The Cognitive Animal Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition
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Animal Welfare and the Paradox of Animal Consciousness
ARTICLE IN PRESS Animal Welfare and the Paradox of Animal Consciousness Marian Dawkins1 Department of Zoology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK 1Corresponding author: e-mail address: [email protected] Contents 1. Introduction 1 2. Animal Consciousness: The Heart of the Paradox 2 2.1 Behaviorism Applies to Other People Too 5 3. Human Emotions and Animals Emotions 7 3.1 Physiological Indicators of Emotion 7 3.2 Behavioral Components of Emotion 8 3.2.1 Vacuum Behavior 10 3.2.2 Rebound 10 3.2.3 “Abnormal” Behavior 10 3.2.4 The Animal’s Point of View 11 3.2.5 Cognitive Bias 15 3.2.6 Expressions of the Emotions 15 3.3 The Third Component of Emotion: Consciousness 16 4. Definitions of Animal Welfare 24 5. Conclusions 26 References 27 1. INTRODUCTION Consciousness has always been both central to and a stumbling block for animal welfare. On the one hand, the belief that nonhuman animals suffer and feel pain is what draws many people to want to study animal welfare in the first place. Animal welfare is seen as fundamentally different from plant “welfare” or the welfare of works of art precisely because of the widely held belief that animals have feelings and experience emotions in ways that plants or inanimate objectsdhowever valuableddo not (Midgley, 1983; Regan, 1984; Rollin, 1989; Singer, 1975). On the other hand, consciousness is also the most elusive and difficult to study of any biological phenomenon (Blackmore, 2012; Koch, 2004). Even with our own human consciousness, we are still baffled as to how Advances in the Study of Behavior, Volume 47 ISSN 0065-3454 © 2014 Elsevier Inc. -
The Neurobehavioral Nature of Fishes and the Question of Awareness and Pain
Reprinted with permission from CRC Press. 2000 NW Corporate Blvd. Boca Raton, FL 33431, USA Tel: 1(800)272-7737 http://www.crcpress.com 2.1. Reviews in Fisheries Science, 10(1): 1–38 (2002) The Neurobehavioral Nature of Fishes and the Question of Awareness and Pain James D. Rose Department of Zoology and Physiology, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071 * Send correspondence to: Dr. James D. Rose, Department of Zoology and Physiology, University of Wyoming, Laramie, WY 82071. e-mail: [email protected] 1064-1262 /02/$.50 ©2002 by CRC Press LLC ABSTRACT: This review examines the neurobehavioral nature of fishes and addresses the question of whether fishes are capable of experiencing pain and suffering. The detrimental effects of anthropomorphic thinking and the importance of an evolutionary perspective for understanding the neurobehavioral differences between fishes and humans are discussed. The differences in central nervous system structure that underlie basic neurobehavioral differences between fishes and humans are described. The literature on the neural basis of consciousness and of pain is reviewed, showing that: (1) behavioral responses to noxious stimuli are separate from the psychological experience of pain, (2) awareness of pain in humans depends on functions of specific regions of cerebral cortex, and (3) fishes lack these essential brain regions or any functional equivalent, making it untenable that they can experience pain. Because the experience of fear, similar to pain, depends on cerebral cortical structures that are absent from fish brains, it is concluded that awareness of fear is impossible for fishes. Although it is implausible that fishes can experience pain or emotions, they display robust, nonconscious, neuroendocrine, and physiological stress responses to noxious stimuli. -
Mental States in Animals: Cognitive Ethology Jacques Vauclair
Mental states in animals: cognitive ethology Jacques Vauclair This artHe addresses the quegtion of mentaJ states in animak as viewed in ‘cognitive ethology”. In effect, thk field of research aims at studying naturally occurring behaviours such as food caching, individual recognition, imitation, tool use and communication in wild animals, in order to seek for evidence of mental experiences, self-aw&&reness and intentional@. Cognitive ethologists use some philosophical cencepts (e.g., the ‘intentional stance’) to carry out their programme of the investigation of natural behaviours. A comparison between cognitive ethology and other approaches to the investigation of cognitive processes in animals (e.g., experimental animal psychology) helps to point out the strengths and weaknesses of cognitive ethology. Moreover, laboratory attempts to analyse experimentally Mentional behaviours such as deception, the relationship between seeing and knowing, as well as the ability of animals to monitor their own states of knowing, suggest that cognitive ethology could benefit significantly from the conceptual frameworks and methods of animal cognitive psychology. Both disciplines could, in fact, co&ribute to the understanding of which cognitive abilities are evolutionary adaptations. T he term ‘cognirive ethology’ (CE) was comed by that it advances a purposive or Intentional interpretation Griffin in The Question ofAnimd Au~aarmess’ and later de- for activities which are a mixture of some fixed genetically veloped in other publications’ ‘_ Although Griffin‘s IS’6 transmitred elements with more hexible behaviour?. book was first a strong (and certainly salutary) reacrion (Cognitive ethologists USC conceptual frameworks against the inhibitions imposed by strict behaviourism in provided by philosophers (such as rhe ‘intentional stance’)“. -
Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: the "Panglossian Paradigm" Defended
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1983) 6, 343-390 Printed in the United States of America Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The "Panglossian paradigm" defended Daniel C. Dennett Department of Philosophy, Tufts University, Medford, Mass. 02155 Abstract: Ethologists and others studying animal behavior in a "cognitive" spirit are in need of a descriptive language and method that are neither anachronistically bound by behaviorist scruples nor prematurely committed to particular "information-processing models. "Just such an interim descriptive method can be found in intentional system theory. The use of intentional system theory is illustrated with the case of the apparently communicative behavior of vervet monkeys. A way of using the theory to generate data - including usable, testable "anecdotal" data - is sketched. The underlying assumptions of this approach can be seen to ally it directly with "adaptationist' theorizing in evolutionary biology, which has recently come under attack from Stephen Gould and Richard Lewontin, who castigate it as the "Panglossian paradigm." Their arguments, which are strongly analogous to B. F. Skinner's arguments against "mentalism," point to certain pitfalls that attend the careless exercise of such "Panglossian" thinking (and rival varieties of thinking as well), but do not constitute a fundamental objection to either adaptationist theorizing or its cousin, intentional system theory. Keywords: adaptation; animal cognition; behaviorism; cognitive ethology; communication; comparative psychology; consciousness; -
Donald Griffin Was Able to Affect a Major Revolution in What Scien- Tists Do and Think About the Cognition of Nonhuman Ani- Mals
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES DONALD R. GRIFFIN 1915– 2003 A Biographical Memoir by CHARLES G. GROSS Any opinions expressed in this memoir are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Academy of Sciences. Biographical Memoirs, VOLUME 86 PUBLISHED 2005 BY THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS WASHINGTON, D.C. DONALD R. GRIFFIN August 3, 1915–November 7, 2003 BY CHARLES G. GROSS OST SCIENTISTS SEEK—but never attain—two goals. The M first is to discover something so new as to have been previously inconceivable. The second is to radically change the way the natural world is viewed. Don Griffin did both. He discovered (with Robert Galambos) a new and unique sensory world, echolocation, in which bats can perceive their surroundings by listening to echoes of ultrasonic sounds that they produce. In addition, he brought the study of animal consciousness back from the limbo of forbidden topics to make it a central subject in the contemporary study of brain and behavior. EARLY YEARS Donald R. (Redfield) Griffin was born in Southampton, New York, but spent his early childhood in an eighteenth- century farmhouse in a rural area near Scarsdale, New York. His father, Henry Farrand Griffin, was a serious amateur historian and novelist, who worked as a reporter and in advertising before retiring early to pursue his literary inter- ests. His mother, Mary Whitney Redfield, read to him so much that his father feared for his ability to learn to read. His favorite books were Ernest Thompson Seton’s animal 3 4 BIOGRAPHICAL MEMOIRS stories and the National Geographic Magazine’s Mammals of North America. -
Bees, Brains and Behaviour: a Philosophical Essay in Theoretical Biology
Bees, Brains and Behaviour: A Philosophical Essay In Theoretical Biology Phiilip A Veldhuis A thesis submiaed to the Fucully of Graduate Studies in parLial Fulflment of the requirementsfor the dcgree of Miasters of Arts Department of Phcüoophy Unntetssiry of Manit00 Wh@%, Manitoba National Library Bibliothèque nationale u*u of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliogmphic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellingtûn Street 395, rue Weilington Ottawa ON KiA ON4 OnawaON K1AW canada Canada The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of ttus thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/nlm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propnéte du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fkom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES ***** COPYRIGHT PERMISSION PAGE Bees, Bths and Bebaviow: A PMiosophicd Essay in Theoreoeil Biology PhUp A Veldhuis A Thtsio/Pncticum rubmitteà to the Ficulty of Graduate Studies of The University of Manitoba in partial MfWment of the requirements of the dcgm of Master of Arts Permission bu ben grrnted to the Libnry of Tk Univeriity of Manitoba to lend or aell copier of thb thcdilpncticum, to the National Lmriry of Canada to microfilm this thcris and to lend or cdl copies of the lilm, and to Disaertidons Abstractr International to pubürh an abstnct of this thaidpridcpm. -
"DO DOGS APE?" OR "DO APES DOG?" and DOES Rr MATTER? BROADENING and DEEPENING COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY
"DO DOGS APE?" OR "DO APES DOG?" AND DOES rr MATTER? BROADENING AND DEEPENING COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY By MA~c BEKOFF4' "Certainlyit seems like a dirty double-cross to enter into a relationshipof trust and affection with any creaturethat can enter into such a relationship, and then to be a party to'its premeditated and premature destruction."1 I. RAiN WrrHouT TmmDER, ANimAS Wrrour MINDS In Rain Without Thunder, Gary Francione raises numerous impor- tant issues and takes on many important people.2 The phrase "rain with- out thunder" made me think about the notion of animals without minds- animals without thoughts or feelings. This idea is troublesome for the nonhuman animals (hereafter animals) to whom it is attributed because it is much easier for humans to exploit animals when we believe that they don't have thoughts or feelings. I have been privileged to study various aspects of animal behavior for over 25 years, including animal cognition3 (cognitive ethology), and have attempted to learn more about how the study of animal cognition can aid discussions of animal protection. 4 As a * Professor of Biology, University of Colorado, Boulder;, A.B. and PILD., Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri; Guggenheim Fellow and Fellow of the Animal Behavior Soci- ety; Correspondence: Marc Bekoff, 296 Canyonside Drive, Boulder, Colorado 80302; Emaih [email protected] 1 LAWRENCE E. JoHNsoN, A MORALLY DEEP WoRLD: AN E.sxe*ON MORAL SIGNIFICANCE AND ENvmonwNAL ETmcs 122 (1991). 2 GARY L. FPNtcioNE, RAiN WmoUr TnuDER TIE IDEOLOGY OF mm.EAn,,AL RPiurrs MovmiErr (1996). 3 INTERPRrrATION AND EXPLANATION IN T-E STUDY OF Amm- Bcsxion (Marc Bekoff & Dale Jamieson eds., 1990); READINGS 1N AmAL COGNMON (Marc Bekoff & Dale Jamieson eds., 1996); Marc Bekoff & Colin Allen, Cognitive Ethology: Slayers, Skeptics, and Propo- nents, in ANmRoPoiORPmS.e ANscDoTE, ANzmms: TuE EMpERiO's NEW CLOTnts? 313 (Rob- ert W. -
The Dancing Bees: Karl Von Frisch, the Honeybee Dance Language
The Dancing Bees: Karl von Frisch, the Honeybee Dance Language, and the Sciences of Communication By Tania Munz, Research Fellow MPIWG, [email protected] In January of 1946, while much of Europe lay buried under the rubble of World War Two, the bee researcher Karl von Frisch penned a breathless letter from his country home in lower Austria. He reported to a fellow animal behaviorist his “sensational findings about the language of the bees.”1 Over the previous summer, he had discovered that the bees communicate to their hive mates the distance and direction of food sources by means of the “dances” they run upon returning from foraging flights. The straight part of the figure-eight-shaped waggle dance makes the same angle with the vertical axis of the hive as the bee’s flight line from the hive made with the sun during her outgoing flight. Moreover, he found that the frequency of individual turns correlated closely with the distance of the food; the closer the supply, the more rapidly the bee dances. Von Frisch’s assessment in the letter to his colleague would prove correct – news of the discovery was received as a sensation and quickly spread throughout Europe and abroad. In 1973, von Frisch was awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine together with the fellow animal behaviorists Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen. The Prize bestowed public recognition that non-human animals possess a symbolic means of communication. Dancing Bees is a dual intellectual biography – about the life and work of the experimental physiologist Karl von Frisch on the one hand and the honeybees as cultural, experimental, and especially communicating animals on the other. -
Cognitive Ethology Ádám Miklósi Dept
Introduction to Cognitive ethology Ádám Miklósi Dept. of Ethology Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest [email protected] 2018 Literature This lecture series is based on Shettleworth, S. J. 2010 Cognition, evolution and behaviour (2nd edition) Oxford University Press Pages where you find background information to these topics: •CH 1, 2: 1-53 Introduction •CH 4: 96-119 Learning •CH 8: 261-283; 296-310 Spatial Cognition •CH 12: 417-455 Social cognition •CH 13: 466-497 Social learning •CH 14: 508-546 Communication You DON NOT have to know/learn all of this, check by means of the ppt files which parts of the chapters are relevant Ethology is the biological study of animal and human behaviour in the natural environment (Tinbergen 1953) Why do we study animals? 1. Understanding the biology of animal behaviour (evolution, genetics, physiology, cognition) 2. Understanding human behaviour 3. Practical reasons (welfare, agriculture) Ethological research has significant effect on people’s perceptions of animals Movies, television, shows, books, magazines Concept 1: Darwinian Evolution Natural selection: Change in the characteristics of organisms over time („continuity”) 1. Large reproductive potential in populations 2. Fixed amount of resources 3. Individuals compete for resources (fitness = offspring) 4. There is an individual variation 5. Individual traits can be inherited (Darwin: Origin of the species) Levels (unit) of selection: gene, individual, kin Concept 1: Darwinian Evolution Sources of variation: Mutation and recombination Adaptation: Is it a circular argument? Just so stories? Can we detect and measure adaptation? Distinguishing „adaptation” from „adaptive” Gould and Vrba (1982): Adaptation: specific evolutionary change as a response to a specific environmental parameter Exaptation: earlier adaptation new function non-adaptation („by product”) new function Adaptation has a function Exaptation has an effect E.g. -
Aquatic Animals, Cognitive Ethology, and Ethics: Questions About Sentience and Other Troubling Issues That Lurk in Turbid Water
DISEASES OF AQUATIC ORGANISMS Vol. 75: 87–98, 2007 Published May 4 Dis Aquat Org OPEN ACCESS Aquatic animals, cognitive ethology, and ethics: questions about sentience and other troubling issues that lurk in turbid water Marc Bekoff* Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309-0334, USA ABSTRACT: In this general, strongly pro-animal, and somewhat utopian and personal essay, I argue that we owe aquatic animals respect and moral consideration just as we owe respect and moral con- sideration to all other animal beings, regardless of the taxonomic group to which they belong. In many ways it is more difficult to convince some people of our ethical obligations to numerous aquatic animals because we do not identify or empathize with them as we do with animals with whom we are more familiar or to whom we are more closely related, including those species (usually terrestrial) to whom we refer as charismatic megafauna. Many of my examples come from animals that are more well studied but they can be used as models for aquatic animals. I follow Darwinian notions of evolu- tionary continuity to argue that if we feel pain, then so too do many other animals, including those that live in aquatic environs. Recent scientific data (‘science sense’) show clearly that many aquatic organisms, much to some people’s surprise, likely suffer at our hands and feel their own sorts of pain. Throughout I discuss how cognitive ethology (the study of animal minds) is the unifying science for understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals because it is essential to know what animals do, think, and feel as they go about their daily routines. -
Animal Umwelten in a Changing World
Tartu Semiotics Library 18 Tartu Tartu Semiotics Library 18 Animal umwelten in a changing world: Zoosemiotic perspectives represents a clear and concise review of zoosemiotics, present- ing theories, models and methods, and providing interesting examples of human–animal interactions. The reader is invited to explore the umwelten of animals in a successful attempt to retrieve the relationship of people with animals: a cornerstone of the past common evolutionary processes. The twelve chapters, which cover recent developments in zoosemiotics and much more, inspire the reader to think about the human condition and about ways to recover our lost contact with the animal world. Written in a clear, concise style, this collection of articles creates a wonderful bridge between Timo Maran, Morten Tønnessen, human and animal worlds. It represents a holistic approach Kristin Armstrong Oma, rich with suggestions for how to educate people to face the dynamic relationships with nature within the conceptual Laura Kiiroja, Riin Magnus, framework of the umwelt, providing stimulus and opportuni- Nelly Mäekivi, Silver Rattasepp, ties to develop new studies in zoosemiotics. Professor Almo Farina, CHANGING WORLD A IN UMWELTEN ANIMAL Paul Thibault, Kadri Tüür University of Urbino “Carlo Bo” This important book offers the first coherent gathering of perspectives on the way animals are communicating with each ANIMAL UMWELTEN other and with us as environmental change requires increasing adaptation. Produced by a young generation of zoosemiotics scholars engaged in international research programs at Tartu, IN A CHANGING this work introduces an exciting research field linking the biological sciences with the humanities. Its key premises are that all animals participate in a dynamic web of meanings WORLD: and signs in their own distinctive styles, and all animal spe- cies have distinctive cultures. -
Anthrozoology
28 ANTHROZOOLOGY theory, has come a renewed acceptance of anthropomorphism. prehistory to the present, including archaeozoology, anthro Ethologists have been joined by psychologists and philosophers pology and sociology; (ii) the effects of associations with in research into the minds of animals. This multidisciplinary animal companions on the development of personality, field of research, known as cognitive ethology, has resulted attitudes and other traits in humans, encompassing psychology in a multitude of investigations into consciousness, cogni and psychiatry; (iii) the therapeutic effects of companion tion, self-awareness and intelligence, as well as on whether animals; and (iv) the ethology of human—animal interactions. animals feel pain, anger, fear, love and have a theory of mind. A further two decades on, knowledge has increased in all of With the expanding research into animal minds has come these areas, and there have also been attempts to forge links the general realization that anthropomorphism does not between them to develop underlying theories of the human— disrupt scientific observation but supports the continuity animal ‘bond’, which will be covered in the latter part of this between humans and animals. A strong supporter of this view entry. is Frans de Waal who, in writing about attitudes to anthro— The roles of animals in human cultures have often been pomorphism, cites the example of his chimpanzee, Georgia, studied from an anthropocentric viewpoint and so fall who regularly ‘plays a trick’ on visitors by taking a drink of outside the scope of this volume. Archaeozoology has made a water and then spraying them with it from her cheek pouches valuable contribution towards our understanding of the (Waal, 2001).