Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific diver assists University of Florida team member with in-water checks to university’s “Subjugator” Autonomous Underwater Vehicle during 14th Annual International RoboSub Competition, July 13, 2011 (U.S. Navy/Rick Naystatt) Global Power Distribution and Warfighting in the 21st Century By John R. Benedict, Jr. he U.S. national security commu- and potential shocks that could dra- Department of Defense (DOD) in the nity needs to focus more on the matically change U.S. national security decades to come, it is crucial that U.S. T driving forces and likely associ- perspectives. By largely ignoring these military forces and their capabilities ated consequences that will influence longer term factors, the U.S. military is be properly aligned to counter a wide warfighting in the 21st century. A dis- unlikely to develop the needed national spectrum of threats and challenges that proportionate amount of effort is spent defense capabilities to deal effectively could undermine U.S. national security by national security experts on narrow with critical threats in this emerging interests in the first half of this century problem and solution spaces without an environment. With even greater fiscal and beyond. adequate appreciation of broader trends constraints predicted for the U.S. Drivers and Trends for U.S. Security The first driving force that deserves John R. Benedict, Jr., is a Fellow in the National Security Studies Office and former Head of the Joint Warfare Analysis Branch within the National Security Analysis Department at The Johns Hopkins more recognition is the nature and University Applied Physics Laboratory. diffusion of power globally. U.S. 6 Forum / Global Power Distribution and Warfighting JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 power is less influential and dominant highly disruptive to the absolutely cata- These four overarching drivers and than it was from World War II to the strophic—in the hands of individuals or other factors will contribute significantly immediate post–Cold War era. In many groups with few of the same policy, legal, toward diminished global governance instances “coalitions of the willing” are or ethical impediments for employing trends that could alter U.S. national secu- now much harder to form and sustain. them that the U.S. military would have.3 rity perspectives and the future use of the Consensus-building in international The first and second aforementioned U.S. military in essential ways. First, U.S. forums is difficult to achieve. It is drivers are largely empowered by a third influence is being gradually reduced due much easier for opposing actors to be one: global communications, such as to its tarnished “brand” from various fac- disruptive and to stop initiatives than the Internet and social media, which can tors or events including the 2008 global it is to move these initiatives forward. have both positive and negative effects. financial crisis, the less than conclusive Disruptions that impede progress at The global communications network outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq, and dealing with international issues can accelerates and amplifies ideas and events the perceived U.S. domestic political occur from nonstate entities as easily as in unprecedented ways compared to dysfunction. Many U.S. alliances have from nation-states. Nation-state legiti- the recent past. This trend is unlikely to weakened without a common threat, macy and authority continue to erode in subside, and it will continue to slowly causing respective priorities and interests many regions with the populace identi- undermine state authority, have dispro- to diverge.6 fying more with their religion, ethnicity, portionate influence on state actions and Second, the potential for U.S. re- race, tribe, class, or other affiliations. policies, empower and facilitate groups trenchment and disengagement from These nonstate entities and their impact and movements, and allow technolo- many of its traditional roles in world af- on national security problems are gies and associated design concepts to fairs is increasing. Much of the American more evident in the morning headlines proliferate worldwide. More individuals public is frustrated by U.S. global obli- every day. As Moisés Naím has argued, and groups will be able to perceive their gations and foreign entanglements that obsessing primarily or exclusively about disadvantaged positions compared to have had questionable effects and return great power rivalries is a red herring others in the world. Access to other par- on investment. They see the “American that prevents a realistic view of nonstate ties with similar grievances will facilitate Dream” eroding and want their govern- entities that are dramatically reshaping movements, enable recruiting and radi- ment to focus more on improving their U.S. national as well as international calization, and support the coordination standards of living rather than engaging security interests.1 and execution of terrorist, insurgent, in dubious international endeavors.7 The second driving force is the ac- criminal, and other disruptive activities Third, various global institutions are celerating pace of, and easier access to, domestically and abroad.4 gradually eroding in influence.8 These in- technology mostly being driven by the One additional driver that will con- clude, but are not limited to, the United commercial sector. Fewer technology tinue to have a large impact on U.S. Nations, International Monetary Fund, developments are the exclusive domain national security and global security ob- World Trade Organization, and World of powerful nations and their militaries as jectives is the economic power shift from Bank. A more fragmented or regional occurred during the Cold War.2 Some of West to East. This “rise of the rest” has di- world order with reduced U.S. leadership the scientific areas being dominated by minished the previous dominance of both will make it particularly difficult to ade- nonmilitary research and development the United States and the West in terms of quately address critical global challenges. are additive manufacturing, including: economic, political, and security matters. Examples of these possible challenges Leading this economic shift from West to are nuclear proliferation, international 3D printing • East is China, whose emboldened leaders terrorism, large-scale issues related to robotics, autonomy, and artificial • are seeking what they believe to be their climate and environmental effects, global intelligence rightful place in the world order. No one financial instability, global economic stag- energy generation and storage • can be certain if Chinese aspirations to be- nation, potential worldwide pandemics, synthetic biology • come the new hegemon in East Asia, with global energy availability and associated biotechnology • a resulting power structure unfavorable price volatility, emerging problems in the nanotechnology • to the United States, will actually occur. global commons such as within each of information technology. • But few can argue that the relationship the cyber and space domains, and large- It is not farfetched to imagine open- between China and the United States is scale regional instabilities or conflicts. source design developments and adaptive fundamentally important to the inter- crowdsourcing by individuals and groups ests of both countries and could largely Four Crucial Threat Concerns that could allow nonstate entities to determine future security and stability The driving forces and trends delineated “out-innovate” states encumbered by in the Asia-Pacific region, the vitality of in the previous section could have sig- large bureaucracies. It does not take the economies for both nations, and the nificant impact on four crucial threat much imagination to conceive of cheap, credibility and influence of American and concerns for the U.S. military in the effective weapons—ranging from the Chinese power around the world.5 21st century. First, increasing global JFQ 83, 4th Quarter 2016 Benedict 7 Airman loads AGM-86B air-cruise launch trainer missile onto B-52H Stratofortress, February 26, 2014, at Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota (U.S. Air Force/Aaron D. Allmon II) disorder, instabilities, and insecurities by nonstate actors. It represents the dark was no longer viewed as credible, for could occur with much of the world side of globalization and can take many example, by perceived U.S. disengage- becoming more dangerous and chaotic.9 forms. Imagine individuals or groups ment from their regions. Increasing the This trend toward a more disorderly operating in garages or small shops number of nuclear nations in East Asia, world, should it happen, would be employing readily available gene-splicing the Middle East, or elsewhere would largely driven by the rise of malevolent equipment and genome sequences to correspondingly increase the potential nonstate actors, reduced authority and synthesize lethal biological agents based for nuclear accidents, crises, and conflicts legitimacy of nation-states in many on information found in the public in these areas. In addition, proliferation regions, and decreased ability to provide domain.12 Also, consider the possibility to nonstate actors could be caused by effective global governance. of nonstate actors relying on open- the nexus of nuclear proliferation among A second threat concern would be source designs and 3D printing to build nations and the increased access to the further rise of regional hegemons of insect-size