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Russia's Domestic Security Wars

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APPENDIX: NOTES ON KEY PLAYERS Sechin’s Silovik Grouping Main Players Igor Sechin: Deputy-head of the Presidential Administration (1999–2008), chair of the Board of Directors of Rosneft (2004–2010), deputy prime minister for industry (2008–2012), CEO of Rosneft and CEO of presidential commission on strategy for energy and ecological security (both since 2012). Vladimir Ustinov: Procurator-general (2000–2006), minister of justice (2006–2010), made presidential commissioner in the southern federal okrug in 2010. Nikolai Patrushev: Chairman of the FSS (1999–2008), made secretary of the Security Council in 2008. Viktor Ivanov: Deputy-head of the Presidential Administration and assistant to the President for personnel (2000–2008), head of the state drug-control agency—SCCN (since 2008). Aleksandr Bastrykin: Chairman of the Investigations Committee of the Procuracy (2007–2010), then of the renamed Investigations Committee of Russia (since 2010). © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018 113 P. Reddaway, Russia’s Domestic Security Wars, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77392-6 114 APPENDIX: NOTES ON KEY PLAYERS Sympathizers Sergei Naryshkin: Head of the government administration (2004–2008), deputy prime minister (2007–2008), head of the Presidential Administration (2008–2011), made Speaker of the Duma in 2011. Mikhail Fradkov: Head of the Federal Tax Police (2001–2004), prime minister (2004–2007), made head of the foreign intelligence or SVR in 2007. Viktor Zubkov: Head of Federal Financial Monitoring Service (2004–2007), Prime Minister (2007–2008), made Chair of Board of Directors of Gazprom in 2008. The Cherkesov–Zolotov Silovik Grouping Main Players Viktor Cherkesov: Presidential commissioner of north-western federal okrug (2000–2003), head of the state drug-control agency—SCCN (2003–2008), head of Federal Agency for the Procurement of Arms, Military and Special Technology, and Material Equipment until dis- missed (2008–2010), Communist Party deputy in the Duma (since 2011). Viktor Zolotov: Businessman, partner of Tsepov until his murder in 2004, head of Presidential Security Service (2000–2013), then deputy head of the MVD Internal Troops. Roman Tsepov: Captain in MVD Internal Troops until 1991, CEO of the Baltik-Eskort security agency in St Petersburg and fxer for Putin, until his murder (1992–2004). Vladimir Kumarin: Organized crime fgure, shadow majority owner of Petersburg Fuel Co. since 1994, arrested in 2007, sentenced to 14-year jail term in 2009, and to a 15-year term in 2012. Andrei Novikov: Career MVD offcer, demoted in 2006 from MVD dep- uty minister to head of the CIS’s Anti-Terrorism Center in Minsk. Sympathizers Yevgeny Murov: Made head of the Federal Protection Service in 2000. APPENDIX: NOTES ON KEY PLAYERS 115 Oleg Deripaska: Aluminum and automobile tycoon close to the Kremlin since 1990s. Yuri Chaika: Minister of Justice (1999–2006), procurator-general (since 2006). Figures with Greater or Lesser Elements of Autonomy Roman Abramovich: Tycoon close to the Yeltsin family, reportedly a business partner of Putin, putative coordinator of a secretive, wealthy grouping opposed to hardliners. Sergei Ivanov: Minister of defense (2001–2007), frst deputy prime min- ister (2005–2008), deputy prime minister (2008–2011), head of the Presidential Administration (since 2011). Dmitri Medvedev: Chair of Gazprom board (2000–2003), head of Presidential Administration (2003–2005), frst deputy prime minister (2005–2008), president (2008–2012), prime minister (since 2012). Aleksei Kudrin: Minister of fnance, then also deputy prime minister, until dismissed for insubordination (2000–2011); head of the independent Committee on Civic Initiatives (since 2011). GLOSSARY AFSS (UFSB in Russian): Administration of the Federal Security Service CFER: Committee on Foreign Economic Relations Clan: a group of powerful or infuential people who support a single political leader (or a duo) Clientelism: a form of political system dominated by individuals, not parties or ideologies. The most powerful individuals attract numer- ous ‘clients’, who believe that these individuals will best promote their material and political interests DACOC: District Administration for Combating Organized Crime (RUBOP in Russian) The Duma: the Russian parliament of elected representatives; in recent years virtually all its members have come from Putin-approved parties; so it almost invariably votes for his policies FCS (in Russian FTS): Federal Customs Service Federal Guard Service (FGS, or FSO in Russian): the service that guards Russia’s offcial buildings Foreign Intelligence Service: FIS (or SVR in Russian) FSS (FSB in Russian): Federal Security Service, the secret police in post-Soviet Russia (see KGB) General Procuracy (GP): the infuential organization that investigates suspected crimes all over Russia, but, since 2007, much reduced in size and power (see ICP below) © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018 117 P. Reddaway, Russia’s Domestic Security Wars, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77392-6 118 GLOSSARY ICP (SKP in Russian): the Investigations Committee of the Procuracy, a powerful service of 18,000 offcials with the right to initiate investi- gations that Putin broke off from the GP in 2007, in order to be able to play it and the GP off against each other; a sort of attorney-general’s organization; in 2010 renamed the Investigations Committee of Russia Internal security system: this consists of several dozen intelligence and related bodies that are mostly specialized, but designed in part to spy on each other KGB: Committee for State Security, the secret police under the Soviet system (see FSS) kompromat: material (true or invented) that compromises someone, especially in the eyes of the law krysha: a person or group that provides an individual or group with political or other protection MIA (GRU in Russian): Main (Military) Intelligence Administration MVD: Ministry of Internal Affairs, the regular police okrug: large administrative region; Russia now consists of eight federal okrugs Petersburg Fuel Company: PFC (or PTK in Russian) ponyatiya: the unwritten understandings that govern the workings of clans, substituting for law; they are determined by the clan lead- ers, and change over time; Putin and his closest cronies set the most important ponyatiya Presidential Security Service (PSS, or SPO in Russian): body that guards the president reiderstvo: the practice of appropriating by force for little or no payment the property of a less powerful individual SCCN (GKKN in Russian): State Committee for the Control of Narcotics Silovik: word used here as a noun or an adjective regarding Russians who are serving, or have served, in the secret police or other armed agencies; the plural of the noun is siloviki Silovik war: a war with political and material goals between different silovik clans Tandem: term for the partnership between Putin and Dmitri Medvedev that existed from 2008 to 2012, when Medvedev was president of Russia, but Putin was its more powerful prime minister GLOSSARY 119 vertikal’ vlasti: literally ‘the vertical structure of authority’, this was a phrase introduced by Putin in 2000 to mean a strong, centrally organ- ized state in which the local authorities would obediently follow cen- tral instructions Yukos case: case of the huge oil company Yukos, which was appropri- ated from its prime owner Mikhail Khodorkovsky, following his arrest in 2003 for posing a potential political threat to Putin; owning it then became an object of ferce political infghting, won by Sechin INDEX A Belyaninov, Andrei, 50 Abramov, Aleksandr, 55 Berezovsky, Boris, 45 Abramovich, Roman, 5, 7, 40, 49, 50, Bernstein, Jonas, 86 52, 59, 70, 74, 78, 81, 83, 85, Bogdanchikov, Sergei, 27, 29, 30, 40, 115 68, 69, 86, 101 al-Assad, Bashar, 109 Bogdanov, Vladimir, 16, 17, 44, 50, Al’bats, Evgeniya, 96 68, 69, 70, 100 Alekperov, Vagit, 53 Borogan, Irina, 3 Allensworth, Wayne, 29, 33 Bortnikov, Aleksandr, 61, 89, 90 Andrushchenko, Nikolai, 27, 61 Breslauer, George, vii Anisimov, Vladimir, 41, 42, 55, 99 Brown, Archie, 6 Antonov, Yuri, 61 Brycheva, Larisa, 53 Aven, Pyotr, 58 Budberg, Aleksandr, 26, 83 Bul’bov, Aleksandr, 49, 51, 63, 70, 75, 78–80, 84, 92, 98, 99, 107 B Butrin, Dmitri, 51 Baev, Pavel, 47, 52 Bagmet, Anatoly, 98 Bakhshetsyan, Ernest, 100 C Barabanov, I., 96 Chaika, Yuri, 46, 49, 50, 52–54, 65, Basanets, Pavel, 59 68, 74, 78–80, 115 Bastrykin, Aleksandr, 40, 55, 63, 65, Chaplina, Natalya, 31, 40, 74, 77, 80 66, 78–80, 92, 95, 97, 98, 113 Chemezov, Sergei, 40, 42 Belkovsky, Stanislav, 2, 44, 52, 53, 54, Cherkesov, Viktor, ix, x, 3, 11, 12, 15, 77, 79, 86 18–20, 25, 27, 28, 30–33, 36, 40, © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018 121 P. Reddaway, Russia’s Domestic Security Wars, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77392-6 122 INDEX 46, 49–52, 55–57, 60–63, 66–68, Glaziev, Sergei, 21 70, 73–75, 77–80, 89–92, 95, 96, Glazkov, Vadim, 17, 44, 56 98, 99, 101, 105–107, 114 Goldman, Marshall, 26 Chesnakov, Aleksei, 40 Goranov, Andrei, 27 Chubais, Anatoly, 5, 59, 60, 81 Gref, German, 47, 84 Coalson, Robert, 59 Grigoriev, Aleksandr, 18–20, 31 Gryzlov, Boris, 19, 20, 40, 50 Gusinsky, Vladimir, 45 D Gustafson, Thane, 17, 30 Dawisha, Karen, 3 Delyagin, Mikhail, 53 Dement’ev, Oleg, 54 H Derbilova, E., 70 Holmes, Leslie, 6 Deripaska, Oleg, 11, 12, 26, 28, 40, Huskey, Eugene, 6 52, 60, 61, 74, 95, 115 Desyaterik, I., 61 Devyatov, Aleksei, 67 I Dovgiy, Dmitri, 92 Il’in, Ivan, 46 Dvoskin, Yevgeny, 38 Ismailov, Telman, 60 Ivanitskaya, Natalya, 44
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