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Bees, Brains and Behaviour: a Philosophical Essay in Theoretical Biology

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Bees, Brains and Behaviour: a Philosophical Essay in Theoretical Biology Bees, Brains and Behaviour: A Philosophical Essay In Theoretical Biology Phiilip A Veldhuis A thesis submiaed to the Fucully of Graduate Studies in parLial Fulflment of the requirementsfor the dcgree of Miasters of Arts Department of Phcüoophy Unntetssiry of Manit00 Wh@%, Manitoba National Library Bibliothèque nationale u*u of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliogmphic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellingtûn Street 395, rue Weilington Ottawa ON KiA ON4 OnawaON K1AW canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of ttus thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/nlm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propnéte du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fkom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES ***** COPYRIGHT PERMISSION PAGE Bees, Bths and Bebaviow: A PMiosophicd Essay in Theoreoeil Biology PhUp A Veldhuis A Thtsio/Pncticum rubmitteà to the Ficulty of Graduate Studies of The University of Manitoba in partial MfWment of the requirements of the dcgm of Master of Arts Permission bu ben grrnted to the Libnry of Tk Univeriity of Manitoba to lend or aell copier of thb thcdilpncticum, to the National Lmriry of Canada to microfilm this thcris and to lend or cdl copies of the lilm, and to Disaertidons Abstractr International to pubürh an abstnct of this thaidpridcpm. The iuthor rtaervea othw puMication ri@@rad neither thia tbddpncticum nor estensive i Abstract: In the introduction to the second edition of Karl von Frisch's popular monograph [1950] on honeybee behaviour, Donald Griffin concludes: a reluctance to become embroiled in rnetaphysics should not anesthetize our perceptions. Heretical as it may seem to many behavioral scientists, I am willing to entertain the thought that perhaps the bees know what they are dohg [ûriffin 197 1, p. xiii]. In this thesis I will not be daunted by metaphysics. Rathei, I will attempt to establish whether honeybee behaviour is best described by Griffin's cognitive theory, and whether this implies that it is reesonable to think 'Wie bees know what they are doing". Griffin has argued extensively that it is possible to leam whether non-human anirnals think consciously. He has founded and defended the recent and controversial scientific discipline of cognitive ethology, which attempts to make a scientific "analysis of the cognitive processes of non-human animals7' [Griffin 1992, p. vii]. Cognitive Ethology seeks to combine and apply theory and method from biology, neuro- physiology, and cognitive psychology to animal ethology. My analysis of bee behaviour will be made within the fiamework of cognitive ethology. I will conclude that the dance Ianguage of the honeybees is intentional. 1 reject Griffui's strategy of conflating cognition wit h consciousness and sel f-consciousness. Therefore, aithough I think the best explanation of honeybee behaviour is a cognitive explanation, I do not conclude that honeybees are conscious or self-conscious. Introduction Introductory Remarks in the introduction to the second edition of Karl von Frisch's popular monograph [1950] on honeybee behaviour, Donald Gnfin concludes: a reluctance to become embroiled in metaphysics should not anesthetue ouperceptions. Heretical as it may seem to many behanoral scientists, 1 am willing to entertain the thought that perhaps the bees know what they are doing [Grifin 197 1, p. xiü]. In this thesis I will not be daunted by metaphysics. Rather, this thesis will be an attempt to establish whaher honeybee behaviour is best described by Grifin's cognitive theory, and whether this implies that it is reasonable to think 'Yhe bees how what they are doing". affin, best known for his discovery that bats navigate by echolocation (sonar), has argued extensively for the view that it is possible to lem whether non-human animals think consciously. He has founded and defended the recent and controversial scientific discipline of cognitive ethology, which attempts to make a scientific "analysis of the cognitive processes of non-human animalsy' [Gritnn 1992, p. vii]. My adysis of bee behaviour will be made within the framework of cognitive ethology. Cognitive ethology saks to combine and apply theory and method Rom biology, muro-physiology, and cognitive psychology to animal ethology. As part of my evaluation of the claim that honeybees 'bow what they are dohg'l, 1 dlargue thet there are some serious dificulties in any attempt to make a systematic study of animal psychology, but that the obstacles are sufmountable if confionteci. However, there will be a methodologicaî and philosophical cost for this success. 1 wiil conclude that a philosophical study of the minds of humans and animals is best conducteci within the framework of evolutioaary theory of Darwin, and not the dominant philosophical framework provided by Descartes. 1 will argue that the various considerations taken by Griffin and his colleagues to support the view that animais have important cognitive experiences codict and so seriously undetmine the prospects for cognitive ethology. Tbuis Structure In making a case for cognitive ethology, Griffin takes on two largely sepmte tasks. Firstly, he must reject the idea that non-human animals differ in kind and not just in degree fkom humans; 1 cal1 this idea the apartness thesis and consider the case against it in chapter one. Secondly, a positive case is required which makes arguments for the primafacie plausibility of cognitive ethology. One main problem is that this second task is actually made more dificult once the apartness thesis is rejected. 1 consider the general case for the plausibility of cognitive ethology in chapter two. In chapter three 1 consider the case of honeybee behaviour within the program of cognitive ethology as developed in the first two chapters. I wish to acknowledge the unwavering support ofmy de,Vona, my parents and family, and fnends Pierre LeMorvan and Dennis Foerster. 1 also want to express my gratitude to Jack Bailey and Martin Gerwin for their support of my academic endeavours. I wish to dedicate this effort to my Grandmother, Ruth Vane, whose started me on my beekeeping career, and whose knowledge and curiosity inspire us dl. Contents . uitroductory Remarks ........................................................................................ ...11 Thesis Structure .................................................................................................. 111 Ac know ledgements ............................................................................................ iv Chapter Onewwmm~ommm~~~w~~~~~~~~~~m~~wwww~~mmwwmmwmwwwwwoow~~~~~wwwm~~~~~~mm~mw~m~~~~wwwwawwwwwwwwwwwwowwmwswwwwowwwl Rejecting The Apartness Thesis ........................................................................... 1 Introduction to the Apariness Thesis .................................................................... I History of the Apariness Thesis ....................................................................... 2 Descartes Versus Animal Cognitivism ........................................................... 3 Afker Descartes ................................................................................................ -6 Darwin and Animal Cognitiwsm ......................................................................... -7 Behaviourism. and the Apartness Thesis ......................................................... 8 Rejecting the Apartness Thesis ....................................................................... 8 Discussion of Particular Versions of the Apartness Thesis ................................... 8 Animai Language.......................................................................................... 8 Higher Order Cognition ................................................................................. 8 Reasun ....................................................................................................*...... 8 Abstraction .................................................................................................... 8 Adaptability and Flexibility as Marks of Intelligence ..................................... 8 Learning ........................................................................................................ 8 Tool Use ........................................................................................................ 8 Consciousness ................ .. .............................................................................. 8 Conclusion to Chapter One ................................................................................ 8 Chapter TWOwowomwwwwwmwwwwwmwmwmmwwwwwmwwwwwwwwwwmsowmwmwwwwwwwwowwwww.wwwwwwwwwwwwwwwmwwmmmwwwwwoowwwmwwmwwwwoww~w0 A Brief History of Cognitive Psychology .......................................................... 8 Methodological Behaviourisrn ............................................................................ 8 The Problem
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