SAARC and Subregional Co‐Operation: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policies in South Asia

Contemporary South Asia

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SAARC and subregional co‐operation: Domestic politics and foreign policies in South Asia

Md Nuruzzaman

To cite this article: Md Nuruzzaman (1999) SAARC and subregional co‐operation: Domestic politics and foreign policies in South Asia, Contemporary South Asia, 8:3, 311-322, DOI: 10.1080/09584939908719871 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09584939908719871

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ccsa20 Contemporary South Asia (1999) 8(3), 311-322

SAARC and subregional co-operation: domestic politics and foreign policies in South Asia

MD NURUZZAMAN

ABSTRACT In 1997, intense debate engulfed Bangladesh domestic politics over the question of subregional co-operation with India, Bhutan and Nepal within the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC). Whilst the political opposition depicted the proposed subregional co-operation scheme as an Indian ploy to undermine the national sovereignty and independence of Bangladesh, the ruling Awami League viewed it as essential for national economic development. This paper examines the scheme's rationale, maps out the nature of its political opposition, analyses India's position, and highlights Pakistani and Sri Lankan concerns as to the nature of subregional co-operation in South Asia. It concludes that minimum value consensus between the political parties on fundamental national issues in all SAARC countries, particularly in Bangladesh, and better political understandings between the governments of the region are the prerequisites to make the scheme for subregional co-operation a success.

In 1997, domestic politics in Bangladesh witnessed a fierce debate over the issue of subregional co-operation within the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) framework. The debate started after Bangladesh and Nepal had proposed at the 17th meeting of the SAARC Council of Ministers (New Delhi, 19-20 December 1996) that subregional co-operation be initiated among Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and the northeastern states of India on mutually agreed areas. The proposal immediately led to an unprecedented polarization of political forces in Bangladesh. The political opposition, specifically the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the largest opposition in the Jatiya Sangsad (National Assembly), expressed vehement opposition to the proposed subregional grouping. BNP politicians and pro-BNP intellectuals painted the new venture as a grave threat to the national sovereignty and independence of Bangladesh.1 The grouping was actually designed, they con- tended, to materialize India's interest and superpower aspirations in South Asia.2

Correspondence: Md Nuruzzaman, Department of Political Science, University of Alberta, Canada.

The Awami League, the ruling party in Dhaka, on the contrary argued that subregional co-operation was essential for the country's economic progress. The debate was very intense in nature and the civil society, as a whole, became sharply divided over the proposed subregional co-operation scheme. Against the backdrop of high political controversy over sub-regional cooperation, this paper seeks to address what factors led the Awami League government, in consonance with its Nepalese counterpart, to propose a sub-regional grouping within SAARC and why the political opposition in Bangladesh opposed the new grouping. It also will attempt to analyse the position of India vis-a-vis the proposed sub-regional scheme. Finally, it will try to highlight the future possibilities of a sub-regional cooperative in South Asia.

Why subregional co-operation? The need for increased economic co-operation among geographically contiguous countries has been a dominant feature of the global political economy ever since the emergence of the European Economic Community (EEC) in the late 1940s and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the 1960s. The rationale for such co-operation has been strengthened further in the 1990s by the emergence of regional trading blocs like the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). The Asian response to trading blocs has not resulted in any concrete achieve- ments, yet efforts to gear up the tempo of cooperation are there. Co-operation on a subregional basis, or forming what is popularly known as a 'growth triangle', is the latest Asian response to emerging trends in the world economy. Growth triangles are all about the intensification of economic co-operation on a limited geographical scale to attract foreign investments and thus boost export promotion. They are based on localized economic zones where geographically contiguous countries with different economic sizes, socio-cultural patterns and political systems seek to integrate parts of their territories for mutual gains. A set of complex key factors—the most prominent being foreign direct investment, complementarities in production systems, export-oriented development strategies and differences in factor costs—facilitates the emergence of growth triangles.3 East and Southeast Asian countries, which have recently achieved unprecedented rates of economic growth, were the first Asian states to experiment with such co-operative designs. Two of the most successful growth triangles are the Southern China growth triangle (Hong Kong, Taiwan and contiguous coastal economic zones in South China), and the Johor (Malaysia)-Singapore-Riau (Indonesia) growth triangle. The clear logic of comparative advantage, a dynamic relationship between the central governments and regional authorities, and successful policy co-ordination between the concerned governments in the region have led to the astonishing success of these two growth triangles.4 Some of the more recently created growth triangles include the Lower Mekong subregion (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam), Tumen River

312 SAARC AND SUBREGIONAL CO-OPERATION subregion (China, North Korea, Mongolia and Russia), and the Indonesia- Malaysia-Thailand (IMT) growth triangle. The growth dynamism in East and Southeast Asia based on effective subregional co-operation provides the necessary impetus for such co-operation in other parts of the world. In its fifteenth session held in May 1995, the SAARC Council of Ministers recommended that effective measures were required for a fast-track approach to SAARC, including subregional co-operation with well- defined objectives. The objectives for subregional co-operation in South Asia, as set out by the Concept Paper on Subregional Co-operation prepared by the Bangladesh delegation5 are defined as the exploitation of complementarities in resource endowment and comparative advantages through cross-border trade and investment flows in a contiguous zone of geographic unity. The utilization of natural resources, including the harnessing of the immense water resources, development of hydropower and energy, promotion of trade and investment, expansion of telecommunication network, improvement of infrastructure of sustained economic development, and development of tourism industry have been identified as possible areas of subregional co-operation. The fast-track approach to SAARC through subregional co-operation involves three basic components: development of the private sector, development of regional communication infrastructure, and equity in development co-operation.6 The private sector undeniably occupies a dominant position in South Asia's trade and investment. The importance of the private sector, in line with general post-Cold War trends, is becoming a fact of economic life in each of the SAARC countries. Although governments in the region are liberalizing their respective economies, cross-border interactions and the operation of the private sector are still not very encouraging. The domestic economic liberalization programmes of the SAARC countries are not being matched by a regionally formulated cross-border liberalization programme. Private sector actors need to be moti- vated to co-operate and integrate through time-bound, business-friendly action plans. The identification of techno-economically sound projects for joint ven- tures can open up real avenues for the successful integration between the private sectors of the participating countries. The process may better get off the ground with subregional efforts that may lead the regional tempo at a later stage. Closely related to the expansion and integration of the private sector is the development of regional communication infrastructure, the second-most important component of the fast-track approach. Quick expansion of trade and investment requires quick expansion of transport infrastructure, including cross- border linkages in road and rail communications, and navigation lines. Infra- structure development also includes telecommunications, large-scale land development, water and power supply, and extensive air links between the growth areas and the rest of the country to facilitate backward and forward linkages. Efforts towards regional integration otherwise can be neither significant nor sustainable. Prior to the partition of British India in 1947, the different parts of northeast South Asia were more or less linked up through 5000 miles of inland waterways

313 MD NURUZZAMAN and a few kilometers of railways. The inland waterways provided extensive transportation network for the movement of goods and peoples. From Calcutta via the Brahmaputra River, there were regular steamer services up to Assam through Bangladesh.7 The West Bengal province of India and East Bengal (now Bangladesh) were also integrated by road and rail communications. The two wars between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1948 and 1965, however, led to a major disruption of the communication networks in northeast South Asia as the Pakistan government forbade rail communication and imposed restrictions on inland waterways' transportation between East Pakistan and contiguous parts of India. However, efforts are now underway to restore road communication between Bangladesh and India, and commercial bus services started operating between Dhaka and Calcutta from 9 July following an agreement signed by the two countries on 17 June 1999.8 The third most important component for subregional co-operation emerges out of the necessity to ensure equity in developmental co-operation between SAARC member states. SAARC policy-makers are planning to move from a South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) to a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by 2005. But it is vital to recognize that all SAARC states are not on the same level of development. India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are comparatively well-advanced, while Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal are lagging behind in terms of development indices. For example, according to the World Development Report 1997, the per capita GNP of Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan are US $240, 200 and 420, respectively, while those of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are US $340, 460 and 700, respectively. The limited production capacities of the least developed countries also may fail to adequately compete and thus derive any benefits from operating in the trade regime to be set by SAFTA in 2005. Thus, it is essential that the least developed countries and areas of SAARC co-operate more effectively to ensure growth with equity under SAFTA.9

The political debate in Bangladesh The strong rationale for subregional co-operation notwithstanding, domestic politics in Bangladesh became highly polarized over proposals for the formation of any such new grouping involving Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and north eastern India. The ruling Awami League viewed subregional co-operation as essential for the economic development of Bangladesh. In her public speeches Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed stressed the need for the political will and determination to create an opportunity for economic development in order to facilitate trade and economic contacts between the contiguous parts of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and northeast India. She categorically stated her support for subregional co-operation as permissible under Article VII of the SAARC Charter, and pointed out that such co-operation was also in practice in different parts of the world.10 Awami League law-makers geared up similar efforts to justify the formation of the proposed sub-grouping. Opening up a general debate on 'transit and subregional co-operation' in the Jatiya Sangsad on

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15 May 1997, Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Azad stated that 'subregional co-operation among four nations within the SAARC will complement and supplement the existing regional co-operation as well'.11 The official position on subregional co-operation was seriously contested by the opposition in the Jatiya Sangsad. BNP chief and leader of the opposition Begum Khaleda Zia, categorically termed the move to form the sub-grouping as a design to make the SAARC ineffective and 'establish Indian expansionism'. There was a conspiracy, in her words, 'to destroy the spirit of SAARC'.12 Speaking in a similar tone, BNP law-maker Moshiur Rahman told the Jatiya Sangsad that 'India cannot be trusted, they are an aggressive force and they want to form a greater India (with the countries of this region)'. Another BNP law-maker, K.M. Obaidur Rahaman, argued that, while 'we want a good working relationship with India ... we can't accept such an agreement as can make the country into a province of another country'.13 The opposition of the BNP to the subregional grouping centres round three particular points.14 Firstly, the proposed grouping undermines the spirit, importance, interests and functions of SAARC. As SAARC is the very embodiment of co-operation of all the countries of South Asia, the formation of a sub-grouping is likely to diminish its effectiveness and make it a loose regional forum. Secondly, once the grouping is formalized, the BNP argues, India would demand 'corridor' facilities through Bangladesh in order to help crush armed insurgency in her northeastern states, endangering Bangladesh's sovereignty and independence. And, in view of Sino-Indian hostilities, India would use Bangladesh territory for military purposes whenever any war situation between India and China arose. Thirdly, the proposed grouping would be superfluous paperwork. The key to regional development is the simulation of growth in the smaller nations, not initiatives and additional paperwork at a superstructure-level by a multilateral bureaucracy. The proponents of subregional co-operation, including Awami League law- makers, dismiss the position of BNP on subregionalism. One newspaper colum- nist accused the BNP of confrontational politics:

for misplaced nationalism, confrontation is of essence; otherwise a populist premise for such nationalism cannot be established. If through the subregional grouping, trade and investment are promoted, particularly with the seven states of northeast India then the future of such nationalist politics is indeed very bleak.13 The proponents of subregionalism also contend that the argument that a subregional grouping runs counter to SAARC's spirit miserably fails to accept current trends in regional and subregional integration efforts for collective economic progress.16 The formation of a subregional arrangement within given regional set-ups, as in ASEAN or in East Asia, are primarily meant to buttress the production capacities of the participating states by employing foreign investments and technologies. The founding fathers of SAARC had similar visions as Article VII of the SAARC charter states: 'The Standing Committee may set up Action Committees comprising Member States concerned with implementation

315 MD NURUZZAMAN of projects involving more than two but not all Member States'. The slow progress of SAARC in the first decade of its existence—mainly due to Indo-Pak rivalry—makes it imperative to try new efforts at closer co-operation under Article VII. The second argument of the opponents to subregional groupings, as its proponents view it, makes no sense: military attempts to crush insurgency have proven to be complete failures. Even if India attempts a military solution in its northeast, it can do so alone as its modern military transport planes can ferry military equipment and armed personnel at a faster speed than land-based methods through corridor facilities. Moreover, corridor facilities through Bangladesh are not essential since India has been successfully containing the insurgency problem in her northeast right from 1947.17 Additionally, the fear of a war between China and India can be dismissed because in the post-Cold War world, Sine—Indian economic and political interests are converging. Both countries are primarily interested in maintaining a peaceful environment to ensure unhindered economic growth which will allow them to exercise a greater degree of autonomy in international politics. The present trend of positive developments between China and India rather indicates that they are in a process of building up an Asian balance against the unilateral domination of the United States in Asian affairs. Although India's nuclear explosions in May 1998, avowedly for military purposes, and its defence minister's identification of China as the number one potential threat to India, slowed the Beijing-New Delhi rapproche- ment process, tensions seem to have subsided since both countries are emphasiz- ing economic values more than military ones. Besides, strategic calculations suggest that a future war between China and India armed with nuclear weapons is most unlikely since both parties can lose much and gain nothing out of it. The slow but progressive trend in Sino-Indian relations suggests that the old parameters of military hostility, although unlikely to disappear totally, are gradually being replaced by the imperatives of political peace and diplomatic co-operation. In response to the last argument of the opposition, the proponents of subregional co-operation argue that the stimulation of growth is not automatic. It is pushed ahead through massive investment for production and the development of infrastructure to facilitate further dynamism in the production sector.18 The opportunities for investment in the proposed subregion of Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and northeastern India are enormous once the proposed grouping takes off. Take the example of hydro-energy production: the subregional grouping has an undeveloped hydro-energy potential of around 40,000 MW. The aggregate peak demand in 1992 in the subregion was around 10,400 MW which is expected to rise to 19,470 MW in 2000, and 32,300 in 2010.19 There need never be an energy crisis in the subregion should there be co-operation in the energy sectors. Similar opportunities exist in other sectors like cement, software, ceramics, gas-based fertilizer and power generation.20 The proponents, in a bid to make their case for subregionalism stronger, further highlight the historical linkages, geographic proximity and ecological

316 SAARC AND SUBREGIONAL CO-OPERATION unity of the subregion.21 Bangladesh and northeast India are partners in a historical civilization, they form part of the same ecological sub-system, and share the great rivers of Ganges, Brahmaputra amd Meghna. The cultural pattern and practices of the Indian states—particularly West Bengal and Assam—bordering Bangladesh are very similar. This is unsurprising as in colonial India these areas were organized in a single administrative unit. Only in 1947 were they politically separated on a permanent basis. Still, the cultural, historical and colonial affinity remains as a useful factor that can be exploited to forge intensive co-operation on a localized basis. The opposition's political stance against subregional groupings appears to be driven largely by India's past foreign policy behaviour in South Asia in general, and its odd relations with Dhaka in particular.22 Customarily, India, with regards to its short-term or long-term interests, has pursued a hard line and uncompro- mising policy in projecting its influence and power vis-a-vis its smaller neighbours. This policy objective got robust expression in what ultimately came to be labeled as the 'India Doctrine'—the South Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine in North America. The essence of the doctrine revolves round the recognition and acceptance of India's paramount position in South Asia's economic, political and security systems, both from major external powers and from other states in the region.23 The doctrine transmitted sufficient alarming signals to all the region's capitals, including Dhaka which, in particular, had tried after 1975 to chalk out a foreign policy course independent of India. India's overt and covert interventions in Nepal in 1950-1951 and again in 1961-1962, as well as in Sri Lanka in 1987 created widespread concern throughout the region. In addition, the evolving patterns of Dhaka-New Delhi relations, particularly after 1975, were characterized by a host of complex issues, the Ganges water-sharing dispute being the most notorious. There was a feeling among the Bangladeshis that India was bent upon using the water issue to corner Bangladesh in regional and international affairs. Apart from any political gains to be made out of anti-India feelings in Bangladesh the opposition political parties that now oppose the subregional co-operative scheme with India are undoubtedly mindful of the latter's past actions.

India's stance on subregional co-operation How does India perceive the formation of the proposed sub-grouping in SAARC? This question begs special attention since India was originally antithet- ical to the idea of a forum for subregional co-operation in South Asia. In fact, the Indian position may better be understood if one looks back to India's original response to the formation of SAARC. To begin with, India was not favourable to the idea of a regional co-operative venture in South Asia and her original response to the Bangladesh Working Paper proposing the formation of SAARC was, at best, lukewarm. The strategic divergences of the region led India to view the Bangladesh move for regional cooperation with skepticism. The coincidence of the move with the Soviet

317 MD NURUZZAMAN

intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 further sharpened its skepticism. The ruling elite in New Delhi considered that it would trap India into a pro-Western strategic consensus and accordingly force it to endorse the renewal and approval of Pakistan-US military ties.24 In the regional context, India suspected the Bangladesh move as having its roots in Nepal's failed efforts to have itself acknowledged as a 'Zone of Peace', a concept India firmly rejects. In addition, India, being mindful of the past experiences of regional pacts in Asia and its determination to prevent itself from getting involved in political and security alliances that invite external powers' involvement in South Asian affairs, decided to adopt a cautious approach towards the Bangladesh proposal fearing that the initiative might be a US move.25 Initial fears and reservations notwithstanding, New Delhi publicly agreed to the Bangladesh move for regional co-operation and ultimately joined SAARC, officially launched in Dhaka in 1985. The prospect of political isolation, in case SAARC minus India could be floated, influenced India's ruling elite to opt for the regional organization at last. India's concurrence with SAARC also may have been influenced by the consideration that, in her absence from the regional forum, SAARC affairs might be influenced by external powers which would be at variance with its foreign policy objectives of preventing external powers' involvement in South Asian affairs.26 In contrast to its initial apathy to joining SAARC, India was enthusiastic to move forward with the idea of a subregional scheme within the organization's structure. It is true that Bangladesh Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Azad formally floated the concept in the December 1996 meeting of the SAARC Council of Ministers in New Delhi, but Indian Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral's press interview wherein he first spoke about Bangladesh, India, Bhutan and Nepal forming 'a dynamic area of growth'27 preceded Azad's move. Gujral, who later became Prime Minister of India, reaffirmed the same idea of subregional co-operation in the region in a lecture delivered at London's Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in September 1996.28 At the same time, there also was a press report that while India initially was reluctant; nonetheless former Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda backed the initiative when he visited Bangladesh in January 1997.29 Gujral did not elaborate what he meant by the 'dynamic area of growth'. But one may extrapolate that he meant the huge growth potentials of the subregion which is endowed with great reserves of human and natural resources, particularly gas, oil, coal and water. These resources, given the political will and appropriate policy coordination, communication infrastructure development, and promotion of trade and cultural linkages, could push the pace of growth significantly in the subregion. The exploitation of mutual economic complementarities on the basis of comparative advantage may open up better avenues to give real life to the dynamic area of growth. What are India's real interests behind the newly floated idea of subregional co-operation? The officially proclaimed objectives of subregional co-operation,

318 SAARC AND SUBREGIONAL CO-OPERATION as spelt out by Bangladesh's Concept Paper on Subregional Co-operation in South Asia and Nepal's Approach Paper for Subregional co-operation in SAARC,30 seen to have been held in good faith by the common people of the subregion. But the Indian press, particularly the West Bengal press, carried stories depicting interests that created public confusion in Dhaka. The Ananda Bazar Patrika (Calcutta) identified access to the northeast through Bangladesh territory and the ending of alleged Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) operations backing militant and secessionist organizations in India's northeastern provinces based in Bangladesh as two factors that were instrumental in the signing of the Indo-Bangladesh Water Treaty of 1996.31 This view lent credence to the apprehensions of the political opposition in Bangladesh that India had new regional designs hiding behind the disguise of the proposed subregional co-operation framework. Various academics and researchers in New Delhi also feel discomfort with the idea of subregional co-operation, and brush the idea aside as something detri- mental to India's interests. For example, Professor Kanti Bajpai, based at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, categorically opined that what subregional grouping was intended to do could be done bilaterally. He was of the view that the floating of the new sub-structure in SAARC would alienate Sri Lanka and Pakistan.32 Dr Partha S. Ghosh, a prominent researcher with the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) thinks that subregional co-operation minus Pakistan and Sri Lanka is an unfeasible idea, and that the 'marginalization of Pakistan would lead to further dilution of SAARC image'.33 India's enthusiasm for subregional co-operation, as the above convents suggest, is without due respect to several pragmatic considerations linked to Indo-Pakistani and Indo-Sri Lankan relations. The alienation of Pakistan and Sri Lanka from the proposed subregional grouping may force them to repeat efforts to forge closer ties with West Asia and Southeast Asia, respectively,34 which India wants to avoid. Particularly, according to some Indian views, Pakistan's drift away from South Asia and the forging of closer linkages with Islamic countries in the Gulf and West Asia may lead it to a more militant path of Islamic fundamentalism. In the long run, such a move would create unnecessary foreign policy complications for India. Secondly, in recent times, trade interactions between India and Pakistan have increased considerably, paving the way for closer economic contacts and also possible integration. Indian academia think it unwise to antagonize the Pakistani business community which is putting tremendous pressure on the government to facilitate trade with India.

Prospects of subregionalism in SAARC Any new co-operative design, regional or subregional, to be successful must pass two tests; it should be acceptable to the people of the participating states, and it should engender a positive and strong regional political response. The proposed subregional grouping in SAARC apparently has failed to score points on both

319 MD NURUZZAMAN counts. Opposition to it first started at home in Bangladesh, and the response from Pakistan and Sri Lanka to the grouping has not been encouraging either. The story of political opposition in Bangladesh to the idea of subregional co-operation is already extensively highlighted and needs not be reproduced here. The situation took a further downward swing due to negative perceptions of the concept by Pakistan and Sri Lanka, two other influential members of SAARC. Pakistan felt unhappy with the proposal and pointed out that it could undermine SAARC. One Foreign Ministry official in Islamabad warned that 'the move will isolate its [SAARC's] three other important members—Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the Maldives and the over-all interest of SAARC will be dam- aged'.35 Sri Lanka expressed a similar reaction and decided to support the Pakistan position. Just before the concluding session of the SAARC summit in Male held in May 1997, Sri Lanka President Chandrika Kumaratunga went on record to state that the establishment of a subregional grouping within SAARC could adversely affect the regional forum. 'We believe that the subregional grouping', added a senior Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry official, 'could be a hurdle to SAARC because the member nations of subregional group may give top priority to implementation of the programmes of that group, thus pushing SAARC programmes to the back seat'.36 Perhaps two important considerations led Pakistan and Sri Lanka to view the subregional grouping with reservations and, ultimately, put up opposition to it. The first was the prospect of economic and, by implication, political isolation from mainstream regional interactions if the subregional grouping was launched. By all measures of power—geography, resources, economic progress and tech- nological advances—India remains the central power of South Asia. New Delhi's closer economic contacts and political interactions with Dhaka, Thimpu and Kathmandu under the garb of subregional co-operation could result in concentrating major regional politico-economic activities in those capitals thus making Colombo and Islamabad less important. Secondly, the forging of a closer identity between Dhaka, Thimpu, Kathmandu and New Delhi also might eventually produce a common strategic view, or even a strategic consensus between India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal that might create unavoidable foreign policy complications for Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Colombo and Islama- bad ultimately may have decided to make a strong bid to keep SAARC's structure intact by expressing their strong reservations against the concept of subregional co-operation. Although Nepal officially backed the formation of the subregional grouping, non-official reactions in Kathmandu were as adverse as official reactions in Islamabad and Colombo. An influential section of Nepalese politicians and intelligentsia remains unconvinced of the need for subregional development initiatives. Former Nepalese Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey told the India Abroad News Service (IANS) that he did not understand why any kind of subregional concept is being forwarded when there is SAARC. Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Maldives too should have been taken into confidence for this initiative'.37 Pandey was joined by the economist, Professor Madhab Khadka of

320 SAARC AND SUBREGIONAL CO-OPERATION

Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, who said: 'At a time when SAARC itself has not been showing effect for overall development of one billion plus people of the region, I do not think any subregional concept will work'.38 It appears abundantly clear that, despite official backing, the formation of a subregional structure in SAARC enjoys less unofficial support in Nepal too.

Conclusion Regionalism in South Asia is not a new phenomenon and, unsurprisingly: internal differences over the modalities to promote effective subregional integration under SAARC do exist, particularly in Bangladesh. The political differences between the ruling and the opposition parties point to the lack of a national consensus to chalk out a long-term plan for the overall development of the country. For social and political stability, a minimum consensus on fundamental national issues between the ruling and the opposition parties is a must. But a lack of minimum consensus has continuously weakened the government in power, shortened state capacities to mobilize resources for national development, and thwarted efforts on the part of Dhaka to play a proactive regional and international role. The opposition to subregionalism is a case in point.39 The idea of subregional co-operation also suffered major setbacks due to adverse perceptions of the concept by Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The official positions of these two countries indicate that they are very reluctant to endorse the proposed subregional grouping between Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and northeast India since they perceive no gain but potential loss if the subgroup was to take firm root. Indeed, their efforts to keep the regional forum created by SAARC stand in close conformity with their perceptions of national interest. The combination of domestic political opposition in Bangladesh and unfavour- able reactions in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and, to a lesser extent, Nepal have frustrated imperatives for a fast-track approach to SAARC, the South Asian vehicle for regional co-operation. There is a common feeling in the region that SAARC has succeeded only in making snail-paced progress, despite the high- sounding statements and declarations issued by the leaders of the region at the end of their ritualistic annual summit. Co-operation on a subregional basis, many believe, could be an effective mechanism to bail SAARC out of superfluous super-structures and paperwork. Such a step, however, remains extremely dependent on building a favourable consensus in domestic Bangladeshi politics, as well as in the region as a whole. Although the concept of subregional co-operation has not been abandoned officially, political developments in domestic and regional contexts do not portend immediate hopes for its fruition. Perhaps more time is required to fight against the political gimmicks that at present thwart the move for subregional co-operation which would ultimately make SAARC a more effective regional organization.

321 MD NURUZZAMAN Notes and references 1. The Daily Star, 13 March 1997; The Bangla Bazar Patrika, 15 February 1997. 2. The Bangladesh Observer, 20 March 1997. 3. Myo Thant, 'Overview', in: Myo Thant et al. (eds), Growth Triangles in Asia: A New Approach to Regional Economic Cooperation, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p 1. 4. For an extensive analysis of the two growth triangles see Edward K.Y. Chen and Joseph S.L. Lee, 'Southern China growth triangle: an overview'; Sree Kumar, 'Johor-Singapore-Riau growth triangle: a model of subregional cooperation'; and G. Naidu, Mohor—Singapore-Riau growth triangle: progress and prospects'; in: Myo Thant op cit, pp 49-101, 187-229 and 231-255. 5. 'Concept paper on subregional cooperation in South Asia', Bangladesh, undated, p 1. 6. 'Approach paper for subregional cooperation in SAARC, Nepal, undated, pp 1-2. 7. ibid., p 7 8. The Daily Star, 9 July 1999. 9. Nepal, op cit, Ref 6, p 6 10. The Daily Star, 9 & 30 January 1997. 11. Ibid, 16 May 1997. 12. Ibid, 8 January 1997. 13. Ibid, 16 May 1997. 14. Ibid, 30 January & 10 April, 1997; and Weekly Holiday, 4 & 11 April 1997. 15. Editorial, The Daily Star, 8 & 24 April 1997. 16. Ibid, 10 June 1997. 17. The Daily Janakantha, 10 November 1997. 18. Editorial The Daily Star, 10 June 1997. 19. Nepal, op. cit., Ref 6, p 5. 20. For elaboration, see Anirban Chattopodhyay, 'Some aspects of developmental regionalism', a paper presented at 'Interactions with Indian Bordering States', Bangladesh Institute of International and strategic studies (BUSS) Dhaka, 19-20 February 1997. 21. For elaboration, see Monirul Hussain, 'Subregional cooperation between Bangladesh and Indian Bordering States: an incomplete perspective from Assam Today', a paper presented at ibid. 22. See Leo E. Rose, 'India and its neighbours: regional foreign and security policies', in: Lawrence Ziring (ed), The Subcontinent in World Politics: India, its Neighbours and the Great Powers (New York: Prager, 1982), pp 37^tl. 23. See Iftekharuzzaman, "The India doctrine: relevance for Bangladesh', in: M.G. Kabir and Shaukat Hassan eds. Issues and Challenges Facing Bangladesh Foreign Policy (Dhaka: Bangladesh Society of Inter- national Studies, 1989). 24. See S.D. Muni, 'Geo-strategic implications of SAARC, pp 23-24, a paper presented at 'Regional Security in South Asia', Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal, 3-5 November 1985. 25. S.D. Muni, 'SAARC: building regionalism from below', Asian Survey, Vol 25, No 4, April 1985, p 395. 26. Md. Nuruzzaman, 'Global change and regional cooperation in South Asia', Regional Studies, Vol 11, No 3, Summer 1993, p 51. 27. Quoted in Abul Kalam, 'Environmentalism in South Asia', BUSS Journal, Vol 17, No 4, October 1996, p535. 28. Editorial, The Daily Bhorer Kagoj, 23 June 1997. 29. The Asian Age, 6 May 1997. 30. Bangladesh, op cit, Ref 5; and Nepal, op cit, Ref 6. 31. Ananda Bazar Patrika, 6 November 1996. 32. Personal interview with Dr Kanti Bajpa in New Delhi, 6 January 1998. 33. Personal interview with Dr Partha S. Ghosh in New Delhi, 7 January 1998. 34. Pakistan, under Z.A. Bhutto and in the wake of its 1971 break-up, tried to forge closer ties with Muslim West Asia. Sri Lanka tried to do the same with Southeast Asian countries in the 1980s. 35. The Asian Age, 6 May 1997. 36. The Daily Star, 13 May 1997. 37. India Abroad News Service. 38. The Daily Star, 6 January 1998. 39. For an elaboration, see B.K. Jahangir, 'Reformist agenda for Bangladesh', The Journal of Social Studies, No 75, January 1997. pp 23-32.

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