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La Situation Et Les Perspectives Des Chrétiens Dans Le Nord Et Le Nord-Est De La Syrie

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La Situation Et Les Perspectives Des Chrétiens Dans Le Nord Et Le Nord-Est De La Syrie La situation et les perspectives des chrétiens dans le nord et le nord-est de la Syrie Otmar Oehring www.kas.de Empreinte Éditrice : Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e. V. 2019, Berlin Rédaction du texte achevé le 15 juillet 2019 Dernière consultation des sources Internet, le 15 juillet 2019 pour l’allemand et l’anglais, le 25 août 2019 pour le français. L’auteur Otmar Oehring est coordinateur du dialogue religieux international au sein de l’équipe Agenda 2030 du Département Coopération européenne et internationale. De décembre 2012 à fin juillet 2016, il a dirigé le bureau de la fondation Konrad Adenauer à Amman, Jordanie. Jusqu’à l’automne 2015, la Syrie et l’Irak ressortaient également des compétences du bureau de Jordanie. Traduction en français : Valentine Meunier Photo de couverture : portail d’entrée de l’église Saint-Georges avec des impacts de balles clairement visibles. © Mais Istanbuli – transterramedia.com Photos : p. 31 © Bertramz [CC BY 3.0 (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)] – https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rasal-Ain,church.jpg; p. 35 © REUTERS/ Rodi Said – Adobe Stock; p. 47 © Tasnim News Agency [CC BY 4.0 (https://creative- commons.org/licenses/by/4.0)] – https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dayr_ az-Zawr_13970904_19.jpg Carte: © 123map Maquette et composition : yellow too Pasiek Horntrich GbR L’édition papier a été imprimée par Druckerei Kern GmbH, Bexbach, et produite sans impact climatique sur papier certifié FSC. Printed in Germany. Imprimé avec le soutien financier de la République fédérale d’Allemagne. Le texte de cette publication est publié sous la licence : « Creative Commons Attribution-Partage dans les même conditions 4.0 International » (CC BY-SA 4.0), https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode.fr ISBN 978-3-95721-593-2 Sommaire 1. Introduction 3 2. Les chrétiens dans le nord de la Syrie 7 2.1 Les adeptes de l’idéologie Dawronoye 8 3. La Fédération démocratique de Syrie du Nord 11 3.1 Les contraintes pour la population 12 3.1.1 Loi sur la confiscation des biens fonciers des « émigrants » 12 3.1.2 Double service militaire obligatoire 12 3.1.3 Taxes et impôts 12 3.1.4 Cotisations obligatoires à la reconstruction de localités en Turquie 13 3.1.5 Introduction de nouveaux programmes scolaires par le gouvernement autonome dominé par le PYD 13 3.1.6 La violence à l’encontre des personnes 13 4. L’armée américaine dans le nord de la Syrie et les Forces démocratiques syriennes (FDS) 17 5. Évolutions dans les différentes régions de la Syrie du Nord 18 5.1 Le gouvernorat d’Alep 18 5.1.1 Afrin 18 L’offensive militaire sur Afrin 19 Présence chrétienne à Afrin 20 5.1.2 Kobané (Aïn Al-Arab) 21 L’ouverture d’une église à Kobané 21 5.2 Gouvernorat de Raqqa 23 5.2.1 Tall Abyad (Girê Spî) 23 Présence chrétienne à Tall Abyad (Girê Spî) 24 5.2.2 Ath-Thaura (Tabqa) 24 Présence chrétienne à Ath-Thaura (Tabqa) 24 5.2.3 Raqqa 25 Présence chrétienne à Raqqa 25 1 La situation et les perspectives des chrétiens dans le nord et le nord-est de la Syrie 5.3 Gouvernorat d’Hassaké 26 5.3.1 Ras al-Aïn/Serê Kaniyê 26 Présence chrétienne à Ras al-Aïn 27 5.3.2 Villages chrétiens sur les rives du Khabour 29 5.3.3 Les combats pour conquérir Hassaké 31 5.3.4 La situation à Qamichli 31 5.3.5 Contraintes pour la population 33 Occupation arbitraire de bâtiments, d’organismes publics, de lieux 33 Introduction de nouveaux programmes scolaires par le gouvernement autonome dominé par le PYD 33 5.4 Gouvernorat de Deir ez-Zor 42 5.4.1 Présence chrétienne à Deir ez-Zor 42 Al-Boukamal/Abu Kamal 44 Al-Mayadin 45 6. Conséquences d’un éventuel retrait des troupes américaines du nord de la Syrie 57 6.1 La décision de retrait des troupes américaines du nord de la Syrie du 19 décembre 2018 57 6.2 Décision sur le maintien des troupes américaines dans le nord de la Syrie du 21 février 2019 58 6.3 Une zone de sécurité au nord de la Syrie ? 59 7. Mouvement d’exil des chrétiens hors du nord de la Syrie 70 8. Annexe 72 8.1 Les milices chrétiennes dans le nord de la Syrie 72 8.2 Les écoles chrétiennes au nord-est de la Syrie 74 8.3 Démographie 78 8.3.1 Évolution démographique en Syrie d’après les données de la Banque mondiale 78 8.3.2 Fidèles des Églises chrétiennes au nord et nord-est de la Syrie (par confession) 79 8.4 Abréviations 83 2 1. Introduction Deux ans se sont écoulés depuis la parution de la publication de Les chrétiens en Syrie : situation actuelle et perspectives1. Alors qu’on pouvait encore espérer en ce début d’an- née 2017 une résolution rapide du conflit en Syrie, l’espoir n’est guère plus d’actualité aujourd’hui. Et pourtant, beaucoup de choses ont évolué dans ce pays. Début 2015, le régime Assad contrôlait moins de 1/5e du territoire de la Syrie ; après l’entrée en guerre de la Russie à l’automne de cette même année, il avait reconquis une grande partie du pays. Aujourd’hui, le régime contrôle de nouveau plus de la moi- tié de la superficie du pays, surtout les régions les plus peuplées, dont le littoral et les grandes villes à l’ouest et au sud, les zones longeant la frontière du Liban et de la Jor- danie et une grande partie du désert au centre de la Syrie, où se trouvent les princi- paux gisements de gaz2. Les conflits armés ont poussé les gens à quitter ces territoires. En avril 2018, l’Agence des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) estimait que le nombre de réfugiés se mon- tait à 5,6 millions et celui des déplacés internes à 6,6 millions3. Rien qu’en 2017, plus de 1,8 million de personnes ont été déplacées, beaucoup d’entre elles pour la deuxième ou la troisième fois4. Par ailleurs, toujours pour la même année 2017, 840 000 per- sonnes ont été « rapatriées » en Syrie, dont plus de 764 000 déplacés internes et 77 000 réfugiés, qui ont organisé eux-mêmes leur retour dans le pays. Dans la phase actuelle, souligne le HCR, « les conditions nécessaires à un retour sûr et digne ne sont pas réunies » ; par conséquent, il ne faudrait pas « encourager le retour »5. Malgré cela, le régime Assad a appelé à plusieurs reprises les réfugiés à revenir en Syrie. Il a cependant rencontré un faible écho, notamment parce que les Syriens qui sont rentrés au pays ces dernières années ont été arrêtés, torturés ou enrôlés de force. De même, l’interprétation d’une loi actuelle exigeant des réfugiés qu’ils fassent la preuve de leur droit de propriété sur leurs biens fonciers laissés dans les zones de reconstruction reste floue. Certains pensent qu’elle vise à faire pression sur les réfu- giés pour rentrer en Syrie, d’autres que le but de cette loi est tout simplement d’ex- proprier les opposants au régime qui ont fui6. Jusqu’à ce jour, toutes les catégories de population – indépendamment de leur origine ethnique et confessionnelle – sont victimes de la guerre en Syrie. Mais il est d’ores et déjà patent que la proportion de membres de la minorité chrétienne est surreprésen- tée parmi les Syriens ayant fui le pays depuis 2011. En 2018, la Banque mondiale évalue la population de la Syrie à 16 906 283 habitants7, soit un déclin de 20,86 % par rapport à 2010. Si l’on rapporte cette perte à la minorité chrétienne, elle devrait être passée d’un million (4,681 %) à 1,5 million (7,021 %) de personnes en 2010 à une communauté oscillant entre 793 200 et 1 189 800 membres aujourd’hui selon les estimations8. 3 La situation et les perspectives des chrétiens dans le nord et le nord-est de la Syrie Cependant, même dans le meilleur des cas, il faut compter que la minorité chrétienne s’élevait au maximum entre 500 000 et 750 000 personnes en 2017. Il est également possible que la proportion de chrétiens de la population ait été déjà inférieure à Forte régression de la 500 000 personnes à cette époque et que, dans le pire des cas, elle n’ait pas dépassé population chrétienne ! les 300 000 habitants9. Lors d’un colloque organisé à l’université catholique Péter Pázmány (PPKE) à Budapest, le cardinal Mario Zenari, nonce apostolique en Syrie, a déclaré le 22 janvier 2019 que le pourcentage de chrétiens dans la population syrienne serait tombé à 2 %10. Si l’on rap- porte ce chiffre aux estimations démographiques de la Banque mondiale pour 2018, ce pourcentage signifierait qu’il n’existe plus que 338 125 chrétiens en Syrie11. Le déclin démographique global entre 2010 et 2018 s’élève à 20,86 % – toujours en s’appuyant sur les données statistiques fournies par la Banque mondiale12. Si l’on part du principe que la Syrie ne comptait plus que 338 125 chrétiens en 2018 et qu’ils étaient 1 million à 1,5 million en 2010, alors la régression démographique de ce groupe entre 2010 et 2018 oscille entre 66,18 % (1 million) et 77,45 % (1,5 million). Parmi les rapatriés mentionnés plus haut – réfugiés et déplacés internes – se trou- vaient également des chrétiens déplacés internes, qui sont revenus dans leur région La majorité des réfugiés d’origine après ‹ l’apaisement › de la situation.
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