DOCSLIB.ORG

Lessons of the Peloponnesian War

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Lessons of the Peloponnesian War HISTORYHISTORY —STRUGGLEFORFREEDOM Lessons of the Peloponnesian War Althoughthecurrent“waronterror”andthePeloponnesianWarinancientGreeceare separatedbyover2,400years,theirsimilaritiesarestriking,instructive,andcautionary. by Joe Wolverton II, J.D. Delay not, fellow-allies, but con- vincedofthenecessityofthecrisis, andthewisdomofthiscounsel,vote forthewar,undeterredbyitsimme - diateterrors,butlookingbeyondto thelastingpeacebywhichitwillbe succeeded.Outofwarpeacegains freshstability. Corcyra —Speechdeliveredbythe Corinthianspleadingwiththe Spartanstorenewthewar withAthens,asquotedby Thucydidesin TheHistory Megara Athens ofthePeloponnesianWar Corinth ATTICA freepeopleembroiledinanin- creasingly unpopular war, a SicilianSea Sparta A mounting death toll, unilateral pursuitofthe“spreadingofdemocracy,” unsuccessfuleconomicsanctionsfollowed bymilitaryinterventionand“liberation,” politicianspromisingtheeventualestab - lishmentoflastingpeacethroughapolicy CreatanSea ofpreemptivestrikes,officialpronounce - mentsthattheliveslostin“defenseof freedom”willnotbeinvain,andfalse eracyknownastheDelianLeague)and ofSparta.ThePeloponnesianWarbegan reassuranceofthenecessityofpreventive itssuperpowerrival,Sparta(theleaderof roughlyin431B.C.whenAthens,under war.DoesthisdescribeAmericaof2005 thePeloponnesianLeague).Therearefew itsrenownedgeneralPericles,interfered andthe“waronterror?”Yes,butitalso statementsmoreaxiomaticthan“thepast inabattlebetweenaSpartanally,Corinth, describesAthensof421B.C.andthePelo - isprologue.”ThekeytoinoculatingAmer - andCorcyra,preventingCorinthfromin - ponnesianWar.Thesimilaritiesbetween icaagainstthediseasesthatinfectedand vadingCorcyra.Followingcloselyafter thesetwoconflictsarestrikingandshould destroyedtheancientGreekcity-statesis thisintervention,Athensplacedanother becautionary. tobecomecoronersexaminingthelifeless Spartan ally, Megara, under oppressive Thosetwowars,separatedbyagulf bodiesoftherepublicsofthepastinorder economicsanctions,forbiddingthesmall ofnearlytwoandahalfmillennia,have todiscoverthecausesoftheirdemiseand Doriancity-statefromtradingwithAthens muchincommon.Asthelegateesofasys - thereby avoid succumbing to the same orhercolonies.Spartaansweredbyinvad - temoforderedlibertygreatlyinfluenced maladies. ingthelandssurroundingAthensknown byancientAthens,wecanlearnagreat Although it occurred more than two asAttica.Periclesallowedtheinhabitants dealfromtherecordofthePeloponnesian millenniaago,thewarbetweenAthens oftheseAthenianhinterlandswithinthe Warpreservedbythefirstgreathistorian, andSpartaisprobablystudiedmorethan walls ofAthens, and he orderedAthe - ThucydidesofAthens,wholivedduring anyotherwarinthehistoryofman.The nianfootsoldierstoengagetheSpartan thetimeofthewar. warlastedsolongthatgrandfathers,fa - forces. thers,andsonsallfoughtinbattlescol - Pericles’defensivestrategyworkedfora History’s Warning Voice lectivelyknownasthePeloponnesianWar. while,andtheSpartansiegeofAtticawas It is fromThucydides that we get our Enmityhadlongexistedbetweenthepow - relatively unsuccessful. However, what primaryrecordoftheworld-alteringwar erfulmaritimedemocracyofAthensand Spartacouldnotdowithmilitarymight, betweenAthens(asleaderoftheconfed - theequallypotentland-basedcity-state a physical plague accomplished rather THE NEW AMERICAN • JANUARY 9, 2006 37 HISTORYHISTORY —STRUGGLEFORFREEDOM wasnotonlyunsuccessfulinits such interposition prevented wider war Exuberance at the beginning of martial questtoexportdemocracy,but fromspreadingtothewholeofthePelo - itfounditselfundertheruleof ponnesianpeninsulaandbringingterrorto ventures is easy. However, just as tyrantswhobroughttoanend Athens’citizens.Athensbeganitspolicy Pericles could not foresee the physical theGoldenAgeofAthens. ofpreventivewarbyimposingharsheco - According to the chronicle nomicsanctionsontheSpartansatellites, plague that would cripple Athens, there ofThucydides,thewar’sroots andwhenthesesmallercommunitiesre - are undoubtedly plagues, moral and can be traced to an attack by sistedsuchAthenianheavy-handedness, thePersians,afterwhichseveral Athensimposedherwillatthepointofa physical, that lay beyond the myopic Greek city-states formed the sword. view of modern American imperialists. DelianLeague,withAthensas AsAthens began losing battles and themostpowerfulmember.The sufferingnumerouscasualtiesasaconse - DelianLeagueusedthePersian quenceofitsdisastrousattemptsatestab - quickly.Justafter430B.C.,aplague(per- attackontheirhomelandasanexcuseto lishingitspeninsula-widedominance,the hapsbubonic)decimatedAthens,killing establishastandingnavy.Asthelargest citizensofAthensbegandoubtingthejust - roughlyone-quarterofthecity’spopula - memberofthisconfederacy,Athensex - nessofthewar,thewisdomofitsleaders’ tion,includingPericles.Uponrecovering erciseddefactocontroloverthepurse headlongmarchintobattleswithinvented fromtheplague,Athens’newleadership andbyexercisingsuchcontrol,converted enemies, and the questionable threats setabouttakingthewartotheSpartans theDelianLeagueintonothingmoreor thoseenemiesposedtoAthenianfamilies andforthenext26years(withtheexcep - lessthananAthenianempire.Inaneffort andhomes.Itwasatafuneralservicefor tionofasixyearcessationofhostilities) to demonstrate its new imperial might, Atheniansoldierswhodiedinwaragainst AthensandSpartatradedvictories. Athensjealouslygazeduponitspeninsu - Spartaandheralliesthatwegetwhatis Finally,in404B.C.,adebilitatedand larrival,Sparta,anddecideditwastim e widelyheldtobethemostinfluentialand humiliatedAthenssurrenderedtotheSpar - toassertitselfandmoveoutofSparta’s motivationalspeechdeliveredduringthis tan commander, Lysander, and the war shadow. eraofhistory—thefuneralo ration of cametoanend.ThewarcostAthensher Pericles. treasure,herprestige,herself-government, War: The Womb of Empire PericleswasanAthenian strategos ,or andthelivesofthousandsofheryoung Athensbeganflexingitsstrengthbyuni- general, charged with propounding the men.Thesaddestaspectofthisseemingly laterallyinterveningindisputesbetween Athenian strategy for winning the war unnecessarywarbetweenGreece’stwo Sparta’salliesaroundtheyear431B.C. againstSparta.Hiseulogy,deliveredin greatestcitiesisthatintheend,Athens TheofficialAthenianjustificationwasthat 430B.C.,representedtheAthenianad - ministration’s best opportunity to reas - sertthenecessityofwaragainstSparta. Periclessoughttoconvincethewavering Atheniansthattheircausewasjustand thatonlythroughtakingthewartoSparta couldAthensbekeptsafefromfutureat - tackonitshomesoil. Inthis,Pericles’taskwassimilartothat oftheBushadministrationasitseeksto rallysupportforthewarinIraq.Thatwar hasalreadysacrificedthelivesofover 2,300Americansoldiersonthealtarof Americanimperialism.Itwasamorbid milestonesuchasthisthatprovidedthe settingforPericles’famousoration. Periclesknewthewarwasnotgoing thewayheandotherAthenianleaders hadpromisedandthatthedeathtollwas mountingandwouldonlycontinuetoin - crease.Herecognizedthattheoccasion ofafuneralfornobleveteranswouldbe palpablyemotionalandthathecoulduse thissemi-religiouseventtoremindAthe - The Athenian fleet, depicted here in battle in the harbor of Syracuse, helped make that city-state niansoftheirdutytopromotetheirform the dominant power in the ancient Delian League. It also created the temptation for Athens to ofself-governmentthroughouttheknown intervene needlessly in conflicts abroad. worldandtopreventbellicoseSpartafrom 38 THE NEW AMERICAN • JANUARY 9, 2006 bringingwarhometoAthens.Inhisora- tion,Periclesstatedthatitwouldbefartoo riskytochangepolicyandleavethejob halfdone.Onlybypersistinginfighting couldAthensbeassuredoflastingpeace. (Thewar,itshouldbeherenoted,lasted another25years!) CommentatorGaryNorthdescribesthe themeofPericles’speechas“Don’tMess WithAthens.”Init,Periclesdeclaredthat Athenswassuperiorineverywaytoits neighbors, especially when it came to Athens’formofgovernment,aformof governmentthatshouldbeimposedonall whoresisted:“Ourconstitutiondoesnot copythelawsofneighboringstates;we areratherapatterntoothersthanimitators ourselves.” That is to say,Athens’ form of gov - ernmentwasbestanditsfallenwarriors broughtthatformofgovernmenttoother less-enlightenedpartsoftheworld,wheth - Democratic demagogue: Pericles used his famous funeral oration to extol the superiority of ertheylikeditornot.Thisisalevelof Athens and to assert the supposed necessity of a generation-long war to export democracy to the hubristhatshouldbefamiliartomodern known world. Americans. Periclesreassuredthemourningfamilies allgoalswouldbeaccomplishedsuccess - gular,acquiringourfriendsbyconferring, ofthefallensoldiersthatthecosttoAth - fullyandallinterveningdifficultieswould not[by]receivingfavors.Yet,ofcourse, enswouldnotbeverygreat(easytosay, beforgottenintheunitingandwarming thedoerofthefavoristhefirmerfriendof perhaps,whenitisn’tyourdeadsonlying afterglowofvictory:“Insteadoflooking thetwo,inorderbycontinuedkindnessto onthefuneralpyre).Athenswasstrong ondiscussionasastumbling-blockinthe keeptherecipientinhisdebt.” andfree,hepointedout,anditwouldbe wayofaction,wethinkitanindispens - Unfortunately,Thucydidesrecordsthat shamefulforAthenianstositidlyby,with - ablepreliminarytoanywiseactionatall. Athens was ultimately unsuccessful at outusingtheirstrengthtobringthebless - Again,inourenterpriseswepresentthe purchasingpeace:Spartaandherallies ingsoffreedomtothosestillwandering singularspectacleofdaringanddelibera - foughtforovertwodecadestoresistbeing aboutinthedarknessoftyranny.Thiswar tion,eachcarriedtoitshighestpoint,and subsumedintoagreaterAthenianempire, wasAthens’sacredduty,regardlessofthe bothunitedinthesamepersons;although
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Alexander's Empire
    4 Alexander’s Empire MAIN IDEA WHY IT MATTERS NOW TERMS & NAMES EMPIRE BUILDING Alexander the Alexander’s empire extended • Philip II •Alexander Great conquered Persia and Egypt across an area that today consists •Macedonia the Great and extended his empire to the of many nations and diverse • Darius III Indus River in northwest India. cultures. SETTING THE STAGE The Peloponnesian War severely weakened several Greek city-states. This caused a rapid decline in their military and economic power. In the nearby kingdom of Macedonia, King Philip II took note. Philip dreamed of taking control of Greece and then moving against Persia to seize its vast wealth. Philip also hoped to avenge the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 B.C. TAKING NOTES Philip Builds Macedonian Power Outlining Use an outline to organize main ideas The kingdom of Macedonia, located just north of Greece, about the growth of had rough terrain and a cold climate. The Macedonians were Alexander's empire. a hardy people who lived in mountain villages rather than city-states. Most Macedonian nobles thought of themselves Alexander's Empire as Greeks. The Greeks, however, looked down on the I. Philip Builds Macedonian Power Macedonians as uncivilized foreigners who had no great A. philosophers, sculptors, or writers. The Macedonians did have one very B. important resource—their shrewd and fearless kings. II. Alexander Conquers Persia Philip’s Army In 359 B.C., Philip II became king of Macedonia. Though only 23 years old, he quickly proved to be a brilliant general and a ruthless politician. Philip transformed the rugged peasants under his command into a well-trained professional army.
    [Show full text]
  • Greece, the Land Where Myths Replaces Reality
    GREECE, THE LAND WHERE MYTHS REPLACE REALITY (Myths about Epirus) What is myth and what does it serve? Myth is a narrative based usually on a false story which can not be used as a replacement of history, but sometimes myth might be considered a distorted account of a real historical event. The myth does not differ much from a folktale and usually the boundary between them is very thin. Myth must not be used to reconstruct, however in the ancient society of the so called “”Ancient Greeks”” myth was usually regarded as a true account for a remote past. Surprisingly this ‘tradition’ is descended to the Modern Greeks as well. They never loose the chance to use the myths and the mythology of a remote past and to pose them as their real ethnic history. This job is being done combining the ancient myths with the ones already created in the modern era. Now let’s take a look at two Greek myths, respectively one ancient and one modern, while our job is to prove that even these myths are respectively hijacked or created to join realities not related to each other, but unfortunately propagandized belonging to a real history, the history of the Greek race. Thus before we analyze and expose some of their myths which are uncountable, we are inclined to say that whatever is considered Greek History is completely based on mythical stories, whose reliability and truthiness is deeply compromised for the mere fact that is based on myths not only by the Modern Greeks and especially philhellenes, but even by the ancient authors.
    [Show full text]
  • PDF Download the Classical Art of Command Eight Greek Generals Who Shaped the History of Warfare 1St Edition Ebook, Epub
    THE CLASSICAL ART OF COMMAND EIGHT GREEK GENERALS WHO SHAPED THE HISTORY OF WARFARE 1ST EDITION PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Joseph Roisman | 9780199985821 | | | | | The Classical Art of Command Eight Greek Generals Who Shaped the History of Warfare 1st edition PDF Book As the Thebans were joined by many erstwhile Spartan allies, the Spartans were powerless to resist this invasion. The Lion at the Gates. The revenge of the Persians was postponed 10 years by internal conflicts in the Persian Empire, until Darius's son Xerxes returned to Greece in BC with a staggeringly large army modern estimates suggest between ,, men. Along with the rise of the city-states evolved a new style of warfare: the hoplite phalanx. The volume also looks at how the Greek art of command changed during the Classical Age, and how adaptable it was to different military challenges. The peace treaty which ended the Peloponnesian War left Sparta as the de facto ruler of Greece hegemon. After his assassination, this war was prosecuted by his son Alexander the Great , and resulted in the takeover of the whole Achaemenid Empire by the Macedonians. The second Persian invasion is famous for the battles of Thermopylae and Salamis. After they refused to disband their army, an army of approximately 10, Spartans and Pelopennesians marched north to challenge the Thebans. Following this victory, the Thebans first secured their power-base in Boeotia, before marching on Sparta. However, from the very beginning, it was clear that the Spartan hegemony was shaky; the Athenians, despite their crushing defeat, restored their democracy but just one year later, ejecting the Sparta-approved oligarchy.
    [Show full text]
  • Hobbes Trans.) Vol
    Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian Wars (Hobbes trans.) Vol. 1: The Online Libra...Page 1 of 493 THE ONLINE LIBRARY OF LIBERTY © 2004 Liberty Fund, Inc. CLASSICS IN THE HISTORY OF LIBERTY THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WARS (HOBBES TRANS.) (1839) VOLUME I Updated: May 18, 2004 Return to the Introduction to Thucydides and the detailed Table of Contents. EDITION USED The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury: Now First Collected and Edited by Sir William Molesworth, Bart., (London: Bohn, 1839-45). 11 vols. z Volume VIII: Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian Wars (History of the Grecian War), trans. Thomas Hobbes Vol. 1 z Volume IX: Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian Wars (History of the Grecian War), trans. Thomas Hobbes Vol. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS z ADVERTISEMENT. z TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR WILLIAM CAVENDISH, KNIGHT OF THE BATH, BARON OF HARDWICK, AND EARL OF DEVONSHIRE. z TO THE READERS. z OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES. { ENDNOTES z THE FIRST BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES. { ENDNOTES z THE SECOND BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES. { ENDNOTES z THE THIRD BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES. { ENDNOTES z THE FOURTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES. { ENDNOTES LONDON: RICHARDS, PRINTER, 100, ST. MARTIN’S LANE. http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/Hobbes0123/Works/0051-08_Bk.html 5/18/2004 Livros Grátis http://www.livrosgratis.com.br Milhares de livros grátis para download. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian Wars (Hobbes trans.) Vol. 1: The Online Libra...Page 2 of 493 ADVERTISEMENT. THE merit of Hobbes’ translation of Thucydides lies principally in the simplicity and force of the language: bearing in that respect some affinity to the original.
    [Show full text]
  • Ancient Greece Athens and Sparta
    ANCIENT GREECE ATHENS AND SPARTA Map of Greece and the cities of Athens and Sparta In Ancient Greece there were two different major forms of government, oligarchy and democracy. Oligarchy refers to a small group of people who govern a nation together. Democracy refers to a system of government in which every person has the right to participate. The two city-states that best represent each form of government were Sparta (oligarchy) and Athens (democracy). Athens focused more on culture, while Sparta focused more on war. The oligarchy structure in Sparta enabled it to keep war as a top priority. ATHENS View of Athens, The Athenian democratic government gave the citizens in Greece more around 3000 years ago. freedom. Ten percent of the total population of Athens had voting rights and all of these citizens were wealthy men who were over thirty years old. The Assembly, which made the laws, was composed by five hundred wealthy men. Women had no freedoms at all. Fathers owned their girls and then women became property of their husbands who then gave them the responsibilities of managing the household and educating the children. Women in Athens took Life was sophisticated and graceful in Athens but the Athenians were often mocked by care of their families. opposing countries for lacking bravery, patriotism and courage. Athens was repeatedly attacked since Athenians didn’t have a war-like reputation. These conflicts eventually led to Athens losing power in Ancient Greece. SPARTA In the city-state of Sparta, an oligarchy controlled the power. The citizens had little say in the decisions made by the government but, at the time, this was the structure that existed.
    [Show full text]
  • The Causes of the Peloponnesian War by Jared Mckinney
    ©Classics of Strategy & Diplomacy1 Structure and Contingency: The Causes of the Peloponnesian War by Jared McKinney Thucydides called it “a war like no other” (1.23.1, trans. Hanson, 2005). It was a 27 year war that brought an end to the fifth century Athenian Golden Age, killed more Greeks in one year than the Persians killed in ten (Hanson, 2005, p. 11), and, in the end, seemed to solve nothing. “Never before had so many cities been captured and then devastated . ; never had there been so many exiles; never such loss of life” (1.23, trans. Warner, 1972). Such was the severity of war that words lost their meanings. Aggression became courage; prudence became cowardice; moderation became unmanly; understanding was mocked; “fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real man . Anyone who held violent opinions could always be trusted, and anyone who objected to them became suspect” (1.82). Greeks, in effect reentering what moderns might call a state of nature, became barbarians. It was in such an environment shortly after the conclusion of the war that Socrates himself—though he fought bravely during the war—was executed (Hanson, 2005, p. 5).* What caused this war? The Greeks themselves were unsure: “As for the war in which they [Athens and Sparta] are engaged, they are not certain who began it,” Thucydides has Spartan delegates declare in a speech to the Athenians (4.20). But with so much devastation and pain, not knowing seemed unacceptable. And so it was that Thucydides (c. 460- c. 400 BC), who was himself an Athenian veteran of the war, undertook the first sustained inquiry in history into the origins and course of a single war (Finley, 1972, p.
    [Show full text]
  • Historical Background 3 Approach 3 Ancient Sources 4 the Athenian
    Winchester 2 Table of Contents Chapter One: Historical Background 3 ● Approach 3 ● Ancient sources 4 ● The Athenian commanders 7 a. Alcibiades 7 b. Nicias 9 c. Lamachus 10 ● The Spartan commanders 11 a. Gylippus 11 Chapter Two: Background on governmental customs and military customs 12 ● Athens 12 ● Sparta 15 ● Sicily 17 Chapter Three: The Sicilian Expedition 19 ● Thucydides’ perspective as an Athenian 19 ● Athens: The conflict between the generals and the Assembly 19 ● Maps of Sicily and the Greek world 24 ● Sicily: The consequences of division and confusion 25 ● The Syracusan side of the war 28 Chapter Four: Analysis 32 ● Consequences of Athenian and Spartan political systems 32 ● Conclusion: Alcibiades and Athens 35 Appendix: Chronology of the Sicilian Expedition 37 Bibliography 38 Winchester 3 Chapter One: Historical Background Approach In this thesis, I will examine the dynamics of power between the Athenian assembly and the three generals assigned to positions of command in the Sicilian Expedition – Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus – and attempt to contextualize Alcibiades’ defecting from Athens to Sparta. I focus on the Sicilian Expedition narrative in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War Books 6 and 7, but also use Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades and Life of Nicias, plus the Life of Coriolanus. In the first chapter, after discussing the sources, I examine the personal history of the commanders involved (the Athenians Alcibiades, Lamachus, and Nicias, and the Spartan Gylippus). In my second chapter, I then turn to the governmental structures and military customs of Athens, Sparta, and Sicily, zeroing in on the Athenian Assembly and its military role.
    [Show full text]
  • Unconventional Weapons, Siege Warfare, and the Hoplite Ideal
    Unconventional Weapons, Siege Warfare, and the Hoplite Ideal Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Masters of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Amanda S. Morton, B.A. Graduate Program in History The Ohio State University 2011 Thesis Committee: Gregory Anderson, Advisor Timothy Gregory Nathan Rosenstein Copyright by Amanda S. Morton 2011 Abstract This paper examines the introduction of unconventional siege tactics, namely the use of chemical and biological weapons, during the Peloponnesian War in an effort to add to an existing body of work on conventional and unconventional tactics in Greek hoplite warfare. This paper argues that the characteristics of siege warfare in the mid-fifth century exist in opposition to traditional definitions of Greek hoplite warfare and should be integrated into the ongoing discussion on warfare in the fifth century. The use of siege warfare in Greece expanded dramatically during the Peloponnesian War, but these sieges differed from earlier Greek uses of blockade tactics, utilizing fire, poisonous gasses and new types of siege machinery that would eventually lead to a Hellenistic period characterized by inventive and expedient developments in siege warfare. ii Acknowledgements I would like to thank Dr. Gregory Anderson, Dr. Nathan Rosenstein and Dr. Timothy Gregory for their guidance and assistance in the production of this paper. In particular, Dr. Anderson’s patience and guidance in the initial stages of this project were essential to its conception and completion. I would also like to thank Dr. David Staley for his research suggestions and for his encouragements to engage in projects that helped shape my research.
    [Show full text]
  • The Peloponnesian War Geopolitics Hope and Fear
    The Peloponnesian War Geopolitics Hope and Fear “The truest explanation… the growth of Athens to greatness and Spartan fear” (Thuc. i.23.5) “The majority of the Hellenes were angry with the Athenians, some wishing to be delivered from their control, others fearful of falling under it” (Thuc. ii. 8.4) Corcyra 434 -33 Epidamnus Colony of Corinth Seeks colony status from Corcyra Corinth threatens war Corcyra appeals to Athens Adds naval strength to Athens Strategic position Athens agrees and sends 20 ships Corcyra: Geo-politics Potidaea Athenian tribute state Corinthian Colony Athens: Feared that Corinth would use Potidaea to retaliate. Feared the involvement of Perdiccas of Macedon Ordered Potidaea to expel the Corinthians Potidaea rises in revolt. Potidaea The Megarian Decree Megara a member of the Peloponnesian League since 445 BC Megarian Decree (before 435?) Megarians may not use Athenian harbours or markets. Pericles issued the decree to incite war (Diod. xii 40.6; Aristophanes Peace 603-11) Megarian Decree Corinth Main instigator in the Peloponnesian League Athenian interference a breach of the treaty Corinth demands that the League respond Athenian treatment of subject states Megarian Decree Corcyra Potidaea Plataea “And the war began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians broke the Thirty Years Truce...” (Thuc. i.23.4) March 5/6th, 431 BC Thebes attempts to take Plataea by force. “… the treaty had been broken by an overt act” (Thuc. ii. 7.1) Archidamus’ Strategy “they will take the field against us… when they see us destroying their property” (Thuc. ii 11.6) “…to provoke rather than to ruin the Athenians” (Hanson, 2006: 53) Olive trees and barley crops: Hanson 1998: et al., ad nauseum 431 – 421: Spartans in Attica less than 150 days (Hanson, 2006: 57) Pericles’ Strategy Withdraw inside the walls Do not engage in hoplite battle When Archidamus sees he cannot win, he will stop Planning not to loose is not the same as planning to win: Pericles “never really had any clear strategy for how to mount an offensive…” (Hanson, 2006: 20).
    [Show full text]
  • Thucydides HISTORY of the PELOPONNESIAN WAR
    Thucydides HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR Thucydides HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR ■ HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/00-index.htm2006-06-01 15:02:55 Thucydides HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR:Index. Thucydides HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR General Index ■ THE FIRST BOOK ■ THE SECOND BOOK ■ THE THIRD BOOK ■ THE FOURTH BOOK ■ THE FIFTH BOOK ■ THE SIXTH BOOK ■ THE SEVENTH BOOK ■ THE EIGHTH BOOK file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvisori/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/0-PeloponnesianWar.htm2006-06-01 15:02:55 PELOPONNESIANWAR: THE FIRST BOOK, Index. THE FIRST BOOK Index CHAPTER I. The State of Greece from the earliest Times to the Commencement of the Peloponnesian War CHAPTER II. Causes of the War - The Affair of Epidamnus - The Affair of Potidaea CHAPTER III. Congress of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Lacedaemon CHAPTER IV. From the end of the Persian to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War - The Progress from Supremacy to Empire CHAPTER V. Second Congress at Lacedaemon - Preparations for War and Diplomatic Skirmishes - Cylon - Pausanias - Themistocles file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvi...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/1-PeloponnesianWar0.htm2006-06-01 15:02:55 PELOPONNESIANWAR: THE SECOND BOOK, Index. THE SECOND BOOK Index CHAPTER VI. Beginning of the Peloponnesian War - First Invasion of Attica - Funeral - Oration of Pericles CHAPTER VII. Second Year of the War - The Plague of Athens - Position and Policy of Pericles - Fall of Potidaea CHAPTER VIII. Third Year of the War - Investment of Plataea - Naval Victories of Phormio - Thracian Irruption into Macedonia under Sitalces file:///D|/Documenta%20Chatolica%20Omnia/99%20-%20Provvi...i/mbs%20Library/001%20-Da%20Fare/1-PeloponnesianWar1.htm2006-06-01 15:02:55 PELOPONNESIANWAR: THE THIRD BOOK, Index.
    [Show full text]
  • Thucydides on Policy, Strategy, and War Termination Karl Walling
    Naval War College Review Volume 66 Article 6 Number 4 Autumn 2013 Thucydides on Policy, Strategy, and War Termination Karl Walling Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Walling, Karl (2013) "Thucydides on Policy, Strategy, and War Termination," Naval War College Review: Vol. 66 : No. 4 , Article 6. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol66/iss4/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Walling: Thucydides on Policy, Strategy, and War Termination THU CYDIDES on POLICY, STRATEGY, and WAR Termination Karl Walling E ven the ultimate outcome is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at a later date. CLAUSEWITZ W ar is like unto fire; those who will not put aside weapons are them- selves consumed by them. LI CHUAN or decades, Thucydides’s account of the Peloponnesian War has been a staple of professional military education at American war colleges, the Naval War FCollege especially.1 And with good reason—he self-consciously supplies his read- ers a microcosm of all war. With extraordinary drama and scrupulous attention to detail he addresses the fundamental and recurring problems of strategy at all times and places.
    [Show full text]
  • Ancient Greece Test 4 Study Guide
    Ancient Greece Test 4 Study Guide 1. the consequences of the Peloponnesian War 2. the political characteristics of fourth-century BCE Greece 3. the economic characteristics of fourth-century BCE Greece 4. the chief powers in early fourth-century BCE Greece 5. Lysander 6. Lysander’s Spartan empire 7. harmosts 8. Cyrus the Younger 9. Artaxerxes II 10. Xenophon 11. the Ten Thousand 12. the Anabasis 13. the exploits of King Agesilaus 14. Iphicrates 15. peltasts 16. the Corinthian War 17. the anti-Spartan alliance 18. Conon 19. the King’s Peace 20. Sparta’s empire after the King’s Peace 21. Spartan policy after the King's Peace 22. the Spartan attack on Thebes 23. Pelopidas 24. Epaminondas 25. the Second Athenian (or Delian) League 26. the organization of the Second Delian League 27. the Sacred Band 28. Jason of Pherae 29. the Common Peace 30. the Battle of Leuctra 31. the end of the Peloponnesian League 32. Alexander of Pherae 33. the collapse of Theban hegemony 34. the Battle of Mantinea 35. the Social War 36. Mausolus of Caria 37. stasis in the fourth century BCE 38. the origins of Carthage 39. Dionysius I of Syracuse 40. Dionysius II of Syracuse 41. Timoleon 42. Macedonian geography 43. traditional Macedonian political structure 44. Macedonian kingship 45. Pella 46. Philip II's family background 47. Philip II's education and training 48. Philip II's character 49. how Philip II came to the throne 50. Philip II's reforms of the Macedonian military 51. the sarissa 52. the hypaspists 53.
    [Show full text]