America at War World War I: People, Politics, and Power

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First Edition

Britannica Educational Publishing Michael I. Levy: Executive Editor Marilyn L. Barton: Senior Coordinator, Production Control Steven Bosco: Director, Editorial Technologies Lisa S. Braucher: Senior Producer and Data Editor Yvette Charboneau: Senior Copy Editor Kathy Nakamura: Manager, Media Acquisition William L. Hosch: Associate Editor, Science and Technology

Rosen Educational Services Hope Lourie Killcoyne: Senior Editor and Project Manager Maggie Murphy: Editor Nelson Sá: Art Director Matthew Cauli: Designer Introduction by Julie Smith

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

World War I: people, politics, and power / edited by William L. Hosch. p. cm.—(America at war) “In association with Britannica Educational Publishing, Rosen Educational Services.” Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 978-1-61530-048-8 (eBook) 1. World War, 1914–1918—Juvenile literature. I. Hosch, William L. II. Title: World War 1. III. Title: World War One. D522.7.W68 2010 940.3—dc22 2009033707

On the cover: Trench warfare, in which opposing forces sacrifice mobility for some degree of protection, reached its highest development on the Western Front during World War I. In this 1916 photo, British troops “go over the top” during the First Battle of the Somme. Popperfoto/Getty Images 43 CONTENTS Introduction 8

Chapter 1: The Roots of World War I 17 Industrialism and Imperialism 19 The Triple Entente 24 The Road to War 26 Crisis in the Balkans 29

Chapter 2: The Outbreak of War 38 Inital Military Forces and Resources 38 Naval Forces 40 Machine Guns and Modern Artillery 48 Tanks 51 88 Chemical Weapons 53 Air Power 54

Chapter 3: The Initial Stages of the War 61 Initial Strategies 61 The War in the West Begins 65 Other Fronts 73

Chapter 4: The Stalemate Years Begin 84 Major Developments in 1915 84 Major Developments in 1916 98 Major Developments in 1917 111

Chapter 5: The Stalemate Breaks, 1918 134 Germany Regroups to Attack in the West 134 Other Developments 140 The Allies Launch the Final Attack on the Western Front 147 115 Chapter 6: Political Leaders 154 Austro-Hungarian Empire 154 Britain 155 France 158 Germany 160 Italy 161 Ottoman Empire 162 Russia 163 United States 167 179

Chapter 7: Military Commanders 173 Entente Powers 173 Central Powers 198

Chapter 8: Casualties of War 217 The War Guilt Question 218

Glossary 226 Bibliography 228 Index 230

196

221

INTRODuCTION Introduction | 9

four-year war, running from 1914 to Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria. A1918, World War I left 10 million On June 28, 1914, the Archduke, heir to people dead, 21 million people wounded, the Austrian throne, and his wife, Sophie, and nearly 8 million missing or impris- duchess of Hohenberg, were shot and killed oned. While it was neither the biggest in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo by a nor the most deadly war in history, this 19-year-old Bosnian Serb, Gavrilo Princip. war, sometimes referred to as the Great The assassination of the Archduke War, is still being researched and written changed everything, moving Austria- about nearly 100 years later. Beyond the Hungary toward all-out war. Initially, 39 million people directly aff ected by this the Austrian government ordered only epic struggle, empires were toppled, rev- an investigation into the assassination, olutions incited, and the seeds of another but behind the scenes the Habsburg global war sewn. monarchy obtained German support for The eff ects of the Great War were felt retaliation against Serbia. Though the far and wide and lasted years after the assassin and his companions were resi- fi ghting had stopped. Some scholars argue dents of Bosnia and therefore subjects of that these eff ects—notably what Germans the Habsburgs, the Austrian government viewed as the fi nancially punitive aspects alleged that the assassination plot was of the Versailles Treaty—led to the begin- conceived in Belgrade with the assistance nings of World War II. Within the pages of of Serbian offi cials. this book, readers will fi nd a robust schol- Less than a month later, the Habsburg arship surrounding the roots of World offi cials presented Serbia with an ultima- War I, the strategic battles and alliances, tum, to which Serbian offi cials responded the key political and military leaders, the within 48 hours. They accepted all but one all-important introduction of technology demand. Austrian leaders broke off rela- onto the battlefi eld, and the geopolitical tions and declared war on July 28, 1914. ramifi cations of the Great War. Austro-Hungarian forces began to Early in 1914, the advent of industrial- attack Belgrade the next day, which led ization and increasingly complex trade Russia to order a mobilization against issues made international politics tense Austria-Hungary. This action led Ger- for the imperial governments involved, many, Austria-Hungary’s ally, to issue but war was not considered inevitable. ultimatums. Germany demanded that The spark that lit the fuse of the Great Russia halt mobilization, and that France War was the assassination of one man, remain neutral, should war be declared

German soldiers, wearing their distinctive Pickelhaube helmets, practice maneuvers as they prepare for war in June 1914. Topical Press Agency/Hulton Archive/Getty Images 10 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power between Germany and Russia. France the summer of 1914 that this conflict and Russia ignored the German demands, would grow from a clash among which brought about both Germany’s Europeans to a long, drawn-out total war order for mobilization against Russia as involving belligerents from six of the well as France’s initial mobilization seven continents, inflicting carnage and against Germany. Germany then threat- devastation on a scale the world had ened Belgium, demanding free passage never seen. through that country to France. In the initial stages of the Great War, the The conflict that would embroil the Allies had clear advantages—industrially, world began in the first week of August demographically, and militarily. And 1914, when Germany declared war on though the United States was still neutral France, and well-trained and disciplined at this point, the young nation supported German troops invaded Belgium. Great the Allies. Britain, which had no reason to support But the Allies’ advantages notwith- Serbia, Russia, or France, was obligated standing, there was no denying the to defend Belgium, which led them to superior training of the German army, declare war on Germany that same long feared by many other nations. Ger week. With lightning-fast speed, Austria- man military leaders were considered Hungary declared war against Russia, some of the best in the world at the Japan, and Belgium; Serbia and Japan beginning of the 20th century. In an declared war against Germany; Montenegro effort to ally themselves against the declared war against Austria-Hungary perceived threat of the German army, in and Germany; and France and Great 1904 France and Britain had signed the Britain declared war against Austria- Entente Cordiale. The two countries then Hungary. This rush to war all happened began to include Russia in negotiations, by the end of the month. which became known as the Triple As alliances were solidified, the war Entente. Once the negotiations began was divided into the Central Powers: with Russia, Germany began to fear mainly Austria-Hungary, Germany, and attack from the three allied countries, Turkey; and the Allies: mainly France, prompting them to plan for that military Great Britain, Russia, Italy, and Japan eventuality. In 1904, in answer to the Ger (later joined by the United States). man government’s concern surrounding Patriotic fervour was running high the Triple Entente, German Army Chief at the outset of the war, creating an of Staff Alfred von Schleiffen was tasked intense feeling of “right against might” with developing a plan to counter a that propelled Europeans to support joint attack. their home countries through the war’s His plan, known as the Schlieffen Plan, infancy. No one could have known in became the key German strategy for the Introduction | 11

German infantrymen stream through a field as they invade France in November 1914. Popperfoto/Getty Images

beginning of World War I. The Schlieff en though, the Germans were held up by the Plan revolved around the swift defeat of Belgian army, and were further stunned France, which would give Great Britain by the speedy Russian advance into East and Russia pause, especially given the Prussia. Germany was also taken aback prolonged period of time Germany by the quick arrival of the British into believed it would take the Russians to France and Belgium. organize their large army. The strategy The First Battle of the Marne, the fi rst called for France’s surrender before major battle of the Western Front of the Russian mobilization could take place. war, was fought in September 1914. It During the fi rst days of August 1914, established the trench warfare with which the Schlieff en Plan was put into operation, World War I would become indelibly with Germany rushing into Belgium, a linked. As the Germans advanced into neutral country. Much to their surprise France, coming within 30 miles of Paris, 12 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power the French army commander, Joseph The Allies were divided on how to Joff re, decided that the best form of break the deadlock. The French wished defense for his troops would be to attack to continue their assault on the Ger- the advancing Germans. On Sept. 6, mans entrenched in their homeland. The 1914, France’s Sixth Army attacked the British were of two minds: some were Germans with 150,000 French soldiers. with the French, others wished to move The attack caused the German army against the Central Powers either in the to split, and August von Moltke, German Balkans or by landing on the German chief of staff ordered a retreat to the Baltic Coast. Aisne River. There they dug trenches and The British stayed true to the adage waited for the Allied army to advance. It “necessity is the mother of invention,” was then that the Germans discovered devising a plan to build a device that the fatal fl aw in the Schlieff en Plan: there could withstand machine gun fi re and was no contingency plan for the French break through the trenches. Conceived fi ghting back. The costs of the battle by Col. Ernest Swinton and guided were high on all sides, with the French through the development process by its and the Germans each losing nearly a champion, Winston Churchill, at that quarter of a million soldiers, and the time fi rst lord of the Admiralty, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) losing weapon that came into being in 1916 was over 10,000. none other than the tank. The trench warfare employed by the But the tank was not the only innova- Germans in this fi rst battle set the stage tive technology devised during the for numerous stalemates, on all fronts, Great War that would change the face through the next three years of war. By of warfare. The burgeoning industries the end of 1914, the Germans had replaced throughout the world were able to von Moltke with Erich von Falkenhayn, develop machines and technologies that who decided that his army would be best strengthened the off ensive and defensive served by focusing on the Eastern Front military operations. These innovations until the impasse created by the trenches included weaponry such as bolt-action could be overcome. He also worked to rifl es, long-range artillery, machine guns, develop German economic organization a more eff ective hand grenade, and high- and management of resources, which explosive shells. prepared them well for the British Another technological advance—if blockade. such a term can be used—was the

France’s Gen. Joseph Jacques Jo re (surrounded by, left to right, British Gens. John French and Douglas Haig) plans the Allies’ next move near the front lines early in 1915. Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images Introduction | 13 14 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power development of chemical weapons. In the beginning, but public outcry was 1915, the German Army first used a drummed up by several factors. One windborn chemical cloud of chlorine gas was Germany’s plan for unlimited sub- in Ypres, France. Soon, both sides sent marine warfare. Another was news that choking agents such as phosgene gas the U.S. had decoded a secret German and blistering agents such as mustard telegram promising Mexico parts of the gas across enemy lines. This in turn led American southwest if it entered the war to the development of gas masks and on Germany’s side. These and other fac- protective overgear. Though deadly, these tors prompted the United States to weapons ultimately had little impact on declare on Germany, two years later on the course of the war. April 6, 1917. Transportation technology develop- The battle lines on the Western Front ments also added heretofore had barely moved from 1914 to 1917, but unimaginable advantages in warfare. the entry of the United States into the war Railways allowed armies to move men was a turning point. Not only was and materials to the front at an unprece- America’s weapons production able to dented rate. Aircraft, initially used as arm its own fighting forces as well as spotters, were eventually transformed those belonging to France and Great into deadly weapons when machine guns Britain, its entry into battle inspired were mounted behind the propeller. other Western Hemisphere countries Manned observation balloons were used such as Brazil, Costa Rica, and Honduras to reconnoiter troop positions and direct to declare war on Germany as well. These artillery fire. developments made the defeat of Ger As far as naval warfare was con- many a possibility in the eyes of the cerned, World War I became the breeding Allies, and, most important, they weak- ground for submarine development. ened the Central Powers’ resolve. The Indeed, the Great War was the first time economic contributions of the Americans submarines were seriously depended also kept the Allies afloat, because by upon in combat. The development of April 1917, the Allies had exhausted their torpedoes during World War I had more finances. of an effect than just sinking ships, The long-running war destabilized though. In 1915, when Germany sank Russia to the point of anarchy, and in March the British passenger ship the Lusitania, 1917, the Russian Revolution overthrew Americans were outraged. The killing of the Russian monarchy. A provisional gov- the 1,198 passengers was one of the major ernment launched an offensive against the reasons that the United States joined Austrians in July, but the Germans stopped forces with the Allies. President Woodrow the Russians in a spectacular defeat that Wilson had been opposed to war from rocked the provisional government and Introduction | 15 gave the Bolsheviks an opening to take 1918—the 11th hour of the 11th day of the control. Lenin and the Marxist soviets 11th month—though the Treaty of Ver seized power in November and ended sailles, which formally ended hostilities, Russian involvement in the war, signing was not signed until June 28, 1919. an armistice on Dec. 15, 1917. Although the fighting had ended, the Although Russia’s withdrawal from consequences of the Great War would the war was a clear advantage to Ger not be fully realized for decades, as this many, its effects were cancelled out by book will illustrate. Events of history do America’s entry into the fight. The British not occur in a vacuum of time or space. blockade had all but starved Germany, Rather, they unfurl over the years, impact- and the 100 days’ offensive that started ing politics and global relationships as on Aug. 8, 1918, spelled the end. An armi- time moves forward, bringing the past stice was signed at 11:00 am on Nov. 11, with it.

ChaPTER 1

The Roots of World War I

fter forty-three years of peace among the Great Powers A of Europe, an act of political terrorism on June 28, 1914 provoked two great alliance systems into mortal combat. The South Slav campaign against Austrian rule in Bosnia, culminating in the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand—the Habsburg heir apparent—at Sarajevo, cata- lyzed a rapid chain reaction leading to War. This local crisis quickly engulfed all the powers of Europe through the mechanisms of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, diplomatic arrangements meant precisely to enhance the security of their members and to deter potential aggressors. The long-term causes of the war can therefore be traced to the factors that impelled the formation of those alliances, increased tensions among the Great Powers, and made at least some European leaders desperate enough to seek their objectives even at the risk of a general war. These factors include the forces of militarism and mass mobilization, instability in domestic and international politics occasioned by rapid industrial growth, global imperialism, popular nationalism, and the rise of a social Darwinist worldview. However, the question of why World War I broke out should be considered together with two further questions: why did this period of peace between the Great Powers of Europe fi nally end, and why did it end in 1914 rather than before or after? 18 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

A portrait of Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck, the ﬁ rst chancellor of the German Empire, c. 1880. Hulton Archive/Getty Images The Roots of World War I | 19

Industrialism and already less than Germany’s 41,000,000. imperialism By 1910, Germany’s population had exploded to a level two-thirds greater than Patterns of Population France’s, while vast Russia’s population nearly doubled from 1850 to 1910 until it In the 19th century, both demographic was more than 70 percent greater than and industrial growth in Europe were Germany’s. While Russia’s administrative frantic and uneven, with both qualities and technical backwardness offset to a contributing to growing misperceptions degree its advantage in numbers, the and paranoia in international affairs. The demographic trends clearly traced the European population grew at the rate of growing danger for France vis-à-vis 1 percent per year in the century follow- Germany and the danger for Germany ing 1815, an increase that would have vis-à-vis Russia. From the early 19th been disastrous had it not been for the century perspective, should Russia ever outlet of emigration and the new prospects succeed in modernizing, it would become of employment in the rapidly expanding a colossus compared to the European cities. However, as the distribution of continent. Europe’s peoples changed radically, the Population pressure was a double- military balance among the Great Powers edged sword dangling above the heads of also shifted. In the days of Louis XIV, European governments in the 19th century. France was the wealthiest and most pop- On the one hand, fertility meant a growing ulous kingdom in Europe, numbering labour force and potentially a larger army. 25,000,000 to Britain’s 14,500,000 as late On the other hand, it threatened social as 1789. When the French Revolution discord if economic growth or external unleashed this national power through safety mechanisms could not relieve the rationalized central administration, mer- pressure. The United Kingdom adjusted itocracy, and a national draft predicated to growth through urban industrializa- on patriotism, it achieved unprecedented tion as well as emigration to the United organization of force in the form of armies States and the British dominions. France of millions of men. felt no such pressure but was instead The size of the French population forced to draft a higher percentage of its was greatly diminished after the loss of manpower to fill the army ranks. Russia more than a million citizens during the exported an estimated 10,000,000 people Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars from to its eastern and southern frontiers 1792 to 1815. Demographic growth in and several million more (mostly Poles and France, alone among the Great Powers, Jews) overseas. Germany, too, sent large was almost stagnant thereafter; by 1870, numbers abroad, and no other nation its population of 36,000,000 was nearly provided more new industrial employ- equal to that of Austria-Hungary and ment from 1850 to 1910. Still, Germany’s 20 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power landmass was small relative to Russia’s rapid mobilization of the citizenry possible, and its overseas possessions unsuitable without the risk to the regime or the elite to settlement. Furthermore, its sense of officer corps posed by a large standing, beleaguerment was acute in the face of the and idle, army. (In Austria-Hungary, the “Slavic threat.” Demographic trends thus crown avoided disloyalty in the army by helped to implant in the German popu- stationing soldiers of one ethnic group lation a feeling of both momentary on the soil of another.) After Prussia’s strength and looming danger. stunning victory over France in 1871, sooner or later all the Great Powers came Industrialization and Trade to adopt the German model of a mass army, supplied by a national network of Industrial trends in the 19th century railways and arms industries coordinated magnified the demographic. As with in turn by a general staff. The industrial- population growth, Germany was far and ization of war meant that planning and away the fastest-growing economic power bureaucracy, technology and finance were on the Continent. This was so not only taking the place of bold generalship and in the basic industries of coal, iron, and esprit in the soldier’s craft. steel, but also in the advanced fields of The final contribution to the revolu- electricity, chemicals, and internal com- tion in warfare innovation was planned bustion. Germany’s swift development research and development of weapons strained the traditional balance of power systems. Begun hesitantly in the French in its own society and politics. By the end Navy in the 1850s and 1860s, command of the century, Germany had become a technology—the collaboration of state highly urbanized and industrial society, and industry in the invention of new complete with large, differentiated middle armaments—was widely practiced by the and factory-proletariat classes. However, turn of the century, adding to the insecu- it was still governed largely by pre- rity that inevitably propelled the arms capitalist aristocrats who were becoming races. The demographic, technical, and increasingly threatened by vocal demands managerial revolutions of the 19th century, for political reform. in sum, made possible the mobilization Industrialization also made it possible of entire populations and economies for to outfit and supply mass armies drawn the waging of war. from the growing populations. After 1815, The home of the Industrial Revolution the monarchies of Europe had shied away was Great Britain, whose priority in the from arming the masses in the French techniques of the factory system and of revolutionary fashion, and the events of steam power was the foundation for a 1848 further justified their fear of an period of calm confidence known (with armed citizenry. But the reserve system some exaggeration) as the Pax Britannica. of Prussia provided a means of making a The pound sterling became the preferred The Roots of World War I | 21 reserve currency of the world, making the (actually years of slower, uneven growth), Bank of England the hub of international industrial and labour leaders formed finance. British textiles, machinery, and cartels, unions, and lobbies to agitate for shipping dominated the markets of Asia, tariffs and other forms of state interven- South America, and much of Europe. tion to stabilize the economy. Germany’s Together, the British Isles (again with Bismarck resisted their demands until some hyperbole) were “the workshop of European agriculture also suffered from the world,” and consequently led the falling prices and lost markets after 1876, world in promoting free trade from 1846 owing to the arrival of North American on. British diplomacy, proudly eschewing cereals in European ports. In 1879 the so- alliances in favour of “splendid isola- called alliance of rye and steel voted a tion,” sought to simultaneously preserve German tariff on foreign manufactured a balance of power on the Continent and goods and foodstuffs. Free trade gave way to protect the routes to India from Russian to an era of neo-mercantilism. France, encroachment in the Middle East or Austria, Italy, and Russia followed the new Afghanistan. (or revived) trend toward tariff protection. However, the Pax Britannica could After 1896 the volume of world trade rose last for only as long as Britain’s indus- sharply again, but the sense of heightened trial hegemony. But that period of British economic competition persisted in Europe. hegemony impelled the other European Social rifts between economic classes nations somehow to catch up: in the short and political opponents also hardened term by imposing protective tariffs to during this period. Challenged by unrest shield domestic industries and in the and demands for reforms, Bismarck longer term by granting government sub- sponsored the first state social insurance sidies (for railroads and other national plans. However, he also used an attempt development work) and the gradual on the Kaiser’s life in 1878 as a pretext to replication of British techniques. First outlaw the Social Democratic Party. While Belgium, France, and New England, then the conservative circles of society, not Germany and other states after 1850, only farmers but the wealthier classes began to challenge Britain’s industrial as well, gradually came to distrust the dominance. loyalty of the urban working class, France (1860), Prussia (1862), and industrialists shared few other interests other countries reversed earlier policies with farmers. Other countries faced and followed the British into free trade. similar divisions between town and However, a financial panic in 1873, attrib- country, but urbanization was not uted by some to overextension in Germany advanced enough in Russia or France for after receiving France’s billion-franc socialism to acquire a mass following. On indemnity, ended the period of rapid the other hand, in Britain, agriculture growth. In the depression of 1873–96 had long since lost out to the commercial 22 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power and industrial classes, and the working did form in the various countries to argue class participated fully in democratic the economic promise of imperialism, politics. The social divisions during this but just as often governments had to fos- period of industrialization were especially ter colonial development. In most cases, acute in Germany because of the rapidity trade did not lead but followed the flag. of its development and the survival of Why, then, was the flag planted in the powerful pre-capitalist elites. Moreover, first place? Sometimes, it was to protect the German working class, while increas- economic interests, as when the British ingly unionized, had fewer legal recourses occupied Egypt in 1882. More often, it was to state policy. All this made for a series of for strategic reasons or in pursuit of deadlocks in German politics that would national prestige. One necessary condition increasingly affect foreign policy after for the New Imperialism was technological Bismarck’s departure. prowess. Prior to the 1870s, Europeans could overpower native peoples along the Imperialism and coasts of Africa and Asia, but lacked Social Darwinism the firepower, mobility, and communications that they would have needed to pacify The 1870s and 1880s, therefore, witnessed the interior. (India was the exception, a retreat from the free market and a return where the British East India Company to state intervention in economic affairs. had exploited an anarchic situation and The foreign counterpart to this phenom- allied itself with selected native rulers enon was the New Imperialism. The Great against others.) The tsetse fly and the Powers of Europe suddenly shook off Anopheles mosquito, indigenous insects almost a century of apathy toward its that carried sleeping sickness and malaria, overseas colonies and, in the space of 20 were the ultimate defenders of African years, partitioned almost the entire uncol- and Asian jungles. However, several onized portion of the globe. Britain and inventions, including shallow-draft river- France were the only capital-exporting boats, the steamship and telegraph, the countries in 1880, and in years to come repeater rifle and Maxim gun, and the dis- their investors preferred to export capital covery (in India) that quinine is an to other European countries (especially effective prophylactic against malaria, Russia) or the Western Hemisphere rather eventually put European colonizing than to their own colonies. The British forces at the advantage. By 1880, small remained free-trade throughout the era of groups of European regulars, armed with the New Imperialism, a booming home modern weapons and exercising fire dis- economy absorbed most German capital, cipline, could overwhelm many times and Italy and Russia were large net import- their number of native troops. ers of capital. Once the scramble for The scramble for Africa should be colonies was complete, pressure groups dated, not from 1882, when the British The Roots of World War I | 23 occupied Egypt, but from the opening of surprising neighbourliness. Colonial wars the Suez Canal in 1869. The strategic did ensue after 1894, but never between importance of that waterway cannot be any two European colonial powers. overstated. It was the gateway to India It has been suggested that imperial and East Asia, and hence, a vital interest rivalries were a long-range cause of World nonpareil for the British Empire. When the War I. It has also been said that they were Khedive of Egypt defaulted on loans owed a safety valve, drawing off European ener- to France and Britain, and a nationalist gies that might otherwise have erupted in uprising ensued—the first such Arab rebel- war much sooner. But the links between lion against the Western presence—the imperialism and the war are more subtle. French backed away from military occu- The heyday of the New Imperialism, pation. Instead, they occupied Tunis in especially after 1894, created a tacit 1881 with Bismarck’s encouragement and understanding among the European moral support, thus expanding their North elites and the broad literate classes that African presence from Algeria. Prime the days of the old European balance of Minister William Ewart Gladstone, other- power were over. A new world order was wise an adamant anticolonialist, then dawning, and any nation left behind in established a British protectorate in Egypt. the pursuit of world power would sink When the French reacted bitterly to the into obscurity. This intuition surely must sudden presence of Britain in Egypt, have fed a growing sense of desperation Bismarck further encouraged French colo- among the Germans, and one of paranoia nial expansion in hopes of distracting among Britons, about trends in global them from European power dynamics, and politics. A second point is that the New he then took his own country into the fray Imperialism, while it did not directly by claiming four large segments of Africa provoke World War I, did occasion a for Germany in 1884. In that year, the king transformation of alliances that proved of the Belgians cast his eye on the entire dangerous beyond reckoning once the Congo Basin. The Berlin West Africa Great Powers turned their attention away Conference of 1884–85 was called to settle from their colonies and back to Europe. a variety of disputes involved in European The British naturalist Charles Darwin colonial occupation, and over the next 10 published The Origin of Species in 1859, years all the Great Powers of Europe, and within a decade his theories of nat- except for Austria and Russia, staked out ural selection and survival of the fittest colonies and protectorates on the African had been applied—or misapplied—to continent. But whatever the ambitions and contemporary politics and economics. rivalries of military adventurers, explorers, This pseudoscientific social Darwinism and private empire-builders on the scene appealed to educated Europeans already were, the cabinets of Europe came to demoralized by a century in which reli- agreements on colonial boundaries with gious scripture had been criticized, and 24 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power they had become conscious of the com- liberal notion that national unity, democ- petitiveness of their own daily lives in that racy, and free trade would spread harmony, age of freewheeling industrial capitalism. were all but dead. The historian cannot By the 1870s, books appeared explaining judge how much social Darwinism influ- the outcome of the Franco-German War, enced specific policy decisions, but a for instance, with reference to the mood of fatalism and bellicosity surely “vitality” of the Germanic peoples by eroded the collective will to peace. comparison to the “exhausted” Latins. Pan-Slavic literature extolled the youth- The Triple Entente ful vigour of that race, of whom Russia was seen as the natural leader. A belief In 1905, the Germans seized on Russia’s in the natural affinity and superiority temporary troubles to pressure France in of Nordic peoples sustained Joseph Morocco. German Chancellor and Chamberlain’s conviction that an Anglo- Prussian Prime Minister Bernhard, prince American–German alliance should govern von Bülow, believed he had much to gain. the world in the 20th century. Non- At best, he might force a breakup of the scholarly Anthropology during this Anglo-French entente, and at worst he period explained the relative merits of might provoke a French retreat and human races on the basis of physiog- secure German rights in Morocco. But at nomy and brain size, a “scientific” the Algeciras Conference in 1906, when approach to world politics occasioned by called to settle the Morocco dispute, only the increasing contact of Europeans with Austria-Hungary supported the German Asians and Africans. Racialist rhetoric position. Far from breaking the Entente became common currency, as when the Cordiale, the affair prompted the British Kaiser referred to Asia’s growing popula- to begin secret staff talks with the French tion as “the yellow peril” and spoke of the military. The United States, Russia, and next war as a “death struggle between even Italy, Germany’s erstwhile partner the Teutons and Slavs.” Poets and philos- in the Triple Alliance, took France’s side. ophers idealized combat as the process For some years, Italian ambitions in the by which nature weeds out the weak and Mediterranean region had been thwarted, improves the human race. and the attempt to conquer Abyssinia in By 1914, therefore, the political and 1896 had failed. The German alliance moral restraints against war that had seemed to offer little to Italy’s benefit, arisen after the period between 1789– while Rome’s other foreign objective, the 1815 were significantly weakened. The Italian irredenta in the Tirol and Dalmatia, old conservative notion that established was aimed at Austria-Hungary. So in governments had a heavy stake in peace, 1900, Italy concluded a secret agreement lest revolution engulf them, and the old pledging support for France in Morocco The Roots of World War I | 25 in return for French support of Italy in that Weltpolitik was either a conscious Libya. The Russo-Japanese War also bid for hegemony or a “vague, confused, strengthened ties between France and and unpractical statesmanship not real- Russia, while French loans again rebuilt izing its own drift.” As Ambassador Sir Russia’s shattered armed forces. Finally, Francis Bertie put it, “The Germans aim and most critically, the defeated to push us into the water and steal our Russians and worried British were now clothes.” willing to put to rest their old rivalry For France, the Triple Entente was in Central Asia. The Anglo-Russian primarily a continental security appara- Convention of 1907 made Tibet a neutral tus. For Russia, it was a means of reducing buffer, recognized Britain’s interest in points of conflict so that the antiquated Afghanistan, and partitioned Persia into tsarist system could buy time to catch spheres of influence. Foreign Secretary up technologically with the West. For Sir Edward Grey also hinted at the possi- Britain the ententes, the Japanese alli- bility of British support for Russian policy ance, and the “special relationship” with in the Balkans, reversing a century-old the United States were diplomatic props tradition. for an empire beyond Britain’s capacity The heyday of European imperialism to defend alone. The three powers’ inter- thus called into existence a second alli- ests by no means coincided, as disputes ance system, the Triple Entente of France, over Persia alone might have smashed Britain, and Russia. It was not originally Anglo-Russian unity if the war had not conceived as a balance to German power, intervened. But to the Germans, the but that was its effect, especially in light Triple Entente looked suspiciously as of the escalating naval race. In 1906 the though it were designed to frustrate Royal Navy under the reformer Sir John their claims to world power and prestige. Fisher launched HMS Dreadnought, a German attempts to break this encircle- battleship whose size, armour, speed, and ment, however, would only alarm the gunnery rendered all existing warships entente powers and cause them to draw obsolete. The German government the loose strings into a knot. That in responded in kind, even enlarging the turn tempted German leaders, fearful Kiel Canal at great expense to accommo- that time was against them, to cut the date its larger ships. What were the Gordian knot with the sword. For after British, dependent on imports by sea 1907, the focus of diplomacy shifted back for seven-eighths of their raw materials to the Balkans, with European cabinets and over half their foodstuffs, to make of unaware, until it was too late, that alli- German behaviour? In January 1907, a ances made with the wide world in mind now-famous Foreign Office memo written had dangerously limited their freedom of by Senior Clerk Sir Eyre Crowe surmised action in Europe. 26 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

The road to war belief that firepower and financial limitations would make the next war short and Anxiety and the Arms Race violent. Simple reaction also played a large role. Fear of the “Russian steam- It is difficult to escape the conclusion roller” was sufficient to expand Germany’s that Europe before 1914 succumbed to service law. Newly larger, the German hubris. The conventional images of army then provoked the outmanned “armed camps,” “a powder-keg,” or “saber French into an extension of national rattling” almost trivialize a civilization service to three years. Only Britain did that combined within itself immense without a large conscripted army, but its pride in its newly expanding power and naval needs were proportionally more almost apocalyptic insecurity about the expensive. future. Europe bestrode the world, and In an age of heavy, rapid-fire artillery, yet Lord Curzon could remark, “We can infantry rifles, and railroads, but not yet hardly take up our morning newspaper including motor transport, tanks, or air- without reading of the physical and planes, a premium was placed by military moral decline of the race,” and the German staffs on mass, supply, and prior plan- chief of staff, Helmuth von Moltke, could ning. European commanders assumed say that if Germany backed down again that in a continental war the opening on Morocco, “I shall despair of the frontier battles would be decisive, hence future of the German Empire.” France’s the need to mobilize the maximum num- stagnant population and weak industry ber of men and move them at maximum made its statesmen frantic for security, speed to the border. The meticulous and while Austrian leaders were filled with rigid advance planning that this strategy foreboding about their increasingly dis- required placed inordinate pressure on affected nationalities. Meanwhile, the the diplomats in a crisis. Politicians tsarist regime, with the most justification, might hold back their armies in hopes of sensed doom. saving the peace, only to risk losing the Whether from ambition or insecurity, war should diplomacy fail. Furthermore, the Great Powers armed themselves as all the continental powers embraced never before in peacetime, with military offensive strategies. The French general expenditures reaching 5 to 6 percent of staff’s “cult of attack” assumed that élan their respective national incomes. Mil could carry the day against superior itary conscription and reserve systems German numbers. Its Plan XVII called made available a significant percentage for an immediate assault on Lorraine. The of the adult male population, and the Germans’ Schlieffen Plan addressed the impulse to create large standing armies problem of war on two fronts by throwing was strengthened by the widespread almost the entire German army into a The Roots of World War I | 27

A map of Europe, 1911. Courtesy of The University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin

sweeping off ensive through neutral perfection that wholly ignored political Belgium to capture Paris and the French factors. None of the general staff s antici- army in a gigantic envelope. Troops pated what the war would actually be like. could then be transported east to meet Had they glimpsed the horrifi c impend- the slower-moving Russian army. ing stalemate in the trenches, surely Worked out down to the last railroad neither they nor the politicians would switch and passenger car, the Schlieff en have run the risks they did in 1914. Plan was an apotheosis of the industrial Above the mass infantry armies of age: a mechanical, almost mathematical the early 20th century stood the offi cer 28 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power corps, the general staff s, and, at the pin- “the herald of world peace” and pro- nacle, the supreme war lords: kaiser, claimed “war on war.” Sober observers emperor, tsar, and king. All of these men like George Bernard Shaw and Max adopted military uniforms as their stan- Weber doubted that any putative sense of dard dress in these years. The army was solidarity among workers would out- a natural refuge for the central and east- weigh their nationalism, but the French ern European aristocracies, the chivalric government kept a blacklist of agitators code of arms sustaining almost the only who might try to subvert mobilization in public service to which they could still any case. Some of Ger many’s leaders reasonably lay claim. Even in republican imagined that war might provide the France a nationalist revival after 1912 opportunity to crush socialism by appeals excited public morale, inspired the mili- to patriotism or martial law. tary buildup, and both fueled and cloaked A liberal peace movement with a a revanche aimed at recovery of the middle-class constituency fl ourished provinces lost 40 years before. Popular around the turn of the century. As many European literature poured forth best- as 425 peace organizations are estimated sellers depicting the next war, and to have existed in 1900, half of them in mass-circulation newspapers incited even Scandinavia and most others in Germany, the working classes with news of imperial adventures or the latest slight by the adversary.

Peace Movements

Various peace movements sprang up to counter the spirit of militarism before 1914. However, movements planned by the Socialists were the most numerous, and also the most disturbing to those responsible for national defense. The Second International took the Marxist view of imperialism and militarism as creatures of capitalist competition, and loudly warned that if the bosses provoked a war, the working classes would refuse to take part. Jean Jaurès defi ned the A portrait of George Bernard Shaw, c. proletariat as “masses of men who collec- 1905. Library of Congress Prints and tively love peace and hate war.” The 1912 Photographs Division Basel Conference declared the proletariat The Roots of World War I | 29

Britain, and the United States. Among radical Liberals like David Lloyd George their greatest achievements were the had to admit that however much they Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, at might deplore arms races in the abstract, which the powers agreed to ban certain all that was liberal and good in the world inhumane weapons but made no progress depended on the security of Britain and toward general disarmament. However, its control of its seas. the liberal peace movement also foundered on internal contradictions. To outlaw war Crisis in the Balkans was to endorse the international status quo, yet liberals always stood ready to Growing Tensions and excuse wars that could claim progressive German Isolation ends. They had tolerated the wars of Italian and German unification, and they In the end, war was not declared over would soon tolerate the Balkan Wars the naval race, commercial competition, against the Ottoman Empire in 1912–13 or imperialism. It was not sparked by the and the Great War in 1914. Another solution institutional violence of the armed states, for many peace advocates was to transcend either. War among nations was provoked the nation-state. Norman Angell’s The by underground terrorism in the name of Great Illusion (1910) argued that it already an oppressed people. It did not come over had been transcended. Angell’s opinion the ambitions of Great Powers to become was that interdependence among nations greater, but over the fear of one Great made war illogical and counterproductive. Power that unless it took vigorous action To Marxists, this image of capitalism was it might cease to exist altogether. The ludicrous; to Weber or Joseph Schumpeter, first “world war” began in the Balkans. it was correct, but beside the point. Blood In 1897, Austria-Hungary and Russia was thicker than class, or money. Politics had agreed to put their dispute over the now dominated economics, and irrational- Balkans aside. When the agreement ran ity dominated reason. out in 1907, the Ottoman Empire still The one European statesman most ruled Macedonia, ringed by Greece, sympathetic to the peace movements Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria. How was, not surprisingly, Britain’s Liberal ever, everything else had changed. For foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey. Citing now, Austria-Hungary’s only reliable ally the waste, social discord, and interna- was Germany, whose Weltpolitik had tional tension caused by the naval arms led it to join the competition for influence race, he made several overtures to at Constantinople. Russia was looking Germany in hopes of ending it. When again at the Balkans for foreign policy these overhauls failed, Britain had little advantage and enjoying, for the first time, choice but to race more quickly than the a measure of British tolerance. In Serbia, Germans toward preparing for war. Even the state most threatening to Vienna 30 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power because of its ethnic tie to the Serbs and moderate and conservative parties in the Croats inside the Dual Monarchy, a fun- Reichstag, as well as the Kaiser, with damental political shift had occurred. the support of Tirpitz, on the basis of a Although in previous years, Vienna had grand compromise of which the navy neutralized Serbia by bribing the ruling was the linchpin. Agrarian interests Obrenović dynasty, in 1903 the rival continued to demand protection against Karageorgević clan seized control in foreign foodstuffs, but the tariffs imposed Belgrade in a bloody coup d’état and to that end harmed German industrial shifted to a violently anti-Austrian policy. exports. A large armaments program, Finally, in 1908, a cabal of officers known especially naval, compensated heavy as the Young Turks staged the first industry for lost foreign markets. Further modernizing revolution in the Muslim more, consumers suffered especially from world and tried to force the Sultan to the tariffs-plus-navy legislation arrange- adopt liberal reforms. In particular the ment; after they paid higher prices for Young Turks called for parliamentary bread, they were taxed again for the elections, thereby placing in doubt the defense program. Popular resentment status of Bosnia and Hercegovina, prov- tended to increase the Socialist vote, inces still under Ottoman sovereignty and the other parties could command a but administered by Austria-Hungary majority only by banding together. since 1878. The Austro-Hungarian foreign Soon, however, the expensive race to minister, Aloys Aehrenthal, proposed to develop warships provoked a fiscal crisis settle the Bosnian issue and to crush that cracked the Bülow bloc and, in Serbian ambitions finally by annexing the 1909, elevated Theobald von Bethmann provinces. To this purpose he teased Hollweg to the chancellorship. He faced the Russian foreign minister, Aleksandr the choice of ending the naval race and Petrovich Izvolsky, with talk of a quid moderating Germany’s Weltpolitik, or pro quo. If Russia acquiescenced in making democratic concessions to the annexation, in return Austria-Hungary left, or somehow rebuilding the coalition would open the Dardanelles to Russian of conservative agrarians and industrial- warships. When instead Aehrenthal ists in the teeth of Socialist opposition. acted unilaterally, and Izvolsky’s straits Bethmann showed signs of preferring the proposal was rejected, the Russians felt first course of action. However, he was betrayed. Their response was to increase undercut by the pressure of industry, aid and comfort to their client Serbia, and Tirpitz’ naval propaganda, and the to determine never again to back down in Kaiser’s bravado, as illustrated by a the Balkans. damaging Daily Telegraph interview In Germany, politics were also (1908) in which the Kaiser made inflam- approaching a breaking point. Chancellor matory remarks about the British. When von Bülow had governed both the in 1912 Lord Haldane was dispatched to The Roots of World War I | 31

Berlin to discuss a suspension of the Raymond Poincaré. Poincaré, a deter- naval arms race, the Kaiser spoiled mined nationalist and advocate of chances for an accord by introducing a military preparedness, quickly secured new naval bill two days before his arrival. passage of an expansion of the standing The British then accelerated their own army. In Britain, Winston Churchill, dreadnought construction. By now, the then first lord of the Admiralty, withdrew failure of German policy was apparent. his fleet from the Mediterranean to home Clearly the British would not permit waters, making mandatory even closer Germany to challenge their sea power, military coordination with France. while the German army agreed in 1912 to This Second Moroccan Crisis con- tolerate further naval expansion only if firmed Germany’s isolation among the the army were granted a sharp increase European powers, while the British, French, in funding as well. In the 1912 elections, and Russian military buildups meant that the Social Democrats won 110 seats time was on the side of the entente. and became the largest party in the Moltke had already raised the notion of Reichstag. preventive war, and in the Kaiser’s war Germany’s military and political council of December 1912, he blustered, leadership were obsessed with domestic “War, the sooner the better.” To be sure, and foreign stalemate. Reform at home jingoism of this sort could be found in meant an end to the privileged positions every Great Power on the eve of the war, of the various elites; retreat abroad meant but only the leaders in Berlin—and soon the end of Germany’s dreams of world Vienna—were seriously coming to view power. A bold stroke, even at the risk of war not as simply a possibility, but as a war, seemed the only way out of the double necessity. impasse. In 1911, Foreign Minister Alfred The final pre-war assault on the von Kiderlen-Wächter tried to force the Ottoman Empire also began in 1911. Italy issue in Morocco, where the French cashed in its bargain with France over clearly aimed at a formal protectorate in Libya by declaring war on Turkey and defiance of the Algeciras accords. Ger sending a naval squadron as far as the many sent the gunboat Panther to the Dardanelles. Simultaneously, Russian Moroccan port of Agadir in defense of ministers in the Balkans brought about “German interests” there. Britain again an alliance between the bitter rivals stood with France, however, and Kiderlen- Serbia and Bulgaria in preparation for a Wächter acquiesced in a French Morocco final strike against Ottoman-controlled in exchange for portions of French colo- Europe. The First Balkan War erupted in nies in Central Africa. In France this October 1912, when Montenegro declared accommodation of Germany brought war on Turkey, followed quickly by Serbia, down the government of Premier Joseph Bulgaria, and Greece. The Young Turks Caillaux, who was succeeded by ended the conflict with Italy, ceding 32 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Libya, but failed to contain the Balkan shall die for federalism; it is the sole armies. In May 1913, the Great Powers salvation for the monarchy, if anything imposed a settlement in which Macedonia can save it.” Out of favour with the court was partitioned among the Balkan states, for his morganatic marriage and further- Crete was granted to Greece, and Albania more resented by conservatives and the was given its independence. Landlocked Hungarians alike, the heir apparent was Serbia, however, bid for additional terri- also feared by Slavic radicals as the one tory in Macedonia, and Bulgaria replied man who might really pacify the nation- with an attack on Serbia and Greece, thus alities and so frustrate their dreams of a beginning the Second Balkan War in June Greater Serbia. Hence, the archduke was 1913. In the peace that followed in August, a marked man among the secret societies Bulgaria lost most of its stake in the for- that sprang up to liberate Bosnia. mer Turkish lands plus much of the The National Defense (Serb-Cyrillic: southern Dobruja region to Romania. Narodna Odbrana) was formed in Serbia Serbia, however, doubled its territory in 1908 to carry on pro-Serbian and anti- and, flushed with victory, turned its Austrian agitation across the border. Its sights on the Austro-Hungarian provinces nonviolent methods were deemed insuf- of Bosnia and Hercegovina. ficient by others, who in 1911 formed the secret society Union or Death (Ujedinjenje Assassination of ili Smrt), also known as the Black Hand. Archduke Ferdinand This society was led by the head of Serbian military intelligence, Colonel How might the Habsburg Empire survive Dragutin Dimitrijević, who had been the rise of particularist nationalism in involved in the 1903 assassinations of the eastern Europe? Austrian statesmen had Obrenović family and favoured terrorist debated the question for 50 years, and the action over intellectual propaganda. With best answer seemed to be some form of his support, if not on his direct orders, a federalism permitting political autonomy band of youthful romantics conspired to to the nationalities. Reforms of this assassinate Francis Ferdinand during his nature had always been vetoed by the state visit to Sarajevo. On June 28, 1914, Hungarians, who stood to lose their which happened to be the Serbian own position vis-à-vis the German- national holiday, the archduke and his Austrians and the minorities in their half wife rode in an open car through the of the empire. Conrad Franz, Graf von streets of the Bosnian capital. A bomb Hötzendorf, chief of the general staff, was thrown at them, but missed. The favoured a preventive war against Serbia archduke completed his official duties, to stifle nationalist agitation for good and whereupon the governor of Bosnia sug- reinforce the old order. Archduke Francis gested they deviate from the planned Ferdinand wrote, however, “I live and route on the return trip for safety’s sake. The Roots of World War I | 33

Archduke Francis Ferdinand (right) and his wife, Duchess Sophie (centre), arriving in Sarajevo, Bosnia, before being assassinated by Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip, June 28, 1914. Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images

However, when the lead driver in the pro- but the aged emperor Francis Joseph cession took a wrong turn, the cars preferred to await an inquiry to determine stopped momentarily. At that moment, the extent of Serbian complicity. Germany, the 19-year-old Gavrilo Princip fi red his on the other hand, pressed for a fi rm revolver, killing both royal passengers. riposte and in the Kaiser’s famous Reaction in Vienna, and Europe gen- “blank check” memo promised to support erally, was surprisingly restrained. No whatever action Austria might take against one imagined that the outrage had more Serbia. The Germans expected Russia to than local importance, much less that back down, since its military reforms Bismarck’s prophecy about “some damned would not be complete for several years, fool thing in the Balkans” starting the but even if Russia came to Serbia’s aid, next war, was about to be fulfi lled. Conrad the German high command was confi dent von Hötzendorf saw the deed as pretext of victory. Bethmann was less so. A move for his preventive war against Serbia, against Serbia could lead to a world war, 34 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

demands for redress. Should Serbia accept, the empire would win a “brilliant diplomatic success”; should Serbia refuse, war could be waged with Austria-Hungary posing as the aggrieved party. In no case was Austria to annex any Serbian territory. The Russian response to any Austrian initiative would be critical, and by chance the president and prime minister of France, Poincaré and René Viviani, were paying a state visit to St. Petersburg in July. Strangely, there is no record of the Franco-Russian conversations, but it is known that Poincaré assured the Russians that France would stand by its alliance commitments. On July 23, just after the French leaders left for home, Vienna presented its ultimatum to Belgrade. They demanded the dissolution of the secret societies, cessation of anti-Austrian propaganda, and Austrian participation in Gavrilo Princip waits in his jail cell to the investigation of the Sarajevo crime. stand trial for the assassination of Serbia was given just 48 hours to Archduke Francis Ferdinand, 1914. Time respond. & Life Pictures/Getty Images The reaction of the Russian foreign minister, Sergey Dmitriyevich Sazonov , he warned on July 7. Yet Bethmann went to the news of the ultimatum was to insist along in the vain hope of localizing the on military measures. The French ambas- confl ict. sador, Maurice-Georges Paléologue , with Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold, or without instructions from his departed Graf von Berchtold , now advocated a chiefs, encouraged Sazonov. If Austria’s fi rm policy toward Serbia, lest Austria’s prestige—and very future—were at stake prestige deteriorate further and the in the Balkans, so too were tsarist Russia’s, Balkan states unite behind Russia. Gróf as the Balkans was the only region left in Tisza , the prime minister of Hungary, which Russia could demonstrate its vital- insisted, however, that diplomatic and ity. But now, Germany was competing for legal justifi cations precede such a clash infl uence over the Young Turks, courting of arms: Austria must fi rst present a list of Bulgaria, and plotting to smash Serbia. The Roots of World War I | 35

Primary Source: Woodrow Wilson’s appeal for Neutrality

“It would be the irony of fate,” Woodrow Wilson remarked before his 1913 inauguration to the offi ce of U.S. President, “if my administration had to deal chiefl y with foreign aff airs.” His worst fears were realized when the general European war began in August 1914 and soon became the most signifi cant crisis he had to confront. Americans reacted to the outbreak of war with a mixture of disbelief and disgust, and with a strong determination not to become involved. Wilson’s message to the Senate on August 19, which is reprinted here, echoed the sentiments of most of the nation. “We must be impartial,” he declared, “in thought as well as in action.” The remark became famous and was quoted often in the ensuing months of the war. Source: 63 Congress, 2 Session, Senate Document No. 566.

I suppose that every thoughtful man in America has asked himself, during these last troubled weeks, what infl uence the European war may exert upon the United States; and I take the liberty of addressing a few words to you in order to point out that it is entirely within our own choice what its eff ects upon us will be, and to urge very earnestly upon you the sort of speech and conduct which will best safeguard the nation against distress and disaster. The eff ect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say and do. Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The spirit of the nation in this critical matter will be determined largely by what individuals and society and those gathered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers and magazines contain, upon what ministers utter in their pulpits and men proclaim as their opinions on the street. The people of the United States are drawn from many nations, and chiefl y from the nations now at war. It is natural and inevitable that there should be the utmost variety of sympathy and desire among them with regard to the issues and circumstances of the confl ict. Some will wish one nation, others another, to succeed in the momentous struggle. It will be easy to excite passion and diffi cult to allay it. Those responsible for exciting it will assume a heavy responsibility, responsibility for no less a thing than that the people of the United States, whose love of their country and whose loyalty to its government should unite them as Americans all, bound in honor and aff ection to think fi rst of her and her interests, may be divided in camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion if not in action. Such divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan but as a friend. I venture, therefore, my fellow countrymen, to speak a solemn word of warning to you against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which may spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides. The United States must be neutral in 36 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men’s souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another. My thought is of America. I am speaking, I feel sure, the earnest wish and purpose of every thoughtful American that this great country of ours, which is, of course, the fi rst in our thoughts and in our hearts, should show herself in this time of peculiar trial a nation fi t beyond others to exhibit the fi ne poise of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self- control, the effi ciency of dispassionate action; a nation that neither sits in judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels and which keeps herself fi t and free to do what is honest and disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the world. Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the restraints which will bring to our people the happiness and the great and lasting infl uence for peace we covet for them?

The German slogan “From Berlin to Bagh- approved the mobilization of the Russian dad,” referring originally only to railroads, army against Austria, and alarms went off took on ominous new political meaning. all over Europe. Sir Edward Grey, Kaiser On July 25, the Russian Council of Min- William, and the Italian government all isters decided that if Austrian forces proposed negotiations, with the Austrians entered Serbia, Russia would mobilize its to occupy Belgrade as a pledge of Serbian army. This precipitous decision refl ected compliance. The German ambassador in Russia’s size and the inadequacy of its St. Petersburg assured the Russians that rail network. Sazonov seems to have con- Austria meant to annex no Serbian terri- sidered mobilization a political threat. tory. Unfortunately, these negotiations However, given the mechanistic time- came as too little, and far too late. In St. tables that were integral to the planning Petersburg, the generals protested that of all the European general staff s, it could partial mobilization would disrupt their only provoke countermobilizations and contingency plans: How could Russia an inexorable drift into war. prepare to fi ght Austria-Hungary while On July 25, Serbia accepted all the leaving naked its border with Austria’s Austro-Hungarian conditions, except for ally Germany? The weak and vacillating those two that directly compromised its Tsar Nicholas II was persuaded that par- sovereignty. Two days later, Berchtold tial mobilization would be adequate, persuaded Francis Joseph to initiate war. and on the afternoon of July 30 he At the same moment, the Kaiser, return- authorized general mobilization of the ing from a yachting expedition, tried Rus sian army. belatedly to restrain Vienna. On July 28 The previous day, Poincaré and Austria declared war and bombarded Viviani had fi nally arrived back in Paris, Belgrade; on the same day the tsar where they were met with patriotic The Roots of World War I | 37 crowds and generals anxious for military international law. On August 4, Britain precautions. In Berlin, anti-Russian dem- declared war on Germany. onstrations and equally anxious generals Thus, a great string of war declara- called for immediate action. On July 31, tions began. Austria-Hungary declared when all the other powers had begun war against Russia on August 5; Serbia preparations of some sort, and even the against Germany on August 6; Montene British had put the fleet to sea (thanks to gro against Austria-Hungary on August 7 Winston Churchill’s foresight), Germany and against Germany on August 12; delivered ultimatums to Russia, demand- France and Great Britain against Austria- ing an end to mobilization, and to France, Hungary on August 10 and on August 12, demanding neutrality in case of war in respectively; Japan against Germany on the east. But Russia and France could August 23; Austria-Hungary against scarcely accede without abandoning Japan on August 25 and against Belgium the Balkans, each other, and their own on August 28. security. When the ultimatums expired, Romania had renewed its secret anti- the Schlieffen Plan was put into effect. Russian alliance of 1883 with the Central Germany declared war against Russia on Powers on Feb. 26, 1914, but now chose to August 1 and against France on Aug remain neutral. On Sept. 5, 1914, Russia, ust 3. They also demanded safe passage France, and Great Britain concluded the for its troops through Belgium. Refused Treaty of London, each promising not to again, Germany invaded Belgium in make a separate peace with the Central full force. Powers. Thenceforth, they could be On August 3, Italy took refuge in the called the Allied, or Entente, Powers, or fact that this was not a defensive war on simply the Allies. Austria-Hungary’s part and declared its The outbreak of war in August 1914 neutrality. That left only Britain to decide was generally greeted with confidence between joining its entente partners in and jubilation by the peoples of Europe, war or standing aloof and risking German among whom it inspired a wave of patri- domination of the Continent. Britain otic feeling and celebration. Few people had little interest in the Serbian affair, imagined how long or how disastrous a and the kingdom was torn by the Irish war between the great nations of Europe question. The Cabinet was in doubt as could be, and most believed that their late as August 2, but the prospect of the country’s side would be victorious within German fleet in the English Channel a matter of months. The war was welcomed and German armies on the Belgian litto- in one of two ways: either patriotically, as a ral finally settled the issue. On August 3, defensive one imposed by national neces- Britain demanded that Germany evacuate sity, or idealistically, as one for upholding Belgium, Grey winning over Parliament right against might, the sanctity of trea- with appeals to British interests and ties, and international morality. ChaPTER 2

The Outbreak of War

INITIaL MILITaRY fORCES aND RESOuRCES

When war broke out the Allied Powers possessed greater overall demographic, industrial, and military resources than the Central Powers. They also enjoyed easier access to the oceans for trade with neutral countries, particularly with the United States. The table at the top of page 39 shows the population, steel production, and armed strengths of the two rival coalitions in 1914. All the initial belligerents in World War I were self- suffi cient in food except Great Britain and Germany. Great Britain’s industrial establishment was slightly superior to Germany’s (17 percent of world trade in 1913 as compared with 12 percent for Germany). However, Germany’s diversi- fi ed chemical industry facilitated the production of ersatz, or substitute, materials, which compensated for the worst shortages ensuing from the British wartime blockade. The German chemist Fritz Haber was already developing a process for the fi xation of nitrogen from air; this process made Germany self-suffi cient in explosives and thus no longer dependent on imports of nitrates from Chile. Of all the initial belligerent nations, only Great Britain had a volunteer army, and this was quite small at the start of the war. The other nations had much larger conscript armies that required three to four years of service from able-bodied males of military age, to be followed by several years in The Outbreak of War | 39

STRENGTh Of ThE BELLIGERENTS, auG. 4, 1941 Resources Central Powers Allied Powers

Population 115.2 265.5 (in millions) steel production (in millions of 17.0 15.3 metric tons) army divisions available for 146 212 mobilization in August 1914 modern battleships 20 39

LaND fORCES Of ThE BELLIGERENTS, auG. 4, 1914 Regular divisions other land total Country (with number of forces manpower field armies) Central Powers 27 Landwehr Germany 98 (8) 1,900,000 brigades Austria-Hungary 48 (6) — 450,000 Allied Powers Russia 102 (6) — 1,400,000 France 72 (5) — 1,290,000 Serbia 11 (3) — 190,000 69,000 fortress Belgium 7 (1) 186,000 troops 14 territorial Great Britain 6 (1) 120,000 divisions* *Restricted in 1914 to service at home. 40 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power reserve formations. Military strength on movement and quick to exploit the land was counted in terms of divisions advantages of flank attacks, German composed of 12,000–20,000 officers and senior officers were to prove generally men. Two or more divisions made up an more capable than their Allied counter- army corps, and two or more corps made parts at directing the operations of large up an army. An army could thus comprise troop formations—a critical ability in anywhere from 50,000 to 250,000 men. wartime. The land forces of the belligerent nations at the outbreak of war in August Naval forces 1914 are shown in the second table on page 39. Sea power was largely determined by the The higher state of discipline, train- number of capital ships, or dreadnought ing, leadership, and armament of the battleships and battle cruisers having German Army reduced the importance of extremely large guns, a navy had. Despite the initial numerical inferiority of the intensive competition from the Germans, armies of the Central Powers. Because of the British had maintained their superi- the comparative slowness of mobiliza- ority in numbers, with the result that, in tion, poor higher leadership, and lower capital ships, the Allies had an almost scale of armament of the Russian armies, two-to-one advantage over the Central there was an approximate balance of Powers. The table at the top of page 41 forces between the Central Powers and compares the strength of the two principal the Allies in August 1914 that prevented rivals at sea, Great Britain and Germany. either side from gaining a quick victory. The numerical superiority of the British Germany and Austria also enjoyed Navy, however, was offset by the tech- the advantage of “interior lines of com- nological lead of the German Navy. In munication,” which enabled them to send many categories, such as range-finding their forces to critical points on the battle- equipment, magazine protection, search- fronts by the shortest route. According to lights, torpedoes, and mines, the Germans one estimate, Germany’s railway network had the technological advantage. Great made it possible to move eight divisions Britain relied on its Royal Navy not only simultaneously from the Western Front to ensure necessary imports of food and to the Eastern Front in just four and a other supplies in wartime, but also to half days. sever the Central Powers’ access to the Even greater in importance was the markets of the world. With superior advantage that Germany derived from numbers of warships, Great Britain could its strong military traditions and its cadre impose a blockade that gradually weak- of highly efficient and disciplined regu- ened Germany by preventing imports lar officers. Skilled in directing a war of from overseas. The Outbreak of War | 41

British and German naval strength, August 1914 Type British German dreadnought battleships 20 14 battle cruisers 9 4 pre-dreadnought 39 22 battleships armoured cruisers 34 9 cruisers 64 41 destroyers 301* 144 submarines 65 28

*Restricted in 1914 to service at home.

Naval Armaments had been no corresponding improvement in fire control. For this reason, effective Guns battle ranges had not extended much beyond 3,000 to 4,000 yards (2.7 km to 3.7 By 1900 a major change had occurred in km). Finally, it was discovered that a the handling of the very heavy main ship’s roll and pitch could be systemati- guns, those of 11- to 13.5-inch (279 to 243 cally compensated for, so that each shot mm) calibre that fired shells weighing could be fired at the same angle to the sea up to 1,300 pounds (589.7 kg). In the and reach almost exactly the same range. 1890s such weapons often fired no faster Greater accuracy could be achieved by than once every 5 minutes, compared to firing groups of artillery shells, or salvos, the 5 to 10 rounds per minute fired by a bunched around the estimated range. 6-inch (152.4 mm) gun. As power con- The pattern of splashes raised by a salvo trol became easier and more precise, would then make corrections possible. By the big guns became more effective. By the end of World War I, fire control had 1900 it was possible for a 12-inch (305 improved enough that guns firing 15,000 mm) gun to fire one or two aimed shots to 20,000 yards (13.7 km to 18.3 km) could per minute. attain a hit rate of 5 percent. This meant Meanwhile, the standard of heavy- that a ship firing 10 heavy guns at the rate gun marksmanship began to improve. of once or twice per minute could expect Although rifled guns had grown bigger a hit after two or three minutes. and muzzle velocity had increased Increased range was valuable for two throughout the late 19th century, there reasons. First, a ship that could hit at 42 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

American factory workers produce torpedoes for the U.S. Navy, c. 1914. Boyer/Roger Viollet/ Getty Images ranges beyond the capabilities of its the use of a gyroscope to control the enemies could stand off and destroy steering rudders. Another signifi cant them at leisure. Second, improved gun improvement was the use of heat range increased protection against the engines for propulsion. British fi rms, new, longer-range torpedoes. introducing both heat engines and con- trarotating propellers, advanced to the Torpedoes high-performance, steam-driven Mark IV torpedo of 1917. Concurrently with this Modifi cations and adaptations of the development, an American fi rm, E.W. original design quickly made the torpedo Bliss Company, successfully used a tur- a formidable weapon. Directional control bine to drive a modifi ed design. (This was greatly improved in the 1890s by Bliss-Leavitt torpedo remained in The Outbreak of War | 43 extensive use until World War II.) By protection. Schemes to place coal bun- 1914, torpedoes were usually 18 or 21 kers near the outside of the ship proved inches (457.2 to 533.4 mm in diameter and impractical. However, research during could reach almost 4,000 yards (3.7 km) World War I showed that the basic idea at 45 knots or 10,000 yards (9 km) at close of keeping the underwater explosion at a to 30 knots. distance from the interior of the ship was correct. In the Royal Navy, existing Ship Armour ships were fi tted with external bulges, or “blisters,” to keep the explosion The torpedo threat forced ship designers farther outboard. New ships were built to provide battleships with underwater with specially designed layers of

An aircraft is mounted on a launching catapult atop one of the main gun turrets of HMS Queen Elizabeth, moored with the British Royal Navy ﬂ eet outside of Southend, Essex, July 1919. Topical Press Agency/Hulton Archive/Getty Images 44 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power compartments designed to absorb the higher thermal content than coal, so that shock of explosion. the same weight or volume of oil could During the war it also became appar- drive a ship much farther. The United ent that the longer firing ranges meant States shifted to oil fuel in new ships in that more shells would fall onto a ship’s about 1910 and converted its remaining deck than on its side armour. Because coal-burning warships after World War I. these ranges were experienced at the Beginning with the Queen Elizabeth class Battle of Jutland, ships designed after- of battleships in 1915–16, Britain also ward with stronger deck armour were switched to oil. However, the other navies called post-Jutland. followed suit only after the war. In contrast to the steam engine, a Ship Propulsion gasoline or diesel engine often needed no tending at all, could be very compact, While weapons were the main driving and could start and stop quite easily. Such force in warship development, changes engines made it possible to build small, in propulsion were also important. In 1890, fast coastal minesweepers, subchasers, propulsion was exclusively by reciprocat- and motor torpedo boats. Internal coming (i.e., piston) steam engines, which were bustion was thought to be especially limited in power and tended to vibrate. To suitable to subchasers, which would have escape these limitations, warship design- to stop their engines while listening for a ers adopted steam turbines, which ran submarine and then start them up sud- more smoothly and had no inherent limits. denly when something was heard. Turbines were applied to destroyers from about 1900 and to battleships from 1906. Capital Ships The main drawback of turbine propulsion was that really efficient turbines Battleships ran too fast to drive efficient propellers. The solution was to reduce turbine speeds A battleship entering service in 1900 typ- to acceptable propeller speeds through ically mounted a mixed battery of several gearing. By 1918, single-reduction gear- different guns of various sizes: four heavy ing was commonplace. (11- to 13.5-inch [279 to 343 mm]) guns in Improvements in ship propulsion two twin turrets, about a dozen secondary required more efficient methods of fuel- guns of 6 to 9 inches (152.4 to 228.6 mm), ing ships. Coal was relatively inexpensive and small, fast-firing guns of 3 inches and easily available; however, it did not (76.2 mm) or less for beating off torpedo- burn cleanly and was difficult to transfer boat attacks. These ships usually from ship to ship at sea. On the other displaced 12,000 to 18,000 tons. hand, oil burned cleanly, and it could be By 1904, however, studies reinforced transferred easily at sea. Also, it had a by battle experience in the Spanish- The Outbreak of War | 45

American and Russo-Japanese wars by cruisers. (Contemporary battleships indicated that fire from large guns at lon- were generally limited to about 18 knots.) ger ranges was more effective than Thus, in mobility as well as in size, the mixed-battery fire closer in. Only bigger Dreadnought began a new era. shells could do serious damage to well- HMS Dreadnought also marked a armoured ships. Moreover, the shells fired beginning of rapid development in big- from guns of many different calibres pro- gun firepower. In 1909 the Royal Navy duced a confusing pattern of splashes in laid down HMS Orion, the first “super the water that made the correcting of aim dreadnought,” which displaced 22,500 and range quite difficult. Effectively tons and was armed with 13.5-inch (3.43 increasing range, then, depended upon mm) guns. The U.S. Navy followed with abandoning the multiple-calibre pattern ships armed with 14-inch (355.6 mm) guns. of previous battleship armament in favour Then, on the eve of World War I, the Royal of a single-calibre armament. Several Navy went a step further with HMS Queen navies reached this conclusion simulta- Elizabeth, armed with 15-inch (381 mm) neously, but the British were the first to guns and capable, in theory, of 25 knots. produce such a ship, HMS Dreadnought, Although World War I stopped the growth completed in 1906. Displacing about of British and German battleships, the 18,000 tons, it carried 10 12-inch (304.8 mm) United States and Japan continued to guns; its only other armament consisted build ships exceeding 30,000 tons dis- of 3-inch (76.2 mm) weapons intended to placement. In 1916 both countries adopted fight off destroyers. the 16-inch (406.4 mm) gun, which fired a The Dreadnought gave its name to an shell of approximately 2,100 pounds (952.5 entirely new class of battleships of the kg). Such guns could be aimed to hit at most advanced design. By 1914 the Royal ranges as great as 20,000 yards (18.3 kg). Navy had 22 dreadnoughts (another 13 The battleship saw little actual com- were completed during World War I), bat in World War I. However, despite Germany built a total of 19 (5 completed submarines, aircraft, and destroyers, the after 1914), and the United States com- outcome of the war still hinged upon pleted 22 (14 of them after 1914). Japan control of the sea by the battleship. Had and Italy built 6 each, while Russia and superiority in battleships passed to France each built 7. Although they all Germany, Britain would have been lost, shared the same name, not all of these and the Allies would have lost the war. ships were strictly equivalent. Unlike its The one moment when this might have immediate German and American con- happened was the only large-scale clash temporaries, the Dreadnought had steam of battleships, the Battle of Jutland. turbines in place of reciprocating engines. Fought in May 1916 in mist, fog, and dark- These enabled it to attain a speed of 21 ness, Jutland revealed the strengths and knots, which was hitherto achieved only weaknesses of battleships and battle 46 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power cruisers. Three British battle cruisers a new stage in warship development. It were lost. Several German battleships, was so large, at 41,200 tons, that it thanks to watertight subdivision and could combine contemporary battleship efficient damage-control systems, sur- armour and armament (equivalent to vived despite more hits. However, that of HMS Queen Elizabeth) with the Germany saw that the British advantage very high speed of 31 knots. Although in battleship numbers was decisive, and classed as a battle cruiser, it was actually instead turned to the submarine to the first of a new generation of very fast counter the Allied blockade. battleships. At the other end of the cruiser spec- Cruisers trum were small, fast “scout” cruisers used for reconnaissance and escort HMS Dreadnought made earlier large duties. These ships displaced from 3,000 cruisers obsolete, since it was nearly as to 7,000 tons and, by 1915, attained speeds fast as any of these ships. Consequently, as high as 30 knots. They were armed the Royal Navy built a series of ships it with guns of smaller calibre, usually 6 or called battle cruisers. These were as large 7.5 inches (152.4 to 190.5 mm). The British as the newest battleships and were armed built many of this type of cruiser, as well with battleship guns, but they were much as larger types that were nevertheless faster (initially a top speed of 25 knots, smaller than their battle cruisers. compared with the 21 knots of battleships). The first one built was the HMS Destroyers Invincible, completed in 1907. Many of these ships were built: 10 for the Royal The greatest impact of the self-propelled Navy before 1914, 7 for Germany, and 4 torpedo was on the design of small sur- for Japan. face ships. Beginning in the 1880s, many Battle cruisers gained their superior nations built hundreds of small steam speed by sacrificing heavy armour. As a torpedo boats on the theory that they consequence, they could not stand up to could bar any enemy from coastal waters. battleships. This was proved at the Battle Because their hulls could be crammed of Jutland, where the Invincible was with machinery, torpedo boats were quite blown into two pieces by a single salvo fast. By the early 1890s, speeds as high as and sunk along with two other battle 25 knots were being reported. As a cruisers. These losses led many to argue defense against this new fast threat, that the battle cruiser was a mistake, but Britain deployed oversized torpedo boats, during the war Britain started to build six calling them torpedo boat destroyers. more, three of which were eventually These craft were successful in hunting completed. The last of them, HMS Hood, down torpedo boats. Eventually they were launched in 1918, could be described as renamed “destroyers.” The Outbreak of War | 47

German infantrymen operating a Maxim machine gun during World War I. Imperial War Museum

The fi rst destroyers were essentially During World War I British destroyer coastal craft, displacing only about 200 design changed radically, creating what tons. Their larger successors, however, became the postwar formula of the V and could accompany battle fl eets to sea. W destroyer classes. These ships had four There it soon became apparent that a 4-inch (101.6 mm) guns superimposed destroyer was, in eff ect, a superior sort fore and aft, a high forecastle forward for of torpedo boat because it was capable of greater sea-keeping ability, and two sets delivering its weapon against capital of twin (later triple) torpedo tubes amid- ships during or immediately after a fl eet ships. These vessels, displacing about engagement. By 1914, 800- or even 1,000- 1,200 tons and capable of 34 knots, made ton destroyers were quite common. all earlier British destroyers obsolete. 48 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

In focus: Submachine Gun

Submachine guns are lightweight, automatic small-arms weapons chambered for relatively low- energy pistol cartridges, meant to be fi red from the hip or shoulder. Most types utilize relatively simple blowback actions. Using cartridges of such calibres as .45 inch or 9 millimetre, they usually have box-type magazines that hold from 10 to 50 cartridges, or occasionally drums holding more rounds. A short-range weapon, the submachine gun is rarely eff ective at more than 200 yards (182.9 m). However, it fi res at rates as high as 650 or more rounds per minute and weighs 6 to 10 pounds (2.7 to 4.5 kg). Developed during World War I, the submachine gun came into great demand during World War II because of the need to increase the individual soldier’s fi repower at close quarters. The Germans developed the fi rst such weapons, modeling them to some extent after the Italian double-barreled Villar Perosa, or VP, a 1915 innovation that fi red so fast it emptied its magazine in two seconds. The Germans identifi ed their weapon, the fi rst true submachine gun, as the MP18, or the Bergmann Muskete. This weapon was fi rst issued in 1918, the last year of World War I. In Britain submachine guns came to be called machine carbines; in Germany, machine pistols; in the United States, submachine guns. An American type, the Thompson submachine gun, or tommy gun, was patented in 1920.

When Germany adopted unrestricted MaChINE GuNS aND submarine warfare in February 1917, sig- MODERN aRTILLERY nifi cant shipping losses soon forced the diversion of destroyers from fl eet duty The planning and conduct of war in to convoy protection and antisubmarine 1914 were crucially infl uenced by both warfare. Destroyers were not ideally suited the invention of new weapons and the to the escort role, as they had limited improvement of existing types since steaming range and their high-speed the Franco-German War of 1870–71. The design made them less seaworthy than chief developments of the intervening the merchant ships they were required to period had been the machine gun and the escort. While the Royal Navy therefore rapid-fi re fi eld artillery gun . The modern built several types of specialized convoy machine gun had been designed in the escort, the U.S. Navy found it easier to 1880s and ’90s, was a reliable belt-fed mass-produce its current destroyer design. gun capable of sustained rates of These vessels, equipped with hydro- extremely rapid fi re; it could fi re 600 phones and depth charges, as well as guns bullets per minute with a range of more and torpedoes, overcame the submarine than 1,000 yards (914.4 m). threat and had a large share in the safe The introduction of smokeless pow- convoy of 2 million U.S. troops to Europe der in the 1880s made it possible to without loss of a single soldier. convert the hand-cranked machine gun The Outbreak of War | 49 into a truly automatic weapon, primarily fire each round and to extract and eject because smokeless powder’s even com- the empty cartridge case. This automatic bustion made it possible to harness the operation may be accomplished by any of recoil so as to work the bolt, expel the three ways: blowback, recoil, and gas spent cartridge, and reload. Hiram operation. Stevens Maxim of the United States was In simple blowback operation, the the first inventor to incorporate this effect empty cartridge case is hurled backward in a weapon design. The Maxim machine by the explosion of the cartridge. Thereby gun (c. 1884) was quickly followed by the cartridge case pushes back the bolt, others—the Hotchkiss, Lewis, Browning, or breechblock, which in turn compresses Madsen, Mauser, and other guns. Some a spring and is returned to the firing posi- of these guns utilized another property of tion upon that spring’s recoil. The basic the even burning of smokeless powder: problem involved in blowback is to con- small amounts of the combustion gas trol the rearward motion of the bolt so were diverted through a port to drive a that the gun’s cycle of operation (i.e., piston or lever to open the breech as each loading, firing, and ejection) takes place round was fired, admitting the next round. correctly. In recoil operation, the bolt is As a result, during World War I the battle- locked to the barrel immediately after a field was from the outset dominated by round is fired. Both the bolt and barrel the new machine gun, generally belt-fed, recoil, but the barrel is then returned for- water-cooled, and of a calibre matching ward by its own spring while the bolt is that of the rifle. Except for synchronizing held to the rear by the locking mecha- with aircraft propellers, the machine gun nism until a fresh round has fallen into remained little changed throughout place in the opened breech. World War I and into World War II. Since More common than either of these two then, innovations such as sheet-metal methods is gas operation. In this method, bodies and air-cooled, quick-changing the energy required to operate the gun is barrels have made machine guns lighter obtained from the pressure of gas tapped and more reliable and quick-firing. off from the barrel after each cartridge However, they still operate under the same explodes. In a typical gas-operated principles as in the days of Hiram Maxim. machine gun, an opening or port is pro- Most machine guns employ gas gen- vided in the side of the barrel at a point erated by the explosion of the cartridge somewhere between the breech and the to drive the mechanism that introduces muzzle. When the bullet has passed this the new round in the chamber. The opening, some of the high-pressure gases machine gun thus requires no outside behind it are tapped off through the hole source of power, but instead uses the and operate a piston or some similar energy released by the burning propel- device for converting the pressure of the lant in a cartridge to feed, load, lock, and powder gases to a thrust. This thrust is 50 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power then used through a suitable mechanism to valuable time. The new improvements were provide the energy necessary for perform- epitomized in the French 75-millimetre ing the automatic functions required for (2.9 in) fi eld gun; it remained motionless sustained fi re: loading, fi ring, and ejection. during fi ring, and it was not necessary In the realm of fi eld artillery, the to readjust the aim in order to bring sus- period leading up to the war saw the intro- tained fi re on a target. When used in duction of improved breech-loading combination with trenches and barbed- mechanisms and brakes . Without a brake wire emplacements, machine guns and or recoil mechanism, a gun lurched out rapid-fi ring artillery gave a decided of position during fi ring and had to be re- advantage to the defense. These weap- aimed after each round, costing a soldier ons’ rapid and sustained fi repower could

British Mark I tank with antibomb roof and “tail,” 1916. Courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London; photographs, Camera Press The Outbreak of War | 51 decimate a frontal assault by either infan- was only at the beginning of the 20th try or cavalry. century that armoured fighting vehicles There was a considerable disparity in began to take practical form. By then the 1914 between the deadly effectiveness of basis for them had become available with modern armaments and the doctrinal the appearance of the traction engine teachings of some armies regarding the and the automobile. Thus, the first self- rules of warfare. The South African War propelled armoured vehicle was built in and the Russo-Japanese War had revealed 1900 in England when John Fowler & the futility of frontal infantry or cavalry Company armoured one of their steam attacks on prepared positions when traction engines for hauling supplies in unaccompanied by surprise, but few mili- the South African War (1899–1902). The tary leaders foresaw that the machine gun first motor vehicle used as a weapon car- and the rapid-firing field gun would force rier was a powered quadricycle on which armies into trenches in order to survive. F. R. Simms mounted a machine gun in Instead, war was looked upon by many 1899 in England. The inevitable next step leaders in 1914 as a contest of national was a vehicle that was both armed and wills, spirit, and courage. A prime example armoured. Such a vehicle was constructed of this attitude was the French Army, to the order of Vickers, Son and Maxim which was dominated by the doctrine of Ltd. and was exhibited in London in 1902. the offensive. French military doctrine Two years later a fully armoured car with called for headlong bayonet charges of a turret was built in France by the Société French infantrymen against the German Charron, Girardot et Voigt, and another rifles, machine guns, and artillery. Ger was built concurrently in Austria by the man military thinking, under the influence Austro-Daimler Company. of Alfred, Graf von Schlieffen, sought, To complete the evolution of the unlike the French, to avoid frontal assaults basic elements of the modern armoured but rather to achieve an early decision fighting vehicle, it remained only to adopt by deep flanking attacks. At the same tracks as an alternative to wheels. This time, the Germans sought to make use of became inevitable with the appearance reserve divisions alongside regular forma- of the tracked agricultural tractor, but tions from the outset of war. The Germans there was no incentive to use tracks on paid greater attention to training their the armoured vehicle for this until after officers in defensive tactics using machine the outbreak of World War I. Tracked guns, barbed wire, and fortifications. armoured vehicles were rejected by many European powers before the war began. Tanks One was proposed in France as early as 1903 but failed to arouse the interest of Although the concept of the armoured military authorities, as did a similar pro- vehicle dates back to ancient warfare, it posal made in England in 1908. Three 52 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power years later a design for a tracked armoured armoured box on a tractor chassis; 400 vehicle was rejected by the Austro- were ordered in February 1916. But French Hungarian and then by the German tanks were not used until April 1917, general staffs, and in 1912 the British War whereas British tanks were first sent into Office turned down yet another design. action on Sept. 15, 1916. Only 49 were The outbreak of World War I in 1914 available, and their success was limited, radically changed the situation. Its open- but on Nov. 20, 1917, 474 British tanks ing stage of mobile warfare accelerated were concentrated at the Battle of the development of armoured cars, num- Cambrai and achieved a spectacular bers of which were quickly improvised in breakthrough. These tanks, however, were Belgium, France, and Britain. The ensu- too slow and had too short an operating ing trench warfare, which ended the range to exploit the breakthrough. In usefulness of armoured cars, brought consequence, demand grew for a lighter, forth new proposals for tracked armoured faster type of tank, and in 1918 the 14-ton vehicles. Most of these resulted from (12.7 metric tons) Medium A appeared with attempts to make armoured cars capable a speed of 8 miles (12.9 km) per hour and a of moving off roads, over broken ground, range of 80 miles (128.7 km). After 1918, and through barbed wire. The first tracked however, the most widely used tank was armoured vehicle was improvised in July the French Renault F.T., a light 6-ton vehicle 1915, in Britain, by mounting an armoured designed for close infantry support. car body on a Killen-Strait tractor. The When World War I ended in 1918, vehicle was constructed by the Armoured France had produced 3,870 tanks, and Car Division of the Royal Naval Air Britain 2,636. Most French tanks survived Service, whose ideas, backed by the first into the postwar period; these were the lord of the Admiralty, Winston S. Renault F.T., much more serviceable than Churchill, resulted in the formation of an their heavier British counterparts. More Admiralty Landships Committee. A series over, the Renault F.T. fitted well with of experiments by this committee led in traditional ideas about the primacy of the September 1915 to the construction of the infantry, and the French army adopted first tank, called “Little Willie.” A second the doctrine that tanks were a mere auxil- model, called “Big Willie,” quickly fol- iary to infantry. France’s lead was followed lowed. Designed to cross wide trenches, in most other countries; the United States it was accepted by the British Army, and Italy both assigned tanks to infantry which ordered 100 tanks of this type support and copied the design of Renault (called Mark I) in February 1916. F.T. The U.S. copy was the M1917 light Simultaneously but independently, tank, and the Italian the Fiat 3000. The tanks were also developed in France. Like only other country to produce tanks by the very first British tank, the first French the end of the war was Germany, which tank (the Schneider) amounted to an built only about 20. The Outbreak of War | 53

Chemical weapons Aside from chlorine gas, other choking gas agents used included phosgene, Although the use of chemical warfare, in diphosgene, and chloropicrin. The blood the form of poisons and toxins—alone or agents included hydrogen cyanide, cyano- with conventional weapons—dates back gen, chlorine, and cyanogen bromide. many millenia, chemical weapons did not Arsenic-laced sneeze agents were also become true weapons of mass destruc- used, as were tear gases like ethyl bromoac- tion until they were introduced in their etate, bromoacetone, and bromobenzyl modern form in World War I. The German cyanide. army initiated modern chemical warfare Choking agents are delivered as gas by launching a chlorine attack at Ypres, clouds to the target area, where individu- Belg., on April 22, 1915, killing 5,000 als become casualties through inhalation French and Algerian troops and momen- of the vapour. The toxic agent triggers tarily breaching their lines of defense. the immune system, causing fluids to Germany’s use of gas and mustard was build up in the lungs, which can cause soon countered by similar tactics from death quickly through asphyxiation or the Allies. By war’s end, both sides had oxygen deficiency if the lungs are badly used massive quantities of chemical damaged. The effect of the chemical weapons, causing an estimated 1,300,000 agent, once an individual is exposed to casualties, including 91,000 fatalities. the vapour, may be immediate or can The Russian army suffered about 500,000 take up to three hours. A good protective of these casualties, and the British had gas mask is the best defense against 180,000 wounded or killed by chemical choking agents. arms. One-third of all U.S. casualties in Blister agents were also developed World War I were from mustard and other and deployed in World War I. The pri- chemical gases, roughly the ratio for all mary form of blister agent used in that participants combined. By the war’s end, conflict was sulfur mustard, popularly all the great powers involved had devel- known as mustard gas. Casualties were oped not only offensive chemical arms inflicted when personnel were attacked but also crude gas masks and protective and exposed to blister agents like sulfur overgarments to defend themselves mustard or lewisite. Delivered in liquid or against chemical weapon attacks. Alto vapour form, such weapons brutally gether, the warring states employed more burned the skin, eyes, windpipe, and than two dozen different chemical agents lungs. The physical results, depending during World War I, including mustard on level of exposure, might be immediate gas, which caused perhaps as many as 90 or might appear after several hours. percent of all chemical casualties (though Although lethal in high concentrations, very few of these casualties were fatal) blister agents seldom kill. Modern blister from that conflict. agents include sulfur mustard, nitrogen 54 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power mustard, phosgene oxime, phenyldichlo- Recognizing a national need to advance rarsine, and lewisite. Protection against aircraft technology independently, the blister agents requires an effective gas U.S. Congress created the National mask and protective overgarments. Advisory Committee for Aeronautics in Blood agents, such as hydrogen cya- March 1915. nide or cyanogen chloride, are designed French industry, assisted by rapidly to be delivered to the targeted area in expanding facilities in its ally Great the form of a vapour. When inhaled, these Britain, carried the production load of the agents prevent the transfer of oxygen to Allies during the war. When the United the cells, causing the body to asphyxiate. States entered the war in 1917, however, Such chemicals block the enzyme that is the French government requested that it necessary for aerobic metabolism, thereby furnish more than 4,000 planes for active depriving red blood cells of oxygen, service by early 1918. To meet the which has an immediate effect similar demands of the French and the U.S. to that of carbon monoxide. Cyanogen Army, the U.S. government and American inhibits the proper utilization of oxygen aircraft manufacturers entered into a within the blood cells, thereby “starving” patent-licensing agreement on July 24, and damaging the heart. The best 1917. Thus the Manufacturers Aircraft defense against blood agents is an Association was formed, which allowed effective gas mask. its members the use of others’ patents for a fixed royalty fee. Air power Because American aircraft manufacturers and suppliers had no experience in France and Germany were both aware of large-scale production, the U.S. govern- the military potential of aircraft, and thus ment enlisted automobile manufacturers began relatively large-scale manufactur- to mass-produce engines and airplanes. ing around 1909. By the outbreak of World For its own use, the U.S. Army ordered War I in 1914, France had built a total of the production of the two-seat British 2,000 airplanes, of which 1,500 were mili- De Havilland DH-4 bomber and the tary; Germany ranked second with about American-designed Curtiss JN-4 Jennie 1,000 military aircraft; and Britain a dis- trainer. By the end of the war 4,500 DH-4s tant third with 176. The United States lost had been built in the United States, 1,213 its lead in aeronautics as the combined of which were shipped to Europe. civil and military market for American Although U.S. production was too late to airplanes was insufficient to permit the matter militarily, by the 1918 Armistice industry to grow significantly; only 49 American factories were capable of pro- aircraft were produced in 1914. In addi- ducing 21,000 planes per year. Worldwide tion, patent rights on airplanes remained 210,000 aircraft were produced from 1914 a major difficulty for the industry. to 1918. In the United States, the greatest The Outbreak of War | 55 success of wartime production was the capability was largely off set by the highly very advanced 12- cylinder, water-cooled, explosive nature of the hydrogen gas that 400-horsepower Liberty engine, devel- gave the zeppelins their lifting power. oped for the DH-4. After losing three zeppelins in daylight raids over heavily defended areas in the Zeppelins and Airships fi rst month of the war, the army abandoned airship operations. The navy, on At the start of the war, the German armed the other hand, with its battle fl eet block- forces had 10 zeppelins and three smaller aded in port by the Royal Navy , mounted airships. However, this impressive off ensive a night bombing off ensive—the fi rst

A zeppelin flying over the harbour at Kiel, Ger., on maneuvers during World War I. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. 56 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power aerial strategic bombardment campaign that could operate as high as 24,000 feet in history. (7.3 km). Radios were carried aloft to The finest of the zeppelins was the permit aerial observers to spot and adjust LZ-70; this craft was 740 feet (225.5 m) long, artillery fire. At first, radios were equipped was able to fly above 16,000 feet (4.9 km), with transmitters only and then, as they and had a range of 7,500 miles (12,070 km). became lighter, with receivers for two- The LZ-70 was shot down late in the war, way communication. however, and large rigid (metal-framed) airships were never again employed as Fighters combat aircraft. Smaller, nonrigid airships were used throughout World War I by the The importance of aerial reconnaissance British for antisubmarine patrol, convoy and artillery spotting (particularly the escort, and coastal reconnaissance, achiev- latter) made it clear that the belligerent ing a remarkable record of protecting parties able to deny the enemy use of air- coastal convoys from German submarines. spaces above the battlefield would enjoy Unpowered, captive balloons also were enormous advantages. This realization led used extensively for observation and to the emergence of fighters as a distinct artillery spotting in World War I. category of aircraft. In the early days of the war, pilots and observers blazed away Reconnaissance Aircraft at enemy aircraft with pistols, rifles, and even shotguns, but to little effect. Machine At the outbreak of World War I, heavier- guns were the obvious artillery solution. than-air craft were used only for visual In 1913 the Vickers company in Britain reconnaissance. Their feeble engines had exhibited a two-seat biplane of pusher could carry little more than a pilot and, configuration, with the propeller behind in some cases, an observer aloft. They the engine. It was armed with a machine soon proved their worth in this mission, gun fired by an observer who sat ahead of however. RFC aviators provided recon- the pilot in a tublike crew compartment. A naissance that enabled the British and development of this machine, the Vickers French armies to counterattack in the F.B.5 Gunbus, entered service in early 1915 decisive Battle of the Marne on Sept. 6–12, as the first production aircraft designed 1914, turning back the invading Germans from the outset with air-to-air armament. just short of Paris. The French armed similarly configured More powerful engines and better Voisin pushers with machine guns (one aircraft designs soon made possible spe- had shot down a German aircraft as early cialized reconnaissance aircraft that as Oct. 5, 1914), but, burdened with the could fly at high altitudes to avoid inter- extra weight of observer and gun, such air- ception. The Germans, for example, had craft were slow and unmaneuverable. In Rumpler two-seaters in service by 1917 fact, their successes were mostly the result The Outbreak of War | 57

and Benz water-cooled, in- line engines, such as those that powered the streamlined Albatros D.I, D.II, and D.III series of fi ghters. These were faster than their Allied opponents and, most important, could carry two machine guns without sacrifi cing performance. The Albatros D.I pioneered a fi ghter confi guration that was to prevail into the 1930s. This confi guration featured a compact, single- seat, externally braced tractor biplane armed with two syn- Italian Caproni bomber of World War I. Courtesy of chronized machine guns John W.R. Taylor mounted ahead of the pilot on the upper fuselage decking of accidental encounters. Light, single- and aimed with a simple ring-and-bead seat aircraft of tractor confi guration, with sight. Albatros fi ghters gave British air- the propeller at the nose, had much better men a terrible drubbing above the Arras performance. However, eff orts to arm battlefi eld during the “Bloody April” of them with machine guns fi ring at an angle 1917, but a new generation of French and to avoid hitting the propeller produced British fi ghters with more powerful little success. engines soon tilted the balance toward Most Allied fi ghters at that time were the Allies. Prominent among these were powered by rotary radial engines, with the French Spad fi ghters and the British the cylinders arranged radially about the S.E.5, both powered by the Spanish- crankcase like the spokes of a wheel, designed and French-built Hispano-Suiza rotating around a stationary crankshaft. watercooled V-8. The British Sopwith These engines were relatively powerful Camel and new versions of the French in relation to their weight. However, their Nieuport, powered by improved rotary large frontal areas produced a great deal radial engines, were also in major use. of drag, and the gyroscopic forces Although Germany fell decisively induced by their whirling mass posed behind France and Britain in aircraft serious aircraft control problems. In mid- production in 1917, and thus lost the war 1916 Germany took the lead in fi ghter in the air, perhaps the defi nitive single- design on the basis of its superb Daimler seat fi ghter of World War I was the Fokker 58 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

D.VII of 1918. Typically powered by a 160- These raids prompted the British horsepower Mercedes engine, the D.VII Admiralty to commission the develop- was a fabric-covered biplane that diff ered ment of the fi rst specialized heavy night from others in that it had a sturdy fuselage bomber, the Handley Page H.P. O/100, structure of welded steel tubing. Armed which fl ew for the fi rst time in December with two machine guns, it had a top speed 1915. Meanwhile, other air forces began of 117 miles (188.3 km) per hour. Even more building and putting into service strate- powerful engines made two-seat fi ghters gic daytime bombers. Among the fi rst possible. The best of these was the British were French Voisins . The type L was used Bristol F.2b, powered by the 220-horse- in early 1915 to carry about 130 pounds power, water-cooled Rolls-Royce Falcon, a (59 kg) of small bombs that simply lay in V-12 engine that gave the Bristol a top the bottom of the cockpit until the time speed of almost 120 miles per hour (193 came for the observer to drop them over- km). The F.2b was armed with a synchro- board manually. Later models had more nized machine gun for the pilot and two powerful engines and were equipped fl exible machine guns for the observer. alternatively as attack aircraft, either carrying up to 660 pounds (299.4 kg) of Bombers bombs or having a 37-millimetre (2.9 in)

Since they had to carry heavy disposable loads over long distances in order to be eff ective, specialized bombers were not developed quickly. The fi rst bombing raids to achieve signifi cant success (and the fi rst to cross national boundaries) were mounted against the Zeppelin works at Friedrichshafen from Belgian bases by airmen of Britain’s Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) on Oct. 8 and Nov. 21, 1914. However, their spectacular success owed more to the Curtiss Model E ﬂ ying boat. American aeronautic pioneer Glenn Hammond Curtiss piloted his Model E ﬂ ying boat highly fl ammable nature of over Keuka Lake, near Hammondsport, N.Y., in 1912. the zeppelins themselves than Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (neg. no. LC-DIG- to the destructive power of the ggbain-11555) 20-pound (9 kg) bombs used. The Outbreak of War | 59 gun mounted in the nose. None flew faster categories of combat naval aircraft than 84 miles (135.2 km) per hour, so the emerged during the war: long-range over- Voisins had to operate mainly under cover water reconnaissance and antisubmarine of darkness in the last year of the war. aircraft operating from shore bases, Italy, too, was quick to appreciate the shorter-range floatplane reconnaissance value of bombing attacks on enemy tar- and fighter aircraft, and ship-borne air- gets. Its big three-engined, twin-tailboom craft. Also in extensive British use were Capronis were among the finest bombers the long-range flying boats (so-called of World War I. Even larger were the Rus because their fuselages were shaped like sian Ilya Muromets bombers of the tsar’s the hull of a boat). These pioneered the Squadron of Flying Ships. Designed by technique of searching for submarines Igor Sikorsky, now remembered mainly with methodical, mathematically devel- as a helicopter pioneer, these biplanes oped search patterns. The German navy spanned about 100 feet (30. 5 m) and were made extensive use of reconnaissance descended from his “Russky Vityaz” of and fighter floatplanes from Belgian May 1913, the world’s first successful four- coastal bases to counter Allied air engined airplane. About 80 were built, and patrols and coastal naval operations. they made 400 raids on German targets Some of these, notably Hansa- with the loss of only one plane. The best- Brandenburg machines designed by known German strategic bombers of Ernst Heinkel, rivaled their land-based World War I were twin-engined Gotha equivalents in performance. “pusher” biplanes, which made several The most efficient of the long-range daylight raids on London in formation in coastal-based airplanes were large, twin- the summer of 1917 before reverting to engined flying boats designed by Glenn night operations. The German air force Curtiss and others. Despite their bulk, also operated a family of giant four- engined these aircraft were sufficiently fast and metal bombers known as Riesenflugzeug, maneuverable to engage enemy zeppelins or R-planes. Typical of these was the and aircraft in combat. Curtiss’ flying boats Staaken R.VI number R.25, which was were the only aircraft of U.S. design to see powered by four 260-horsepower Mercedes frontline combat service in World War I. engines. This had a takeoff weight of Carrier-based air power also advanced 25,269 pounds (11,462 kg), which included rapidly. In early 1916 the first landplanes a crew of seven and a bomb load of up to (British Sopwith Pups) were flown off the 4,000 pounds (1,814 kg). 200-foot (61 m) decks of primitive carriers that had been converted from merchant Naval Aviation ships. On Aug. 2, 1917, a pilot landed a Pup on the takeoff deck of HMS Furious while Significant progress was made in naval the ship was under way. Thus, the concept flying in World War I. Three distinct of the true aircraft carrier had been born. 60 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Britain went on to develop more for- RFC School of Special Flying at Gosport, midable naval aircraft. In October 1918, a Eng., Major Robert Smith-Barry intro- squadron of Sopwith Cuckoos, each able duced a curriculum based on a balanced to carry an 18-inch (457 mm) torpedo, was combination of academic classroom embarked on HMS Argus. The war ended training and dual flight instruction. before the squadron could go into action, Philosophically, Smith-Barry’s system but the RNAS had already used torpedoes was based not on avoiding potentially dropped from Short seaplanes to sink dangerous maneuvers, as had been the enemy ships in the Mediterranean. The case theretofore. Rather, Smith-Barry’s Cuckoo, with its modest top speed of 103 curriculum exposed the student to them miles (165.8 km) per hour and endurance in a controlled manner so that he could of four hours, heralded the eventual learn to recover from them, thereby demise of the battleship in the face of air- gaining confidence and skill. Techno power dominance at sea. logically, it was based on the Avro 504J, a specialized training aircraft with dual Air Transport and Training controls, good handling characteristics, and adequate power. The training aircraft Over the four-year course of the war, also featured in-flight communication techniques in military air transport between instructor and student by showed little development. Aircraft were means of an acoustic system of soft rub- used on occasion to drop supplies to cut- ber tubing—the so-called Gosport tube. off or besieged forces, but the methods For the first time, new military pilots flew were extremely primitive by today’s into action as masters of their airplanes. standards: bags of food, medical supplies, The Gosport system of training was even- or munitions were dropped from bomb tually adopted at training schools racks or simply heaved over the side. throughout the world, remaining the Conversely, flight training made dominant method of civil and military enormous strides during the war. At the flight instruction into the jet age. ChaPTER 3

The Initial Stages of the War

INITIaL STRaTEGIES

The Schlieffen Plan

Years before 1914, successive chiefs of the German general staff foresaw that Germany might have to fi ght a war on two fronts at the same time. Russia, in the east, and France, in the west, whose combined strength was numerically superior to the Central Powers’, indeed could potentially pose simultaneous threats to Germany. The elder Helmuth von Moltke, chief of the German general staff from 1858 to 1888, decided that Germany should stay at fi rst on the defensive in the west and deal a crippling blow to Russia’s advanced forces before turning to counterattack the French advance. His immediate successor, Alfred von Waldersee , also believed in staying on the defensive in the west. Alfred, Graf von Schlieff en , who served as chief of the German general staff from 1891 to 1905, took a contrary view, and the plan he developed was to guide Germany’s initial wartime strategy. Schlieff en realized that on the outbreak of war, Russia would need six full weeks to mobilize and assemble its vast armies. Russia’s immense countryside and population, sparse rail network, and ineffi - cient government bureaucracy would make immediate mobilization impossible. Taking advantage of this fact, Schlieff en planned to initially adopt a purely defensive posture on the Eastern Front with a minimal number of troops 62 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

A portrait of Gen. Joseph Jo re, who served as commander-in-chief of the French Army from 1914 to 1916. Hulton Archive/Getty Images The Initial Stages of the War | 63 facing Russia’s slowly gathering armies. France into a humiliating surrender. The Germany would instead concentrate large wheeling movement that the plan almost all of its troops in the west against envisaged required correspondingly France and would seek to bypass France’s large forces for its execution, as it also frontier fortifications by an offensive required sustaining the numerical through neutral Belgium to the north. strength of the long-stretched marching This offensive would sweep westward line and needed to leave adequate detach- and then southward through the heart of ments on guard over the Belgian northern France, capturing the capital fortresses that had been bypassed. and knocking that country out of the war Accordingly, Schlieffen allocated nearly within a few weeks. Having gained secu- seven-eighths of Germany’s available rity in the west, Germany would then shift troop strength to the execution of the its troops to the east and destroy the wheeling movement by the right and cen- Russian menace with a similar concen- tre wings, leaving only one-eighth to face tration of forces. a possible French offensive on Germany’s By the time of his retirement in 1905, western frontier. Thus, the maximum of Schlieffen had elaborated a plan for a strength was allocated to the wheel’s edge great wheeling movement of the right to the right. Schlieffen’s plan was observed (northern) wing of the German armies by the younger Helmuth von Moltke, who not only through central Belgium but became chief of the general staff in 1906. also, in order to bypass the Belgian for- Moltke was still in office when war broke tresses of Liège and Namur in the Meuse out in 1914. Valley, through the southernmost part of The Netherlands. With their right wing Eastern Front Strategy entering France near Lille, the Germans would continue to wheel westward until The strategy of the Central Powers’ Eastern they were near the English Channel. Front, on the other hand, was to occupy Then, they would turn southward so as to Russia with a small number of troops sever the French armies’ line of retreat immediately, at the start of the war. Russian from France’s eastern frontier to the south. Poland, the westernmost part of the Finally, the outermost arc of the wheel Russian Empire, was a thick tongue of would sweep southward west of Paris, in land enclosed to the north by East Prussia, order to avoid exposing the German right to the west by German Poland (Poznania) flank to a counterstroke launched from and by Silesia, and to the south by Austrian the city’s outskirts. If the Schlieffen Plan Poland (Galicia). It was thus obviously succeeded, Germany’s armies would exposed to a two-pronged invasion by the simultaneously encircle the French Army Central Powers. However, the Germans, from the north, overrun all of northeast- apart from their grand strategy of crush- ern France, and capture Paris, thus forcing ing France before attempting anything 64 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power against Russia, took note of the poverty of French high command had subscribed to Russian Poland’s transportation network, the strategy of an initial defensive against and so were disinclined to overrun that German attack. The defensive, however, vulnerable area prematurely. Austria- would be followed by a counterstroke Hungary, however, whose frontier with against the expected invasion: a great Russia lay much farther east than system of fortresses was created on the Germany’s and who was moreover afraid frontier, but gaps were left in order to “can- of disaffection among the Slav minorities, alize” the German attack. France’s alliance urged some immediate action to forestall a with Russia and its entente with Great Russian offensive. Moltke therefore agreed Britain, however, encouraged a reversal of to the Austrian general staff’s suggestion plan. After the turn of the century, a new for a northeastward thrust by the Austrian school of military thinkers began to argue Army into Russian Poland—the more read- for an offensive strategy. The advocates of ily because it would occupy the Russians the offensiveà l’outrance (“to the utmost”) during the crisis in France. gained control of the French military The Russians, for their part, would have machine, and in 1911 a spokesman of this preferred to concentrate their immediately school, General J.-J.-C. Joffre, was desig- available forces against Austria, and to nated chief of the general staff. He leave Germany undisturbed until their sponsored the notorious Plan XVII, with mobilization should have been completed. which France went to war in 1914. The French were anxious to relieve the However, Plan XVII gravely under- German pressure against themselves, how- estimated the strength that the Germans ever. Thus, they persuaded the Russians would deploy against France. Accepting to undertake an offensive involving two the possibility that the Germans might armies against the Germans in East Prussia employ their reserve troops along with simultaneously with one involving four regular troops at the outset, Plan XVII armies against the Austrians in Galicia. estimated the strength of the German The Russian Army, whose proverbial slow- Army in the west at a possible maximum ness and unwieldy organization dictated a of 68 infantry divisions. The Germans cautious strategy, undertook an extra offen- actually deployed the equivalent of 83 sive against East Prussia that only an army half divisions, counting Landwehr of high mobility and tight organization (reserve troops) and Ersatz (low-grade could have hoped to execute successfully. substitute troops) divisions. But French military opinion crucially ignored or The Strategy of the doubted this possibility. During the war’s Western Allies critical opening days, when the rival armies were concentrating and moving For some 30 years after 1870, considering forward, the French Intelligence counted the likelihood of another German war, the only Germany’s regular divisions in its The Initial Stages of the War | 65 estimates of the enemy strength. This was defenses, for the smooth working of their a serious miscalculation. Plan XVII also plan for the invasion of France. German miscalculated the direction and scope of troops crossed the frontier into Belgium the coming onslaught. Although it fore- on the morning of August 4, 1914. Thanks saw an invasion through Belgium, it to the resolution of a middle-aged staff assumed that the Germans would take the officer, Erich Ludendorff, a German bri- route through the Ardennes, thereby expos- gade occupied the town of Liège itself in ing their communications to attack. Basing the night of August 5–6 and the citadel itself on the idea of an immediate and on August 7. However, the surrounding general offensive, instead of concentrating forts held out stubbornly until the on maintaining a strong defense, Plan XVII Germans brought their heavy howitzers called for a French thrust toward the Saar into action against them on August 12. into Lorraine by the 1st and 2nd armies. These 420-millimetre (16.5 in) siege guns At the same time, on the French left (to the proved too formidable for the forts, which north), the 3rd and 5th armies, facing Metz one by one succumbed. The vanguard of and the Ardennes, respectively, stood ready the German invasion was already press- either to launch an offensive between Metz ing the Belgian field army between the and Thionville or to strike from the north Gete River and Brussels, when the last of at the flank of any German drive through the Liège forts fell on August 16. The Bel the Ardennes. When war broke out, it was gians then withdrew northward to the taken for granted that the small British entrenched camp of Antwerp. On August Expeditionary Force (BEF) under Sir John 20 the German 1st Army entered Brussels French should be used as an adjunct to while the 2nd Army appeared before France’s forces, more or less as the French Namur, the one remaining fortress bar- might see fit. The failure of the plan was ring the Meuse route into France. that the French remained oblivious to the The initial clashes between the French gigantic German offensive that was being and German armies along the Franco- aimed at their left (northern) wing. German and Franco-Belgian frontiers are collectively known as the Battle of the The war in the Frontiers. This group of engagements, West begins which lasted from August 14 until the beginning of the First Battle of the Marne The German Invasion on September 6, was to be the largest battle of the war and was perhaps the As the war began, the Germans first had largest battle in human history up to that to reduce the ring fortress of Liège, which time, given the fact that a total of more commanded the route prescribed for their than 2,000,000 troops were involved. 1st and 2nd armies and which was the The planned French thrust into foremost stronghold of the Belgian Lorraine, totaling 19 divisions, started on 66 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

A crowd watches in the rain as German troops march into Brussels, the Belgian capital, 1914. Henry Guttmann/Hulton Archive/Getty Images

August 14 but was shattered by the Germans’ left, or southern wing, in German 6th and 7th armies in the Battle Lorraine were proving unwilling to forfeit of Morhange-Sarrebourg on August their opportunity for personal glory. 20–22. Yet, this abortive French off ensive Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria ordered had an indirect eff ect on the German his 6th Army to counterattack on Aug- plan; when the French attack in Lorraine ust 20 instead of continuing to fall back developed, Moltke was tempted momen- before the French advance as planned, and tarily to postpone the right-wing sweep Crown Prince William of Germany ordered and instead to seek a victory in Lorraine. his 5th Army to do the same. The strate- This fl eeting impulse led him to divert to gic result of these unplanned German Lorraine the six newly formed Ersatz divi- off ensives was merely to throw the French sions that had been intended to increase back onto a fortifi ed barrier that both the weight of his right wing. This was the restored and augmented their power of fi rst of several impromptu decisions by resistance. Thus, the French were soon Moltke that were to fatally impair the exe- afterward enabled to dispatch troops to cution of the Schlieff en Plan. reinforce their left fl ank—a redistribution Meanwhile, the German imperial of strength that was to have far-reaching princes who commanded armies on the results in the decisive Battle of the Marne. The Initial Stages of the War | 67

While this seesaw campaign in right-hand claw of the French pincer (23 Lorraine was taking place, more decisive divisions) collided with the German 5th events were occurring to the northwest. and 4th armies (20 divisions) in the The German attack on Liège had awak- Ardennes and was thrown back, the left- ened Joff re to the reality of a German hand claw (13 French and 4 British advance through Belgium, but not to its divisions) found itself nearly trapped strength or to the wideness of its sweep. between the German 1st and 2nd armies, In preparing a counterattack against the with a total of 30 divisions, on the one German advance through Belgium, Joff re hand, and the 3rd, on the other. As the envisaged a pincer movement, with the French 5th Army, under General Charles French 3rd and 4th armies on the right Lanrezac , was checked in its off ensive and the 5th, supported by the BEF, on the south of the Sambre River by a German left, to trap the Germans in the Meuse– attack on August 21, the British, who Ardennes area south of Liège. The reached Mons on August 22, at fi rst fundamental fl aw in this new French plan agreed to stand there to cover Lanrezac’s was that the Germans had deployed about left. However, on August 23 news of the 50 percent more troops than the French fall of Namur and of the German 3rd had estimated, and for a vaster envelop- Army’s presence near Dinant induced ing movement. Consequently, while the Lanrezac to wisely order a general retreat.

Adolf Hitler (front left) poses for a picture with a group of fellow German soldiers during World War I, 1914. Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images 68 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

In focus: Big Bertha

Several 420-millimetre (16.5 in) howitzers, known as Big Berthas, were used by advancing German forces to batter the Belgian forts at Liège and Namur in August 1914, at the start of World War I. The guns were designed and built by Krupp, Germany’s largest armaments manufacturing fi rm, in the years before the war for the express purpose of overcoming modern forts built of reinforced concrete. The Big Berthas were the largest and most powerful artillery produced to that time. Each gun propelled a shell weighing 2,100 pounds (952.5 kg) for a distance of almost 9 miles (14.5 km). The shells were equipped with delayed-action fuses to explode after having penetrated a fortifi ed target. The gun and its carriage, when fully assembled, weighed about 75 tons and was operated and serviced by a crew of about 280 men. For transport to the battlefi eld, the howitzer was disassembled into four sections—gun barrel, mounting, carriage, and ground platform—and loaded onto railway cars, which carried them to Belgium. After they were offl oaded from the train, the sections were hauled by tractor-driven wagons to the fi ring sites and reassembled. Big Berthas and Austrian Skoda 305-millimetre (12 in) howitzers were brought into action against the complex of Belgian forts around Liège on Aug. 12, 1914. They destroyed most of the forts in the next four days, thereby enabling the German army to sweep westward through southern Belgium on its way to invade northern France. Farther to the west, the forts around the city of Namur were similarly battered into surrender by Big Berthas and Skoda guns on August 21–25. According to some sources, the nickname for the guns was bestowed by the Krupps in honour of Frau Bertha von Bohlen, head of the family. In popular usage, the name Big Bertha was also applied to the extreme long-range cannons with which the Germans shelled Paris in 1918. However, these guns are more properly known as Paris Guns.

Finally, on August 24, the British began and at the same time to withdraw some their retreat from Mons, just in time to strength from the right wing so as to be escape envelopment by the German 1st able to station a newly created 6th Army Army’s westward march around their on the extreme left, north of Paris. This unprotected left fl ank. plan might, in turn, have collapsed if the At last Joff re realized the truth and Germans had not themselves departed the utter collapse of the inadequate Plan from Schlieff en’s original plan. Due to a XVII. However, resolution was Joff re’s combination of Moltke’s indecisiveness, greatest asset, and with imperturbable poor communications between his head- coolness he formed a new plan out of the quarters and the fi eld army commanders wreckage. Joff re decided to swing the of the German right wing, and Moltke’s Allied centre and left back southwest- resulting confusion about the developing ward from the Belgian frontier to a line tactical situation, the Schieff en Plan in its pivoted on the French fortress of Verdun, orthodox form was all but discarded. In The Initial Stages of the War | 69 the first place, the German right wing was the vicinity of Paris. But such an Allied weakened by the subtraction of 11 divi- countermove had already begun before sions; 4 were detached to watch Antwerp the new German plan could be put into and to invest French fortresses near the effect, to German misfortune. Belgian frontier, instead of using reserve and Ersatz troops for this as earlier The First Battle intended, and 7 more regular divisions of the Marne were transferred to check the Russian advance into East Prussia. In the second Already on September 3, 1914, General J.- place, Alexander von Kluck, in command S. Gallieni, the military governor of Paris, of the 1st Army, did, in fact, wheel inward had guessed the significance of the Ger north of Paris rather than southwest of man 1st Army’s swing inward to the Marne the city. east of Paris. On September 4, Joffre, who Kluck’s change of direction meant that had been convinced by Gallieni’s argu- the original wide sweep around the far ments, decisively ordered his whole left (western) side of Paris would inevitably wing to turn about from their retreat and be abandoned. Now the flank of this to begin a general offensive against the wheeling German line would pass the Germans’ exposed right flank on Sept near side of Paris and across the face of ember 6. The French 6th Army, under the Paris defenses into the valley of the M.-J. Maunoury, had been forewarned by Marne River. The premature inward Gallieni and actually begun attacking on wheel of Kluck’s 1st Army before Paris September 5. The pressure of these attacks had been reached thus exposed the Ger caused Kluck finally to engage the whole man extreme right wing to a flank attack 1st Army in support of his right flank and a possible counter-envelopment. On when he was still no farther up the Marne September 4, Moltke decided to abandon Valley than Meaux, with nothing but a the original Schlieffen Plan and substi- cavalry screen stretched across the 30 tuted a new one. The German 4th and 5th miles (48.3 km) between him and Karl von armies should drive southeastward from Bülow’s 2nd Army (at Montmirail). While the Ardennes into French Lorraine west the French 5th Army was turning to attack of Verdun and then converge with the Bülow, the BEF (between the 5th and the southwestward advance of the 6th and 6th armies) was still continuing its retreat 7th armies from Alsace against the Toul– for another day. However, on September 9 Épinal line of fortifications, so as to Bülow learned that the British too had envelop the whole French right wing. turned and were advancing into the gap Meanwhile, the 1st and 2nd armies, in between him and Kluck. He therefore the Marne Valley, should stand guard ordered the 2nd Army to retreat, thus against any French countermove from obliging Kluck to do likewise with the 1st. 70 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Two German soldiers stand guard in the snow as fellow soldiers sleep in their trench near the Aisne River valley on the Western Front, 1914. Hulton Archive/Getty Images

The counterattack of the French 5th and points within the circle formed by the 6th armies and the BEF developed into a front, the German troops had found their general counterattack by the entire left advance hampered by demolished bridges and centre of the French Army. This and destroyed rail lines. Their food and counter attack is known as the First Battle ammunition supplies were consequently of the Marne. By September 11 the Ger man restricted, and the troops also had to retreat extended to all the German armies. make their advance by foot. Moreover, the There were several reasons for this Germans had underestimated the resil- extraordinary turn of events. Chief among ient spirit of the French troops, who had them was the utter exhaustion of the maintained courage, morale, and confi - German soldiery of the right wing, some dence in their commanders. This fact was of whom had marched more than 150 strikingly illustrated by the compara- miles (241.4 km) under conditions of fre- tively small number of prisoners taken by quent battle. Their fatigue was ultimately the Germans in the course of what was a by-product of the Schlieff en Plan itself, undeniably a precipitous French retreat. for while the retreating French had been Meanwhile, the assault by the German able to move troops by rail to various 6th and 7th armies on the defenses of the The Initial Stages of the War | 71

In focus: Trench Warfare

With the development of long-range artillery, trench warfare was crucial for the survival of troops meeting at relatively close range on World War I’s Western Front. In trench warfare opposing armed forces attack, counterattack, and defend from relatively permanent systems of trenches dug into the ground. The opposing systems of trenches are usually close to one another. Trench warfare is resorted to when the superior fi repower of the defense compels the opposing forces to “dig in” so extensively as to sacrifi ce their mobility in order to gain protection. A trench system may begin simply as a collection of foxholes hastily dug by troops using their entrenching tools. These holes may subsequently be deepened so that a soldier can safely stand up in one of them, and individual foxholes may be connected to each other by shallow crawl trenches. From this beginning, a system of more permanent trenches may be constructed. In making a trench, soil from the excavation is used to create raised parapets running both in front of and behind the trench. Within the trench are fi ring positions along a raised forward step called a fi re step, and duckboards are placed on the often muddy bottom of the trench to provide secure footing. The tactical ancestor of modern trench warfare was the system of progressively extended trenches developed by the French military engineer Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban for the attack of fortresses in the 17th century. Trenches remained merely a part of siegecraft until the increasing fi repower of small arms and cannon compelled both sides to make use of trenches in the American Civil War (1861–65). The trench lines of the Petersburg–Richmond theatre of operations in the fi nal months of that war were the foremost example of trench warfare in the 19th century. Trench warfare reached its highest development on the Western Front during World War I, when armies of millions of men faced each other in a line of trenches extending from the Belgian coast through northeastern France to Switzerland. These trenches arose within the fi rst few months of the war’s outbreak, after the great off ensives launched by Germany and France had shattered against the deadly, withering fi re of the machine gun and the rapid-fi ring artillery piece. The sheer quantity of bullets and shells fl ying through the air in the battle conditions of that war compelled soldiers to burrow into the soil to obtain shelter and survive. The typical trench system in World War I consisted of a series of two, three, four, or more trench lines running parallel to each other and being at least 1 mile (1.6 km) in depth. Each trench was dug in a type of zigzag so that no enemy, standing at one end, could fi re for more than a few yards down its length. Each of the main lines of trenches was connected to each other and to the rear by a series of communications trenches that were dug roughly perpendicular to them. Food, ammunition, fresh troops, mail, and orders from commanding offi cers were delivered through these trenches. The intricate network of trenches contained command posts, forward supply dumps, fi rst-aid stations, kitchens, and latrines. Most important, trench networks had machine-gun emplacements to defend against an assault, and dugouts deep enough to shelter large numbers of defending troops during an enemy bombardment. The first, or front, line of trenches was known as the outpost line and was thinly held by scattered machine gunners distributed behind dense entanglements of barbed wire. The main line 72 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power of resistance was a parallel series of two, three, or four lines of trenches containing the bulk of the defending troops. The defenders’ artillery was posted to the rear of the main line of trenches. Each main line of trenches was fronted by fi elds of barbed wire intended to slow down and entangle attacking infantry. As World War I progressed, both sides, but particularly the Germans, developed trench systems of progressively greater depth and strength in order to ensure that the enemy could not achieve a breakthrough at any particular point. The Germans evolved an extremely elaborate defense system using pillboxes, or concrete shelters, for machine guns. Behind the pillboxes were more lines of barbed wire and more trenches and dugouts reinforced with concrete to withstand artillery bombardment. Behind these defenses were still more lines of trenches that were eff ectively out of range of the enemy’s artillery fi re. By 1918, the Germans had constructed some trench systems that had a depth of 14 miles (22.5 km). Throughout most of World War I, the opposing armies on the Western Front tried to break through the enemy’s trench system by mounting infantry assaults preceded by intense artillery bombardments of the defending trenches. These attacks usually failed for several reasons: partly because the preliminary bombardment alerted the defenders to the imminence of an attack, thus allowing them time to bring up reserves for a counterattack, and because the bombardments themselves turned the “no-man’s-land” between the opposing sides into rough, shell-pocked terrain that slowed down the attacking infantry. The crucial elements in attacking a trench system, surprise and overwhelming numbers of infantry, were thus almost impossible to attain. The Allies’ increased use of the tank in 1918 marked the beginning of the end of trench warfare, however, since the tank was invulnerable to the machine gun and rifl e fi re that were the trenches’ ultimate defense.

French eastern frontier had already had the manpower readily available, the proved a predictably expensive failure, only alternative was to try to overlap and and the German attempt at a partial envelop the other’s fl ank, in this case the envelopment pivoted on Verdun was one on the side pointing toward the North abandoned. The German right wing Sea and the English Channel. Thus began withdrew northward from the Marne and the “Race to the Sea,” in which the devel- made a fi rm stand along the Lower Aisne oping trench networks of both sides were River and the Chemin des Dames ridge. quickly extended northwestward until Along the Aisne, the preponderant they reached the Atlantic at a point just power of the defense over the off ense was inside coastal Belgium, west of Ostend. reemphasized as the Germans repelled The First Battle of the Marne suc- successive Allied attacks from the shelter ceeded in pushing the Germans back for of trenches. The First Battle of the Aisne a distance of 40 to 50 miles (64.4 to 80.5 marked the real beginning of trench war- km), and thus saved the capital city of fare on the Western Front. Both sides Paris from capture. In this respect, it was were in the process of discovering that, in a great strategic victory, since it enabled lieu of frontal assaults for which neither the French to renew their confi dence and The Initial Stages of the War | 73 to continue the war. But the great German from Ypres on October 19, the German offensive, though unsuccessful in its object thrust began the next day. Though the of knocking France out of the war, had Belgians of the Yser had been under enabled the Germans to capture a large increasing pressure for two days already, portion of northeastern France. The loss both Sir John French and Ferdinand Foch, of this heavily industrialized region, which Joffre’s deputy in the north, were slow to contained much of the country’s coal, appreciate what was happening to their iron, and steel production, crucial to war- “offensive.” In the night of October 29–30, time manufacturing, was a serious blow to the Belgians had to open the sluices on the continuation of the French war effort. the Yser River to save themselves by The Belgian Army, meanwhile, had flooding the Germans’ path down the fallen back to the fortress city of Antwerp, coast. The Battle of Ypres had its worst which ended up behind the German lines. crises on October 31 and November 11 The Germans began a heavy bombard- and did not die down into trench warfare ment of Antwerp on September 28, and until November 22. Antwerp surrendered to the Germans on By the end of 1914, the casualties the October 10. French had so far sustained in the war After the failure of his first two totaled about 380,000 killed and 600,000 attempts to turn the Germans’ western wounded. The Germans had lost only a flank (one on the Somme, the other near slightly smaller number. With the repulse Arras), Joffre obstinately decided to try of the German attempt to break through again yet farther north with the BEF— at the Battle of Ypres, the strained and which in any case was being moved exhausted armies of both sides settled northward from the Aisne. The BEF, down into trench warfare. The trench accordingly, was deployed between La barrier was consolidated from the Swiss Bassée and Ypres, while on the left the frontier to the Atlantic; the power of mod- Belgians—who had wisely declined to ern defense had triumphed over the attack, participate in the projected attack— and stalemate ensued. The military his- continued the front along the Yser down tory of the Western Front during the next to the Channel. Erich von Falkenhayn, three years was to be a story of the Allies’ however, who on September 14 had suc- attempts to break this deadlock. ceeded Moltke as chief of the German general staff, had foreseen what was Other fronts coming and had prepared a counterplan. One of his armies, transferred from The Eastern Front and the Lorraine, was to check the expected offen- Battle of Tannenberg sive, while another was to sweep down the coast and crush the attackers’ left On the Eastern Front, greater distances and flank. The British attack was launched quite considerable differences between 74 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

In focus: Battle of verdun

The Battle of Verdun, fought Feb. 21–July, 1916, was one of the most devastating engagements of World War I, in which the French repulsed a major German off ensive. German General Erich von Falkenhayn believed in a strategy of attrition, and argued that Germany should bleed France to death by choosing a point of attack “for the retention of which the French would be compelled to throw in every man they have.” The fortress of Verdun and its surrounding fortifi cations along the Meuse River was the point selected. The Germans amassed huge amounts of artillery and troops for the attack, which the French knew was impending but believed would occur elsewhere. Thus, Verdun was unprepared when one of the heaviest bombardments of the war rained down on the area. From the off ensive’s start on February 21, the Germans advanced with little opposition for four days until they reached Fort Douaumont, which they took. French reinforcements arrived just in time and with them General Henri Pétain, who took command and managed to slow the German advance by several French counterattacks. In March and April the hills and ridges west of the Meuse and north of Verdun were bombarded, attacked, counterattacked, taken, and retaken. In June, the Germans again assaulted the heights along the Meuse but were unable to maintain an advantage. By July they realized that their plan to seize Verdun and undermine France’s will to resist had failed with a terrible loss of men—about 400,000 French casualties and nearly as many German—and material for both sides. From October until the end of the year, the French took the off ensive and regained the forts and territory they had lost earlier.

the equipment and quality of the oppos- Army under A. V. Samsonov ) were to ing armies ensured a fl uidity of the front converge on the German 8th Army in that was lacking in the west. Trench lines East Prussia from the east and the south, might form, but to break them was not respectively. Rennenkampf’s left fl ank diffi cult, particularly for the German army. would be separated by 50 miles (80.5 km) Then, mobile operations of the old style from Samsonov’s right fl ank. The Russian could be undertaken. force had a two-to-one superiority in Urged by the French to take off ensive numbers over the Germans. action against the Germans, the Russian Max von Prittwitz und Gaff ron , com- commander in chief, Grand Duke Nicholas , mander of the 8th Army, with his took it loyally but prematurely, before the headquarters at Neidenburg (Nidzica), cumbrous Russian war machine was had seven divisions and one cavalry ready, by launching a pincer movement division on his eastern front but only the against East Prussia. Under the higher three divisions of Friedrich von Scholtz’s control of General Ya. G. Zhilinsky , two XX Corps on his southern. He was there- armies (the 1st, or Vilna, Army under P. K. fore dismayed to learn, on August 20, Rennenkampf and the 2nd, or Warsaw, when the bulk of his forces had been The Initial Stages of the War | 75

Russian prisoners, having been captured by German forces at the Battle of Tannenburg, ride the German strategic railway across a bridge, 1914. Popperfoto/Getty Images

repulsed at Gumbinnen (August 19–20) northward to Mühlhausen (Młynary), was by Rennenkampf’s attack from the east, surprised on August 22 by a telegram that Samsonov’s 13 divisions had crossed announcing that General Paul von the southern frontier of East Prussia Hindenburg , with Ludendorff as his chief and were thus threatening his rear. He of staff , was coming to supersede him in initially considered a general retreat. command. Arriving the next day, Ludendorff However, his staff objected to this, and readily confi rmed Hoff mann’s dispositions thus he approved their counterproposal for the blow at Samsonov’s left. of an attack on Samsonov’s left fl ank. For Meanwhile, Zhilinsky was not only this purpose, three divisions were to be giving Rennenkampf time to reorganize switched in haste by rail from the after Gumbinnen but even instructing Gumbinnen front to reinforce Scholtz him to invest Königsberg instead of (the rest of the Gumbinnen troops could pressing on to the west. When the make their retreat by road). The principal Germans on August 25 learned from an exponent of this counterproposal was intercepted uncoded Russian wireless Lieutenant Colonel Max Hoff mann . message (the Russians habitually trans- Prittwitz, having moved his headquarters mitted combat directives “in clear,” not in 76 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power code) that Rennenkampf was in no hurry ordered General Hermann von François, to advance, Ludendorff saw a new oppor- with the I Corps on Scholtz’s right, to tunity. Developing the plan put forward attack Samsonov’s left wing near Usdau by Hoffmann, Ludendorff concentrated (Uzdowo). There, on August 27, German about six divisions against Samsonov’s artillery bombardments threw the hungry left wing. This force, inferior in strength, and weary Russians into precipitate could not have been decisive. Ludendorff flight. François started to pursue them then took the calculated risk of with- toward Neidenburg, in the rear of the drawing the rest of the German troops, Russian centre, and then made a momen- except for a cavalry screen, from their tary diversion southward, to check a confrontation with Rennenkampf and Russian counterattack from Soldau rushing them southwestward against (Działdowo). Two of the Russian 2nd Samsonov’s right wing. Thus, August von Army’s six army corps managed to escape Mackensen’s XVII Corps was taken from southeastward at this point, and François near Gumbinnen and moved southward then resumed his pursuit to the east. By to duplicate the planned German attack nightfall on August 29, his troops were on Samsonov’s left with an attack on his in control of the road leading from right, thus completely enveloping the Neidenburg eastward to Willenberg Russian 2nd Army. This daring move was (Wielbark). The Russian centre, amount- made possible by the notable absence of ing to three army corps, was now caught communication between the two Rus in the maze of forest between Allenstein sian field commanders, whom Hoffmann and the frontier of Russian Poland. It had knew to personally dislike each other. no line of retreat, was surrounded by the Under the Germans’ converging blows, Germans, and soon dissolved into mobs Samsonov’s flanks were crushed and his of hungry and exhausted men who beat centre surrounded during August 26–31. feebly against the encircling German ring. The outcome of this military master- They then allowed themselves to be taken piece, called the Battle of Tannenberg, prisoner by the thousands. Samsonov was the destruction or capture of almost shot himself in despair on August 29. By the whole of Samsonov’s army. Imperial the end of August, the Germans had taken Russia’s unfortunate participation in World 92,000 prisoners and annihilated half of War I is epitomized in the ignominious the Russian 2nd Army. Ludendorff’s bold outcome of the Battle of Tannenberg. recall of the last German forces facing The progress of the battle was as Rennenkampf’s army was wholly justified follows. Samsonov, his forces spread out in the event, since Rennenkampf remained along a front 60 miles (96.6 km) long, utterly passive while Samsonov’s army was gradually pushing Scholtz back was surrounded. toward the Allenstein–Osterode (Olsztyn– Having received two fresh army corps Ostróda) line. On August 26, Ludendorff (seven divisions) from the Western Front, The Initial Stages of the War | 77 the Germans now turned on the slowly network in November. When the retreat- advancing 1st Army under Rennenkampf. ing German forces had crossed the The latter was attacked on a line extend- frontier back into Prussian Silesia, they ing from east of Königsberg to the were promptly moved northward by rail southern end of the chain of the Masurian into Prussian Poland, and thence sent Lakes during September 1–15, and was southeastward to drive a wedge between driven from East Prussia. As a result of the two armies of the Russian right flank. these East Prussian battles, Russia had The massive Russian operation against lost about 250,000 men and, what could Silesia was disorganized, and within a be afforded still less, much war matériel. week four new German army corps But the invasion of East Prussia had at had arrived from the Western Front. least helped to make possible the French Ludendorff was able to use them to press comeback on the Marne by causing the the Russians back by mid-December to the dispatch of two German army corps from Bzura–Rawka line in front of Warsaw. The the Western Front. depletion of their munition supplies Having ended the Russian threat to compelled the Russians to also fall back East Prussia, the Germans could afford in Galicia to trench lines along the Nida to switch the bulk of their forces from that and Dunajec rivers. area to the Czestochowa–Kraków front in southwestern Poland, where the Austrian Austria’s Serbian offensive, launched on August 20, had Campaign and the Battle been rolled back by Russian counter of the Kolubara attacks. A new plan for simultaneous thrusts by the Germans toward Warsaw The first Austrian invasion of Serbia was and by the Austrians toward Przemyśl launched with numerical inferiority due was brought to nothing by the end of to the diversion by part of one army October. The Russians could now mount originally destined for the Balkan front to counterattacks in overwhelming strength, the Eastern Front on August 18, 1914, their mobilization being at last nearly and the able Serbian commander, completed. The Russians then mounted a Radomir Putnik, brought the invasion to powerful effort to invade Prussian Silesia an early end by his victories on the Cer with a huge phalanx of seven armies. Mountain (August 15–20) and at Šabac Allied hopes rose high as the much- (August 21–24). In early September, heralded “Russian steamroller,” as the however, Putnik’s subsequent northward huge Russian Army was called, began its offensive on the Sava River had to be ponderous advance. The Russian armies broken off. The Austrians had begun a were advancing toward Silesia when second offensive, against the Serbs’ Hindenburg and Ludendorff exploited western front on the Drina River. After the superiority of the German railway some weeks of deadlock, the Austrians 78 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power began a third offensive, which had some of two German warships, the Goeben and success in the Battle of the Kolubara, the Breslau, in the Dardanelles on August and forced the Serbs to evacuate 10 turned the scales in favour of Enver’s Belgrade on November 30. However, by policy. The ships were sold to Turkey in December 15, a Serbian counterattack name, but they retained their German had retaken Belgrade and forced the crews. The Turks began detaining British Austrians to retreat. Copious mud and ships, and more anti-British provocations exhaustion kept the Serbs from turning followed, both in the Straits and on the the Austrian retreat into a rout, but the Egyptian frontier. Finally the Goeben led victory sufficed to allow Serbia a long the Turkish fleet across the Black Sea to spell of freedom from further Austrian bombard Odessa and other Russian ports advances. between October 29–30. Russia declared war against Turkey on November 1. The Turkey Joins the western Allies, after an ineffective bom- Central Powers bardment of the outer forts of the Dardanelles on November 3, declared The entry of present-day Turkey, or the war likewise on November 5. Then, a Ottoman Empire, as it was then called, British force from India occupied Basra, into the war as a German ally was the one on the Persian Gulf, on November 21. In great success of German wartime diplo- the winter of 1914–15 Turkish offensives macy. Since 1909, Turkey had been under in the Caucasus and in the Sinai Desert, the control of the Young Turks, over albeit abortive, served German strategy whom Germany had skillfully gained a well by tying Russian and British forces dominating influence. German military down in those peripheral areas. instructors permeated the Turkish Army, and Enver Paşa, the leader of the Young Destruction of Germany’s Turks, saw alliance with Germany as the Surface Ships and best way of serving Turkey’s interests. Submarine Warfare Germany, in particular, could provide protection against the Russian threat to In August 1914, Great Britain and the Straits. He therefore persuaded the Germany were the two great rival sea grand vizier, Said Halim Paşa, to make a powers. Great Britain had 29 capital ships secret treaty (negotiated in late July and completed and 13 under construction, signed on August 2) pledging Turkey to while Germany had built 18 capital ships the German side if Germany should have and was working on 9 more. However, to take Austria-Hungary’s side against neither of them at first wanted a direct Russia. The unforeseen entry of Great confrontation: the British were chiefly Britain into the war against Germany concerned with the protection of their alarmed the Turks, but the timely arrival trade routes, while the Germans hoped The Initial Stages of the War | 79 that mines and submarine attacks would the East Asiatic squadron of fast cruisers, gradually destroy Great Britain’s numeri- including the Scharnhorst, the Gneisenau, cal superiority, so that confrontation could and the Nürnberg, under Admiral Graf eventually take place on equal terms. Maximilian von Spee. For four months The first significant encounter between this fleet ranged almost unhindered over the two navies was that of the Helgoland the Pacific Ocean, while the Emden, hav- Bight, on Aug. 28, 1914. During this ing joined the squadron in August 1914, encounter, a British force under Admiral was detached for service in the Indian Sir David Beatty, having entered German Ocean. The Germans could thus threaten home waters, sank or damaged several not only merchant shipping on the British German light cruisers and killed or cap- trade routes but also troopships on their tured 1,000 men at a cost of one British way to Europe or the Middle East from ship damaged and 35 deaths. For the fol- India, New Zealand, or Australia. The lowing months the Germans, in both Emden sank merchant ships in the Bay of European or British waters, confined Bengal, bombarded Madras (September themselves to submarine warfare. They 22), haunted the approaches to Ceylon, and had some notable successes: on September had destroyed 15 Allied ships in all before 22 a single German submarine, or U-boat, it was caught and sunk off the Cocos sank three British cruisers within an hour; Islands on November 9, by the Australian on October 7 a U-boat made its way into cruiser Sydney. the anchorage of Loch Ewe, on the west Meanwhile, Admiral von Spee’s main coast of Scotland; on October 15 the squadron had been threading a devious British cruiser Hawke was torpedoed; and course in the Pacific from the Caroline on October 27 the British battleship Islands toward the Chilean coast since Audacious was sunk by a mine. August and had been joined by two more On December 15, 1914, battle cruisers cruisers, the Leipzig and the Dresden. On of the German High Seas Fleet set off on November 1, in the Battle of Coronel, the a sortie across the North Sea, under the squadron inflicted a sensational defeat command of Admiral Franz von Hipper. on a British force, under Sir Christopher They bombarded several British towns Cradock, which had sailed from the and then made their way home safely. Atlantic to hunt it down. Without losing a Hipper’s next sortie, however, was inter- single ship, von Spee’s squadron sank cepted on its way out. On Jan. 24, 1915, in Cradock’s two major cruisers and Cradock the Battle of the Dogger Bank, the German himself was killed. But the fortunes of the cruiser Blücher was sunk and two other war on the high seas were reversed when, cruisers damaged before the Germans on December 8, the German squadron could make their escape. attacked the Falkland Islands in the South Abroad on the high seas, the Ger Atlantic. They were probably unaware of mans’ most powerful surface force was the naval strength that the British, since 80 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Coronel, had been concentrating there engagement. When the German light under Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee , cruiser Dresden was caught and sunk off including a force of two battle cruisers the Juan Fernández Islands on March 14, (the Invincible and Inﬂ exible , each 1915, commerce raiding by German sur- equipped with eight 12-inch (305 mm) face ships on the high seas was at an end. guns) and six other cruisers. The German Raiding was just beginning by German ships were suff ering from wear-and-tear submarines, however. after their long cruise in the Pacifi c and The belligerent navies were employed were no match for the newer, faster British as much in interfering with each other’s ships, which soon overtook them. The commerce as in fi ghting each other. Scharnhorst , with Admiral von Spee Immediately after the outbreak of war, aboard, was the fi rst ship to be sunk, then the British had instituted an economic the Gneisenau , followed by the Nürnberg blockade of Germany, with the aim of and the Leipzig . The British ships, which preventing all supplies reaching that had fought at long range so as to render country from the outside world. The two useless the smaller guns of the Germans, routes by which supplies could reach sustained only 25 casualties during this German ports were either through the

A World War I–era German U-Boat used to attack merchant ships in British waters, c. 1916. Topical Press Agency/Hulton Archive/Getty Images The Initial Stages of the War | 81

English Channel and the Dover Straits, or A number of other sinkings followed, and around the north of Scotland. A minefield the Germans soon became convinced laid in the Dover Straits with a narrow that the submarine would be able to bring free lane made it fairly easy to intercept the British to an early peace where their and search ships using the Channel. To commerce raiders on the high seas had the north of Scotland, however, there was failed. On Jan. 30, 1915, Germany carried an area of more than 200,000 square the campaign a stage further by torpedo- miles to be patrolled, and the task was ing two Japanese liners (Tokomaru and assigned to a squadron of armed mer- Ikaria) without warning. They next chant cruisers. During the early months announced, on February 4, that from of the war, only absolute contraband such February 18 they would treat the waters as guns and ammunition was restricted, around the British Isles as a war zone in but the list was gradually extended to which all Allied merchant ships were to include almost all material that might be be destroyed. No ship, whether enemy or of use to the enemy. not, would be immune. The prevention of the free passage of Yet, whereas the Allied blockade was trading ships led to considerable difficul- preventing almost all trade for Germany ties among the neutral nations, particularly from reaching that nation’s ports, the with the United States, whose trading German submarine campaign yielded interests were hampered by British policy. less satisfactory results. During the first Nevertheless, the British blockade was week of the campaign, seven Allied or extremely effective. During 1915, the Allied-bound ships were sunk out of 11 British patrols stopped and inspected attacked, but 1,370 others sailed without more than 3,000 vessels, of which 743 being harassed by the German subma- were sent into port for examination. rines. In the whole of March 1915, during Outward-bound trade from Germany was which 6,000 sailings were recorded, only brought to a complete standstill. 21 ships were sunk. In April, only 23 ships The Germans similarly sought to were sunk from a similar number. Apart attack Great Britain’s economy with a from its lack of positive success, the campaign against its supply lines of U-boat arm was continuously harried by merchant shipping. In 1915, however, their Great Britain’s extensive antisubmarine surface commerce raiders were elimi- measures, which included nets, specially nated from the conflict, they were forced armed merchant ships, hydrophones for to rely entirely on the submarine. locating the noise of a submarine’s The Germans began their submarine engines, and depth bombs for destroying campaign against commerce by sinking it underwater. a British merchant steamship the Glitra, For the Germans, a worse result than after evacuating the crew, on Oct. 20, 1914. any of the British countermeasures 82 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

In focus: Sinking of the LUSITANIA and unrestricted Submarine Warfare

The inability of the German command to perceive that a minor tactical success could constitute a strategic blunder of the most extreme magnitude was conﬁ rmed on May 7, 1915, when a German submarine sank the British liner Lusitania. The Lusitania was on its way from New York to Liverpool, and though the ship was, in fact, carrying 173 tons of ammunition, it also had nearly 2,000 civilian passengers. When the ship sank, 1,198 people were drowned, including 128 U.S. citizens. The loss of the liner and so many of its passengers, including the Americans, aroused a wave of indignation in the United States, and it was fully expected that a declaration of war might follow. But the U.S. government clung to its policy of neutrality and contented itself with sending several notes of protest to Germany. Despite this, the Germans persisted in their policy and, on August 17, sank the Arabic, which also had U.S. and other neutral passengers. Following a new U.S. protest, the Germans undertook to ensure the safety of passengers before sinking liners henceforth. However, only after the torpedoing of yet another liner, the Hesperia, did Germany, on September 18, decide to suspend its submarine campaign in the English Channel and west of the British Isles, for fear of provoking the United States further. Thus, the German civilian statesmen had temporarily prevailed over the naval high command, which still advocated “unrestricted” submarine warfare.

imposed on them was the long-term The Loss of the growth of hostility on the part of the neu- German Colonies tral countries. Certainly the neutrals were far from happy with the British blockade, Germany’s overseas colonies, virtually with- but the German declaration of the war out hope of military reinforcement from zone and subsequent events turned them Europe, defended themselves with varying progressively away from their attitude of degrees of success against Allied attack. sympathy for Germany. The hardening of Togoland was conquered by British their outlook began in February 1915, forces from the Gold Coast (now Ghana) when the Norwegian steamship Belridge , and by French forces from Dahomey (now carrying oil from New Orleans to Benin) in the fi rst month of the war. In Amsterdam, was torpedoed and sunk in the Cameroons (German: Kamerun), the the English Channel. The Germans con- Germans put up a more eff ective resis- tinued to sink neutral ships occasionally, tance to Allied invasions from the south, and undecided countries soon began to the east, the northwest, and from the sea adopt a hostile outlook toward this activ- in the west, in August 1914. The last ity when the safety of their own shipping German stronghold there, Mora, held out was threatened. until Feb. 18, 1916. The Initial Stages of the War | 83

Operations by South African forces in The story of German East Africa huge numerical superiority were launched (comprising present-day Rwanda, Burundi, against German South West Africa and continental Tanzania) was very dif- (Namibia) in September 1914. However, ferent, thanks to the quality of the local they were held up by the pro-German askaris (European-trained African troops) rebellion of certain South African officers and to the military genius of the German who had fought against the British in the commander Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck. A South African War of 1899–1902. The landing of troops from India was repelled rebellion died out in February 1915, but with ignominy by the Germans in the Germans in South West Africa never- November 1914. A massive invasion from theless did not capitulate until July 9. the north, comprising British and colo- In Jiaozhou (Kiaochow), a small nial troops under the South African J. C. German enclave on the Chinese coast, Smuts, was launched in February 1916. the port of Qingdao (Tsingtao) was the This invasion was to be coordinated with object of Japanese attack from September a Belgian invasion from the west and with 1914. With some help from British troops an independent British one from and from Allied warships, the Japanese Nyasaland in the south. However, though captured it on November 7. In October, Dar es Salaam fell to Smuts and Tabora to meanwhile, the Japanese had occupied the Belgians in September, Lettow- the Marianas, the Caroline Islands, and the Vorbeck maintained his small force. In Marshalls in the North Pacific, these November 1917 he began to move south- islands being defenseless since the ward across Portuguese East Africa departure of Admiral von Spee’s naval (Germany had declared war on Portugal squadron. in March 1916) and, after crossing back In the South Pacific, Western Samoa into German East Africa in September (now Samoa) fell without blood at the end 1918, he turned southwestward to invade of August 1914 to a New Zealand force Northern Rhodesia in October. Having supported by Australian, British, and taken Kasama on November 9 (two days French warships. In September an before the German armistice in Europe), Australian invasion of Neu-Pommern he finally surrendered to Allied forces on (New Britain) won the surrender of the November 25. With just some 12,000 men whole colony of German New Guinea at the outset, he eventually tied down within a few weeks. 130,000 or more Allied troops. ChaPTER 4

The Stalemate Years Begin

y late 1914 the state of deadlock on the Western Front of B the fi rst World War had become clear to the governments of the opposing countries and even to many members of their general staff s. As each side sought a solution to this deadlock, the solutions varied in form and manner.

MajOR DEvELOPMENTS IN 1915

Dardanelles Campaign

Erich von Falkenhayn had succeeded the dispirited Moltke as chief of the German general staff in September 1914. By the end of 1914 Falkenhayn seems to have concluded that although the fi nal decision would be reached in the West, Germany had no immediate prospect of success there. Therefore, the only practicable theatre of operations in the near future was the Eastern Front, however inconclusive those operations might be. Falkenhayn was convinced of the strength of the Allied trench barrier in France, so he took the momentous decision to stand on the defensive in the West. Falkenhayn saw that a long war was now inevitable and set to work to develop Germany’s resources for such a warfare of attrition. Thus, the technique of fi eld entrenchment was carried to a higher pitch by the Germans than by any other country. Germany’s military railways were expanded for the lateral movement of reserves. Furthermore, the The Stalemate Years Begin | 85 problem of the supply of munitions and Swinton in October 1914 and was nour- of the raw materials for their manufacture ished and tended in infancy by Winston was tackled so energetically and compre- Churchill , then fi rst lord of the Admiralty. hensively that an ample fl ow was ensured Ultimately, after months of experiment from the spring of 1915 onward—a time hampered by offi cial opposition, this when the British were only awakening to machine, the weapon known as the tank, the problem. Here were laid the founda- came to maturity in 1916 . Some of the tions of that economic organization and British strategists, on the other hand, utilization of resources that was to be argued that instead of seeking a break- the secret of Germany’s power to resist the through on the Germans’ impregnable pressure of the British blockade. Western Front, the Allies should turn the The western Allies were divided into whole position of the Central Powers two camps about strategy during its either by an off ensive through the Balkans stalemate with the Central Powers. or even by a landing on Germany’s Baltic General Joseph Joff re and most of the coast. Joff re and his supporters won the French general staff , backed by the British argument, and the Balkan projects were fi eld marshal Sir John French , argued for relinquished in favour of a concentration continuing assaults on the Germans’ of eff ort on the Western Front. But the entrenched line in France, despite the misgivings of Joff re’s opponents were continued attrition of French forces that not silenced, and a situation arose that this strategy entailed. Apart from this, revived the Middle Eastern scheme in a the French high command was singularly new, if attenuated, form. lacking in ideas to break the deadlock of Early in January 1915 the Russians, trench warfare. While desire to hold on to threatened by the Turks in the Caucasus, territorial gains governed the German appealed to the British for some relieving strategy, the desire to recover lost terri- action against Turkey. The British, after tory dominated the French. acrimonious argument among them- While the French concentrated on selves, decided in favour of “a naval recovering territory, British-inspired solu- expedition in February to bombard and tions to the deadlock crystallized into two take the Gallipoli Peninsula (the western main groups: one tactical, the other stra- shore of the Dardanelles), with Con- tegical. The fi rst was to unlock the trench stantinople as its objective.” Though barrier by inventing a machine that would subsequently it was agreed that army be invulnerable to machine guns and troops might be provided to hold the shores capable of crossing trenches and would if the fl eet forced the Straits, the naval thus restore the tactical balance upset by attack began on February 19 without the new preponderance of defensive over army support. When at last Sir Ian off ensive power. The idea of such a Hamilton’s troops from Egypt began to machine was conceived by Colonel Ernest land on the Turkish shores on April 25, 86 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power the Turks and their German commander, peninsula as many troops as possible. Otto Liman von Sanders, had had ample The standstill of the enterprise led to a time to prepare adequate fortifi cations. political crisis in London between The defending armies were now six times Churchill, who, after earlier doubts, had as large as when the campaign opened. made himself the foremost spokesman of Against resolute opposition from the Dardanelles operation, and John, the local Turkish commander (Mustafa Lord Fisher , the fi rst sea lord, who had Kemal, the future Atatürk), Australian always expressed doubts about it. Fisher and New Zealand troops won a bridge- demanded on May 14 that the operation head at Anzac Cove, north of Kaba Tepe, be discontinued, and when he was over- on the Aegean side of the peninsula, with ruled, resigned the next day. The Liberal some 20,000 men landing in the fi rst two government was replaced by a coalition. days. The British, meanwhile, tried to land However, though relieved of his former at fi ve points around Cape Helles. post, Churchill remained in the War However, they only established footholds Council of the Cabinet. at three of them and then asked for rein- In July the British began sending forcements. Thereafter little progress was fi ve more divisions to the peninsula, made, and the Turks took advantage of and a new plan was hatched. In the the British halt to bring into the hope of cutting the Turks’ north–south

In focus: aNzaC

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) was a combined corps that served with distinction in World War I during the ill-fated 1915 Gallipoli Campaign, an attempt to capture the Dardanelles from Turkey. In 1916 Australian and New Zealand infantry divisions were sent to France. They took part in some of the bloodiest actions of the war and established reputations as elite shock troops, at the price of heavy casualties. The New Zealand Division, eventually sustained by conscription, was second to none in combat, planning, and administration. The Australians, on the other hand, eventually reaching a strength of fi ve divisions, faced diffi culty replacing losses as Australia twice rejected conscription. Grouped into a single corps commanded by Sir John Monash, who comple- mented the panache and the tactical skill of his soldiers with comprehensive, careful planning, the Australians nevertheless were central to defeating the German off ensive of March 1918 and to the “hundred days” from August 8 to November 11 that ended the Great War. The ANZAC cavalry units remained in the Middle East, playing a major role in the 1917–18 Palestine campaign. A unique mentality based on concepts of manhood, mateship, and meritocracy is frequently cited as the key to Australian and New Zealand soldiers’ valour and eff ectiveness. In Australia and New Zealand, ANZAC Day—April 25 (the date of the Gallipoli landing)—has been a major occasion for expressing national sentiment. The Stalemate Years Begin | 87 communications down the peninsula by artillery opened an intense bombardment seizing the Sari Bair heights, which com- on a 2,000-yard (1.8 km) front. Then, after manded the Straits from the west, the 35 minutes, they lengthened its range so British reinforced the bridgehead at that the attacking British infantry, behind Anzac Cove. In the night of August 6–7, the second screen of shells, could over- they landed more troops at Suvla Bay run the trenches ravaged by the first. The (Anafarta Limanı), farther to the north. experiment’s immediate result was Within a few days, both the offensive merely the loss of life, rather than any from Anzac Cove and the new landing ground gained, both because shortage of had proved ineffectual to the success of munitions made the second barrage their strategy. More argument ensued in inadequate and because there was a five- the War Council, and only late in the year hour delay in launching the infantry was it acknowledged that the initially assault, against which the Germans, hav- promising but ill-conducted enterprise ing overcome their initial surprise, had should be given up. The evacuation of the time to rally their resistance. It was clear troops was carried out from Suvla Bay to the Allies that this small-scale tactical and from Anzac Cove under cover of experiment had missed success by only a darkness in December 1915, and from the narrow margin and that there was scope Cape Helles beaches in January 1916. for its development. But the Allied com- The Dardanelles campaign thus came to mands seemingly missed the true lesson, a frustrating end. Had it succeeded, the which was that a surprise attack could be campaign might well have ended Turkey’s successfully made immediately following participation in the war. In failing, how- a short bombardment that compensated ever, it had cost about 214,000 casualties for its brevity by its intensity. Instead, and achieved nothing. they drew the superficial deduction that mere volume of shellfire was the key to The Western and reducing a trench line prior to an assault. Eastern Fronts, 1915 Not until 1917 did they revert to the Neuve-Chapelle method. It was left to The Western Front the Germans to profit from the experiment. In the meantime, a French offensive Repeated attacks in February–March 1915 in April against the Germans’ Saint- on the Germans’ Western trench barrier Mihiel salient, southeast of Verdun, in Champagne won the French only 500 sacrificed 64,000 men to no effect. yards (460 metres) of ground at a cost of The Germans, in accordance with 50,000 men. Britain’s Sir Douglas Haig Falkenhayn’s strategy, remained gener- and his 1st Army, between Armentières ally on the defensive in the West. They and Lens, tried a new experiment at did, however, launch an attack on the Neuve-Chapelle on March 10, when its Allies’ Ypres salient (where the French 88 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Both the horses and rider of this German resupply team have been equipped with gas masks, c. 1918. Hulton Archive/Getty Images The Stalemate Years Begin | 89 had in November 1914 taken the place of On May 9, meanwhile, the Allies had the British). There, on April 22, 1915, they launched yet another premature off en- used chlorine gas , a choking agent, for sive. They combined a major French the fi rst time on the Western Front. onslaught between Lens and Arras with However, they made the mistake of dis- two thrusts by Haig’s 1st Army, from charging it from cylinders (which were Festubert and from Fromelles, against the dependent on a favourable wind) rather Aubers Ridge north of Lens. The French than lobbing it onto the enemy trenches prolonged their eff ort until June 18, los- in artillery shells. The gas did throw the ing 102,000 men without securing any agonized defenders into chaotic fl ight; gain; the British, still short of shells but the German high command, having against the Germans’ mass of machine been disappointed by the new weapon’s guns, already had suspended their attacks performance under adverse conditions in three weeks earlier. Poland earlier in the year, had failed to An even worse military failure was provide adequate reserves to exploit its the joint off ensive launched by the Allies unforeseen success. By the end of a on Sept. 25, 1915. While 27 French divi- month-long battle, the Allies’ front was sions with 850 heavy guns attacked on a only slightly retracted. front 18 miles long in Champagne , north

In focus: Paris Gun

Several long-range cannons produced by the German arms manufacturer Krupp during World War I were called Paris Guns. The guns were so called because they were specially built to shell Paris at a range, never before attained, of approximately 75 miles (121 km). The guns were fabricated by adding a tube to the barrel of a 380-millimetre (15 in) naval gun. The barrel was thus elongated to about 112 feet (34.2 m), weighed 138 tons, and needed supports to hold it straight. A charge of 550 pounds (249.5 kg) of gunpowder was used to propel a shell out of the barrel at a velocity of 5,260 feet (1.6 km) per second. The extremely long range of the guns was achieved by sending the shells on a trajectory 24 miles (38.6 km) up into the stratosphere, where atmospheric drag was almost nonexistent. After modifi cations, the Paris Guns were initially 210 millimetres (8.3 in) in calibre, but successive fi rings eroded the inner linings of the gun barrels and their calibre was increased to about 240 millimetres (9.5 in). The Paris Guns were moved to their emplacements near the German front lines on railway tracks and successively carried out an inter- mittent bombardment of Paris over a period of about 140 days, beginning in March 1918. The Paris Guns killed about 250 Parisians and wrecked a number of buildings during 1918, but they did not appreciably aff ect French civilian morale or the larger course of the war. The name Big Bertha, which was derisively applied to the guns by Parisians under bombardment from them, is more properly applied to the 420-millimetre (16.5 in) howitzers used by the German army to batter Belgian forts in August 1914, at the start of the war. 90 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power and east of Reims, simultaneous blows preparations for a blow at East Prussia’s were delivered in distant Artois by 14 southern frontier were forestalled. French divisions with 420 heavy guns on Germany’s General Erich Ludendorff, a 12-mile front south of Lens and by six striking suddenly eastward from East British divisions with only 117 guns at Prussia, enveloped four Russian divisions Loos north of Lens. All of these attacks in the Augustów forests, east of the were disappointing failures, partly Masurian Lakes, in the second week of because they were preceded by prolonged February. However, in Galicia the winter’s bombardments that gave away any fighting culminated in the fall of Przemyśl chance of surprise and allowed time for to the Russians on March 22. German reserves to be sent forward to For the Central Powers, the Austrian close up the gaps that had been opened spokesman, Conrad, primarily required in the trench defenders’ ranks by the artil- some action to relieve the pressure on his lery bombardment. At Loos the British Galician front. Falkenhayn was willing to use of chlorine gas was less effective than help him for that purpose without depart- Haig had hoped, and his engagement of ing from his own general strategy of all his available forces for his first assault attrition, which was already coming into came to nothing when his commander conflict with Ludendorff’s desire for a in chief, Sir John French, was too slow in sustained effort toward decisive victory sending up reserves. The French on both over Russia. The plan they finally adopted, their fronts likewise lost, through lack of with the aim of smashing the Russian timely support, most of what they had centre in the Dunajec River sector of won by their first attacks. In all, for a little Galicia by an attack on the 18-mile front ground, the Allies paid 242,000 men, from Gorlice to Tuchów (south of Tarnów), against the defenders’ loss of half as was conceived with tactical originality. In many men. order to maintain the momentum of Having subsequently complained advance, no daily objectives were to be bitterly about Sir John French’s manage- set for individual corps or divisions. ment of operations, Haig was appointed Instead, each should make all possible British commander in chief in his place progress before the Russians could bring in December. their reserves up, on the assumption that the rapid advance of some attacking units The Eastern Front would contagiously promote the subsequent advance of others that had at first The Russians’ plans for 1915 prescribed met more resistance. In late April, 14 divi- the strengthening of their flanks in the sions, with 1,500 guns, were quietly north and in Galicia before driving concentrated for the stroke against the westward again toward Silesia. Their six Russian divisions present. Mackensen The Stalemate Years Begin | 91

A portrait of German ﬁ eld marshal August von Mackensen, c. 1914. Topical Press Agency/ Hulton Archive/Getty Images 92 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power was in command, with Hans von Seeckt, the German emperor decided in favour of sponsor of the new tactic of infiltration, Falkenhayn’s plan, over Ludendorff’s as his chief of staff. protestations. The Gorlice attack was launched on The results of the plan justified May 2 and achieved success beyond all Ludendorff’s reservations. The Russians expectation. Routed on the Dunajec, the held Mackensen at Brest-Litovsk and Russians tried to stand on the Wisłoka, Hindenburg on the Narew River long then fell back again. By May 14, enough to enable the main body of their Mackensen’s forces were on the San, 80 troops to escape through the unclosed miles from their starting point, and at gap to the east. Though by the end of Jarosław they even forced the Russians to August all of Poland had been occupied re-cross that river. Strengthened with and 750,000 Russians had been taken more German troops from France, prisoner in four months of fighting, the Mackensen then struck again, taking Central Powers had missed their oppor- Przemyśl on June 3 and Lemberg (Lvov) tunity to break Russia’s ability to carry on June 22. The Russian front was now on the war. bisected, but Falkenhayn and Conrad had Too late, Falkenhayn in September foreseen no such result and had made no allowed Ludendorff to try what he had preparations to exploit it promptly. Their been urging much earlier, a wider envel- consequent delays enabled the Russian oping movement to the north on the armies to retreat without breaking up Kovno–Dvinsk–Vilna triangle. The Ger entirely. man cavalry, in fact, approached the Falkenhayn then decided to pursue a Minsk railway, far beyond Vilna. However, new offensive. Mackensen was instructed the Russians’ power of resistance was too to veer northward, so as to catch the great for Ludendorff’s slender forces, Russian armies in the Warsaw salient whose supplies moreover began to run between his forces and Hindenburg’s, out. By the end of the month his opera- which were to drive southeastward from tions were suspended. The crux of this East Prussia. Ludendorff disliked the plan situation was that the Russian armies had as being too much of a frontal assault: the been allowed to draw back almost out of Russians might be squeezed by the clos- the net of German forces before the long- ing-in of the two wings, but their retreat delayed Vilna maneuver was attempted. to the east would not be cut off. He once Meanwhile, an Austrian attack eastward more urged his spring scheme for a wide from Lutsk (Luck), begun later in enveloping maneuver through Kovno September and continued into October, (Kaunas) on Vilna (Vilnius) and Minsk, in incurred heavy losses for no advantage at the north. Falkenhayn opposed this plan, all. By October 1915 the Russian retreat, fearing that it would mean more troops after a nerve-wracking series of escapes and a deeper commitment, and on July 2 from the salients the Germans had The Stalemate Years Begin | 93 systematically created and then sought part of Azerbaijan and taken Tabriz on to cut off , had come to a defi nite halt January 14, were expelled by a Russian along a line running from the Baltic Sea counterinvasion in March. just west of Riga southward to Czernowitz During this campaign, the Armenians (Chernovtsy) on the Romanian border. had created disturbances behind the Turkish lines in support of the Russians Other Fronts and had threatened the already arduous Turkish communications. On June 11, The Caucasus 1915, the Turkish government decided to deport the Armenians. In the process of The Caucasian front between Russia and deportation, the Turkish authorities com- Turkey comprised two battlegrounds: mitted atrocities on a vast scale: Armenian Armenia in the west, Azerbaijan in the deaths have been estimated at some east. While the ultimate strategic objec- 600,000. Subsequently, the Armenians tives for the Turks were to capture the perpetrated similar atrocities against the Baku oilfi elds in Azerbaijan and to pene- Turkish population of the Armenian trate Central Asia and Afghanistan in country, but perforce on a smaller scale. order to threaten British India, they needed fi rst to capture the Armenian fortress of Kars. The fortress, together with that of Ardahan, had been a Russian possession since 1878. A Russian advance from Sarıkamış (Sarykamysh, south of Kars) toward Erzurum in Turkish Armenia in November 1914 was countered in December when the Turkish 3rd Army, under Enver himself, launched a three-pronged off ensive against the Kars–Ardahan position. This off ensive was catastrophically defeated in battles at Sarıkamış and at Ardahan in January 1915. However, the Turks, ill-clad and ill-supplied in the Caucasian winter, lost many more men through exposure and exhaustion than in fi ghting (their 3rd Army was reduced in one month from 190,000 to 12,400 men, the battle casual- A portrait of Grand Duke Nicholas of Rus- ties being 30,000). Turkish forces, which sia, c. 1918. Hulton Archive/Getty Images had meanwhile invaded neutral Persia’s 94 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Grand Duke Nicholas, who had were 500 miles away from their base at hitherto been commander in chief of all Basra. They fought a profitless battle at Russia’s armies, was superseded by Ctesiphon, only 18 miles from Baghdad, Emperor Nicholas himself in September on November 22 but then had to retreat 1915; the Grand Duke was then sent to to al-Kūt. There, from December 7, Towns command in the Caucasus. He and hend’s 10,000 men were besieged by the General N. N. Yudenich, the victor of Turks; and there, on April 29, 1916, they Sarıkamış, started a major assault on surrendered themselves into captivity. Turkish Armenia in January 1916; Erzurum was taken on February 16, Trab The Egyptian Frontiers zon on April 18, Erzıncan on August 2; and a long-delayed Turkish counterattack Even after the evacuation from Gallipoli, was held at Oğnut. Stabilized to Russia’s the British maintained 250,000 troops in great advantage in the autumn, the new Egypt. A major source of worry to the front in Armenia was thereafter affected British was the danger of a Turkish threat less by Russo-Turkish warfare than by the from Palestine across the Sinai Desert to consequences of impending revolution the Suez Canal. That danger waned, how- in Russia. ever, when the initially unpromising rebellion of the Hāshimite amir usayn Mesopotamia ibn ‘Alī against the Turks in the Hejaz was developed by the personal enterprise of The British occupation of Basra, Turkey’s an unprofessional soldier of genius, T. E. port at the head of the Persian Gulf, in Lawrence, into a revolt infecting the November 1914 had been justifiable stra- whole Arabian hinterland of Palestine tegically because of the need to protect and Syria and threatening to sever the the oil wells of southern Persia and the Turks’ vital Hejaz Railway (Damascus– Abadan refinery. The British advance of Amman–Ma‘ān–Medina). Sir Archibald 46 miles (74 km) northward from Basra to Murray’s British troops at last started a al-Qurnah in December and the farther massive advance in December 1916 and advance of 90 miles (144.8 km) up the captured some Turkish outposts on the Tigris to al- ‘Amārah in May–June 1915 northeastern edge of the Sinai Desert. ought to have been reckoned enough However, they made a pusillanimous for all practical purposes. However, the withdrawal from Gaza in March 1917 at advance was continued in the direction the very moment when the Turks were of the fatally magnetic Baghdad, ancient about to surrender the place to them; the capital of the Arab caliphs of Islam. Al-Kūt attempt the next month to retrieve was occupied in September 1915, and the the mistake was repulsed with heavy advance was pushed on until the British, losses. In June the command was trans- under Major General Charles Townshend, ferred from Murray to Sir Edmund The Stalemate Years Begin | 95

Allenby. In striking contrast to Murray’s consolidate the Alpine frontier), Gorizia, performance was Lawrence’s capture of Istria, and northern Dalmatia. On May 23, Aqaba (al-‘Aqabah) on July 6, 1917, when 1915, Italy accordingly declared war on his handful of Arabs got the better of Austria-Hungary. 1,200 Turks there. The Italian commander, General Luigi Cadorna , decided to concentrate Italy and the Italian front his eff ort on an off ensive moving eastward from the province of Venetia across On April 26, 1915, Great Britain, France, the comparatively low ground between and Russia concluded the secret Treaty of the head of the Adriatic and the foothills London with Italy . The treaty induced of the Julian Alps, or across the lower val- the latter to discard the obligations of the ley of the Isonzo (So a) River. Against the Triple Alliance and to enter the war on risk of an Austrian descent on his rear the side of the Allies by the promise of from the Trentino (which bordered territorial aggrandizement at Austria- Venetia to the northwest) or on his left Hungary’s expense. Italy was off ered fl ank from the Carnic Alps (to the north), not only the Italian-populated Trentino he thought that limited advances would and Trieste but also South Tirol (to be precaution enough.

Italian troops serving in World War I pose for a photograph with their weapons, c. 1915. Archive Holding Inc./The Image Bank/Getty Images 96 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

The Italians’ initial advance eastward, Serbia and the begun late in May 1915, was soon halted, Salonika Expedition largely because of the flooding of the Isonzo, and trench warfare set in. Cadorna, Serbia had brusquely repulsed Austria’s however, was determined to make prog- three attempted invasions of Serbia in ress and so embarked on a series of 1914 with a series of counterattacks. By persistent renewals of the offensive, the summer of 1915 the Central Powers known collectively as the Battles of the were doubly concerned with conquering Isonzo. The first four of these (June 23– Serbia, both for reasons of prestige and for July 7; July 18–August 3; October the sake of establishing secure rail commu- 18–November 4; and November 10– nications with Turkey across the Balkans. December 2) achieved nothing worth the In August, Germany sent reinforcements cost of the 280,000 men lost; and the fifth to Austria’s southern front. The Central (March 1916) was equally fruitless. The Powers concluded a treaty with Bulgaria, Austrians had shown on this front a fierce whom they drew to their side by the offer resolution that was often lacking when of territory to be taken from Serbia, on they faced the Russians. In mid-May 1916 Sept. 6, 1915. The Austro-German forces Cadorna’s program was interrupted by attacked southward from the Danube on an Austrian offensive from the Trentino October 6; and the Bulgars, undeterred into the Asiago region of western Venetia. by a Russian ultimatum, struck at eastern Though the danger of an Austrian Serbia on October 11 and at Serbian breakthrough from the mountainous Macedonia on October 14. borderland into the Venetian plain in the The western Allies, surprised in rear of the Italians’ Isonzo front was September by the prospect of a Bulgarian averted, the Italian counteroffensive in attack on Serbia, hastily decided to send mid-June recovered only one-third of the help through neutral Greece’s Macedonian territory overrun by the Austrians north port of Salonika, relying on the collusion and southwest of Asiago. The Sixth Battle of Greece’s pro-Entente prime minister, of the Isonzo (August 6–17), however, did Eleuthérios Venizélos. Troops from win Gorizia for the Italians. On August 28, Gallipoli, under the French general Italy finally declared war on Germany as Maurice Sarrail, reached Salonika on well. The next three months saw three October 5. However, on that day Venizélos more Italian offensives on the Isonzo, fell from power, thus thwarting the Allies’ none of them really profitable. In the plan. The Allies advanced northward up course of 1916, the Italians had sustained the Vardar into Serbian Macedonia but 500,000 casualties, twice as many as the found themselves prevented from junction Austrians, and were still entrenched on with the Serbs by the westward thrust of the Isonzo. the Bulgars. Driven back over the Greek The Stalemate Years Begin | 97

In focus: Battles of the Isonzo

A series of 12 battles were fought between 1915 and 1917 along the Isonzo River on the eastern sector of the Italian Front in World War I. Although it is now located in present-day Slovenia, the Isonzo River at the time ran roughly north-south just inside Austria along its border with Italy at the head of the Adriatic Sea. The river is fl anked by rugged peaks, and the Austrians already had fortifi ed these mountains prior to Italy’s entry into the war on May 23, 1915, giving them quite a considerable advantage over the Italians. The Italian general Luigi Cadorna launched his fi rst attack against the Austrians on June 23. For 14 days, the Italian army attempted to cross the river and scale the heights beyond, but they were beaten back. Again during July 18–August 3, October 18–November 3, and November 10– December 2, the Italians attacked, but they penetrated only a few miles into the Austrian sector at the cost of heavy losses. From March 9 to 17, 1916, Cadorna tried to cross the river again—and again failed. In the sixth battle, August 6–17, 1916, Gorizia was captured and a bridgehead was secured across the Isonzo, the fi rst real victories. In the next three battles, September 14–17, October 10–12, and November 1–4, the Italians changed their tactics to short, intense attacks in order to limit their casualties, but they still could not penetrate the formidable natural barriers protected by Austrian artillery. In the 10th battle, May 12–June 8, 1917, Cadorna struck in two places with massed troops and a larger number of guns but gained only a few yards of ground. During August 19–September 12 the Italians struck again, this time with a total of 51 divisions and 5,200 guns, and they slowly pushed forward, dislodging the Austrians as they advanced. The Germans feared that the Austrian front might collapse against the Italian attack and sent reinforcements. On October 24 the Austrian-German forces took the off ensive, beginning with a heavy bombardment. By afternoon the Italian army was in a rout. War-weary and demoralized territorial troops threw down their arms, the Austrians poured over the Isonzo, and Caporetto fell, though many Italian units continued to fi ght as they retreated toward the Piave River. There, they held the line on November 7, after one of the worst defeats in Italian history. frontier, the Allies were merely occupying British, and some Russian troops, and the the Salonika region by mid-December. bridgehead was expanded westward to The Serbian Army, meanwhile, to avoid Vodena (Edessa) and eastward to Kilkis. double envelopment, had begun an However, the Bulgars, who in May arduous winter retreat westward over obtained Fort Rupel (Klidhi, on the the Albanian mountains to refuge on the Struma) from the Greeks, in mid-August island of Corfu. not only overran Greek Macedonia east In the spring of 1916 the Allies at of the Struma but also, from Monastir Salonika were reinforced by the revived (Bitola), invaded the Florina region of Serbs from Corfu as well as by French, Greek Macedonia, to the west of the 98 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Allies’ Vodena wing. The Allied counter- armies, was held at Joffre’s headquarters. offensive took Monastir from the Bulgars They adopted the principle of coordinat- in November 1916, but more ambitious ing a simultaneous general offensive in operations, from March to May 1917, 1916 by France, Great Britain, Russia, proved abortive. The Salonika front was and Italy. However, military action by tying down some 500,000 Allied troops Germany was to dislocate this scheme, without troubling the Central Powers in and only the British offensive came fully any significant way. into operation. By the winter of 1915–16, Falkenhayn Major developments regarded Russia as paralyzed and Italy as in 1916 inconsiderable. He considered the time at last ripe for positive action against The Western Front and the France, after whose collapse Great Britain Battle of Verdun would have no effective military ally on the European continent and would be Although in 1914 the centre of gravity of brought to terms rather by submarine World War I had been on the Western warfare than by land operations. For his Front, in 1915 it shifted to focus on the offensive in the West, however, Falkenhayn Eastern. However, by 1916, it shifted once clung always to his method of attrition. more moved back to France. Though the He believed that a mass breakthrough western Allies had dissipated some of was unnecessary and that instead the their strength in the Dardanelles, Germans should aim to bleed France of its Salonika, and Mesopotamia, the rising manpower by choosing a point of attack tide of Britain’s new armies and of its “for the retention of which the French increased munition supplies promised Command would be compelled to throw in the means for an offensive far larger in every man they have.” The town of Verdun scale than any before to break the trench and its surrounding complex of forts was deadlock. Britain’s armies in France had chosen for many reasons: because it grown to 36 divisions by the end of 1915. was a menace to the main German lines By that time voluntary enlistments, of communications, because it was within though massive, had nevertheless a French salient and thus cramped the proved to be inadequate to meet Britain’s defenders, and because of the certainty needs. By January 1916, the Military Serv that the French would sacrifice any ice Act replaced voluntary service with number of men to defend Verdun for rea- conscription. sons of patriotism associated with the In December 1915 a conference of the town itself. leaders of the French, British, Belgian, The keynote of Falkenhayn’s tactical and Italian armies, with representatives plan was to place a dense semicircle of present from the Russian and Japanese German heavy and medium artillery to The Stalemate Years Begin | 99

French troops under shellﬁ re huddle together during the Battle of Verdun, 1916. General Photographic Agency/Hulton Archive/Getty Images the north and east of Verdun and its out- warning of the impending German attack lying fortresses and then to stage a fell on deaf ears. At 7:15 am on Feb. 21, continuous series of limited infantry 1916, the heaviest German artillery bom- advances upon the forts. These advances bardment yet seen in the war began on a would draw the French infantry into front of 8 miles (12.9 km) around Verdun, defending or trying to retake the forts, and the French trenches and barbed wire in the process of which they would be fi elds there were fl attened out or upheaved pulverized by German artillery fi re. In in a chaos of tumbled earth. At 4:45 pm addition, each German infantry advance the German infantry advanced—although would have its way smoothed by a brief for the fi rst day only on a front of two and but extremely intense artillery bombard- a half miles. From then until February 24 ment that would clear the targeted ground the French defenders’ lines east of the of defenders. Meuse River crumbled away. Fort- Although French Intelligence had Douaumont, one of the most important given early warnings of the Germans’ fortresses, was occupied by the Germans off ensive preparations, the French high on February 25. By March 6, when the command was so preoccupied with its Germans began to attack on the west own projected off ensive scheme that the bank of the Meuse as well as on the east 100 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

In focus: Erich Maria Remarque

(b. June 22, 1898, Osnabrück, Ger.—d. Sept. 25, 1970, Locarno, Switz.), Erich Maria Remarque, who wrote under the pseudonym of Erich Paul Remark, is chiefl y remembered as the author of Im Westen nichts Neues (1929; All Quiet on the Western Front), which became perhaps the best-known and most representative novel dealing with World War I. Remarque was drafted into the German army at the age of 18 and was wounded several times. After the war he worked as a racing-car driver and as a sportswriter while working on All Quiet on the Western Front. The novel’s events are those in the daily routine of soldiers who seem to have no past or future apart from their life in the trenches. Its title, the language of routine communiqués, is typical of its cool, terse style, which records the daily horrors of war in laconic understatement. Its casual amorality was in shocking contrast to the wars’ patriotic rhetoric. The book was an immediate international success, as was the American fi lm made from it in 1930. It was followed by a sequel, Der Weg zurück (1931; The Road Back), dealing with the collapse of Germany in 1918. Remarque wrote several other novels, most of them dealing with victims of the political upheavals of Europe during World Wars I and II. Some had popular success and were fi lmed (e.g., Arc de Triomphe, 1946), but none achieved the critical prestige of his fi rst book. Remarque left Germany for Switzerland in 1932, before his books were banned by the Nazis in 1933. In 1939 he went to the United States, where he was naturalized in 1947. After World War II he returned to Europe and settled in Porto Ronco, Switz., on Lake Maggiore, where he lived with his second wife, the American actress Paulette Goddard, until his death.

bank, the French had come to see that leading into Verdun that had not been something more than a feint was intended. closed by German shelling. This was the To relieve the pressure on France, the Bar-le-Duc road, which became known Russians made a sacrifi cial attack on as La Voie Sacrée (the “Sacred Way”) the Eastern Front at Lake Naroch; the because vital supplies and reinforce- Italians began their fi fth off ensive on ments continued to be sent to the Verdun the Isonzo; and the British took over the front along it despite constant harass- Arras sector of the Western Front, thus ment from the German artillery. becoming responsible for the whole line Slowly but steadily, the Germans from the Yser southward to the Somme. moved forward on Verdun. They took Meanwhile, General Philippe Pétain was Fort-Vaux, southeast of Fort-Douaumont, entrusted with commanding the defense on June 7 and almost reached the of Verdun. He organized repeated Belleville heights, the last stronghold counter attacks that slowed the German before Verdun itself, on June 23. Pétain advance, and, more importantly, he was preparing to evacuate his troops from worked to keep open the one road the east bank of the Meuse when the The Stalemate Years Begin | 101

Allies’ off ensive on the Somme River of defenders by the artillery. But the was at last launched. Thereafter, the unconcealed preparations for the assault Germans assigned no more divisions to and the long preliminary bombardment the Verdun attack. had given away any chance of surprise, Preceded by a week of bombardment, and the German defenders were well pre- which gave ample warning of its advent, pared for what was to come. In the event, the Somme off ensive began on July 1, the 60,000 attacking British infantrymen, 1916. The 11 British divisions of moving forward in symmetrical align- Rawlinson’s new 4th Army coordinated ment at a snail’s pace, enforced by each attacks on a 15-mile (24 km) front between man’s 66 pounds (30 kg) of cumbrous Serre, north of the Ancre, and Curlu, north equipment were mowed down in masses of the Somme, while fi ve French divisions by the German machine guns. The day’s attacked at the same time on an 8-mile casualties were the heaviest ever sus- (12.9 km) front mainly south of the tained by a British army. The French Somme, between Curlu and Péronne. participants in the attack had twice as With incredibly misplaced optimism, many guns as the British and did better Haig had convinced himself that the against a weaker system of defenses, but British infantry would be able to walk almost nothing could be done to exploit forward irresistibly over ground cleared this comparative success.

In focus: first Battle of the Somme

The First Battle of the Somme was fought July 1–Nov. 13, 1916. It was a costly and largely unsuccessful Allied off ensive on the Western Front during World War I. The Germans were securely entrenched and strategically located when the British and French launched their frontal attack on a 21-mile (33.8 km) front north of the Somme River. A week-long artillery bombardment preceded the British infantry’s “going over the top,” but the latter were nevertheless mowed down as they assaulted the virtually impregnable German positions. The British sustained nearly 60,000 casualties (20,000 dead) on the fi rst day of the attack. The Somme off ensive then deteriorated into a battle of attrition. In September the British introduced their new weapon, the tank, into the war for the fi rst time, but with little eff ect. In October torrential rains turned the battlefi eld into an impassable sea of mud, and by mid-November the Allies had advanced only 5 miles (8 km). Although the fi gures have been much disputed, the casualties from the First Battle of the Somme perhaps amounted to roughly 650,000 German, 195,000 French, and 420,000 British. Because of the absolutely staggering number of casualties incurred by all involved, the Battle of the Somme became a metaphor for futile and indiscriminate slaughter. Even though their attack itself was unsuccessful, by taking the off ensive in the Somme, the Allies managed to relieve the German pressure on Verdun, however, and the subsequent fi ghting did much to wear down the German army by destroying its prewar cadres. 102 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Resigning himself now to limited of Verdun amounted to about 400,000; advances, Haig concentrated his next German casualties reached about effort on the southern sector of his Somme 350,000. front. The Germans’ second position there (Longueval, Bazentin, and Ovillers) The Battle of Jutland fell on July 14, but again the opportunity of exploitation was missed. Thenceforward, The summer of 1916 saw the long- at great cost in lives, a methodical advance deferred confrontation of Germany’s was continued, gaining little ground but High Seas Fleet and Great Britain’s Grand straining the German resistance. The first Fleet in the Battle of Jutland—history’s tanks to be used in the war, though in biggest naval battle, which both sides numbers far too small to be effective, claimed as a victory. were thrown into the battle by the British Admiral Reinhard Scheer, who on September 15. In mid-November early became commander in chief of the High rains halted operations. The four-month Seas Fleet in January 1916, planned to Battle of the Somme was a miserable fail- contrive an encounter on the open sea ure except that it diverted German between his fleet and some part of the resources from the attack on Verdun. It British fleet in separation from the cost the British 420,000 casualties, the whole, so that the Germans could exploit French 195,000, and the Germans their momentary superiority in numbers 650,000. to achieve victory. Scheer’s plan was to At Verdun, the summer slackening of ensnare Admiral Beatty’s squadron of German pressure enabled the French to battle cruisers at Rosyth, midway up organize counterattacks. Surprise attacks Britain’s eastern coast, by stratagem and directed by General Robert Nivelle and destroy it before any reinforcements from launched by General Charles Mangin’s the Grand Fleet’s main base at Scapa army corps recovered Fort-Douaumont Flow could reach it. on October 24, Fort-Vaux on November 2, To set the trap, five battle cruisers of and places north of Douaumont in mid- the German High Seas Fleet, together December. Pétain’s adroit defense of with four light cruisers, were to sail north- Verdun and these counterattacks had ward, under Hipper’s command, from deprived Falkenhayn’s offensive of its Wilhelmshaven, Ger., to a point off the strategic fulfillment. However, France southwestern coast of Norway. Scheer had been so much weakened in the first himself, with the battle squadrons of the half of 1916 that it could scarcely satisfy High Seas Fleet, was to follow, 50 miles the Allies’ expectations in the second. (80 km) behind, to catch Beatty’s forces in Verdun was one of the longest, bloodi- the gap once they had been lured east- est, and most ferocious battles of the ward across the North Sea in pursuit of war. French casualties during the whole Hipper. But the signal for the German The Stalemate Years Begin | 103 operation to begin, made in the afternoon brought to bear on the approaching of May 30, was intercepted and partially German ships, who could in turn reply decoded by the British. Before midnight, only with the forward guns of their lead- the whole British Grand Fleet was on its ing ships. The British ships in effect way to a rendezvous off Norway’s south- formed the horizontal stroke and the western coast and roughly across the German ships the vertical stroke of the planned route of the German fleet. letter “T,” with the British having deployed At 2:20 pm on May 31, when Admiral into line at a right angle to the German John Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet squadrons ships’ forward progress. This maneuver from Scapa Flow were still 65 miles (104.6 was in fact known as “crossing the ene- km) away to the north, Beatty’s advance my’s T” and was the ideal situation guard of light cruisers—5 miles (8 km) dreamed of by the tacticians of both ahead of his heavier ships—and Hipper’s navies, since by “crossing the T” one’s scouting group learned quite accidentally forces temporarily gained an overwhelm- of one another’s proximity. An hour later, ing superiority of firepower. the two lines were drawn up for battle, For the Germans, this was a moment and in the next 50 minutes the British of unparalleled risk. Three factors helped suffered severely, and the Indefatigable prevent the destruction of the German was sunk. When Beatty’s battle cruisers ships in this trap: their own excellent con- came up, however, the German cruisers, struction, the steadiness and discipline of in their turn, sustained such damage that their crews, and the poor quality of the Hipper sent a protective screen of British shells. The Lützow, the Derfflinger, German destroyers in to launch a torpedo and the battleship König led the line and attack. The British had lost another battle were under broadside fire from some 10 cruiser, the Queen Mary, before the Ger British battleships, yet their main guns man High Seas Fleet was sighted by a remained undamaged. They fought back British patrol to the south, at 4:35 pm. On to such effect that one of their salvoes fell this report Beatty ordered his ships north- full on the Invincible and blew it up. This ward, to lure the Germans toward the success, however, did little to relieve the Grand Fleet under Jellicoe’s command. intense bombardment from the other Not until 6:14 pm, after Jellicoe’s British ships, and the German fleet was squadrons and Beatty’s light cruisers had still pressing forward into the steel trap been within sight of one another for of the Grand Fleet. nearly a quarter of an hour, was the Relying on the magnificent seaman- German fleet precisely located—only just ship of the German crews, Scheer in time for Jellicoe to deploy his ships to extricated his fleet from the appalling the best advantage. Jellicoe arrayed the danger into which it had run by a simple Grand Fleet end-to-end in a line so that but, in practice, extremely difficult maneu- their combined broadsides could be ver. At 6:30 pm he ordered a turn of 180° 104 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power for all his ships at once, which was exe- ordered the Grand Fleet forward through cuted without collision. The German the screen of charging German battle battleships reversed course in unison and cruisers at that moment, the fate of the steamed out of the jaws of the trap, while German High Seas Fleet would likely German destroyers spread a smoke have been sealed. As it was, fearing and screen across their rear. The smoke and overestimating the danger of torpedo worsening visibility left Jellicoe in attacks from the approaching destroyers, doubt about what had happened, and Jellicoe ordered his fleet to turn away, the British had lost contact with the and the two lines of battleships steamed Germans by 6:45 pm. apart at a speed of more than 20 knots. Yet the British Grand Fleet had They did not meet again, and when dark- maneuvered in such a way that it ended ness fell, Jellicoe could not be sure of the up between the German High Seas Fleet route of the German retreat. By 3:00 am and the German ports, and this was the on June 1 the Germans had safely eluded situation Scheer most dreaded, and so at their pursuers. 6:55 pm Scheer ordered another reverse Despite their various tactical suc- turn, perhaps hoping to pass around the cesses in the battle, the British had rear of the British fleet. But the result for sustained greater losses than the Germans him was a worse position than that from in both ships and men. In all, the British which he had just escaped: his battle line lost three battle cruisers, three cruisers, had become compressed, and his leading eight destroyers, and 6,274 officers and ships found themselves again under men in the Battle of Jutland. The Germans intense bombardment from the broad- lost one battleship, one battle cruiser, four side array of the British ships. Jellicoe light cruisers, five destroyers, and 2,545 had succeeded in crossing the Germans’ officers and men. The losses inflicted on “T” again. The Lützow now received irrep- the British, however, were not enough to arable damage, and many other German affect the numerical superiority of their ships were damaged at this point. At 7:15 fleet over the Germans in the North Sea, pm, therefore, to cause a diversion and where their domination remained practi- win time, Scheer ordered his battle cruis- cally unchallengeable during the course ers and destroyers ahead to virtually of the war. Henceforth, the German High immolate themselves in a massed charge Seas Fleet chose not to venture out from against the British ships. the safety of its home ports. This was the crisis of the Battle of Jutland. As the German battle cruisers Russia Stumbles and destroyers steamed forward, the German battleships astern became con- In the hope of diverting German strength fused and disorganized in trying to from the attack at Verdun on the West execute their reverse turn. Had Jellicoe ern Front, the Russians gallantly but The Stalemate Years Begin | 105 prematurely opened an offensive north and Buchach (Buczacz) in the central sec- and south of Lake Naroch (Narocz, east of tor, and Czernowitz at the southern end. Vilna) on March 18, 1916. The offensive Having struck first in the Tarnopol and continued until March 27, though they Czernowitz sectors on June 4, Brusilov won very little ground at great cost and on June 5 took the Austrians wholly by only for a short time. They then reverted surprise when he launched A. M. Kaledin’s to preparations for a major offensive in army toward Lutsk. The Austrian defenses July. The main blow, it was planned, crumbled at once, and the attackers should be delivered by A. E. Evert’s cen- pushed their way between two Austrian tral group of armies, assisted by an inward armies. As the offensive was developed, movement of A. N. Kuropatkin’s army in the Russians were equally successful in the the northern sector of the front. But at the Buchach sector and in their thrust into same time, A. A. Brusilov’s southwestern Bukovina, which culminated in the cap- army group was authorized to make a ture of Czernowitz. By June 20, Brusilov’s supposedly diversionary attack in its own forces had captured 200,000 prisoners. sectors. In the event, Brusilov’s attack Evert and Kuropatkin, however, became by far the more important opera- instead of striking in accordance with the tion of the offensive. agreed plan, found excuses for procrasti- Surprised by the Austrians’ Asiago nation. The Russian chief of general staff, offensive in May, Italy promptly appealed M. V. Alekseyev, therefore tried to trans- to the Russians for action to draw the fer this inert couple’s reserves to Brusilov, enemy’s reserves away from the Italian but the Russians’ lateral communications fronts, and the Russians responded by were so poor that the Germans had time advancing their timetable again. Brusilov to reinforce the Austrians before Brusilov undertook to start his attack on June 4, was strong enough to make the most of on the understanding that Evert’s should his victory. Although his forces in be launched 10 days later. Bukovina advanced as far as the Thus began an offensive on the Carpathian Mountains, a counterstroke Eastern Front that was to be Imperial by Alexander von Linsingen’s Germans Russia’s last really effective military in the Lutsk sector checked Russian effort. Popularly known as Brusilov’s progress at the decisive point. Further offensive, it had such an astonishing ini- Russian drives from the centre of tial success as to revive Allied dreams Brusilov’s front were launched in July. about the irresistible Russian “steam- However, by early September the oppor- roller.” Instead, its ultimate achievement tunity of exploiting the summer’s victory was to sound the death knell of the was lost. Brusilov had driven the Austrians Russian monarchy. Brusilov’s four armies from Bukovina and from much of eastern were distributed along a very wide front, Galicia and had inflicted huge losses of with Lutsk at the northern end, Tarnopol men and equipment on them, but he had 106 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

In focus: u-Boats By the eve of World War I, all of the major navies included submarines in their fl eets, but these craft were relatively small, were considered of questionable military value, and generally were intended for coastal operations. The most signifi cant exception to the concept of coastal activity was the German Deutschland class of merchant U-boats, each 315 feet (96 m) long with two large cargo compartments. These submarines could carry 700 tons of cargo at 12- to 13-knot speeds on the surface and at 7 knots submerged. The Deutschland itself became the U-155 when fi tted with torpedo tubes and deck guns, and, with seven similar submarines, it served in a combat role during the latter stages of the war. In comparison, the “standard” submarine of World War I measured slightly over 200 feet (61 m) in length and displaced less than 1,000 tons on the surface. The prewar submarines generally had been armed with self-propelled torpedoes for attacking enemy ships. During the war, submarines also were fi tted with deck guns. This permitted them to approach enemy merchant ships on the surface and signal them to stop for searching, as part of an early war policy, and later to sink small or unarmed ships that did not warrant expenditure of torpedoes. Most war-built submarines had one and sometimes two guns of about 3- or 4-inch (76.2 or 101.6 mm) calibre; however, several later German submarines carried 150-millimetre (5.9 in) guns (including the Deutschland class in military confi guration). A notable armament variation was the submarine modifi ed to lay mines during covert mis- sions off an enemy’s harbours. The Germans constructed several specialized submarines with vertical mine tubes through their hulls; some U-boats carried 48 mines in cargo, in addition to their torpedoes. Also noteworthy was the development, during the war, of the concept of an antisubmarine submarine. British submarines sank 17 German U-boats during the confl ict; the early submarine- versus-submarine successes led to British development of the R-class submarine intended specifi cally for this role. Antisubmarine craft were relatively small, 163 feet (49.7 m) long and displacing 410 tons on the surface, with only one propeller (most contemporary submarines had two). Diesel engines could drive them at nine knots on the surface, but once submerged, large batteries permitted their electric motors to drive them underwater at the high speed of 15 knots for two hours. (Ten knots was a common speed for submerged submarines until after World War II.) Thus, they were both maneuverable and fast. Advanced underwater listening equipment (asdic, or sonar) was installed, and six forward torpedo tubes made these craft potent weapons. Although these submarines appeared too late into the war to have any actual eff ect on its outcome, they pioneered a new concept in the development of the submarine. All World War I–era submarines were propelled by diesels on the surface and by electric motors submerged, except for the British Swordfi sh and K class. These submarines, intended to operate as scouts for surface warships, required the high speeds then available only from steam turbines. The K-boats steamed at 23.5 knots on the surface, while electric motors gave them a 10-knot submerged speed. The Stalemate Years Begin | 107 depleted his own armies by about year led to his being replaced by 1,000,000 men in doing so. However, a Hindenburg as chief of the German gen- large portion of this number consisted of eral staff on August 29, Falkenhayn’s deserters or prisoners. This loss seriously recommendation that Mackensen should undermined both the morale and the direct a Bulgarian attack on southern material strength of Russia. Brusilov’s Romania was approved. Falkenhayn offensive also had indirect results of himself went to command on the great consequence. First, it had com- Transylvanian front, for which five pelled the Germans to withdraw at least German, as well as two more Austrian seven divisions from the Western Front, divisions were found available as where they could be ill spared from the reinforcements. Verdun and Somme battles. Second, it Mackensen’s forces from Bulgaria hastened Romania’s unfortunate entry stormed the Turtucaia (Tutrakan) bridge- into the war. head on the Danube southeast of Disregarding Romania’s military Bucharest on September 5. His subse- backwardness, the Romanian govern- quent advance eastward into the Dobruja ment of Ionel Brătianu declared war caused the Romanians to switch their against Austria-Hungary on Aug. 27, reserves to that quarter instead of rein- 1916. In entering the war, Romania suc- forcing their Transylvanian enterprise, cumbed to the Allies’ offers of which thereupon came to a halt. Austro-Hungarian territory, and to the Falkenhayn soon attacked. First, at the belief that the Central Powers would be southern end of the 200-mile (321.9 km) too much preoccupied with other fronts front, he threw one of the Romanian col- to mount any serious riposte against umns back into the Roter Turm (Turnu a Romanian offensive. Some 12 of Roşu) Pass, then in the centre, he Romania’s 23 divisions, in three columns, defeated another at Kronstadt (Braşov) thus began on August 28 a slow west- by October 9. For a month, however, ward advance across Transylvania, where the Romanians withstood Falkenhayn’s at first there were only five Austro- attempts to drive them out of the Vulcan Hungarian divisions to oppose them. and Szurduk (Surduc) passes into The riposte of the Central Powers was Walachia. But just before winter snows swifter than the progress of the invasion. blocked the way, the Germans took the Germany, Turkey, and Bulgaria declared two passes and advanced southward to war against Romania on August 28, Tîrgu Jiu, where they won another vic- August 30, and September 1, respectively. tory. Then Mackensen, having turned Falkenhayn had plans already prepared westward from the Dobruja, crossed the for attacking Romania. Though the mis- Danube near Bucharest, on which his carriage of his overall program for the and Falkenhayn’s armies converged. 108 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Bucharest fell to the Central Powers on to supporting the chief of the Admiralty December 6, and the Romanian Army, a staff, Henning von Holtzendorff, in his crippled force, could only fall back north- arguments against the German chancel- eastward into Moldavia, where it had the lor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, belated support of Russian troops. After and the foreign minister, Gottlieb von Romania’s defeat, the Central Powers had Jagow. Whereas Bethmann and some access to its wheat fields and oil wells, other statesmen were hoping for a nego- and the Russians had 300 more miles tiated peace, Hindenburg and Ludendorff (482.8 km) of front to defend. were committed to a military victory. The British naval blockade, however, threat- German Strategy and ened to starve Germany into collapse Submarine Warfare before a military victory could be achieved, and soon Hindenburg and Both Admiral Scheer and General Ludendorff got their way: it was decided Falkenhayn doubted whether the German that, from Feb. 1, 1917, submarine warfare submarines could do any decisive dam- should be unrestricted and overtly so. age to Great Britain so long as their warfare was restricted in deference to the Wilson Offers to Mediate protests of the United States, following a Peace Treaty and the the sinking of so many ships carrying Zimmermann Telegram large numbers of neutral passengers. After a tentative reopening of the sub- There were few efforts by any of the marine campaign on Feb. 4, 1916, the Central or Allied Powers to achieve a German naval authorities in March gave negotiated peace in the first two years of the U-boats permission to sink without the war. By 1916 the most promising signs warning all ships except passenger vessels. for peace seemed to exist only in the The German civilian statesmen, however, intentions of two statesmen in power— who paid due attention to their diplomats’ the German chancellor Bethmann and warnings about U.S. opinion, were soon the U.S. president Woodrow Wilson. able to prevail over the generals and the Wilson, having proclaimed the neutrality admirals. On May 4 the scope of the sub- of the United States in August 1914, strove marine campaign was again severely for the next two years to maintain it. Early restricted. in 1916 he sent his confidant, Colonel The controversy between the states- Edward M. House, to sound London and men and the advocates of unrestricted Paris about the possibility of U.S. media- warfare was not dead yet. Hindenburg, tion between the belligerents. House’s chief of the general staff from August 29, conversations with the British foreign had Ludendorff as his quartermaster secretary, Sir Edward Grey, resulted in the general. Ludendorff was quickly won over House–Grey Memorandum (Feb. 22, The Stalemate Years Begin | 109

The Zimmermann Telegram, decrypted and translated, 1918, changed U.S. opinion on war against Germany. National Archives and Records Administration 110 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

1916), declaring that the United States The Germans, on the other hand, suspect- might enter the war if Germany rejected ing collusion between Wilson and the Wilson’s mediation but that Great Britain Allies, agreed in principle to the opening reserved the right to initiate U.S. media- of negotiations but left their statement of tory action. However, by mid-1916, the December 12 practically unchanged. imminent approach of the presidential Privately, they decided that Wilson election in the United States caused should not actually take part in any nego- Wilson to suspend his moves for peace. tiation that he might bring about. By In Germany, meanwhile, Bethmann mid-January 1917, the December over- had succeeded, with difficulty, in post- tures had ended. poning the declaration of unrestricted Strangely enough, Wilson’s next appeal, submarine warfare. Wilson, though he a speech on Jan. 22, 1917 preaching inter- was reelected president on Nov. 7, 1916, national conciliation and a “peace without let another month pass without working victory,” elicited a confidential response toward peace, and during that period the from the British expressing readiness to German victory over Romania was taking accept his mediation. In the opposite place. Thus, while Bethmann lost patience camp, Austria-Hungary would likewise with waiting for Wilson to act, the German have listened readily to peace proposals, military leaders came momentarily to but Germany had already decided, on think that Germany, from a position of January 9, to declare unrestricted sub- strength, might now propose a peace marine warfare. Bethmann’s message acceptable to themselves. Having been restating Germany’s peace terms and constrained to agree with the militarists inviting Wilson to persevere in his that if his proposals were rejected by the efforts was delivered on January 31, but Allies, unrestricted submarine warfare was paradoxically accompanied by the should be resumed, Bethmann was announcement that unrestricted sub- allowed to announce, on December 12, marine warfare would begin the next day. the terms of a German offer of peace— Wilson severed diplomatic relations terms, however, that were militarily so between the United States and Germany far-reaching as to preclude the Allies’ on Feb. 3, 1917, and asked Congress, on possible acceptance of them. The main February 26, for power to arm merchant- stumbling block was Germany’s insistence men and to take all other measures to upon its annexation of Belgium and of the protect U.S. commerce. But American occupied portion of northeastern France. opinion was still not ready for war, and On Dec. 18, 1916, Wilson invited both the Germans wisely abstained from belligerent camps to state their “war aims.” attacks on U.S. shipping. What finally The Allies were secretly encouraged by changed the tenor of public feeling was the U.S. secretary of state to offer terms the publication of the Zimmermann too sweeping for German acceptance. Telegram. The Stalemate Years Begin | 111

Arthur Zimmermann had succeeded December 1916 by a coalition under Jagow as Germany’s secretary of state for David Lloyd George. During that same foreign affairs in November 1916. In that month in France the post of commander same month the Mexican president, in chief of the army was transferred from Venustiano Carranza, whose country’s Joffre to General Robert Nivelle. relations with the United States had As for the military situation, the been critical since March, had virtually fighting strength of the British Army on offered bases on the Mexican coast to the Western Front had grown to about the Germans for their submarines. 1,200,000 men and was still growing. That Zimmermann sent a coded telegram to of the French Army had been increased his ambassador in Mexico on Jan. 16, by the incorporation of colonial troops 1917, instructing him to propose to the to some 2,600,000, so that, including the Mexican government that if the United Belgians, the Allies disposed an esti- States should enter the war against mated 3,900,000 men against 2,500,000 Germany, Mexico should become Ger Germans. To the Allies, these figures many’s ally with a view to recovering suggested an offensive on their part. Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona from the Nivelle, who owed his appointment United States. Intercepted and decoded to the contrast between the brilliant suc- by the British Admiralty Intelligence, this cess of his recent counterattacks at message was communicated to Wilson Verdun and the meagre results of Joffre’s on February 24. It was published in the strategy of attrition, was deeply imbued U.S. press on March 1, and it immediately with the optimism of which experience set off a nationwide demand for war was by now curing Joffre. He also had against Germany. ideas of national glory and, accordingly, modified plans made by Joffre in such a Major developments way as to assign to the French Army the in 1917 determinant role in the offensive that, it was calculated, must decide the issue on Spring Offensives on the the Western Front in 1917. Nivelle’s plan Western Front in its final stage was that the British should make preparatory attacks not only The western Allies were, with good rea- north of the wilderness of the old Somme son, profoundly dissatisfied with the poor battlefields but also south of them (in the results of their enterprises of 1916, and sector previously held by French troops). this dissatisfaction was signalized by Also, these preparatory attacks should two major changes made at the end of attract the German reserves. Finally, that the year. In Great Britain, the government the French should launch the major offen- of H. H. Asquith, already turned into a sive in Champagne (their forces in that coalition in May 1915, was replaced in sector having been strengthened both by 112 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power new troops from the overseas colonies and Coucy) were abandoned to the and by those transferred from the Allies, but the area was left as a desert. Somme). The tactics Nivelle planned to The roads were mined, trees cut down, use were based on those he had employed wells fouled, and houses demolished, and so successfully at Verdun. But he placed the ruins were strewn with explosive an optimistic overreliance on his theory booby traps. of combining “great violence with great This baffling and unexpected German mass,” which basically consisted of withdrawal dislocated Nivelle’s plan, but intense artillery bombardments followed unperturbed by warnings from all quar- by massive frontal attacks. ters about the changed situation, Nivelle Meanwhile, Ludendorff had foreseen insisted on carrying it out. The Battle of a renewal of the Allied offensive on the Arras, with which the British started the Somme, and he used his time to frustrate offensive on April 9, 1917, began well Nivelle’s plans and to strengthen the enough for the attackers. This successful German front in two different ways. First, beginning was thanks to much-improved the hitherto rather shallow defenses in artillery methods and to a new poison gas Champagne were by mid-February shell that paralyzed the hostile artillery. reinforced with a third line, out of range Vimy Ridge, at the northern end of the of the French artillery. Second, Ludendorff 15-mile battlefront, fell to the Canadian decided to anticipate the attack by falling Corps. However, the exploitation of this back to a new and immensely strong line success was frustrated by the congestion of defense. This new line, called the of traffic in the British rear, and though Siegfriedstellung, or “Hindenburg Line,” the attack was continued until May 5, was rapidly constructed across the base stiffer German resistance prevented of the great salient formed by the German exploitation of the advances made in the lines between Arras and Reims. From the first five days. German position east of Arras, the line Nivelle’s own offensive in Champagne, ran southeastward and southward, pass- launched on April 16 on the Aisne front ing west of Cambrai and Saint-Quentin from Vailly eastward toward Craonne and to rejoin the old German line at Anizy Reims, proved to be a fiasco. The attack- (between Soissons and Laon). After a ing troops were trapped in a web of preliminary step backward on February machine-gun fire, and by nightfall the 23, a massive withdrawal of all German French had advanced about 600 yards troops from the westernmost bulges of (548.6 m) instead of the 6 miles (9.7 km) the great salient to the new and shorter anticipated in Nivelle’s program. Only on line was smoothly and quickly made on the wings was any appreciable progress March 16. The major towns within the achieved. The results compared favour- areas evacuated by the Germans (i.e., ably with Joffre’s offensives, as some Bapaume, Péronne, Roye, Noyon, Chauny, 28,000 German prisoners were taken at a The Stalemate Years Begin | 113 cost to the French of just under 120,000 until new factors had changed the condi- casualties. But the eff ect on French morale tions suffi ciently to justify taking the was worse, because Nivelle’s fantastic off ensive with a reasonable hope of suc- predictions of the off ensive’s success cess. His constant advice was: “We must were more widely known than Joff re’s wait for the Americans and the tanks.” had ever been. With the collapse of Tanks were now belatedly being built in Nivelle’s plan, his fortunes were buried large numbers, and this emphasis on in the ruins, and after some face-saving arming armoured vehicles showed a delay he was superseded as commander dawning recognition that machine war- in chief by Pétain on May 15, 1917. fare had superseded mass infantry This change was made too late to warfare. avert a more harmful sequel, for in late April a mutiny broke out among the America Declares War French infantry and spread until 16 French army corps were aff ected. The authorities After the rupture of diplomatic relations chose to ascribe it to seditious propa- with Germany on Feb. 3, 1917, events ganda, but the mutinous outbreaks always pushed the United States inexorably occurred when exhausted troops were along the road to war. On March 9, using ordered back into the line. The aggravated his authority as commander in chief, troops signaled their grievances by such Wilson ordered the arming of American signifi cant cries as: “We’ll defend the merchant ships so that they could defend trenches, but we won’t attack.” Pétain themselves against German U-boat restored tranquillity by addressing and attacks. Three U.S. merchant ships were meeting the just grievances of the troops. His reputation for sober judgment restored the troops’ confi - dence in their leaders, and he made it clear that he would avoid future reckless attacks on the Ger man lines. However, following the April mutinies, the military strength of France could never be fully restored during the war. U.S. Army recruits at Camp Pike, Arkansas, in 1918, following Pétain insisted that the the United States’ entry into World War I in April 1917. only rational strategy was Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. to keep to the defensive 114 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Army recruiting poster featuring “Uncle Sam,” designed by James Montgomery Flagg, 1917. The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. The Stalemate Years Begin | 115 sunk by German submarines during if the United States went to war, the Allies’ March 16–18, with heavy loss of life. military eff ort against Germany would be Supported by his Cabinet, by most news- upheld by U.S. supplies and by enormous papers, and by a large segment of public extensions of credit. These expectations opinion, Wilson made the decision on were amply and decisively fulfi lled. The March 20 for the United States to declare United States’ production of armaments war on Germany. On March 21, he called was to meet not only its own needs but Congress to meet in special session on also France’s and Great Britain’s. In this April 2. He delivered a ringing war mes- sense, the American economic contribu- sage to that body, and the war resolution tion alone was decisive in the infl uence of was approved by the Senate on April 3 its entry into the war. By April 1, 1917, and by the House of Representatives on the Allies had exhausted their means of April 6. The presidential declaration of paying for essential supplies from the war followed immediately. United States, and it is diffi cult to see how The entry of the United States was they could have maintained the war eff ort the turning point of the war, because it if the United States had remained neutral. made the eventual defeat of Germany American loans to the Allies worth possible. It had been foreseen in 1916 that $7,000,000,000 between 1917 and the end

New recruits to the U.S. Army prepare to depart from Woodhaven, Long Island, N.Y., c. 1918. The sign at the front reads, “Express, Woodhaven to Berlin, No Sleepers.” FPG/Hulton Archive/Getty Images 116 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

In focus: SCHENCK V. UNITED STATES

On March 3, 1919, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Schenck v. United States that the freedom of speech protection aﬀ orded in the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment could be restricted if the words spoken or printed represented to society a “clear and present danger.” In June 1917, shortly after the United States’ entry into World War I, Congress passed the Espionage Act, which made it illegal during wartime to “willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies . . . [or] willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States.” Charles T. Schenck was general secretary of the U.S. Socialist Party, which opposed the implementation of a military draft in the country. The party printed and distributed some 15,000 leaﬂ ets that called for men who were drafted to resist military service. Schenck was subsequently arrested for having violated the Espionage Act; he was convicted on three counts and sentenced to 10 years in prison for each count. Oral arguments at the Supreme Court were heard on Jan. 9, 1919, with Schenck’s counsel arguing that the Espionage Act was unconstitutional and that his client was simply exercising his freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. On March 3, the court issued a unanimous ruling upholding the Espionage Act and Schenck’s conviction. Writing for the court, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., argued: “Words which, ordinarily and in many places, would be within the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment may become subject to prohibition when of such a nature and used in such circumstances as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils which Congress has a right to prevent.” Throughout the 1920s, however, the court abandoned the clear and present danger rule and instead utilized an earlier-devised “bad [or dangerous] tendency” doctrine, which enabled speech to be limited even more broadly, as seen in, for example, Gitlow v. New York (1925). of the war maintained the fl ow of U.S. only 85,000 U.S. troops in France when arms and food across the Atlantic. the Germans launched their last great The American military contribution off ensive in March 1918. However, there was as important as the economic one. A were 1,200,000 there by the following system of conscription was introduced by September. The U.S. commander in the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, Europe was General John J. Pershing. but many months were required for the The U.S. Navy was the second largest raising, training, and dispatch to Europe in the world, Great Britain’s Royal Navy of an expeditionary force. There were still being the largest, when America entered The Stalemate Years Begin | 117

Primary Document: George M. Cohan’s “Over There”

“Over There” was actor and songwriter George M. Cohan’s main contribution to the U.S. war eﬀ ort— and no meager contribution it was. Enrico Caruso sang it on the steps of the New York Public Library and sold thousands of dollars worth of Liberty Bonds, and it was adopted by the men of the American Expeditionary Force as their favorite marching song. Congress authorized Cohan a special medal for the song in 1940, and it was sung by a new generation of American soldiers in World War II. Legion Airs: Songs of the Armed Forces, Lee O. Smith, ed., New York, 1960.

Johnnie get your gun, get your gun, get your gun, Take it on the run, on the run, on the run; Hear them calling you and me; Every son of liberty. Hurry right away, no delay, go today, Make your daddy glad, to have had such a lad, Tell your sweetheart not to pine, To be proud her boy’s in line. Chorus: Over there, over there, Send the word, send the word over there, That the Yanks are coming, the Yanks are coming, The drums rum-tumming everywhere. So prepare, say a prayer, Send the word, send the word to beware, We’ll be over, we’re coming over, And we won’t come back till it’s over over there. Johnnie get your gun, get your gun, get your gun, Johnnie show the Hun, you’re a son-of-a-gun, Hoist the fl ag and let her fl y, Like true heroes do or die. Pack your little kit, show your grit, do your bit, Soldiers to the ranks from the towns and the tanks, Make your mother proud of you, And to liberty be true. the war in 1917. The Navy soon aban- chasers so desperately needed to protect doned its plans for the construction of Allied shipping from the U-boats. By July battleships and instead concentrated on 1917, there were already 35 U.S. destroyers building the destroyers and submarine stationed at Queenstown (Cobh) on the 118 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power coast of Ireland—enough to supplement poorly trained, and poorly commanded British destroyers for a really effective and had suffered a long series of defeats. transatlantic convoy system. By the end The soviets’ propaganda—including the of the war, there were more than 380 U.S. notorious Order No. 1 of the Petrograd craft stationed overseas. Soviet (March 14, 1917), which called for The U.S. declaration of war also set committees of soldiers and sailors to take an example to other states in the Western control of their units’ arms and to ignore Hemisphere. Cuba, Panama, Haiti, Brazil, any opposition from their officers— Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and served to subvert the remnants of Honduras were all at war with Germany discipline in troops who were already by the end of July 1918. The Dominican deeply demoralized. Republic, Peru, Uruguay, and Ecuador But the leaders of the provisional contented themselves with the severance government foresaw that a German vic- of relations. tory in the war would bode ill for Russia in the future, and they were also con- The Russian Revolutions scious of their nation’s obligations toward the western Allies. A. F. Kerensky, minis- The Russian Revolution of March ter of war from May 1917, thought that a (February, Old Style) 1917 put an end to victorious offensive would enhance the the autocratic monarchy of Imperial new government’s authority, besides Russia and replaced it with a provisional relieving pressure on the Western Front. government. But the latter’s authority The offensive, however, which General was at once contested by soviets, or L. G. Kornilov launched against the “councils of workers’ and soldiers’ depu- Austrians in eastern Galicia on July 1, ties,” who claimed to represent the masses 1917, was brought to a sudden halt by of the people and, thus, the rightful con- German reinforcements after 10 days of ductors of the revolution. The March spectacular advances, and it turned into a Revolution was an event of tremendous catastrophic rout in the next three weeks. magnitude. Militarily, it appeared to the By October the advancing Germans had western Allies as a disaster and to the Cen won control of most of Latvia and of the tral Powers as a golden opportunity. approaches to the Gulf of Finland. While the Russian Army remained in the Meanwhile, anarchy was spreading field against the Central Powers with a throughout Russia. The numerous non- broken spirit, the Russian people were Russian peoples of the former empire utterly tired of a war that the imperial were one after another claiming autonomy regime for its own reasons had under- or independence from Russia—whether taken without being morally or materially spontaneously or at the prompting of the prepared for it. The Russian army had Germans in occupation of their countries. been poorly armed, poorly supplied, Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, The Stalemate Years Begin | 119

Vladimir Lenin addresses a rally gathered in Moscow, 1917. Popperfoto/Getty Images and Poles were, by the end of 1917, all in Revolution spelled the end of Russia’s various stages of the dissidence from participation in the war. Lenin’s decree which the independent states of the post- on land, of November 8, undermined the war period were to emerge. At the same Eastern Front by provoking a homeward time, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, rush of soldiers anxious to profi t from the and Azerbaijanis were no less active in expropriation of their former landlords. their own nationalist movements. On November 8, likewise, Lenin issued The provisional government’s author- his decree on peace, which off ered nego- ity and infl uence were rapidly fading away tiations to all belligerents but precluded in Russia proper during the late summer annexations and indemnities, and stipu- and autumn of 1917. The Bolshevik lated a right of self-determination for Revolution of November (October, Old all peoples concerned. Finally, on Novem- Style) 1917 overthrew the provisional ber 26, the new Bolshevik government government and brought to power the unilaterally ordered a cessation of hostili- Marx ist Bolsheviks under the leader- ties both against the Central Powers and ship of Vladimir Lenin . The Bolshevik against the Turks. 120 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Primary Document: The archangel Expedition After the overthrow of the Kerensky regime by the Bolsheviks in the October 1917 revolution, the new rulers of Russia immediately set about ending their country’s involvement in the World War. Public opinion in western Europe and in America had been sympathetic to the revolution at ﬁ rst, but sentiment changed when the Lenin-Trotsky regime sued for a separate peace with Germany in March 1918. For a time, there was hope that the White, or anti-Bolshevik, Russians would be able to reinstate the “legitimate” government of the country. To this end, several detachments of American troops were sent to join Allied forces already in Archangel in northern Russia. The following aide-mémoire, sent by Secretary of State Robert Lansing to the Allied ambassadors on July 17, 1918, explained U.S. policy with regard to Russia. [United States Department of State] Papers Relating to Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Supplement on Russia, Vol. II, pp. 287–290.

The whole heart of the people of the United States is in the winning of this war. The controlling purpose of the government of the United States is to do everything that is necessary and eff ective to win it. It wishes to cooperate in every practicable way with the Allied governments, and to cooperate ungrudgingly; for it has no ends of its own to serve and believes that the war can be won only by common counsel and intimate concert of action. It has sought to study every proposed policy or action in which its cooperation has been asked in this spirit, and states the following conclusions in the confi dence that, if it fi nds itself obliged to decline participation in any undertaking or course of action, it will be understood that it does so only because it deems itself precluded from participating by imperative considerations either of policy or of fact. In full agreement with the Allied governments and upon the unanimous advice of the Supreme War Council, the government of the United States adopted, upon its entrance into the war, a plan for taking part in the fi ghting on the Western front into which all its resources of men and material were to be put, and put as rapidly as possible; and it has carried out that plan with energy and success, pressing its execution more and more rapidly forward and literally putting into it the entire energy and executive force of the nation. This was its response, its very willing and hearty response, to what was the unhesitating judgment alike of its own military advisers and of the advisers of the Allied governments. It is now considering, at the suggestion of the Supreme War Council, the possibility of making very considerable additions even to this immense program which, if they should prove feasible at all, will tax the industrial processes of the United States and the shipping facilities of the whole group of associated nations to the utmost. It has thus concentrated all its plans and all its resources upon this single absolutely necessary object. In such circumstances it feels it to be its duty to say that it cannot, so long as the military situation on the Western front remains critical, consent to break or slacken the force of its present eff ort by diverting any part of its military force to other points or objectives. The United States is at a great distance from the fi eld of action on the Western front; it is The Stalemate Years Begin | 121 at a much greater distance from any other fi eld of action. The instrumentalities by which it is to handle its armies and its stores have at great cost and with great diffi culty been created in France. They do not exist elsewhere. It is practicable for her to do a great deal in France; it is not practicable for her to do anything of importance or on a large scale upon any other fi eld. The American government, therefore, very respectfully requests its associates to accept its deliberate judgment that it should not dissipate its force by attempting important operations elsewhere. It regards the Italian front as closely coordinated with the Western front, however, and is willing to divert a portion of its military forces from France to Italy if it is the judgment and wish of the Supreme Command that it should do so. It wishes to defer to the decision of the commander in chief in this matter, as it would wish to defer in all others, particularly because it considers these two fronts so closely related as to be practically but separate parts of a single line and because it would be necessary that any American troops sent to Italy should be subtracted from the number used in France and be actually transported across French territory from the ports now used by the armies of the United States. It is the clear and fi xed judgment of the government of the United States, arrived at after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia, that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prose- cution of our main design—to win the war against Germany. It cannot, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would, in its judgment, even supposing it to be effi cacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the east, be merely a method of making use of Russia, not a method of serving her. Her people could not profi t by it, if they profi ted by it at all, in time to save them from their present distresses, and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies, not to reconstitute their own. Military action is admissible in Russia, as the government of the United States sees the circumstances, only to help the Czechoslovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any eff orts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or Allied troops can be employed, it submits, is to guard military stores which may subsequently be needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense. For helping the Czechoslovaks there is immediate necessity and suffi cient justifi cation. Recent developments have made it evident that that is in the interest of what the Russian people themselves desire, and the government of the United States is glad to contribute the small force at its disposal for that purpose. It yields, also, to the judgment of the Supreme Command in the matter of establishing a small force at Murmansk, to guard the military stores at Kola, and to make it safe for 122 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Russian forces to come together in organized bodies in the north. But it owes it to frank counsel to say that it can go no further than these modest and experimental plans. It is not in a position, and has no expectation of being in a position, to take part in organized intervention in adequate force from either Vladivostok or Murmansk and Archangel. It feels that it ought to add, also, that it will feel at liberty to use the few troops it can spare only for the purposes here stated and shall feel obliged to withdraw those forces in order to add them to the forces at the Western front if the plans in whose execution it is now intended that they should cooperate should develop into others inconsistent with the policy to which the government of the United States feels constrained to restrict itself. At the same time the government of the United States wishes to say with the utmost cordiality and goodwill that none of the conclusions here stated is meant to wear the least color of criticism of what the other governments associated against Germany may think it wise to undertake. It wishes in no way to embarrass their choices of policy. All that is intended here is a perfectly frank and defi nite statement of the policy which the United States feels obliged to adopt for herself and in the use of her own military forces. The government of the United States does not wish it to be understood that in so restricting its own activities it is seeking, even by implication, to set limits to the action or to defi ne the policies of its associates. It hopes to carry out the plans for safeguarding the rear of the Czechoslovaks operating from Vladivostok in a way that will place it and keep it in close cooperation with a small military force like its own from Japan and, if necessary, from the other Allies, and that will assure it of the cordial accord of all the Allied powers; and it proposes to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplates any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal aff airs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or hereafter, but that each of the associated powers has the single object of aff ording such aid as shall be acceptable, and only such aid as shall be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own aff airs, their own territory, and their own destiny. It is the hope and purpose of the government of the United States to take advantage of the earliest opportunity to send to Siberia a commission of merchants, agricultural experts, labor advisers, Red Cross representatives, and agents of the Young Men’s Christian Association accustomed to organizing the best methods of spreading useful information and rendering educational help of a modest sort, in order in some systematic manner to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the people there in every way for which opportunity may open. The execution of this plan will follow and will not be permitted to embarrass the military assistance rendered in the rear of the westward- moving forces of the Czechoslovaks. The Stalemate Years Begin | 123

An armistice between Lenin’s Russia Eleuthérios Venizélos , leader of the and the Central Powers was signed at Liberal Party, favoured the Allied cause. Brest-Litovsk on Dec. 15, 1917. The ensu- As prime minister from 1910, Venizélos ing peace negotiations were complicated. wanted Greece to participate in the Allies’ On the one hand, Germany wanted peace Dardanelles enterprise against Turkey in in the east in order to be free to transfer 1915, but his arguments were overruled troops thence to the Western Front. At by the general staff . The Allies occupied the same time, Germany was concerned Lemnos and Lesbos regardless of about exploiting the principle of national Greece’s neutrality. Constantine dis- self-determination in order to transfer as missed Venizélos from offi ce twice in much territory as possible into its own 1915, but Venizélos still commanded a safe orbit from that of revolutionary majority in Parliament. The Bulgarians’ Russia. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks occupation of Greek Macedonia in sum- wanted peace in order to be free to con- mer 1916 provoked another political solidate their regime in the east with a crisis. Venizélos left Athens for Crete late view to being able to extend it westward in September, set up a government of his as soon as the time should be ripe. The Germans, despite the armistice, invaded the Ukraine to cooperate with the Ukrain- ian nationalists against the Bolsheviks there, and furthermore resumed their advance in the Baltic countries and in Belorussia. Following this, Lenin rejected his colleague Leon Trotsky’s stopgap policy (“neither peace nor war”) and accepted Germany’s terms in order to save the Bolshevik Revolution. By the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, 1918), Soviet Russia recognized Finland and the Ukraine as independent; renounced control over Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and most of Belorussia; and ceded Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi to Turkey.

Greek Affairs Greek prime minister Eleutherios Greece’s attitude toward the war was long Venizelos, 1914. Topical Press Agency/ uncertain: whereas King Constantine I Hulton Archive/Getty Images and the general staff stood for neutrality, 124 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power own there, and transferred it early in Oct. 24, 1917, began to force its way over October to Salonika. On November 27, the barrier of the Julian Alps at the north- Venizélo’s government declared war on eastern corner of the Venetian salient, Germany and Bulgaria. Finally, the with Caporetto approximately opposite Allies, on June 11, 1917, deposed King the middle point of the line. The Italians, Constantine. Venizélos then returned to completely surprised by this thrust, which Athens to head a reunified Greek govern- threatened their forces both to the north ment, which on June 27 declared war on and to the south, fell back in confusion. the Central Powers. Below’s van reached Udine, the former site of the Italian general headquarters, The Battle of Caporetto by October 28 and was on the Tagliamento River by October 31. Below’s success had On the Italian front, Cadorna’s 10th Battle far exceeded the hopes of the planners of of the Isonzo in May–June 1917 won very the offensive, and the Germans could not little ground. However, his 11th battle exploit their speedy advance as effec- strained Austrian resistance very severely, tively as they wished. Cadorna, with his especially from August 17 to Septem centre shattered, managed by precipitate ber 12, during which time General Luigi retreat to save the wings of his army. By Capello’s 2nd Army captured much of the November 9, he was able to rally his Bainsizza Plateau (Banjška Planota), remaining 300,000 troops behind the north of Gorizia. To avert an Austrian col- Piave River, north of Venice. The Italians lapse, Ludendorff decided that the had sustained about 500,000 casualties, Austrians must take the offensive against and 250,000 more had been taken pris- Italy and that he could, with difficulty, oner. General Armando Diaz was then lend them six German divisions for that appointed commander in chief in purpose. Cadorna’s place. The Italians managed The Austrian offensive against Italy to hold the Piave front against direct was boldly planned, very ably organized, assaults and against attempts to turn its and well executed. Two Austrian armies, left flank by an advance from the Trentino. under General Svetozar Borojević von The Italians’ defense was helped by Bojna, attacked the eastern end of the British and French reinforcements that Italians’ Venetian salient on the Bainsizza had been rushed to Italy when the col- Plateau and on the low ground near the lapse began. A conference of the military Adriatic shore. At the same time, the Ger and political leaders of the Allies was held man 14th Army, comprising the six German at Rapallo in November, and out of this divisions and nine Austrian ones under conference there sprang the joint Supreme Otto von Below, with Konrad Krafft von War Council at Versailles was established, Dellmensingen as his chief of staff, on as was a unified military command. The Stalemate Years Begin | 125

Britain Captures to one of victory for the British. However, Mesopotamia he died of cholera on Nov. 18, 1917. His successor in command in Mesopotamia The British forces in Mesopotamia, was Sir William Marshall. neglected hitherto and discouraged by the disaster at al-Kūt, received better Britain Captures Palestine attention from London in the second half of 1916. Sir Frederick Stanley Maude, who After assuming command in Egypt, became commander in chief in August, Allenby set his sights on advancing on did so much to restore their morale that Palestine. Allenby transferred his head- by December, he was ready to undertake quarters from Cairo to the Palestinian the recapture of al-Kūt as a first step front and devoted the summer of 1917 to toward capturing Baghdad. preparing a serious offensive against the By a series of outflanking movements, Turks. On the Turkish side, Falkenhayn, the British made their way gradually and now in command at Aleppo, was at this methodically up the Tigris, compelling time himself planning a drive into the the Turks to extend their defenses Sinai Peninsula for the autumn. However, upstream. When the final blow at al-Kūt the British were able to strike first. was delivered by a frontal attack on Feb. 22, The Turkish front in southern 1917, British forces were already crossing Palestine extended from Gaza, on the the river from the west bank behind the coast, southeastward to Abu Hureira (Tel town. However, though al-Kūt fell two Haror) and thence to the stronghold of days later, most of the Turkish garrison Beersheba. Allenby began his operation extricated itself from the threatened with a heavy bombardment of Gaza from encirclement. Unable to hold a new line October 20 onward, in order to disguise on the Diyālā River, the Turkish com- his real intention of achieving a break- mander, Kâzim Karabekir, evacuated through at Abu Hureira, a prerequisite in Baghdad, which the British entered on reaching Beersheba. When Beersheba March 11. In September the British posi- had been seized by converging move- tion in Baghdad was definitively secured ments on October 31, a feint attack on by the capture of ar-Ramādī, on the Gaza was launched next day to draw the Euphrates about 60 miles (96.6 km) to Turkish reserves thither. Then, the main the west. In early November, the main attack, delivered on November 6, broke Turkish force in Mesopotamia was driven through the weakened defenses at Abu from Tikrīt, on the Tigris midway between Hureira and into the plain of Philistia. Baghdad and Mosul. Falkenhayn had attempted a counter- Within a year, Maude changed the stroke at Beersheba, but the collapse of Mesopotamian scene from one of despair the Turkish centre necessitated a general 126 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power retreat. By November 14, the Turkish the flatness of the plain prevented any forces were split in two divergent groups, concealment of Haig’s preparations, and the port of Jaffa was taken, and Allenby a fortnight’s intensive bombardment wheeled his main force to the right for (4,500,000 shells from 3,000 guns) served an advance inland on Jerusalem. On to underline the obvious—without, how- December 9, the British successfully ever, destroying the German machine occupied Jerusalem. gunners’ concrete pillboxes. Thus, when the Third Battle of Ypres Summer and Fall Offensives began on July 31, only the left wing’s on the Western Front objectives were achieved. On the crucial right wing the attack was a failure. Four After Nivelle’s failure, Pétain decided to days later, the ground was already remain temporarily on the defensive, swampy. When the attack was resumed which gave Haig the opportunity to fulfill on August 16, very little more was won on his desire for a British offensive in the right, but Haig was still determined Flanders. Haig took the first step on June 7, to persist in his offensive. Between 1917, with a long-prepared attack on the September 20 and October 4, thanks to Messines Ridge, north of Armentières, on an improvement in the weather, the the southern flank of his Ypres salient. infantry was able to advance into posi- This attack by General Sir Herbert tions cleared by bombardment, but no Plumer’s 2nd Army proved an almost farther. Haig launched another futile complete success; it owed much to the attack on October 12, followed by three surprise effect of 19 huge mines simulta- more attacks, scarcely more successful, in neously fired after having been placed at the last 10 days of October. At last, on the end of long tunnels under the German November 6, when his troops advanced a front lines. The capture of the ridge very short distance and occupied the inflated Haig’s confidence. Despite the ruins of Passchendaele (Passendale), recommendations of General Sir Hubert barely 5 miles (8 km) beyond the starting Gough, in command of the 5th Army, to point of his offensive, Haig felt that use a step-by-step method for the offen- enough had been done. Having prophe- sive, Haig committed himself to Plumer’s sied a decisive success without “heavy view that they “go all out” for an early losses,” he in fact had lost 325,000 men breakthrough. Haig disregarded the well- and inflicted no comparable damage on founded meteorological forecast that from the Germans. the beginning of August, rain would be Pétain, less pretentious and merely turning the Flanders countryside into an testing what might be done with his reha- almost impassable swamp. The Germans, bilitated French Army, had at least as much meanwhile, were well aware that an offen- to show for himself as Haig. In August the sive was coming from the Ypres salient: French 2nd Army under General M.-L.-A. The Stalemate Years Begin | 127

Guillaumat fought the last battle of Verdun, in time, the advance came to a halt several winning back all the remainder of what miles short of Cambrai. A German counter- had been lost to the Germans in 1916. In stroke, on November 30, broke through on October General P.-A.-M. Maistre’s 10th the southern flank of the new British salient Army, in the Battle of Malmaison, took and threatened Byng’s whole army with the ridge of the Chemin des Dames, north disaster before being checked by a further of the Aisne to the east of Soissons, where British counterattack. In the end, three- the front in Champagne joined the front quarters of the ground that the British had in Picardy south of the Somme. won was reoccupied by the Germans and The British, at least, closed the year’s Cambrai was not captured. Even so, the campaign with an operation of some sig- Battle of Cambrai had proved that surprise nificance for the future. When the offensive and the tank in combination could unlock from Ypres died out in the Flanders mud, the trench barrier. they looked again at their tanks, of which they now had a considerable force The Far East but which they could hardly use profitably in the swamps. A Tank Corps officer, China’s entry into the war in 1917 on the Colonel J.F.C. Fuller, had already suggested side of the Allies was motivated not by a large-scale raid on the front southwest any grievance against the Central Powers of Cambrai, where a swarm of tanks, but by the Beijing government’s fear lest unannounced by any preparatory bom- Japan, a belligerent since 1914, should bardment, could be released across the monopolize the sympathies of the Allies rolling downland against the German and of the United States when Far Eastern trenches. This comparatively modest affairs came up for settlement after the war. scheme might have been wholly successful Accordingly, in March 1917 the Beijing if left unchanged, but the British command government severed its relations with transformed it: Sir Julian Byng’s 3rd Army Germany; and on August 14 China was not only to actually try to capture declared war not only on Germany but Cambrai but also to push on toward also on the western Allies’ other enemy, Valenciennes. On November 20, therefore, Austria-Hungary. China’s contribution to the attack was launched, with 324 fighting the Allied war effort was to prove negligible tanks leading Byng’s six divisions. The first in practical effects, however. massed assault of tanks in history took the Germans wholly by surprise, and the British Naval Operations achieved a far deeper penetration and at less cost than in any of their past offensives. Allied Convoys Unfortunately, however, all of Byng’s troops and tanks had been thrown into Since Germany’s previous restrictions the first blow, and, as he was not reinforced of its submarine warfare had been 128 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

In focus: The Battle of Cambrai

The Battle of Cambrai, a British off ensive from November to December 1917 on the Western Front, marked the fi rst large-scale, eff ective use of tanks in warfare. Carried out by the 3rd Army under General Sir Julian Byng in order to relieve pressure on the French front, the off ensive consisted of an assault against the Germans’ Hindenburg line along a 10-mile (16 km) front some 8 miles (12.9 km) west of Cambrai in northern France. The chosen terrain, rolling chalk downland, was especially suitable for tank movement. Nineteen British divisions were assembled for the off ensive, supported by tanks (476 in all, of which about 324 were fi ghting tanks; the rest were supply and service vehicles) and fi ve horsed cavalry divisions. For the initial attack, eight British divisions were launched against three German divisions. Attacking by complete surprise on November 20, the British fi ghting tanks ripped through German defenses in depth and took some 7,500 prisoners at low cost in casualties. Bad weather intervened, however, so that the cavalry could not exploit the breakthrough, and adequate infantry reinforcements were not available. By November 29 the off ensive had been halted after an advance of about 6 miles (9.7 km). On November 30 the Germans counterattacked with 20 divisions, and by December 5 the British had been driven back almost to their original positions. Casualties on both sides were nearly equal—about 45,000 each. Despite the British failure to exploit the initial success of their tanks, the battle demonstrated that armour was the key to a decision in the trenches on the Western Front.

motivated by fear of provoking the United shipping could be sunk at the monthly States into war, the U.S. declaration of war rate of 600,000 tons, the Allies, being in April 1917 removed any reason for the unable to build new merchant ships fast Germans to retreat again from their enough to replace those lost, could not already declared policy of unrestricted carry on the war for more than fi ve warfare. Consequently, the U-boats, hav- months. At the same time, the Germans, ing sunk 181 ships in January, 259 in who had 111 U-boats operational when February, and 325 in March, sank 430 the unrestricted campaign began, had more ships in April. The April sinkings embarked on an extensive building pro- represented 852,000 gross tons, to be gram that, when weighed against their compared both with the 600,000 postu- current losses of one or two U-boats lated by the German strategists as their per month, promised a substantial net monthly target and with the 700,000 that increase in the U-boats’ numbers. During the British in March had pessimistically April, one in every four of the merchant foretold for June. The Germans had cal- ships that sailed from British ports was culated that if the world’s merchant destined to be sunk, and by the end of The Stalemate Years Begin | 129

May the quantity of shipping available to from the United States sailed later in carry the vital foodstuffs and munitions May; ships using the South Atlantic to Great Britain had been reduced to only sailed in convoy from July 22. During 6,000,000 tons. the later months of 1917, the use of con- The April total, however, proved to be voys caused an abrupt fall in the sinkings a peak figure—primarily because the by U-boats: 500,500 tons in May, 300,200 Allies at last adopted the convoy system in September, and only about 200,600 in for the protection of merchant ships. November. The USS Alcedo, a former Previously, a ship bound for one of the civilian yacht commissioned for convoy Allies’ ports had set sail by itself as soon duty, was the first U.S. Navy ship to be as it was loaded. The sea was thus dotted sunk by a German submarine, UC-71, on with single and unprotected merchant November 5, en route to Brest, France. ships, and a scouting U-boat could rely Just two days later, the U.S. Navy scored on several targets coming into its range its first German submarine when the in the course of a cruise. The Allies’ con- USS Fanning and the USS Nicholson voy system remedied this by having sank U-58 off Milford Haven, Wales. The groups of merchant ships sail within a convoy system was so quickly vindi- protective ring of destroyers and other cated that in August, it was extended to naval escorts. It was logistically possible shipping outward-bound from Great and economically worthwhile to provide Britain. The Germans themselves soon this kind of escort for a group of ships. observed that the British had grasped Furthermore, the combination of convoy the principles of antisubmarine warfare, and escort would force the U-boat to risk and that sailing ships in convoys con- the possibility of a counterattack in order siderably reduced the opportunities to sink the merchant ships, thus giving for attack. the Allies a prospect of reducing the U-boats’ numbers. Despite the manifest The Channel and North Sea and seemingly overwhelming benefits of Mine Barrages the convoy system, the idea was novel and, like any untried system, met with Apart from employing a system of con- powerful opposition from within the voys to protect ships from submarine military. It was only in the face of extreme attacks, the Allies improved their anti- necessity, due to excessive loss of ships submarine technology (hydrophones, and cargo, and under great pressure from depth charges, etc.) and extended their Lloyd George that the system was tried, minefields. In 1918, moreover, Admiral more or less as a last resort. Sir Roger Keyes, in command at Dover, The first convoy sailed from Gibraltar set up a system whereby the English to Great Britain on May 10, 1917; the first Channel was patrolled by surface craft 130 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power with searchlights, so that U-boats pass- Peace Moves ing through it had to submerge themselves to depths at which they were Until the end of 1916, the pursuit of peace liable to strike the mines that had been was confined to individuals and to small laid for them. Subsequently, most of the groups, rather than nations or their gov- U-boats renounced the Channel as a way ernments. However, in the following into the Atlantic and instead took the months it began to acquire a broad pop- passage north of Great Britain, thus los- ular backing. Semi-starvation in towns, ing precious fuel and time before reaching mutinies in the armies, and casualty lists the heavily traveled sea lanes of the west- that seemed to have no end made more ern approaches to Great Britain. Thus, in and more people question the need and the summer of 1918, U.S. minelayers laid the wisdom of continuing the war. more than 60,000 mines (13,000 of them Francis Joseph, Austria’s venerable British) in a wide belt across 180 miles old emperor, died on Nov. 21, 1916. The of the North Sea between Scotland and new emperor, Charles I, and his foreign Norway. This operation known as the minister, Graf Ottokar Czernin, initiated North Sea Mine Barrage, obstructed peace moves in the spring of 1917. the U-boats’ only access from Germany Unfortunately, they did not concert their to the Atlantic other than the closely diplomatic efforts, and the channels of guarded Channel. negotiation they opened between Austria- The cumulative effect of all these Hungary and the Allies had dried up by measures was the gradual containment that summer. and, ultimately, the defeat of the U-boat In Germany, Matthias Erzberger, a campaign, which never again achieved Roman Catholic member of the Reichstag, the staggering success of its April 1917 had, on July 6, 1917, proposed that terri- numbers. While sinkings by submarines, torial annexations be renounced in order after that month, steadily fell, the losses to facilitate a negotiated peace. During of U-boats showed a slow but steady rise, the ensuing debates Bethmann Hollweg and more than 40 were destroyed in the resigned the office of chancellor. The first six months of 1918. At the same time, emperor William II appointed the next the replacement of merchant vessels in chancellor, Ludendorff’s nominee Georg the building program improved steadily, Michaelis, without consulting the until the size of the merchant fleet even- Reichstag. The Reichstag, offended, pro- tually far surpassed the number of ships ceeded to pass its Friedensresolution, or lost to submarines. In October 1918, for “peace resolution,” of July 19 by 212 votes. example, 511,000 tons of new Allied mer- The peace resolution was a string of chant ships were launched, while only innocuous phrases expressing Germany’s 118,559 tons were lost. desire for peace, but was without a clear The Stalemate Years Begin | 131

An undated portrait of Pope Benedict XV by the artist Fabres Antonio. Imagno/Hulton Archive/Getty Images 132 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power renunciation of annexations or indemni- renunciation of secret diplomacy, (2) free- ties. The Allies took almost no notice of it. dom of navigation on the high seas in Erzberger’s proposal of July 6 had wartime as well as peace, (3) the maxi- been intended to pave the way for Pope mum possible freedom of trade, (4) a Benedict XV’s forthcoming note to the guaranteed reduction of armaments, (5) belligerents of both camps. Dated Aug. 1, an impartial colonial settlement accom- 1917, this note advocated a German with- modating not only the colonialist powers drawal from Belgium and from France, but also the peoples of the colonies, (6) the Allies’ withdrawal from the German the evacuation of all Russian territory colonies, and the restoration not only of and respect for Russia’s right of self- Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania but determination, (7) the complete restoration also of Poland to independence. France of Belgium, (8) a complete German with- and Great Britain declined to give an drawal from France and satisfaction for express reply pending Germany’s state- France about Alsace-Lorraine, (9) a read- ment of its attitude about Belgium, on justment of Italy’s frontiers on an ethnic which Germany avoided committing basis, (10) an open prospect of autonomy itself. for the peoples of Austria-Hungary, (11) Another unofficial peace move was the restoration of Romania, Serbia, and made in London on Nov. 29, 1917. The Montenegro, with free access to the sea Daily Telegraph published a letter from for Serbia and international guarantees Lord Lansdowne suggesting negotiations of the Balkan states’ independence and on the basis of the status quo antebel- integrity, (12) the prospect of autonomy lum. However, Lloyd George rejected for non-Turkish peoples of the Ottoman Lansdowne’s theses on December 14. Empire and the unrestricted opening of By 1918, the U.S. president Woodrow the Straits, but secure sovereignty for the Wilson had made himself the chief for- Turks in their own areas, (13) an indepen- mulator and spokesman of the war aims dent Poland with access to the sea and of the Allies and the United States. The under international guarantee, and (14) first nine months of 1918 saw Wilson’s “a general association of nations,” to famous series of pronouncements on his guarantee the independence and integ- war aims: the Fourteen Points (January rity of all states, great and small. The 8), the “Four Principles” (February 11), the three subsequent groups of pronounce- “Four Ends” (July 4), and the “Five ments mainly consisted of idealistic Particulars” (September 27). Most impor- expansions of themes implicit in the tant, not least because of Germany’s Fourteen Points, with increasing empha- deluded reliance on them in its eventual sis on the wishes of subject populations. suing for peace, were the Fourteen Points: However, the first of the “Four Ends” was (1) open covenants of peace and the that every arbitrary power capable by The Stalemate Years Begin | 133 itself of disturbing world peace should be 1918. Indeed, the Germans conducted their rendered innocuous. preliminary peace talks exclusively with Wilson’s peace campaign was a signifi- Wilson. Furthermore, the Armistice, when cant factor in the collapse of the German it came on Nov. 11, 1918, was formally based people’s will to fight, or to support upon the Fourteen Points and additional Germany’s military actions, and also a sig- Wilsonian pronouncements, with two just nificant factor in the decision of the German reservations by the British and French relat- government to sue for peace in October ing to freedom of the seas and reparations. ChaPTER 5

The Stalemate Breaks, 1918

GERMaNY REGROuPS TO aTTaCk IN ThE WEST

In 1917, the German strength on the Western Front was being steadily increased by the transfer of divisions from the Eastern Front, where they were no longer needed since Russia had withdrawn from the war. Facing an imminent German off ensive, the Allies’ main problem was how to withstand a massive attack pending the arrival of massive reinforcements from the United States. Eventually Pétain persuaded the reluctant Haig that the British with 60 divisions should extend their sector of the front from 100 to 125 miles as compared with the 325 miles (523 km) to be held by the French with approximately 100 divisions. Haig thus devoted 46 of his divisions to the front from the Channel to Gouzeaucourt (southwest of German-held Cambrai) and 14 to the remaining third of the front from Gouzeaucourt past German-held Saint-Quentin to the Oise River. On the German side, between Nov. 1, 1917, and March 21, 1918, the German divisions on the Western Front were increased from 146 to 192, the newly arrived troops having been drawn from Russia, Galicia, and Italy. By these means, the German armies in the west were reinforced by a total of about 570,000 men. General Erich Ludendorff ’s interest was to strike from his temporary position of strength—before the arrival of the major U.S. contingents—and at the same time to The Stalemate Breaks, 1918 | 135 ensure that his German off ensive should The troops were systematically trained in not fail for the same reasons the Allies’ the new tactics, and every eff ort was also off ensives of the past three years had made to conceal the actual areas at which failed. Accordingly he formed an off en- the German main attacks would be made. sive strategy based on taking the tactical Ludendorff ’s main attack was to be line of least resistance. The main German on the weakest sector of the Allies’ front, attacks would begin with brief, but the 47 miles (75.6 km) between Arras and extremely intense, artillery bombard- La Fère (on the Oise). Two German ments using a high proportion of poison armies, the 17th and the 2nd, were to break gas and smoke shells. These would inca- through the front between Arras and pacitate the Allies’ forward trenches and Saint-Quentin, north of the Somme. Then, machine-gun emplacements and would they were to wheel right so as to force obscure their observation posts. Then a most of the British back toward the second and lighter artillery barrage would Channel, while the 18th Army, between begin to creep forward over the Allied the Somme and the Oise, protected the trenches at a walking pace (in order to left fl ank of the advance against counter- keep the enemy under fi re), with the attack from the south. Code-named masses of German assault infantry “Michael,” this off ensive was to be sup- advancing as closely as possible behind plemented by three other attacks: “St. it. The key to the new tactics was that the George I” against the British on the Lys assault infantry would bypass machine- River south of Armentières; “St. George gun nests and other points of strong II” against the British again between resistance instead of waiting for rein- Armentières and Ypres; and “Blücher” forcements to mop up the obstructions against the French in Champagne . It was before continuing the advance, as had fi nally decided to use 62 divisions in the been the previous practice on both sides. main attack, “Michael.” The Germans would instead continue to advance in the direction of the least Operation Michael enemy resistance. Advancing this way would ensure the mobility of the German Preceded by an artillery bombardment troops, and the deep infi ltration of its using 6,000 guns, “Michael” was launched advance would result in large amounts of on March 21, 1918, and was helped by an territory being taken. early morning fog that hid the German Such tactics demanded exceptionally advance from the Allied observation fi t and disciplined troops and a high level posts. The attack, which is known as the of military training. Ludendorff accord- Second Battle of the Somme or the Battle of ingly drew the best troops from all the Saint-Quentin, took the British altogether Western Front forces at his disposal and by surprise. However, it did not develop formed them into elite shock divisions. as Ludendorff had foreseen. While the 136 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

recovered from their initial dismay, and French reserves were coming up to reinforce the British line. The German drive was halted east of Amiens and so too was a renewed attack on April 4. After these latest attacks, Ludendorff then suspended his Somme off ensive. This off ensive had yielded the largest territorial gains of any operation on the Western Front since the First Battle of the Marne, more than three years before, in September 1914. The collapse of one-third of the British front at least produced one over- due benefi t for the Allies. On March 26, Marshal Ferdinand Foch was appointed to coordinate the Allies’ military operations at Haig’s own suggestion; and on A portrait of Field Marshal Ferdinand April 14 he was named commander in Foch, who became Supreme Allied Com- chief of the Allied armies. Previously, mander in March 1918, c. 1916. Hulton Haig had resisted the idea of a Archive/Getty Images generalissimo.

Operations St. George I and II 18th Army under von Hutier achieved a complete breakthrough south of the On April 9, the Germans began their Somme, the major attack to the north was operation “St. George I,” against British held up, mainly by the British concentra- forces with an attack on the extreme tion of strength at Arras. For a whole week northern front between Armentières and Ludendorff , in violation of his new tactical the canal of La Bassée, their aim being to emphasis, vainly persisted in trying to advance across the Lys River toward carry out his original plan instead of Hazebrouck. Such was the initial success exploiting the unexpected success of the of this attack that “St. George II” was 18th Army, though the latter had advanced launched the very next day, with the more than 40 miles (64.4 km) westward capture of Kemmel Hill (Kemmelberg), and had reached Montdidier by March 27. southwest of Ypres, as its fi rst objective. At last, however, the main eff ort of the Armentières fell, and Ludendorff came to Germans was converted into a drive think for a time that this Battle of the Lys toward Amiens, which began in force on might be turned into a major eff ort. The March 30. By that time the Allies had British, however, after being driven back The Stalemate Breaks, 1918 | 137

In focus: The Second Battle of the Somme

The Second Battle of the Somme, or Battle of Saint-Quentin (March 21–April 5, 1918), was a partially successful German off ensive against Allied forces on the Western Front in the last year of the war. The German commander, General Erich Ludendorff , believed that it was essential for Germany to use the troops freed from the Eastern Front by the collapse of Imperial Russia to achieve a victory on the Western Front in the spring of 1918, before American troops arrived in suffi cient numbers to eff ectively reinforce the war-weary Allies. His fi rst off ensive was directed against the rather weak British armies north of the Somme River, between Arras and La Fère. The British trenches were shelled and gassed before a massive morning attack in dense fog, which took the British by surprise, as they could not see the advancing German troops. Their fi rst and second lines of British soldiers quickly fell, and by March 22 the shattered British 5th Army was in retreat and had lost contact with the French to the south. The Germans moved rapidly forward, hoping to drive a permanent wedge between the French and the British, but by March 28, the Allies had assembled new troops that checked the German advance east of Amiens. The German off ensive had obtained the single largest territorial gain on the Western Front since the early months of the war in late 1914. The Germans had advanced almost 40 miles and had taken about 70,000 prisoners, but in spite of these gains the Allied lines were only bent, not broken, as Ludendorff had hoped. The German tactical virtuosity, unconnected to any broader strategic concept, only exhausted Germany’s limited resources.

10 miles (16 km), halted the Germans temporarily, while the German strength short of Hazebrouck. By then, French mounted to 208 divisions, of which 80 reinforcements began to come up. Thus, were still in reserve. A restoration of the when the Germans had taken Kemmel balance, however, was now in sight. A Hill (April 25), Ludendorff decided to dozen U.S. divisions had arrived in France, suspend exploitation of the advance, for and great eff orts were being made to fear of a counterstroke against his front’s swell the stream. Furthermore, Pershing , new bulge. the U.S. commander, had placed his troops, aff ectionately known as “dough- Doughboys and boys,” at Foch’s disposal for use wherever Operation Blücher required. The fi rst signifi cant action by American troops, with French air and Thus far, Ludendorff had fallen short of artillery support, occurred at the village strategic results, but he could claim huge of Cantigny, which the U.S. 1st Division tactical successes—the British casualties captured on May 28 and held against a incurred under his command alone sustained German counterattack. Known amounted to more than 300,000. Ten as the Battle of Cantigny, the doughboy’s British divisions had to be broken up determination to hold onto the village, 138 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power with casualties of more than a quarter of the first major engagement by American their troops, demonstrated the fighting forces and had the dubious distinction of spirit of American troops. However, this the highest casualties sustained by the minor battle was overshadowed by the marines before World War II. Control of last great German offensive, which the woods changed some half dozen already had begun along the Aisne River. times, with American casualties of 9,777, Ludendorff had finally launched including 1,811 dead. Operation “Blücher” on May 27, on a front Overtaken by the inordinate fruition extending from Coucy, north of Soissons, of his own offensives, Ludendorff paused eastward toward Reims. Fifteen German for a month’s recuperation. The tactical divisions suddenly attacked the seven success of his own blows had been his French and British divisions opposing undoing; yielding to their influence, he them swarming over the ridge of the had pressed each too far and too long, Chemin des Dames and across the Aisne using up his own reserves and causing an River. By May 30, the Germans were on undue interval between blows. He had the Marne, between Château-Thierry and driven three great wedges into the Allied Dormans. Their advance was halted at lines, but none had penetrated far enough the Marne by the U.S. 3rd Division under to sever a vital rail artery, and this strate- the command of Major General Joseph gic failure left the Germans with a front Dickman, who earned the sobriquet of whose several bulges invited flanking “Rock of the Marne” for his stubborn counterstrokes. Moreover, Ludendorff had defense of the main bridge connecting used up many of his shock troops in the the twin city of Château-Thierry. Once attacks, and the remaining troops, though again the attack’s initial success went far strong in numbers, were not as well- beyond Ludendorff’s expectation or trained. The Germans were to end up intention. However, when the Germans sustaining a total of 800,000 casualties in tried to push westward against the right their great 1918 offensives. Meanwhile, flank of the Allies’ Compiègne salient, the Allies were now receiving U.S. troops which was sandwiched between the at the rate of 300,000 men per month. Germans’ Amiens and Champagne bulges, they were checked by counter The Second Battle attacks. These responses included the of the Marne taking of Château-Thierry (June 3–4) by the U.S. 2nd and 3rd Divisions, with help Following Operation Blücher, the next from the French 10th Colonial Division. German offensive, which opened the The 2nd Division’s Marine Corps were Second Battle of the Marne, was launched then tasked with clearing the nearby in Champagne on July 15. It came to Belleau Wood (Bois de Belleau). The nothing: a German thrust from the front Battle of Belleau Wood (June 6–26) was east of Reims toward Châlons-sur-Marne The Stalemate Breaks, 1918 | 139 was frustrated by the “elastic defense” occupation of the “Michael” bulge, the 4th that Pétain had recently been prescribing Army advanced steadily for four days. but that the local commanders had failed Over the course of those four days, they to practice against the offensive of May 27. took 21,000 prisoners and inflicted as A drive from Dormans, on the left flank of many or more casualties at the cost of the Germans’ huge Soissons–Reims only about 20,000 casualties to them- bulge, across the Marne toward Épernay, selves, and halted only when it reached simply made the Germans’ situation more the desolation of the old battlefields of precarious when Foch’s long-prepared 1916. Several German divisions simply counterstroke was launched on July 18. collapsed in the face of the offensive, their In this great counterstroke one of Foch’s troops either fleeing or surrendering. The armies assailed the Germans’ Champagne Battle of Amiens was thus both a striking bulge from the west, another from the material and moral success for the Allies. southwest, one more from the south, and However, Ludendorff put it differently: a fourth from the vicinity of Reims. “August 8 was the black day of the German Masses of light tanks—a relatively new Army in the history of the war . . . It put the weapon on which Ludendorff had placed decline of our fighting power beyond all little reliance, preferring gas instead in doubt . . . The war must be ended.” After his plans for the year—played a vital part Amiens, he informed Emperor William II in forcing the French forcing Germans and Germany’s political chiefs that peace into a hasty retreat. By August 2, the negotiations should be opened before the French had pushed the Champagne front situation became worse. The conclusions back to a line following the Vesle River reached at a German Crown Council held from Reims and then along the Aisne to a at Spa were that “We can no longer hope point west of Soissons. to break the war-will of our enemies by military operations,” and “the objects of The Battle of Amiens our strategy must be to paralyse the enemy’s war-will gradually by a strategic Having recovered the initiative after the defensive.” In other words, the German Second Battle of the Marne, the Allies high command had abandoned hope of were determined not to lose it. For their victory or even of holding their gains. next blow, they chose again the front north After crushing defeat at Amiens, they and south of the Somme. The British 4th hoped only to avoid outright surrender. Army, including Australian and Canadian forces, with 450 tanks, struck the Germans The Hindenburg Line and the with maximum surprise on Aug. 8, 1918. Battle of Saint-Mihiel Overwhelming the German forward divisions, who had failed to entrench Meanwhile, the French had retaken themselves adequately since their recent Montdidier and were thrusting toward 140 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Lassigny (between Roye and Noyon). On Because of the clear evidence of the August 17, they began a new drive from Germans’ decline, Foch decided to seek the Compiègne salient south of Noyon. victory in the coming autumn of 1918 Then, in the fourth week of August, two instead of postponing the attempt until more British armies went into action on 1919. In order to ensure a victorious out- the Arras–Albert sector of the front, the come, all the Allied armies in the west one advancing directly eastward on were to combine in a simultaneous Bapaume, the other operating farther to offensive. the north. From then on, Foch delivered a series of hammer blows along the Other developments length of the German front, launching a series of rapid attacks at different points, Nationalist Movements each broken off as soon as its initial impetus waned. All of the attacks were The growth of the national movements close enough in time to attract German toward the end of the war, which, under reserves, which consequently were unavail- the eventual protection of the Allies, were able to defend against the next Allied to result in the foundation of new states attack along a different part of the front. or the resurrection of long-defunct ones By the early days of September, the at the end of the war. There were three Germans were back where they had such movements: that of the Czechs, with been before March 1918—behind the the more backward Slovaks in tow; that Hindenburg Line. of the South Slavs, or Yugoslavs (Serbs, The Allies’ recovery was consum- Croats, and Slovenes); and that of the mated by the first feat executed by Poles. The Czech country, namely Pershing’s U.S. forces as an independent Bohemia and Moravia, belonged in 1914 army (hitherto the U.S. divisions in France to the Austrian half of the Habsburg mon- had fought only in support of the major archy, the Slovak to the Hungarian half. French or British units): the U.S. 1st Army The Yugoslavs had already been repre- on September 12 erased the triangular sented in 1914 by two independent Saint-Mihiel salient that the Germans kingdoms, Serbia and Montenegro, but had been occupying since 1914 (between they were also predominantly numerous Verdun and Nancy). Saint-Mihiel was in territories still under Habsburg rule: the greatest air battle of the war. Nearly Serbs in Bosnia and Hercegovina (an 1,500 Allied airplanes faced about 500 Austro-Hungarian condominium) and in German aircraft during the battle (Sept. Dalmatia (an Austrian possession); 12–16). The Allied forces, which included Croats in Croatia (Hungarian), in Istria American, French, and British aircraft, (Austrian), and in Dalmatia; Slovenes in was led by U.S. Colonel William (Billy) Istria and in Illyria (Austrian likewise). Mitchell. Poland was divided into three parts: The Stalemate Breaks, 1918 | 141

Germany had the north and the west as committed themselves to the Czecho- provinces of the Kingdom of Prussia; slovak idea from 1917 onward, when Austria had Galicia (including an ethni- Russia’s imminent defection from the war cally Ukrainian extension to the east); made them ready to exploit any means at Russia controlled the rest. hand for the disabling of Austria-Hungary. The Czechs had long been restless Furthermore, Wilson’s sympathy for the under the Austrian regime, and one of cause was implicit in his successive peace their leading intellectual spokesmen, pronouncements of 1918. Tomáš Masaryk (in fact a Slovak), had For the South Slavs of Austria- already envisaged the carving of Czech- Hungary the Yugoslav Committee , with oslovak and Yugoslav states out of representatives in Paris and in London, Austria-Hungary in December 1914. In was founded in April 1915. On July 20, 1916 he and a fellow émigré, Edvard 1917, this committee and the Serbian gov- Beneš , based respectively in London and ernment in exile made the joint Corfu in Paris, organized a Czechoslovak Declaration forecasting a South Slav state National Council . The western Allies to comprise Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The Polish nationalist leaders in the fi rst years of the war were uncertain whether to rely on the Central Powers or on the Allies for a restoration of Poland’s independence. So long as the western Allies hesitated to encourage Polish nationalism for fear of off ending imperial Russia, the Central Powers seemed to be the most likely sponsors; and Austria at least allowed Józef Piłsudski , from 1914, to organize his volunteer Polish legions to serve with Austrian forces against the Russians. Austria’s benevolence, however, was not refl ected by Germany; and when the Two Emperors’ Manifesto of Nov. 5, 1916, provided for the constitution of an independent Polish kingdom, it was clear that this kingdom would consist only of Polish territory conquered from Russia, not of any German or Austrian A portrait of Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, territory. When, after the March president of Czechoslovakia, c. 1910. Imagno/Hulton Archive/Getty Images Revolution of 1917, the Russian provisional government had recognized 142 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Poland’s right to independence, Roman now promoting there. Finally, the Ukrain Dmowski’s Polish National Committee, ian nationalist government, which had which from 1914 had been functioning in already been challenged by a Communist a limited way under Russian protection, one before its separate peace with the could at last count seriously on the sym- Central Powers (Brest-Litovsk, February pathy of the western Allies. While 9), was promptly displaced by a new regime Piłsudski declined to raise a Polish army after the advance of German and Austro- to fight against the new Russia, a Polish Hungarian troops into its territory. army was formed in France, as well as The Romanian armistice of December two army corps in Belorussia and in the 1917 was converted into the Treaty of Ukraine, to fight against the Central Bucharest on May 7, 1918. Under this trea- Powers. The Bolshevik Revolution and ty’s terms, southern Dobruja was ceded to Wilson’s Fourteen Points together con- Bulgaria; northern Dobruja was put under summated the alignment of the Poles on the joint administration of the Central the side of the western powers. Powers; and the latter obtained virtual control of Romania’s oil fields and com- Germany Takes Control of munications. Romania, on the other Eastern Europe hand, had some consolation from Bessarabia, whose nationalists, after The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (March 3, receiving Romanian assistance against 1918), negotiating a separate peace the Bolsheviks, had voted in March 1918 between Russia and Germany, gave for their country’s conditional union with Germany a free hand to do what it liked Romania. with Russia’s former land possessions in Even Transcaucasia began to slide eastern Europe. While their plan of 1916 into the German camp. The short-lived for a kingdom of Poland was under way, federal republic was dissolved by its three the Germans took new measures for the members’ individual declarations of other countries. Lithuania, recognized as independence—Georgia’s on May 26, independent, was to be a kingdom under Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s on May 28. some German prince. Latvia and Estonia Treaties of friendship were promptly were to be merged into a grand duchy of signed between Georgia and Germany the Baltikum under the hereditary rule of and between Armenia and Turkey, and Prussia. An expeditionary force of 12,000 Turkish troops advanced into Azerbaijan, men, under General Graf Rüdiger von der where they occupied Baku on September Goltz, was sent to Finland to uphold the 15. The western Allies, meanwhile, were Finnish general C.G.E. Mannerheim’s hoping that some new semblance of an nationalist forces against the Red Guards, Eastern Front could be conjured up if they whom the Bolsheviks, despite their rec- supported the various and growing forces ognition of Finland’s independence, were in Russia that were opposed to the The Stalemate Breaks, 1918 | 143 peacemaking Bolsheviks. Since the Black French divisions against a seven-mile Sea and the Baltic were closed to them, the front held by only one Bulgarian division. Allies could land troops only on Russia’s The initial assault, preceded by heavy distant Arctic and Pacific shores. Thus, bombardment at night, began in the the Allied “intervention” in Russia on the morning of Sept. 15, 1918. By nightfall on side of the anti-Bolshevik (“White”) forces September 16, a five-mile penetration was began with an Anglo-French landing at achieved. The next day, the Serbs Murmansk, in the far north, on March 9, advanced 20 miles forward, while French 1918. The subsequent reinforcement of and Greek forces on their flanks widened Murmansk made possible the occupation the breach to 25 miles. A British attack, of the Murmansk railway as far south as launched on September 18 on the front Soroka (now Belomorsk). A further land- between the Vardar and Lake Doiran, ing at Arkhangelsk in the summer raised prevented the Bulgars from transferring the total Allied strength in northern Russia troops westward against the right flank of to some 48,000 (including 20,000 Russian the penetration. By September 19, the “Whites”). By this time, moreover, there Serbian cavalry had reached Kavadarci, were some 85,000 interventionist troops at the apex of the Crna–Vardar triangle. in Siberia, where a strong Japanese land- Two days later the whole Bulgarian front ing at Vladivostok in April had been west of the Vardar had collapsed. followed by British, French, Italian, and While Italian forces in the extreme U.S. contingents. A “White” provisional west advanced on Prilep, the elated Serbs, government of Russia was set up at Omsk, with the French beside them, pressed on with Admiral A. V. Kolchak as its domi- up the Vardar Valley. The British in the nant personality. The “White” resistance east now made such headway as to take in the south of European Russia, which Strumica, across the old Bulgarian fron- had been growing since November 1917, tier, on September 26. Facing sure defeat, was put under the supreme command of the Bulgars then sued for an armistice. General A. I. Denikin in April 1918. Still, a bold French cavalry thrust up the Vardar from Veles (Titov Veles) and took The Balkan Front Skopje, the key to the whole system of communications for the Balkan front, on At Salonika the Allies’ politically ambi- September 29. Bulgarian delegates signed tious but militarily ineffective commander the Armistice of Salonika, accepting the in chief, General Sarrail, was replaced at Allies’ terms unreservedly the same day. the end of 1917 by General Guillaumat. Guillaumat was in turn succeeded in The Turkish Fronts July 1918 by General L.-F.-F. Franchet d’Espèrey, who launched a major offensive In the summer of 1918, the British–Turkish in September with six Serbian and two front in Palestine ran from the Jordan 144 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

River westward north of Jericho and the Arabs had already severed the railway Lydda to the Mediterranean just north of line and were lying in wait for them. A Jaffa. North of this front there were three British cavalry division from Beisān was Turkish “armies” (in fact, barely stronger also about to push eastward to intercept than divisions): one to the east of the their withdrawal. Simultaneously, two Jordan, two to the west. These armies more British divisions and another force depended for their supplies on the Hejaz of Arabs were racing on toward Damascus, Railway, the main line of which ran from which fell on October 1. The campaign Damascus southward, east of the Jordan, ended with the capture of Aleppo and the and which was joined at Déraa (Dar‘ā) by junction of the Baghdad Railway. In 38 a branch line serving Palestine. days Allenby’s forces had advanced 350 Liman von Sanders, Falkenhayn’s miles and taken 75,000 prisoners at a cost successor as commander of the Turkish of less than 5,000 casualties. forces in Syria–Palestine, was convinced In Mesopotamia, meanwhile, the that the British would make their main British had taken Kifrī, north of the Diyālā effort east of the Jordan. Allenby, how- left-bank tributary of the Tigris, in ever, was really interested in taking a January 1918. They also took Khān straight northerly direction. He reckoned al-Baghdā ī, up the Euphrates, in March. that the Palestine branch rail line at ‘Afula Pressing northward from Kifrī, they took and Beisān, some 60 miles (96.6 km) Kirkūk in May but evacuated it soon behind the Turkish front, could be reached afterward. by a strategic “bound” of his cavalry and The British centre in Mesopotamia, that their fall would isolate the two advancing up the Tigris in October, was Turkish armies in the west. about to capture Mosul when the hostilities Having by ruse and diversion induced were suspended. The Ottoman govern- the Turks to reduce their strength in the ment, seeing eastern Turkey defenseless, west, Allenby struck there on Sept. 19, feared Allied advance against Istanbul 1918, with a numerical superiority of 10 to from the west now that Bulgaria had col- one. In this Battle of Megiddo, a British lapsed. Thus, they decided to capitulate. infantry attack swept the astonished On October 30, the Armistice of Mudros defenders aside and opened the way for was signed, on a British cruiser off the cavalry, which rode 30 miles north Lemnos. The Turks, by its terms, were to up the coastal corridor before swinging open the Straits to the Allies, demobilize inland to cut the Turks’ northward lines their forces, allow the Allies to occupy of retreat. ‘Afula, Beisān, and even any strategic point that they might Nazareth, farther north, were in British require, and also, to use all Turkey’s ports hands the next day. and railways. They also were ordered to When the Turks east of the Jordan surrender their remaining garrisons in River began to retreat on September 22, Arabia, Syria, and Mesopotamia. With The Stalemate Breaks, 1918 | 145 the signing of the Armistice of Mudro, the Piave prevented two of the three central centuries-old Ottoman Empire finally had armies from advancing simultaneously come to an end. with the third. However, the latter of the armies, comprising one Italian and one The Italian Front British corps, having under cover of darkness and fog occupied Papadopoli Island After the stabilization of the Italian front farther downstream, won a foothold on on the Piave River at the end of 1917, the the left bank of the river on October 27. Austrians made no further move until The Italian reserves were then brought the following June. They then tried not up to exploit this bridgehead. only to force the Tonale Pass and enter Mutiny was already breaking out in northeastern Lombardy but also to make the Austrian forces, and on October 28 the two converging thrusts into central Austrian high command ordered a gen- Venetia. One thrust was to move south- eral retreat. Vittorio Veneto was occupied eastward from the Trentino and the the next day by the Italians, who were other southwestward across the lower also pushing on already toward the Piave. The whole offensive came to Tagliamento. On November 3 the Austri worse than nothing, the attackers losing ans obtained an armistice. 100,000 men. Armando Diaz, the Italian com- The Collapse of mander in chief, was meanwhile Austria-Hungary deliberately abstaining from positive action until Italy should be ready to strike In the Austro-Hungarian empire, the with success assured. In the offensive he duality of the Habsburg monarchy had planned, three of the five armies lining been underlined from the very beginning the front from the Monte Grappa sector of the war. Whereas the Austrian parlia- to the Adriatic end of the Piave were to ment, or Reichsrat, had been suspended drive across the river toward Vittorio in March 1914 and was not reconvened Veneto. This would cut communications for three years, the Hungarian parliament between the two Austrian armies oppos- in Budapest continued its sessions, and ing them. the Hungarian government proved itself When Germany, in October 1918, was constantly less amenable to dictation at last asking for an armistice, Italy’s time from the military than had the Austrian. had obviously come. On October 24, the The Slav minorities, however, showed anniversary of Caporetto, the offensive little sign of anti-Habsburg feeling before opened. An attack in the Monte Grappa Russia’s March Revolution of 1917. In May sector was repulsed with heavy loss, 1917, however, the Reichsrat was recon- though it served to attract the Austrian vened, and just before the opening reserves. Furthermore, the flooding of the session the Czech intelligentsia sent a 146 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power manifesto to its deputies calling for “a Early in September 1918, the Austro- democratic Europe . . . of autonomous Hungarian government proposed in a states.” The Bolshevik Revolution of circular note to the other powers that a con- November 1917 and the Wilsonian peace ference be held on neutral territory for a pronouncements from January 1918 general peace. This proposal was quashed onward encouraged either socialism or by the United States on the ground that nationalism, or alternatively, a combination the U.S. position had already been enun- of both tendencies, among all peoples of ciated by the Wilsonian pronouncements the Habsburg monarchy. (the Fourteen Points, etc.). However, when Austria-Hungary, after the collapse of Bulgaria, appealed on October 4 for an armistice based on those very pronouncements, the answer from the United States on October 18 was that the U.S. government was now committed to the Czechoslovaks and to the Yugoslavs, who might not be sat- isfi ed with the “autonomy” postulated heretofore. The emperor Charles had, in fact, granted autonomy to the peoples of the Austrian Empire (as distinct from the Hungarian Kingdom) on October 16. However, this conces- sion was ignored internationally and served only to facilitate the process of disruption within the monarchy: Czechoslovaks in Prague and South Slavs in Zagreb had already set up organs ready to take power. The last scenes of Austria- Hungary’s dissolution were performed very rapidly. On Emperor Charles I of Austria and his wife, Empress October 24 (when the Italians Zita, at their coronation, 1916. Charles was the last launched their very timely off en- Habsburg emperor to reign over Austria-Hungary. Keystone/Hulton Archive/Getty Images sive), a Hungarian National Council prescribing peace and The Stalemate Breaks, 1918 | 147 severance from Austria was set up in his king, the Austrian emperor Charles, Budapest. On October 27, they sent a note on October 31. However, he had promptly accepting the U.S. note of October 18 to started to dissociate his country from Washington from Vienna, but it remained Austria—partly in the vain hope of unacknowledged. On October 28 the obtaining a separate Hungarian armi- Czechoslovak committee in Prague stice. Charles, the last Habsburg to rule passed a “law” for an independent state, in Austria-Hungary, renounced the right while a similar Polish committee was to participate in Austrian affairs of gov- formed in Kraków for the incorporation ernment on November 11. On November of Galicia and Austrian Silesia into a 13, he renounced his right to participate unified Poland. On October 29, while in Hungarian affairs as well. the Austrian high command was asking the Italians for an armistice, the Croats in The Allies Launch the Zagreb declared Slavonia, Croatia, and Final Attack on the Dalmatia to be independent, pending the Western Front formation of a national state of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. On October 30 the In planning their final offensive of the German members of the Reichsrat in war, the Allied commanders eventually Vienna proclaimed an independent state agreed that Pershing’s U.S. troops of German Austria. should advance across the difficult ter- The solicited armistice between the rain of the Argonne Forest, so that the Allies and Austria-Hungary finally was combined Allied offensive would consist signed at the Villa Giusti, near Padua, of converging attacks against the whole on Nov. 3, 1918, to become effective on German position west of a line drawn November 4. Under its provisions, from Ypres to Verdun. Thus, the Austria-Hungary’s forces were required Americans from the front northwest of to evacuate not only all territory occupied Verdun and the French from eastern since August 1914 but also South Tirol, Champagne were to launch attacks on Tarvisio, the Isonzo Valley, Gorizia, September 26, the former on the west Trieste, Istria, western Carniola, and bank of the Meuse, the latter west of the Dalmatia. All German forces should be Argonne Forest, with Mézières as their expelled from Austria-Hungary within ultimate objective. This would threaten 15 days or interned, and the Allies were not only the Germans’ supply line along free to use of Austria-Hungary’s internal the Mézières–Sedan–Montmédy railway communications, and to take possession and the natural line of retreat across of most of its warships. Lorraine but also the hinge of the Antwerp– Count Mihály Károlyi, chairman of Meuse defensive line that the Germans the Budapest National Council, had been were now preparing. The British were to appointed prime minister of Hungary by attack the Hindenburg Line between 148 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Cambrai and Saint-Quentin on Septem immediate peace move with the Western ber 27 and to try to reach the key rail powers. On October 1, they even disclosed junction of Maubeuge, so as to threaten their despondency to a meeting of the the Germans’ line of retreat through the leaders of all the national political par- Liège gap. The Belgians, with Allied sup- ties, thus undermining the German home port, were to begin a drive from Ypres front by a sudden revelation of facts long toward Ghent on September 28. hidden from the public and its civilian The Americans took Vauquois and leaders. This new and bleak honesty Montfaucon in the first two days of their about Germany’s deteriorating military offensive but were soon slowed down. On situation gave an immense impetus to October 14, when their attack was sus- the native German forces of pacifism and pended, they had only reached Grandpré, internal discord. On October 3 the new less than halfway to Mézières. The French chancellor Prince Maximilian of Baden advance meanwhile was halted on the was appointed. He was internationally Aisne. The British, though they had bro- known for his moderation and honorabil- ken through the German defenses by ity. However, Max demanded a few days’ October 5 and thenceforward had open interval lest Germany’s overture for peace country in front of them, could not pur- should appear too obviously an admis- sue the Germans fast enough to endanger sion of imminent collapse, the military their withdrawal. Nevertheless, the pierc- leaders insisted on an immediate move. ing of the Hindenburg Line unnerved the A German note to Wilson, requesting an German supreme command as Belgians armistice and negotiations on the basis were in possession of all the heights of Wilson’s own pronouncements, was around Ypres. sent off in the night of October 3–4. The United States answered on German Collapse October 8 requiring that Germany pre- liminarily assent to negotiations on the Georg von Hertling had taken the place sole question of the means of putting of Georg Michaelis as Germany’s chan- Wilson’s principles into practice, and cellor in November 1917, but had proved also, to the withdrawal of German forces no more capable than Michaelis of from Allied soil. The German govern- restraining Ludendorff and Hindenburg; ment’s note of October 12 accepted these thus, he tendered his resignation on requirements and suggested a mixed Sept. 29, 1918, the day of the Bulgarian commission to arrange the postulated armistice and of the major development evacuation. On October 14, however, the of the British attack on the Western Front. U.S. government sent a second note, Pending the appointment of a new chan- which coupled allusions to Germany’s cellor, Ludendorff and Hindenburg “illegal and inhuman” methods of warfare obtained the Emperor’s consent to an with demands that the conditions of the The Stalemate Breaks, 1918 | 149

In focus: Sergeant York

(b. Dec. 13, 1887, Pall Mall, Tenn., U.S.—d. Sept. 2, 1964, Nashville, Tenn.), Sergeant Alvin York, a celebrated American hero of World War I, was immortalized by the fi lm version of his life story, Sergeant York (1941). A blacksmith from Cumberland Hill, Tenn., York was denied status as a conscientious objector and was drafted into the army during World War I. While serving in the 82nd Infantry Division at the Meuse-Argonne Off ensive (October 1918), he was among a patrol of 17 men ordered to take out a German machine-gun emplacement that was checking his regiment’s advance. Behind enemy lines, the patrol lost half its men but managed to take a handful of prisoners before it was pinned down by extremely heavy rifl e and machine-gun fi re. Corporal York assumed command of the patrol. While the rest of the survivors took up defensive positions and stood guard over the prisoners, York attacked alone. Firing rapidly and with deadly accuracy at the enemy gunners, York killed more than two dozen of them, which prompted the others to surrender. En route back to the American lines, he captured still more Germans, to a total of 132. York was promoted to the rank of sergeant, and later he received the Congressional Medal of Honor and similar honours from France and other countries. After the war, York returned to Tennessee, where he lived on a farm given to him by that state. There he helped establish an industrial institute and a Bible school for the education of rural youth.

armistice and of the evacuation be deter- supply lines. However, Ludendorff still mined unilaterally by its own and the wanted an armistice, but only to give his Allies’ military advisers. Furthermore, troops a rest as a prelude to further resis- that the “arbitrary power” of the German tance and to ensure a secure withdrawal regime be removed in order that the forth- to a shortened defensive line on the coming negotiations could be conducted frontier. By October 17 he even felt that with a government more representative his troops could do without a rest. It was of the German people. less that the situation had changed than By this time, the German supreme that his impression of it had been revised; command had become more cheerful, it had never been quite so bad as he had even optimistic about outcomes on the pictured it on September 29. But his dis- Western Front, as it saw that the piercing mal fi rst impression had now spread of the Hindenburg Line had not been throughout German political circles and followed by an actual Allied break- the public. Although they had endured through. More encouragement came increasing privations and were half- from reports of a slackening in the force starved due to the Allied blockade by of the Allies’ attacks, largely because mid-1918, the German people had retained they had advanced too far ahead of their their morale surprisingly well as long as 150 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power they believed Germany had a prospect of and their property by the aggression of achieving victory on the Western Front. Germany.” Wilson’s note on November 5 When this hope collapsed in October apprised the Germans of these reserva- 1918, many, and perhaps even most, tions and stated that Foch would Germans wished only that the war would communicate armistice terms to Ger end, even if it might mean their nation many’s accredited representatives. On would have to accept unfavourable peace November 8 a German delegation, led by terms. German public opinion, having Matthias Erzberger, arrived at Rethondes, been more suddenly disillusioned, was in the Forest of Compiègne, where the now far more radically defeatist than the Germans met face to face with Foch and supreme command. his party. There they were informed of A third German note to the United the Allies’ peace terms. States, sent on October 20, agreed to the Meanwhile, revolution was shaking unilateral settlement of conditions for the Germany. The unrest began with a sail- armistice and for the evacuation, in the ors’ mutiny at Kiel on October 29 in express belief that Wilson would allow no reaction to the naval command’s order for affront to Germany’s honour. The answer- the High Seas Fleet to go out into the ing U.S. note of October 23 conceded North Sea for a conclusive battle. Though Wilson’s readiness to propose an armi- the U-boat crews remained loyal, the stice to the Allies, but added that the mutiny of the surface-ship crews spread terms must be such as to make Ger to other units of the fleet, developed into many incapable of renewing hostilities. armed insurrection on November 3, and Ludendorff saw this, militarily, as a progressed to open revolution the next demand for unconditional surrender and day. There were disturbances in Hamburg continued resistance. However, the situa- and in Bremen; “councils of soldiers and tion had passed beyond his control. He workers,” like the Russian soviets, were was made to resign by the emperor on formed in inland industrial centres; and October 26, on Prince Max’s advice. On in the night of November 7–8 a “demo- October 27, Germany acknowledged the cratic and socialist Republic of Bavaria” U.S. note. was proclaimed. The Social Democrats of Wilson now began to persuade the the Reichstag withdrew their support Allies to agree to an armistice and nego- from Prince Max’s government in order to tiations according to the U.S.-German be free to contend against the Communists correspondence. They agreed, but with for the leadership of the revolution. While two reservations: they would not sub- William II, at Spa, was still wondering scribe to the second of the Fourteen whether he could abdicate his imperial Points (on the freedom of the seas); and German title but remain king of Prussia, they wanted “compensation . . . for dam- Prince Max, in Berlin on November 9, age done to the civilian population . . . announced William’s abdication of both The Stalemate Breaks, 1918 | 151 titles on his own initative. The German delegation obtained some miti- Hohenzollern monarchy thus came to an gation of these terms. They suggested end, joining those of the Habsburgs and that the blockade might be relaxed. They the Romanovs. Prince Max handed his also asked for a reduction in the quantity powers as chancellor over to Friedrich of armaments to be handed over, and per- Ebert, a Majority Social Democrat, who mission for the German forces in eastern formed a provisional government. A Europe to stay put for the time being. The member of this government, Philipp Germans might have held out longer for Scheidemann, hastily proclaimed a further concessions if the fact of revolu- republic. On November 10 William II tion on their home front had not been took refuge in the neutral Netherlands, coupled with the imminence of a new where on November 28, he signed his military blow from the west. own abdication of his sovereign rights. Though the Allied advance was continuing and seemed in some sectors even The Armistice to be accelerating, the main German forces had managed to retreat ahead of it. When finally presented in the railway The Germans’ destruction of roads and carriage at Rethondes, the Allies’ armi- railways along the routes of their evacua- stice terms were stiff. Germany was tion made it impossible for supplies to required to evacuate not only Belgium, keep pace with the advancing Allied France, and Alsace-Lorraine, but also all troops. Therefore, pause in the advance the rest of the left (west) bank of the would occur while Allied communica- Rhine; it also had to neutralize that river’s tions were being repaired, and that would right bank between the Netherlands and give the Germans a breathing space in Switzerland. The German troops in East which to rally their resistance. By Africa were to surrender; the German November 11, the Allied advance on the armies in eastern Europe were to with- northern sectors of the front had come draw to the prewar German frontier; and more or less to a standstill on a line run- the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest ning from Pont-à-Mousson through were to be annulled. Lastly, the Germans Sedan, Mézières, and Mons to Ghent. were to repatriate all prisoners of war and Foch, however, now had a Franco-U.S. hand over to the Allies a large quantity of force of 28 divisions and 600 tanks in the war materials, including 5,000 pieces of south ready to strike through Metz into artillery, 25,000 machine guns, 1,700 air- northeastern Lorraine. Since Foch’s gen- craft, 5,000 locomotives, and 150,000 eral offensive had absorbed the Germans’ railroad cars. Meanwhile, the Allies’ reserves, this new offensive would fall on blockade of Germany was to continue. their bared left flank and held the prom- Pleading the danger of Bolshevism in ise outflanking their whole new line of a nation on the verge of collapse, the defense (from Antwerp to the line of the 152 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

A large crowd of soldiers and civilians celebrating the signing of the armistice by the German leadership, signaling the end of the war, Nov. 11, 1918. Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images

Meuse) and of intercepting any German The fact that Matthias Erzberger, retreat. By this time the number of U.S. who was a civilian politician rather than a divisions in France had risen to 42. In soldier, headed the German armistice addition, the British were about to bomb delegation became an integral part of the Berlin on a scale hitherto unattempted in cultural legend of the “stab in the back” air warfare. (Dolchstoss im Rücken ). This legend’s Whether the Allies’ projected fi nal theme was that the German army was off ensive, intended for November 14, “undefeated in the fi eld” unbesiegt ( im would have achieved a breakthrough can Felde ) and had been “stabbed in the never be known. At 5:00 am on Nov. 11, back”—i.e., had been denied support at 1918, the armistice document was signed the crucial moment by a weary and defeat- in Foch’s railway carriage at Rethondes. ist civilian population and their leaders. At 11:00 am on the same day, World War I This theme was adopted soon after the came to an end. war’s end by Ludendorff himself and by The Stalemate Breaks, 1918 | 153

In focus: Wilfred Owen

(b. March 18, 1893, Oswestry, Shropshire, Eng.—killed in action Nov. 4, 1918, France), English poet Wilfred Owen was noted for his anger at the cruelty and waste of war and his pity for its victims. He also is signifi cant for his technical experiments in assonance, which were particularly infl uential in the 1930s. Owen was educated at the Birkenhead Institute and matriculated at the University of London; but after an illness in 1913 he lived in France. He had already begun to write and, while working as a tutor near Bordeaux, was preparing a book of “Minor Poems—in Minor Keys—by a Minor,” which was never published. These early poems are consciously modeled on those of John Keats; often ambitious, they show enjoyment of poetry as a craft. In 1915 Owen enlisted in the British army. The experience of trench warfare brought him to rapid maturity; the poems written after January 1917 are full of anger at war’s brutality, an elegiac pity for “those who die as cattle,” and a rare descriptive power. In June 1917 he was wounded and sent home. While in a hospital near Edinburgh he met the poet Siegfried Sassoon, who shared his feelings about the war and who became interested in his work. Reading Sassoon’s poems and discussing his work with Sassoon revolutionized Owen’s style and his conception of poetry. Despite the plans of well- wishers to fi nd him a staff job, he returned to France in August 1918 as a company commander. He was awarded the Military Cross in October and was killed a week before Armistice Day. Published posthumously by Sassoon, Owen’s single volume of poems contains the most poignant English poetry of the war. His collected poems, edited by C. Day-Lewis, were published in 1964; his collected letters, edited by his younger brother Harold Owen and John Bell, were published in 1967.

other German generals who were unwill- politicians had been at hand ready to do ing to admit the hopelessness of the Allies’ bidding by signing the Germany’s military situation in November Armistice. Adolf Hitler eventually 1918 and who wanted to vindicate the became the foremost of these political honour of German arms. The “stab in the agitators, branding Erzberger and the back” legend soon found its way into leaders of the Social Democrats as German historiography and was picked the “November criminals.” Thus, Hitler up by German right-wing political agita- advocated militaristic and expansionist tors who claimed that Allied propaganda policies by which Germany could redeem in Germany in the last stages of the war its defeat in the war, gain vengeance had undermined civilian morale. They upon its enemies, and become the pre- also claimed that traitors among the eminent power in Europe. ChaPTER 6

Political Leaders

he following brief biographies of the major political T leaders of the combatants concentrate on their actions during World War I.

auSTRO-huNGaRIaN EMPIRE

Francis Joseph (b. Aug. 18, 1830, Schloss Schönbrunn, near Vienna—d. Nov. 21, 1916, Schloss Schönbrunn)

Francis Joseph was both emperor of Austria (1848–1916) and king of Hungary (1867–1916). He divided his empire into the Dual Monarchy, allowing Austria and Hungary to coexist as equal partners. In 1879 he formed an alliance with Prussian- led Germany. In 1914 his ultimatum to Serbia led Austria and Germany into World War I. From 1908–14 Francis Joseph held fast to his peace policy despite warnings by the chief of the general staff , Franz, Graf Conrad von Hötzendorf , who repeatedly advocated a preventive war against Serbia or Italy. Yet, without fully considering the consequences, he was in July 1914, persuaded by Leopold, Graf von Berchtold , the foreign minister, to issue the intransigent ultimatum to Serbia that led to Austria and Germany’s involvement in World War I. Political Leaders | 155

Charles I armies on the Italian front, Charles (b. Aug. 17, 1887, Persenbeug Castle, renounced all participation in state aff airs Austria—d. April 1, 1922, Quinta do but did not abdicate. He was exiled to Monte, Madeira) Switzerland in March 1919, he was deposed by the Austrian parliament that Charles I was emperor (kaiser) of Austria April. He twice tried to regain his and, as Charles IV , king of Hungary, the Hungarian throne, but failed and was last ruler of the Austro-Hungarian mon- once again exiled to Madeira, where he archy (Nov. 21, 1916–Nov. 11, 1918). lived impoverished and eventually died A grandnephew of the emperor of pneumonia. Francis Joseph I, Charles became heir presumptive to the Habsburg throne BRITaIN upon the assassination of his uncle, Francis Ferdinand (June 28, 1914), whose David Lloyd George children were barred from succession (b. Jan. 17, 1863, Manchester, Eng.—d. because of his morganatic marriage. After March 26, 1945, Ty-newydd, near his accession, Charles, a peace-loving Llanystumdwy, Caernarvonshire, Wales) man, attempted to remove Austria- Hungary from World War I by way of As British prime minister (1916–22), secret overtures to the Allied powers, David Lloyd George dominated the the most promising being through his British political scene in the latter part of brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus von World War I. He was raised to the peer- Bourbon-Parma. However, all attempts age in the year of his death. failed, largely at the emperor’s refusal to When concerns of entry into the war cede any territories to Italy. Because he pressed the Cabinet in late July and early had also supported French claims to August 1914, Lloyd George initially seemed Alsace-Lorraine, his reputation both in inclined to the isolationist section, and Germany and at home suff ered as these for a brief moment contemplated retire- eff orts were made public. ment. But the tide of events swept him to World War I accelerated the centrifu- the other side. As chancellor, he plunged gal forces of nationalism in Charles’s into the fi nancial problems posed by multinational empire. In October 1918, he the war. announced his solution to transform Throughout the remainder of 1914 the Western part of the empire into a and into 1915, Lloyd George was a vigor- federated state. This, however, lacked ous advocate of increased munitions suffi ciency and the necessary time, and production. Though this was opposed by ultimately failed. On Nov. 11, 1918, follow- Lord Kitchener in the War Offi ce, Admiral ing the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Fisher’s 1915 resignation forced Asquith 156 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

He doubted the possibility of breaking through on the Western Front and instead advocated a fl ank attack from the Near East. He was thus at loggerheads with the view of the offi cial military hierarchy, cogently pressed by Sir Douglas Haig and Sir William Robertson , that the war could only be won in the West. On June 5, 1916, Kitchener drowned on his way to Russia, when his ship struck a German mine. A last-minute accident—acute developments in the Irish situation—had prevented Lloyd George from travelling with him. After some hesitation, Asquith appointed Lloyd George to the vacant position at the War Offi ce. Lloyd George held the post for fi ve months, but Robertson as chief of the A portrait of David Lloyd George, British imperial general staff possessed nearly prime minister and delegate to the all the important powers of the war minis- Versaille Peace Conference, 1919. Hulton ter. Lloyd George chafed under these Archive/Getty Images restrictions, mostly because he disagreed with Robertson on issues of strategy. to reconstruct the government on a coali- Thus frustrated, he began to survey the tion basis, and admit the Conservatives. whole direction of the war with increas- In the new administration, Lloyd George ing skepticism. He did not conceal his became minister of munitions. In this doubts from friends who, by the end of capacity, he made one of the most notable November, were convinced that Asquith contributions to the Allied victory. His should delegate the day-to-day running methods were unorthodox and shocked of the war to a small committee chaired the civil service, but his energy was by Lloyd George. There was widespread immense. He imported able assistants uneasiness at Asquith’s conduct of aff airs, from big business and used his eloquence particularly in the Conservative Party. to induce the cooperation of organized Asquith was forced into resignation on labour. When, in the summer of 1916, the December 5, and was replaced two days great Battle of the Somme began, sup- later by Lloyd George. Although he was plies were forthcoming. supported by the leading Conservatives, Lloyd George formulated defi nite the most prominent Liberal ministers had views on war strategy at an early stage. resigned with Asquith. Political Leaders | 157

One of Lloyd George’s most notable objectives. Lloyd George was now con- achievements was in combating the vinced of the incompetence of the British submarine menace, which, in early 1917, high command. threatened to starve Britain into sub- He still dared not take action against mission. He accomplished this by forcing them openly. Instead, he began what Sir the adoption of the convoy system upon Winston Churchill called “a series of a reluctant Admiralty. The food shortage extremely laborious and mystifying resulting from the submarine war was maneuvers,” aimed to create a unified acute. Drastic action had to be taken to command under someone other than step up agricultural production, and Haig. In February 1918 Robertson offered eventually a system of food rationing his resignation. Though Lloyd George had to be introduced (1918). In these accepted it, Haig remained commander matters Lloyd George was at his best— in chief. Lloyd George continued to dis- contemptuous of red tape, determined to trust Haig, so much that, during the take action and to make his will prevail. winter of 1917–18, he deliberately kept It was in the field of grand strategy him short of troops for fear that he might that he was least successful. Lloyd George renew the attack. The result was that remained profoundly skeptical of the the German commander, General Erich ability of the British high command to Ludendorff, came near to launching a conduct even a Western strategy success- successful offensive against the British fully. Without warning Haig or Robertson sector in March 1918. The emergency in advance, he confronted them at the caused a unified command under Marshal Calais Conference of February 1917 with a Ferdinand Foch to be established (April), plan to place the British army under and by May the situation had stabilized. French command for General Robert The tide then turned, and the Western Nivelle’s forthcoming offensive. Haig Allies launched a series of successful and Robertson deeply distrusted Lloyd attacks upon the exhausted Germans. George from that moment onward. The The Armistice of November 1918 pre- Nivelle offensive was a total failure, and sented Lloyd George with a dilemma. Lloyd George was, as a result, on shaky Should he allow a return to peacetime ground when he endeavoured to resist party politics or continue the coalition? Haig’s proposals for a major British cam- There was little doubt of the answer. The paign in Flanders in the summer. After leader of the Conservatives, Bonar Law, much hesitation, he gave way, and on was willing to cooperate. A somewhat July 31, 1917, the ill-fated Passchendaele perfunctory offer to include Asquith was offensive began. Although it may have declined. The ensuing election in forestalled a possible German attack on December gave the coalitionists an over- the French, Passchendaele, with enormous whelming victory. The rift between Lloyd loss of life, achieved none of its main George and Asquith’s supporters became 158 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power wider than ever, however, and Lloyd stating that both countries should con- George was now largely dependent on sult in the event of an international Conservative support. crisis as well as to discuss joint military As one of the three great statesmen plans. Although his support of Russian at Versailles, Lloyd George bore a major activities in the Balkans and his uncom- responsibility for the peace settlement. promising attitude toward Germany have He pursued an intermediary course been cited as evidence of warmongering between Georges Clemenceau and Wood revanchism, Poincaré believed that in row Wilson, but was pressured to pursue contemporary Europe, war was inevitable the more draconian policy of Clemenceau. and that only a strong alliance guaranteed It is to his credit that the final settlement security. His greatest fear was that France was not far worse than actually occurred. might once again become isolated as it The treaty was well received in Britain, had been in 1870, and fall easy prey for a and in August 1919 the king conferred on militarily superior Germany. Lloyd George the Order of Merit. Poincaré ran for the office of president; despite the opposition of the left, under France Georges Clemenceau, a lifelong enemy, he was elected on Jan. 17, 1913. Although Raymond Poincaré the presidency was a position with little (b. Aug. 20, 1860, Bar-le-Duc, real power, he hoped to infuse new vitality France—d. Oct. 15, 1934, Paris) into it and make it the base of a union sacrée of right, left, and centre. Through Raymond Poincaré was the French prime out World War I (1914–18) he strove to minister in 1912 who largely determined preserve national unity, even confiding the policy that led to France’s involve- the government to Clemenceau, the ment in World War I. During this period, man best qualified to lead the country he also served as president of the Third to victory. Republic. In January 1912, Poincaré became Georges Clemenceau prime minister, serving simultaneously (b. Sept. 28, 1841, Mouilleron-en-Pareds, as foreign minister until January 1913. In France—d. Nov. 24, 1929, Paris) the face of new threats from Germany, he conducted diplomacy with new decisive- Georges Clemenceau was a dominant ness and determination. In August 1912 figure in the French Third Republic he assured the Russian government that and, as premier (1917–20), a major con- his government would stand by the tributor to the Allied victory in World Franco-Russian alliance. In November War I and a framer of the postwar Treaty he concluded an agreement with Britain of Versailles. Political Leaders | 159

the hands of the censors for Clemenceau’s plain speaking and, in September 1914, was suppressed. Two days later, however, it reappeared entitled L’Homme Enchaîné. Meanwhile, in the Senate Clemenceau agitated for more guns, munitions, and soldiers, for judicious use of the available manpower, and for a better organized and equipped medical service. Deeply concerned about the attitude of the United States to the war, he sent urgent appeals to the American public and to President Woodrow Wilson and was overjoyed at the United States’ entry into British Prime Minister David Lloyd the war in April 1917. George (left), French Prime Minister Above all, Clemenceau strove to Georges Clemenceau (centre), and create an indomitable “will to victory.” American President Woodrow Wilson As the war dragged on, weariness, slack- (right) walk together to the signing of ness, and pacifi sm began to appear. He the Treaty of Versailles, 1919. Hulton was the fi rst to draw public attention to Archive/Getty Images such insidious perils. In these diffi cult conditions, President Poincaré, in In 1911 Clemenceau became both a November 1917, called upon Clemenceau member of the French Senate’s commis- to form a government. Though he was 76 sions for foreign aff airs as well as the years of age, he formed his Cabinet and army. He was convinced that Germany appointed himself minister of war as was intent upon war, and, haunted by the well as premier. Clemenceau’s primary fear that France might again be caught desire was to win the war; to this aim all unprepared, he enquired diligently into other interests were subordinated. For the state of France’s armaments. In order traitors and defeatists he had no clem- to publicize his views on rearmament, he ency. The hope of victory urged him on. founded in May 1913 a new daily paper, He was obsessed over the need for a uni- L’Homme Libre , and acted as its editor. fi ed military command and was ultimately When World War I erupted in July 1914, able to convert to his viewpoint the the partisan in him gave way to the Allied governments and military leaders. patriot, who called upon every Frenchman In March 1918, Ferdinand Foch was desig- to join the fray. L’Homme Libre suff ered at nated sole commander. Despite disasters 160 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power in May 1918, Clemenceau’s resolve GERMaNY remained unshaken, and he declared that he would wage war “to the last quar- William II ter hour, for the last quarter hour will (b. Jan. 27, 1859, Potsdam, near Berlin be ours.” [Germany]—d. June 4, 1941, Doorn, Neth.) The armistice signed by the defeated Germans on Nov. 11, 1918, proved him William II was German emperor (kaiser) right and brought him, the last survivor and king of Prussia from 1888 to the end of those who had protested at Bordeaux of World War I in 1918. He was known for in 1871 against the harsh terms imposed his frequently militaristic manner as well on France, the satisfaction of seeing as for his vacillating policies. Alsace-Lorraine returned to France. What began as an attempt to save Clemenceau found that building the Austria - Hungary from collapse, was peace was a more arduous task than winning the war. He wanted the wartime alliance to be followed by an indefectible peacetime alliance. He presided with authority over the diffi cult sessions of the Paris Peace Conference (1919). The Treaty of Versailles was in preparation, and this necessitated strenuous days of work and delicate negotiations. Clemenceau made it his responsibility to reconcile the interests of France with those of Great Britain and the United States. He defended the French cause with enthusiasm and conviction, forcing his view alternately on the British prime minister, David Lloyd George, and the United States president, Woodrow Wilson. He also took care to see that Germany was disarmed. With his desire for poetic justice, he insisted that the Treaty of Versailles be signed (June 28, 1919) in the Hall of Mirrors of the William II, emporer of Germany, wearing Versailles palace where, in 1871, William I his military uniform, c. 1915. Imagno/ had himself proclaimed the German Hulton Archive/Getty Images emperor. Political Leaders | 161 transformed into a world conflict by Salandra became premier in March Germany. William, having encouraged 1914 and so was confronted with a critical the Austrians to adopt an uncompromis- decision on the outbreak of World War I. ing line, took fright when he found war Despite the generation-old Triple Alliance looming, but was not able to halt the of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, implementation of the mobilization Salandra chose neutrality, taking for legal measures that he had allowed his gener- ground the Austrians’ failure to consult als to prepare. During the war, although the Italian government before attacking nominally supreme commander, William Serbia. Salandra then used Italy’s strong did not attempt to resist his generals position to bargain with both sides, even- when they kept its conduct in their own tually bringing his country into the war, hands. He encouraged, instead of chal- in May 1915, on the Allied side, on the lenging, the grandiose war aims of the basis of definite promises of the comple- many generals and politicians that ruled tion of Italian unification by acquisition out all chance of a compromised peace. of territory from Austria-Hungary. By the autumn of 1918 he realized that In 1916 Salandra was forced to resign Germany had lost the war, and he his as a result of Italy’s growing military dif- throne. Refusing to abdicate, he was ficulties. After the war his authoritarian finally forced into resignation on conservatism led him to support Benito November 9, 1918, then persuaded to seek Mussolini and fascism, but, when the asylum in The Netherlands. He avoided extreme course of the new regime captivity and perhaps death, but asylum became clear, he modified his support. also made it impossible for William to Nevertheless, Mussolini made him a retain his position of emperor of Germany. senator in 1928. Subsequently, he lived quietly as a country gentleman in the Netherlands until his Paolo Boselli death in 1941. (b. June 8, 1838, Savona, Piedmont, kingdom of Sardinia [now in Italy]— Italy d. March 10, 1932, Rome)

Antonio Salandra Paolo Boselli headed the Italian govern- (b. Aug. 13, 1853, Troia, Puglia, Kingdom ment that declared war on Germany in of the Two Sicilies [Italy]—d. Dec. 9, World War I. 1931, Rome) The first professor of financial science at the University of Rome, Boselli served Antonio Salandra was premier of Italy as a parliamentary deputy from 1870 to at the beginning of World War I 1921. He later became a senator in 1921. (1914–16). He was minister of education in the 162 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power government of Francesco Crispi in 1888, favoured Italy’s entrance into the war reorganized the Bank of Italy as minister (May 1915), and in October 1917, in the of the treasury under Premier Luigi crisis following the defeat of Italy’s forces Pelloux in 1899, and was a minister in the at the Battle of Caporetto by the Austrians, government of Sidney Sonnino in 1906. he became prime minister, successfully Favouring Italy’s entry into World rallying the country to a renewed effort. War I against Austria-Hungary (1915), he made an important speech in the Ottoman Empire chamber in support of a bill granting full powers to Premier Antonio Salandra. Said Halim Paşa When Salandra’s government fell after (b. 1863, Cairo, Egypt—d. Dec. 6, 1921, the Austrian offensive of May–July Rome, Italy) 1916, the 78-year-old Paolo Boselli became premier, forming a coalition government. Said Halim Paşa served as grand vizier After recovering territory lost in the (chief minister) of the Ottoman Empire Austrian offensive, Boselli’s government from 1913 to 1916. declared war on Germany on Aug. 28, The grandson of Mu ammad ‘Alī 1916. Italy’s disastrous defeat at Caporetto Pasha, a famous viceroy of Egypt, Said brought about Boselli’s resignation on was educated in Turkey and later in Oct. 30, 1917. Switzerland. In 1888 he was appointed a member of the state judicial council. In Vittorio Emanuele Orlando 1911 he became the foreign minister in (b. May 19, 1860, Palermo, Italy—d. Dec. 1, Mahmud Şevket’s Cabinet. After Mahmud 1952, Rome) Şevket’s death Said was made grand vizier. Although he signed the treaty of Vittorio Emanuele Orlando was the alliance with Germany in 1914, he was Italian prime minister during the con- known to oppose Ottoman participation cluding years of World War I and head of in World War I. While he was prepared to his country’s delegation to the Versailles resign at the outset of war, he remained at Peace Conference. his post at the insistence of the ruling Having been educated at Palermo, Committee of Union and Progress. In Orlando first made a name for himself 1916, however, he did resign, and then he with writings concerning electoral reform became a member of the Senate. After and government administration. He was the armistice signed at Mudros (Oct. 30, elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1918), he was banished to Malta by British 1897. He served as minister of education authorities. On his release he went to in 1903–05 and of justice in 1907–09, Rome, where he was assassinated by an resuming the same portfolio in 1914. He Armenian. Political Leaders | 163

RuSSIa 1915, the emperor dismissed him and assumed supreme command himself. Nicholas II Since the emperor had no experience of (b. May 6 [May 18, New Style], 1868, war, almost all his ministers protested Tsarskoye Selo [now Pushkin], near St. against this step, as it was likely to impair Petersburg, Russia—d. July 16/17, 1918, the army’s morale. They were overruled, Yekaterinburg) however, and soon dismissed. When riots broke out in Petrograd Nicholas II was the last Russian emperor (St. Petersburg) on March 8, 1917 , Nicholas (1894–1917). With his wife, Alexandra, and instructed the city commandant to take their children, he was killed by the fi rm measures, sending troops to restore Bolsheviks after the October Revolution. order. It was too late, however, and the After its ambitions in the Far East were checked by Japan, Russia turned its attention to the Balkans. Nicholas sym- pathized with the national aspirations of the Slavs and was anxious to win control of the Turkish straits, but tempered his expansionist inclinations with a sincere desire to preserve peace among the Great Powers. After the assassination of the Austrian archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo, he tried hard to avert the impending war by diplomatic action. Until July 30, 1914, he resisted the pressure of the military for general, rather than partial, mobilization. The outbreak of World War I temporarily strengthened the monarchy, but Nicholas did little to maintain his people’s confi dence. The Duma was slighted, and voluntary patriotic organizations were hampered in their eff orts; the gulf between the ruling group and public opinion grew steadily wider. Alexandra A portrait of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, turned Nicholas’s mind against the popu- c. 1910. W. & D. Downey/Hulton Archive/ lar commander in chief, his father’s cousin Getty Images the grand duke Nicholas, and on Sept. 5, 164 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power government resigned. The Duma, sup- builder, and first head (1917–24) of the ported by the army, called on the emperor Soviet state. He was the founder of to abdicate. At Pskov on March 15, with the organization known as Comintern fatalistic composure, Nicholas renounced (Communist International) and the post- the throne—not, as he had originally humous source of “Leninism,” the intended, in favour of his son, Alexis, but doctrine codified and conjoined with in favour of his brother Michael, who then Marx’s works by Lenin’s successors to refused the crown. form Marxism-Leninism, which became Nicholas was detained at Tsarskoye the Communist worldview. Selo by Prince Lvov’s provisional govern- When war broke out, in August 1914, ment. It was planned that he and his Socialist parties throughout Europe were family would be sent to England; but obliged by prewar congresses of the instead, mainly because of the opposition Second International to resist or even of the Petrograd Soviet, the revolutionary overthrow their respective governments Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council, they were should they plunge their countries into removed to Tobolsk in Western Siberia. an imperialist war. This step sealed their doom. In April Lenin succeeded in reaching neutral 1918 they were taken to Yekaterinburg in Switzerland in September 1914, there the Urals. joining a small group of antiwar Bolshevik When anti-Bolshevik “White” Russian and Menshevik émigrés. The war virtu- forces approached the area, the local ally cut them off from all contact with authorities were ordered to prevent the Russia and with like-minded Socialists in prisoners’ rescue. On the night of July other countries. Nevertheless, in 1915 and 16–17, all of the prisoners were all slaugh- 1916, antiwar Socialists in various countered in the cellar of the house where they tries managed to hold two antiwar had been confined. The bodies were conferences in Zimmerwald and Kienthal, burned, cast into an abandoned mine Switzerland. shaft, and then hastily buried elsewhere. By 1917 it seemed to Lenin that the war would never end and that the pros- Vladimir Ilich Lenin pect of revolution was rapidly receding. (b. April 10 [April 22, New Style], 1870, But in the week of March 8–15, the starv- Simbirsk, Russia—d. Jan. 21, 1924, Gorki ing, freezing, war-weary workers and [later Gorki Leninskiye], near Moscow) soldiers of Petrograd (until 1914, St. Petersburg) succeeded in deposing the Vladimir Lenin was the founder of the tsar. Lenin and his closest lieutenants Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), hastened home after the German authori- inspirer and leader of the Bolshevik ties agreed to permit their passage Revolution (1917), and the architect, through Germany to neutral Sweden. Political Leaders | 165

Berlin hoped that the return of antiwar of the workers, soldiers, and peasants for Socialists to Russia would undermine the immediate peace and division of landed Russian war effort. estates among the peasants. Lenin arrived in Petrograd on April 16, Initially, Lenin’s fellow Bolsheviks 1917, one month after the tsar had been thought that he was temporarily disori- forced to abdicate. Out of the revolution ented by the complexity of the situation; was born the Provisional Government, moderate Socialists thought him mad. formed by a group of leaders of the bour- It required several weeks of sedulous geois liberal parties. This government’s persuasion by Lenin before he won the accession to power was made possible Bolshevik Party Central Committee to only by the assent of the Petrograd Soviet, his view. The April Party Conference a council of workers’ deputies elected in endorsed his program: that the party the factories of the capital. Similar soviets must withhold support from the Pro of workers’ deputies sprang up in all visional Government and win a majority the major cities and towns throughout the in the soviets in favour of soviet power. A country, as did soviets of soldiers’ deputies soviet government, once established, and of peasants’ deputies. Although the should begin immediate negotiations for Petrograd Soviet had been the sole politi- a general peace on all fronts. The soviets cal power recognized by the revolutionary should forthwith confiscate landlords’ workers and soldiers in March 1917, its estates without compensation, national- leaders had hastily turned full power ize all land, and divide it among the over to the Provisional Government. The peasants. The government should estab- Petrograd Soviet was headed by a major- lish tight controls over privately owned ity composed of Menshevik and Socialist industry to the benefit of labour. Revolutionary (SR), or peasant party, From March to September 1917, the leaders who regarded the March (Febru Bolsheviks remained a minority in the sovi- ary, Old Style) Revolution as bourgeois; ets. By autumn, however, the Provisional hence, they believed that the new regime Government (since July headed by the should be headed by leaders of the bour- moderate Socialist Aleksandr Kerensky, geois parties. who was supported by the moderate On his return to Russia, Lenin electri- Socialist leadership of the soviets) had lost fied his own comrades, most of whom popular support. Increasing war-weariness accepted the authority of the Provisional and the breakdown of the economy over- Government. Lenin called this govern- taxed the patience of the workers, ment, despite its democratic pretensions, peasants, and soldiers, who demanded thoroughly imperialist and undeserving immediate and fundamental change. of support by Socialists. It was incapable of Lenin capitalized on the growing disillu- satisfying the most profound desires sionment of the people with Kerensky’s 166 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power ability and willingness to complete the 1917, as Lenin saw it, was either a soviet revolution. Kerensky, in turn, claimed republic—a dictatorship of the quite vast that only a freely elected constituent propertyless majority—or a parliamen- assembly would have the power to decide tary republic—as he saw it, a dictatorship Russia’s political future—but that must of the propertied minority. await the return of order. Meanwhile, From late September, Lenin, a fugi- Lenin and the party demanded peace, tive in Finland, sent a stream of articles land, and bread—immediately, without and letters to Petrograd feverishly exhort- further delay. The Bolshevik line won ing the Party Central Committee to increasing support among the workers, immediately organize an armed uprising, soldiers, and peasants. By September as the opportune moment might be lost. they voted in a Bolshevik majority in the For nearly a month Lenin’s forceful urg- Petrograd Soviet and in the soviets of ings from afar were unsuccessful. In April, the major cities and towns throughout the Lenin again found himself in the party country. minority, and resorted to a desperate Lenin, who had gone underground in stratagem. July after he had been accused as a In disguise and at considerable per- “German agent” by Kerensky’s govern- sonal risk, Lenin slipped into Petrograd ment, now decided that the time was ripe and attended a secret meeting of the to seize power. The party must immedi- Bolshevik Central Committee held on ately begin preparations for an armed the evening of October 23. Only after a uprising to depose the Provisional heated 10-hour debate did he finally win Government and transfer state power to a majority in favour of preparing an the soviets, now headed by a Bolshevik armed takeover. Consequently, these majority. steps included enlisting the support of Until 1917 all revolutionary Socialists soldiers and sailors, and training the rightly believed, Lenin wrote, that a par- Red Guards, the Bolshevik-led workers’ liamentary republic could serve a Socialist militia, for an armed takeover proceeded system as well as a capitalist. But the openly under the guise of self-defense of Russian Revolution had brought forth the Petrograd Soviet. something new, the soviets. Created by On November 7 and 8, the Bolshevik- workers, soldiers, and peasants and led Red Guards and revolutionary excluding the propertied classes, the soldiers and sailors, meeting only slight soviets infinitely surpassed the most resistance, deposed the Provisional democratic of parliaments in democracy, Government and proclaimed that state because parliaments everywhere virtu- power had passed into the hands of the ally excluded workers and peasants. The Soviets. By this time the Bolsheviks, with choice before Russia in early September their leftist allies, constituted an absolute Political Leaders | 167 majority of the Second All-Russian to bring about the overthrow of the Congress of Soviets. The delegates there- Soviet government. That determination fore voted overwhelmingly to accept full hardened when, in 1918, Lenin’s govern- power and elected Lenin as chairman of ment repudiated repayments of all foreign the Council of People’s Commissars, the loans obtained by the tsarist and pro new Soviet Government, and approved his visional governments and nationalized Peace and Land Decrees. Overnight, Lenin foreign properties in Russia without had vaulted from his hideout as a fugitive compensation. From 1918 to 1920 Russia to head the Revolutionary government of was torn by a civil war, which cost mil- the largest country in the world. lions of lives and untold destruction. One The Allies refused to recognize the of the earliest victims was Lenin himself. Soviet government; consequently it In August 1918 an assassin fired two entered alone into peace negotiations bullets into Lenin as he left a factory in with the Central Powers (Germany and which he had just delivered a speech. its allies Austro-Hungary and Turkey) at Because of his robust constitution, he the town of Brest-Litovsk. They imposed recovered rapidly. ruinous conditions that would strip away The Soviet government faced tre- from Soviet Russia the western tier of mendous odds. The anti-Soviet forces, or non-Russian nations of the old Russian Whites, headed mainly by former tsarist Empire. Left Communists fanatically generals and admirals, fought desper- opposed acceptance and preached a rev- ately to overthrow the Red regime. olutionary war, even if it imperilled the Moreover, the Whites were lavishly sup- Soviet government. Lenin insisted that plied by the Allies with materiel, money, the terms, however ruinous and humiliat- and support troops that secured White ing, must be accepted or he would resign bases. Yet, the Whites failed. from the government. He sensed that From the moment Lenin came to peace was the deepest yearning of the power, his abiding aims in international people; in any case, the shattered army relations were twofold: to prevent the for- could not raise effective resistance to the mation of an imperialist united front invader. Finally, in March 1918, after a still against Soviet Russia; but, even more larger part had been carved out of old important, to stimulate proletarian revo- Russia by the enemy, Lenin succeeded in lutions abroad. winning the Central Committee’s acceptance of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. At United States last Russia was at peace. Brest-Litovsk, however, intensified the Woodrow Wilson determination of counterrevolutionary (b. Dec. 28, 1856, Staunton, Va., U.S.— forces and the Allies who supported them d. Feb. 3, 1924, Washington, D.C.) 168 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Woodrow Wilson was the 28th president Germans, for military reasons of their of the United States (1913–21). An own, pledged to curtail submarine war- American scholar and statesman, Wilson fare in April 1916. For the rest of that year is best remembered for his legislative the threat of war receded, while relations accomplishments and his high-minded with Great Britain worsened because of idealism. Wilson led his country into their ever-tightening blockade and their World War I and became the creator and brutal suppression of the Easter Rising, leading advocate of the League of the armed revolt in Ireland that eventu- Nations, for which he was awarded the ally led to independence. 1919 Nobel Prize for Peace. During his Wilson prevailed in the 1916 election, second term the Nineteenth Amendment becoming the first Democrat to win a to the U.S. Constitution, giving women second consecutive term since Andrew the right to vote, was passed and ratified. Jackson. His narrow victory by 277 to He suffered a paralytic stroke while 254 electoral votes over Charles Evans seeking American public support for Hughes, the nominee of the reunited and the Treaty of Versailles (October 1919), resurgent Republicans, was a great politi- and his incapacity, which lasted for the cal feat. The campaign cry “He kept us rest of his term of office, caused the worst out of war” helped, but Wilson’s domestic crisis of presidential disability in U.S. record on progressive and labour issues history. played the biggest part in his achieving a The outbreak of World War I in healthy plurality in the popular vote and August 1914, which coincided with his a small electoral margin. wife’s death, tried Wilson’s mind and soul. His reelection assured, Wilson Almost no one questioned American mounted a peace offensive in December neutrality in the beginning, but both 1916 and January 1917 aimed at ending the British blockade of maritime trade the world war. First he made a public dip- and German U-boat attacks soon made lomatic appeal to the belligerent nations neutrality painful. On May 7, 1915, when a to state their peace terms and accept U-boat sank the British liner Lusitania, American mediation, and then on January killing more than 1,100 people, including 22 he gave a stirring speech in which he 128 Americans, the war came home with called for a “peace without victory” and a vengeance. Wilson at first urged his pledged to establish a league of nations countrymen to show restraint, declaring, to prevent future wars. “There is such a thing as a man being too Unfortunately, the Germans rendered proud to fight,” but he also pressed the Wilson’s peace efforts moot by unleash- Germans to rein in their submarines and ing their submarines on February 1. For decided to build up the armed forces. A the next two months Wilson agonized combination of patience and firmness on over how to respond. Public opinion the president’s part paid off when the remained divided and uncertain, even Political Leaders | 169

Antiwar cartoon by I. Klein from The Masses. Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 170 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power after publication of the Zimmermann ask for a declaration of war to fulfi ll his Telegram , a secret communication by the injunction that “the world must be made German foreign secretary that off ered safe for democracy.” Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona to Wilson proved to be a surprisingly Mexico in return for going to war against eff ective war president. Recognizing the United States. Wilson fi nally decided what he did not know, he delegated mili- to intervene, seeing no alternative and tary decisions to professional soldiers, hoping to use American belligerency as a particularly General John J. Pershing, means to build a just, lasting peace. On who commanded the American Exped- April 2, 1917, he went before Congress to itionary Force in France, and economic

(Left to right) The “Big Four”: David Lloyd George of Britain, Vittorio Orlando of Italy, Georges Clemenceau of France, and Woodrow Wilson of the United States, the principal architects of the Treaty of Versailles. National Archives, Washington, D.C. Political Leaders | 171 mobilization to such men as Bernard financial and territorial terms severely Baruch, William Gibbs McAdoo, and compromised Wilson’s aims, but those Herbert Hoover. Careful planning also were offset by its inclusion of the ensured the success of the Selective Covenant of the League of Nations, which Service Act, which became law in May. he believed would adjust international This helped to raise the strength of the differences and maintain peace. armed forces to 5 million men and Wilson returned from the peace con- women, 2 million of whom reached France ference exhausted, in failing health, and by the war’s end. The boost given to the in no shape to face the biggest fight of his Allies by American money, supplies, and career. Republican senators, led by Henry manpower tipped the scales against the Cabot Lodge, sought either to reject the Germans, who sued for peace and laid treaty or to attach reservations that would down their arms with the Armistice of gravely limit America’s commitments to Nov. 11, 1918. the League of Nations. In September 1919, A less happy side to Wilson’s delega- after two months of frustrating talks tion of war-making tasks came at home, with senators, Wilson took his case to the where some of his cabinet members, most people with the hope of shaping public notably U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell opinion on this important issue of the Palmer, brutally suppressed dissent. The day. A master of the English language overzealous hounding of radical groups, and public oratory, he threw himself into aliens, and dissidents both during the a whirlwind cross-country tour, giving 39 war and in the Red Scare of 1919–20 was speeches in three weeks. justified on grounds of national security The mental and physical strain was but was condemned by civil libertarians too much for him. He had a near break- and ultimately discredited. Diplomacy down on September 25, after which his was the one job that Wilson kept to him- doctor canceled the rest of the tour and self. He seized the initiative on war aims rushed him back to Washington. On with his Fourteen Points speech of Jan. 8, Oct. 2, 1919, Wilson suffered a massive 1918, in which he promised a liberal, non- stroke that left him partially paralyzed on punitive peace and a league of nations. his left side. His intellectual capacity was Determined to keep those promises, not affected, but his emotional balance Wilson made the controversial decision and judgment were badly impaired. to go in person to the Paris Peace This was the worst crisis of presi- Conference, where he spent seven months dential disability in U.S. history, and it in wearying, often acrimonious negotia- was handled poorly. No one seriously tions with the British, French, and Italians. suggested that Wilson resign. His wife, The final product, the Treaty of Versailles, Edith, controlled access to him, made was signed on June 28, 1919. The treaty’s decisions by default, and engineered a 172 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power cover-up of his condition, by releasing and the Republicans. Twice, on Nov. 19, misleadingly optimistic reports from his 1919, and March 19, 1920, the Treaty of doctors. Although he gradually recovered Versailles failed to gain the two-thirds from the worst effects of the stroke, vote necessary for ratification. Later, under Wilson never again fully functioned as Warren G. Harding, Wilson’s Republican president. successor, the United States made a sep- The peace treaty went down to arate peace with Germany, something defeat in the Senate. As a consequence Wilson had believed “would place ineffable of Wilson’s stroke-induced rigidity, he stain upon the gallantry and honor of the demanded that Democratic senators United States.” The United States never spurn all efforts at compromise with Lodge joined the League of Nations. ChaPTER 7

Military Commanders

he following brief biographies of military commanders T for the Entente and Central powers concentrate on their actions during World War I.

ENTENTE POWERS

Arab

usayn ibn ‘alī (b. c. 1854, Constantinople, Turkey, Ottoman Empire [now Istanbul, Turkey]—d. 1931, Amman, Transjordan [now Jordan])

usayn ibn ‘Alī was emir of Mecca from 1908 to 1916 and king of Hejaz from 1916 to 1924. usayn was born into the line of Hāshimites to which the Meccan emirate had passed in the early 19th century. He became emir in 1908 and was a leader in the Arab revolt against Ottoman rule during World War I. In October 1916 he proclaimed himself “king of the Arab countries,” though the Allies formally recognized him only as king of the Hejaz. usayn was represented at the Versailles peace conference by his third son, Fay al, but refused to ratify the Versailles Peace Treaty (1919) as a protest against the mandatory regimes imposed on Syria, Palestine, and Iraq by France and Great Britain. Subsequently his domestic policy was 174 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power marked by ever-increasing avarice and In March 1918 he took command of the conservatism, while he sowed the seeds Australian Corps, and on July 4 he tested of future trouble by deliberately court- his theory of the semimobile managed ing the enmity of Ibn Sa‘ūd. In March battle in a small-scale attack at Le Hamel, 1924 he proclaimed himself caliph, but France. Its outstanding success led war with Ibn Sa‘ūd was imminent, and Monash to develop a more comprehen- the Wahhābīyah attack on a - ā’if in sive plan for a sustained offensive, which September found him unprepared. On shaped the general British plan as well. October 5 he abdicated. The British con- From August 8 until its withdrawal from veyed him to Cyprus, where he lived the line in October, the Australian Corps until 1930. was in almost continuous combat as the spearhead of the British Expeditionary Australia Force’s advance to victory. Monash is generally considered Sir John Monash among the best corps commanders of (b. June 27, 1865, West Melbourne, World War I, though his capacities at Austl.—d. Oct. 8, 1931, Melbourne) higher levels remained untested.

John Monash, a civil engineer and sol- Britain dier, is best known for his role as commander of the Australian army corps Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby in France during World War I. (b. April 23, 1861, Brackenhurst, near Monash attended Scotch College and Southwell, Nottinghamshire, Eng.— Melbourne University, obtaining degrees d. May 14, 1936, London) in the arts, civil engineering, and law. Active in the prewar militia, he com- Edmund Allenby, a field marshal and the manded an infantry brigade at the Battle last great British leader of mounted cav- of Gallipoli during the Dardanelles alry, directed the Palestine campaign in Campaign in Turkey. From 1916–17, he World War I. commanded a division on the Western Educated at the Royal Military Front. Monash was not a frontline gen- Academy, Sandhurst, Allenby joined the eral, but his extensive and successful Inniskilling Dragoons in 1882 and saw business experience led him to empha- active service in the Bechuanaland size planning and organization. He expedition (1884–85), in Zululand (1888), favoured using technical and mechanical and in the South African War (1899– resources—tanks, artillery, and aircraft—to 1902). He was inspector general of relieve the infantry as much as possible cavalry from 1910 to 1914, and upon the of the burden of fighting its way forward. outbreak of World War I he took a Military Commanders | 175 cavalry division to France. After periods over the Turks at Gaza (November 1917), in command of the British cavalry and which led to the capture of Jerusalem the 5th Corps, he became commander of (Dec. 9, 1917). Further advances were the 3rd Army (October 1915) and was checked by calls from France for his prominently engaged at the Battle of troops, but after receiving reinforcements Arras (April 1917). he won a decisive victory at Megiddo Allenby’s service in the Middle East (Sept. 19, 1918), which, followed by his proved more distinguished. In June 1917 capture of Damascus and Aleppo, ended he took command of the Egyptian Ottoman power in Syria. Allenby’s success Expeditionary Force. The strength of in these campaigns was attributable his personality created a new spirit in his partly to his skillful and innovative use of army, and after careful preparation and cavalry and other mobile forces in posi- reorganization he won a decisive victory tional warfare. As high commissioner for Egypt (1919–25) Allenby steered that country fi rmly but impartially through political disturbances and saw it recognized as a sovereign state in 1922. He was created 1st Viscount Allenby of Megiddo and of Felixstowe in October 1919.

David Beatty (b. Jan. 17, 1871, Howbeck Lodge, Stapeley, near Nantwich, Cheshire, Eng.—d. March 11, 1936, London)

David Beatty was a British admiral of the fl eet and commander of Britain’s battle cruisers in the Battle of Jutland (1916). Beatty was the son of Captain David Longfi eld Beatty. He began training as a naval cadet in 1884. From 1896 to 1898 he served in Egypt and the Sudan and then in 1900 in China during the Boxer Rebellion. He was promoted to captain at the early age of 29. In 1911, as a rear admi- A portrait of Gen. Edmund Allenby, c. 1917. Hulton Archive/Getty Images ral, he became naval secretary to the fi rst lord of the Admiralty, then Winston 176 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Churchill, and in 1913 was appointed to Julian Byng was a British field marshal command the battle cruiser squadron. during World War I. Soon after the outbreak of World War A career soldier from 1883, Byng was I in August 1914, Beatty’s naval force promoted to major general in 1909. As made a raid into the Helgoland Bight and commander of the Canadian Corps in sank three cruisers and one destroyer France (from May 1916), he was responsible without loss. A few months later he inter- for one of the most famous Canadian cepted the German squadron under victories in either world war, the capture Admiral von Hipper in its third attempt of Vimy Ridge, north of Arras (April 9, on the English coastal towns. In a run- 1917). As commander of the British 3rd ning fight, the rear German battle cruiser Army (from June 1917) he conducted the “Blücher” was sunk by British gunfire. first large scale attack by tanks in history This action was known as the Battle of (at Cambrai, Nov. 20, 1917). His army the Dogger Bank. broke the German Hindenburg Line on In the Battle of Jutland on May 31, Sept. 27, 1918. 1916, the battle cruiser fleet under Beatty Byng was promoted to full general was heavily engaged in a running fight in 1917 and was made a field marshal in with the German battle cruisers in the 1932. After World War I he served as van under Hipper. Although Beatty’s governor-general of Canada (1921–26) battle cruisers were superior in number, and commissioner of London police they proved unable to sustain the gunfire (1928–31). He was created a baron in 1919 of the German ships, with the result that and a viscount in 1928. the “Indefatigable” and “Queen Mary” were sunk. Nevertheless, Beatty succeeded Sir Arthur William Currie in his main object of drawing the com- (b. Dec. 5, 1875, Napperton, Ont., bined German high sea fleet to the Can.—d. Nov. 30, 1933, Montreal, Que.) northward, whence Admiral Jellicoe, with the whole British grand fleet, was hasten- From 1917, Arthur Currie was the first ing to meet and engage it. The resulting Canadian commander of Canada’s over- engagement, the Battle of Jutland, proved seas forces in World War I. indecisive. In December 1916, on Jellicoe’s Currie taught school before going being appointed first sea lord, Beatty into business in Victoria, B.C. He enlisted became commander in chief of the in the militia and rose from the ranks to grand fleet. become lieutenant colonel of artillery. In spite of this minimum of professional Julian Hedworth George Byng training, he was given command of a bat- (b. Sept. 11, 1862, Wrotham Park, talion in the first Canadian contingent Middlesex, Eng.—d. June 6, 1935, sent to assist Britain in 1914. He advanced Thorpe Hall, Essex) steadily, winning distinction at the battles Military Commanders | 177 of Ypres and Saint-Julien in Belgium and A soldier from 1874, French became a at the battle of Vimy Ridge in France. public figure with his successful leader- Within three years he became lieutenant ship of British cavalry against the Boers general and commander of the four divi- in the South African War (1899–1902). He sions of the Canadian Corps, succeeding was appointed inspector general in 1907 the British general Sir Julian Byng. He and chief of the Imperial General Staff was one of the most successful and effec- in 1913. tive corps commanders in any army On Aug. 23, 1914, near Mons, Belg., during the war’s final months. Currie was French directed the first major engage- knighted in 1918. After the war Currie ment of British troops in the war. Although served as inspector general of the superior German strength forced him to Canadian militia and became the first retreat, he had intended merely to cover general in the Canadian Army. In 1920 he the withdrawal of the French 5th Army, accepted the position of principal and and as a delaying action the battle was a vice chancellor of McGill University, success. He was criticized, however, for Montreal, and retained this post until his failure to coordinate the movement of his death. his two corps or even to remain in touch with their commanders. After a costly John French battle at Le Cateau, France, on August 26, (b. Sept. 28, 1852, Ripple, Kent, Eng.— he seemed to lose his nerve and planned d. May 22, 1925, Deal, Kent) to withdraw south of the Seine River and perhaps from France altogether. Lord John French commanded the British Kitchener, the British secretary of state army on the Western Front between for war, induced him to remain in action August 1914, when World War I began, and to work more closely with the French and Dec. 17, 1915, when he resigned under and Belgian armies. pressure and was succeeded by General On Oct. 19, 1914, French ordered his (afterward Field Marshal) Douglas Haig. force, increased by that time to three The battles fought under French’s corps, to start a two-branched offensive direction at Ypres, Belg., and elsewhere eastward from Ypres. The British collided were noteworthy in Britain for high num- with German armies that began an offen- bers of British losses—e.g., more than sive of their own the next day. The bitter 117,000 casualties in the first two battles of resistance of French’s army helped pre- Ypres. He was considered unable to adapt vent the German forces from advancing; himself to unfamiliar conditions of war or however, no movement was made by the to work harmoniously with the British Allies either. By November 22 the battle government, his own subordinates, or the had ended in a stalemate. In 1915, the French and Belgian generals with whom battles of Neuve-Chapelle (from March 10), he was supposed to cooperate. Ypres again (from April 22), and Loos 178 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

(from September 25) also produced no of general and received the award of the Allied advance. French’s indecisive use of Knight Grand Cross of the Bath in 1937. his reserves at Loos led to his removal. French was created a viscount in 1916 Douglas Haig and an earl in 1922. He was commander (b. June 19, 1861, Edinburgh, Scot.—d. in chief in the United Kingdom and then Jan. 29, 1928, London, Eng.) (1918–21) lord lieutenant of Ireland. Douglas Haig was a British field marshal Sir Hubert Gough and commander in chief of the British (b. Aug. 12, 1870, London, Eng.—d. forces in France during most of World March 18, 1963, London) War I. His strategy of attrition (tautly summarized as “kill more Germans”) Hubert Gough was the World War I com- made him a subject of controversy, and mander of the British 5th Army, which resulted in enormous numbers of Brit bore the brunt of the great German offen- ish casualties but little immediate gain sive in March 1918. in 1916–17. He joined the 16th Lancers in 1889 On the outbreak of World War I in and served in the Tirah Expedition in August 1914, Haig led I Corps of the India (1897) and in the South African War British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to (1899–1902). He commanded the 3rd northern France, and, early in 1915, he Cavalry Brigade in 1914 and opposed the became commander of the 1st Army. On use of force at the Curragh to compel December 17 of that year, he succeeded Ulster to accept Home Rule. Sir John French (afterward 1st Earl of In France, Gough became com- Ypres) as commander in chief of the BEF. mander of the 5th Army on its formation In July–November 1916, he committed (1916) and took part in the battles of the great masses of troops to an unsuccessful Somme (1916) and Ypres (1917), where he offensive on the Somme River, resulting earned a reputation as a poor administra- in 420,000 British casualties. The next tor and a hard driver—indifferent to the year, when the French decided to stand casualties his men suffered. In March on the defensive until forces from the 1918 his army was compelled to withdraw United States (which had entered the war with considerable loss under heavy April 6) could arrive in quantity, Haig German pressure. Although his skillful resolved to try to defeat the Germans by a handling of the battle led to the eventual purely British offensive in French and stemming of the German advance, the Belgian Flanders. In the resulting Third government blamed him for temporary Battle of Ypres (July–November 1917), German successes and insisted on his also called the Passchendaele Campaign, removal. He retired in 1922 with the rank the number of casualties shocked the Military Commanders | 179

Allied commander on the western front. In March 1918, Haig secured the appointment of another French general, Ferdinand Foch, as Allied generalissimo. The two men worked well together, and Haig exercised full tactical command of the British armies, which had not been the case under Nivelle. After helping to stop the last German off ensive of the war (March–July 1918), Haig showed perhaps his best generalship in leading the victorious Allied assault beginning August 8. After the war, Haig organized the British Legion and traveled throughout the British Empire collecting money for needy former servicemen. He was created an earl in 1919.

Sir Ian hamilton (b. Jan. 16, 1853, Corfu, Ionian Islands [Greece]—d. Oct. 12, 1947, London, Eng.)

A portrait of Gen. Douglas Haig, c. 1918. Ian Hamilton was the commander in Hulton Archive/Getty Images chief of the British Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in the unsuccessful campaign against Turkey in the Gallipoli British public, as the Somme death toll Peninsula during World War I. had done. Although he failed to reach his Hamilton served in various cam- objective—the Belgian coast—he did paigns in India and Africa, beginning in weaken the German forces and helped the 1870s, and was Lord Kitchener’s chief prepare the way for their defeat in 1918. of staff during the South African War Promoted to fi eld marshal late in 1916, (1899–1902). He was knighted in 1902. In Haig was steadfastly supported by King 1910, he became British commander in George V, but not by David Lloyd George, chief in the Mediterranean. prime minister from December of that On March 12, 1915, Hamilton was year. From that month to May 1917, Haig placed in charge of the expeditionary was an unwilling subordinate of the force intended to seize control of the French general Robert Nivelle, supreme Dardanelles Strait and to capture 180 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Constantinople. During the next six During the next year his efforts to combat months, he conducted operations against the new German submarine campaign the Turks at Gallipoli but suffered heavy were ineffective until the convoy system casualties and made little headway. He was adopted at the insistence of the prime remained unrealistically optimistic, and, minister, David Lloyd George, who was when the British cabinet had begun to responsible for Jellicoe’s retirement from favour the evacuation of his force, he the Admiralty at the end of 1917. After the inopportunely reiterated his belief in the armistice, Jellicoe was sent on a special ultimate success of the campaign. He was mission to visit the dominions and advise recalled on Oct. 16, 1915, and was given on the postwar organization of their no further command. navies. Promoted to admiral of the fleet in 1919, he became governor of New John Rushworth Jellicoe Zealand in 1920. (b. Dec. 5, 1859, Southampton, For his services in World War I, Hampshire, Eng.—d. Nov. 20, 1935, Jellicoe was raised to the peerage as Kensington, London) Viscount Jellicoe of Scapa in 1918. On his return from New Zealand and in recogni- John Jellicoe was the British admiral of tion of his services as governor, he was the fleet who commanded at the crucial created an earl and Viscount Brocas of Battle of Jutland (May 31, 1916) during Southampton in 1925. World War I. On the eve of World War I, Jellicoe Roger John Brownlow Keyes was sent to join the home fleet at Scapa as (b. Oct. 4, 1872, Tundiani Fort, second in command under Admiral Sir India—d. Dec. 26, 1945, Buckingham, George Callaghan. He was soon appointed Buckinghamshire, Eng.) commander in chief with acting rank of admiral. He was confirmed in his rank in Roger Keyes was the British admiral who March 1915 and for two years organized planned and directed the World War I and trained the grand fleet, keeping it raid on the German base at Zeebrugge, ready for action. His command was put to Belg., April 22–23, 1918, and thus helped the test at the Battle of Jutland. Although to close the Strait of Dover to German his tactics were severely criticized at the submarines. time, it is now accepted that he achieved Keyes entered the Royal Navy in 1885. a strategic victory that left the German For bold action during the Boxer Rebellion high seas fleet ineffective during the in China in 1900, he was promoted to remainder of the war. Toward the end of commander. As commodore in charge of 1916 Jellicoe left his last command afloat submarines (1910–14), he was partly to become first sea lord of the Admiralty. responsible for the British victory in the Military Commanders | 181

Battle of Helgoland Bight (Aug. 28, 1914). As a protégé of the Oxford archaeolo- In 1915, he was chief of staff for the unsuc- gist D. G. Hogarth, Lawrence acquired a cessful Dardanelles expedition. demyship (travelling fellowship) from Appointed director of plans at the Magdalen College and joined an expedi- Admiralty in 1917, Keyes began to prepare tion excavating the Hittite settlement of operations to block the entrances to Carchemish on the Euphrates. He worked Zeebrugge and Ostend. On the first there from 1911 to 1914, first under Hogarth attempt, the mission at Zeebrugge suc- and then under Sir Leonard Woolley, and ceeded, but the blockships could not find used his free time to travel on his own the Ostend entrance. Two weeks later, and get to know the language and the Keyes sent the Vindictive to Ostend, people. Early in 1914 he and Woolley, and where its volunteer crew sank the ship at Capt. S. F. Newcombe, explored northern the harbour entrance, thus discouraging Sinai, on the Turkish frontier east of Suez. most German U-boat operations in Dover Supposedly a scientific expedition, and Command waters. in fact sponsored by the Palestine Explo After the Armistice Keyes was made ration Fund, it was more a map-making a baronet and received a government reconnaissance from Gaza to Aqaba, des- grant of £10,000. He held a number of tined to be of almost immediate strategic commands, attaining the rank of admiral value. The cover study was nevertheless of the fleet from 1930. He sat in Parliament of authentic scholarly significance; writ- from 1934 until his elevation to the peer- ten by Lawrence and Woolley together, it age in 1943. Briefly, in May 1940, he was published as The Wilderness of Zin returned to prominence in an attack on in 1915. Neville Chamberlain’s conduct of World The month the war began, Lawrence War II. became a civilian employee of the Map Department of the War Office in London, T. E. Lawrence charged with preparing a militarily use- (b. Aug. 15, 1888, Tremadoc, ful map of Sinai. By December 1914 he Caernarvonshire, Wales—d. May 19, was a lieutenant in Cairo. Experts on Arab 1935, Clouds Hill, Dorset, Eng.) affairs—especially those who had trav- elled in the Turkish-held Arab lands—were T. E. Lawrence was a British archaeologi- rare, and he was assigned to intelligence, cal scholar, military strategist, and where he spent more than a year inter- author, who is best known for his legend- viewing prisoners, drawing maps, ary war activities in the Middle East receiving and processing data from during World War I and for his account agents behind enemy lines, and produc- of those activities in The Seven Pillars of ing a handbook on the Turkish Army. Wisdom (1926). When, in mid-1915, his brothers Will and 182 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Frank were killed in action in France, T. E. In doing so, he tied down enemy forces was reminded cruelly of the more active that otherwise would have been deployed front in the West. Egypt was, at the time, elsewhere, and kept the Damascus-to- the staging area for Middle Eastern mili- Medina railway largely inoperable, with tary operations of prodigious inefficiency; potential Turkish reinforcements thus a trip to Arabia convinced Lawrence of helpless to crush the uprising. In such an alternative method of undermining fashion Lawrence—“Amīr Dynamite” to the Germany’s Turkish ally. In October 1916 admiring Bedouins—committed the cyni- he had accompanied the diplomat Sir cal, self-serving shaykhs for the moment Ronald Storrs on a mission to Arabia, to his king-maker’s vision of an Arab where usayn ibn ‘Alī, amīr of Mecca, had nation. He goaded them with examples of proclaimed a revolt against the Turks the his own self-punishing personal valour previous June. Storrs and Lawrence con- when their spirits flagged, and bribed sulted with usayn’s son Abdullah, and them with promises of enemy booty and Lawrence received permission to go on English gold sovereigns. to consult further with another son, Fay al, Aqaba—at the northernmost tip of who was then commanding an Arab force the Red Sea—was the first major victory southwest of Medina. Back in Cairo in for the Arab guerrilla forces; they seized November, Lawrence urged his superiors it after a two-month march on July 6, 1917. to abet the efforts at rebellion with arms Thenceforth, Lawrence attempted to and gold and to make use of the dissident coordinate Arab movements with the shaykhs by meshing their aspirations for campaign of General Sir Edmund independence with general military strat- Allenby, who was advancing toward egy. He rejoined Fay al’s army as political Jerusalem, a tactic only partly successful. and liaison officer. In November Lawrence was captured at Lawrence was not the only officer to Dar‘ā by the Turks while reconnoitring become involved in the incipient Arab the area in Arab dress and was appar- rising. However, from his own small cor- ently recognized and homosexually ner of the Arabian Peninsula he quickly brutalized before he was able to escape. became—especially from his own The experience, variously reported or accounts—its brains, its organizing force, disguised by him afterward, left physical its liaison with Cairo, and its military and emotional scars from which he never technician. His small but irritating sec- recovered. The next month, nevertheless, ond front behind the Turkish lines was a he took part in the victory parade in hit-and-run guerrilla operation, focused Jerusalem before returning to increas- upon the mining of bridges and supply ingly successful actions in which trains, and obscuring the location of Arab Fay al’s forces nibbled their way north, units first in one place and then another. and Lawrence rose to the rank of Military Commanders | 183 lieutenant colonel with the Distinguished The eldest son of Prince Alexander Service Order (DSO). of Hesse, he was naturalized as a British By the time the motley Arab army subject in 1868, when he entered the reached Damascus in October 1918, Royal Navy. He took part in the British Lawrence was physically and emotionally invasion of Egypt in 1882, which included exhausted, having forced body and spirit the bombardment of Alexandria (July to the breaking point too often. He had 11). After serving as director of naval been wounded numerous times, captured, intelligence, he was promoted to the rank and tortured; had endured extremities of of rear admiral in 1904 and vice admiral hunger, weather, and disease; had been in 1908. He commanded the Atlantic driven by military necessity to commit Fleet from 1908 to 1910 and became first atrocities upon the enemy. His aspira- sea lord in 1912. As such he was charged tions were defeated as he witnessed the with readying the fleet for war. After a chaos of Damascus. In the very moment of test mobilization in July 1914, he ordered their triumph, their seemingly incurable (with instructions from Churchill, first factionalism rendered them incapable lord of the Admiralty) the reserve ships of becoming a nation. (Anglo-French to remain in full commission; thus, the duplicity, made official in the Sykes-Picot fleet was wholly mobilized on Aug. 3, Agreement, Lawrence knew, had already 1914, the day before Great Britain entered betrayed them in a cynical wartime divi- World War I. sion of expected spoils.) Distinguished Despite this and other services, he and disillusioned, Lawrence left for home was forced to resign as first sea lord (Oct. just before the Armistice and politely 29, 1914) because of his German birth. In refused, at a royal audience on Oct. 30, 1917, at the request of King George V, he 1918, the Order of the Bath and the DSO, relinquished his German titles, assumed leaving the shocked king George V (in the surname of Mountbatten, and on July his words) “holding the box in my hand.” 17 of that year was created marquess of He was demobilized as a lieutenant colo- Milford Haven. nel on July 31, 1919. Sir William Robert Robertson Louis Alexander Mountbatten (b. Jan. 29, 1860, Welbourn, Lincolnshire, (b. May 24, 1854, Graz, Austria—d. Sept. Eng.—d. Feb. 12, 1933, London) 11, 1921, London, Eng.) William Robertson was chief of the British Louis Mountbatten, a British admiral of Imperial General Staff during most of the fleet and first sea lord, was responsible, World War I. He supported Sir Douglas with Winston Churchill, for the total mobi- Haig, the British commander in chief in lization of the fleet prior to World War I. France, in urging concentration of 184 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Britain’s manpower and matériel on the Hugh Montague Trenchard Western Front. (b. Feb. 3, 1873, Taunton, Somerset, After serving as an enlisted man for 11 Eng.—d. Feb. 10, 1956, London) years, Robertson was commissioned in 1888. He served in India until 1896 and Hugh Trenchard was the British officer then became the first officer from the ranks and air marshal who helped lay the foun- to pass through the Staff College at dations of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Camberley, Surrey (1897). During the South Trenchard entered the army in 1893 African War (1899–1902) he was on the and served in the South African War and intelligence staff. He was appointed com- later in Nigeria. After being invalided mandant of the Staff College (1910) and home in 1912, he learned to fly and in 1913, director of military training (1913) in the he became assistant commandant of the War Office. Robertson was widely regarded Central Flying School, Upavon, Wiltshire. as “the cleverest man in the army.” In 1915, during World War I, he assumed From the beginning of World War I, command in France of the Royal Flying Robertson was quartermaster general of Corps, which was then a branch of the the British expeditionary force in France. British army. His policy of launching In January 1915 he was appointed chief of persistent attacks in order to establish staff to Sir John French, and in December dominance of the air became the stan- of that year he became chief of the dard doctrine of Britain’s air force. In Imperial General Staff. January 1918 he became Britain’s first In this capacity Robertson held most chief of air staff, though he resigned the of the powers of the secretary of state for post in April of that year. Subsequently war. The holder of that office in the latter that year, he organized the Inter-Allied part of 1915, David Lloyd George, dis- Independent Bomber Force, a force of agreed with Robertson and Haig that the RAF heavy bombers to raid targets in war could and should be won in the west Germany. and advocated an Allied attack originat- In 1919 Trenchard was appointed by ing in the Middle East. The mutual War Minister Winston Churchill to be distrust between the two generals on one the chief of staff of the RAF. In this capac- side, and their civilian superior on the ity he strengthened the RAF by founding other, grew after Lloyd George became colleges for air officer cadets and staff prime minister in December 1916. Finally, officers and by introducing a system of in February 1918, Robertson resigned as short-service commissions, thereby build- chief of the Imperial General Staff and ing a reserve of trained officers. He held was given a command in England. In 1919 the post of chief of air staff until he and 1920, he commanded the British army became the first marshal of the RAF in of occupation on the Rhine. 1927. He retired from the service in 1929. Military Commanders | 185

Sir Henry Hughes Wilson necessity of military conscription (not (b. May 5, 1864, near Edgeworthstown, instituted until 1916). The smooth mobili- County Longford, Ire.—d. June 22, 1922, zation of the standing army and its rapid London, Eng.) movement to France in August 1914 may be credited largely to Wilson’s prewar Henry Wilson was the chief of the British planning. Imperial General Staff and the main mili- Wilson soon went to France as assis- tary adviser to Prime Minister David tant chief of the general staff. His only Lloyd George in the last year of World field command in the war (December War I. While director of military opera- 1915–December 1916) was marked by the tions in the War Office (1910–14), he loss to the Germans of a sector of Vimy determined that Great Britain should Ridge, near Arras, by his IV Corps. In support France in a war against Germany September 1917 he took over the Eastern on the basis of French requirements. It Command, a position that enabled him to was a policy not favoured by many British live in London and ingratiate himself leaders. with Lloyd George. As chief of the impe- A soldier from the early 1880s, Wilson rial general staff (from Feb. 18, 1918), he rose to the command of the Staff College aided the prime minister in securing at Camberley, Surrey (1907–10). During Foch’s appointment as supreme com- this period he cultivated the friendship of mander of the Allied armies on the his counterpart at the French war college, Western Front. General (afterward Marshal) Ferdinand Foch—an association that may account Canada for Wilson’s readiness to involve Great Britain in French strategy. He also played William Avery Bishop a dubious part in the Curragh incident (March 1914), surreptitiously encourag- (b. Feb. 8, 1894, Owen Sound, Ont., ing some British army officers who had Can.—d. Sept. 11, 1956, West Palm refused to lead troops against Ulster Beach, Fla., U.S.) opponents of Irish Home Rule. On the outbreak of World War I, the William (“Billy”) Bishop was a Canadian British government chose Wilson’s policy fighter ace who shot down 72 German of fighting in France alongside French aircraft during World War I. armies as opposed to attacking the Bishop was educated at the Royal German invaders in Belgium, the pre- Military College, Kingston, and went ferred strategy of the commander in chief, overseas during World War I with the Field Marshal Earl Roberts. Wilson Canadian cavalry. In 1915 he transferred agreed with Roberts, however, on the to the Royal Flying Corps, joining the 186 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

60th Squadron in France in 1917. He soon commander in chief, Joseph Joffre, called became highly skilled in aerial combat Foch to command the army detachment— and shot down a total of 72 enemy air- which later became the IX Army—that craft, including 25 in one 10-day period. was being formed there. The enemy tried He was awarded the Victoria Cross and to break through, but Foch held on. His several other decorations, and in March tenacity made it possible for Joffre to win 1918 he was promoted to the rank of at the First Battle of the Marne. The same major, assuming command of the 85th was true at the battles of the Yser and of Squadron. Ypres, where he had been sent by Joffre Once promoted to lieutenant colonel, to coordinate the efforts of the English, Bishop was appointed to the staff of the the French, and the Belgians, who were British Air Ministry in August 1918, and being severely attacked. in this capacity he helped to form the For two thankless years—1915 and Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) as a 1916—Foch, commanding the Northern separate service. Army Group, vainly tried to break through the German line in Artois and at the France Somme, but was unable to compensate for the lack of equipment and supplies. In Ferdinand Foch May 1917 he was appointed chief of the (b. Oct. 2, 1851, Tarbes, France— war minister’s general staff, a position d. March 20, 1929, Paris) that made him adviser to the Allied armies. However, advising was not com- Ferdinand Foch was marshal of France manding. Russia was about to collapse, and commander of Allied forces during thus allowing Germany to bring all its the closing months of World War I. He is forces back to the Western Front, where generally considered the leader most the Belgians, English, and French were responsible for the Allied victory. lined up under separate commands. Foch After commanding a division in 1911 predicted that when the Germans struck and briefly commanding an army corps, this poorly consolidated front, each force he was, in August 1913, put in command would think only of its own fate, and that of the XX Army Corps in Nancy, protect- the front would be broken up. He advo- ing the Lorraine frontier. It seemed to cated establishing a single command, but be the crowning point of Foch’s career the British Prime Minister David Lloyd because he would reach retirement age in George and Clemenceau (again appointed only three years. premier in November) refused to listen When war broke out on Aug. 2, 1914, to Foch. Foch first fought on the right flank, in Events, however, were to prove Foch Lorraine. On August 28 a dangerous right. On March 21, 1918, the British front gap appeared in the centre, and the in Picardy collapsed under the impact of Military Commanders | 187 the German attack. By March 24, British Foch drove Ludendorff back to a defensive commander Field Marshal Douglas Haig position. The honour of marshal of France was thinking about his embarkation ports, was conferred on Foch on August 6, just as and French commander General Philippe he was intensifying his offensive on the Pétain was thinking about Paris. The sev- Germans, giving no respite to the enemy erance of the two armies had begun. The nor to his own troops. Finally, the German Germans, who quickly perceived the situ- army, already exhausted and dwindling in ation, were already crying victory. numbers, was threatened with disintegra- Lloyd George and Clemenceau real- tion by the revolution in Germany and ized that Foch was the only person who was abandoned by its allies. Germany was could fill the void. By early May, Foch had forced to ask for an armistice, the condi- been made commander in chief of all tions of which were dictated by Marshal Allied armies on the Western and Italian Foch in the name of the Allies on Nov. 11, fronts. The battle of two wills began: Erich 1918, at Rethondes. On November 26 Foch Ludendorff, who was in virtual command returned to Metz, having succeeded in his of the German forces, versus Foch. lifelong goal of giving Alsace and Lorraine Ludendorff, who had the initiative and back to France. superiority in numbers, redoubled his After the war Foch was showered with attacks. Foch resorted to parrying while honours, including being made marshal waiting for the arrival of the American of Great Britain and of Poland. He was armies. He urged his men on to the limits buried near Napoleon under the dome of of their endurance and succeeded in stop- the Church of Saint-Louis, in the Invalides ping Ludendorff in Picardy as well as in Paris. Flanders. However, in order to support the English, who were being pushed back Louis Franchet d’Espèrey to the sea by Ludendorff, Foch withdrew (b. May 25, 1856, Mostaganem, Alg.— troops from the French front. Ludendorff d. July 8, 1942, Albi, France) took advantage of this. On May 27 he broke through that front, and his troops Louis d’Espèrey was a marshal of France spread as far as the Marne. On June 9 a and one of the most effective French mili- new gap appeared at the Oise: Foch tary leaders of World War I. He was stopped it up again. Ludendorff then responsible for driving Bulgaria out of decided to gamble everything he had the war, thereby opening the road to before the Americans joined the battle. Vienna for the Allies. On July 15 he made a massive attack in Trained at Saint-Cyr, d’Espèrey Champagne. Two days later he was served during the prewar period in stopped; he had lost. Algeria and Tunisia. At the outbreak of It was now Foch’s turn to strike. In two World War I, he was a corps commander offensives on July 18 and on August 8, at Lille. His successful leadership resulted 188 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power in his being promoted to command the where he successfully combatted rebel eastern army group (March 1916) and Sudanese forces. In 1892–96 he served in later the northern army group (January French Indochina and was then sent to 1917). After a defeat by the Germans on Madagascar. There he suppressed the the Chemin des Dames (a road between revolt of monarchist forces and served as the Aisne and Ailette rivers in the Aisne governor general until 1905, winning a district of northern France) in May 1918, reputation as a judicious, flexible, and d’Espèrey was sent to command the poly- humane colonial master. He was charac- glot Allied armies in Macedonia. There terized by both a paternalistic regard for he achieved the decisive victory (Sept. the indigenous people and an overriding 15–29, 1918) that forced Bulgaria out of sense of duty to France. the war. He then led a bold thrust to the Gallieni was the logical choice for Danube, resulting in the collapse of supreme commander of the French Army demoralized German divisions hurriedly in 1911, but advanced age and poor health sent back from Russia and the surrender led him to decline in favour of General of Hungary. He was created a marshal of Joseph Joffre. Gallieni retired in April France in 1921 and was elected to the 1914 only to be recalled in August, just French Academy in 1934. before the outbreak of World War I, as military commander of Paris. Rather Joseph Gallieni than remain a passive figure, he launched (b. April 24, 1849, Saint-Béat, an important counterattack against the France—d. May 27, 1916, Versailles) German armies as they crossed the Marne in September. He became minister of Joseph Gallieni, a French army officer, war in October 1915 and served with successfully directed the pacification of distinction until ill health forced his the French Sudan and Madagascar and the retirement in March 1916. integration of those African territories into the French colonial empire. Joseph Joffre After training at the military acad- (b. Jan. 12, 1852, Rivesaltes, France— emy of Saint-Cyr and serving in the d. Jan. 3, 1931, Paris) Franco-German War (1870–71), Gallieni was sent to Africa in the mid-1870s. As a Joseph Joffre was commander in chief captain in 1881 he was captured by the (1914–16) of the French armies on the forces of the amīr Ahmadou in the Upper Western Front in World War I. He won Niger region, but within a year he had fame as “the Victor of the Marne.” extracted exclusive privileges for France After graduating from the École Poly in that area. technique, he took part as a subaltern in After serving in Martinique, Gallieni the siege of Paris (1870–71) and later was named governor of the French Sudan, served in Indochina, West Africa, and Military Commanders | 189

Madagascar. Promoted to general of 1915 the French armies under Joffre division in 1905, he was appointed chief attempted to burst through the German of the French general staff in 1911 and positions at ruinous cost, and failed. thereby commander in chief in the event Joffre’s prestige began to wane, and the of war. Joffre was responsible for the evident lack of French preparation for French Army’s calamitous plan of cam- the German attack on Verdun in 1916, paign with which it began operations in for which he was held responsible, pre- 1914 against Germany, calling for mass pared his downfall. After being stripped attacks across the Franco-German fron- of the power of direct command, Joffre tier. The plan’s futility became apparent resigned on Dec. 26, 1916, and created a when a massive German encircling move- marshal of France on that same day. ment through Belgium caught Joffre and the rest of the French high command Charles Lanrezac unawares and threatened to outflank the (b. July 31, 1852, Pointe-à-Pitre, Guad.— Allied forces and capture Paris. Once d. Jan. 18, 1925, Neuilly-sur-Seine, France) convinced of the developing German threat on the French left flank, Joffre Charles Lanrezac was a French army shifted his forces and created a new commander during the first part of World French army, the 6th, under his direct War I. Though a capable tactician, he authority, to counter the threat of German proved unable to stop the German envelopment. In this moment of supreme advance in northern France and was con- trial his best qualities came to the fore; sequently replaced. his imperturbability, his force of charac- Rising steadily in the French army, ter, and his courage saved the situation. Lanrezac had by 1914 become a member Constantly threatened by greatly supe- of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre rior German forces wheeling in a great (Supreme War Council) and commander northern arc on Paris, the French retreated of the 5th Army. Poised on the left flank of steadily until their left flank was fighting the French force that was expected to just outside the city on September 5. sweep eastward into Germany through Joffre then issued the order that on Alsace and Lorraine at the outbreak of September 6 launched the Allied coun- World War I, he was compelled to swing terstrike, the first of the battles of the his army northward to face the German Marne. The encounter resulted in the par- armies advancing through Belgium. tial repulse of the German advance and Forced to retreat south under pressure the ruin of German hopes for a swift from Gen. Karl von Bülow’s German victory on the Western Front. 2nd Army, he became increasingly pes- By the end of 1914 the Western Front simistic about the outcome of the had settled into the heavily entrenched campaign. On orders of the French com- lines that existed until 1918. Throughout mander in chief, General Joseph Joffre, 190 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power he nevertheless supported the British expe- David Lloyd George, the British prime ditionary force east of Paris, winning a minister, heartily subscribed to Nivelle’s brilliant tactical victory at Guise (Aug. 29, advocacy of frontal assaults carried out in 1914). His continued retreat, however, led close coordination with massive artillery Joffre to replace him on September 3. bombardments, and he placed the British armies in France under Nivelle’s com- Robert Nivelle mand for his great offensive. Nivelle, (b. Oct. 15, 1856, Tulle, France—d. however, steadily lost the confidence of March 23, 1924, Paris) his own chief subordinates, and his final offensive on the Aisne front (April 1917) Robert Nivelle was commander in chief failed to break through German lines and of the French armies on the Western cost France 120,000 casualties. The next Front for five months in World War I. His month there were widespread mutinies in career was wrecked by the failure of his the French armies. On May 15, 1917, offensive in the spring of 1917. Nivelle was replaced by Pétain as com- Nivelle graduated from the École mander in chief, and in December 1917 he Polytechnique in 1878, served in Indo was transferred to North Africa. china, Algeria, and China as an artillery officer, and was made a general of brigade Philippe Pétain in October 1914 after World War I began. (b. April 24, 1856, Cauchy-à-la-Tour, In 1915 he rose to command a division France—d. July 23, 1951, Île d’Yeu) and then the 3rd Corps, which helped stem the German offensive at the Battle Philippe Pétain was a French general. He of Verdun early in 1916. In May 1916 he became a national hero for his victory at succeeded General Philippe Pétain as the Battle of Verdun in World War I but commander of the 2nd Army at Verdun. was discredited as chief of state of the His use of creeping artillery barrages in French government at Vichy in World two dazzlingly successful French counter- War II. He died under sentence in a prison attacks there (October, December 1916) fortress. enabled the French to retake nearly all His advancement until the outbreak the ground gained by the Germans over of World War I in 1914—he was 58 when the previous six months. he finally became a general—was slow That December, Nivelle was pro- because as a professor at the War College moted over many senior officers to he had propounded tactical theories succeed General Joseph-Jacques Joffre opposed to those held by the high com- as commander in chief of the French mand. While the latter favoured the armies. He then proclaimed that his offensive at all costs, Pétain held that a methods at Verdun could win the war. well-organized defensive was sometimes Military Commanders | 191 called for and that before any attack the historic. He became a popular hero, and, commander must be sure of the superior- when serious mutinies erupted in the ity of his fi re power. French army following the ill-considered After successively commanding a off ensives of Gen. Robert Nivelle , Pétain brigade, a corps, and an army, in 1916, was named his successor as French com- Pétain was charged with stopping the mander in chief. German attack on the fortress city of He reestablished discipline with a Verdun. Though the situation was minimum of repression by personally practically hopeless, he masterfully explaining his intentions to the soldiers reorganized both the front and the trans- and improving their living conditions. port systems, made prudent use of the Under Pétain the French armies partici- artillery, and was able to inspire in his pated in the victorious off ensive of 1918, troops a heroism that has become led by Marshal Ferdinand Foch, generalissimo of the Allied armies. Pétain was made a marshal of France in November 1918 and was subsequently appointed to the highest military offi ces (vice president of the Supreme War Council and inspector general of the army).

Italy

Luigi Cadorna (b. Sept. 4, 1850, Pallanza, Piedmont, Kingdom of Sardinia [Italy]—d. Dec. 21, 1928, Bordighera, Italy)

Luigi Cadorna completely reorganized Italy’s ill-prepared army on the eve of World War I and was chief of staff during the fi rst 30 months of that confl ict. Cadorna was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Italian army in 1868. Rising through the ranks for half a century, he was appointed chief of the Italian An undated portrait of General Henri general staff in July 1914. When Italy Pétain. Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division entered World War I by declaring war on Austria-Hungary in May 1915, Cadorna 192 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power was given command on the Austro-Italian under Cadorna and contributed as a staff frontier. While maintaining a defensive officer, then as a division and corps com- posture in the Trentino, he mounted a mander, to the Italian victories at Carso series of offensives along the Isonzo and Gorizia (August 1916). When the River that incurred heavy casualties Italians were overwhelmingly defeated and gained little ground. Cadorna’s by the Austrians at Caporetto (October principal military successes were the 1917), Diaz replaced Cadorna as chief of blunting of the Austrian offensive in staff. Diaz succeeded in sufficiently -sta the Trentino (spring 1916), the capture of bilizing the Italian Army enough to Gorizia (August 1916), and the victory at mount a strong counteroffensive after Baensezza (1917). repelling the Austrian offensive in June The entry of Germany into the 1918. Diaz’ decisive victory at Vittorio Austro-Italian theatre in 1917 turned Veneto (Oct. 24–Nov. 3, 1918) signalled the balance of forces decisively against the defeat of the Austrian forces. Italy. After the overwhelming defeat of As a reward for his military successes, the Italian army on the Isonzo front at the he was named duca della vittoria (Italian: Battle of Caporetto (Oct. 24, 1917), “duke of victory”) in 1921 and appointed Cadorna was removed as chief of staff marshal in 1924. He served as minister of and transferred to the Allied military war in the first Fascist Cabinet (1922–24). council at Versailles. However, the official Poor health, however, forced him to resign inquiry into the defeat at Caporetto forced and to retire to private life. his recall from Versailles. Nevertheless, he was named a field marshal in 1924. Russia

Armando Diaz Nicholas (b. Dec. 5, 1861, Naples, Italy—d. Feb. 29, (b. Nov. 18 [Nov. 6, Old Style], 1856, St. 1928, Rome) Petersburg, Russia—d. Jan. 5, 1929, Antibes, France) Armando Diaz was chief of staff of the Italian army during World War I. Nicholas was a Russian grand duke and A graduate of the military colleges of army officer. He served as commander in Naples and Turin, Armando Diaz served chief against the Germans and Austro- with distinction in the Italo-Turkish War Hungarians in the first year of World (1911–12). Appointed major general in War I and was subsequently (until March 1914, he collaborated with Gen. Luigi 1917) Emperor Nicholas II’s viceroy in Cadorna in the reorganization of the the Caucasus and commander in chief Italian Army in preparation for World against the Turks. War I. When Italy entered the war in The son of the emperor Alexander May 1915, he was chief of operations II’s brother, the grand duke Nikolay Military Commanders | 193

lead the Russian armies himself and appointed the grand duke Nicholas commander in chief. Despite their early successes, the Russians were outgener- alled by the German chief of staff , Erich Ludendorff , and eventually were immobilized by munitions shortages. The grand duke is considered to have done as well as possible, considering he was obliged to follow the general staff ’s plans. On Sept. 5 (Aug. 23, Old Style), 1915, the emperor assumed supreme military command. He sent the grand duke to the Caucasus, where he remained until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1917. The emperor’s last offi cial act was to appoint the grand duke commander in chief once more. However, his appointment was canceled almost immediately by Prince Georgy Y. Lvov, head of the provisional government. Two years later, after the war, Grand Duke Nicholas sailed from Armando Diaz, 1921. Encyclopædia Russia in a British warship. He lived in Britannica, Inc. France until his death, heading an organization that sought to unite all anticommunist Russian émigrés. Nikolayevich “the Elder,” Nicholas was educated at the general staff college and Serbia commissioned in 1872. He served in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 and as Radomir Putnik inspector general of cavalry (1895–1905), (b. Jan. 24, 1847, Kragujevac, Serbia— introducing major reforms in training d. May 17, 1917, Nice, France) and equipment. He was made commander of the St. Petersburg military district in Radomir Putnik was a Serbian army com- 1905 and also was appointed fi rst presi- mander. He was victorious against the dent of the short-lived imperial committee Austrians in 1914, but a year later, he was of national defense. defeated and relieved of his command. When World War I began, Emperor Educated at the artillery school, Nicholas II abandoned his intention to Putnik was commissioned in 1866. He 194 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power graduated from the staff college in 1889 After graduating from West Point in and became a general in 1903. Except for 1879, Liggett served in frontier posts and three periods when he was war minister in the Philippines. He attended the Army (1904–05, 1906–08, 1912), he was chief of War College (1909–10) and then served on staff from 1903 to 1916. The skill, good the General Staff, earning wide respect for equipment, and fighting spirit of the his ability and character. By 1913 he was a Serbian army during the war were mainly brigadier general and president of the War due to Putnik’s leadership. College. Arriving in France with the Putnik headed a brigade in the two American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in wars against Turkey (1876, 1877–78) and October 1917, Liggett took command of headed a divisional staff in the war the U.S. Army’s I Corps on Jan. 20, 1918. against Bulgaria (1885). He was com- This appointment was a sign of the high mander in chief in the two Balkan Wars esteem that the AEF commanding gen- (1912–13), routing the Turks at Kumanovo eral, John J. Pershing, had for him, in spite (October 1912) and—as field marshal—at of Liggett’s strong dissent from Pershing’s Monastir, Tur. (now Bitola, Macedonia; commitment to open-order tactics (as November 1912). Largely because of him, opposed to rigid formations), as well as the Bulgarians were defeated at Bregalnica Liggett’s arthritic, overweight, and gener- (June–July 1913). When World War I ally unprepossessing appearance. began, Putnik, then in Austria, was Liggett took the I Corps to war on escorted to Romania. In poor health, he July 4, 1918, commanding it in the Second resumed the post of commander in chief Battle of the Marne (July 15–18, 1918), in and routed overwhelming Austrian forces which the corps crossed the Ourcq and on Cer Mountain (August 1914), the first Vesle rivers while suffering heavy casual- Allied victory in the war, and on the ties. In the Saint-Mihiel offensive that Kolubara River (November–December began on September 12, the corps took 1914). A year later, Putnik, carried in a its objectives ahead of schedule, and as a sedan chair, shared in the retreat of his result it was assigned to one of the best- army across Albania. Relieved of his com- defended sectors in the battles of the mand, he retired to Nice. Meuse-Argonne (Sept. 26–Nov. 11, 1918). By October 10, I Corps had cleared most United States of the Argonne Forest against stubborn German resistance, and on October 16, Hunter Liggett Pershing appointed Liggett commander (b. March 21, 1857, Reading, Pa., U.S.— of the First U.S. Army. Liggett spent two d. Dec. 30, 1935, San Francisco, Calif.) weeks reorganizing chaotic administrative and replacement systems, then he Hunter Liggett served as an American corps resumed the offensive successfully until and army commander in World War I. the November 11 armistice. Military Commanders | 195

Liggett commanded the American occupation forces in Germany until July 1919, and he retired in 1921. The AEF ’s best senior fi eld commander, Liggett justifi ed his own aphorism that fat around the waist was less dangerous than fat above the collar.

William Mitchell (b. Dec. 29, 1879, Nice, France—d. Feb. 19, 1936, New York, N.Y., U.S.)

William (“Billy”) Mitchell was an American army offi cer and early advocate of a separate U.S. air force and greater Col. William “Billy” Mitchell, advocate for preparedness in military aviation. He was a U.S. air force, 1925. Lib rary of Congress court-martialed for his outspoken views Prints and Photographs Division and did not live to see the fulfi llment during World War II of many of his prophecies concerning the importance of power up to that time. In the Meuse- military aviation in wartime, including Argonne campaign he used formations strategic bombing, mass airborne opera- of up to 200 planes for mass bombing of tions, and the eclipse of the battleship by enemy targets. the bomb-carrying airplane. After the war Mitchell was appointed After serving as a private in the infan- assistant chief of the air service. He try during the Spanish-American War became a strong proponent of an inde- (1898), Mitchell received a commission pendent air force and of unifi ed control of as a second lieutenant in the signal corps. air power, both of which were opposed by He served in Cuba, the Philippines, and the army general staff and the navy. As a Alaska and in 1909 graduated from the result, he became increasingly outspoken Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, in his criticism of the military hierarchy, Kan. In 1915 he was assigned to the avia- and, when his term ended in April 1925, tion section of the signal corps. During he was sent to the remote post of San World War I Mitchell became the out- Antonio, Texas. The climax of his con- standing U.S. combat air commander, fl ict with military leadership came in advancing to the rank of brigadier gen- September 1925, when the loss of the navy eral. In September 1918 he commanded a dirigible Shenandoah in a storm inspired French-U.S. air armada of almost 1,500 him publicly to accuse the War and Navy planes—the largest concentration of air departments of “incompetency, criminal 196 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power negligence, and almost treasonable Graduating from the U.S. Military administration of the national defense.” Academy at West Point, N.Y., in 1886, In December an army court-martial con- Pershing served in several Indian wars, victed him of insubordination. Sentenced in the Spanish-American War (1898), as to suspension from rank and duty for brigadier general in the Philippine fi ve years, he resigned from the army Islands (1906–13), and as commander of (Feb. 1, 1926). a punitive raid against the Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa (1916). He also john j. Pershing was a military instructor at the University (b. Sept. 13, 1860, Laclede, Mo., U.S.—d. of Nebraska, Lincoln, and at West Point. July 15, 1948, Washington, D.C.) After the United States declared war on Germany (April 1917), President John J. Pershing commanded the Amer- Woodrow Wilson selected Pershing to ican Expeditionary Force (AEF) in Europe command the American troops being sent during World War I. to Europe. In June he submitted a “General Organization Report” recom- mending an army of 1,000,000 men by 1918 and 3,000,000 by 1919. Though early U.S. planning had not included such a large force, Pershing’s recommendations prevailed. Pershing was determined to preserve the integrity of the AEF as an independent army, despite pressure from the Allied high command to use U.S. troops as replacement units in European divisions, many of which were exhausted from the setbacks of 1917. Pershing largely resisted these pressures, although, during the March-June 1918 German off ensive threatening Paris, he was fi nally persuaded to release his troops temporarily Gen. John Pershing (centre) inspects British troops, Brest, France, 1918. Hulton Archive/Getty Images to the inter-Allied commander Marshal Ferdinand Foch. Military Commanders | 197

Although Pershing’s army never became entirely self-suffi cient, it conducted two signifi cant operations. In September 1918, the AEF assaulted the Saint-Mihiel salient successfully. Then, at Foch’s request, Pershing quickly regrouped his forces for the Meuse-Argonne offensive later that month, despite his original plans to advance toward Metz. Though incom- plete preparations and inexperience slowed the Meuse-Argonne operations, the inter-Allied offensive in France destroyed German resistance in early October and led to the Armistice the next month. Pershing was criticized for operational and logistic errors, but his creation of the AEF was a remarkable achievement. He returned home with a sound U.S. Army Air Corps pilot and ﬂ ying ace reputation and, in 1919, was given the Eddie Rickenbacker, c. 1916. Topical Press rank of general of the armies of the United Agency/Hulton Archive/Getty Images States. Pershing’s nickname, “Black Jack,” was originally derived from his service with an African American regiment Rickenbacker developed an early early in his career. However, it came to interest in internal-combustion engines signify his stern bearing and rigid disci- and automobiles, and, by the time the pline. Eschewing politics, Pershing United States entered World War I, he remained in the army and served as chief was one of the country’s top three racing of staff from 1921 until his retirement drivers. He entered the army in 1917 as a three years later. driver attached to General John J. Pershing’s staff and drove a car for Edward vernon Rickenbacker Colonel William (“Billy”) Mitchell, the (b. Oct. 8, 1890, Columbus, Ohio, noted advocate of tactical air power. U.S.—d. July 23, 1973, Zürich, Switz.) With Mitchell’s help, he became a fi ghter pilot and was assigned to the 94th Edward (“Eddie”) Rickenbacker was a pilot, Aero Pursuit Squadron. He accumulated industrialist, and the most celebrated 26 air victories and numerous decora- U.S. air ace of World War I. tions, including the Medal of Honor. 198 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Central Powers repulsed, in part because of his late rede- ployment of Austria’s strategic reserve to Austro-Hungarian Empire the East, but more so because of Conrad’s insistence on attacking a numerically Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf superior enemy. Only German interven- (b. Nov. 11, 1852, Penzing, Austria—d. tion saved Austria from total disaster. Aug. 25, 1925, Mergentheim, Ger.) The Austro-German offensive of 1915, planned by Conrad, succeeded, but by Franz von Hötzendorf was a controversial this time the Austrian army had become military strategist and one of the most increasingly subordinated to the German influential conservative propagandists general staff and had virtually lost its of Austria-Hungary. He planned the independence. His Italian offensive of Habsburg monarchy’s campaigns during 1916 also came close to success, but troop World War I. withdrawals from the Italian frontier to Advancing rapidly in the Austro- the threatened Russian front again cost Hungarian army, Conrad became chief of him victory. When the new emperor, staff in 1906 on the recommendation of Charles I, took over command in 1916, he the heir to the throne, archduke Francis dismissed the strong-willed Conrad, who Ferdinand, whose military views he commanded an army group on the Italian shared. A staunch conservative, Conrad front until the summer of 1918. distrusted the expansionist tendencies of Serbia and Austria’s ally Italy, advocating Germany preventive wars against both. His vocifer- ously aggressive stance toward Italy in Georg Bruchmüller 1911 caused his temporary dismissal, but (b. Dec. 11, 1863, Berlin [Ger.]—d. Jan. 26, he returned to head the General Staff in 1948, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, W. Ger.) 1912. He devised two plans for an eventual war in the East. If Russia remained Georg Bruchmüller, a German artillery neutral, he would throw preponderant officer, revolutionized techniques of fire forces against Serbia. However, if Russia support during World War I. became involved, Austria would concen- Bruchmüller’s peacetime career was trate its strength on that front. undistinguished, and he was retired as a Upon Russia’s entry into World War lieutenant colonel on medical grounds in I, most Austrian troops were sent to face 1913. However, he was recalled to active that enemy. As a result, Conrad’s invasion duty in 1914, serving on the Eastern Front, of Serbia failed; that country was not where in 1915–16 he recognized the limi- finally subdued until the end of 1915, and tations of long artillery preparations and then only with German aid. His offen- massive barrages. Instead, Bruchmüller sives on the Russian front also were advocated combined operations in which Military Commanders | 199 intense bombardments, lasting only a few hours, would stun the defenders just before attacking infantry could reach them. He also favoured heavy use of gas and smoke shells, which immobilized and disrupted targets without destroying the intervening ground. Systematic preparation of the attack front, accompanied by surprise and secrecy, were essential tactical requirements. The core of Bruchmüller’s system, however, was the functional, fl exible organization of artillery under central control for specifi c purposes such as deep interdiction, counterbattery, and close support. First tested at the attack on Riga, Russia, in September 1917, Bruchmüller’s methods proved so successful that, despite intense opposition within some military quarters, they were adopted for the March 1918 Western off ensive. Bruchmüller was responsible for fi re support in fi ve separate A portrait of Gen. Eric von Falkenhayn, attacks. While unable to compensate for c. 1905. Hulton Archive/Getty Images the army’s lack of tanks as compared to the Allied forces, the German artillery was so successful at breaking open Allied defenses German general staff early in World that its commander received the nick- War I. name Durchbruchmüller (“Breakthrough Falkenhayn gained military experi- Müller”). Inscribed on his tombstone, the ence as an instructor to the Chinese army nickname epitomizes Bruchmüller’s status and as a member of the Prussian General as the father of modern artillery methods. Staff in the international expedition of 1900 against the Boxers in China. He Erich von falkenhayn served as Prussian minister of war from (b. Nov. 11, 1861, near Graudenz, West July 1913 to January 1915 an offi ce for Prussia—d. April 8, 1922, near which he was responsible for the arma- Potsdam, Ger.) ment and equipment of the German army. Within Germany he greatly improved the Erich von Falkenhayn was the Prussian system of munitions supply and trans- minister of war and chief of the imperial portation of troops by rail. He ignored 200 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power some recommendations of Gen. Helmuth Wilhelm Colmar von Moltke, chief of the General Staff, (b. Aug. 12, 1843, near Labiau, East who for that reason considered him Prussia [now Polessk, Russia]—d. responsible for the army’s failure in April 19, 1916, Baghdad, Iraq, Ottoman France in 1914. On Sept. 14, 1914, after Empire [now in Iraq]) the German retreat from the Marne, William II chose Falkenhayn as Moltke’s Wilhelm Colmar was the imperial German successor. field marshal who reorganized the Turkish Falkenhayn was convinced that the army (1883–96) and served as commander war had to be won in France, chiefly by in chief of Turkish forces against the Germany’s standing on the defensive and British in Mesopotamia (Iraq) during exhausting its enemies. He did not World War I. Despite his advanced age, believe Russia could be defeated militar- he successfully conducted the 143-day- ily. Thus, he opposed the plan of Field long siege of General Sir Charles Marshal Paul von Hindenburg and Gen. Townshend’s British contingent at Kut Erich Ludendorff for an eastern offensive (1915–16). and was reluctant to provide troops for a In August 1914, the first month of theatre he believed “gave nothing back.” World War I, Colmar was appointed Instead, he began concentrating resources governor-general of German-occupied for an attack on Verdun that he believed Belgium. In November of that year, he would wear out the French army. On became aide-de-camp to the Ottoman Aug. 29, 1916, following a long and unsuc- sultan Mehmed V. Placed in command of cessful German assault on that French the Turkish First Army in Mesopotamia, fortress-city, Falkenhayn was dismissed he halted Townshend’s Anglo-Indian as chief of the General Staff by the army at Ctesiphon on Nov. 22, 1915, and emperor in favour of the more aggressive then, on December 8, trapped Townshend Hindenburg. inside Kut. After Colmar’s troops had After leading a German army against repulsed a large British relief force, Romania for 10 months, Falkenhayn took Townshend surrendered on April 29, 1916. command of the Central Powers forces According to the official report, Colmar (mainly Turkish) in Palestine (July 9, 1917). had died of typhus, but it also has been There he was unable to stop the advance said that he was poisoned by the revolu- of the British under Gen. Edmund Allenby. tionary Young Turks. Having been succeeded in Palestine by Gen. Otto Liman von Sanders, Falkenhayn Gustav Rüdiger commanded an army in Lithuania from (b. Dec. 8, 1865, Züllichau, Brandenburg, March 4, 1918, until the end of the war a Prussia [now Sulechów, Pol.]—d. Nov. 4, few months later. 1946, Kinsegg, Allgäu, W. Ger.) Military Commanders | 201

Gustav Rüdiger was a German army offi- on Dec. 18, 1919, he retreated into East cer who, at the end of World War I, tried Prussia. unsuccessfully to build a German- controlled Baltikum in Latvia in order to Paul von Hindenburg prevent domination of that country by (b. Oct. 2, 1847, Posen, Prussia [now Soviet Russia. Poznań, Pol.]—d. Aug. 2, 1934, Neudeck, A general commanding an infantry Ger. [now in Poland]) division in France, Rüdiger was trans- Paul von Hindenburg served as a German ferred to Finland in March 1918 to help the field marshal during World War I and as Finnish national army against the Finnish- second president of the Weimar Republic Russian Red Army. Entering Helsinki on (1925–34). His presidential terms were April 13, his division successfully held wracked by political instability, economic the city until after the armistice of Nov. 11, depression, and the rise to power of Adolf 1918. In January 1919 the German high Hitler, whom he appointed chancellor command appointed him “governor” of in 1933. Liepāja (Libau), Latvia, where Prime Hindenburg was the son of a Prussian Minister Kārlis Ulmanis’ Latvian govern- officer of old Junker (aristocratic) stock. ment had taken refuge from the Red His mother, however, was from a middle- Army occupying Riga. Arriving at Liepāja class family—a fact he preferred to ignore. on February 3, he took command of the A cadet at the age of 11, he served in German-Latvian VI Reserve Corps, which, the Austro-Prussian (Seven Weeks’) War on May 22, captured Riga. There, he of 1866 and in the Franco-German War of attempted to set up a pro-German civil 1870–71. He retired as a general in 1911 government. In a battle near Cesis after an honourable but not especially (Wenden) on June 19–22, however, he was distinguished career. defeated by an Estonian-Latvian force Hindenburg was called back into ser- under Estonian General Johan Laidoner vice in August 1914 to be the nominal and forced to abandon Riga, to which the superior of Maj. Gen. Erich Ludendorff. Ulmanis government returned. Acclaimed as one of the army’s best strat- On July 19, British General Sir Hubert egists, Ludendorff was to drive a Russian de la Poer Gough, head of the Allied mili- invasion force from East Prussia. For this tary mission to the Baltic countries, achievement, the rocklike Hindenburg, ordered Rüdiger and his troops to return rather than Ludendorff, received the to Germany. Rüdiger declined to obey nation’s applause. Soon Hindenburg’s his orders for five months, using such popular standing overshadowed that of stratagems as the pretense that his Emperor William II. He was promoted to army comprised anti-Communist White the rank of field marshal, and in 1916 the Russians rather than Germans. Finally, emperor was pressured into giving him 202 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power command of all German land forces, with 1914, as a colonel and chief staff officer Ludendorff his co-responsible chief aide. of the German 8th Army, he tried to per- Unable to win the war on land, the duo suade the 8th Army’s commanding officer, tried starving Britain into surrender by General Max von Prittwitz, not to with- unrestricted submarine warfare. How draw the army behind the Vistula River ever, Germany’s policy of unrestricted and so abandon East Prussia to the Rus submarine attacks eventually drew the sian forces. Prittwitz was soon recalled United States into the war, and caused in disgrace, and his replacements, gen- Germany’s ultimate defeat. When they erals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich conceded defeat, Hindenburg let Ludendorff, accepted Hoffmann’s plans Ludendorff take the blame. for the 8th Army to attack the uncoordi- After the overthrow of William II, nated Russian armies in the area. The Hindenburg collaborated briefly with the result of the consequent Battle of new republican government. He directed Tannenberg on August 26–30 was Ger the withdrawal of German forces from many’s first great military victory on the France and Belgium and had his staff Eastern Front. organize the suppression of left-radical Hoffmann planned the Battle of the risings in Germany. With both tasks Masurian Lakes (February 1915), another accomplished (and the old officer corps German victory. In August 1916, a year preserved in the process), he retired once and a half later, he was promoted to colo- more in June 1919. Living quietly in nel and appointed chief of staff to the Hanover, he occasionally expressed anti- new German commander of the Eastern republican views but, on the whole, Front. At the Brest-Litovsk peace talks cultivated his image of a nonpartisan (December 1917–March 1918), Hoffmann, national hero. as the senior representative of the Ger man High Command, and Richard von Max Hoffmann Kühlmann, the foreign minister, (b. Jan. 25, 1869, Homberg an der Efze, attempted to negotiate German treaties Hesse [Germany]—d. July 8, 1927, Bad with Ukraine and Russia. When the Reichenhall, Ger.) Bolsheviks showed reluctance to sign a treaty, however, Hoffmann denounced Max Hoffmann was primarily responsible (Feb. 16, 1918) the Russo-German armi- for several striking German victories on stice and two days later launched a the Eastern Front in World War I. massive German offensive against Rus Hoffmann joined the German army sia. With this offensive, Hoffman in 1887, studied at the Berlin War captured a great deal of territory and Academy, and eventually became the thus forced the Bolshevik government to General Staff’s expert on the eastern agree to peace terms with Germany on sector (Russia and Japan). In August March 1. Military Commanders | 203

Alexander von Kluck Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (b. May 20, 1846, Münster, Prussian (b. March 20, 1870, Saarlouis, Rhine Westphalia [Germany]—d. Oct. 19, Province, Prussia [now in Germany]— 1934, Berlin) d. March 9, 1964, Hamburg, W. Ger.)

Alexander von Kluck commanded the Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck commanded German 1st Army in the offensive against Germany’s small African force during Paris at the beginning of World War I. World War I. He was a determined and Although Kluck is best known for resourceful leader who favoured guerilla his service in World War I, he first saw tactics and hoped to influence the war in service in the Seven Weeks’ War (1866) Europe by pinning down a dispropor- and in the Franco-German War (1870– tionately large number of Allied troops in 71). In 1906 he became a general of his area. infantry and in 1913 an inspector gen- Lettow-Vorbeck served on the expe- eral. On the outbreak of war in 1914 he dition to put down the Herero and assumed his war appointment as com- Hottentot rebellion (1904–07) in German mander of the 1st Army on the extreme South West Africa (now Namibia), during right flank of the German force that which he gained experience in bush fight- would penetrate into northern France. ing. Appointed military commander of His task was to roll up the left flank of German East Africa in 1914, he repelled a the French armies, encircle Paris, and British landing at Tanga (Tanzania) in thus bring the war in the West to a rapid November of that year. For four years, conclusion. However, partly because of with a force that never exceeded about lack of control by supreme headquar- 14,000 men (3,000 Germans and 11,000 ters, these plans miscarried and Kluck’s askaris, or native Africans), he held in army prematurely executed a wheel to check a much larger force (estimates the west of Paris, a maneuver that range to more than 300,000) of British, opened up a gap in the German lines Belgian, and Portuguese troops. which afforded an opportunity for a On his return to Germany in January counteroffensive by French and British 1919, Lettow-Vorbeck was welcomed as a forces. Kluck almost succeeded in hero. In July 1919 he led a corps of right- reaching Paris but was defeated only 13 wing volunteers that occupied Hamburg miles (21 km) from the city by Anglo- to prevent its take-over by the left-wing French forces in the First Battle of the Spartacists. He was a deputy to the Reich Marne, Sept. 6–9, 1914. By October 1914 stag (parliament) from May 1929 to July the German advance had been halted 1930. Though a member of the right wing, and trench warfare had begun. Kluck he was not a Nazi and unsuccessfully was wounded in March 1915 and retired tried to organize a conservative opposi- the next year. tion to Hitler. 204 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Otto Liman von Sanders (b. Feb. 17, 1855, Stolp, Pomerania— d. Aug. 22, 1929, Munich)

German General Otto Liman von Sanders was largely responsible for making the Ottoman army an eff ective fi ghting force in World War I, especially in the defeat of the Allies at Gallipoli. Liman began his military career in 1874 and rose to the rank of lieutenant general. In 1913 he was appointed director of a German military mission charged with reorganizing the Turkish army. Up to the outbreak of World War I, he did much to improve its fi ghting capabilities, which had been impaired by reverses during the Balkan Wars. In March 1915 Liman was given command of the 5th Turkish Army at Gallipoli. Assisted by Turkish commanders, he succeeded in forcing the A portrait of Gen. Erich Ludendor , c. 1916. British and Australian invasion force to Hulton Archive/Getty Images evacuate the Dardanelles, thus preventing an Allied seizure of Constantinople (now Istanbul). In March 1918 he headed Erich Ludendorff was mainly responsible the 4th, 7th, and 8th Turkish armies in for Germany’s military policy and strat- Syria and Palestine. For a time he held egy in the latter years of World War I. up the British advance but was forced to After the war he became a leader of reac- withdraw to Aleppo. After the armistice, tionary political movements, for a while he organized the repatriation of German joining the Nazi Party and subsequently soldiers who had served in Turkey dur- taking an independent, idiosyncratic ing the war. right-radical line. In 1908, Ludendorff was put in Erich Ludendorff charge of the 2nd (German) department (b. April 9, 1865, Kruszewnia, near in the army general staff, the institu- Poznań, Prussian Poland—d. Dec. 20, tion generally known as the “great 1937, Munich, Ger.) general staff ,” which was responsible for Military Commanders | 205 preparing contingency deployment and The spectacular victory of Hinden mobilization plans. Under the chief of burg and Ludendorff over the Russians in the general staff, General Helmuth von August 1914 at Tannenberg, in East Moltke, Ludendorff played a significant Prussia, a battle that brought Hindenburg part in the revision of the Schlieffen Plan. worldwide renown, was followed by the This plan envisaged a gigantic outflank- German defeat on the Marne in the west ing movement involving the infringement that signaled the failure of Ludendorff’s of Belgian neutrality with the aim of revised Schlieffen Plan. Hindenburg and crushing France with one blow. Moltke Ludendorff fought off the Russians in the and Ludendorff decided to secure more east for two years. Ludendorff’s plan of a firmly the extended southern flank general offensive against Russia by between Switzerland and Lorraine. They means of a temporary reduction of the also discarded the idea of forcing a way German forces in the west did not receive through southern Holland. Instead, they approval by the supreme army command made preparations for the surprise cap- in the summer of 1915. ture of Liège, the most important fortress Only in August 1916, after the failure in eastern Belgium, often characterized of the German offensive at Verdun and as “impregnable.” in view of the Allied onslaught on both The excessively active departmental the eastern and western fronts, did the chief irritated the military authorities, emperor finally appoint the two generals and in 1913 Ludendorff was transferred to to assume supreme military control. They the infantry as regimental commander. attempted to conduct a sort of total war Consequently, when war broke out in by mobilizing the entire forces of the 1914, he was appointed quartermaster home front, which was already suffering in chief (supply and administration) of from the effects of the British blockade. the 2nd Army in the west. Ludendorff staked everything on a single It was not until two Russian armies card, the stubborn pursuit of a “victorious threatened to overrun the German 8th peace” that was to secure German territo- Army in East Prussia that Ludendorff was rial gains in east and west. In 1917 he appointed chief of staff of the 8th Army. approved the unrestricted submarine Serving under the elderly General Paul warfare against the British that led to the von Hindenburg, who was renowned for entry of the United States into the war his iron nerves, Ludendorff was consid- against Germany but not to England’s ered dynamic but occasionally harsh and, collapse. After the tsar had been deposed in times of crisis, often nervous. However, in March 1917, Ludendorff gave his bless- Ludendorff regarded the problems with ing to the return of the Russian Bolshevik which he and his commander in chief were emigrants (including the as yet unknown faced as difficult but never insoluble. V. I. Lenin), in the hope of persuading the 206 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Russians to conclude peace. Hindenburg resignation and went into exile in Sweden and Ludendorff, who now exercised a for several months. sort of military semidictatorship, also While, according to Prussian custom, brought about the dismissal of Chancellor general staff officers accepted joint Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg in responsibility for all decisions made, the vain hope that “a strong man” could they had to preserve strict anonymity. be found to assume the leadership of Ludendorff, however, whose ambition the Reich. was as immense as his strategic gifts, at On March 21, 1918, Ludendorff the close of the lost war claimed to have opened a general offensive on the West been the sole real “commander” of World ern Front with the object of smashing the War I. He asserted that he had been Anglo-French armies and forcing a deci- deprived of victory by sinister forces that sion in Europe before the Americans had been operating behind the scenes. arrived in force. However, he had over- By propagating the legend that the estimated the strength of the German German army, undefeated in the field, armies. The offensive failed, and when, in was sabotaged by the “home front,” he the autumn of 1918, the collapse of the did a great deal to poison public life German allies—Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, against the government in the Weimar and Turkey—was imminent, Ludendorff Republic. demanded immediate negotiations for an armistice. For a while, the nerves of August von Mackensen the hopelessly overworked general gave (b. Dec. 6, 1849, Haus Leipnitz, Saxony way, and a psychiatrist had to be sum- [Germany]—d. Nov. 8, 1945, Celle, Ger.) moned to supreme headquarters. When Ludendorff realized the severity of the August von Mackensen was one of the armistice conditions, he instead insisted most successful German commanders in that the war be carried on. Then, when he World War I. saw that the political leaders were not Beginning his army career in 1869, prepared to do this, he offered his resig- Mackensen served in various campaigns, nation, which William II accepted on received successive promotions, and, Oct. 26, 1918. At the same time, the during World War I, took command of emperor, much to Ludendorff’s distaste, the combined German-Austrian 11th ordered Hindenburg to remain at his Army in western Galicia (Poland; April post. A titan of willpower and energy 1915). Then, ably assisted by his chief of who had attempted the impossible was staff, Hans von Seeckt, Mackensen suddenly torn away from his sphere of achieved the great German breakthrough activity; the shock was immense. in the Gorlice-Tarnów area (Poland), for Ludendorff met the revolution that broke which he was promoted to field marshal out in November 1918 with complete (June 20, 1915). The breakthrough was Military Commanders | 207 the beginning of a series of victories for which he was completely unqualified. In Mackensen: the defeat of the Russians at 1903 Moltke became quartermaster gen- Brest-Litovsk and at Pinsk (August– eral; three years later he succeeded September 1915), the overrunning of Alfred von Schlieffen as chief of the Serbia (October–November 1915), and General Staff. He thus inherited the occupation of Romania (1916–17). Schlieffen’s plan for a war on two fronts, After the Armistice, Mackensen was which envisaged only light German interned for a year. He retired from the forces facing Russia on the east until army in 1920 and was made a Prussian France on the west had been defeated. In state councillor in 1933 by Hermann the Schlieffen plan of campaign against Göring. Mackensen, a nationalist rather France, the German left (southern) wing than a National Socialist, frequently would hold Alsace-Lorraine defensively appeared at Nazi functions wearing his while an overwhelmingly strong right imperial cavalry uniform; he became a (northern) wing would advance rapidly major symbol of the integration of the through Belgium and northern France, Second and Third Reichs. outflanking and eventually helping encircle the French armies while also Helmuth von Moltke capturing Paris. (b. May 25, 1848, Gersdorff, As chief of staff, however, Moltke’s Mecklenburg [Germany]—d. June 18, principal duty was to revise the Schlieffen 1916, Berlin) Plan to meet modern conditions. But his task was a difficult one, and when war Helmuth von Moltke was chief of the broke out in August 1914 Moltke did not German general staff at the outbreak of measure up to its requirements. He World War I. He modified the German allowed several army commanders on the attack plan in the west and as unable to German left wing to attack into France retain control of his rapidly advancing instead of remaining on the defensive. armies, which significantly contributed Moreover, he reinforced these attacks to the halt of the German offensive on the with divisions taken from the crucial right Marne in September 1914 and the frustra- wing and then sent several more divi- tion of German efforts for a rapid, decisive sions to the Eastern Front to check the victory. Russian advance into East Prussia. The Moltke rose rapidly in the German German high command lost communica- army, becoming adjutant in 1882 to his tion with the advancing armies of the uncle and namesake, who was chief of right wing, and the movements of that the General Staff at the time. The per- wing’s constituent units became dis- sonal favour of the emperors William I jointed. These and other factors and William II, coupled with his great culminated not only in the right wing name, quickly elevated him to offices for failing to encircle the French left, but 208 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power becoming itself the victim of a French participated in the invasion of Belgium and British flank attack that halted the and France. When trench warfare settled entire German offensive at the Battle of in and the cavalry became sidelined, the Marne (Sept. 6–12, 1914). Moltke’s Richthofen joined the infantry. In 1915 he mood became more and more despairing transferred to the Imperial Air Service during this time, and finally he abdicated and in September 1916 entered combat responsibility completely. On Sept. 14, as a fighter pilot. He became commander 1914, Emperor William II functually of Fighter Wing I (Jagdgeschwader 1), replaced Moltke as chief of staff, though which, because of its frequent moves by Moltke retained nominal command until rail and its fancifully decorated planes, the end of the year. A speedy victory in came to be known as “Richthofen’s Flying the west had eluded Germany’s grasp. In Circus.” Richthofen personally was fact, within a few months of the Battle of credited with shooting down 80 enemy the Marne the Western Front had settled aircraft. However, he was killed in his red down to the murderous and static trench Fokker triplane when caught in a barrage warfare that was to persist unabated for of Australian enemy ground fire during a almost three years. Moltke died a broken battle near Amiens. According to another man less than two years later. account, he was shot down by Captain A. Roy Brown, a Canadian in the Royal Manfred, baron von Richthofen Air Force. His eventual successor as (b. May 2, 1892, Breslau, Ger. [now commander of the fighter group was Wrocław, Pol.]—d. April 21, 1918, Hermann Göring. Vaux-sur-Somme, France) Reinhard Scheer Baron von Richthofen was Germany’s top (b. Sept. 30, 1863, Obernkirchen, aviator and leading ace in World War I. Hanover [Germany]—d. Nov. 26, 1928, He was known as the “Red Baron” for his Marktredwitz, Ger.) red-painted Fokker triplane—an unusual and daring colour choice when most Reinhard Scheer commanded the Ger pilots opted instead for a colour with bet- man High Seas Fleet at the Battle of ter camouflage characteristics. Jutland (1916). Members of a prosperous family, both Scheer entered the German navy in Richthofen and his younger brother 1879 as a cadet at the age of 15, and by Lothar followed their father into military 1907 had become the captain of a battle- careers. In 1912 Richthofen became a lieu- ship. He became chief of staff of the tenant in the 1st Uhlan Cavalry Regiment High Seas Fleet under Henning von of the Prussian Army. As a member of Holtzendorff in 1910 and commander of this regiment, he fought in Russia after a battle squadron in 1913. After the out- the outbreak of World War I and then break of World War I, he advocated the Military Commanders | 209 use of submarines and gained fame as a soon moved to the general staff and par- submarine strategist. He planned subsur- ticipated in the Seven Weeks’ War against face raids off the English coast, which Austria (1866) and the Franco-Prussian consisted of using surface units as bait War (1870–71). By 1884 he had become for any British ships lured into the open head of the military-history section of the sea, with submarines lying ready to general staff and in 1891 replaced Alfred, ambush. Scheer received command of the Graf von Waldersee, as chief of the Great fleet in January 1916; he hoped to precipi- General Staff. tate a strategic division of the British Germany, by this time, had to face the Grand Fleet and catch it at a disadvan- possibility of a two-front war—against tage. A combination of both planning France in the west and Russia in the and chance resulted in the two fleets east—decades before World War I actu- converging at the Battle of Jutland ally began. In attempting to solve this (May 31–June 1, 1916), the only major problem, Schlieffen differed from his pre- fleet action of World War I and consid- decessors, Waldersee and Field Marshal ered to be the largest naval battle in Helmuth, Graf von Moltke, who had history. Although the Grand Fleet was aimed the first strike against Russia. not successfully divided and the British Taking into account the vast territorial decisively outnumbered the Germans, expanse of Germany’s eastern neighbour Scheer’s maneuvering ultimately saved and its growing defensive strength, he the High Seas Fleet. The battle itself proposed to aim a rapid, decisive open- proved inconclusive, with both sides ing blow on the Western front against claiming victory. France. Further, realizing that frontal On Aug. 8, 1918, Scheer succeeded assaults against mass armies would be Holtzendorff as chief of the admiralty costly and often indecisive, Schlieffen staff, serving for five more months until decided to strike at the enemy’s flank. his retirement. The plan that gradually emerged through the 1890s and the first years of the 20th Alfred, count von Schlieffen century envisaged that only small num- (b. Feb. 28, 1833, Berlin, Ger.—d. Jan. 4, bers were to be left in the east to contain 1913, Berlin) any threat by slowly mobilizing Russian forces, while the great bulk of Germany’s Count von Schlieffen was head of the armies were to be deployed in the west. German general staff and responsible for Schlieffen predicted that a flanking the plan of attack (Schlieffen Plan) that the movement would have greatest success German armies used, with significant mod- in the north, through Belgium and pos- ifications, at the outbreak of World War I. sibly Holland, as the south was too Schlieffen, the son of a Prussian mountainous to allow the rapid move- general, entered the army in 1854. He ment of large bodies of troops. Hence, 210 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Schlieffen proposed to hold the southern for South America. After bombarding portion of the Western Front with rela- Tahiti on September 22, he destroyed a tively few men, while concentrating a vast hastily assembled British cruiser squad- force in the north, which would sweep ron on Nov. 1, 1914, off Coronel, Chile. through Belgium and northern France, Two battle cruisers under Vice enveloping the French armies and even- Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee tually crushing them against Germany’s were sent from England against Spee. southern wing. This, in essence, was the They arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Schlieffen Plan as it was finalized in 1905, Islands, on Dec. 7, 1914. Spee, who had the year of its author’s retirement. left Chile on November 26, appeared off The plan was not applied in its pure the Falklands on December 8, perhaps form at the beginning of World War I, not knowing that the British squadron however. Schlieffen’s successor, Helmuth was there. The Germans were defeated; von Moltke, drastically reduced the Spee’s flagship, the armoured cruiser strength of the attacking armies and thus, Scharnhorst, went down with all hands. is often blamed for Germany’s failure to win a quick, decisive victory. Alfred von Tirpitz (b. March 19, 1849, Küstrin, Prussia— Maximilian, count von Spee d. March 6, 1930, Ebenhausen, near (b. June 22, 1861, Copenhagen, Den.— Munich, Ger.) d. Dec. 8, 1914, off Falkland Islands) Alfred von Tirpitz was the chief builder Count von Spee commanded the of the German Navy in the 17 years pre- German naval forces in the battles of ceding World War I and a dominant Coronel and the Falkland Islands early personality of Emperor William II’s reign. in World War I. He entered the German He was ennobled in 1900 and attained Navy in 1878, and in 1887–88 he com- the rank of admiral in 1903 and that of manded the port in German Cameroon. grand admiral in 1911; he retired in 1916. In 1908 he was made chief of staff of In June 1897 Tirpitz became secretary the German Ocean (North Sea) Com of state of the Imperial Navy Department. mand, and at the end of 1912 he was His appointment marked the beginning appointed commander of the Far Eastern of his two-decade buildup of the German Squadron. fleet in close collaboration with Emperor When World War I began, Spee was William II. In 1898 Tirpitz introduced the in the Caroline Islands. Japan’s declara- First Fleet Act, for the reorganization of tion of war against Germany (Aug. 22, Germany’s sea power. This law provided 1914) caused him to abandon plans for for an active navy consisting of 1 flagship, operations in Chinese waters and to head 16 battleships, 8 armoured coastal ships, Military Commanders | 211

34 small cruisers. Tirpitz knew how to stimulate public interest in a bigger navy, and, as secretary of state from 1897, he dis- played great skill as a parliamentarian. Tirpitz was ennobled in 1900 and awarded the Order of the Black Eagle, and in 1911 he rose to the rank of grand admiral. In the meantime not even the 1900 navy law had evoked any signifi cant political response in Britain. The reactions to the expansion of the German navy were late in coming: after the British formed their alliances of 1904 (with France) and 1907 (with Russia), they launched the Dreadnought (1906) in an eff ort to score an important technical advantage over Germany by constructing oversized capital ships. Their building program turned out to be a miscalculation, however, because not only all the other great powers but even many countries with small A portrait of Adm. Alfred von Tirpitz, navies such as Chile and Turkey immedi- c. 1910. Hulton Archive/Getty Images ately followed suit. Nevertheless, because Britain had had a head start since 1905, it had an edge of seven capital ships over its and a force of 9 large and 26 small cruisers principal rival, Germany. Because of rap- to be ready by 1904. Such a navy was idly increasing British and declining regarded as strong enough for limited German construction, there were 49 off ensives in a war against France and British battleships either in service or Russia. While the 1898 act was designed to being built in 1914, compared to 29 meet the need for a high-seas battle fl eet, German vessels of the same type. Tirpitz’s Tirpitz’s Second Fleet Act of 1900 laid construction plan was never completed as down a more ambitious program—to build he originally envisioned it. a larger and more modern ocean going As grand admiral, Tirpitz advocated fl eet—that the navy was never able to prac- for unrestricted submarine warfare tically fulfi ll. This law set 1917 as the year against Great Britain. However, his vocal of completion for an active navy of 2 fl ag- agitations to lift restrictions on German ships, 36 battleships, 11 large cruisers, and submarines put him out of favour with the 212 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power emperor, who feared that the destruction Ottoman Empire of ships carrying American passengers would draw the ire of the U.S. government kemal atatürk and people. Thus, Tirpitz was forced to (b. 1881, Salonika [now Thessaloníki], resign from his post in March 1916—the Greece—d. Nov. 10, 1938, Istanbul, Tur.) same month that Germany resumed unrestricted U-boat attacks and a full Kemal Atatürk was the founder and fi rst year before the United States declared president (1923–38) of the Republic of war on Germany. Turkey . He modernized the country’s legal and educational systems and Otto Weddigen encouraged the adoption of a European (b. Sept. 15, 1882, Herford, Westphalia, way of life, with Turkish written in the Ger.—d. March 18, 1915, at sea off the Latin alphabet and with citizens adopt- Moray Firth, Scot.) ing European-style names.

Otto Weddigen’s feat of sinking three British armoured cruisers in about an hour, during the second month of World War I, has made him one of the most famous of German submarine commanders. Weddigen entered the German navy in 1901 and participated from the beginning in the development of the U-boat force, which he led by the beginning of the war in August 1914. Off the Dutch coast on Sept. 22, 1914, Weddigen’s U-9 torpedoed fi rst theAboukir and then, when they stopped to rescue survivors, the Hogue and the Cressy , with a combined loss of 1,400 men. On Oct. 15, 1914, the U-9 also sank the cruiser Hawke off Scotland, costing the British 500 more lives. Afterward, Weddigen commanded a more modern submarine, the U-29, which was lost with all hands, including Weddigen, when it was rammed by the British battleship Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), 1923. UPI/ Dreadnought off the Moray Firth, Bettmann Newsphotos Scotland, in March 1915. Military Commanders | 213

In October 1912, while Mustafa Kemal to general, acquiring the title of pasha. was in Vienna, the First Balkan War broke He was the only Turkish general to win out. He was assigned to the defense of the any victories over the Russians on the Gallipoli Peninsula, an area of strategic Eastern Front. Later that year, he took importance with respect to the Darda over the command of the 2nd Army in nelles. Within two months the Ottoman southeastern Anatolia. There he met Empire lost most of its territory in Europe. Colonel İsmet (İnönü), who would The Second Balkan War, of short dura- become his closest ally in building the tion (June–July 1913), saw the Ottomans Turkish republic at the end of the war. regain part of their lost territory. Further Fighting was halted by the Armistice more, relations were renewed with of Mudros (Oct. 30, 1918). Shortly after- Bulgaria. Mustafa Kemal’s former school- ward, Enver and other leaders of the mate Ali Fethi was named ambassador to Committee of Union and Progress fled to Bulgaria, and Mustafa Kemal accompa- Germany, leaving the sultan to lead the nied him to Sofia as military attaché. There government. To ensure the continuation he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. of his rule, Mehmed VI was willing to Mustafa Kemal complained of Enver cooperate with the Allies, who assumed Paşa’s close ties to Germany and pre- control of the government. dicted German defeat in a hypothetical However, the Allies did not wait for a international conflict. Once World War I peace treaty to begin claiming Ottoman broke out, however, and the Ottoman territory. Early in December 1918, Allied Empire entered on the side of the Cen troops occupied sections of Istanbul and tral Powers, he sought a military set up an Allied military administration. command. Enver made him wait in Sofia, The Allies made plans to incorporate the but finally Mustafa Kemal was given com- provinces of eastern Anatolia into an inde- mand of the 19th Division being organized pendent Armenian state. French troops in the Gallipoli Peninsula. It was here on advanced into Cilicia in the southeast. the peninsula that the Allies attempted Greece and Italy put forward competing their ill-fated landings, giving Mustafa claims for southwestern Anatolia. The Kemal the opportunity to throw them Italians occupied Marmaris, Antalya, and back and thwart their attempt to force Burdur, and on May 15, 1919, Greek troops the Dardanelles (February 1915–January landed at Izmir and began a drive into the 1916). His success at Gallipoli thrust his interior of Anatolia, killing Turkish inhab- name and reputation onto the world itants and ravaging the countryside. Allied scene. He was hailed as the “Saviour of statesmen seemed to be abandoning Istanbul” and was promoted to colonel on Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points in June 1, 1915. favour of the old imperialist views set In 1916 Mustafa Kemal was assigned down in covert treaties and contained in to the war’s Russian front and promoted their own secret ambitions. 214 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Meanwhile, Mustafa Kemal’s armies Kemal’s orders. Imperial orders for his had been disbanded. He returned to arrest were circulated. Istanbul on Nov. 13, 1919, just as ships of Mustafa Kemal avoided outright the Allied fleet sailed up the Bosporus. dismissal from the army by officially He was determined to oust them. In vari- resigning late on the evening of July 7. ous parts of Anatolia, Turks had already As a civilian, he pressed on with his reti- taken matters into their own hands, call- nue from Sivas to Erzurum, where ing themselves “associations for the General Kâzim Karabekir, commander of defense of rights” and organizing para- the 15th Army Corps of 18,000 men, was military units. They began to come into headquartered. At this critical moment, armed conflict with local non-Muslims, when Mustafa Kemal had no military and it appeared that they might soon do support or official status, Kâzim threw in so against the occupying forces as well. his lot with Mustafa Kemal, placing his Fearing anarchy, the Allies urged the troops at Mustafa Kemal’s disposal. This sultan to restore order in Anatolia. The was a crucial turning point in the struggle grand vizier recommended Mustafa for Turkish independence. Kemal as a loyal officer who could be sent Kâzim had called for a congress of all to Anatolia as inspector general of the 3rd defense-of-rights associations to be held Army. Mustafa Kemal contrived to get his in Erzurum on July 23, 1919. Mustafa orders written in such a way as to give him Kemal was elected head of the Erzurum extraordinarily extensive powers. These Congress, thereby gaining an official included the authority to issue orders status again. The congress drafted a throughout Anatolia and to command document covering the six eastern prov- obedience from provincial governors. inces of the empire. Later known as the Modern Turkish history may be said National Pact, it affirmed the inviolability to have begun on the morning of May 19, of the Ottoman “frontiers”—that is, all the 1919, with Mustafa Kemal’s landing at Ottoman lands inhabited by Turks when Samsun, on the Black Sea coast of the Armistice of Mudros was signed. It Anatolia. There he told a cheering crowd also created a provisional government, that the sultan was the prisoner of the revoked the special status arrangements Allies and that he had come to prevent for the minorities of the Ottoman Empire the nation from slipping through the fin- (the capitulations), and set up a steering gers of its people. The Allies pressured committee, which then elected Mustafa the sultan to recall Mustafa Kemal, who Kemal as head. ignored all communications from Istan Unconvinced of the sultan’s ability to bul. The sultan dismissed him and rid the country of the Allied occupation, telegraphed all provincial governors, Mustafa Kemal established the seat of instructing them to ignore Mustafa his provisional government in Ankara, Military Commanders | 215

300 miles from Istanbul. There he would The nationalists occupied Istanbul be safer from both the sultan and the on October 2. Ankara was named the cap- Allies. This proved a wise decision. On ital, and on October 29 the Turkish March 16, 1920, in Istanbul, the Allies republic was proclaimed. Turkey was now arrested leading nationalist sympathizers in complete control of its territory and and sent them to Malta. sovereignty, and the Ottoman Empire Many prominent Turks escaped from was no longer. Istanbul to Ankara, including İsmet and, after him, Fevzi (Çakmak), the sultan’s Enver Paşa war minister. Fevzi became Mustafa (b. Nov. 22, 1881, Constantinople [now Kemal’s chief of the general staff. New Istanbul], Tur.—d. Aug. 4, 1922, near elections were held, and a parliament, Baldzhuan, Turkistan [now in called the Grand National Assembly Tajikistan]) (GNA), met in Ankara on April 23, 1920. The assembly elected Mustafa Kemal as Enver Paşa was an Ottoman general and its president. commander in chief, a hero of the Young In June 1920 the Allies handed the sul- Turk Revolution of 1908, and a leading tan the Treaty of Sèvres, which he signed member of the Ottoman government on Aug. 10, 1920. By the provisions of this from 1913 to 1918. He played a key role in treaty, the Ottoman state was greatly the Ottoman entry into World War I on reduced in size, with Greece one of the the side of Germany, and, after the major beneficiaries. Armenia was declared Ottoman defeat in 1918, he attempted to independent. Mustafa Kemal repudiated organize the Turkic peoples of Central the treaty. Having received military aid Asia against the Soviets. from the Soviet Union, he set out to drive An organizer of the Young Turk Revo the Greeks from Anatolia and Thrace and lution, Enver joined General Mahmud to subdue the new Armenian state. Şevket, under whose command an With Anatolia rid of most of the “Army of Deliverance” advanced to Con Allies, the GNA, at the behest of Mustafa stantinople to depose the Ottoman sultan Kemal, voted on Nov. 1, 1922, to abolish Abdülhamid II. In 1911, when warfare the sultanate. This was soon followed broke out between Italy and the Otto by the flight into exile of Sultan Mehmed man Empire, he organized the Ottoman VI on November 17. The Allies then resistance in Libya, and in 1912 he was invited the Ankara government to discus- appointed the governor of Banghāzī sions that resulted in the signing of the (Benghazi; now in modern Libya). Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923. This Back in Constantinople, he partici- treaty fixed the European border of Turkey pated in the politics of the Committee of at the Maritsa River in eastern Thrace. Union and Progress, leading the coup 216 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

When the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers (November 1914), Enver cooperated closely with German offi cers serving in the Ottoman army. His military plans included Pan-Turkic (or Pan-Turanian) schemes for uniting the Turkic peoples of Russian Central Asia with the Otto man Turks. These plans resulted in the disastrous defeat in December 1914 at Sarıkamış, where he lost most of the 3rd Army. He recovered his prestige, however, when the Allied forces withdrew from the Dardanelles (1915–16). In 1918, following the Russian Revolution of 1917 and Russia’s withdrawal from the war, he occupied Baku (now in Azer- baijan). However, after the Armistice in Europe, Enver fl ed to Germany (Nov- ember 1918). In Berlin he met the Bolshevik leader Karl Radek, and in 1920 he went to Enver Paşa. Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. Moscow. He proposed the idea of over- throwing the regime of Mustafa Kemal d’état of Jan. 23, 1913, which restored his (Atatürk) in Turkey with Soviet aid, but party to power. In the Second Balkan War this plan received no support from (1913), Enver was chief of the general staff Moscow. Though the Russian leaders of the Ottoman army. On July 22, 1913, he became suspicious of him, Enver was recaptured Edirne (Adrianople) from the nevertheless allowed to go to Turkistan Bulgars; and until 1918, the empire was with a plan for helping to organize the dominated by the triumvirate of Enver, Central Asian republics. In 1921, however, Talât Paşa, and Cemal Paşa . the revolt of the Basmachi in Bukhara In 1914, Enver, as minister of war, was against the Soviet regime fl ared up, and instrumental in the signing of a defensive Enver joined the insurgents. He was killed alliance with Germany against Russia. in action against the Red Army. ChaPTER 8

Casualties of War

he casualties suff ered by the participants in World War I T dwarfed those of previous wars: some 8,500,000 soldiers died as a result of fi ghting wounds and/or disease. The greatest number of casualties and wounds were infl icted by artillery, followed by small arms, and then by poisonous gases. The bayonet, which was relied on by the prewar French Army as the decisive weapon, actually produced few casualties in World War I. War was increasingly mechanized from 1914 and produced casualties even when nothing important to the outcome of the war was happening. On even a quiet day on the Western Front, many hundreds of Allied and German soldiers died. The heaviest loss of life for a single day occurred on July 1, 1916, during the Battle of the Somme, when the British Army suff ered 57,470 casualties. Sir Winston Churchill once described the battles of the Somme and Verdun, which were typical of trench warfare in their futile and indiscriminate slaughter, as being waged between double or triple walls of cannons fed by mountains of shells. In an open space, surrounded by masses of these guns, large numbers of infantry divisions collided. They fought in this dangerous position until battered into a state of uselessness. Then, they were replaced by other divisions. So many men were lost in the process, and shattered beyond recognition, that there is a French monument at Verdun to the 150,000 unlocated dead whose unidentifi able remains are assumed to be buried in the vicinity. 218 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

This kind of war made it difficult to selected to shift the blame and prove that prepare accurate casualty lists. There they were fighting in self-defense. Serbia, were revolutions in four of the warring as told by Serbians, was defending itself countries in 1918, and the attention of the against Austrian aggression. On the other new governments quickly shifted away hand, Austria-Hungary claimed to be from the grim problem of war losses. A defending its very existence against ter- completely accurate table of losses of ror plotted on foreign soil. Russia was human life incurred during the war may defending Serbia and the Slavic cause never be compiled. against German imperialism. Germany The best available estimates of World was defending its lone reliable ally from War I military casualties are assembled attack and itself from entente encircle- in the table on page 219. ment. France, with most justification, was Similar uncertainties exist about the defending itself against unprovoked number of civilian deaths attributable to German attack. And Britain was fighting the war. During World War I, there were in defense of Belgium, international law, no agencies established to keep records and the balance of European power. of these fatalities; however, it is clear that In the Treaty of Versailles (1919), the the displacement of peoples through the victorious coalition justified its peace movement of the war in Europe and in terms by forcing Germany and its allies Asia Minor, accompanied as it was in 1918 to acknowledge guilt for the war. This by the most destructive outbreak of influ- tactic was historically dubious and politi- enza in history, led to the deaths of large cally disastrous, but it stemmed from number of civilians. It has been estimated the liberal conviction, as old as the that the number of civilian deaths attrib- Enlightenment, that peace was normal utable to the war was higher than the and war an aberration or crime for military casualties, around 13,000,000 which clear responsibility—guilt—could people. These civilian deaths were largely be established. Almost at once, revision- caused by starvation, exposure, disease, ist historians examined the thousands of military encounters, and massacres. documents that governments made available after 1920 and challenged the The war guilt question Versailles verdict. The German government had indeed issued the risky “blank The Search for Causes check” and urged Vienna on an aggressive course. It had swept aside all Debate over the origins and causes of proposals for mediation until events had World War I was from the start partisan gained irreversible momentum. It had, and moral in tone. Each of the belliger- finally, surrendered its authority to a mili- ents published documentary collections tary plan that ensured the war could not Casualties of War | 219

Armed forces mobilized and casualties in World War I* percentage total prisoners killed total of mobilized country mobilized wounded and and died casualties forces in forces missing casualties Allied and Associated Powers Russia 12,000,000 1,700,000 4,950,000 2,500,000 9,150,000 76.3 British 8,904,467 908,371 2,090,212 191,652 3,190,235 35.8 Empire France 8,410,000 1,357,800 4,266,000 537,000 6,160,800 73.3 Italy 5,615,000 650,000 947,000 600,000 2,197,000 39.1 United 4,355,000 116,516 204,002 4,500 323,018 8.1 States Japan 800,000 300 907 3 1,210 0.2 Romania 750,000 335,706 120,000 80,000 535,706 71.4 Serbia 707,343 45,000 133,148 152,958 331,106 46.8 Belgium 267,000 13,716 44,686 34,659 93,061 34.9 Greece 230,000 5,000 21,000 1,000 27,000 11.7 Portugal 100,000 7,222 13,751 12,318 33,291 33.3 Montenegro 50,000 3,000 10,000 7,000 20,000 40.0 Total 42,188,810 5,142,631 12,800,706 4,121,090 22,064,427 52.3 Central Powers Germany 11,000,000 1,773,700 4,216,058 1,152,800 7,142,558 64.9 Austria- 7,800,000 1,200,000 3,620,000 2,200,000 7,020,000 90.0 Hungary Turkey 2,850,000 325,000 400,000 250,000 975,000 34.2 Bulgaria 1,200,000 87,500 152,390 27,029 266,919 22.2 Total 22,850,000 3,386,200 8,388,448 3,629,829 15,404,477 67.4

Grand 65,038,810 8,528,831 21,189,154 7,750,919 37,468,904 57.5 total

*As reported by the U.S. War Department in February 1924. U.S. casualties as amended by the Statistical Services Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nov. 7, 1957. 220 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power be localized. Indeed, the whole course of European leaders had wanted a great war, German foreign policy since 1890 had and identified as its deeper causes the been restless and counterproductive, alliance systems, militarism, imperialism, calling into existence the very ring of nationalism, and the newspaper press. enemies it then took extreme risks to (Marxists, of course, from the publication break. But, on the other hand, Russia’s of Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage hasty mobilization expanded the crisis of Capitalism in 1916, had held finance beyond the Balkans, initiated a round of capitalism to be accountable for the war.) military moves, and contributed to In this view, the polarization of Europe German panic. Given the military reali- into alliance systems had made “chain- ties of the age, Sazonov’s notion of reaction” escalation of a local imbroglio Russian mobilization as a mere “applica- almost assured. Militarism and imperial- tion of pressure” was either disingenuous ism had fed tensions and appetites or foolish. France also could be faulted for among the Great Powers, while national- not restraining Russia and for issuing its ism and sensationalist journalism had own “blank check.” Even the British might stoked popular resentments. How else have done more to preserve peace, either could one explain the universal enthusi- through more vigorous mediation or by asm with which soldiers and civilians making clear that they would not remain alike greeted the outbreak of war? Such neutral in a continental war, thus deter- evenhanded sentiments, along with the ring the German military aggression. abstraction of the terms of analysis that Finally, what of the states at the heart of exculpated individuals while blaming the the crisis? Surely Belgrade’s use of politi- system, were both appealing and pre- cal terrorism in the name of Greater scriptive. In the 1930s, British statesmen Serbia, and Austria-Hungary’s determi- in particular would strive to learn the les- nation to crush its tormentors, provoked sons of 1914 and so prevent another war. the crisis in the first place. By the 1930s, But as another generation’s hindsight moderate historians had concluded, as would reveal, the lessons did not apply to had Lloyd George, that no one country the new situation. was to blame for the war: “We all stumbled After World War II and the Cold War into it.” had left the issues of 1914 passé, a com- Thus, the failure of documentary mittee of French and German historians research to settle the war-guilt question agreed that World War I was an unwilled led other historians to look behind the disaster for which all countries shared July 1914 crisis for long-range causes of blame. Only a few years later, however, the war. Surely, they reasoned, such pro- in 1961, that consensus shattered. The found events must have had profound German historian Fritz Fischer published origins. As early as 1928, the American a massive study of German war aims Sidney B. Fay concluded that none of the during 1914–18 and held that Germany’s Casualties of War | 221

This painting by William Orpen commemorating the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 depicts Dr. Johannes Bell of Germany signing the treaty. He is surrounded by dignitar- ies from the United States, France, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, Portugal, Yugoslavia, India, Italy, Belgium, South Africa, and Australia. Hulton Archive/Getty Images 222 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power government, social elites, and even broad navy leagues thrilled at the prospect of a masses had consciously pursued a break- Nelsonian clash of dreadnoughts? The through to world power in the years Germans were not the only people who before World War I. Thus, the German grew weary of peace or harboured grandi- government, fully aware of the risks of ose visions of empire. To this universalist world war and of British belligerency, had view leftist historians like the American deliberately provoked the 1914 crisis. A. J. Mayer then applied the “primacy of Fischer’s thesis sparked bitter debate and domestic policy” thesis and hypothesized a rash of new interpretations of World that all the European powers had courted War I. Leftist historians made connec- war as a means of cowing or distracting tions between Fischer’s evidence and their working classes and national minor- evidence that had been cited 30 years ities from domestic political unrest. before by Eckhart Kehr, who had traced Such “new left” interpretations trig- the social origins of the naval program gered a period of intense study of the to the cleavages in German society and connections between domestic and for- the stalemate in the Reichstag. Other eign policy, leading to the conclusion historians saw links to the Bismarckian that a postulation of internal origins of technique of using foreign policy excur- the war, while obvious for Austria and sions to stifle domestic reform, a plausible for Russia, failed in the cases of technique dubbed “social imperialism.” democratic Britain and France. If any- To these historians, it appeared that thing, internal discord made for reticence Germany’s rulers had resolved before rather than assertion on the part of their 1914 to overthrow the world order in foreign policy elites. The conservative hopes of preserving the domestic order. historian Gerhard Ritter even challenged Traditionalist critics of Fischer the Fischer thesis in the German case. pointed to the universality of imperialis- The real problem, he argued, was not fear tic, social Darwinist, and militaristic of the Social Democrats but the age-old behaviour, especially among the Great tension between civilian and military Powers, on the eve of the war. The kaiser, influence in the Prussian-German gov- in his most nationalistic moods, only ernment. Politicians, exemplified by spoke and acted like many other influen- Bethmann, did not share the eagerness or tial figures among the Great Powers. Did imprudence of the general staff but lost not Sazonov and the Russian generals, in control of the ship of state in the atmo- their unrecorded moments, yearn to erase sphere of deepening crisis leading up to the humiliation of 1905 and conquer the 1914. Finally, a moderate German histo- Dardanelles, or Poincaré and General rian, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, dispensed J.-J.-C. Joffre wonder excitedly if the with polemics altogether. Germany’s recovery of Alsace-Lorraine were finally rapid industrialization and the tardiness at hand? And were not Primrose and of modernization in Austria-Hungary Casualties of War | 223

In focus: League of Nations

During the war, inﬂ uential groups in the United States and Britain had urged the creation of a supranational organization to solve disputes between countries, and U.S. President Woodrow Wilson strongly favoured the idea as a means of preventing another destructive world conﬂ ict. A league covenant, embodying the principles of collective security (joint action by league members against an aggressor), arbitration of international disputes, reduction of armaments, and open diplomacy, was formulated and subscribed to by the Allies at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The Covenant established the League of Nations’ directing organs: an assembly composed of representatives of all members; a council composed of permanent representatives of the leading Allied Powers (with additional rotating members); and a secretariat (executive), presided over by a secretary-general. It also provided for a Permanent Court of International Justice and for a system whereby colonies in Asia and Africa would be distributed among the Allied Powers in the form of mandates. During the 1920s the League of Nations, with its headquarters at Geneva, assimilated new members (neutral and enemy nations had been initially excluded), helped settle minor international disputes, and experienced no serious challenges to its authority. It was seriously weakened, however, by the nonadherence of the United States; the U.S. Congress failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles (containing the covenant). One of the league’s main purposes in preventing aggression was to preserve the status quo as established by the post–World War I peace treaties.

and Russia, he concluded, created insta- information and insight, ran ultimately bilities in central and eastern Europe aground. After all, if “imperialism” or that found expression in desperate self- “capitalism” had caused the war, they assertion. Echoing Joseph Schumpeter, had just as assuredly caused the unprec- Mommsen blamed the war on the sur- edented era of peace and growth that vival of precapitalist regimes that simply preceded it. Imperialist crises, though proved “no longer adequate in the face tense at times, had always been resolved, of rapid social change and the steady and even Germany’s ambitions were on advance of mass politics.” This interpre- the verge of being served through a 1914 tation, however, amounted to an updated agreement with Britain on a planned par- and elaborated version of the unsophisti- tition of the Portuguese empire. Imperial cated consensus that “we all stumbled politics were simply not a casus belli for into it.” Were the world wars, then, as anyone except Britain. Military prepared- some historians claimed, beyond human ness was at a peak. However, armaments control? are responses to tensions, not the cause Thus, the search for long-range of them, and they had, perhaps, served causes, while turning up a wealth of new to deter war in the numerous crises 224 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power preceding 1914. Capitalist activity since heedless policies of the other powers, the turn of the century tied the nations of however, gradually undermined the Europe together as never before, and in Habsburg monarchy until it was faced 1914 most leading businessmen were with a mortal choice. At that point, the advocates of peace. The alliance systems most stable member of the system between the Great Powers themselves became the most disruptive, the girders were defensive and deterrent by design of security (the alliances) generated and had served as such for decades. Nor destructive pressures of their own, and were they inflexible. Italy opted out of its the European system collapsed. To be sure, alliance, the tsar was not bound to risk his Austria-Hungary was threatened with its dynasty on behalf of Serbia, or the kaiser own nationality problem, aggravated by his on behalf of Austria-Hungary, while Serbia. It could better have met that the French and British cabinets might threat, however, if the Great Powers had never have persuaded their parliaments worked to ameliorate pressures on it, just to take up arms had the Schlieffen Plan as they had carried the declining Ottoman not forced the issue. Perhaps the 1914 cri- Empire for a full century. Instead, the sis was, after all, a series of irreparable ambitions of Russia, France, and Britain, blunders, in which statesmen failed to and the stifling friendship of Germany, perceive the effects their actions would only served to push Austria-Hungary to have on the others. the brink. This was not their intention, but it was the effect. The Centrality of the The central fact of global politics Habsburg Monarchy from 1890 to 1914 was Britain’s relative decline in power and influence. This Perhaps a long-range view that is still occurred naturally, as industrial power serviceable in explaining what caused diffused, but was aggravated by the the war is precisely the one derived from particular challenge of Germany. Over old-fashioned analysis of the balance-of- extended, the British sought partners to power system, forgotten amid the debates share the burdens of a world empire and over national or class responsibility. This were obliged in return to look kindly on view, suggested by Paul Schroeder in those partners’ ambitions. However, the 1972, asks not why war broke out in 1914, resulting Triple Entente was not the cause but why not before? What snapped in of Germany’s frustrations in the conduct 1914? The answer, he argued, is that the of Weltpolitik. Rather it was the cause of keystone of European balance, the ele- Germany’s frustrations to pursue an ment of stability that allowed the other imperial policy à outrance. Situated in powers to chase imperial moonbeams the middle of Europe, with hostile armies at will, was Austria-Hungary itself. The on two sides, and committed to the Casualties of War | 225 defense of Austria-Hungary, Germany expose the ethnic mare’s nest of south- was unable to make headway in the over- eastern Europe to civil war or Russian or seas world despite its strength. By German domination. Yet nothing was contrast, relatively weak France or hope- done about it. France could scarcely lessly ramshackle Russia could engage in afford to intervene—its security was too adventures at will, suffer setbacks, and tightly bound to Russia’s—but France’s return to the fray in a few years. Schroeder policy of wooing Italy out of the Triple concluded: “The contradiction between Alliance was a grave setback, not for what Germany wanted to do and what Germany but for Austria-Hungary. Russia she dared to do and was obliged to do brazenly pushed the Slavic nationalities accounts in turn for the erratic, uncoordi- forward, thinking to make gains but never nated character of German world policy, realizing that tsarism was as dependent its inability to settle on clear goals and on Habsburg survival as Austria-Hungary carry them through, the constant initia- had been on Ottoman survival. Only tives leading nowhere, the frequent Britain had the capacity to maneuver, to changes in mid-course.” All Germany restrain the likes of Serbia and Russia could do was bluff and hope to be paid for and take some of the Austro-Hungarian doing nothing: for remaining neutral in burden off Germany’s shoulders. And the Russo-Japanese War, for not building indeed it had done so before—in 1815–22, more dreadnoughts, for letting the French 1878, and 1888. But now the British chose into Morocco, for not penetrating Persia. Of vaguely to encourage Russia in the course, Germany could have launched an Balkans, letting Austria-Hungary, as it imperialist war in 1905 or 1911 under more were, pay the price for distracting Russia favourable circumstances. It chose not to from the frontiers of India. So, by 1914, do so, and German might was such that Austria was encircled and Germany was prior to 1914 the other powers never consid- left with the choice of watching its only ered a passage of arms with Germany. ally collapse or risking a war against all Instead, Triple Entente diplomacy Europe. Having chosen the risk, and lost, served to undermine the stability of it is no surprise that the Germans (as well Austria-Hungary. Everyone recognized as the other powers) gave vent to all their that it was the “sick man of Europe” and prewar bitterness and pursued a thor- that its demise would be inconvenient at ough revision of world politics in their very best and would almost certainly own favour. Glossary ameliorate To make better; to improve. emplacement The platform for a gun or aphorism A terse saying dealing with a battery and its accessories. general truth. exculpate To clear of guilt or blame. apotheosis Ideal example; epitome. execrate To curse; denounce. armistice A temporary suspension of foxhole A small pit dug for shelter in a hostilities by agreement of all war- battle area. ring parties. fruition Realization of something assonance Poetic device in which the desired; attainment. same vowel sounds are used with generalissimo In certain countries, the different consonants in the stressed name for the supreme commander of syllables of the rhyming words. armed forces. attenuate To weaken or reduce in force hegemony Leadership or predominant or intensity. influence exercised by one power attrition A reduction in numbers, size, over another. or strength. historiography The body of techniques, avarice Insatiable greed; miserly desire theories, and principles of historical to gain or hoard wealth. research. bellicosity Eagerness to fight; hostility. hubris Excessive pride. cadre Key group of military officers ignominious Marked by humiliation necessary to train and establish a and disgrace. new military unit. imbroglio Disagreement of a bitter caliph A former leader of the nature, as between persons or Ottoman Empire. nations. chancellor The chief minister of state immolate Sacrifice. in certain parliamentary governments, intelligentsia Intellectuals considered as with Germany. as a group or class. chassis The frame and wheels of a interdiction Steady bombardment of motor vehicle. enemy positions. commodore In the navy, an officer next intransigent Uncompromising; in rank below rear admiral. inflexible. conscription Compulsory enrollment in kaiser A German or Austrian emperor. military services; draft. laconic Expressing much in few words; cumbrous Cumbersome, difficult to carry. concise. dreadnought A type of battleship armed nonpareil A person or thing without with big guns in all of its turrets. equal; peerless. Glossary | 227 peerage The rank of any of the five salvo Simultaneous discharge of degrees of nobility in Great Britain. artillery shells. perfunctory Performed only as routine sedulous Diligent; persevering, duty; hasty and superficial; lacking assiduous. care or enthusiasm. shaykh Also called a sheik, a phalanx A body of troops in close order. spiritual guide. pincer A movement in which an enemy sortie A rapid movement of troops force is attacked from both sides and from a defensive position to a place the front. of attack. posthumously Arising or occurring union sacrée Political truce in France after one’s death. during World War I in which the left prophylactic Defense against a disease wing agreed not to oppose the or infection, as a drug. government. pusillanimous Cowardly, lacking cour- vanguard The front section of an age or resolution. advancing army. riposte A sharp return in speech or viscount A nobleman below earl and action; counterstroke. above baron in rank. 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(1989), discusses the German attempt to Flow (1961–70), is a detailed presentation find a tactical solution to the war. T.E.H. from a British perspective. Paul Halpern, Travers, The Killing Ground (1987) and A Naval History of World War I (1994), is How the War Was Won (1992), present more comprehensive and less forbid- the British approach to winning the war. ding. John Morrow, The Great War in the Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare Air (1993), and Lee Kennett, The First Air (1992), presents a Canadian perspective War, 1914–1918 (1991), cover the new third on the war. G. D. Sheffield,Leadership element of conflict. in the Trenches (2000), covers officer– Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring enlisted man relations in the British (1989), and Paul Fussell, The Great War army. Peter Simkins, Kitchener’s Army and Modern Memory (1975), discuss the (1986), analyzes the last great volunteer war’s mentalities. John Horne and force. Douglas Porch, The March to the Arnold Kramer, German Atrocities: A Marne (1981), is excellent on the French History of Denial (1992), analyzes the army’s prewar matrix. Leonard Smith, psychology of atrocities. Jay Winter, Between Mutiny and Obedience (1984), Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning interprets the mentality of the wartime (1995), deals with emotional legacies. force by focusing on one of its divisions. Manfred Boemke, Gerald Feldman, Edward M. Coffman,The War to End All and Elisabeth Glaser (eds.), The Treaty Wars (1968), and James Hallas (ed.), of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Doughboy War (2000), combine to Years (1998), makes a case that the present the American Expeditionary Versailles treaties offered at least reason- Forces experience. Edward Erickson, able possibilities for reconstruction and Ordered to Die (2001), surveys the reconciliation. Arno Mayer, The Politics Ottoman army. and Diplomacy of Peacemaking (1969), The five-volume history, Arthur stresses Western fear of radicalism in Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa determining the peace processes. Index

A “blank check” memo, 33 blowback operation, 49 Admiralty Landships Committee, 52 Bolsheviks, 15, 119, 120, 123, 142, 143, 154, 163, aircraft carrier, development of, 59–60 166, 202, 205 air power, development of in World War I, bomber planes, development of, 58–59 54–60 Boselli, Paolo, 161 Aisne, First Battle of the, 72 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 123, 142, 151, 167 Albatros D.I., 57 British Expeditionary Force, 12, 65, 67, 70, 73, Allenby, Edmund Henry Hynman, 94–95, 125, 174, 178, 184 126, 144, 174–175, 182, 200 British Grand Fleet, 103, 104 All Quiet on the Western Front, 100 British naval blockade, 38, 80–82, 108, 151, American Expeditionary Force, 117 168, 205 Amiens, Battle of, 139 British War Office, 52, 156, 185 Angell, Norman, 29 Bruchmüller, Georg, 198–199 Archangel Expedition, 120–122 Brusilov, Aleskey, 105, 107 Armistice of November 1918, 54, 133, 151–153, Brusilov’s Front, 105, 107 157, 160, 181, 197, 204, 216 Bucharest, Treaty of, 142, 151 Arras, Battle of, 57, 112, 175 Byng, Julian Hedworth George, 127, 128, 176 Atatürk, Kemal, 86, 212–215, 216 Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), 86 C Cadorna, Luigi, 95, 96, 97, 124, 191–192 B Cambrai, Battle of, 52, 127 Cantigny, Battle of, 137–138 Baghdad, 94, 125 Caporetto, Battle of, 124, 145, 162, 192 Balkan Front, 77–78, 96–98, 143 casualties, 73, 74, 77, 79, 80, 86, 87, 89, 90, 93, Balkan Wars, 31–32, 194, 204, 213, 216 96, 100, 102, 104, 107, 112–113, 124, 126, battleships, development of, 44–46 128, 129, 130, 137, 138, 139, 144, 145, 149, Beatty, David, 79, 102, 103, 175–176 167, 177, 178, 190, 217–218 Belleau Wood, Battle of, 138 Caucasian Front, 93 Benedict XV, 132 Charles I, 130, 147, 155, 198 Berchtold, Leopold von, 34, 36, 154 chemical weapons, overview of use in Bergmann Muskete, 48 World War I, 14, 53–54 Bethmann Hollweg, Theobald von, 30, 33–34, China, 83, 127 108, 110, 130, 206 chlorine gas, 14, 53, 89, 90 Big Bertha, 68, 89 Churchill, Sir Winston, 12, 31, 37, 52, 85, 86, Bishop, William Avery, 185–186 157, 175–176, 182, 184, 217 Bismarck, Otto von, 21, 23, 33, 222 Clemenceau, Georges, 158–160, 186, 187 Index | 231

Cohan, George M., 117 “Five Particulars,” 132 Colmar, Wilhelm, 200 flight training, 60 Comintern, 164 Foch, Ferdinand, 73, 136, 137, 139, 140, 150, 151, convoy system, Allied adoption of, 129, 157 157, 159, 179, 185, 186–187, 191, 196 Corfu Declaration, 141 “Four Ends,” 132–133 Coronel, Battle of, 79, 80 “Four Principles,” 132, 148 cruiser ships, development of, 46 Fourteen Points, 132, 133, 142, 150, 213 Currie, Sir Arthur William, 176–177 Franchet d’Espèrey, Louis, 187–188 Czech nationalist movement, 140, 141 Francis Ferdinand, 9, 32–33, 155, 163, 198 Czechoslovak National Council, 141 Francis Joseph, 33, 36, 130, 154 French, Sir John, 65, 73, 85, 90, 177–178, 184 D French infantry mutiny, 113 Friedensresolution (of July 19), 130–132 Dardanelles, campaign in the, 78, 84–87, 98, Frontiers, Battle of the, 65–69 123, 174, 179–180, 181, 204, 216 declarations of war, 9, 10, 14, 36, 37, 78, 95, 96, 107, 115, 118, 124, 127, 128, 170, 191, 196, 210 G destroyer ships, development of, 46–48 Gallieni, Joseph, 69, 188 Diaz, Armando, 124, 145, 192 Gallipoli, Battle of, 85–86, 174, 179, 204, 213 Dogger Bank, Battle of the, 79, 176 gas masks, importance of in World War I, Dreadnought, 25, 45, 46, 211, 212 14, 53, 54 D.VII, 58 gas operation, 49 German High Seas Fleet, 102, 103, 104, 150 E Gough, Sir Hubert, 126, 178, 201 Greek campaign, 96–98, 123–124, 143 East Africa, campaign in, 83, 151, 203 Grey, Sir Edward, 25, 29, 36, 37 Eastern Front, 12, 40, 61, 63–64, 73–77, 84, 90–93, 98, 100, 104–105, 107–108, 110, 118, H 119, 120–122, 123, 134, 137, 142–143, 151, 188, 198, 201, 202, 205, 206, 207, 213 Habsburg, House of, 9, 17, 32, 145–146, 147, Egypt, campaign in, 94–95, 125, 182 151, 155, 198, 224, 225 Entente Cordiale, 10, 24, 64 Haig, Douglas, 87, 89, 90, 102, 134, 136, 156, Enver Paşa, 78, 93, 213, 215–216 157, 177, 178–179, 183, 184, 187 Erzberger, Matthias, 130, 132, 150, 152, 153 Halim Paşa, Said, 78, 162 Espionage Act, 116 Hamilton, Sir Ian, 85, 179 Helgoland Bight, Battle of, 79, 181 Hindenburg, Paul von, 75, 77, 92, 107, 108, 128, F 148, 200, 201–202, 205, 206 Falkenhayn, Erich von, 12, 73, 74, 84, 87, 90, Hindenburg Line, 112, 140, 147–148, 149, 176 92, 98, 102, 107, 108, 125, 144, 199–200 Hitler, Adolf, 153, 201, 203 fighter planes, development of, 56–58 Hoffmann, Max, 75, 202 Fisher, Sir John, 25, 86, 155 Hood, 46 232 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power

Hötzendorff, Franz Conrad von, 32, 33, 154, 198 Liman von Sanders, Otto, 204 House, Edward M., 108 Lloyd George, David, 29, 111, 129, 155–158, House–Grey Memorandum, 108–110, 160, 179, 180, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 220 usayn ibn ‘Alī, 94, 173–174, 182 London, Treaty of, 37, 95 Ludendorff, Erich, 65, 75, 77, 90, 92, 108, 112, I 124, 130, 134–135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 148, 149, 150, 152, 157, 187, 193, 200, 201, 202, imperialism, overview of in the 19th and 204–206 early 20th centuries, 22–24 Lusitania, 14, 82, 168 Indefatigable, 103, 176 Lys, Battle of the, 136–137 industrialization, 17, 19–22 Invincible, 46, 103 Isonzo, Battles of, 96, 97, 100, 124, 192 M Italian Front, 95–96, 100, 105, 124, 145, 162, machine gun, history of, 48–51 187, 192, 198 Mackensen, August von, 76, 90, 92, 107, 206–207 J Malmaison, Battle of, 127 Manufacturers Aircraft Association, 54 Jellicoe, John Rushworth, 103, 104, 180, 176 March Revolution, 14–15, 118, 141, 145, 166, 216 Joffre, Joseph, 12, 64, 67, 68, 69, 73, 85, 98, 111, Marne, First Battle of the, 11–12, 56, 65, 66, 112, 113, 186, 188–189, 190, 222 69–70, 72–73, 136, 186, 189, 203, 208 Jutland, Battle of, 44, 45–46, 102–104, 175, 176, Marne, Second Battle of the, 138–139, 189, 194 180, 208, 209 Maude, Frederick Stanley, 125 Maxim gun, 49 K Maximilian, Prince of Baden, 148, 150–151 Keyes, Roger John Brownlow, 129, 180–181 Megiddo, Battle of, 144 Kluck, Alexander von, 69, 203 Mesopotamia, campaign in, 94, 125, Kolubara, Battle of, 78 144–145, 200 Krupp, 68, 89 Mexico, 14, 111 Military Service Act, 98 L mine barrages, English Channel and North Sea, 129–130 Landsdowne, Lord, 132 Mitchell, William, 195–196, 197 Lanrezac, Charles, 67, 189–190 Moltke, Helmuth von, 12, 26, 31, 63, 64, 66, 68, Lansing, Robert, 120–122 69, 73, 84, 200, 205, 207–208, 209 Lawrence, T. E., 94, 95, 181–183 Monash, Sir John, 86, 174 League of Nations, 168, 172 Morhange-Sarrebourg, Battle of, 66 Lenin, Vladimir Ilich, 15, 119, 120, 123, Mountbatten, Louis Alexander, 183 164–167, 205, 220 Mudros, Armistice of, 144–145, 162, 213 Lettow-Vorbeck, Paul von, 83, 203 Mussolini, Benito, 161 Liggett, Hunter, 194–195 mustard gas, 14, 53–54 Index | 233 N Pétain, Philippe, 74, 100, 102, 113, 126, 134, 139, 187, 190–191 National Advisory Committee for Plan XVII, 27, 64–65, 68 Aeronautics, 54 Poincaré, Raymond, 31, 34, 36, 158, 159, 222 naval armaments, variety of in World War I, Polish National Committee, 142 41–42, 106 Polish nationalist movement, 140, 141–142 naval aviation, development of, 59–60 Princip, Gavrilo, 9, 33 naval battles, 44, 45, 46, 78–82, 102–104, 175, Putnik, Radomir, 77, 193–194 180, 181, 208, 209 Nicholas, 94, 192–193 Nicholas II, 36, 59, 74, 94, 163–164, 165, 192, Q 205, 224 Queen Elizabeth, 45, 46 Nivelle, Robert, 102, 111–112, 113, 126, 157, 179, 190, 191 R O “Race to the Sea,” 72 Rapallo Conference, 124 October Revolution, 119, 120, 123, 142, 163, rapid-fire artillery gun, history of, 48–51 164, 166, 216 recoil operation, 49 Order No.1 of the Petrograd Soviet, 118 reconnaissance aircraft, use of in World Orion, 45 War I, 56 Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, 162 Remarque, Erich Maria, 100 Operation Blücher, 137 Richthofen, Manfred von, 208 Operation Michael, 135–136, 137, 139 Rickenbacker, Edward Vernon, 197 Operation St. George I, 135, 136–137 Robertson, Sir William Robert, 156, 157, Operation St. George II, 135, 136–137 183–184 “Over There,” 117 Royal Navy, British, 40, 43, 45, 46, 55, 116, Owen, Wilfred, 153 180, 183 Royal Naval Air Service, 58, 60 P Rüdiger, Gustav, 142, 200–201 Russo-Japanese War, 51 Pacific, campaign in the, 83 Palestine, campaign in, 86, 94, 125–126, S 143–144, 174, 200 Paris guns, 89 Saint-Mihiel, Battle of, 140, 194, 197 Paris Peace Conference, 124, 158, 160, 162, Salandra, Antonio, 161, 162 192, 223 Salonika Expedition, 96–98, 143 Pax Britannica, 20–21 Samsonov, Aleksandr Vasiliyevich, 74, 75, 76 peace movements, prewar, 28–29 Sazonov, Sergey Dmitriyevich, 34, 36, 222 Pershing, John J., 116, 137, 140, 147, 170, 194, Scheer, Reinhard, 102, 103–104, 108, 208–209 196–197 Schenk v. United States, 116 234 | World War I: People, Politics, and Power Schlieffen, Alfred von, 10, 51, 61, 63, 207, U 209–210 U-boats, development of German, 106 Schlieffen Plan, 10–11, 12, 26–27, 37, 61–63, 66, U.S. Navy, 116–118 68, 69, 70, 205, 207, 209–210, 224 Scholtz, Friedrich von, 74–75, 76 sea power, overview of in World War I, V 40–48 Venizélos, Eleuthérios, 123–124 Selective Service Act, 116, 171 Verdun, Battle of, 74, 98–101, 102, 104, 107, 111, ship armour, advances in, 43–44 112, 127, 189, 190, 191, 200, 217 ship propulsion, advances in, 44 Versailles, Treaty of, 9, 15, 160, 168, 172, 173, social Darwinism, 17, 23–24, 222 218, 223 Social Democratic Party, 21, 30, 31, 150, 151, Villar Perosa, 48 153, 222 Viviani, René, 34, 36 Somme, First Battle of the, 101, 102, 107, 156, Voie Sacrée, La, 100 178, 179, 217 Somme, Second Battle of the, 135–136, 139 W South Africa, campaign in, 83 Weddigen, Otto, 212 South African War, 51, 83, 177, 178, 179, 184 Western Front, 11–12, 14, 40, 64–73, 76, 77, 84, Spee, Maximilian Johannes Maria Hubert 85, 87–90, 98–102, 104, 107, 111–113, 118, von, 79, 80, 83, 210 120, 123, 126–127, 128, 134–140, 148, 149, “stab in the back,” the, 152–153 150, 151, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 184, 185, submachine gun, history of, 48 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 194, 195, 197, submarine campaign, German, 81–82, 106, 203, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210, 217 108, 110, 113–115, 127–129, 130, 157, 168 William II, 21, 24, 30–31, 33, 36, 130, 139, 148, Suez Canal, 23, 94 150, 151, 160–161, 200, 201, 202, 206, 207, 208, 210, 222, 224 T Wilson, Sir Henry Hughes, 185 Wilson, Woodrow, 14, 35–36, 108–111, 113–115, tank, development of the, 12, 51–52 132–133, 141, 148, 150, 158, 159, 160, Tannenberg, Battle of, 76–77, 202 167–172, 196, 213, 223 Tirpitz, Alfred von, 30, 210–212 torpedoes, overview of use in World War I, Y 42–43, 46 Trenchard, Hugh Montague, 184 York, Alvin, 149 trench warfare, overview of use in World Young Turks, 30, 31–32, 34, 78, 200, 215 War I, 12, 52, 71–72 Ypres, Battles of, 73, 126, 176–177, 178 Triple Alliance, 17, 95, 161, 225 Yugoslav nationalist movement, 140, 141 Triple Entente, 10, 17, 25, 37, 224, 225 Trotsky, Leon, 120, 123 Z Turkish Front, 78, 84–87, 98, 123, 143–145, 162, zeppelins and airships, development of, 55–56 174, 179–180, 181, 204, 213–214, 216 Zimmermann, Arthur, 111 Two Emperors Manifesto, 141 Zimmermann Telegram, 110–111, 170