Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific diver assists University of Florida team member with in-water checks to university’s “Subjugator” Autonomous Underwater Vehicle during 14th Annual International RoboSub Competition, July 13, 2011 (U.S. Navy/Rick Naystatt)
Global Power Distribution and Warfighting in the 21st Century
By John R. Benedict, Jr.
he U.S. national security commu- and potential shocks that could dra- Department of Defense (DOD) in the nity needs to focus more on the matically change U.S. national security decades to come, it is crucial that U.S. T driving forces and likely associ- perspectives. By largely ignoring these military forces and their capabilities ated consequences that will influence longer term factors, the U.S. military is be properly aligned to counter a wide warfighting in the 21st century. A dis- unlikely to develop the needed national spectrum of threats and challenges that proportionate amount of effort is spent defense capabilities to deal effectively could undermine U.S. national security by national security experts on narrow with critical threats in this emerging interests in the first half of this century problem and solution spaces without an environment. With even greater fiscal and beyond. adequate appreciation of broader trends constraints predicted for the U.S. Drivers and Trends for U.S. Security The first driving force that deserves John R. Benedict, Jr., is a Fellow in the National Security Studies Office and former Head of the Joint Warfare Analysis Branch within the National Security Analysis Department at The Johns Hopkins more recognition is the nature and University Applied Physics Laboratory. diffusion of power globally. U.S.
6 Forum / Global Power Distribution and Warfighting JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 power is less influential and dominant highly disruptive to the absolutely cata- These four overarching drivers and than it was from World War II to the strophic—in the hands of individuals or other factors will contribute significantly immediate post–Cold War era. In many groups with few of the same policy, legal, toward diminished global governance instances “coalitions of the willing” are or ethical impediments for employing trends that could alter U.S. national secu- now much harder to form and sustain. them that the U.S. military would have.3 rity perspectives and the future use of the Consensus-building in international The first and second aforementioned U.S. military in essential ways. First, U.S. forums is difficult to achieve. It is drivers are largely empowered by a third influence is being gradually reduced due much easier for opposing actors to be one: global communications, such as to its tarnished “brand” from various fac- disruptive and to stop initiatives than the Internet and social media, which can tors or events including the 2008 global it is to move these initiatives forward. have both positive and negative effects. financial crisis, the less than conclusive Disruptions that impede progress at The global communications network outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq, and dealing with international issues can accelerates and amplifies ideas and events the perceived U.S. domestic political occur from nonstate entities as easily as in unprecedented ways compared to dysfunction. Many U.S. alliances have from nation-states. Nation-state legiti- the recent past. This trend is unlikely to weakened without a common threat, macy and authority continue to erode in subside, and it will continue to slowly causing respective priorities and interests many regions with the populace identi- undermine state authority, have dispro- to diverge.6 fying more with their religion, ethnicity, portionate influence on state actions and Second, the potential for U.S. re- race, tribe, class, or other affiliations. policies, empower and facilitate groups trenchment and disengagement from These nonstate entities and their impact and movements, and allow technolo- many of its traditional roles in world af- on national security problems are gies and associated design concepts to fairs is increasing. Much of the American more evident in the morning headlines proliferate worldwide. More individuals public is frustrated by U.S. global obli- every day. As Moisés Naím has argued, and groups will be able to perceive their gations and foreign entanglements that obsessing primarily or exclusively about disadvantaged positions compared to have had questionable effects and return great power rivalries is a red herring others in the world. Access to other par- on investment. They see the “American that prevents a realistic view of nonstate ties with similar grievances will facilitate Dream” eroding and want their govern- entities that are dramatically reshaping movements, enable recruiting and radi- ment to focus more on improving their U.S. national as well as international calization, and support the coordination standards of living rather than engaging security interests.1 and execution of terrorist, insurgent, in dubious international endeavors.7 The second driving force is the ac- criminal, and other disruptive activities Third, various global institutions are celerating pace of, and easier access to, domestically and abroad.4 gradually eroding in influence.8 These in- technology mostly being driven by the One additional driver that will con- clude, but are not limited to, the United commercial sector. Fewer technology tinue to have a large impact on U.S. Nations, International Monetary Fund, developments are the exclusive domain national security and global security ob- World Trade Organization, and World of powerful nations and their militaries as jectives is the economic power shift from Bank. A more fragmented or regional occurred during the Cold War.2 Some of West to East. This “rise of the rest” has di- world order with reduced U.S. leadership the scientific areas being dominated by minished the previous dominance of both will make it particularly difficult to ade- nonmilitary research and development the United States and the West in terms of quately address critical global challenges. are additive manufacturing, including: economic, political, and security matters. Examples of these possible challenges Leading this economic shift from West to are nuclear proliferation, international 3D printing •• East is China, whose emboldened leaders terrorism, large-scale issues related to robotics, autonomy, and artificial •• are seeking what they believe to be their climate and environmental effects, global intelligence rightful place in the world order. No one financial instability, global economic stag- energy generation and storage •• can be certain if Chinese aspirations to be- nation, potential worldwide pandemics, synthetic biology •• come the new hegemon in East Asia, with global energy availability and associated biotechnology •• a resulting power structure unfavorable price volatility, emerging problems in the nanotechnology •• to the United States, will actually occur. global commons such as within each of information technology. •• But few can argue that the relationship the cyber and space domains, and large- It is not farfetched to imagine open- between China and the United States is scale regional instabilities or conflicts. source design developments and adaptive fundamentally important to the inter- crowdsourcing by individuals and groups ests of both countries and could largely Four Crucial Threat Concerns that could allow nonstate entities to determine future security and stability The driving forces and trends delineated “out-innovate” states encumbered by in the Asia-Pacific region, the vitality of in the previous section could have sig- large bureaucracies. It does not take the economies for both nations, and the nificant impact on four crucial threat much imagination to conceive of cheap, credibility and influence of American and concerns for the U.S. military in the effective weapons—ranging from the Chinese power around the world.5 21st century. First, increasing global
JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Benedict 7 Airman loads AGM-86B air-cruise launch trainer missile onto B-52H Stratofortress, February 26, 2014, at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota (U.S. Air Force/Aaron D. Allmon II) disorder, instabilities, and insecurities by nonstate actors. It represents the dark was no longer viewed as credible, for could occur with much of the world side of globalization and can take many example, by perceived U.S. disengage- becoming more dangerous and chaotic.9 forms. Imagine individuals or groups ment from their regions. Increasing the This trend toward a more disorderly operating in garages or small shops number of nuclear nations in East Asia, world, should it happen, would be employing readily available gene-splicing the Middle East, or elsewhere would largely driven by the rise of malevolent equipment and genome sequences to correspondingly increase the potential nonstate actors, reduced authority and synthesize lethal biological agents based for nuclear accidents, crises, and conflicts legitimacy of nation-states in many on information found in the public in these areas. In addition, proliferation regions, and decreased ability to provide domain.12 Also, consider the possibility to nonstate actors could be caused by effective global governance. of nonstate actors relying on open- the nexus of nuclear proliferation among A second threat concern would be source designs and 3D printing to build nations and the increased access to the further rise of regional hegemons of insect-size drones capable of delivering advanced technology including nuclear revisionist powers such as China, Russia, deadly poisons to assassinate world weapon designs, nuclear or radiological and Iran, whose objectives often clash leaders.13 Finding these individuals or materials, and related expertise. with U.S. national interests. Should these groups around the globe easily exceeds regional developments occur, particularly the law enforcement capabilities in most Need for a Bifurcated as a result of reduced U.S. influence and locales. Thus there is a significant role Military Approach engagement in those same regions, then to be played by multinational intelli- Given these four threat concerns, the likelihood of adverse regional compe- gence assets, military forces, and other each of them serious in its own right, tition, arms races, and state conflict could organizations. how does the U.S. military need to be be increased.10 The final threat concern would largely aligned in order to protect or further A third threat concern involves the complicate the other three. It is a greatly U.S. interests in this dangerous future? rise of “super-empowered” individuals increased level of nuclear proliferation It needs to adopt a bifurcated approach and groups capable of levels of violence beyond the gradual erosion of the to deal with both nation-state and non- formerly only within the purview of Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear state threats. Neither type of threat can nations.11 This ominous threat devel- Weapons that we see today.14 This prolif- be considered a “lesser included case” opment is primarily enabled by the eration among nations could be enabled of the other. They demand significantly increased access to advanced technology if the U.S. nuclear umbrella for key allies different approaches.
8 Forum / Global Power Distribution and Warfighting JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 To counter nation-state threats posed weaponry, or ready access to SATCOM •• manned “tourist submarines” or by countries ranging from near-peer rivals and GPS. As a result, defense of maritime mini-submarines entering a major to rogue states, the U.S. military must be forces and power projection by those U.S. harbor and detonating 5 to prepared to conduct high-tech warfare same forces could be much more difficult 10 tons of high explosives under an in harsh antiaccess/area-denial (A2/ than in the recent past. In future conflicts oil tanker or liquefied natural gas AD) environments.15 This would require U.S. air and space forces cannot count on carrier19 U.S. forces to have advanced air-missile air and space superiority due to advanced •• a ship-launched torpedo detonating defenses capable of handling large-capac- integrated air defenses and effective a radiological dispersal device and ity adversary attacks to leverage certain kinetic and nonkinetic antisatellite tech- wreaking havoc on a major port or U.S. undersea capabilities for asymmetric niques of their opponents. This means base20 advantage and to project advanced strike that conducting strikes, close air support, •• mobile mines or improvised under- capabilities effectively against a variety and other missions could be much water explosive devices deployed of adversary targets. To prevail in high- more challenging than in recent history. from surface vessels and detonating tech warfare, the military must be able Despite these challenges, the United against various targets transiting to to achieve information dominance by States should not overprepare and overin- and from U.S. ports21 protecting its own assets and by coun- vest against nation-state opponents at the •• heavyweight torpedoes deployed tering those of the adversary including cost of being ill-prepared for conflicts or from a camouflaged gravity launcher in the crucial space domain. Advanced contingencies involving nonstate actors. on a merchant ship, homing on the information operations such as electronic To counter nonstate threats, in- wake signature of a nearby transiting warfare, military deception, cyber attacks, cluding potential super-empowered cruise ship, and detonating lethally and psychological warfare will need to be individuals and groups of terrorists, in- under thousands of passengers22 integrated with kinetic attacks to achieve surgents, criminals, and other bad actors, •• a nuclear-tipped cruise missile fired maximum effects. The military will need significant U.S. military resources and from a merchant ship or from across to maintain an adequate and coherent capabilities will need to be developed. the U.S. border and targeting a nuclear deterrence posture, a topic that This means continuing counterterrorism, major urban area23 has been largely neglected by portions of including efforts to penetrate adversary •• a ballistic missile with an electro- the national security community since the information and other networks. It could magnetic pulse (EMP) warhead fired end of the Cold War.16 It will also need to evolve to increased homeland defense from a merchant ship off the conti- be capable of countering ballistic missile roles and capabilities plus key support to nental United States and disabling a nuclear threats from rogue nations such various homeland security endeavors such major portion of the electric grid for as North Korea, and be prepared to fight as combating WMD. Furthermore, U.S. weeks to months24 in limited nuclear wars if an adversary forces will have to improve their ability to •• an unmanned aerial system dispens- should make a potentially ill-advised deci- operate and fight in urban, mountainous, ing deadly biological agents over a sion to initiate such a conflict. or other demanding environments. The dense U.S. city.25 Increasing access by nations to com- U.S. military must also increase its ability If these types of threats develop, mercial technologies will likely translate to deal with so-called hybrid warfare it may become necessary to divert key to effective military applications that will situations (for example, those involving DOD assets to provide the needed home- significantly close the gap with the U.S. surrogate or proxy forces operating land protection. military.17 In the future, U.S. ground below the threshold of war or adversaries forces cannot count on air superiority employing an innovative mix of low-tech Additional Perspectives due to advanced missiles and other air- and high-tech weaponry). Finally, the In recent history there has been a dimin- borne threats, or the ready availability U.S. military needs to upgrade its mes- ished willingness of states with tradi- of satellite communications (SATCOM) saging capabilities to gain crucial support tional militaries to make full use of their and GPS, or being able to conduct for its irregular operations. destructive power due to policy, legal, operations in strictly non–weapons of As indicated earlier, the role of the regulatory, ethical, moral, and other mass destruction (WMD) environments. U.S. military in homeland defense is reasons. These constraints will only be This means that gaining access to areas likely to be elevated in the future due compounded in the future for the U.S. of operation, conducting expeditionary to the increased threat from advanced military, particularly when dealing with maneuvers, and defending ground units technologies and systems falling into the less discriminating nonstate actors and could prove much more challenging hands of nonstate adversaries. Examples rogue or desperate nations who have than it has been in recent conflicts. of these emerging threats include: access to advanced technologies. For Similarly, U.S. maritime forces cannot autonomous undersea vehicles or example, certain transnational terrorists count on air superiority, control of the •• deep submersible vehicles cutting would attempt to employ nuclear or undersea environment due to advanced undersea cables18 radiological weapons against U.S. or adversary submarines and other undersea
JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Benedict 9 Although military power is unlikely to prove decisive by itself, it could provide a crucial underpinning for nonmilitary components of power such as diplomatic, intelligence, economic, financial, infor- mational, and legal measures.
Guiding Principles So what are some of the guiding prin- ciples for DOD that are consistent with achieving a more cohesive and balanced military approach? The first principle is to emphasize fundamentals. An example would be for DOD and other elements of the national security community to place as much focus on the information and cyberspace domain as they have traditionally done for the ground, maritime, air, and space domains. Infor- mation operations have always been important in warfare.28 But dominating Sailor assigned to USS Mustin stands watch in ship’s combat information center during Exercise the information domain could prove to st Valiant Shield 2014, which integrates about 18,000 U.S. Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps be the coin of the realm in 21 -century personnel, more than 200 aircraft, and 19 surface ships for real-world joint operational experience, warfare. Another example is for DOD September 16, 2014 (U.S. Navy/Declan Barnes) to maintain its technological edge by greater leveraging of commercial devel- other civilian populations if they had an electronic warfare jamming against •• opments in many fields,29 thus avoiding opportunity. Some adversary nation- civilian assets such as GPS an overreliance on technology develop- state militaries, if losing to the United fully autonomous armed robots •• ments within the Defense Department States in a conventional conflict and nanotechnology weapons •• unless absolutely necessary. their leadership feared regime change biotechnology-enhanced •• The second principle is to emphasize and its very survival, could choose to “super-soldiers” prevention. An illustration would be for employ tactical nuclear weapons against kinetic weapons in space with the •• DOD to give comparable emphasis to U.S. forces. Conversely, current U.S. potential to create debris fields that peacetime activities designed to deter policy deemphasizes employment of render portions of that domain and prevent conflicts as it has historically tactical nuclear weapons on the battle- unusable. given to planning for war if deterrence field.26 Thus the U.S. military could be As a possible disadvantaged user in and prevention measures fail. This viewed as a “disadvantaged user” when these and other areas, the U.S. military would include a revitalization of nuclear it comes to tactical nuclear weapons. will need to adapt and compensate for deterrence, not so much by increasing Similar examples could be provided for utterly ruthless opponents who are capability or capacity, but by clearly chemical and biological weapons. relatively unconstrained by rules of articulating its purpose and continued Another related illustration is in the engagement, disproportionate effects, importance.30 Revitalization would have realm of EMP weapons. Future adver- and the need to minimize destruction of a three-fold effect: It would boost morale saries may not hesitate to employ EMP infrastructure and civilian populations. for those in the military assigned to this against space and terrestrial targets. U.S. As a final note, many national secu- mission; it would clarify to U.S. allies and policy is to avoid use of these weapons if rity problems are such that “war is not partners any limitations on the nuclear they would heavily damage civilian infra- the ultimate arbiter,” as Joseph Nye has umbrella that is being provided to them; structure. Some U.S. adversaries in the so aptly stated.27 This would include and it would also increase the credibility future would be equally indiscriminate in challenges such as those posed by inter- of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to any po- employing the following capabilities: national terrorism, insurgents, organized tential adversaries. •• offensive cyber weapons or physical crime, maritime piracy, natural disasters, The third principle is to reduce attacks against critical civilian infra- large-scale poverty, mass migration, money pits. An example would be for structure, such as power grids, finan- genocide and other widespread human DOD to seriously address its increasing cial networks, communication net- rights abuses, cyber threats, infrastruc- human capital expenditures, which works, and water and food supplies ture attacks, and nuclear proliferation. are unsustainable on their current
10 Forum / Global Power Distribution and Warfighting JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 trajectory.31 This adverse trend needs expect to encounter guerrilla forces, Conclusion to be reversed in a manner that is not including in challenging urban environ- The primary objective for the U.S. detrimental to the viability of the all-vol- ments. This could occur while either military in a highly constrained budget unteer force. On the material side, DOD coming to the aid of an ally or partner environment should not be to achieve needs to reduce its focus on maintaining nation or while attempting to maintain at all costs a decisive win in a major force structures for large, expensive adequate security and order in the after- war against a near-peer rival by domi- traditional platforms or systems if they math of a conflict that the U.S. military nating that adversary in all warfighting require significantly increased levels of and its allies have just won. domains. That objective would be protection or have decreased overall util- The final principle is to be prepared extremely resource intensive and techni- ity against key portions of the emerging for out-of-the-box situations. As an cally challenging; it would also consume threat spectrum.32 illustration, the U.S. Government, with large portions of future military budgets The fourth principle is to be selective key contributions from DOD, will need at the expense of countering other and prioritize. An illustration would to counter challenging asymmetric threats that also deserve significant be to make only large military resource approaches by potential nation-state ad- resources and attention.40 Additionally, commitments and expenditures (people, versaries. These include: a truly decisive win against the conven- equipment, funding) in areas that clearly tional forces of a major power could financial attacks involve either vital or very important U.S. •• inadvertently escalate that conflict to a economic and trade destabilization national interests.33 A corollary for the •• nuclear war.41 measures U.S. Government and DOD is to stop On the contrary, the primary objec- sabotage or bombings attempting to do more with less. This •• tives for the U.S. military should be to assassinations does not work. It is necessary, in fact, •• support efforts to deter adversaries and extortion, intimidation, or political to make hard choices by setting priori- •• prevent a major power war as well as other coercion ties that ultimately will help to prevent types of conflicts from occurring; if a cyber warfare stretching U.S. military forces too thin. •• conflict does occur and is in U.S. national psychological warfare and Finally, the U.S. Government and its mil- •• interests, then to help win it in terms propaganda itary must develop effective strategies for of reaching a successful and sustainable various gray zone or hybrid warfare each of the long-term national security •• political outcome, which may or may not approaches conducted through sur- challenges to which they are committed. involve a decisive win by the military; and rogates or other means.37 Correspondingly, as Mike Vickers stated to effectively contribute to mitigating a in recent Senate testimony, the military A second illustration is the need for variety of global security challenges, in- needs “to identify a decisive element that the U.S. military to develop adequate cluding those posed by nefarious nonstate confers enduring advantage, and then to mitigation measures against adversaries actors, by achieving successful outcomes focus actions and resources on it.”34 employing advanced technologies in as part of an overall team composed of The fifth principle is to avoid tunnel which the United States could find itself other U.S. agencies, partner nations, and vision. DOD is focusing strongly on as a disadvantaged user. This includes re- organizations. Hopefully this set of objec- countering A2/AD threats posed by solving policy issues regarding the U.S. tives for the U.S. military would be more certain militaries in key regions such military employing systems or weaponry affordable, more technically achievable, as Europe, the Middle East, and the that rely on advances in robotics and less likely to result in nuclear escalation, Western Pacific. As important as this is, it artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and better able to address a broad set of should not be done to such a degree that directed energy, nanotechnology, syn- security challenges. it is at the expense of dealing with other thetic biology, genetic engineering, A properly designed, bifurcated more likely threats and challenges.35 For biotechnology, and other potentially military approach that is employed example, irregular warfare and counter- controversial areas.38 Finally, the U.S. effectively in coordination with other terrorism efforts by the military Services Government, including DOD, will need components of national and inter- against nonstate actors will need to to dramatically increase its participation national power would support these increase to ensure sufficient preparedness in public-private partnerships in order objectives. Focusing on major power against the proliferation of super-em- to provide protection against out-of- wars and treating other national security powered individuals and groups, which the-box threats to the homeland.39 challenges as lesser included cases, how- some believe are just over the horizon. Without these partnerships it is difficult ever, would not. U.S. decisionmakers in Also, despite contrary strategic guidance to imagine how sufficient levels of cyber charge of developing an effective mili- released by DOD in January 2012, it is security, bio security, nuclear or radio- tary approach to counter the emergent imperative that the U.S. military maintain logical security, EMP security, financial threats outlined herein need to choose the capability to conduct counterinsur- security, and energy and power grid wisely—U.S. national security and global gency and stability operations of various security would be achievable. international security in the 21st century scales.36 In the future the joint force can could depend on it. JFQ
JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Benedict 11 November 2015), 52–56, 78–88, 93–96, erations: Warfare and the Hard Reality of Soft Notes 120–121. Power (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 2004), 15 Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC), 9, 13–14, 231–233. 1 Moisés Naím, The End of Power: From Version 1.0 (Washington, DC: Department of 29 FitzGerald and Sayler, 6, 9–10, 16–17, Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to Defense, January 17, 2012), 9–16, available at 19, 34–35. States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used
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