Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952 Author(s): Melvyn P. Leffler Source: The Journal of American History, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Mar., 1985), pp. 807-825 Published by: Organization of American Historians Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1888505 . Accessed: 15/09/2011 19:06 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Organization of American Historians is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of American History. http://www.jstor.org Strategy,Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The UnitedStates, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952 MelvynP. Leffler On March12, 1947,President Harry S. Trumanappeared before a jointsession of Congressand made one of the most momentousaddresses of the postwar era. Requesting$400 millionin aid forGreece and Turkey, he emphasizedthat a "fatefulhour" had arrivedand thatnations had to "choose betweenalter- nativeways of life." The UnitedStates, Truman insisted, had to support"free peoples who are resistingattempted subjugation by armedminorities or by outside pressures."Greece, of course, was then beleagueredby civil war. Turkey,while enjoyingremarkable internal stability, supposedly was subject to pressurefrom the SovietUnion, a constantwar of nerves, and theprospect of outrightSoviet aggression.Undersecretary of State Dean G. Acheson warnedthat if the United States did not act, three continents could fall prey to Sovietdomination. 1 The internationalsituation, of course, was far more complex than that describedby Truman or Acheson. The presidentand his closest advisers simplifiedinternational realities in orderto generatepublic supportfor un- precedentedpeacetime foreign-policyinitiatives.2 Many scholars have demonstratedthat the Greekcivil war did not fallneatly into the categoryof Soviet aggression-Americanresponse. Developmentsin Turkey,however, havereceived far less attention.3 MelvynP. Leffleris associateprofessor of historyat VanderbiltUniversity. Research for this articlewas supportedby grantsfrom the WoodrowWilson International Center, the Council on ForeignRelations, the HarryS. Truman Institute,and the VanderbiltUniversity Research Council. 1 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1947 (Washington, 19631,178-79; Dean Acheson,Present at theCreation: My Yearsin theState Department (New York,1969), 219; JosephM. Jones,Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947) (New York,1955), 39-198. 2 PresidentHarry S. Trumansaid thathe confronted'the greatestselling job everfacing a Presi- dent."Dean Achesonadmitted: "No timewas leftfor measured appraisal." Matthew J. Connelly, noteson cabinetmeeting, March 7, 1947,box 1, MatthewJ. Connelly Papers (Harry S. Truman Library,Independence, Mo.); Acheson,Present at theCreation, 219. 3 LawrenceS. Wittner,American Intervention in Greece,1943-1949 (New York, 1982); John R. Oneal,Foreign Policy Making in Timesof Crisis (Columbus, 1982), 137-215; George Martin Alex- The Journalof American History Vol. 71 No. 4 March1985 807 808 The Journalof American History The purposeof this articleis to examinethe policy of the United States towardTurkey in the postwarera, to elucidateUnited States policy makers' assessmentsof Soviet intentions toward Turkey, and to explainthe reasons for and the consequencesof Turkey's inclusion in the TrumanDoctrine. Rather thanexpecting an imminentSoviet attack on Turkey,United States officials soughtto takeadvantage of a favorableopportunity to enhancethe strategic in- terestsof the United States in theMiddle East and theeastern Mediterranean. Assistanceunder the TrumanDoctrine was designedto improvethe military capabilitiesof both Turkeyand the United States to wage war againstthe SovietUnion shouldconflict unexpectedly erupt. Although United States of- ficialshoped to capitalizeon Turkey'sgeographic location without assuming specificguarantees to defendTurkey's territorial integrity, they soon found thattheir investment in Turkeymight be wastedand theirhopes for strategic gainunrealized if they did not acceptmore binding commitments in theform of Turkey'sadmission into the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This article,then, underscores the importantand oftenunexplained role of strategicimperatives in theshaping of foreign-policy actions and alliancerela- tionships.More indirectly,it seeks to stimulatea reconsiderationof how the relationshipbetween the United States and Turkey might have interactedwith othervariables to escalatetensions during the formative years of the Cold War. In theimmediate aftermath of World War II, UnitedStates policy makers did not believethat Soviet leaders intended to use forceto achievetheir goals vis- a-visTurkey. State Department and militaryofficials assumed that the Soviet Union's desireto revisethe MontreuxConvention, to establishbases in the Dardanelles,and to acquireKars and Ardahan constituted threats to long-term Anglo-Americaninterests in the Mediterranean.Foreign Service officers such as GeorgeF. Kennanand ElbridgeDurbrow and strategicplanners such as Gen. ander,The Preludeto the TrumanDoctrine: British Policy in Greece,1944-1947 (New York, 1982); John0. Iatrides,Revolt in Athens:The GreekCommunist "Second Round," 1944-1945 (Princeton,1972); C. M. Woodhouse,The Strugglefor Greece, 1941-1949 (London, 1976). Turkish-Americanrelations are coveredbriefly in mostof the standard accounts of the originsof the Cold Warand of UnitedStates policy in the MiddleEast. See, forexample, Daniel Yergin, ShatteredPeace: The Originsof the Cold Warand the NationalSecurity State (Boston,1977), 233-35; JohnLewis Gaddis, The UnitedStates and theOrigins of the Cold War,1941-1947 (New York,1972), 336-52; ThomasG. Paterson,Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruc- tionand theOrigins of the Cold War(Baltimore, 1973), 174-206; Joyce Kolko and GabrielKolko, The Limitsof Power: The Worldand UnitedStates Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York, 1972), 242-45,336-46; GeorgeKirk, The Middle East, 1 945-1 950 (London,1954), 21-56; JohnC. Camp- bell, Defenseof the MiddleEast: Problemsof American Policy (New York,1958), 154-82; and GeorgeLenczowski, Soviet Advances in theMiddle East (Washington,1972), 37-49. Fora recent accountof UnitedStates policy in the regionprior to the TrumanDoctrine, see BruceRobellet Kuniholm,The Originsof the Cold Warin theNear East: GreatPower Conflict and Diplomacyin Iran,Turkey, and Greece(Princeton, 1980). For the controversy over the Dardanelles, see HarryN. Howard,Turkey, the Straitsand U.S. Policy (Baltimore,1974); AnthonyR. De Luca, "Soviet- AmericanPolitics and the TurkishStraits," Political Science Quarterly,92 (Fall 1977),503-24; and David J. Alvarez,Bureaucracy and Cold WarDiplomacy: The UnitedStates and Turkey, 1943-1946 (Thessaloniki,1980). For an analysisof Truman'sperceptions of Sovietintentions regardingTurkey, see J. GarryClifford, "President Truman and Peter the Great's Will," DiplomaticHistory, 4 (Fall 1980),371-85. United States, Turkey, and NATO 809 GeorgeA. Lincoln,however, maintained that Soviet leaders felt too weak to engagein militaryaggression and therebyto riska generalwar.4 Those assessmentswere based on appraisalsof Sovietactions that were, in fact,carefully modulated. In June1945, for example, Soviet Foreign Minister VyacheslavM. Molotovinformed the Turkishambassador that Soviet accep- tanceof a new treatyof friendship was contingenton revisionof the Montreux Convention,frontier readjustments, and greatersecurity in the straits,in- cludinga base. Yet even hard-lineUnited States officialssuch as Loy W. Henderson,director of the Office of Near Eastern and AfricanAffairs, acknowledgedthat the Soviets had not made formaldemands, had acted withrestraint, and had invitedfurther discussion. When Josef Stalin discussed theseissues withWinston S. Churchilland Trumanat Potsdamand whenhe reviewedthem with AmbassadorWalter Bedell Smith in Moscow in April 1946, the Soviet leader was neitherintransigent nor intemperate.Soviet diplomatsmade it clearthat they were flexible on theterritorial issue and that it was of secondaryimportance. After the springof 1946,the Sovietsstopped raisingthe matterof frontierreadjustments, and the issue fadedfrom the diplomaticscene.5 In theirrelations with Turkey, the Sovietsgave priorityto enhancingtheir securityin the straitsand in the Black Sea. Because thatmatter has received extensiveattention, there is no reason to dwell on it here. In brief,United Statesofficials acknowledged the legitimacyof the Sovietdesire to revisethe MontreuxConvention but opposedSoviet acquisition of bases. Trumanand Churchillagreed at Potsdamthat the Sovietsought to raise the questionof revisionat a subsequenttime. In theirinformal and nonacrimoniousdiscus sions withTurkish officials in 1945 and early1946, Sovietdiplomats empha sized theneed to enhanceSoviet security in the Dardanellesand in the Black 4 Expandeddraft of letter from Secretary of War to Secretaryof State,"U.S. Positionre Soviet Proposalson Kiel Canal and Dardanelles,"July 8, 1945, sec. 1-A,ABC 093 Kiel (6 July1945), Recordsof the War Department General