Indian Foreign Affairs Journal Vol. 4, No. 3, July - September, 2009, 102-117 ORAL HISTORY Birth of Bangladesh: Down Memory Lane Arundhati Ghose, often acclaimed for espousing wittily India’s nuclear non- proliferation policy, narrates the events associated with an assignment during her early diplomatic career that culminated in the birth of a nation – Bangladesh. Indian Foreign Affairs Journal (IFAJ): Thank you, Ambassador, for agreeing to share your involvement and experiences on such an important event of world history. How do you view the entire episode, which is almost four decades old now? Arundhati Ghose (AG): It was a long time ago, and my memory of that time is a patchwork of incidents and impressions. In my recollection, it was like a wave. There was a lot of popular support in India for Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his fight for the rights of the Bengalis of East Pakistan, fund-raising and so on. It was also a difficult period. The territory of what is now Bangladesh, was undergoing a kind of partition for the third time: the partition of Bengal in 1905, the partition of British India into India and Pakistan and now the partition of Pakistan. Though there are some writings on the last event, I feel that not enough research has been done in India on that. IFAJ: From India’s point of view, would you attribute the successful outcome of this event mainly to the military campaign or to diplomacy, or to the insights of the political leadership? AG: I would say it was all of these. Everything was geared towards a particular objective, which served India’s strategic interest. At the same time one must recognize that it was essentially a civil war in Pakistan, where the Bengalis, at least most of them, suffered a great deal and, were fighting for their existence. IFAJ: Was it our precise military campaign? AG: It was basically the political direction – though military and diplomatic tools were used. Oral History: Birth of Bangladesh: Down Memory Lane ... 103 IFAJ: Could you elaborate what were our strategic objectives? AG: Clearly, the objective was primarily to help the refugees who had streamed across the border to return. The moral, political and financial aid to those fighting for their freedom escalated into war when the Pakistanis attacked our airports in the north. I do not believe our involvement had Bangladeshi independence from Pakistan as an initial objective. It sort of became inevitable. Let me, however, start at the beginning. I was a junior officer in the Ministry of External Affairs, an Under Secretary dealing with Nepal at the time. I was aware of the happenings in East Pakistan and was interested, like everyone else, in the developments. A lot of sentiment and emotion was involved! One day in May 1971, I was summoned by Joint Secretary Ashok Ray who, without preamble, asked me if I spoke Bengali. On being assured that I did, he instructed me to leave for Calcutta (now Kolkata) immediately. It was a bit of a jolt, as I was not really prepared for any such move. What had happened, apparently, was that the Ministry, looking for a junior Bengali-speaking officer to work with Ashok Ray in the Branch Secretariat in Calcutta had found that the other Bengali officers available in Delhi were unwilling to move to Calcutta. Reluctantly, they settled on me. I, of course, had no problems, as my mother and brother were in Calcutta at the time. The crackdown by the Pakistan Army on East Pakistan started on 25 March 1971. I moved to Calcutta only in May that year, and initially my task was anything but exciting. We were first accommodated by the West Bengal Government in two rooms in its Secretariat in Writers Buildings. I still remember the monster mosquitoes there! Then a building was requisitioned for the Branch Secretariat and it had to be staffed with security-cleared persons. My memory of the time is that it was all rather slapdash. Subsequently, I was posted to Dacca (now Dhaka) in January 1972. I didn’t go back to Delhi. IFAJ: What was the task of the Secretariat during those days? AG: Apart from Joint Secretary Ashok Ray, who I recall spent much of the time in Delhi, there was an outstanding officer from the BSF, a Mr. Chattopadhyay, and support staff. In general, our job was to liaise with the Mujib Nagar Government, the Bangladesh government-in-exile. I was, of course, only a foot- soldier, rushing around carrying messages – I had a subaltern view, so to say. One of the tasks was to coordinate with the Bangladesh Government the 104 Arundhati Ghose defection of Pakistani-Bengali diplomats who wished to leave their posts in Pakistani Missions abroad. The task was to ease their “transfer” and ensure their security without breaking diplomatic protocol and the laws of the countries where these diplomats were posted. It was tricky, but our Missions had been briefed on how to handle these cases. IFAJ: Precisely what was the strategy to deal with these defecting Bengalis? AG: Normally, as I remember, a Bengali-Pakistani diplomat would indicate his wish to defect to the Indian Mission through some intermediary. As they found themselves becoming more and more uncomfortable in the Pakistani Mission – Bengalis were apparently being treated with suspicion and excluded from much of the work of the Mission – messages were sent, whichever way they could, to the Indian Mission. On receiving the name from the Ministry, I had to get it cleared with the Bangladesh Government authorities. Subsequently, the diplomat and his family would be assisted in leaving that country for some safe destination as he could not very well go to Dacca. I also had dealings with the Bangladesh authorities to try and help them in the myriad problems that they faced logistically and, in acting as a channel to Delhi. I was also a carrier of messages from Delhi to the Bangladesh Government, and had occasion to interact with their President, Nazrul Islam, Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed, Home Minister Kamruzzaman, Minister Mansur Ali, Foreign Minister Khondaker Mushtaque Ahmed, and Foreign Secretary Mahbub Alam Chashi. If there was one issue on which they all agreed, it was the urgent need for India to recognize Bangladesh. I had no idea why there was a delay – one can guess in hindsight – but one had to reassure them of India’s support on a continuous basis. Recently, I met the then Cabinet Secretary, Towfiq Imam, now an adviser to the Prime Minister. One recalled the old interactions, but unfortunately, only briefly, given his tight schedule in Delhi. Another job related to clearing and, sometimes helping the rather aggressive foreign press that wanted to cover the “story”. Our own journalists were not only more understanding but were better informed. I recall particularly some American journalists who wanted to cross the border and report on the Mukti Bahini. You will remember the US had been extremely hostile to India at Oral History: Birth of Bangladesh: Down Memory Lane ... 105 the time, so it was a bit sticky on occasion. I had to engage with the Military Press Office after they had been cleared by Delhi. One particular and very charming journalist, Sydney Schanberg, tried to cross the border without clearances. I had to work to get him out of a local jail! Obviously, we were involved in the overall coordination effort – MEA, IB, Special Branch, RAW, the Government of West Bengal, Military Intelligence – it all works so smoothly in a time of crisis! Another task, which grew out of the situation, was to deal with young Awami League leaders who later assumed high positions – Tofail Ahmed, Abdur Razzak, Sheikh Moni (Mujib’s nephew) – this acquaintance helped later when I was posted to Dacca. At the time, we even helped them financially – very modest amounts, though larger amounts were being spent in financing the entire establishment. I didn’t receive or disburse any large amounts, though I was aware of money kept in a safe in my room. IFAJ: How large was the sum? AG: I was not aware of the actual amounts. Let me give you an example of the kind of work we were called upon to do – the flavour of the job, as it were. On 15th or 16th December [1971], I was informed by General Jacob that the surrender of the Pakistan Army was to take place at Dacca and, that he was leaving by helicopter in a few hours. He invited Ashok Ray to accompany him. At almost the same time, I received a call from Delhi from the Ministry giving me an urgent task. I had been tracking the course of USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal from the Straits of Malacca. I was to get the President and the Prime Minister to sign a declaration declaring Bangladesh’s territorial waters. This declaration was to be read out over the Bangladesh Radio at 3 p.m. and, half an hour later, by All India Radio. I had about four hours to complete the job. When I informed Secretary Banerjee (who was impatiently issuing these instructions to me) that Ashok Ray was going to Dacca for the surrender ceremony, I was told to get my priorities right! The surrender could take place without my help! Of course, we didn’t have mobile phones then. Getting through to Delhi was a major operation. I had also to inform Ray’s wife that he had gone to Dacca, had to draft the declaration, get Tajuddin Ahmed to sign it, disturb the Bangladesh President at lunch and get his signature, get to Swadhin Bangla Betar Kendra (Free Bangladesh Radio), explain and convince them of the need 106 Arundhati Ghose to broadcast the declaration on time and then do the same with All India Radio.