- 11 -

General Eisenhower ordered a full invostication to be made o~i: (C . I .G. S . Summary Nos 94 and 95, dated 5 arrl 6 Dec 431 . . ·.

. 41. Because of the difficulty of employing large tank forces in the mountainous sector during the winter months , 1 Cdn Armd Bde xx left 13 Corps on· 15 Nov, and moved to thv 4\.dria tic coast to cor.ia under command of 5 Corps . 12 Cdn Armd Regt, which at tho time of th.:i move was operating with 5 (Brit) Div in the Isernia area, remained behind to provide any tank assistance that might bo required there . ' (Hist Sec f ile Italy: 19~3/1 Cdn i.rmd Bdo/C/F: Seyond the San~ro; Account of Operations of 1 Cdn Armd Bdo , December 194 ). The original orders for the move received by Brigade Headquarters on 14 Nov applied only to 1·1 Cdn Armd Re gt, but the following day i t was decided that the t"!h.ole of the brig'ldo, loss 12 Cdn "~rmd Rcgt, would. concentrate in tho Termoli - Vas to area ( 1:1.D ., H .Q. 1 Cdn ~\.rmd Tk Bdo, 14-15 Nov 43) • To ensure that the brigad~ arrived in its now area in a battle­ worthy c ondi ti on, the tanks we re "orour~ht from ·i;he mountains down to tho sea on transporters . On 18 Nov, one squadron of 14 Cdn :.rnP. Regt was detailed to provide flank protection for 78 Div during the forming- up stage of Operation 11 ENCRO.f...CH 11 as it was originally pl8.nned, but tho move was cancelled in the gener~l delay and replanning of the attack (Ibi~, 18 Nov 43) . The anticipated role of the brigade in Operation "ENCROACH'' was the eventual relief of ,1 (Brit) 11.rmd Bde , e.nd with this in vievr, Brigadier \'iyman intended that the tanks should be well forward to avoid dcln.y and confusion when I operations were such that the exchange could take place (Belond the Sangr o, and W.D., H.Q. 1 Cdn ,\rrr.y Tk Bde , 29 Dec 43), Dur ng the last two weeks of Nov0mbor, tho Brigade was con­ fined to the Termol i - Vasto area by a 5 Corps order deny~ng to armour the use of the 1·oad south of Vg,sto - an or der necessary to preserve the road surface and prevent traffic congestion on routes to the forward areas whore essential stores ft>r, the attack were accumulating ('ii .D ., H .Q. 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde, 20- 22Nov 43) .

42 . During this waiting poriod, tho i 0linister of Nationttl Defence, Colonel The Honourable J .L . Ralston, and Lt-Gen H.D.G . Crerar , who were completing their tour of Canadian formations on the Italian front , visited the Brigade (Ibid, 25 Nov 43')'. - 43 . After the departure of 13 Corps, Brigade Headquarters was re- organized to form a Tactical Headquarters and a Main Headquarters , the former consistin~ of 11 G11 staff personnel, and the latter , ''A and Q. 11 • This would enable the na 11 sta.ff to move closer to the scene of battle and exercise better operational control , whilG tho administrative group, neces8arily cumbersome in an armoured forma ::.ion, fUnc tionod farther to the ·. rear . Throughout the operations of December, the t•."o did

ll An entire cargo of must9.rd gas blow up during the raid with tho result that thG vrater and surviving ships wor•e heavily contaminated . This ""as not realized until the follo•.. ing day when many of the casualties being treated for shock died from blis~e~ing . (Verbal account by Lt- Col S . H. S . Hughes).

xx Tho ordor changing the designation of this fo~mation from 1 Cdn rlrmy Tk Bde to 1 Cdn ~rmd Bde was received by Brigade Headquarters on 2 Dec 43 (Y.' .D.,' H.Q. 1 Cdn Arrrry Tk Bde, Doc ember 1943 : Appx 66, A & Q War Diary, 2 Dec tl3) • - 15 -

not join. \;hen conditions demanded it, a. Battle Headquarters worked forward from Tnctical Headqu

30 Nov: Divisi onal Headquarters and 2 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (incl udi ng 3 Pd Re gt, R .c . ii. . ) along the route .from Campobasso ; Divisional Engineers along the route from Carovilli. 1 Dec : 1 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (including 2 Fd Regt, R .c .A. ) and Divisional Troops alone; the road f r om Campobasso.

4 Dec : 3 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (including 1 Fd Regt, R .C.H,Li. .) along th0 route from Ca.rovilli; and.;, Cdn Reece Regt along the route from Campobasso.

~ See Report No . 161 of Historical Section (G . S . ) Depart ment of National Defonce , - 16 -

46 . Each group ras to spcn1 one night in tho staging area a.nq complete Phase II on the f cllov:ing day. ·2 Cdn Inf Bdo ,,..,ns to r·e·place 36 fde in its reserv\3 ~osi tion on the north bank of- the Sangro on the nig~t ·or i/2 Dec. 1 Cdn lnf Bde J.•1as to ts.kc up d.efensi vc positions in the Fossc.ccsia area on tho night of 2/3 Dec , thus relieving 11 Bdoo On ~ Doc 2 Cdn Inf Bde '"as to raove into the. nd vanco on So Vi to¢ On 5 DQc , .3 Cdn Inf Bde was to cross tho Sq.ngro, thereby completing the changeover and allo1ving 38 Bdo to go into :-est . Tho plans were tentative and dopond.ont on the progress of the battle . Bocause of the increased cnomy. air activity over the l~dria tic sector, emphasis vro.s placed on camouflage and disper­ sal of vehicles in concentration areas . Wireless silence nas imposed. (Hist Sec file Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/C/I ; Notes on G . O .c ' s Conference, 27 Nov 43) ·17 . By the evening of. 30 Nov, Di vis iona.l Hee.dquar ters and 2 Cdn Inf Bde were concuntre.tcd in tho 3tablng area around s . Salvo and Petacciato ('7.D . , H.Q . 2 Cdn Inf Bdo, and Vw .D., G. S ., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 30 Nov ·13). Tho progress · · of tho battle· was such that it ,.'.•as decided to push 2 Cdn In:' Bdc directly through to 11 Bde positions forward of Fossacenia rather than have it relieve 36 Bdo (1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Messag0 Log, loc cit, Serial 8919, 30 Nov !:3) . ':'he follol·:ing day Br igaO:iorl!Offmeigter visited' Tactical Divisional Headqua~te1"'s at Casalbordino Station and t"h.., n proc~oded across the river to 11 Bde H .Q . (Vi .D ., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bie, 1 DJc ·43) . At this time 38 Bde and ~ ;~rmd Bdo were mo.king .a. c,ombined thrust fror.i Rocca. S . Giovanni northwards across tho ridges to S ~ Vito . 11 Bde and 36 Bde were situa t ed south of Fossacesia on tho ~a.st and west sides of th(; coast roa(}_o (1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Message Log, loc cit, Seri-al 8936, 1 Dec '13),. The int ention of Corps Headquarters was tho.t 38 Bde and 4 llrmd Bao should continue their thrust towards s. Vito (Ibid, Serial 8921, 1 Dec 43). By replaeing 11 Bde , 2 Cdn-rnr Bde woul d be in a position to follow up 38 Bdo, relic ve it, and. continue the advance . ;ccordingly, on 1 Doc, Brigadier Hoffmeister ordered his brigade o.cross th~ river to occupy the positions hel•:: by 11 Bde. Those move~ v.rero completea by 0900 hrs the following do.y ( \-: .D. , H .Q . 2 Cdn Inf Bde , 2 Dec 43)

48. In the afternoon of 2 Dec, thG commnn1 pas_ed fro~ 78 Div to the G .0 .c . 1 Cdn Inf Div who ordered 38 Bde and 4 !1rmd Bde to secur e the plP.teau on tho top of ''.'hich lay S. Vi to, and ·push on to the Moro River ·a.long the main a.xis throu&h S . Apollinare (Hist Sec fi•le Ital¥: 1943/l Cdn Inf Div/C/F: CrossinP, of the Moro and___Q~~u.!'~ · of O~tona: ilccount by Maj- Gen Vokes) • 1 Cctn--rn--r ode l.i.aa in---u:le mean­ time , moved from Campobasso to the etaging area at Petacciato , and was ordered to cross the Sangro on 3 D0c and to occupy positions at Fossacesi a behind 2 Cdn Inf Bde which was by then to have moved forward to Rocca . V/hon General Vokes took over command at 1600 hrs 2 Dec , ·J: ,,rmd Bdc, 38 Bde , 56 Rocco Re gt and· field rq•tillery of. 78 Div remained in the battlo , and it was the G. O.C 1 s intention to employ these troops until the line of the Moro River v•ns roached. In offe ct, the combined 78 Div - 1 Cdn Inf Div forco 1J1a.s c·che lo"'lGd along tho coast road with 38 Bde and 4 ,\r1:rl Bdc for111•ard: fol lowed by 2 Cdn Inf Bde and 1 Cdn Inf Bdc in ltfirm base11 positions . i:ri th the eventual relief of 38 Bdo in vieVl , Brigadier Hoffmeister moved his brigade close behind that formation. (Ibid)

·19 . Tho last enemy effort south of tho S . Vito - Lanciano road came in the afternoon of 2 Doc v·hen ei,):it tanks s dug in and camouflaged, attempted unsuccessfully to block tho ent~y into Treglio, o. hamlet south- 11.rest of ~ .. Vito. "!:ith the fall of S . Vi to , on the seaward. point· of tho plateau, the f ollcwing - 17 - day, tho answer to the question of where the onamy would make his next stand ,..as conjectural. Fifteen mil cs· to the North, tho Pescara River offered th~ best natural advantages f or a substitute Winter Line, but the trans- Aponnine highway, vital to the v•holc of his defence acrous the Peninsula, la.y to _the South ·of that r iver. If the e nemy v.1as to repair the damage that bad already been done to h is \'iintcr ·Lino , he must prevent tho breakthrough from roaching the Pescara River . It was thought probabl e , therefore, thnt tho Moro River line woul d be chosen to make an intermediate sto.nd before the Pescara. (Vl .D., H.Q. 1 Cdn ... ~rmy Tk Bde , Deceraber 1913: Appx 47 , 5 Corps Int Summary No . 210 , 2 Dec 43)

50 . It was from 2 N.Z . Div on the laft af 5 Corps that a swift and sudJ.en throat to the ener:iy ' s hopes of stemming the advance along tho Moro c ame . Rapidly exploit ing their initial gains , General Froyberg ' s troops had out the lateral r oad wes t of Lanciano by the capture of Castelfrcntano, and had struck westwards to v:i thin throe miles of Guardiagrel c , and northwards ov:0r the ridges to positions dor:iina ting Orsogna. This latter town vras iP.tportant in that ·it lay on th0 lateral road thirteen miles south- v·ost of Ortona . !'" dri vo to1·1ards tho sea from 0!"sogna would. seriously jeopardize any eneny s tand on tho Moro River . (Ibid) • The suddenness '"i th which the New Zealanders occupied Orsogna on 3 Dec was natched by the sudden...""less and effcctivonoss with 111hich the enemy replied. Tanks and infantry of 26 Pz Div count1.jr- attackcd, forci ng the Nevr Zealanders to abandon tho town before sufficient support could be brought up to hold it . Ther e afto~ , tha bulk of 26 Pz Div was committed t o block further exploitction in this sector . Vlith tho s. Vito - La.nciano - Gua.rdigrC3lo lateral road crossed at both ends , Lanciano lost any significance to the enemy defence , and was occupied by 8 Ind Div on 3 Dec . 1 (Ibid, 5 Corps Int Summary No , 2 :kl 1 3 Dec 43) . /\.t the so.r:ie trin.e-38 Bde and 4 Arr.id. Bde had met only slight opposition between s. Vito and tha line of the Moro . Descending from the high plateau which overlooks tho sea, and from v·hich the Ortona promontory is clearly visible, they hnd ·cross0d the river in the valley below and carried the line of advance forward t o 1 ts northernrnost point . All the bridges across the Moro had been blown. Efforts to cross in force hatl failed (Crossing of the i1~oro) • 51. Bet we:on the Ri v0r Feltrino, which enters the .i.driatic at s. Vito Marina , and the River Moro, the ccast road crosses the intervening plateau by turning inland to s. Apollinare, a small farming village on the edge of the plateau overlooking the Moro Valley, t•,10 miles from the soa . J\s the coast road l eaves s . Apollinare it descends fron the I·ioro in the dir ection of the s0a and crosses the river a mile inland. The next inportant river a.nd trans verse valley beyond tho Moro is the Ariolli, six miles to the North. The plateau bctwoc::m tho two, across which the Canadians were to fif:.:ht , is dissected by streams flo•·•ing in all d5.rections into tho two bordering rivers and into the i1clriatic, forming many elongated r c ­ entre.nts north from the Moro, south from tho .1rielli and in­ land from the sea . The Ortona. - Orsogna la toral road, which at that time t he Now Zealanders were struc;gling to command at the base of the snow- covered Maiclla, runs down the centre of the plateau. The main north- south road, from the point ,.,here it crosses the Moro , v!injs up to s . Leonardo, t•'fin village to S, Apollinar e across the valley, cr osses the plateau, drops down into the gully of a creek running towards tho sea, and ascends to join the Ort ona - Orsogna l a teral road a r.1ilo and a half inland. This road through S . /~pollina~o and S . Leonardo had been designated as the r.iain Corps axis . Thero "'as , hov1- ovor, a newly- constructed road from s . Vito Marina to Ortona which followed more closely th0 line of the coast . I ts completion was too recent to be. sho·:•n on the :maps then availabla, ,

- 18 - but air photographs indicatc1 its future usefulness .~

52. The v:ide dissected plateau be tween the Moro a.nd the Arielli is well farmed and rJarked vrith olive groves and nu.~erous hamlets and villages. Two such farming centres on the north bank of th0 Moro aro La To~r e , -1 , 300 yards v.rest of S . Leonardo, and Villa .Roa tti, 3 , 000 yards upstream from the main axis crossing . i~long the edge of the plateau on the south side of the Moro a narrov1 unmotalled road runs south- west~Pards to Frisa . 3 , 000 yards from S • .•lpollinare it intersects a similar roo.d ''!hich crosses the river below Vi.J.la. Roatti but S\'1lnes west without entering the tov..rn, and continues northward to the 0rtona - Orsognn lateral road.

53 . On :;ho night of -1:/5 Dec the line of advance ex.tended along the edge of the plateau on the south·bqnk from the sea to Frisa • 2 Cdn Inf Bde v.r:1s brought forward to take up positions on the le ft of 38 Bde from S . .. ~pollinare to the r oad junction on the south bank opposite Villa Roatti . 8 Ind Div . 'rrero on the left of 2 Cdn Inf Edo . 4: ,\rmd Bde continued to provide suppOTt for 2 Cdn Inf Bde and 38 Bde . (1 Can Inf Div 0 ps Message Log, loc cit, Serial 9178, 4 Dtic 43) • 1 Ccn Inf Bde "'as concentro.tea on the s . Vito plateau, vrhilo 3 Cdn Inf Bde had moved from the mountains and ,.,as in Casalbordino with ordors to cross the river to Fossacesia on 5 Dec (Ibi d) . 54. The improved weather which had continued since the beginning of December, while ·~·elcot;JO as· an ii:nr11ediato relief; also had its malevolent effects .. Snov• in the mountains began t o melt; rivers flowing from the Apcnninc canyons deepened in the vr· lleys and widened across the silty plains e By midnisht 4 Dec , the Sangro had r isen six feet, and all the 11 11 bridges were av1ash or carried away .from their bankseats (1 Cdn Inf Div Ops Message Log , loc cit, Serial 9 179, 4 Dec 4 3) . This situation, ·~rhich if not ovorcor.ie1rnr-.,odiately pprten•. ·d . ill s uccess to· tho forcing of th0 ?1!or·o, paralysed traffic on both sides of the rl ver . For some time work had bc0n prog­ resJing on a perma.mont all- weatbor bridge ·four and a half I!liles from the see. below Paglieta, but it was o stim~ted that this bridge would not be openen until 1100 hrs 6 Dec (Ibid: Serial 92•±3, 5 Dec ·13) . ~·rith some foresight, a. large dump had been built on the b~ach in the aroa of Fossacesia st~tion, and had been const~ntly refurnished with supplies anc arnraun­ ition ferried around tho mouth of thc ·Sangro by D.U. W.Ks . With all the bridges down, the cargo of these amphibious craft was controlled rigidly, emphasis being placed on.rations 'lnd ammunl ti on, particularly 25-pr ( ~7 .D., H .Q . C .R .A . S .C . 1 Odn Inf Div, 5 Dec 43) . By 7 Dec the bridge situation began to improve slowly; but the process of disentangling the stroams of tr•o.ffic on both banks was long a nd delayed. I n the meantime , the D . U. ": .Ks became tho i::ain suPt::>l y lino of the forces on the north bank, and that fact that on 7 Dec the Service Corps was abl e ~o fill an ord0r for 40, 000 rounds of

25-pr, a proportion of nedium and 105-"!'?lm, 10 1 000 gallons o f potrol, 40, 000 r ations , 10,000 rounds of 40- mm , 1,000 rounds of 1.2 mortar (H.E . ) arrl 500 r ounds of•4 . 2 mortar (smoke), shows the effort involved to keep this supply line fUnctioning (~ , 7 Dec ~3) . ·

55 . ~··'h il e Eighth Ar!:1y was o. ttacking the '."iinter Line in x \·vith the knov:lcc.:ge of this road's existence the term "coast road" became ambiguous . From this po:i nt ln the na.rrQ ti vo the S . Lo onardo route "rill b reforrcd to D. 'l t11:i "ma.in · axis 11 , an:i. th:; ne•,·ly co11s tructod. roar·~. fron. S . Vi to Iiio.rina as tho 11 coast road" . 19 -

the North, Fifth .\.rmyX on 2 Dec began its assault on the long-prepared defences int ho South. 1.\s the Canadians battled a.cross the Moro to Ortona, General Clark' s troops bat t l ed no Jess furiously through the Mignano Gap towards Cassino. If the onemy doubted the strength of his winter / positions, those doubts concerned chiefly the approaches to the Erternal City, around which at that time he retained the bulk of his availo.blo reserves . The Garigliano River, counterpart of the Snngro in the extr.eme southern soctor of the line , was in flood ovor an area ex'tend.ing ten miles in- land . In Italy during December the .i.llied 1 5 ."i.rmy Group and the Gernan Tenth ,\rmy ~ere equally dog~ed in their opposOO. intentions; tho former were aeterminea to break through the Winter Line; tho latter were oqually determined to hold that line. The result was a. prolonged and bi ttor struggle . ( ':/a.r Office Weekly Intelligence Summaries , 8 anl 15 Dec ·13 , Nos W and 18)

FIRST BRII?GEHEt.DS ..:.CROSS THE MORO I 5 - 7 DEC

56 . · v1hen the enemy wi thdrow over the Moro River on ·1 Dec, 5 Corps had brought about the collapse of thG northern extremity of the '•'linter Line, c.nd had defeated 65 Inf Div in its first battle . From resources known to be available to tho German Tenth 1.\rmy , it was eviclent that the task of holding a sub­ stitute line on tho Moro River i.vould fall to 90 Gren (Mot) Di v:HRwhose 200 Gren Re gt had been identified as occupying positions to the South and West of S. Leonardo. Of this formation's arrival an~ expected methods of defence , the Int­ elligence Sunnnary of 1 Cdn Inf Div on ~ Dec , said: It is fair to say that the encmi is still so concerned to rob our adv of its momentum that his t~ctic is one of plugging gaps and striking back at local thrusts . Ha is in the passive def phase, not yet having gained the freedom to mount a serious counter- attack. The la teat evidence of this came today 1 vrhen the missing 200 PG Regt (90 PG Div) appeared at 3109 in a passive role . 2 Bn was actually contact ed. 200 PG Regt was the only force of bde size known to be in immediate res ••• and this leaves 76 Pz Gorps vd thout any counter attack force in hand. ( 1.7 .D . , H .Q . 2 Odn Inf Bct.e , Deceml:er 1943 : Appx 6, 1 Cdn Inf Div Int ' Summary No . 27, 5 Dec 43)

~ The Fifth Army a t this time included 10 (Brit) Corps ,which ~as composed of 46 (Brit) Inf Div; 56 (Brit) Inf Div, and 23 (Brit) ,\rnrl Jde (C .I .G .s . Su.:rri.mary No . 93, 4 Dec 43) . For an account of Fifth hrmy operati ons during this peri od soc The Winter Linc, published by the Military Intelligence Div­ i s i on of tho U.S . War Department . This book deals, however , almost exclusively with the activity of U.S . troops . xx From the interrogation of the first prisoners of 90 Pz Gr Div it was l earnt that thi s division had become known as 90 Gren (Mot) Div, and its two Regiments as 361 Gren Regt and 200 Gren Re~t (W .D., G.S ., Main II .Q. Eighth Army : Appx "B" Int Summary No . 242 , 6 Dec 43) . This ,must have been done to convince its Members that they were of some stra~e elite. . . 1.

- 20 ·- ..

Intelligence Staffs anticipated in their summaries little more than the haphazrrd .employment of 200 Gren Regt in .. manner simi1lar to that in which 361 Gren Regt had been · used. Had this been the case , it is probable that 90 Gren (Mot) Div would have been hurr·ied to a ruin equal to that of 65 Inf Div. (Ibid, and 1N .D . , H .Q. 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde ; Appx 47 , 5 Corps Int Summary No. 242, 4 Dec 43). ~Corps' Intelligence Summary of 4 Dec commented: ••• recent a i r photographs ro.;..:;ial no l~rge scale preparation south of Pesc~ra. (Ibid) 57 . Afte.r> the confusion of the first week of the offensive .the enemy' s lines had become more 01•dered with tho allotnont t o 90 Gren (Mot) Di v of a definite sector extending from the sea along the north bank of th~ Moro to a point six mites . inland. Hero they busied themselves digging in· across the pl ateau, taking advantage of tho reverse slopes of the gulllcs - a tactic so emphasized by their pr~decessors 1 cor:tI!lander. (Ibid, 5 Corps Int Summary No. 243, 5 Dec 43)

58. Th0 immediate future of General Vokes 1 troops ,.,as indicated in a message from the Corps Commander to H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div on 4 Dec : Indians are in .Frisa ,..1th some tks over river . NZ held up at Orsogne. and Guardia.grclo se l:i p:fect) ·· 1: attack necessary. You must get over R. Moro as soon a.s possible. · ( 1 Cdn Inf Div Op·s. ~res sage Log, loc ~it, Serial 9099, .4 Dec 43)

Accor dingly, the G.O.C. ordered both 38 Bde and 2 Cdn Inf Bde to patrol across the Moro during the night ·:J/5 Dec to discover suitable tank and. infantry crossin~s; these patrols were to be accompanied by Engineer parties (Crossing of the Moro) . The nature of tho ground suggested three areas in ~to cross: the coast ro~d, the nain axis , and along the narrovr road on the Di vision ts- le ft flank. The P. P .C. L .I . patrol which reconnoitred belO\'.' Villa Roatti i~eported :

•.• M'lny confusing, tracks in this area crossing is possible fo~ tks and routes dow:i:i ~re possible. C-r>ossing is NOT a bridge but consists of large STEPPING STONES . Bottom is goo4 hard gravel and approaches are firm. Route up far sido is fairly steep but passable eas~ of crossingc Ground WES~ is too steep. Crossings are possible area of tv·o island~ to :IB of crossing •• •The River is fordable for Inf in all its extent, average depth one and one half feot and NOT i,•iider than ten feet o Patrol crossed to 200 yds on far side heard considerable activity of'tpt half tracks and motorcyclcso • ~ (W.D . , H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde , I~t Log, 5 Dec 43) 59. Whilst there was little doubt that if there had been a bridge the enemy ~ould have destroyed it, tho patrol report contradicted air photographs (Ibid). Tho condition. of the bridge - if it existed - becamo"3.n 'lndeterminod factor in the appreciation, and the P.P . C '. L.I~ were ordered to solve the puzzl e . The unit continued\ to roport that no bridge existed, until finally one was discovt')red farther upstream, demolished and useless . (W .D., P . P .C. L. I . , 5 Doc 43, . Dovmstream, patrols of 38 Bde reported the ri vcr to be deeper e.nd w·ider, 21 ....

and the approaches more difficult (1 Cdn Inf Div Ops· Message Log, loc £.ll, ~forial 9195, 5 Doc '1:3) · 60. The Divisional Comr.mndor decided. to continue tho .adyo.nQe along the M.A.in axis, with the object of est~blishing one of his brigades as soon as·possible at its intersection '''+th the Or tona. .- Orsogna lateral r9ad, thus enabling sub­ sequent expl oitation first on Tollo, four mi~cs to the North- ?·es t across · the ,-irielli / and. then seawards . on Ortona . With this intention, the C .R .E . wo.s instructecl to prepare a cross.i:Qg .on the main a.xis , \"hi le the infantry, supported by tanks , during the ni~ht of 5/6 ~cc, established brid~eheads on .the far bank in the areas of the coast road and Villa Roat ti, in an effort to draw thE) enemy from the S . Leonardo positions • .. (Cro:ssinf of the Moro) . The choice of the . main axis did not exc ude ·the pos.sibil.ity of effecting ~ crossings on t::.e coast road or bc;;low 'Villa Roatt1 . . 3'8 Bde , v•hich had been engaged in heavy fightinc; since the operation began, '11/as relieved by 1 Cd.n Inf Ede during the afternoon of 5 Dec . (Ibid} · . 61 . The plan ,.. hi ch then toolc shape was for an a sse.ult' · across the ri vor ,,,est of the main axis by 2 Cdn Inf Bde , and a diversionary attack of batt'=llion strength up the coast road by 1 Cdn Inf Bde ( ',7 .D., U . Q . 2 Cdn Inf Bde December 1943: Appx 15 - Notes on Brigo.do 11 0 11 Gp) • An ft 0 11 Gp was held at H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde at 1445 hrs 5 Dec (Ibid) . The scope of the olanning for this atta'ck extended tothe capture of the junction of the ~ain axis with the Ortona - Orsogna lateral road as a firm base fro~ which thG P . P .C . L . I . ~ould patrol to Ort 9no:, ·~hi l o 1 Cdn Inf B~e pa.ssca through to ocqupy Tello (Ibid) . 2 Cdn Inf Bde was to assault si"multaneously at t 1·•0 point s west of the main axis . The Sea.forth of C .. \'!ere t.o attack to,.. ards S . Leonardo 1•:1 th the task of forming a bridgehead '"hich was to be inclusive of tho tovrn and the spur running east. from La Torre, thus denying to the enemy positions from v•hich he could bring dovrn observed fire on the Engineers ·~rorking on the main axis bridge site . The P . P .C . L . I . 1 s objective mas a bridgehead in the Villa Roatti area from \Jfhich an attempt to cut the Ortona· - Orsogna lateral ro~d farther inland was to bo made . :~s brigade reserve tr_e L. Edr.m R . was to maintain a firm base on the south bank in tho vicinity of the r:iain a.xis cros sing, cover the Seaforth attack, and prepare for exploitation northwards to Ortona . (Ibid)

62 . Two battalions of l Arr:id Bde were to support the assault, one ~ith each batt~lion of i nfantr y . No barrage was to precede the attack, but t he Divisional artillery and the available elements of :-. . G.R .A . were "on ca.'1111 • (Ibid, and Hist Sec file Italr: 19~3/2 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D : ACCOi:int by Captain ".',' .S. Dewar) . :1n extensive registration of targets had been completed ';,y 2 and 3 Fd Regts , R . c . A. , and 4 and 70 Med Re gts , R .A . ( '.'! .D . , H .Q. R .c .A . , 1 Cdn Inf Div, 5 an d 6 Dec ·13. Note: This source records events as taking place on0 day lat er than' they actually did) . Harassing fire , directed at the co~st road to the North of 01- tona, and the road running east from Tello, was planned (Vl .D . , H . Q . 2 Cdn Inf Bde, DecembE)r 1913: ;\ppx 15 .,. Notes on Brigade "011 Gp, 5 Dec) . Bombing tar pets, depending on the availability of aircraft, ·Wore t o be in the area of Tello, and the junotion of the Ortona - 01•sogna. lateral road with the main axis (Ibid) . It was expected that elements of .armour •1•ould be depl oyed to strengthen the Grenadiers, ~nd it was therefore important that 17- pr anti- tank guns be in the bridgeheads as soon as possible . If the :D.":oro proved too great an obstacle, they were to bo to,11ed over by tanks . 50 nules each vrere a ve.ilable to tho P .P .C . L . I . and Seaforth bf C. Zero hour v:o.s to be midnight 5/6 Doc . (Ibid) - 22 ...

63. Both engineer and infRntry reconnaissance parties had declared the r1vor fordable by tanks , but Brigadier Hoffmeister, realizing that much dap·ends on the ability of armour to cross in suvport of the infantry, ordered tank personnel themselves to chock those crossings ( 1:1' .D., H.r.t . 2 Cdn Inf Bde·, 5 Dec 43) , During the da.y patrols continued to reconnoitre enemy defences on tho fnr bank (Ibid) . The · Canadians were now facing an enemy r easona.bly v1eITSupported ' by art11iery; hostile aircraft ventured more frequently against the Spi tfiros of the Desert ,·dr Force , but the bombing done had a negligible effect (':: .D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde : Appx 9 - .. ~ir Sumn~ary / 5 Dec 15) . .'\.long the lino of the Moro , enemy shell and mortar.fire was intense for n sector where activity was temporarily confined to patrolling. Enemy long-range guns harassed roar ec haloh• and ancillary units in the area of s . Vito, and along tha road to Rocca s . Giovanni (Ibid, ••ppx 8 - 5 Corps Counter- Battery Int- · ' elligence Repo~o . 19 , 6 Dec 43) . 64 . Planning for the a.ssaul t a.cross the l1:oro suffered from a singular lack of kno,,.·ledge of the enemy' s preparations. flround Vi~la .Roatti, where the P . P .C . L .I . vrere to force a· bridgehead ~ patrols had been active throughout da.ylight on 5 Dec , and ·rrom their reports it ,..as judged that the town was hold by a perimeter defence ,..,1th a garrison inside • .i-°1.pproach to the village by the ] eft fltJ.nk ,.. as handicapped by s t eep banks , but a ronte 500 yards east of the town where the slope vra.s :-1or c era.dual i•1as fouml . Lack of suit able tank crossings caused anxiety, but tho officers of the 41 Royal Tank Regiment who reconnoitred the line of the river, considered' it an obstacle, but one ,,,hich could be overcome .

65 . Lt-Col C .B . ':Jn.re , conur.anding the P . P .C .L.I.; decided to cross the river on a one- company front with each remaining company follovfing at defini to intervals . It was considered that the enemy from their positions 1·1ould not be P.ble to cover the crossing uith ma.chine- gun fire , nor \'•as it thought that small arms fire ,~ould interfere with the actual fording of the river . Prospects of achieving suprise, since no preliminary bombardment \••as ':>lanned, ··•ore good. The to.nks V!ere to descend to the ri vor by thv •'Tindinc.; road on the left of tho battalion positions , and ford the river near t he demolished bridge / the existence of v•hich had been so heatedly discussed earlier in the morning. They ''!Ore then ~o :E= r oceed along the far shore to a point east of Villa Roatti and climb the bank by a steep and t•·risting mule track. It was hoped that they would be i n support of the infantry soon after first light. The order of crossing for the P. P .C .L . I . r1as "B" Coy, 2400 hrs (zoro); 11.1" Coy, 0020 hrs ; "C" Coy, 0500 hrs; "D" Coy, "on order" . fls" coy w"' s to force the perimeter and capture the main part of the viJlago, aftor which 111l 11 Coy •vould turn northwards to the cluster of · buildings separated from the m!lin village by a ,.. ide draw. 11 C11 Coy was to c oncentratc on th.) east edge of the village until it was cleared by 11 B11 Coy, and thon pass through to take up positions 500 yards along the track leading to the We~t . "D 11 Coy was to keep a firm base in the area of the river crossing . (Hist Soc file Italy: 19~3/2 Cdn Inf Belo/ C/F: Crossin of the Moro and ca ture of Villa Roatti, account y t- o • • 'wVaro • Two o~warc o scrva t on officers from 3 Fd Rcgt, R .c . ~ . t:"·ere to bf; •-1i th the infantry; one of them would nccotJpn.ny nu n Coy rhile the other remained in an obser vation post on the near bank. Intercommunication by "lire less was normal . (Ibid)

x Below Roatti the course of tho Moro is almost northerly. - 23 -

• ' r \, r : 66 . Such v.ras the/ regimental plan for the capture of Villa Roatti, an:l the foregqing outlinG is bas;)d on an ·­ account produced by the P . P .C . L. I. and enti tlod Crossing . of the Moro and Captu:re of Villa Roatti . This account agrees in most points with tho unit 'liar Diary, but on one important factor th0 two sources are contradictory. Yias there to be a preliminary artillery concentration or not? In recor~ing the events im.~odiately before the attack began the unit War Diary says: An attack by the Regiment has been teed up for midnight, this was to be proceedod (sic) by an .trtillery concentration (UNCLE target)?£ to bo laid on V. Roel ti (sic) from 23·~5 hrs to 2359 hrs . The Brigade and the l ~rtillery claimed there vrasn' t sufficient enemy there to ~~!arrant an UNCLE target, therefore ···ithout the consent or kno•'Tledge of the C .o., t t-Col C ,3. //are, the shoot was changed to a MIKE target •

11 11 • • • B c·oy was to cross Sta.rt Line, tho River, at the end of the ~rty shoot, namely 2359 hrs . 2350 arrived, no Arty. 2355 still no arby. By this time the C.O., Lt-Col C . J . ware was very worried, not knoV"•ing whether tho Arty was oo.lled off or· corely delayed. Was it 150ing to come dovm on "B" Coy or not . Hovrevor 2359 hrs arrived and 11 B11 Coy v1a.s ordered to kick off.

(W.D . , P . P . C. L.I . , 5 Dec 43)

67 . That the P . P. C. L . I . intended to bombard Villa Roatti there is no doubt. •i. t 2320 hrs they told Brigade Headquarters: We are having FOO engage 319097 {1illa Roatt~ as MIKE target . ( W.D . , H .Q . 2 Cdn Inf Bde, , Decer.iber. 19 ~3: f~ppx 15, Int Log, 5 Dec 43) That Sunday eveni ng, as the platoons wore descending to their forming- up places, and zero hour approached without the expected barrage , the Battalion Commander might well be con­ cerned about his leading company being caught ln gun- fire meant for the enemy. 68. 11 B11 Coy was over the river at 2400 hrs after a fording, s ilen.t and •·Ji thout incident . The leading platoon moved around to the right , and began the ascent to the village . Fire v·as not opened until the platoon reached a track junction, one branch of which led to the ma.in part of the town, and the other to the cluster of buildings to the North. As the platoon was moving into position to deal with this fire which came from the left, further cross- fire and grenade t hrowing began on the right , effective raply to which was made by Brens and 2-inch mortars firing low angle . The Company Conunander then decided to neutralize these posts and assault the village from the left. T•170 of tho 9osts v1ere overcome by rushing the occupants and trucing them prisoner . ~ y this time firing broke out at other points ar~und the perimeter, but in the confusion of the night it was practi­ cally ineffective . Slowly 11 B11 Coy forced its rray into the

x "Uncle" target is one on which all the divisional artillery fires , normally 72 guns . "Miko" target is one on which one regiment fires, normally 24 guns . - 24 - outskirts of the town, and finally the square. The enemy clung tenaciously to the houses, covering the village in a network of severe cross-fire. By 0700 hrs all the enemy posts were cleared out by patrols working in sectors of the village as it was divided up by the Company Commander . Prisoners taken, many of whom had been in bed when the . Company entered the town, appeared surprised at.the attack, and were forced to leave behind the breakfasts that had been prepared for them in 'the houses. {Ware, op cit ; and W.D., P.P.C.L. It, 6 Dec 43) ·

69. 11 A" Coy crossed the river at its proper time and came under fire before leaving the valley. Close contact was kept with "B Coy, and after the perimeter was broken "A" Coy swung off to the right towards its objective. The first enemy to be contacted was . ~ motorcyclist riding down from the cluster of buildings shouting "Achtungn . 8 Pl on the Company's left closed in on a house in which a light was burning. The occupants , who belonged to an enemy company headquarters, fled in the direction· of 7 Pl; six were taken prisoner. ''A" Coy then proceeded to clear out the buildings and the cav~s where the ground dropped away to the North;. more prisoners· w·ere taken. en Coy and Battalion Headquarters crossed together to the outskirts of the town where tney waited until the clear~ng out process had been completed. (Ibid) ' ' . . ~ ?C. As daylighy grew stronger, · the. P.P. C.L. I. found themselves well into Villa Roatti; company positions were re- organized, and the scout and sniper platoon were kept busy dealing with the determined sniping of the enemy. Ammunition expenditure through the night had been heavy. From first light, intense mortar fire was maintained by the enemy, and before 19ng it was clear that the Grenadiers were ready to reclaim possession' of Villa Roatti . If the claim was to be thwarted, the Patricias were in need of ammunition, and the armour which was struggling with mud and rock on·a winding track - a route which, hitherto no machine had proved negotiable . The surprise stealth attack had been successful; the result of an attack announced by an artillery prelude must be left to. fancy. The' Battalion Commander commented: The degree of surprise attained in this opera­ tion was very high indeed, .and the enemy on the objectiv~ was thoroughly 'caught napping'. This is attributed to skillful and thorough recce and absolute silence in the crossing. The absence of any large scale preliminary fire plan confused the enemy as to the size of the force coming in against them, and at first light they were faced with the accomplished fa.ct. (Ware, op cit) The absence of a barrage was justified by the results . Crossing of the Moro and Capture of Villa Roatti from which the quotation is made, was written in April 1944 when all events could be given their proper value in the light of subsequent experience; whereas the War Diary was written as events occurred. It was not until late in the month that the lesson of how quickly an enemy, well dug in on reverse . slopes, could recover from a heavy barrage, was learned. 71. . VfuilRe the P.? .C.L.I . was fightiug through the darkness into Villa oatti th~ Seaforth were fi~ding tne main axis and S. Leonardo stubbornly defended. In appreciating the main axis as the best natural approach to the Ortona - Orsogna l ateral road, the enemy had preparbd defences of well- nbsted machine gun posts ~trongly supported by mortars and artillery. - 25 -

He avy and constant fire fell on the ]Snginoors at work on the main axis crossing. The Seaforth positionsalone the edge of tho plateau on the south bank ~ere no more free from this hazard, t·•hich restrictod movement and observation, and prevented thorough reconnaissance . ( ·:; .D ., Seaforth of C ., December 1913: !lppx 7 - Account by Lt-Col J .D. For in) • Lt- Col J .D . For in and his company c om:r;.andcrs studied the approaches from the near bank . Of the difficulties , Colonel Forin wrote: No definite information as to German strength or dispositions, no time allowed for patrolling, no supporting firo . It looked like a rush job , and always rush jobs have spelt to us. unfavourablo settings and ad vantage 1.•ri th the Germans • . .

(~}

Like that of the P . P .c . L. I ., the Seaforth attack was not to be precoded by artillery. 72 . s. Leonardo is larger than Villa Roatti and lies 1,000 yards west of the river along the main axis . Immed- iately to the South, a long gully cuts 2 , 000 yards through the plateau in a '"estcrly dir0ction to La Torre . Both S . Leonardo and La Torre, if possible , were to be included in the Seaforth bri~gehead , to achieve "thich the plan was broken into t ..w phases : the capture of s . L13onardo, and the capture of La Torre (Ibid) . During the first phase, "B'' Coy was to take up posi ti ens-on the left flank bot,.reen the t1•10 tovms to stop enemy assistance tnat might come from La Torre, while "C" Coy crossed at the main axis bridg·. site and continued up the road towards S . Leonardo . These two companies i-rere to cross at midnight . Thirty minutes later, 11 A11 Coy was to ford the river and carry out a right flankitlg move up a more covered approach to S . Leonardo . 11 D11 Coy, held as a battalion reserve , was to f ollovr up either 11 ; . " or 11 C11 Coy whichever v1as progressing more successfully . .tction against La Torre de- penied on company positions at the end of Phase I . Supporting tanks 1•1ere to follow :I,n daylight . (Ibid) 73 . Neither tho Grenadiers on the high ground, nor the Seaforth wading the river , broke tho silence; 11 B11 Coy was allowed to reach its left flank l:)Ositions without interference, and dug in. 11 C" Coy, less fortunate, had progressed only 100 yards fro1:1 the river ' s edge ,.,h~n the enemy opened fire . This more obvious approach was defended ilfi th mo.chine - guns firing on fixed lines from the high ground facing the line of advance ; tho Company ,.,as brought to a standstill. , On the right ''A" Coy met equally fierce resistance from what were estimated to be fifteen to t\'rnnty machine- guns . The Company Commander was blinded by an explosive bullet, and his Sergeant- Major was killed. One of the platoon officers , out of communication with Battalion Headquarters b~cause of a fault in the Company ' s 18 sot, made repeated attempts to work small parties forward , put without success , and finally 1.~as forced to 'd thdraw the Company tot he south bank. Endeavouring once more to cross the river, "A" Coy f'ollowod 11 C11 Coy ' s route , v1hlch v•as a mule track 150 yards to tho south and parP_- llel vTith the main axis . .l.fter fivo hours fighting 11 A11 and 11 C11 Coys had succeeded in gaining only a narrow bridgehead which fell far short of the original objoctives, leaving the enemy free to dominate tho main axis crossings vrhere the Engineers 11rere '"Orking. The mule track ap';)roach of the two companies vras under incessant shell and mortar fire , to over­ cor.te which, little covld be .ione until daylight ·;hen, it v.ras hoped, armcur c::n1 artillery 1·1ould be able to roduce the har d core of enemy resista?ce on tho high ground . (Ibid) - 26 - . . 74 . . Between the main axis and the sea, the enemy had a.lr.eo..9-y. demons tro. ted th9. t he would nake a: s t~nd along the Mor o . ~ , 'J:'he diversionary -attack by 1 C:ln Inf Bde , without reconnaissance· or support .was intended to be l ittle more t han a test of ·enemy defences and a temporary bewilqerment to 90 Greri O~ot) Div. Only if 1ight resistance v1as met, w~s the advance to be pursued up the coast road . The defences , when proved, ···ere adequate; the at ta.ck became a bitter skirmish, ."1hich by 0100 hrs subsided with the return of the Hast & P .E .R . to the south bank . (Hist Sec file Italy: 1943/l Cdn Inf Bde/C/F: Crossing of the Moro 1 Cdn Inf Bde Battle Narrative ; Hist Sec file Italy: 1943/f Cdn In£ Bde/C/D: ,,ccount by Major G.E .B . Renison; and W.D. , Hast & P.E .R ., 5 Dec 43) 75 . Scarcely had Brigadier Graham' s troops relieved 38 Brigade when the attack began . .At an 11 0 11 Group held at 1 345 hrs 5 Dec , the Brigade Comm~nder had ordered 48 Highrs · to relieve the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers on the right of 2 Cdn Inf Bdc, and.the Hast & ? .E .R . to replace the Royal Irish Fusiliers a.long the edge · of the plateau along .the sea;­ wa.rd flank . ' The Hast & P .E .R • v:as chosen to make the diversionary attack \'.'hich had -to begin bef.ore zero hour of the in~in assault by 2 Cdn Inf Bde . This feint was to start by sending patrols across the river, after which the Be.ttnlion woulP, begin an infiltration process to the top of tho plateau, and working , ;if possible , towards the Ortona - OrsoBna lateral road . Contact vias to be kept ,,.i th 2 Cdn .Inf Bdo on the left. No artillery 'was to be in support; armour, as .. ,as the case farther upstream, i•.r£1s to cross at first llpht . (Vl .D ., H.Q. . 1 Cdn Inf Bde: ,\.ppx 6, Int Log, 5 Dec 43) . ' 48 Highrs and R . C.R . were to .remain in defensive positions on tho near bank, alert agairiat. counter- attacks (Ibid) .

76 . ""hen at 1900 hr13 the Hast & P .E .R . had taken the place of the Royal Irish Fusiliers on the near bank of the river, it was dark . Patrols v1ere irnmedia tely sent forwo.rd to discover suitable crossings , and from their reports it was decided to make the feint at a point about 200 yards from the sea. . Major il .A. Kennedy, temporarily comr.1anding the Batta.lion, decided to send one platoon over the· river, establish it firmly I then f olloyr up ••ri th the remafnder of the Company. ( "H .D., Hast & P .E .R. , 5 Dec 43) • V1h0n the forward company had gained a bridgehead on the edge of the valley, the Battallon 1vas to follo--r up and consoTidato for the ni'Sht on the plateau . During the attn.ck the Battalion Pioneer platoon, screened by carriers, was to prepare a t'lnk crossing near the blown bridge of the coast road . (Ibid) . The scheme was ambitious ' but was to be executed only rr enemy resistance was light . 77 . The lending platoon of "A" Coy fordod the river at 2200 hrs and diso.ppee.red into the darkness . ':lhon the pl atoon had succeeded in reaching the high ground, it wa.s to have signo.lled back for .tho remaii;;ider of the Company to follow . Its 11rireless set was faulty, however , the sisnal did not come , and tho other platoons crossed 'ri thout \•·al ting . The leading platoon had moved around to the loft to a more gradual slope , and the m~in body cf the Company, searching for the VL>.nguard , found itself faced vri th sheer cliff. In the dark- ness tho t·.,o neve.r joined. :30th tho groups, entrapped in the fixed lines of the enemy• s for\·•ard defended localities, became immobile under the s•,.eeping machine- gun fire . 'lli th the Company • s wireless set out of ord ~r, •nortar sup_;>ort mas not possible . Before •··ithdrawing at 0100 hrs, both parties, rememberi~g thnt_. their· main object \"a::-1 to crca. te a diversion, contributed to a chaotic exchange of small arms fire . (!__9_d!.1_..:1~~-~<:!.? __B._~t~.3:~. !~arr_~tivc: loc_ _£i1~_; r:. onison: .0..E c;.t: - 27 -

Hist Sec filo Italy: 1943/C/F Battle of the Moro River , Hastin~s and Prince Edward Regiment ; '7 .D. , Hast & P .E .R., 5 Dec 3).

78. · · By the first light of 6 Doc , 1 Cdn Inf Div h:td secured two 111eak positions on the e d:-::o of the plateau beyond the Moro , both of them in th8 2 c~n Inf Bde sector .. The P . P . C. L . I ., having fought into Villa Roatti by nit;ht, were fac od with the problem of holding it by day ; tv•o Seat:orth companies , in the narro•7 bridgehei:ld along the rn.o.in a.xis , also had to withstand enemy attenpta to eject ther.1 from t hat uncertain foothold . (Hist Sec file Italy: 1943/2 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D, 1~ccount by Capt ·;; .. s . Dewar) · 79 . The first counter- attack against Villa Roatti ca.r.ie from tho Wost at 0900 hrs . During the preceding two hours of light, a shell ano mortar barrage foll on tho village . (W .D., ILQ . 2 Cdn Inf .r3de , 6 Dec 43) . 10 platoon of "B" Coy, occupying the extreme western houses of.the main part of the town, enfiladed enemy forning up places . :il though the attackers took good advantage of the thick olive grovos, the platoon was · able to brin3 heavy fire upon them. Separated from the r..::mainder of tho Battalion, 11 i. 11 Coy, in the cluster of buildings to the North; rocei ved the first blovr of the counter- attack. (''Jaro: £E_ cit) . It was the determined defence of 7 pl in o. left forl··n.rd posit~on that allo\•;ed 1111. 11 Coy to redispose .:.ts forces to hold the · attack. Tho platoon stood firm until. one sec,tion ran con- plotely out of annnunition; the Platoon Co1Tu~andor, after ordering the sec ti on back, took his rum~ining men and with a diminishing supply Df ammunition blocked ene~y progress . He and five of his nen, when their ammunition was finally expended, were captured. This stand provided tho Company Cprmnander with sufficiunt time to reorganize his remaining pl atoons into a compact barrie::."' comn.Rnding the enemy ' s l ine of advance . (Ibid)

80. Calmly and ·skilfully the C ompi:my Cof.1.l'l··e.nder handled J his charge . In an account of the action, the Battalion Commander said:

CA~ coy H •Q . was me ant ime 'under he a~ M.d . fire and Maj or l!l . de N . Watson, M .c . comr.le.nding A Coy cocll yreorganized his coy. 8 pl covered the mover. ..ent of Coy H . Q. . into a now position and then covered by fire from 9 pl., 8 pl worked ita3lf into better positions . 9 pl was in an excellent position and did good execution on the att~cking force . (Ware, £E cit) The Unit War Diary remarks:

In the me an time things had re re hod a very critical stage with •A• Coy bearing the brunt . Major de N~ Watson handled this Coy well, bein3 as cool as the proverbial cucumber when he was in the thick of the enemy fire. (~ . D ., P . P .C .L . I . , 6 Dec ~3) 11 A11 Coy ' s ammunition supf;)ly was d1·rindling rapidly until it vras refurnished by contributior.s from 11 0 11 and 11 D11 Coys . 11 0 11 Coy, in the eastern edge of' the town, was kept in reserve to deliver an immediate councer- attack if 11 A11 Coy ' s defence was overwhelmed . (Via.re , ~ cit) ~ 28 -

'· . .. 81 . From daybreak, tho infantry in the town above could s ee the tanks struggling ,... i th the rock and e;ra vel along the line of the river. It 'vas 0930 hrs before tho fir st tank appea.red, and was guided into position by one of the plat0 1. officer's . The Squadron COr.ir.lander , his own ta.nk bog r;~9'd down along the river , climbed to the t°'·rn on foot to direct those follo1:ring. Tanks to hard- pressed infantryman are blessings . from the God of '."iar . The cheering sound of 75- mm., and a seominel y inexhaustable stream of machine- gun fire raised the spirits of th0 BRttalion; four more tanks arrived and went into action. .1.rmour and infantry co- operated superbly. ; tank commanders le~nt out of their J:1achines to receive the shouted directions of the infantrymen. (Ibid) .

8~ . t the hei~ht of the battle, tho first mule train of ammunition stun1bled into the villar,e (•::are, ~ cit) . Finally at 1130 hrs , a green flare shot up and the counter- attack died away (~ . D . , P . P .C . L.I., 6 Dec 43) . There was no living German in Villa Roatti . The Grenadiers had not lacked courage; one macpine- gun group opened fire on a tank, and persisted until the last nan was killed . (~'/arc : op cit) . The bodies that lay scattered around wore well Ja den ~ blankets and food which suggested that the enemy had expected success , ~nd their infantrymen a comfortable night in Roatti •s houses , rather than a drizzly shroud in its· olive groves (Ibid} . Eighteen, more fortunate , were sent back to the di VISI'onal cage ( '\' .D., H .Q . 2 Cdn Inf Bde: Appx 7 , Intelligence Log, 6 Dec 43} . 83 . Tho second counter- attack began at 1330 hrs . During the short respite , battalion positions were re- organised. 11 11 11 A Coy, 1.. i th an ad.di tiona.l platoon from "D Coy, consolidated in the separated portion of tho village. 11B 11 Coy remained in the ma.in part of tho to,.•n facing the road which comes from the s outh- west . 11 C11 Coy was l'::>cated centrally, ready to supuort either flank . 11 D" Coy protected the mule train route from the river to the village . (ri~re: £E. cit) . Eight tanks had now roached tho oattalion, the remainder of the squadrons having become bogred down or victim8 to the mines along the route (Dewar, ~cit) . Those .t.hat had reached the to1.. n wero placed innull="down positions facing the only feasible tank approach, '"hich w!ls the narrow plateau south- vrnst of the town between the Moro and a deep gully to the 1.'/est n·1are: Q2 cit) . It was up this approach that the second counter- attackcaill9 . 1.'larnin~ of tanks and infantry was given by the .standing patrol of 'B" Coy that had boen placed in a grou~ of houses 500 yards beyond the Company positions (!.£! ..~) · 84 . Seven Mark IV Special Tanks , o.nd what was thought to be a company of infantry, were attacking 11 B" Coy in t·he south- •·1estern end of Villa Roatti . One tank v·as knocked out by one of the Battalion's anti- tank guns firing from the opposite bank of the ?i~oro . "B" Coyrs houses were bombarded with high explosive and anti- personPel shells, and covered with machine- gun fh•e . Immediately after the attacking

force was ennagcd by the defenders 1 it S'Jli t into two groups . Three tanks , "'i th some of the infantry, swung off the road through the olive groves tomards 10 Pl which was holding the Company•s left flank . The attack pressed on despite the defonsi ve fire brought do·~n by the artillery. Sherman tanks accounted for all of the three Mark IVs striking at 10 Pl. On the Company's rip,ht, the r emaininc tanks and infantry were fighting into 11 and 12 Pls. Ono tank succeeded in getting into the middle of 12 Pl•s positions; another became ' the vict im of a Sherman' s 75-mm. The enemy infantry accom- panying the to.nks deployed ,.,hen close to the to'~'n , and attempted to infiltrate . \ lthough their tank support failed them, they attacKed and ,~ere repulsed five times , reorganizing - 29 ... s9.ch time under cover of the olive groves o Al1••ays they ,.,ere c.et '"ith heavy and accurate fire from Bren euns , rifles and ,machine- guns of the defending tankso One group succeeded in reaching some houses on th~ edge of the to\'rn but were t r apped . '.','hen two or three ~rere killed, the 'v:hi·i;c 'flag appeared, 'J.nd tho survivors ··,ere taken prisoner. · On the extreme left flank, 11 Pl '~·as in danger of being cut off, but s t ood fi~m and killed many enemy. (Ibid)o 85 . .tfter t•"O hours' fighting the att;nckors 1,•rithdrevr ('.'l .D., P . P .C. L . I ., 6 Dec 43) . For them, the effort had been costly, the prisoner count was ~ver 40; the estimate of dead over 100 (~Vare : £E. cit) .. Fivo tanks were des­ troyed, and the heap of booty included Gne anti- tank gun, t hree motorcycl es , . six 81-mm mortars , several machine- guns , rifles , pistols , wireless sets and telephones, and considerable clothing, blankets , food and cigaretteso The mortars and anti- tank·guns "'ere later put to use against their former owners . ~ During both attacks artillery aupport was called for through Battalion Rear Headq_uarters .• since early in the fighting both set.s of the forward observation officer w~re destroyed by shell fire . 86 . The day ' s fighting, during ,.,hi ch tho Bat ta.lion ,.,i th- s tood its' first counter- attacl<:, v·as fo1• tne Patricias the~ heaviest since the Italian campaign opened. · P.P .C . L . I . I casualties amounted to eight killed, nirn, missing believed pr~soners of war, and 60 rounded . (Ibid) . Much of the success •ras due to the indomitable efforts of tho crews of 44 Royal Tank Regiment , ,.,ho , realizing the situation depended on their timely arrival , had not failed,, In the struggle i-1i th the river bed: and steep incline to the village, the tank cr ews had climbed out to clear their own path through the mines . Two of the Sherm.ans had been lost in the fighting . ( '.'v· .D., H .Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bdc, 6 Dec 43) · 87 . With night approaching, Colonel Ware once more re- ~rouped his Battalion. 11 D11 Coy was brought up to strengthen 1 B" Coy; positions for the night were taken up; and the two mile trek back ,.,1th the ,..ounded began.. Stretcher parties from "A" Echelon came forv•ard to carry t:te more severely wounded dov•n the muddy slopes and along tho river to the waiting ambul~nces . (Ware : .2E. cit)

88. Below S . Leonardo , the narro"' bridgehead v1on during t he night by the two companies of Seaforths .• was less secure than the Roatti positions of the P . P.C.L. I . The night attack had lacked support, and it \"as the Battalion Com."" J:l&tlder's intention to wait until first light when both artillery and tanks could be used to dislodge the enemy from their positions on the high ground (Forin: ~cit). 11 D11 Coy and Battal ion Headquarters had not crossed tEe·river; 11 AT! and 11 C11 Coys were in tho bridgehead ; and 11 B" Coy had disappeared into temporary obscurity somewhere between S., Leonardo and La Torre . li.ny further progrGss depended on tanks , but the Moro proved too great an obs t'.3.cle . Al] morning, repeated attempts vrcro made J n four different places, but as the number of machines that became stuck in the 'soft river bed increased, the . vlc tory of this wa. ter barrier was conceded. Nothing remained for the t'l.nks but to suDport the infantry from tho near bank; they ,,·ore aligned along the escarpment v1henc0 machine- gun posts in S. Leonardo and along the high ground were heavily shelled: but, in the thin morning mist and at such long range: much of the firing was at random • . (Ibid) . Extensive artillery fire did not pre­ vent the situation from becoming a deadlock.