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Home , Deir Atiyah, Hama, Maaloula, Michel Kilo, Yabroud

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Caught between Autocracy and WP ’s Christians Hope for the Implementation of Geneva I

Petra Becker S

The discourse conducted by Syria’s Christians since March 2011 reveals that many of them have now turned their back on the protest movement, despite their initial sym- pathy and even involvement with it. These Christians have not turned away out of any deeply held convictions in support of the regime, but because they are worried by the militarisation and radicalisation of the revolution, and by the fact that after three years the opposition has still not shown itself to be a credible alternative to the regime. German and European policymakers should continue working towards a political solu- tion and avoid supporting any particular religious or ethnic groups at the expense of others, because apart from those in areas where foreign Jihadists operate, Christians in Syria are no more at risk than other .

Christians are firmly rooted in Syrian soci- motivated violence. In various places, ety, and account for an estimated 8–10 there have been reports of local Muslim percent of the population. The three largest populations coming to the defence of of their eleven denominations are the Christians when they were attacked by Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox foreign Jihadists. and Greek Catholic communities. Apart Many Christians hope that the situation from the Armenians, the Assyrians and the will stabilise, allowing them to resume Chaldeans, Christians are among the oldest their lives as before. The Armenians are less inhabitants of the modern state of Syria. optimistic, their memories clouded by the Particularly in rural areas, people are very genocide of their ancestors during World much aware of this rootedness. Many Mus- War I in what is now Turkey. The same is lims in rural areas even know which of true of the Chaldeans and Assyrians, who their ancestors converted from fled to the Syrian region after to Islam; the other side of their clan remains in response to massacres of the Christian but is still seen as extended family. Christian population in Iraq. This knowledge of common roots lives on to this day, and helps to explain why, during three years of conflict, Christians have so rarely been the target of religiously

Petra Becker is a Research Fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” SWP Comments 29 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of June 2014 the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Ph.D. grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

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Regional Differences Rebel-Controlled Areas Christian settlements are spread through- The regime has lost control over the out the whole of Syria but, like other seg- provinces of , , und Deir ments of the population, Christians have ez-Zor, and most Christians have fled from fled their homes to escape the fighting. As a them. The main reason for their flight was result, the original demographic spread has one that equally affected their Muslim changed considerably, and the situation of neighbours: the threat of fighting and area Christians varies a great deal, depending bombardment, which the regime inflicts on the forces in control of different parts upon areas no longer under its control. of the country. Furthermore, in rebel-held areas practically all sources of income have dried up. Fear of Jihadists, by contrast, was a less pressing The Kurdish North-East reason to flee. After regime-controlled media After the uprising began in 2011, the north- had initially fuelled this fear, despite a lack east remained mostly calm because the of any particular cause for concern, the regime had bought the allegiance of large threat did become more severe during the parts of the Kurdish opposition. As soon course of 2013. as demonstrations broke out, major con- Christians are at particularly high risk cessions were made to the Kurds, who up anywhere ISIS is active, although practi- to that point had been the most heavily cally all Christians have left such areas. In marginalised ethnic minority. The regime March 2014 it was reported from Raqqa allowed the Kurdish Democratic Union province that ISIS was forcing the few Party (PYD) – the Syrian branch of the remaining Christians there to pay the jizya, Workers’ Party (PKK), which a capitation tax that was required of reli- operates in Turkey – to take charge of the gious minorities under the region’s security, and enforce law and order for example. In current reports of public on its behalf. executions, the victims are generally The historical experience of the Arme- fighters from rival rebel groups or political nians, Chaldeans and Assyrians was a key activists who stand up to ISIS. reason why the majority of them left the According to statements by church north-east long before the first Jihadist representatives and human rights organisa- groups arrived there. Moreover, they were tions, there have so far been very few reli- able to reunite with family members giously motivated murders of Christians among large diaspora communities of throughout the country. In Aleppo, Chris- Assyrians and , particularly in tian institutions and Christian activists are Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany. working in the rebel-held part of the city Since 2013 Kurdish areas have been (though only in small numbers). This is also regularly threatened by Jihadist militias, true (or was true) of rebel strongholds in especially the al-Qaeda affiliated group the disputed areas, such as the old town centre Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This of or the town of in the Anti- has led many Christians in the region to mountains, where Christians move closer to the left-wing secular PYD, organised a shared civil administration which, according to its manifesto, champi- together with the Sunni majority without ons the rights of minorities. However, the being subject to discrimination. When in PYD has itself brutally persecuted political mid-2013 Jihadists from outside the area enemies in the past, and so it seems doubt- shot at churches in Yabroud, the local coun- ful that it can be a guarantor of pluralism cil posted sentries in front of the churches, and democracy. thus preventing further hostilities. It was not until mid-March 2014, when the govern- ment army and attempted to

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recapture the town, that most of the in- the only region in Syria where Christians habitants fled. They were fearful of regime make up the majority of the population. forces, who in recapturing the neighbour- According to estimates, the number of its ing town of had gone on a loot- residents has quadrupled since 2011 due to ing spree, shot civilians indiscriminately the immigration of Christians, mostly from and burnt their bodies later. Homs but also from and Aleppo.

Disputed Areas Reasons for Fleeing and In the west-central Syrian provinces of Places of Refuge and Homs, fighting has continued to Apart from the fighting, bombardment and flare up between regime forces and rebels. poverty, another major reason for fleeing is This, along with the desperate security widespread crime. Neither the regime forces situation in general, has caused approxi- nor the rebels are paid well enough to sup- mately half of the Christians to leave their port their families, and so they exploit the . Large parts of the city of Homs population by extorting money from them have been destroyed by army bombard- at checkpoints or taking passers-by hostage. ment. Residents report that there are no Both sides feel encouraged to engage in this longer any neighbourhoods in which behaviour, as they are confident that they Sunnis and live together. Never- will not be called to account for it. Further- theless, Christians in Homs still live in more, common criminals often pose as mixed neighbourhoods (some with Alawites militia members of one side or the other, and some with Sunnis), without any major and commit crimes in their name. The conflicts arising. regime contributed to this situation in the In Deraa province the frontlines are first year of the revolution by enacting shifting constantly between the regime amnesties that allowed common criminals forces, the Free (FSA) and to be released. Residents of all parts of the Jihadists, who entered the country from country complain that the regime recruited Jordan to form Jabhat an-Nusra. Conse- many of these small-time criminals, who quently, most Christians have also fled were already known to the police, into their from the province. Christians in the south- militias. These so-called “Popular Commit- west area around Damascus and the Golan tees” are supposed to provide security in Heights, on the other hand, have mostly their local neighbourhoods, but in fact remained in their villages, having appar- often do the opposite. ently come to an arrangement with both The uncertain political situation is an- regime forces and local FSA units. other factor which could drive the Chris- tians out of the country permanently. If made to choose sides, Christians would Regime-controlled Areas tend to side with the Assad regime rather Christians have also migrated from areas than the opposition; yet in conversation under regime control, such as Damascus most of them readily admit that they see no and the coastal mountain range. However, future for Syria under Assad either. Among the proportion of Christians among the the refugees who have left Syria since the population as a whole here has increased, outbreak of unrest in March 2011, the pro- as Christians from other regions have portion of Christians is relatively low. Most sought refuge in these areas. This applies to of the refugees in the camps in neighbour- the city centre of Damascus, but especially ing countries are Sunnis. Some of the to the coastal mountain range. A special Armenians have fled to Armenia, but most case is Wadi an-Nasara (Valley of the Chris- Christians seek sanctuary in the coastal tians) between Homs and Tartous, which is mountain range or go to Lebanon, where

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many hope to receive the support of family wittingly supporting foreign-controlled and church networks. Above all it seems terrorists. However, there was no guaran- that the Christians who leave the country tee of safety for Christians. To name just are those who can afford it or can emigrate two high-profile examples: the well-known to the West. Those who do not have this Christian human rights lawyer, Khalil option flee from one town or region to the Maatouk, was taken away by the intelli- next, depending on where the situation gence service in autumn 2012; to this day is least dangerous, or are forced to return he remains imprisoned and has yet to be home if they run out of money. brought before a custodial judge; the Chris- tian sculptor, Wael Qastoun, was tortured to death by members of the intelligence The Syrian Regime – service in July 2012. Protector of Christians? The Assad regime presents itself as a pro- tecting power of the Christians. However, Targeted Disinformation on a publicity visit to the famous Christian One of the most effective weapons of the pilgrimage site at in April 2014, regime is its consistent strategy of disin- Assad made no mention of the fact that formation, which is not only aimed at the most of the damage to churches and mon- home front, but also at the outside world. asteries there had been caused by the To implement this strategy it uses the Syrian army and that the town, which regime-controlled media and the intelli- had changed hands in the fighting several gence services. From the outset, the regime- times, had been looted by rebels and controlled media portrayed the protests as regime forces alike. an uprising initiated by foreign Salafists Assad’s strategy is to polarise religious willing to use violence to establish a theoc- minorities and the Sunni majority popu- racy in Syria. Meanwhile, the intelligence lation. He has aimed from the very begin- service was tasked to spray anti-Christian ning to drive a wedge between the Sunnis slogans on the walls of Christian neighbour- on the one hand and the Alawites, Chris- hoods, or to send agents provocateurs to mix tians, Druze, Ismaili and Shiites on the with the demonstrators, shouting such other. His regime drove the protest move- slogans in order to discredit the protest ment to militarisation through heavy use movement and frighten the Christians. of violence, and fuelled its radicalisation Another frequently observed strategy is to by releasing dozens of Jihadists from high position artillery in the immediate vicinity security prisons. Largely through intimida- of monasteries and churches, and to fire at tion, disinformation and fomenting con- Sunni villages from there. flicts between the various groups, he has In pursuing its media strategy, the managed to prevent the Christians from regime can also rely upon the churches broader commitment to the revolution. that they have brought into line. In early 2011 a group of Christian activists visited the spiritual leaders of the Christian denomi- Intimidation nations to ask them to exercise restraint in From the outset, anyone involved with the their pro-regime rhetoric. Subsequently one revolution ran the risk of being shot or of the patriarchs betrayed them to the intel- imprisoned, but the security services dealt ligence service. The Greek Catholic church with Christians more carefully. They were was put under such pressure that it even still arrested at demonstrations or sub- cancelled its funeral service for the young jected to interrogations, but on the whole oppositional filmmaker, Bassel Shehadeh, they were quickly released again. During who died in the army’s bombardment of interrogations they were accused of un- Homs in May 2012.

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Clerics of various denominations allow Religious freedom is guaranteed in both themselves to be used by the regime. They the 1970 constitution, which came into help to spread media lies about massacres force under the Ba’ath regime, and the of Christians in order to provide publicity constitution rushed through by Assad in abroad for the Assad regime, which is seek- 2012. However, both stipulate that the ing to sell itself as the only guarantor of president must be a Muslim and that Islam the survival of Christianity in Syria. Recalci- is the main source of legislation. trant priests, on the other hand, can expect The principle of equality before the law reprisals: the Italian Jesuit Paolo dell’Oglio, has always been in place. An exception to who worked for thirty years to improve this, as in nearly all Middle Eastern coun- understanding between Christians and tries, is civil status law. This legal area is in Syria, was declared persona non dealt with by Sharia courts for Muslims, grata by the regime at the end of 2011. and by church courts for Christians. How- Priests who do not clearly side with the ever, Christians have been increasingly regime are intimidated. critical of this in recent decades as it means, for instance, that it is impossible for mem- bers of the various Catholic churches to get Fomenting religious conflicts divorced according to civil law. The regime tries at all costs to prevent Moreover, religious freedom only applies Christians from showing solidarity with to Christians who are born as such. Syrian Sunnis, the main victims of regime violence. law does not allow for conversion to Chris- The actions of the security services in the tianity, although it certainly allows con- small west-central Syrian town of al-Suqay- version to Islam, and this can potentially labiyah on Good Friday 2011 serve as an lead to conflict in interfaith marriages. If a example of this. In the Sunni villages in the Muslim woman wishes to marry a Christian surrounding areas of al-Suqaylabiyah they man, the latter is obliged to convert to Islam. spread the false message that at midday a A Christian woman, on the other hand, large anti-regime demonstration would be may marry a Muslim without renouncing held in the town, whereupon the villagers her faith. However, she may not inherit his made their way by bus to the supposed possessions, because neither Christians nor demonstration. Meanwhile security forces Muslims can inherit from one other. in al-Suqaylabiyah, where the annual Good Christians also criticise the Assad regime Friday procession was taking place, started for the fact that after the suppression of a rumour that the Sunnis from the neigh- the 1982 uprising (in which the Muslim bouring villages were on their way into Brotherhood was the key player), it co-opted town to set fire to the church. It was only conservative Sunni clerics in a calculated thanks to the level-headedness of the town’s power play. Never before in Syria have so dignitaries, who had seen through the deceit- many mosques been built as during the ful plan, that bloodshed was avoided. Assad era. The government established large numbers of Quran schools (the so- called Hafez al-Assad schools for memoris- Syria – a Secular State? ing the Quran), and in 2005 the Ba’ath Practices of the kind outlined above have regime was so keen to find favour with the nothing in common with the protection conservative Islamic clergy that it banned of religious minorities. Even from a purely a book which questioned the veiling of legal point of view, the regime’s claim to women. be the sole guarantor of a secular state and of coexistence of all denominations and religions in harmony and equality, does not stand up to scrutiny.

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Political Representation under the al-Bunni, Khalil Maatouq, Michal Shammas, Ba’ath Regime Daad Moussa and Catherine at-Telli. If one talks to older Syrian Christians they The same Christians were involved when complain that the influence of Christians the opposition made another attempt to has decreased under forty years of Ba’athist form, with the in rule. In the first half of the 20th century 2005. They were involved again in March Christians had an active role in politics. 2011, when the first protests were organ- For instance, two major Syrian parties were ised in Damascus to demand an end to the established by Christians: the Social- state of emergency in place since 1963, ist Ba’ath Party, by Michel Aflaq, and the along with serious political reforms. Chris- Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), by tians also took part in spontaneous protests Antoun Saadeh, although neither of these in rural areas. Christian activists from all parties had a democratic, pluralistic agenda. parts of the country tell of their partici- Under the Ba’ath regime, independent pation in secret meetings to discuss the political activity was no longer possible. It demands of the revolutionary movement. pursued co-optation rather than participa- According to them, it was unanimously tion. In the 1970s, left-wing parties and agreed at these meetings that the uprising unions were involved in the uprising along was not aimed against any particular with the . Subsequent- segment of society, but rather against an ly, parties that did not allow themselves to unjust regime which suppressed all activity be co-opted were banned, as were all inde- within civil society. pendent youth organisations. Youth employ- The role of Christians in the revolution- ment was then only possible through the ary movement, then, is by no means as small Ba’ath Party’s “Revolutionary Youth Union”. as one might suppose. Apart from Christian Only in 2000 were churches re-permitted politicians and civil activists there are even to set up scout groups, which until then Christian fighters among the rebels. Despite had also fallen under the ban. Their activ- this, however, the majority of the Christian ities were subject to heavy surveillance, population has distanced itself from the however, as were the sermons in mosques revolutionary movement. This is as much and churches. Even today, no ecclesiastical due to the militarisation and radicalisa- office is awarded without the approval of tion of the movement as to the successful the intelligence service; their approval is counter-strategies of the Syrian regime. required for all church activities, and for Both of these factors have led to the majority all other civil society activities. of Christians fearing the fall of the regime, although they are aware that the regime actively fuels religious tensions. High-Profile Christians in the Opposition In 2001, encouraged by promises of reform Weakness of the Opposition made by Bashar al-Assad upon taking office, Although, when asked, most Christians are a civil rights movement was formed known certain that the Assad regime can neither as the “”, although this bring peace to Syria in the long term nor was soon cracked down on by Assad him- improve their security, they rightly point self. Christians were well represented among out that the opposition has so far not the movement’s main protagonists, with managed to provide a credible alternative journalists and authors such as , to the regime that can guarantee the secu- Akram al-Bunni, Hussein Awdat and An- rity and rights of all citizens. Many Chris- toun Maqdisi, and the historian Abdallah tians distrust the National Coalition of the Hanna. High-profile lawyers in the , which in their eyes is an Islamist human rights movement included Anwar project. High-profile Christian opposition

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members of the National Coalition, such as tians in armed clashes with their Sunni Michel Kilo or George Sabra are dismissed neighbours have been partially successful. by many as “token Christians” who are being Elements of the “National Defence Force”, used to give the coalition a secular veneer. a militia formed by the regime from local This view is reinforced by the military and SSNP militias, have been incited to balance of power in rebel-controlled areas. attack Sunni villages. The most recent Financial backing of Islamist and Salafist notable instance of these dangerous devel- groups by state and private actors from the opments was the looting of the of Gulf States has led to such groups control- al-Husn in Wadi an-Nasara in late March ling most of the rebel-held areas. Attacks on 2014, and the displacement of its Sunni churches and – in a few isolated cases – population. on Christians, mostly carried out by foreign In the Kurdish north-east there are a Jihadists, have also earned the opposition a small number of Assyrian Christians who bad reputation as far as Christians are con- have formed their own unit within the cerned. Kurdish “People’s Protection Units” (YPG), the military wing of the PYD. Until now this form of militarisation and use of force has Representation vs. Civil Rights been viewed with unease by the Christian Christians who want to become politically population. However, if the conflict becomes active in the public domain find them- increasingly polarised along religious lines, selves in a predicament. Almost all Chris- it can be assumed that the Christians will tian oppositional politicians and activists ultimately become heavily involved in openly wish to avoid making an issue of the fighting, as they did in the Lebanese their religious beliefs, because they would civil war. see this as a betrayal of a fundamental demand of the revolution, namely the equality of all citizens with regard to their Conclusion and Recommendations rights and obligations. Various Christian At the present time, Christians are in groups have become established within the danger not primarily because of their faith opposition who explicitly want to be active but because, like all Syrians, they are ex- as Christians, and occasionally make public posed to fighting, bombardments and the statements protesting against being co-opted desperate security situation. However, if by the regime. However, attempts to unify the conflict cannot be resolved in the fore- these groups to achieve a broader represen- seeable future they will be at considerable tation of Christians within the opposition risk due to increasing radicalisation and have so far failed for fear of slipping into a polarisation along religious lines. On the proportional system, as this kind of system, one hand there is the risk of attacks and in which certain offices and quotas are suppression from Jihadists, and on the reserved for various religious communities, other hand there is the risk of growing has not led to a functioning state either in radicalisation and militarisation within Lebanon or Iraq. their own ranks. This is bound to lead to confrontation with the majority popula- tion, with whom they have coexisted peace- Christians Take up Arms fully until now. The insecurity currently felt by Christians It would therefore be counterproductive in Syria has led to their taking up arms to emphasise the risk to Christians in this in certain areas. Initially this was for the conflict, let alone to allow special quotas defence of their residential areas. of Christians when admitting refugees into However, continued attempts by the the country; this would create the impres- intelligence services to involve the Chris- sion that Christians were the protégés of

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the West, which would put them under even more pressure at home. Instead, Germany and Europe should do all they can to find a permanent settlement to the conflict. However, this will only succeed if all groups in the country can be confident that in a future Syria the prin- ciples of Geneva will apply: commitment to a democratic multi-party system which respects the rights of all citizens, regard- less of their ethnic or religious identity. This was also the conclusion reached by the attendees of a conference which the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung helped to organise

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und in March 2014 in Amman (see “Present and Politik, 2014 Future of Christians in Syria”, http://www. All rights reserved alqudscenter.org/english/pages.php?local_ These Comments reflect type=122&local_details=1&idd=342). solely the author’s views. The resignation of United Nations and SWP Arab League Special Envoy, Lakhdar Stiftung Wissenschaft und Brahimi, should not be a reason to give up Politik German Institute for hope of a negotiated settlement. Russia and International and Iran need to be included in this in order to Security Affairs put pressure on the regime and persuade Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 it to allow a ceasefire and a transitional 10719 Berlin government. At the same time Saudi Arabia Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 and the other Gulf States must be urged to www.swp-berlin.org stop financing Jihadist groups and to pro- [email protected] hibit private actors from doing so. ISSN 1861-1761

Translation by Andrew Mason

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 39/2014)

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