Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: the United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952 Author(S): Melvyn P

Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952 Author(s): Melvyn P. Leffler Source: The Journal of American History, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Mar., 1985), pp. 807-825 Published by: Organization of American Historians Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1888505 . Accessed: 15/09/2011 19:06

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http://www.jstor.org Strategy,Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The UnitedStates, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952

MelvynP. Leffler

On March12, 1947,President Harry S. Trumanappeared before a jointsession of Congressand made one of the most momentousaddresses of the postwar era. Requesting$400 millionin aid forGreece and Turkey, he emphasizedthat a "fatefulhour" had arrivedand thatnations had to "choose betweenalter- nativeways of life." The UnitedStates, Truman insisted, had to support"free peoples who are resistingattempted subjugation by armedminorities or by outside pressures."Greece, of course, was then beleagueredby civil war. Turkey,while enjoyingremarkable internal stability, supposedly was subject to pressurefrom the SovietUnion, a constantwar of nerves, and theprospect of outrightSoviet aggression.Undersecretary of State Dean G. Acheson warnedthat if the United States did not act, three continents could fall prey to Sovietdomination. 1 The internationalsituation, of course, was far more complex than that describedby Truman or Acheson. The presidentand his closest advisers simplifiedinternational realities in orderto generatepublic supportfor un- precedentedpeacetime foreign-policyinitiatives.2 Many scholars have demonstratedthat the Greekcivil war did not fallneatly into the categoryof Soviet aggression-Americanresponse. Developmentsin Turkey,however, havereceived far less attention.3 MelvynP. Leffleris associateprofessor of historyat VanderbiltUniversity. Research for this articlewas supportedby grantsfrom the WoodrowWilson International Center, the Council on ForeignRelations, the HarryS. Truman Institute,and the VanderbiltUniversity Research Council. 1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947 (Washington, 19631,178-79; Dean Acheson,Present at theCreation: My Yearsin theState Department (New York,1969), 219; JosephM. Jones,Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947) (New York,1955), 39-198. 2 PresidentHarry S. Trumansaid thathe confronted'the greatestselling job everfacing a Presi- dent."Dean Achesonadmitted: "No timewas leftfor measured appraisal." Matthew J. Connelly, noteson cabinetmeeting, March 7, 1947,box 1, MatthewJ. Connelly Papers (Harry S. Truman Library,Independence, Mo.); Acheson,Present at theCreation, 219. 3 LawrenceS. Wittner,American Intervention in Greece,1943-1949 (New York, 1982); John R. Oneal,Foreign Policy Making in Timesof Crisis (Columbus, 1982), 137-215; George Martin Alex-

The Journalof American History Vol. 71 No. 4 March1985 807 808 The Journalof American History

The purposeof this articleis to examinethe policy of the United States towardTurkey in the postwarera, to elucidateUnited States policy makers' assessmentsof Soviet intentions toward Turkey, and to explainthe reasons for and the consequencesof Turkey's inclusion in the TrumanDoctrine. Rather thanexpecting an imminentSoviet attack on Turkey,United States officials soughtto takeadvantage of a favorableopportunity to enhancethe strategic in- terestsof the United States in theMiddle East and theeastern Mediterranean. Assistanceunder the TrumanDoctrine was designedto improvethe military capabilitiesof both Turkeyand the United States to wage war againstthe SovietUnion shouldconflict unexpectedly erupt. Although United States of- ficialshoped to capitalizeon Turkey'sgeographic location without assuming specificguarantees to defendTurkey's territorial integrity, they soon found thattheir investment in Turkeymight be wastedand theirhopes for strategic gainunrealized if they did not acceptmore binding commitments in theform of Turkey'sadmission into the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This article,then, underscores the importantand oftenunexplained role of strategicimperatives in theshaping of foreign-policy actions and alliancerela- tionships.More indirectly,it seeks to stimulatea reconsiderationof how the relationshipbetween the United States and Turkey might have interactedwith othervariables to escalatetensions during the formative years of the Cold War. In theimmediate aftermath of World War II, UnitedStates policy makers did not believethat Soviet leaders intended to use forceto achievetheir goals vis- a-visTurkey. State Department and militaryofficials assumed that the Soviet Union's desireto revisethe MontreuxConvention, to establishbases in the Dardanelles,and to acquireKars and Ardahan constituted threats to long-term Anglo-Americaninterests in the Mediterranean.Foreign Service officers such as GeorgeF. Kennanand ElbridgeDurbrow and strategicplanners such as Gen. ander,The Preludeto the TrumanDoctrine: British Policy in Greece,1944-1947 (New York, 1982); John0. Iatrides,Revolt in Athens:The GreekCommunist "Second Round," 1944-1945 (Princeton,1972); C. M. Woodhouse,The Strugglefor Greece, 1941-1949 (London, 1976). Turkish-Americanrelations are coveredbriefly in mostof the standard accounts of the originsof the Cold Warand of UnitedStates policy in the MiddleEast. See, forexample, Daniel Yergin, ShatteredPeace: The Originsof the Cold Warand the NationalSecurity State (Boston,1977), 233-35; JohnLewis Gaddis, The UnitedStates and theOrigins of the Cold War,1941-1947 (New York,1972), 336-52; ThomasG. Paterson,Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruc- tionand theOrigins of the Cold War(Baltimore, 1973), 174-206; Joyce Kolko and GabrielKolko, The Limitsof Power: The Worldand UnitedStates Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York, 1972), 242-45,336-46; GeorgeKirk, The Middle East, 1 945-1 950 (London,1954), 21-56; JohnC. Camp- bell, Defenseof the MiddleEast: Problemsof American Policy (New York,1958), 154-82; and GeorgeLenczowski, Soviet Advances in theMiddle East (Washington,1972), 37-49. Fora recent accountof UnitedStates policy in the regionprior to the TrumanDoctrine, see BruceRobellet Kuniholm,The Originsof the Cold Warin theNear East: GreatPower Conflict and Diplomacyin Iran,Turkey, and Greece(Princeton, 1980). For the controversy over the Dardanelles, see HarryN. Howard,Turkey, the Straitsand U.S. Policy (Baltimore,1974); AnthonyR. De Luca, "Soviet- AmericanPolitics and the TurkishStraits," Political Science Quarterly,92 (Fall 1977),503-24; and David J. Alvarez,Bureaucracy and Cold WarDiplomacy: The UnitedStates and Turkey, 1943-1946 (Thessaloniki,1980). For an analysisof Truman'sperceptions of Sovietintentions regardingTurkey, see J. GarryClifford, "President Truman and Peter the Great's Will," DiplomaticHistory, 4 (Fall 1980),371-85. United States, Turkey, and NATO 809

GeorgeA. Lincoln,however, maintained that Soviet leaders felt too weak to engagein militaryaggression and therebyto riska generalwar.4 Those assessmentswere based on appraisalsof Sovietactions that were, in fact,carefully modulated. In June1945, for example, Soviet Foreign Minister VyacheslavM. Molotovinformed the Turkishambassador that Soviet accep- tanceof a new treatyof friendship was contingenton revisionof the Montreux Convention,frontier readjustments, and greatersecurity in the straits,in- cludinga base. Yet even hard-lineUnited States officialssuch as Loy W. Henderson,director of the Office of Near Eastern and AfricanAffairs, acknowledgedthat the Soviets had not made formaldemands, had acted withrestraint, and had invitedfurther discussion. When Josef Stalin discussed theseissues withWinston S. Churchilland Trumanat Potsdamand whenhe reviewedthem with AmbassadorWalter Bedell Smith in Moscow in April 1946, the Soviet leader was neitherintransigent nor intemperate.Soviet diplomatsmade it clearthat they were flexible on theterritorial issue and that it was of secondaryimportance. After the springof 1946,the Sovietsstopped raisingthe matterof frontierreadjustments, and the issue fadedfrom the diplomaticscene.5 In theirrelations with Turkey, the Sovietsgave priorityto enhancingtheir securityin the straitsand in the Black Sea. Because thatmatter has received extensiveattention, there is no reason to dwell on it here. In brief,United Statesofficials acknowledged the legitimacyof the Sovietdesire to revisethe MontreuxConvention but opposedSoviet acquisitionof bases. Trumanand Churchillagreed at Potsdamthat the Sovietsought to raise the questionof revisionat a subsequenttime. In theirinformal and nonacrimoniousdiscus sions withTurkish officials in 1945 and early1946, Sovietdiplomats empha sized theneed to enhanceSoviet security in the Dardanellesand in the Black 4 Expandeddraft of letter from Secretary of War to Secretaryof State,"U.S. Positionre Soviet Proposalson Kiel Canal and Dardanelles,"July 8, 1945, sec. 1-A,ABC 093 Kiel (6 July1945), Recordsof the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165 (NationalArchives); George A. Lincoln to StanleyD. Embick, July7, 1945, ibid.; Lincoln to JohnE. Hull, April 11, 1945, OPD 336 TS, ibid.; JointChiefs of Staff[JCS] 1418/1, enclosure "B," JCSto Secretaryof State,July 30, 1945, CCS 092 (7-10-45),Records of the JointChiefs of Staff,RG 218 (NationalArchives); JCS 1641,IU.S. SecurityInterests in theEastern Mediterranean," March 10-13, 1946,sec. 6, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), ibid.; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946 (11 vols., Washington, 1969-1972),VII, 840-42; GeorgeF. Kennanto Secretaryof State, March 17, 1946,box 63, George M. ElseyPapers (Harry S. TrumanLibrary); Elbridge Durbrow to Secretaryof State, Aug. 5, 1946, file761.67/8-546, Records of the Department of State, RG 59 (NationalArchives). 5 Memorandumregarding Soviet-Turkish Relations, June 29, 1945, FW 761.6711/6-1845, Recordsof the Departmentof State;Edwin C. Wilsonto Secretaryof State,April 19, 1946,file 761.67/4-1946,ibid.; JamesF. Byrnes,memorandum for the President,July 4, 1945, box 175, President'ssecretary's file, Harry S. TrumanPapers (HarryS. TrumanLibrary); Walter Bedell Smith to Secretaryof State, April 5, 1946, box 188, ibid.; ForeignRelations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945 (2 vols., Washington,1960), I, 1010-54,1II, 257-58, 266-67, 301-305,312-14, 320, 365-67, 372-73, 393, 606, 1427-28, 1439-40; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, VII, 809-810; "Russian- TurkishFrontier," March 11, 1946,box 11,William D. LeahyPapers, Records of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff. It is difficultto findany reference to theSoviets' raising the territorial issue anew after the middleof 1946. In May 1953the Soviets assured Turkey that they no longerlaid claimto Karsand Ardahan.Stephen G. Xydis,"The 1945Crisis over the Turkish Straits," Balkan Studies, 1 (1960), 90. 810 The Journalof American History

Sea. Theywere usually vague aboutwhat they wanted, but occasionallythey intimatedthat they might be satisfiedwith less thanpermanent bases in the straits. 6 Whenthe Soviets finally raised the issue ofthe straits in a formaldiplomatic note in August1946, the furorengendered in Washingtonwas out of propor- tionto thediplomatic event. Edwin C. Wilson,the UnitedStates ambassador to Turkey,interpreted the Soviet proposals,including a request for joint defenseof the Dardanelles, as a smokescreen for destroying Turkey's independence. Wilson acknowledged,however, that the Soviet note itselfwas not threateningin tone.Nor were Turkish officials particularly alarmed. They did not expecta Sovietattack, and theyhad anticipateda morebellicose Soviet diplomaticinitiative. Moreover, they considered the second Sovietnote, cir- culatedin September,even milderand morerestrained. The Sovietquest for bases in the Dardanelles,in fact,was similarto ongoingUnited States efforts to negotiatebase rightsin Iceland,Greenland, Panama, the Azores,and the westernPacific. Several months earlier Henderson had emphasizedprecisely thispoint when he had advisedagainst raising a formalobjection to Sovietre- questsof Turkey. 7 What supposedlydistinguished Soviet actions towardTurkey was Soviet bellicosity.Diplomats and historiansoften have focusedon Soviet troop movementsto supporttheir contention that the Soviets were preparingor threateningto use forceto dominateTurkey. On March18, 1946,for example, in a frequentlycited dispatch,Ambassador Wilson informedWashington of new Soviettroop dispositions and suggestedthat the Soviets might soon be in a positionto strikeat Turkey.In themost recent and widelyacclaimed analysis of developmentsin the Near East, Bruce RobelletKuniholm fully accepts Wilson'sappraisal of Soviet actions and intentions.8 There is, however,considerable reason to question that view of Soviet behaviorand to reassess the motivationsbehind subsequent actions of the UnitedStates. Throughout late 1945and 1946,for example, United States officials receivedintelligence that Soviet troops were being withdrawn in substan- tial numbersfrom eastern and southeasternEurope. Although troop rotations 6 Howard,Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy;Xydis, '"1945 Crisis over the Turkish Straits," 65-90; Byrnes,memorandum for the President, July 4, 1945,box 175,President's secretary's file, TrumanPapers; Smith to Secretaryof State, April 5, 1946,box 188,ibid.; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, VII, 812-13, 816, 826. Despite occasional vituperouspress and radio announcementsby boththe Turksand the Soviets,United States officials knew that Turkish- Sovietdiplomatic talks tookplace in a correct,if not a cordial,manner. Ibid., 810-18; Foreign Relationsof the United States, 1945 (9 vols.,Washington, 1967-1969), VIII, 1219. 7Foreign Relationsof the UnitedStates, 1946, VII, 827-29, 835, 837, 859, 860, 867-68, 869; ThomasT. Handyto DwightD. Eisenhower,Aug. 15, 1946,P&O 092 TS, Recordsof the United StatesArmy Staff, RG319 (NationalArchives); JCS 1704/1, "Military Implications of the Current TurkishSituation," Aug. 24, 1946,sec. 1, CCS 092 (8-22-46),Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Loy W. Hendersonto H. FreemanMatthews, Jan. 30, 1946,box 17, Lot 54D394, Recordsof the Departmentof State. 8 EdwinC. Wilson's stresson Soviettroop movements can be foundin his frequentlycited dispatchto theSecretary of State.Bruce Robellet Kuniholm uses thatdocument as a framework formuch of his analysisregarding Turkey. Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, 1946, VII, 818-19;Kuniholm, Origins of the Cold Warin theNear East, 316-17, 356. UnitedStates, Turkey, and NATO 811 and maneuversdid occur,those actionswere considerednormal. In October 1945 a reportfrom the joint intelligence subcommittee in Londonemphasized thatthere was no appreciablebuildup of troops in Bulgariaand no concentra- tion of aircraft,either in Bulgariaor in the Caucasus, capableof sustaininga Soviet attackon Turkey.In late December 1945 UnitedStates Army intelli- gencereported that stories of Soviet troop concentrations in Bulgariahad been alarmist.Some incrementof Soviet troops in Bulgariaprobably did occur brief- ly in early1946, but UnitedStates military analysts concurred with Turkish officialsthat it did not portenda Sovietattack. Indeed, at the verytime that Wilsonsent his alarmingdispatch on March 18, warningof impending Soviet aggression,both the Turkishprime minister and the secretary-generalof the TurkishForeign Office were discounting that possibility. According to United Statesintelligence, between May and September1946, Soviet troops in Europe decreasedfrom about 2 millionmen to about 1.5 million;within the Soviet Union,from about 5 millionto 2.7 million.During the crisisof August 1946, Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg,director of the Central IntelligenceGroup, reassuredPresident Truman that there were no unusual Soviettroop concentrations,troop movements, or supplybuildups.9 Why,then, were United States officials so exercisedby Sovietpolicy toward Turkey?Although they did not expect the Soviets to apply militaryforce, policymakers worried that the Soviet demandfor bases in the Dardanelles mightbe a ruse forthe eventualprojection of Sovietpower into the eastern Mediterraneanand the Near East. Bases in the straits,United States military expertsargued, would not sufficeto keep the waterwayopen in wartime againstmodern air power;hence, the Sovietswere likelyto seek additional bases in the Aegean and the easternMediterranean. If Soviet influenceex- pandedin thatregion, vital Britishpetroleum supplies and communication networksmight be jeopardized.And if the British Empire disintegrated, Soviet prospectsfor gaining control of Eurasia would be greatlyenhanced, and the United Statesmight be leftvulnerable and exposed. At a meetingwith the presidenton August15, 1946,Acting Secretary of StateAcheson, Secretary of the Navy JamesV. Forrestal,Assistant Secretary of War KennethC. Royall, and top militaryleaders presented those argumentsand urgedresistance to Sovietdemands. Truman fully concurred with their advice. 10 9 Forweekly calculations of Soviet troop dispositions, see CarlEspe, memoranda, 1946, A8, box 106,series V, StrategicPlans Division (Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard); JIC (45) 289 (0) (FINAL),Report by JointIntelligence Subcommittee, "The RussianThreat to Turkey," Oct. 6, 1945,ABC 092 USSR (15 November1944), Records of the WarDepartment General and Special Staffs;Joint Intelligence Committee, "Russian Troop Movements in SouthEast Europe and Persia,"May 15, 1946,ibid.; MilitaryIntelligence Division, "Review of Europe, Russia, and theMiddle East," Dec. 26, 1945,sec. 2, OPD 350.05TS, ibid.;John Weckerling to DeputyChief of Staff,March 19, 1946,ibid.; SACMED AFHQ, Caserta,Italy, to WarDepartment, March 9, 1946, box 1, LeahyPapers, Records of the JointChiefs of Staff;William M. Robertsonto WarDepart- ment,June 13, 1946,ibid.; HoytS. Vandenberg,memorandum for the President, Aug. 24, 1946, box 249,President's secretary's file, Truman Papers. For Wilson's cables noting the Turkish belief thatthe Soviets were not planning an attack,see Wilsonto Secretaryof State, March 19, 1946,file 761.67/3-1946,Records of the Department of State. 10 ForeignRelations of the United States, 1946, VII, 840-58. 812 The Journalof American History

The decision to encourageTurkish oppositionto Soviet overturescon- stitutedpart of the overall tougheningof United States policy towardthe SovietUnion during 1946. Trumanbegan the year determined to stopbabying the Soviets;in his "long" telegramin February,Kennan laid out an elaborate rationalefor resisting Soviet pressure; during the Iraniancrisis in the spring, UnitedStates officials learned that if they assumed a determinedposture, the Soviets would back down. Rankledby domesticcriticism and by division withinhis administration,beleaguered by a hostof domestic and international problems,exasperated by the tedious negotiationsover the minor peace treaties,and cognizantof traditionalSoviet ambitionsin the Near East, Trumanwas in no moodto enterinto negotiations with the Soviet Union over theDardanelles. I1 Duringthe summerthe president asked ClarkM. Clifford,one ofhis assis- tantsin theWhite House, to writea paperoutlining Soviet violations of inter- nationalcommitments. Clifford and GeorgeM. Elsey,another White House aide, took the opportunityto consult with all the leadingmembers of the administration,including top militaryofficers, and to writea comprehensive reportcalling for the global containmentof Soviet influence.The rapid, decisive, and unanimous accord to stiffenTurkish resistance to Soviet demandsreflected a consensusthat new initiativeshad to be takento shoreup UnitedStates influence in areasof vital importance. 12 Top officialssuspected, however, that the Americanpublic would not understandthe strategicimportance of Turkey.At theirAugust meeting with the president,Royall and Forrestalemphasized the importanceof properly briefingthe press. Shortly thereafter, Royall informed Secretary of-War Robert P. Pattersonthat Acheson was readyto discuss means "of conditioningthe publicmind." Exactlywhat was done is uncertain,but the news media did beginto explainto the attentivepublic thatthe disputeover the straitswas assumingcentral importance in the overallrivalry between the SovietUnion and the UnitedStates. For example, Time notedthat the Sovietproposals on the Dardanelles, coupled with Bulgaria's request for part of Thrace, representedthe SovietUnion's effortto gain access to the Aegean,to seal off thestraits, and to threatenGreece and Turkey.At the same time,the Saturday EveningPost reproachedleft-wingers, isolationists, and appeasersfor their in- differenceto the SovietUnion's ominousattempt to excludethe shippingof othernations from the Black Sea. UnitedStates News, quotingadministration officials,reported that the Soviet goal was to gain controlof the eastern Mediterranean,to secureaccess to oil in the Middle East, and to establisha "flankingposition on Indiaand China." 13 11 RobertL. Messer, The End of an Alliance: JamesF. Byrnes,Roosevelt, Truman, and the Originsof the Cold War(Chapel Hill, 1982),137-94; Oneal, Foreign Policy Making, 68-136; Clif- ford,"President Truman and Peter the Great's Will. " 12Arthur Krock, Memoirs: Sixty Years on theFiring Line (New York,1968), 421-82; box 63, ElseyPapers; boxes 14, 15,Clark M. CliffordPapers (Harry S. TrumanLibrary). 13 WalterMillis, ed., The ForrestalDiaries (New York, 1951), 191-92; KennethC. Royallto RobertP. Patterson,n.d. [mid-August19461, box 9, generaldecimal file, Robert P. Patterson Papers,Records of the Office of the Secretaryof War, RG 107 (NationalArchives); Time, Sept. 2, UnitedStates, Turkey, and NATO 813

Whattop officialsdid not tell thepress and whatthe media did not explain werethe precise strategic calculations that underlay United States determinationto containSoviet influence in theNear East. Indeed,on thevery day that Acheson,Forrestal, and Royallmet with Truman,military planners on the JointWar Plans Committeewere putting the final touches on a strategicstudy, knownas "Griddle,"that emphasized the importanceof Turkeyas a base for Allied operationsagainst the Soviet Union should war unexpectedlyerupt. Those civilianand militaryofficials who met withTruman on August15, in- cludingAdm. ChesterW. Nimitz, Gen. Carl Spaatz, and Gen. Thomas T. Handy,were very aware of Turkey'sprospective strategic importance to the Westin wartime. 14 In fact,despite the rhetoric about the Sovietexpansionist thrust southward, militaryanalysts and civilianofficials acknowledged that Soviet demands on Turkeyhad a substantialdefensive component. "Soviet pressure in theMiddle East," concludedthe JointChiefs of Staff(JCS) in March 1946, "has forits primaryobjective the protection of the vital Ploesti, Kharkov and Baku areas.' Threemonths later, in a comprehensiveassessment of Soviet intentions in the MiddleEast, British intelligence emphasized Soviet efforts to move the center of Sovietindustry eastward, to safeguardthe Caucasian oil fields,and to pro- tect the developmentof Soviet resourcesfrom prospective attack. In their reportto thepresident, Clifford and Elseyalso notedthat "the Near East is an areaof great strategic interest to theSoviet Union because of the shift of Soviet industryto southeasternRussia, within range of air attackfrom much of the Near East." Andin November1946, in a stillmore detailed assessment of the region,United States war plannersstressed that the SovietUnion wantedto controlthe easternMediterranean and PersianGulf areas in order"to deny themas possibleenemy air, sea, andground offensive bases. Bythis increase in thedepth of her southerly territorial border, the Soviets would greatly increase the securityof theirvital areas fromair attackand fromseizure by ground forces."'5 It was thisvery vulnerability that United States strategic planners hoped to capitalizeon. In fact,United States interest in Turkeyaccelerated as warplan- ners beganto developa strategicconcept for the postwarera and as overall United States-Soviet relations deterioratedsharply in early 1946. In September1945 strategicplanners emphasized "the necessityof keepinga prospectiveenemy at the maximumpossible distance, and converselyof pro- 1946,p. 22; "Our LeftWingers Go Isolationist,"Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 12, 1946,p. 160; "U.S. Standon Dardanelles:High Stakes in theMiddle East," UnitedStates News, Aug. 30, 1946, pp. 16-17. 14 JointWar Plans Committee[JWPC] 467/1, Aug. 15, 1946,sec. 11, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), Recordsof the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See also citationsin footnote18. 15 JCS1641/1, "U.S. SecurityInterests in theEastern Mediterranean," March 10, 1946,sec. 6, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; JWPC 475/1, "Strategic Study of the Areabetween the Alps and theHimalayas," Nov. 2, 1946,sec. 3, pt. 1, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), ibid.; JointIntelligence Committee [of the BritishStaff Mission], Memorandum for Information No. 223, "Russia'sStrategic Interests and Intentions in theMiddle East," June28, 1946,sec. 1-C, ABC 336 Russia (22 August1943), Records of the WarDepartment General and Special Staffs; Krock,Memoirs, 434. 814 The Journalof American History jectingour advance bases intoareas well removedfrom the United States, so as to projectour operationswith new weaponsor otherwisenearer the enemy." Withregard to a prospectivewar withthe SovietUnion, the aim was "to op- pose,as faras possible,Russian advances beyond her own bordersand to obtain suchstrategic positions as arerequired to destroyher war potential rather than to overrunthe USSR." Laterin theautumn of 1945,the first efforts were made to defineSoviet industrial-urbancenters of criticalstrategic importance. In orderof priority,planners focused on oil-producingcenters in the Caucasus and in Rumania and, secondarily,on industrialcomplexes in the Urals, Ukraine,Upper Silesia and Czechoslovakia,Moscow, and Mukden areas. "Destructionby air of the Caucasian and Ploestioil fieldsand theUkraine and Uralindustrial centers would prevent Soviet prosecution of war. " 16 Turkey's special role emergedin March 1946 when, duringthe Iranian crisis, State Departmentofficials pressed military planners to definemore clearlythe importanceof Turkeyand when strategicanalysts were forcedto come to termswith the effects of Western Europe's military weakness and the UnitedStates' rapid demobilization. Assuming that Soviet troops would easily overrunall of WesternEurope and that United States forceswould be evacuatedfrom the continent,the utilizationof air power took on more significancethan ever before. Turkey was seen as a keyto theeffective applica- tionof air power. 17During the springand summerof 1946,prior to the Soviet note on the straits,strategic planners decided that other than GreatBritain, the Cairo-Suezarea was the most desirableplace on theglobe from which to launch an air attackagainst Soviet targets. Should war erupt,Turkey's great importancewould be that it providea cushion,absorbing the initial Soviet blowand deterringSoviet advances, while the United States prepared to under- takethe counteroffensive, particularly from the Cairo-Suez area. In April1946 GeneralLincoln repeatedly emphasized that strategy to BenjaminV. Cohen, Secretaryof State James F. Byrnes'sclosest aide; in JulyAdm. Richard L. Con- olly,commander of United States naval forcesin the easternAtlantic and the Mediterranean,almost certainly discussed the strategywith Byrnes and other State Departmentofficials when he servedwith themon the United States delegationto the ParisPeace Conference;and laterin the monthSecretary of WarPatterson explained the same strategyto PresidentTruman. By the time 16 JointPlanning Staff )JPSI 744/3, "Strategic Concept and Plan forthe Employment of United StatesArmed Forces," Sept. 14, 1945, sec. 1, CCS 381 (5-13-45),Records of the JointChiefs of Staff;Joint Intelligence Staff [JIS] 80/8, "StrategicVulnerability of Russia to a LimitedAir Attack,"Oct. 25, 1945,sec. 2, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),ibid.; JIS226/2, "Areas Vital to Soviet WarEffort," Feb. 12, 1946,sec. 5, ibid.; JIS226/3, "Areas Vital to SovietWar Effort," March 4, 1946,ibid. 17 Bymesto JCS,March 6, 1946,sec. 5, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),ibid.; memo for the Joint Staff Planners,March 8, 1946, ibid.; JCS 1641/1, "U.S. SecurityInterests in the EasternMediter- ranean,"March 10, 1946,sec. 6, ibid.; JPS789, "Conceptof Operations for Pincher," enclosure "B," sec. 1, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),ibid.; JWPC453, "Dispositionof OccupationForces in Europeand the Far East in theEvent of Hostilities in Europe,and theImportance of Certain Areas of Eurasia,"March 27, 1946,sec. 5, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),ibid.; OperationsDivision, "Ade- quate GovernmentalMachinery to Handle ForeignAffairs," March 13, 1946, P&O 092 TS, Recordsof the United States Army Staff; meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, March 6, 1946,box 3, safefile, Patterson Papers. UnitedStates, Turkey, and NATO 815 of the August1946 crisis,it was evidentto high-levelcivilian policy makers, not just to militaryplanners, that "Turkeymust be preservedfor reasons of Middle East strategy"as well as to preventthe fallingof otherdominoes in WesternEurope and in theFar East. 18 While StateDepartment officials labored over an answerto the Sovietnote on theDardanelles, military planners insisted that "every practicable measure shouldbe undertakento permitthe utilizationof Turkeyas a base forAllied operationsin the eventof war withthe USSR." Ifwar occurred Turkey could slow down a Soviet advance to Suez and North Africa,attack Soviet oil resources,provide fighter cover for bombers heading toward Moscow, bottle up Sovietsubmarines in the Black Sea, destroySoviet shipping, and launch a possibleground offensive into the Soviet heartland. It was indispensable,then, to encourageTurkey to resist Soviet demandsin peacetimeand to thwart Sovietadvances in wartime.Accordingly, military planners began advocating the allocation of militaryassistance to Turkey,including fighter aircraft, automatic weapons, ammunition,and small arms. They believed that previousstudies had exaggeratedSoviet logistic capabilities and thatTurkey could mountan effectiveresistance, especially if providedwith aid priorto hostilities.With that in mind,initial United States Army Air Force plans for launchinga strategicoffensive assumed the deployment to theCairo-Suez area of threeheavy bomber groups and the commencementof sustainedconven- tionalbombing of SovietRussia fromthat location within 120 days afterthe onset of hostilities.On January14, 1947, Adm. ForrestSherman made a de- tailedpresentation of those evolving strategic concepts to PresidentTruman. 19 By early1947 almostall civilianand militaryofficials agreed on theneed to furnishmilitary assistance to Turkey. Left uncertainwere whetherthis assistancewould be providedby the United States or by Great Britain,the precisepurposes for which the assistancewould be used, and the means of garneringsupport in theUnited States. After extensive interagency discussions

18 JPS789/1, appendix "B," April13, 1946,sec. 1, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),Records of the Joint Chiefsof Staff;Pincher plans and discussionson JWPC432 series,April-July 1946, sec. 2, ibid.; JCS1704/1, "Military Implications of the Current Turkish Situation," Aug. 24, 1946,sec. 1, CCS 092 (8-22-46),ibid.; S.W.D., memorandumfor the record, June 12, 1946,P&O 092 TS, Recordsof theUnited States Army Staff; Patterson to Truman,July 27, 1946,ibid.; Lincoln,memorandum forthe record,April 16, 1946, sec. 1-C, ABC 336 Russia (22 August1943), Records of the War DepartmentGeneral and Special Staffs;James McCormack, memorandum for Charles H. Bonesteel,April 20, 1946,sec. 1-A,ABC 093 Kiel (6 July1945), ibid.; H.C.P., memorandumfor Patterson,April 22, 1946,box 1, safefile, Patterson Papers; "Possible Program in Connectionwith Turkey,"Aug. 15, 1946,box 9, generaldecimal file, ibid.; RichardL. Conollyinterview, 1960, transcript,pp. 293-303,Columbia Oral HistoryCollection (Butler Library, Columbia University, New YorkCity). 19JWPC 467/1, "Griddle," Aug. 15, 1946,sec. 11,CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),Records of the Joint Chiefsof Staff;joint Logistic Plans CommitteeIJLPCI 35/23, "Requestfor Logistic Information relativeto Turkey,"Oct. 10. 1946,sec. 12,pt. 1,ibid.; JWPC475/1, "Strategic Study of the Area betweenthe Alps and the Himalayas,"Nov. 2, 1946,sec. 3, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),ibid.; JCS 1704/1,"Military Implications of the Current Turkish Situation," Aug. 24, 1946,sec. 1, CCS 092 (8-22-46),ibid.; A. R. Pefleyto Op-30,Aug. 21, 1946,box 68, seriesIII, StrategicPlans Division; "AirPlan for Makefast," n.d., sec. 3, ABC 381 USSR (2 March1946), Records of the War Depart- mentGeneral and Special Staffs;Forrest P. Sherman,"Presentation to the President,"Jan. 14, 1947,box 2, ForrestP. ShermanPapers (Naval Historical Center). 816 The Journalof American History

in the autumnof 1946, Hendersonnoted the oppositionof the Export-Import Bank to large-scalefinancial assistance to Turkey;yet he encouragedcon- tinuedconsultation between the State,War, and Navy departmentsso that I"wewill be preparedto move when conditionsare propitious."The British notesin February1947, announcing their intent to withdrawfrom Greece and theirinability to continuemilitary assistance to Turkey,provided the ra- tionaleto mobilizecongressional and publicsupport.20 Nevertheless,United States policy makers had considerabledifficulty making theircase foraid to Turkey.Turkey was not experiencingdire economic conditions,nor was it facingfinancial stringencies. The Soviets had not recentlyexerted pressure on Turkey,nor did Americanofficials expect an im- minentattack. Hence, the most effectiveargument that could be made in public was that the Turkish militaryestablishment constituted a serious burdenon theTurkish economy; that burden had to be eased to ensurethat the Turkswould not acquiesce to Soviet demands.During executive sessions of the Committeeon ForeignRelations, however, senators' skepticism about whetherthe Turkishcrisis constituted an emergencycompelled Acheson to acknowledgethe strategicmotivations behind the United States initiative. Similarquestions forced Ambassador Wilson to answerso franklythat his testimonyhad to be strickeneven fromthe executivehearings. In his classic, personal account of the period, JosephM. Jonesacknowledges that "the strategicimportance of Turkeyranked high in discussionswithin the executive branchand in discussionswith congressionalleaders. They were, however,consciously played down in the President'smessage, in the public sessionsof the congressionalcommittees, and in the public approachgener- ally." That long-termstrategic calculations rather than short-termexpecta- tionsof Sovietaggression prompted concern with Turkey was evidentseveral monthslater when United States officials supported a partialdemobilization of Turkishforces because "no immediatedanger of an armedclash between Turkeyand Russia" was foreseen.2' 20 WilliamClayton to Byrnes,Sept. 12, 1946,P&O 092 TS, Recordsof the United States Army Staff;Meetings of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, Nov. 5, Nov. 13,box 3, safefile, Patter- son Papers;Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, VII, 894-97,916-17; Hendersonto R. L. Dennison, Dec. 18, 1946, EF-70, series 1, Recordsof the Politico-MilitaryDivision (Naval HistoricalCenter); Henderson, memorandum, "Aid to Turkey,"Nov. 24, 1946, ibid.; David LeBreton,memorandum of conversation,Nov. 18, 1946, file 867.20/11-1846,Records of the Departmentof State; ForeignRelations of the United States, 1947 (8 vols., Washington, 1971-1973),V, 35-37. Secretaryof War Robert P. Pattersondid consistently question the wisdom ofmilitary assistance to Turkey.See, forexample, Patterson to ActingSecretary of State, Sept. 12, 1946, box 7, safe file,Patterson Papers. 21 Henderson,memorandum, "'Aid to Turkey,"Nov. 24, 1946,EF-70, series 1, Recordsof the Politico-MilitaryDivision; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, VII, 921-22; Foreign Rela- tionsof the UnitedStates, 1947, V, 61-62, 90-91, 95, 364-65; Wilsonto Secretaryof State,Feb. 26, 1947,file 761.67/2-2647, Records of the Department of State; LeBreton to Henderson,Oct. 8, 1947,file 867.20/10-447, ibid.; "Summaryof Costs of U.S. Assistanceto Greeceand Turkey until 30 June1948," n.d. [earlyMarch 1947], box 65, ElseyPapers; Lincoln to Secretaryof War, March 12, 1947, box 1, generalsubject file, Howard C. PetersenPapers, Records of the Officeof the Secretaryof War; U.S. Congress,Senate, Committee on ForeignRelations, Legislative Origins of theTruman Doctrine: Hearings Held in ExecutiveSession before the Committee on ForeignRela- tions(Washington, 1973), 7-10, 48-53, 55-61,84, 105;Jones, Fifteen Weeks, 162. UnitedStates, Turkey, and NATO 817

Althoughplanned Soviet aggression was not anticipated,war could eruptas a resultof a miscalculationin a diplomaticcrisis. Accordingly,under the auspicesof the Truman Doctrine, United States officials designed the aid pro- gramto enhancethe fightingcapabilities of the Turkisharmy, air force,and navy,to help build strategicroads, and to restockTurkish arsenals and war reserves.American military advisers, however, were most concerned with the Turkisharmy. They desired to reorganizeand modernizethe army, to buildup its combat effectiveness,to provide it with much greatermobility and firepower,to develop its transportationand communicationinfrastructure, and to bolsterits logistical capabilities.22United States militaryadvisers hopedthat the Turkish army would play a keyrole in retardinga Sovietland offensivein the MiddleEast shouldwar occur,thereby affording time for the UnitedStates and GreatBritain to activateand utilizebases in the Cairo-Suez region.The Turkisharmy was givenequipment that would enableit initially to resista three-prongedSoviet attack across the Bosporus,the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. Recognizingthat Turkish forces could not hold thosepositions, UnitedStates military assistance sought to providethe Turkish army with the mobilityand logistical capability to fallback gradually, to carryon guerrillaac- tivitybehind advancing Soviet forces, and to make a final,large-scale stand in southernTurkey in the Iskenderonpocket. Much of the road construction undertakenin Turkeywith United States funds was designedto facilitatethat strategy.From the military perspective, a concentratedTurkish defense in the Iskenderonarea was a keyto maintainingaccess to MiddleEastern oil as well as to defendingvital strategic airports and communicationfacilities in Egypt.23 Fromair bases in Turkey,fighter bombers and attackplanes could not only aid Turkishground forces inside Turkey but also interdictSoviet troops mov- ing throughIran and Iraq towardPersian Gulf oil or sweepingwidely toward Cairo-Suez.Accordingly, next to the army,the Turkishair forcewas the largestrecipient of United States assistance.During 1948, forexample, the United States transferredover 180 F-47s, 30 B-26s, and 86 C-47s. Smaller 22 Minutesof the Executive Committee, Turkish General Staff/U.S. Mission, May 27-July10, 1947,file 867.20/7-1047, Records of the Department of State; Wilson to Secretaryof State, Jan. 30, 1948, file 867.20/1-3048, ibid.; ForeignRelations of the United States, 1947, V, 233-36; "Call for Estimates, FY 1950, MAP," Sept. 23, 1949, P&O 092 Europe TS, Records of the United States ArmyStaff; Joint American Military Mission forAid to Turkey[JAMMAT], "Major Items of Equipment:Aid to TurkeyProgram," March 1952, box 56, Recordsof the Assistant Secretary of Defense,International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretaryof Defense, RG 330 (NationalAr- chives).Many monthly progress reports on thearrival of assistance and on thecourses of instruc- tionmay be foundin decimalfile series 867.00, Records of the Department of State. 23 CentralIntelligence Agency, "The CurrentSituation in Turkey,"Oct. 20, 1947, box 254, President'ssecretary's file, Truman Papers; JointStrategic Plans Committee[JSPCI 868/1, "Guidance forthe Coordinator,Armed Forces Groups,American Mission forAid to Turkey [AMATI,"March 26, 1948,P&O 091 TurkeyTS, Recordsof the United States Army Staff; Chief of Staff,U.S. Army,memorandum, "Turkish and Iranian Military Effort in War,"Feb. 25, 1950,381 MiddleEast TS, ibid.; RobertB. Carney,memorandum for Secretary of Defense, Sept. 29, 1948, CD 2-2-5,box 4, Recordsof the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Subcommittee for the Near and MiddleEast, memorandum for the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, Dec. 15, 1948,box 134, TS file,Records of the State-War-NavyCoordinating Committee [SWNCC], RG 353 (NationalArchives). 818 The Journalof American History numbersof jet fightersbegan arriving in 1950 and 1951. At thesame time,the United Statesplaced a greatdeal of stresson reconstructingand resurfacing Turkishairfields at places such as Bandirmaand Diyarbakir.As a result, Turkey began to develop the capabilityto attack vital Soviet petroleum resourcesin Rumania and in the Caucasus; Ploesti and Baku, forexample, came withinrange of the F-47s and the B-26s. Even more important,the rehabilitationof Turkish airfields and the constructionof new ones at Adana, forexample, meant that if war erupted the United States would be able to bring in itsown B-29sto bombthe Soviet Union. Secretaryof the Air Force W. Stuart Symingtonand Secretaryof DefenseForrestal were contemplatingthat con- tingencyin early 1948. A more systematiceffort to achieve such bombing capabilitywas inauguratedin late 1949; significantprogress toward that goal was expectedduring 1952.24 UnitedStates assistance to theTurkish navy aimed primarily at enhancing Turkey'sability to close the Dardanellesand to preventSoviet submarines fromentering the Mediterranean.The UnitedStates also wantedto help the Turkishnavy plan the defenseof the Bosporusand developthe capabilityof destroyingSoviet Black Sea shipping.But the lattermission also was within the purviewof the United StatesNavy. Aircraftfrom United States carriers would leapfrogto Turkishair bases, refuel,and attackoil cargoeson Soviet shipsin the Black Sea. To achievethat capability, Admiral Conolly, with the supportof the secretary of defense, sought funds for the storage of aviation gas inTurkey.25 Throughoutthe period 1947-1950, United States militaryplanners were eagerto use assistanceas a leverto bringTurkish military planning into line with United States desires.United States Armyofficers feared that Turkey wouldtry to makea full-scalestand at theBosporus and would lose muchof its army;such a possibilityconflicted with the United States emphasison the 24 Ambassador'sReport on Aidto Turkey, July 15, 1947,Annex D, PartThree, P&O 091 Turkey, Recordsof the United States Army Staff; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,memorandum, "Turkish and IranianMilitary Effort in War,"Feb. 25, 1950,381 MiddleEast TS, ibid.; "Proposalfor Continuing Aid to the TurkishAir Force," appendedto Wilds to RobertA. Lovett,Jan. 23, 1948, file 867.20/1-2348,Records of the Departmentof State; JohnH. Ohly to LlewellynE. Thompson, Nov. 22, 1949,box 1, Lot 484, ibid.; USTAP ReportNo. 29, March12, 1949,file 867.00/5-1249, ibid.; StuartSymington to JamesV. Forrestal,March 9, 1948,CD 6-2-38,box 35, Recordsof the Officeof the Secretaryof Defense; Lyman L. Lemnitzerto JamesH. Burns,March 6, 1950,CD 6-2-46,box 23, ibid.; National SecurityCouncil [NSCJ42, "U.S. Objectiveswith Respectto Greeceand Turkey to CounterSoviet Threats to U.S. Security,"March 4, 1949,Records of the Na- tionalSecurity Council, RG 273 (NationalArchives); Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950 (7 vols.,Washington, 1976-1980), V, 1234, 1250; ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates, 1951 (6 vols.,Washington, 1977-1983), V, 1124-25. 25 JCS1704/8, enclosure "A," memorandumfor the Coordinator, Armed Forces Group, AMAT; n.d. [Sept.19481, P&O 091 TurkeyTS, Recordsof the United States Army Staff; J. R. D., memofor therecord, Feb. 18, 1949,ibid.; RayT. Maddocks,memorandum for Horace L. McBride,March 1, 1949,ibid.; Louis Denfeld,memorandum for JCS, Aug. 9, 1948,JJ7, box 245, StrategicPlans Divi- sion; E. T. Wooldridge,memorandum for Op-03, Jan. 10, 1949,A19, box 251, ibid.; ElliottB. Strauss,memorandum for Op-30, June 17, 1949, A14, box 249, ibid.; JCS 1887/20,Carney to CNO, Jan.30, 1951, sec. 4, CCS 381 EasternMediterranean and Middle East Area [EMMEAJ (11-19-47),Records of the JointChiefs of Staff;Forrestal, memorandum for the NSC, n.d. [early 19491,CD 19-2-21,box 92, Recordsof the Office of the Secretary of Defense. UnitedStates, Turkey, and NATO 819

Iskenderonpocket. United States naval officials,despairing of the Turkish navy's elementarystrategy, its relianceon a pre-WorldWar I Germanbattle- ship, and its focuson protectingTurkish coastal shippingin the Black Sea, soughta Turkishcommitment to minethe straits and to close theBosporus on receivinginstructions from the commanderof United Statesnaval forcesin the Mediterranean.United States Air Force advisers, frustrated by the defen- sive mentalityof Turkish officers, wanted to use Turkey'sair assets to attack enemyairfields, refineries, and communicationand rail centersin Bulgaria, Rumania, and the Caucasus. United States officersalso were uncertain whetherTurkey would permit their use ofits airfields.In orderto clarifymat- tersand to achieve UnitedStates goals, ArthurW. Radford,the vice chiefof naval operations,Admiral Conolly, and other militaryofficers desired to institutionalizestrategic coordination with Turkey.26 StateDepartment officials, however, would not permit formal strategic col- laborationwithout prior treaty commitments. During 1948-1949 the forma- tionof the NATO allianceriveted American attention on WesternEurope and unexpectedlyreoriented United States strategicpriorities. In July 1948 Undersecretaryof State RobertA. Lovetttold the Turkishambassador that Americans"must be carefulnot to over-extendourselves. We lack sufficient financialand economic resourcessimultaneously to financethe economic recoveryof Europe, to furnisharms and equipmentto all individualcountries or groupsof countries which request them, and to buildup our own military strength." When Acheson assumed the officeof secretaryof state, he reiteratedthose views. The UnitedStates, he maintained,was assumingun- precedentedobligations in WesternEurope; those commitmentshad to be workedout in all theircomplexity before the UnitedStates could offeraddi- tional guaranteeselsewhere. Throughout 1949 Achesonrepeatedly rebuffed Turkishpleas to be includedin thealliance.27 Toiling over the problemof meetingexpanding commitments with ex- tremelycircumscribed resources, stemming from budgetary restrictions, the JCS vigorouslysupported Acheson's desireto limit the alliance and to give priorityto assistanceto WesternEurope. United States war plannerswere 26 ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates, 1950, V, 1249-50; McBrideto Director,Plans and OperationsDivision, May 18, 1948,P&O 091 TurkeyTS, Recordsof the United States Army Staff; J.R.D.,memorandum for the Record, Feb. 18, 1949,ibid.; JCS 1704/7, McBride, memorandum for the JCS,Feb. 19, 1948,ibid.; JSPC868/1, Guidance for the Coordinator,Armed Forces Groups, AMAT,March 26, 1948,ibid.; Chiefof Staff, U.S. Army,memorandum, n.d. [Feb.25, 19501,381 ME TS, ibid.;A. D. Struble,memo for CNO, Oct. 4, 1948,A19, box 244, StrategicPlans Division; Carney,memorandum for Op-03, March 22, 1949,EF, box 252, ibid.; Strauss,memorandum for Op-30,March 25, 1949,ibid.; C. V. Johnson,memorandum for Op-30, Sept. 16, 1949,A8, box 249, ibid.; Carneyto Struble,March 31, 1949,A16-1, ibid.; CNO, memorandum,March 13, 1950,sec. 1, CCS 337 (2-20-50),Records of the joint Chiefs of Staff; JCS 2105 series,"Proposed Positions to Be Takenin Conversationswith Political and Military Authorities of Near and Middle East Coun- tries,"Feb.-April 1950, ibid.; ArthurW. Radfordto RichardL. Conolly,Jan. 17, 1949,drawer 1, safeA, ArthurW. RadfordPapers (Naval Historical Center). 27 ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates, 1948 (9 vols., Washington,1972-1975), HI, 197, IV, 84-85, 114-15, 148-49, 172-73, 214; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949 (9 vols., Washington, 1974-1978), IV, 120, 177-78, 234-35, 243-44, 270-71, 359-60, VI, 1647-53, 1656-57;Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, V, 1238-40. 820 The Journalof American History overwhelmedby the difficulties of figuring out how to defendWestern Europe. They modifiedemergency war plans and placed a much greateremphasis on defenseof the western Mediterranean and thelaunching of the strategic offensive primarilyfrom Great Britain. Had a war eruptedin 1949 or 1950, the UnitedStates would not have had themeans to aid Turkeydirectly or even to secure Cairo-Suez.Defense of the Middle East, althoughrecognized as crit- ically important,was assignedto GreatBritain despite that nation's limited capabilities.Yet United States war plannersnever relinquished the hope of capitalizingon Turkey's geopolitical position and on the opportunities emanatingfrom military assistance. During 1949, for example, Forrestal still soughtappropriations to helpbuild up bases in theCairo-Suez region. And during 1951 the JCSmade clear its determinationto retaincontrol over strategic planningand coordinationin Greece,Turkey, and Irandespite Great Britain's overallmilitary responsibility for the rest of the Middle Eastern region.28 Turkishofficials, however, were offendedby rebuffsto theirrequests for concretemilitary guarantees and forinclusion in the NATO alliance. Am- bassadorWilson feared that the Turkish government might conclude that the UnitedStates was downgradingthe importanceof Turkeyand mightadopt a more neutralposture. The Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) agreed that Turkeyfelt exposed and vulnerable.The greatimponderable, then, was what Turkeywould do if a Sovietattack took place beyondTurkey's borders. The United States air attacheemphasized to naval plannersthat Turkeywould resistif attackedbut otherwisewould attemptto remainneutral. In March 1950 AdmiralConolly beseeched Sherman, now chiefof naval operations,to getthe JCS to supportan alliancewith Turkey. "It is ofutmost importance," Conollywrote, to engageTurkey's certain participation [in a war].Although it canbe assumedthat Turkeywould fight if attacked it is almostas certainthat Turkey would not fight if not attackedand very probable that USSR would not immediately attack Turkey. It would thereforebe greatlyto ournational interest considering money we havespent on her militaryestablishment tohave Turkey bound to us formallyby mutual defense treaty, toinclude an engagementfor her to go towar in caseof attack upon her own territory orupon or through any neighboring contiguous state. 29 In the springof 1950, however,neither State Departmentofficials nor the JCSwere ready to make commitmentsto Turkey.These policymakers feared that the capabilitiesof the United Statesto defendvital interestsin Europe 28 ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates, 1949, I, 285-87; ForeignRelations of the United States,1951, V, 36-37. The viewsof the joint Chiefs of Staff are best found in theJCS 2105 series citedin footnote26. See especiallyJCS 2105/2, Report by theJoint Strategic Survey Committee, March17, 1950,sec. 1, CCS 337 (2-20-50),Records of the joint Chiefs of Staff. For the evolution of UnitedStates war plans from 1948 to 1950,see especiallythe JCS1844 series,secs. 10-45,CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),ibid.; and documents in secs. 1, 2, CCS 381 EMMEA(11-19-47), ibid. 29 JosephC. Satterthwaiteto Secretaryof State, March 31, 1949,file 711.67/3-3149, Records of theDepartment of State; Robertson to GeorgeMcGhee, July 26, 1949,box 1, Lot 484,ibid.; Cen- tralIntelligence Agency, "Review of the WorldSituation," April 20, 1949,box 206, President's secretary'sfile, Truman Papers; Johnson, memorandum to Op-30,Sept. 16, 1949,A8, box 249, StrategicPlans Division; Conolly to CNO, March9, 1950,box 6, ShermanPapers. UnitedStates, Turkey, and NATO 821 still were not adequate.A memorandumprepared in the State Department's Officeof Near Easternand AfricanAffairs emphasized that only after Western Europe'sdefensive strength was augmentedwould theUnited States consider additionalsecurity arrangements elsewhere. The outbreakof the KoreanWar initiallyintensifed those views. Faced with the emergency in theFar East, fearing a full-scalewar in Europe,and not foreclosingthe possibilityof a diver- sionarytrap by a Soviet satellite,policy makers did not wish to incurcom- mitmentsthat might embroil the UnitedStates in anotherlocalized conflict and sap thenation's strength.30 The real dilemmafor the UnitedStates was to finda means to ensurethe availabilityof Turkey'sstrategic assets to the West withoutextending com- mitmentsthat might be bothbeyond the capabilities of the United States and disproportionateto the advantagesthat might accrue from a formalalliance. Boththe JCSand the Near East divisionof the StateDepartment studied the problemthroughout the late summerof 1950. Achesonprodded Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnsonto considerhow new arrangementswith Turkey mightdeter or provokethe SovietUnion, mightoffer military advantages or mightpose militaryliabilities by addingnew administrativeor command problemsto the NATO alliance. The JCSbelieved, however, that immediate enlargementof NATO mightupset the substantialprogress then underway withinthe alliance and mightadd new distractionsjust at the time thatthe UnitedStates was committingforces-in-being to Western Europe.31 But to rebuffTurkey completely risked the loss of a keyprospective ally in wartime.Hence, the JCS concluded that the United States ought to try"to ob- tainthe benefits of Turk and Greekparticipation in theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organizationand at the same timeminimize the disadvantages thereof by ac- cordingto thesetwo nationsan associatestatus-such a statuswould permit theirrepresentatives to participatein coordinatedplanning against Soviet aggression."Acheson presented this position to the Britishand the Frenchin September1950. Shortlythereafter, the Defense Committeeof the North AtlanticCouncil voted to invite Turkey and Greece to coordinatetheir militaryplanning with appropriate NATO commanders.32 The Turkishgovernment immediately agreed but again expresseddisap- 30 JCS2105/6, enclosure "B," Officeof Near Eastern and AfricanAffairs, Department of State, "RegionalSecurity Arrangements in theMediterranean and NearEastern Areas," April 18, 1950, sec. 1, CCS 337 (2-20-50),Records of the JointChiefs of Staff;Foreign Relations of the United States,1950, I, 353-57,376-87, III, 975-76, 1218,V, 153-57. 31 Paul H. Nitzeto PhilipJessup, Aug. 14, 1950,box 1, Lot 484, Recordsof the Department of State;JCS to Secretaryof Defense, Sept. 9, 1950,ibid.; Johnsonto Acheson,Sept. 11, 1950,ibid.; Officeof Near Eastern and AfricanAffairs, "Security Problem in theNear East and Africa,"Aug. 29, 1950,CD 092.3NATO-Council of Ministers, box 184,Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense;Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, HI, 257-61. 32 JCSto Secretaryof Defense, Sept. 9, 1950,box 1,Lot 484,Records of the Department of State; ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates, 1950, III, 1218-20,1284-85; Matthews to Burns,Oct. 3, 1950,CD 092.3 NATO-DefenseCommittee, box 184, Recordsof the Officeof the Secretaryof Defense.For references to apprehensionsover losing a prospectiveally in wartime,see citationsin footnote31. 822 The Journalof American History pointmentin not securingfull membership. When Assistant Secretary of State GeorgeC. McGhee visitedTurkey in February1951, PresidentCelal Bayar emphasizedthat he was affrontedby NATO's refusalto offerfull membership to Turkey,especially in view of Turkey's directmilitary contribution in Korea. Speakingbluntly, President Bayar told McGhee that Turkey was unhappywith its statusand soughtreciprocal guarantees; Turkey would not be contentwith anythingless. McGhee thendiscussed Turkish sentiments with all the United States chiefsof mission in the Middle East who were gatheredin Istanbulfor a conferencewith the assistant secretary of state. They stronglysupported a guaranteeof Turkey's security. McGhee wiredthe State Departmentthat "thereis reason to believe thatTurkey will veertowards a policyof neutralism, which will alwayshave a strongbasic appeal;and, until a commitmentis extendedto Turkey,there is no assurancethat Turkey will declarewar unless it is attacked.In orderto assure Turkey'simmediate co- belligerency,utilization in collectivesecurity action of themilitary potential whichTurkey is building,and immediateUnited States and Alliedutilization of Turkish bases . . . a commitment on the part of United States is required." At aboutthe same time,Henry S. Villard,of the PolicyPlanning Staff, urged Paul H. Nitze, the staff'sdirector, to focus attentionon meetingTurkey's desirefor security guarantees. In general,State Department officials believed thatnew United Statesinitiatives in the Middle East could and oughtto be takenbecause the militarybuildup in the UnitedStates already had reached significantproportions, organizational progress had been achievedin Western Europe,and "the chancesof the Middle East remainingtranquilly on the side of theWest without some practicalevidence of Western interest have greatly declined. "'33 United Statesdefense officials, however, remained ambivalent. While the JCSstill feared any agreementthat might imply the commitmentof forces to the regionin the eventof hostilities,Adm. RobertB. Carney,commander in chiefof United States forces in theMediterranean, urged officials to reexamine the question of securitycommitments to Turkey. Carney agreed with McGhee's assessmentof the situation,feared Turkish neutrality, and sought substantialmilitary aid "predicated on the Turkish capacity for great resistanceand thepossibility of generating some limitedTurkish offensive." AtNATO headquartersa separatestudy, conducted under the authority of Vice Adm. JerauldWright, also stressedthat there was a "real danger"of Turkish neutrality"stemming from the Turks' gnawing feeling of frustration and isola- tion." Andat theend of February 1951, the CIA completedthe coordination of a new NationalIntelligence Estimate (NIE) of "Turkey'sPosition in the East- WestStruggle. " EmphasizingTurkey's strong antipathy to theSoviet Union as well as Turkey's desire to facilitatea Westernvictory should war erupt elsewhere,the NIE neverthelessnoted that "the commitmentof Turkish 33 Memorandumof conversation, Feb. 12, 1951, CD 092.3 NATO-GEN,box 243,Records of the Officeof the Secretaryof Defense; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, V, 1321; Foreign Relationsof the United States, 1951, V, 4-11, esp. 8, 21-27, 51-76,esp. 52, 1117-19. UnitedStates, Turkey, and NATO 823 troopsor theprovision of Turkish bases would . .. be contingentupon a firm assuranceof U.S. armedsupport in eventof Soviet attack. " 34 Fear of Turkey's neutrality,then, played a decisive role in compelling anotherappraisal of Turkey'srelationship to NATO. Officialsin the State Department,not thosein the DefenseDepartment, continued to be the most vigorousproponents of expandingmilitary assistance and commitments throughoutthe Middle East. In theirview, the forcesof nationalismand neutralismwere making headway, partly because of a pervasivefeeling of in- security.Military assistance would help strengthen United States influence on existinggovernments; security guarantees to Turkeywould bolster confidence in that country,the linchpinof effortsto defendthe Middle East. When SecretaryAcheson asked the DefenseDepartment to reconsiderTurkey's ad- missioninto NATO, he emphasizedthat a securityarrangement might induce Turkeyto undertakecertain measures that would redoundto themilitary ad- vantage of the entireanti-Soviet coalition. He specificallyalluded to the peacetimemining of the straitsthat the NavyDepartment had been advocat- ingfor several months. A securityagreement also wouldfacilitate conclusion ofan agreementon theuse offorward air bases in Turkey.Fearing the loss of those opportunities,McGhee summedup the view of the State Department whenhe returnedfrom the Middle East and metwith the JCS. He emphasized that"there is a realdanger that the Turks will chooseneutrality if they cannot obtaina securitycommitment. We cannotbe surethat we will have Turkeyas an allyunless we extenda securitycommitment."35 In May 1951 the JCSfinally decided to accede to an expansionof United Statescommitments. Military officers recognized the critical role Turkey could play in protectingthe West's southernflank in Europe,in divertinglarge numbersof Soviet troops to theTurkish theater, and in facilitatingdefense of theMediterranean and theMiddle East. Ifthe Soviets decided to sweeparound Turkeythrough Iran and Iraq and ifTurkey opted for neutrality, military plan- nersrecognized that the West would have greatdifficulty closing the straits to Soviet submarines,protecting NATO's lines of communicationin the Mediterranean,and destroyingSoviet shippingin the Black Sea. Even more disillusioningwas theprospect of wasting the millions of dollars that had been spenton theconstruction of airfields in Turkey.With that in mind,the army chiefof staffcirculated a memorandumto the otherchiefs underscoring the importanceof readyingTurkish airports for use by heavy bombersand jet fightersand urgingthe consummationof a commitmentby treatywith Turkey.Cognizant that United States capabilities had beenexpanding rapidly, the JCSnow endorsedTurkey's inclusion in NATO. The National Security 34 ForeignRelations of the United States, 1951, V, 27-42, 103-104,113-18, 1118, 1119-26, esp. 1120;JCS 2009/12, "Factors Involving the Inclusion of Greece and Turkeyas FullMembers of the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization," March 16, 1951,sec. 1, CCS 337 (2-20-50),Records of the JointChiefs of Staff. 35 ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates, 1951, III, 501-505,V, 4-11, 21-42, 80-83, 113-20, esp. 117; memorandumfor the Secretaryof Defense,Feb. 27, 1951, CD 092 Turkey,box 236, Recordsof the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 824 The Journalof American History

Council formallyadopted that positionin May 1951. During the following summerand autumn,United States officials persuaded NATO allies to admit Turkeyand Greeceinto the alliance.36 Fromthe time of the TrumanDoctrine until Turkey'sentry into NATO, strategicconsiderations exerted an importantinfluence on the course of United States policy toward Turkey. Turkey became firstthe object of assistancefrom and thenthe formalally of the UnitedStates, not because of the expectationof any imminentSoviet attack on Turkey,but because of Turkey'spotential utility in wagingwar, protecting air bases, and safeguarding Middle Easternoil resources.In March 1951, as had been the case in March 1947, United States officialsrealized that the Soviet threatto Turkeywas "relativelyquiescent." Soviet policy seemed ominous in otherareas of the world,however, and ifhostilities erupted elsewhere, United States war plan- nerswanted to use Turkishfacilities and manpowerto neutralizethe Soviet submarinethreat in the Mediterranean,to tie up large numbersof Soviet troops, and to launch air attacks on vital Soviet petroleumresources. Estimatesthat Soviet air defensesin the south were meagerand ineffective wereadded inducements to establisha strategicair base in theregion.37 Whateffect did all ofthis have on relationsbetween the UnitedStates and the SovietUnion? From the middleof 1947, the Sovietsbitterly condemned UnitedStates military assistance to Turkey.Soviet diplomats insisted that the UnitedStates was undertakingaggressive action and establishingbases from whichattacks on the SovietUnion couldbe launchedeasily and effectively.38 United States war plans and military-assistanceprograms demonstrate that Sovietmilitary planners had reasonto worryabout the ramifications of United Statesaid to Turkey.A majorobject of UnitedStates policy was to enhance 36 JCS1704/49, memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,May 1, 1951,sec. 53, CCS 092 (8-22-46),Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; "Summary Views and Basesfor Joint Chiefs of Staff Positionon SecurityArrangements for Greece and Turkey,"n.d. [April19511, CD 092.3 NATO, box 243, Recordsof the Office of the Secretaryof Defense; Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951,V, 1148-62.The negotiationson theinclusion of Turkey and Greece into the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization were complicated by differencesover the command structure in theMiddle East.Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, HII, 479-85, 505-506, 551-55, 558, 567, 569-71, 574-613,621-32, 661-63, 669, 678-81, 744, 1265-67,1302. 37 JCS2009/12, "Factors Involving the Inclusion of Greeceand Turkey as Full Membersof the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization," March 16, 1951,sec. 1, CCS 337 (2-20-50),Records of the JointChiefs of Staff. For the situation in March1947, see citationin footnote21. Forweaknesses of Soviet air defensesin the south,see JCS 1952/1,Chief of Staff,United States Air Force, memorandum,Dec. 21, 1948,sec. 1, CCS 373 (10-23-48),Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In an assessmentof Soviet radar nets, the chief of naval intelligence stressed the likelihood that by 1950 the Sovietswould have integratedearly-warning nets in the west,north, and east. He made no mentionof such nets in the south. Op-32 to GeneralBoard, May 12, 1948, 425 (serial315), Recordsof the General Board (Naval Historical Center). 38 Wilsonto Secretaryof State, July 29, 1947,file 861.20267/7-2947, Records of the Department ofState; Smith to Secretaryof State, Aug. 2, 1947,file 867.00/8-247, ibid.; Wilson to Secretaryof State,Sept. 11, 1947,file 861.20267/8-2947, ibid.; Bursleyto Secretaryof State, Nov. 18,Nov. 25, 1947, file 861.20267/11-1847,10-3147, ibid.; Wilsonto Secretaryof State,Dec. 1, 1947, file 761.67/11-2147,ibid.; Smithto Secretaryof State,April 30, 1948,file 861.20267/4-3048, ibid.; ForeignRelations of the UnitedStates, 1950, IV, 1254-55; [NikitaS. Krushchev],Krushchev Remembers,ed. EdwardCrankshaw and Strobe Talbott (Boston, 1970), 494, 514. UnitedStates, Turkey, and NATO 825

Turkey'smilitary capabilities and, if militaryconflict occurred, to integrate thosecapabilities into the war effort. This is notto say oreven to intimatethat theUnited States was planningaggressive war. Butif war broke out as a result of a miscalculationin a diplomaticcrisis-and thatwas consideredthe most probablecause ofwar-then Turkeywould play an importantrole in American offensiveas well as defensiveactions. The Sovietshad cause to worryabout developmentsin Turkey;just as the UnitedStates feared Soviet inroads in Cuba in 1962. The difference,of course, was thatin 1962 the UnitedStates had the militarywherewithal to stop the emergenceof an offensivethreat on its southernborder. In 1947-1948 the Sovietshad no suchpower. Although they had exertedrather little pressure on Turkey,they now had to contemplatethe developmentof a more modern militaryinfrastructure in Turkey,to grapplewith the latent abilityof the UnitedStates to projectpower from the Middle East, and to deal withthe global geopoliticalpolicy inherentin the TrumanDoctrine. That challenge,along withother concurrent developments, may well have servedto intensifytheir suspicions of United States intentionsand to magnifytheir sense of weakness.39 A studyof American policy toward Turkey in theaftermath of World War II highlightsthe role of strategicimperatives both in the expansionof United Statesglobal interests and in theformation of the nation's alliance system.It also helps to elucidatethe matrixof considerationsthat accelerated distrust betweenthe Soviet Union and theUnited States and generated the Cold War. 39Although this is notthe place for a discussionof Soviet foreign policy, two recent studies sug- gestthe defensiveand reactivecharacter of JosefStalin's actions in 1947 and 1948. William0. McCagg,Jr., Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948 (Detroit, 1978); WilliamTaubman, Stalin's American Policy:From Entente to Detente to Cold War(New York, 1982), esp. 128-92.