To what extent was Alcibiades responsible for the renewal of the Peloponnesian War in 413?

Alcibiades was, to a minor extent, responsible for the renewal of the Peloponnesian war. While his actions and decisions hold him directly accountable, the unstable nature of the peace and opposition from other city-states ensured that the Peace of Nicias was unlikely to last even without Alcibiades’s actions.

Alcibiades’s actions in Athens and Spartans were directly responsible for the renewal of the Peloponnesian War. By bringing Athens into an alliance with Argos, Mantinea and Elis and indirectly involving in the Battle of Mantinea in 418, he disturbed the peace from the very beginning. His flight from Athens to Sparta in 415 allowed him to give valuable advice to Sparta and it was under his advice that the Spartans sent a fleet to Syracuse to combat the Athenians. Kagan stated that ‘Alcibiades’s first goal was to persuade [the Spartans] to defeat the Athenians in Sicily and then to resume the war in Greece’, showing that it was his intention to restart the conflict. The Spartans also fortified Decelea in 413 under the advice of Alcibiades, which turned Athens into ‘a garrisoned fortress’ (Thucydides), as it kept ‘year- round pressure on Athens’ (Rhodes). The actions of the Spartans under the advice of Alcibiades exacerbated the tension already present between the Athenians and Spartans, which led to the renewal of the Peloponnesian War.

However, the Peace of Nicias of 421 was unlikely to last due to its unstable nature. The opposition to the peace from the Peloponnesian forces, in particular Megara, Corinth and Thebes intensified the conflict between Athens and Sparta. Kagan noted that ‘serious weakness in the peace emerged almost immediately’. While the peace was welcomed in Athens, and ‘Nicias was in every mouth as a man dear to the gods’ (Plutarch), Athens also lacked the stability of leadership needed to sustain the peace. The more aggressive war faction of Sparta and Athens was also not discredited. Evans noted that ‘the death of Cleon did not bring an end to the war party’, and the election of anti-Athenian ephors at Sparta in 421 also escalated the tension between Athens and Sparta. These factors severely affected the stability of the peace.

The peace was also flawed due to its inability to restore the territorial status quo. Both sides agreed to the agreement due to ‘military threat’ and ‘temporary difficulties’ (Kagan) rather than a legitimate and sincere pursuit of peace. Key strategic territories such as Pylos was still in control of Athens, while Amphipolis and Panactum which was previously held by Athens were now under the control of those ‘hostile to Athens and not subservient to Sparta’ (Kagan), hence Athens could not regain control over these territories. The peace treaty between Sparta and Argos also came to an end in the same year, which threatened the peace as Argos was eager to challenge the hegemony of Sparta in the Peloponnese. Burn described that ‘war between [Sparta and Argos] was imminent’, threatening the peace. These flaws and obstacles ‘made the prospects for peace dubious from the start’ (Kagan). While the actions of Alcibiades directly led to the Decelean War in 413, the Peace of Nicias was unlikely to last due to its inability to restore the status quo and the opposition to the peace from both Athens and the Peloponnesian forces.