 64, 1950 82 Dean Acheson Urges Aid for Indochina, 1950 84 Ho Chi Minh Denounces U.S. Intervention, 1950 84 ESSAYS Patrick J. Hearden • An Economic Perspective on U.S. Involvement 86 Robert J. McMahon • A Strategic Perspective on U.S. Involvement 102 CHAPTER 4 Dwight D. Eisenhower and Vietnam: Deepening the Commitment Page 118 DOCUMENTS Dwight D. Eisenhower Appeals for British Help, 1954 120 Eisenhower Explains the Domino Theory, 1954 122 Vo Nguyen Giap on Diebienphu (1954), 1964 123 Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, 1954 124 Edward G. Lansdale on the Importance of the South Vietnamese Experiment, 1955 126 National Security Council Discussion of the Sect Crisis, 1955 127 South Vietnamese Statement of Reunification, 1955 131 Elbridge Durbrow Assesses the Diem Regime, 1957 132 National Security Council Discussion of Diem's Growing Problems, 1960 133 ESSAYS Stephen E. Ambrose • The Wisdom of U.S. Nonintervention 134 David L. Anderson • The Tragedy of U.S. Intervention 145 CHAPTER 5 John F. Kennedy and Vietnam: Incremental Escalation Page 159 DOCUMENTS Maxwell Taylor Recommends the Dispatch of U.S. Forces, 1961 160 Dean Rusk and Robert S. McNamara's Alternative Plan, 1961 162 An Early U.S. Army Adviser Remembers His Experiences (1962-1963), 1981 166 Mike Mansfield Questions American Policy, 1962 167 John F. Kennedy Criticizes the South Vietnamese Government, 1963 169 Kennedy Reaffirms the Domino Theory, 1963 170 Contents xiii Henry Cabot Lodge Discusses Coup Prospects, 1963 171 McGeorge Bundy Expresses Reservations, 1963 173 Diem's Final Appeal for U.S. Help, 1963 175 ESSAYS Lawrence J. Bassett and Stephen E. Pelz • The Failed Search for Victory 176 c — John M. Newman • Kennedy's Plan for American Withdrawal 195 CHAPTER 6 Lyndon B. Johnson's Decisions for War Page 207 DOCUMENTS Reassessment of U.S. Objectives in South Vietnam, 1964 208 The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 1964 209 Lyndon B. Johnson Explains Why Americans Fight in Vietnam, ? —- 1965 210 " ^ Robert S. McNamara Recommends Escalation, 1965 213 George Ball Dissents, 1965 217 Johnson Recalls His Decision to Commit Troops (1965), 1971 219 t£r; Philip Caputo Remembers His Idealism (1965), 1977 223 ^ "™ ESSAYS David Halberstam • To Achieve a Victory 224 Brian VanDeMark • To Avoid a Defeat 231 CHAPTER 7 U.S. Military Strategy Page 243 DOCUMENTS Robert S. McNamara Urges Additional Troop Deployments, 1965 244 George F. Kennan Criticizes the American Military Commitment, 1966 246 The Central Intelligence Agency's Assessment of the Bombing Campaign, 1967 248 McNamara on the Improved Military Outlook, 1967 249 William C. Westmoreland Reflects on a War of Attrition, 1977 251<^> A Soldier's Perspective on Combat in Vietnam, 1977 254 / ESSAYS Harry G. Summers, Jr. • A Critical Appraisal of American Strategy 257 Gary R. Hess • Were There Viable Alternative Strategies? 262 Loren Baritz • The Limits of Technological Warfare 275 XIV Contents CHAPTER 8 The Enemy: North Vietnam and the "Vietcong" Page 282 DOCUMENTS Ho Chi Minh's Appeal After the Geneva Agreements, 1954 283 Truong Nhu Tang on the Origins of the National Liberation Front(1957-1959), 1985 285 Manifesto of the National Liberation Front, 1960 289 A Vietcong Recruit Explains Why He Joined the Revolution (1961), 1986 292 A South Vietnamese Peasant Girl Becomes a Vietcong Supporter (C. 1961), 1989 293 Vo Nguyen Giap on People's War, 1961 297 Nguyen Chi Thanh on Communist Strategy, 1963 299 Ho Vows to "Fight Until Complete Victory," 1966 302 ESSAYS Douglas Pike • Revolutionary Mystique 304 Eric M. Bergerud • The Success of Communist Strategy at the Village Level 312 CHAPTER 9 The Tet Offensive Page 337 DOCUMENTS Lyndon B. Johnson on the Failed Communist Offensive, 1968 338 Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk Assess the Tet Offensive, 1968 339 Robert F. Kennedy Calls Vietnam an Unwinnable War, 1968 341 Earle G. Wheeler's Report on Military Prospects After Tet, 1968 344 A Communist Party Evaluation, 1968 347 A U.S. Air Force Nurse Remembers the Tet Offensive (1968), 1987 350 Robert Komer Recalls Tet's Impact (1968), 1987 352 Clark M. Clifford Remembers His Post-Tet Questions (1968), 1969 354 Johnson Calls for Negotiations, 1968 356 ESSAYS William S. Turley • Tactical Defeat, Strategic Victory for Hanoi 361 Gabriel Kolko • A Decisive Turning Point 373 Contents XV CHAPTER 10 The Ally: South Vietnam Page 389 DOCUMENTS Ngo Dinh Diem Requests Additional U.S. Aid, 1957 390 Tran Van Don on the Need for Reforms After the Coup Against Diem (1963), 1978 391 Nguyen Cao Ky on the Battle for Hearts and Minds, 1976 393 Nguyen Van Thieu's Address to the National Assembly, 1969 396 An American Serviceman's View of the South Vietnamese Army, 1987 397 ESSAYS y Gabriel Kolko • A Doomed Dependency 398 Bui Diem • A Viable State 413 CHAPTER 11 Richard M. Nixon's Strategy for Withdrawal Page 422 DOCUMENTS Henry A. Kissinger Reflects on the Nixon Administration's Dilemma in Vietnam (1969), 1979 423 National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, 1969 426 A Guerrilla Leader Remembers 1969 as "The Worst Year" (1969), 1986 431 Richard M. Nixon on Vietnamization, 1969 432 Nixon Explains the Cambodian Incursion, 1970 437 Henry A. Kissinger Reveals the U.S. Negotiating Position, 1972 440 Negotiating Position of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, 1972 442 ESSAYS Arnold Isaacs • The Limits of Credibility 443 Walter Isaacson • Vietnam and the Nixon-Kissinger World Order 453 CHAPTER 12 The Antiwar Movement and Public Opinion Page 466 DOCUMENTS SDS States Opposition to the War, 1965 467 Carl Oglesby Denounces the "Liberals' War," 1965 468 Martin Luther King, Jr., Declares His Opposition to the War, 1967 470 XVI Contents --- Proclamation of the Antidraft Resistance, 1967 476 James Fallows Reflects on the Draft's Inequities (1969), 1975 477 •\ A Veteran Remembers His Bitter Homecoming, 1981 480 Todd Gitlin Recalls the New Left's Revolutionary Romanticism, 1987 481 ""•> A Vietnam Veteran Opposes the War, 1971 483 ESSAYS Melvin Small • The Impact of the Antiwar Movement 487 J Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield • The Antiwar Movement and American Society 494 Christian G. Appy • American Veterans and the Antiwar Movement 511 CHAPTER 13 The Media and the War Page 466 DOCUMENTS The New York Times Supports American Policy, 1962 521 Neil Sheehan Recalls Initial Press Attitudes Toward the War (1962-1963), 1988 522 Walter Lippmann on a "Limited War" with "Unlimited Aims," 1967 524 Newsweek Editorializes About "A Nation at Odds," 1967 525 Walter Cronkite Criticizes a Policy "Mired in Stalemate," 1968 528 Life Publicizes One Week's Dead in Vietnam, 1969 529 Spiro T. Agnew Assails the Television Networks for Biased Coverage, 1969 531 Don Oberdorfer on Charges of Media Bias, 1987 534 ESSAYS Robert Elegant • How to Lose a War 535 Peter Braestrup • Missing the "Big Story" 543 Daniel C. Hallin • A Critique of the Oppositional Media Thesis 553 CHAPTER 14 The Paris Peace Accords of 1973 and the Fall of South Vietnam Page 563 DOCUMENTS Richard M. Nixon Reassures Nguyen Van Thieu, 1973 564 The Paris Peace Accords, 1973 565 Henry A. Kissinger Appeals to Congress for Emergency Aid, 1975 569 Contents XVli James R. Schlesinger, Jr., Recalls the Collapse of South Vietnam (1975), 1987 573 A South Vietnamese Pilot Reflects on His Country's Defeat (1975), 1990 573 A South Vietnamese Civilian Remembers His Last Days in Saigon (1975), 1990 575 A North Vietnamese Commander Celebrates the "Great Spring Victory" (1975), 1977 577 Nixon Blames Congress for the Fall of South Vietnam (1975), 1978 580 ESSAYS Allan E. Goodman • What Went Wrong? 582 William J. Duiker • Why the Communists Won 594 CHAPTER 15 Consequences and Lessons of the War Page 608 D 0 C U M"E NTS Gerald R. Ford on the Lessons of Vietnam, 1975 609 Jimmy Carter Sees a "Profound Moral Crisis," 1977 609 Richard M. Nixon Reads Vietnam's Lessons, 1985 610 William Sullivan Identifies Some Positive Consequences, 1987 612 Ronald Reagan Calls Vietnam a Noble and Just Cause, 1988 614 President Bill Clinton Lifts the Trade Embargo on Vietnam, 1994 615 An American Veteran Helps to Dedicate the Vietnam War Memorial /- (1982), 1985 617 ^ An African-American Draftee Reflects on the War's Impact, 1984 619 A Former Army Nurse Considers the War's Impact, 1987 621 ESSAYS Paul Kennedy • The Impact of Vietnam on America's World Role 622 EricM. Bergerud • Lessons of an Intractable Conflict 627 Marilyn B. Young • The War's Tragic Legacy 637.
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