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1 the UNIVERSITY of HULL the Medvedev Years THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL The Medvedev Years: An Examination of the External Forces & Internal Dynamics Affecting the Kremlin's Foreign Policy Decisions being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of PhD of International Relations in the University of Hull by Julian Mark Reder, Master of International Relations, Bond University June 2013 1 Abstract: The Medvedev Years: An Examination of the External Forces & Internal Dynamics Affecting the Kremlin's Foreign Policy Decisions The central question of this thesis is what forces and personal dynamics ultimately shape the Kremlin’s responses to foreign policy issues. The legacies of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin are traced from the Soviet democratization during the 1980’s and the constitutional empowerment of the Russian presidency during the 1990’s. These two coexistent forces of empowering the average citizen in a country in which the President is the most powerful authority in decision-making are examined. The forces of the Kremlin affect the current inner circle of Siloviki, Technocrats, and Yeltsin Liberals who are integral members of the policy formulation. Vladimir Putin and his handpicked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, were now at the helm of a government with these three groups of bureaucrats from 2008 to 2012. The Medvedev presidency was confronted with challenges in the post-Soviet space, which included Georgian military operations against Russia and an anti-Russian leader in Kyrgyzstan. In addition to this, the Kremlin was faced with the decisions to enforce sanctions against rogue regimes pursuing nuclear capability, specifically Iran and North Korea. The Arab Spring of 2011 brought with it momentous change in the Middle East and the Russian Federation was forced to decide whether to consent to sanctions against the Khadafy regime in Libya and the Assad regime in Syria. The six foreign policy decisions in this thesis illuminate the Kremlin’s internal dynamics as well as the handling of the external political forces enacted by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Graham Allison’s Governmental Politics Model, which analyzes foreign policy from a personal perspective of the chief decision-makers, is used throughout this body of doctoral research. 2 Acknowledgments: I am personally indebted to many people for this achievement in my life. My PhD would not have been possible without the support of my parents, Zinaida and Igor, as well as my younger sister, Michelle. I am convinced that I was only able to achieve this because I stood on the shoulders of my family. I would like to thank my grandfather, Abram Davidovich, for his many contributions to my life that made this possible. It was his life – the Soviet Union, World War 2, and coming to the United States that had the greatest impact on the course of my life and academic interests. It was a poignant moment when I was able to tell him about my meeting with Dr. Sergei Khrushchev. The grandson was now researching the Kremlin that shaped the lives of his forebears. I only hope I have done a small part in honouring my grandparents and great-grandparents who were citizens of the Soviet Union. I was incredibly fortunate to have had my supervisor, Professor Caroline Kennedy, guide me through this rigorous process. I have benefitted immensely from her patience, advice, and kindness. She has been an amazing mentor without whom this doctoral dissertation would not have been possible. Thank you, Professor Kennedy. I want to thank the University of Hull’s Politics & International Studies Department for the opportunity to conduct my research. My time in the United Kingdom was truly memorable thanks to the wonderful department that gave me the forum to research the Russian Federation and the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev. I am grateful to all the scholars whom I interviewed at the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, Brown University Watson Institute of International Studies, Columbia University School of Public & International Affairs, New York University Centre for Global Studies, New School University, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, and American Enterprise Institute. Their scholarly insights will always be appreciated. Lastly, I have dedicated my doctoral dissertation to the memory of my grandmother, Yelizaveta Davidovich, who has been sorely missed for the past fifteen years. It was her influence during my childhood that has remained with me during the many years since her passing. Today is a bittersweet moment as I reflect on how much I have progressed in the last fifteen years and only wish she were alive to witness this accomplishment in my life. 3 Table of Contents: Title Page: Page 1 Abstract: Page 2 Acknowledgements: Page 3 Table of Contents: Page 4 Introduction: The Medvedev Years, Page 5 Chapter 1: The Transformational Themes of the Kremlin & a Theoretical Framework, Page 29 Chapter 2: Russia’s War, Page 86 Chapter 3: Russia’s Response to East Asia’s Rogue Regime, Page 125 Chapter 4: A Confluence of Two Inconsequential Foreign Policy Issues and One Important Foreign Policy Event, Page 162 Chapter 5: Russia’s Response to the Iranian Nuclear Threat, Page 199 Chapter 6: The Decision to Support Sanctions against the Khadafy Regime, Page 237 Chapter 7: The Refusal to Consent to Sanctions against the Assad Regime, Page 276 Conclusion, Page 315 Bibliography, Page 341 4 The Medvedev Years: An Examination of the External Forces & Internal Dynamics Affecting the Kremlin's Foreign Policy Decisions. Introduction: The Russian Federation has consolidated its political and foreign policy stances, strengths, and interests and has moulded its role in international affairs by virtue of the cataclysmic events, which occurred during its early years. Russian foreign policy has been seen by scholars through the prism of Soviet era-Cold War analysis, notwithstanding the structural transformations of the world stage and political evolution within the Russian Federation. Kremlinology is a vastly different era of study compared with Sovietology because of many factors, but few discern the difference and some assume Russian foreign policy is a mirror image of its predecessor.1 The goal of this body of research is to illuminate the integral processes and evolutionary catalysts that can be attributed to Russia’s distinct choices while navigating on the world stage. The author argues that Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev’s foreign policy must be distinguished from its immediate predecessor, that of Boris Yeltsin. A much more vigorous, cohesive, and calculated foreign policy can be attributed to the current vision and pragmatism of Russia’s leaders. However, broadly speaking scholarly research of the Russian Federation does not link the current successes or failures of Russia’s foreign policy to the important events that are associated with its inception. Dr. Nina Khrushcheva, a public intellectual and relative of Nikita Khrushchev, notes that ‘Gorbachev’s legacy was not important during the Medvedev presidency.’2 This research uses foreign policy analysis to understand the mechanisms and procedures of policy formulation in order to enhance the current understanding of Russia’s role in world affairs. 1 G. Arbatov, ‘Sovietology and Kremlinology?’, International Institute for Strategic Studies [online journal], 12:6, 208-209, < http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00396337008441111>, accessed 1 June 2012. 2 N. Khrushcheva, ‘The Russian Public & The Medvedev Presidency’ [interviewed by Julian Reder], 23 January 2013, New School University, New York, New York 5 The fundamental issue arising within Russian political circles is what the new status on the world stage is. The impulses, synergies, and ideologies of those within the decision- making apparatus in the Kremlin warranted investigation. In theoretical terms, Soviet foreign policy has always been an important and commonly studied area of research, but the analysis of the mechanics of its decision-making has yet to take account of the effects of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin’s respective tenures within the realm of foreign policy-making in the Russian Federation. The crux of this research therefore delves into Russian decision-making by analyzing the Russian Federation’s behaviour in security, war, and diplomacy during the tenure of President Dmitry Medvedev from 2008 to 2012. The events of the early 1990’s serve as a guide to understanding the transformational effects on the foreign policy apparatus inherited by Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. This research expounds on the lasting legacies of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin in terms of their respective impacts on the mechanisms and processes responsible for formulating the Kremlin’s role in world affairs two decades after. Conceptual Framework: There are several issues that are addressed in relation to foreign policy decisions made during the tenure of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev in the Kremlin’s upper echelon. The first research question is what effect Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms had on current foreign policy formulation. The extent of Glasnost and Soviet democratization’s reconfiguration in the foreign policy formulation in today’s Russia is therefore a focal point of investigation. The aftermath and lasting legacy of the 1991 coup against Gorbachev is of central importance. The thesis takes into account the legacy of Gorbachev’s reforms, which can summarily be described as empowering the average citizen in relation to the 6 government.3 The ‘Yeltsonian’ theme acknowledges and traces the legacy of the attempted coup against Boris Yeltsin and his transformational legacy on the powers and apparatus of the Russian presidency. The primary analysis involves the 1993 constitutional crisis in which Boris Yeltsin emerged victorious, and investigates how this event transformed the presidential system and apparatus with regards to foreign policy decisions in today’s Russia under the helm of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. The attempted coup turned into a victory for the Russian President against the Russian legislative body and a powerful presidency was created during the early 1990’s.
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