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Animal Consciousness Animal consciousness Pierre Le Neindre, Emilie Bernard, Alain Boissy, Xavier Boivin, Ludovic Calandreau, Nicolas Delon, Bertrand Deputte, Sonia Desmoulin-canselier, Muriel Dunier-Thomann, Nathan Faivre, et al. To cite this version: Pierre Le Neindre, Emilie Bernard, Alain Boissy, Xavier Boivin, Ludovic Calandreau, et al.. Animal consciousness. [Other] European Food Safety Authority. 2017, 165 p. hal-01594939 HAL Id: hal-01594939 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01594939 Submitted on 26 Sep 2017 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - ShareAlike| 4.0 International License EXTERNAL SCIENTIFIC REPORT APPROVED: 29 November 2016 doi:10.2903/sp.efsa.2017.EN-1196 Animal Consciousness Pierre Le Neindre (1), Emilie Bernard (2), Alain Boissy (3), Xavier Boivin (3), Ludovic Calandreau (4), Nicolas Delon (5), Bertrand Deputte (6), Sonia Desmoulin-Canselier (7), Muriel Dunier (8), Nathan Faivre (9), Martin Giurfa (10), Jean-Luc Guichet (11), Léa Lansade (4), Raphaël Larrère (12), Pierre Mormède (13), Patrick Prunet (14), Benoist Schaal (15), Jacques Servière (16), Claudia Terlouw (3) (1): INRA, 75338 Paris Cedex 07, France; (2): UMR Pegase, INRA, Agrocampus Ouest, 35590 Saint Gilles, France; (3): UMR 1213 Herbivores, INRA, Vetagro Sup, Centre Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes, 63122 Saint-Genès Champanelle, France; (4): UMR 85 Physiologie de la Reproduction et des Comportements INRA Val de Loire-CNRS-Université de Tours-IFCE, 37380 Nouzilly, France; (5): Environmental Studies and Animal Studies, New York University, USA; (6): Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire d'Alfort, 94704 Maisons Alfort Cedex, France; (7): UMR 6297 Droit et Changement Social, CNRS-Faculté de Droit et Sciences Politiques, , 44313 Nantes Cedex 3, France; (8): Délégation à l'Expertise scientifique collective, à la Prospective et aux Etudes (DEPE), INRA, 75338 Paris Cedex 07, France; 9): UMR 8174, Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, CNRS, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France; (10) UMR 5169, Centre de Recherches sur la Cognition Animale, CNRS-Université Paul Sabatier Toulouse III, 31062 Toulouse Cedex 9, France; (11): CAREF, Ecole Supérieure du Professorat et de l’Education de Beauvais, Université de Picardie Jules Verne, 60000, Beauvais, France; (12): INRA, UR RITME, 94205 Ivry-sur-Seine, France; (13): UMR 1388 INRA-INPT GenPhySE-Université de Toulouse-ENVT, 31320 Castanet Tolosan, France; (14): UR 1037 Laboratoire de Physiologie et génomique des Poissons, INRA, 35042 Rennes Cedex, France; (15): Centre des Sciences du Goût, CNRS-Université de Bourgogne-Franche-Comté-INRA, 21000 Dijon, France; (16): INRA-AgroParisTech, 75005 Paris, France Abstract After reviewing the literature on current knowledge about consciousness in humans, we present a state-of-the art discussion on consciousness and related key concepts in animals. Obviously much fewer publications are available on non-human species than on humans, most of them relating to laboratory or wild animal species, and only few to livestock species. Human consciousness is by definition subjective and private. Animal consciousness is usually assessed through behavioural performance. Behaviour involves a wide array of cognitive processes that have to be assessed separately using specific experimental protocols. Accordingly, several processes indicative of the presence of consciousness are discussed: perception and cognition, awareness of the bodily-self, self- related knowledge of the environment (including social environment). When available, specific examples are given in livestock species. Next, we review the existing evidence regarding neuronal correlates of consciousness, and emphasize the difficulty of linking aspects of consciousness to specific neural structures across the phyla because high-level cognitive abilities may have evolved independently along evolution. Several mammalian brain structures (cortex and midbrain) are involved in the manifestations of consciousness, while the equivalent functional structures for birds and fishes would likely be the pallium/tectum and midbrain. Caution is required before excluding consciousness in species not having the same brain structures as the mammalian ones as different neural architectures may mediate comparable processes. Finally, specific neurophysiological mechanisms appear to be strongly linked to the emergence of consciousness, namely neural synchrony and neural feedback. Considering the limited amount of data available and the few animal species studied so far, we conclude that different manifestations of consciousness can be observed in animals but that further refinement is still needed to characterize their level and content in each species. Further research is required to clarify these issues, especially in livestock species. © European Food Safety Authority, 2017 Key words: Animal, consciousness, awareness, behaviour, neurobiology, philosophy, adaptation Question number: EFSA-Q-2015-00390 Correspondence: [email protected], [email protected] www.efsa.europa.eu/publications EFSA Supporting publication 2017:EN-1196 Animal consciousness Disclaimer: The present document has been produced and adopted by the bodies identified above as author(s). This task has been carried out exclusively by the author(s) in the context of a contract between the European Food Safety Authority and the author(s), awarded following a tender procedure. The present document is published complying with the transparency principle to which the Authority is subject. It may not be considered as an output adopted by the Authority. The European Food Safety Authority reserves its rights, view and position as regards the issues addressed and the conclusions reached in the present document, without prejudice to the rights of the authors. Acknowledgements: Acknowledgement to the reviewers: Robert Dantzer, Professor Dept. of Symptom Research, Division of Internal Medicine, University of Texas, MD Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, USA; Linda Keeling, Professor in Animal Welfare, Dept. of Animal Environment and Health Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden; David Lindsay, Professor Emeritus, School of Animal Biology, University of Western Australia (M085), 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley, Australia; Virginie Michel, Unité Epidémiologie et Bien-Etre en Aviculture et Cuniculture, Agence nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire de l'alimentation, environnement et travail (ANSES), Ploufragan, France. Acknowledgement to: Kim Girard, assistant at DEPE INRA for diligent budget and administrative management; Sophie Le Perchec, INRA librarian, UAR 1266 DV/IST and DEPE, INRA, for librarian advices; Hanna and Antonio Damasio for their advices on November 13th, 2015 (meeting in Paris) Suggested citation: Le Neindre P, Bernard E, Boissy A, Boivin X, Calandreau L, Delon N, Deputte B, Desmoulin-Canselier S, Dunier M, Faivre N, Giurfa M, Guichet J-L, Lansade L, Larrère R, Mormède P, Prunet P, Schaal B, Servière J, Terlouw C, 2017. Animal consciousness. EFSA supporting publication 2017:EN-1196. 165 pp. doi:10.2903/sp.efsa.2017.EN-1196 ISSN: 2397-8325 © European Food Safety Authority, 2017 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. Reproduction of the images listed below is prohibited and permission must be sought directly from the copyright holder: Photograph on page 3 ©Fotolia www.efsa.europa.eu/publications 2 EFSA Supporting publication 2017:EN-1196 The present document has been produced and adopted by the bodies identified above as author(s). This task has been carried out exclusively by the author(s) in the context of a contract between the European Food Safety Authority and the author(s), awarded following a tender procedure. The present document is published complying with the transparency principle to which the Authority is subject. It may not be considered as an output adopted by the Authority. The European Food Safety Authority reserves its rights, view and position as regards the issues addressed and the conclusions reached in the present document, without prejudice to the rights of the author(s). Animal consciousness www.efsa.europa.eu/publications 3 EFSA Supporting publication 2017:EN-1196 The present document has been produced and adopted by the bodies identified above as author(s). This task has been carried out exclusively by the author(s) in the context of a contract between the European Food Safety Authority and the author(s), awarded following a tender procedure. The present document is published complying with the transparency principle to which the Authority is subject. It may not be considered as an output adopted by the Authority. The European Food Safety Authority reserves its rights, view and position as regards the issues addressed and the conclusions reached in the present document, without prejudice to the rights of the author(s). Animal consciousness Summary The current report is based on a corpus of publications partly retrieved from databases (WOS) after an extensive bibliographic search. It provides the
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