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Russia's Power Ministries: Coercion and Commerce

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Russia's Power Ministries: Coercion and Commerce Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism, Syracuse University Russia’s Power Ministries: Coercion and Commerce Brian D. Taylor RUSSIA’S POWER MINISTRIES: COERCION AND COMMERCE Bran D. Taylor Assstant Professor Department of Poltcal Scence Maxwell School of Ctzenshp and Publc Affars Syracuse Unversty October 2007 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Smth Rchardson Foundaton for ths project. I also thank the Carnege Corporaton of New York for prevous support related to ths project. I thank Rchard Bodnar and Jekaterna Kalandadze for research assstance, and the overall project support of Marlene Damond and Kel Perrn of the Insttute for Natonal Securty and Counterterrorsm (INSCT). I also thank Rchard Bodnar and Renée de Nevers for revewng the manuscrpt. The vews expressed heren are mne alone, as are all remanng errors. Copyrght 2007 Bran D. Taylor Cover Photo: Bernard Lo/Stockphoto EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Russan Presdent Vladmr Putn has ncreased the power and resources of Russa’s power mnstres – mltary, securty, and law enforcement agences. He also has empowered many poltcal alles wth backgrounds n these structures, placng them n mportant postons throughout the state, and n state-owned busnesses. At the same tme, there reman mportant dvsons between these agences and among these officals; they are not a unfied group. The promnent poltcal role gven to the power mnstres has contrbuted to ncreasng authortaransm under Putn. It has not, however, acheved Putn’s stated goal of buldng a strong and effectve Russan state. Ths s because these very same power mnstres are themselves corrupt, and thus the personal enrchment of state officals often takes prorty over accomplshng state goals. Corrupt and nefficent Russan power mnstres potentally threaten U.S. foregn and securty nterests, partcularly n terms of nonprolferaton and transnatonal crme and terrorsm. The U.S. should contnue to cooperate where possble wth Russa on mportant securty nterests, but must be aware of how the “commercalzaton” of the power mnstres affects ther behavor and complcates jont projects. Although U.S. nfluence on Russan state agences s mnmal, engagement wth Russan power mnstres should emphasze more strongly the benefits to Russa of reforms that strengthen the rule of law and mprove publc admnstraton. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. v CHAPTER ONE: OVERVIEW OF THE POWER MINISTRIES .................................................... 1 The Mnstry of Defense and ts Successors .................................................................................... 1 The KGB and ts Successors ............................................................................................................. 5 The Mnstry of Internal Affars (MVD) ........................................................................................... 7 Other Power Mnstres and Law Enforcement Agences ............................................................... 8 Power Mnstry Budgets: Reversal of Fortune ................................................................................. 10 Power Mnstry Leaders: Stablty n Cadres .................................................................................... 12 CHAPTER TWO: THE SILOVIKI: COHORT, CLAN, AND CORPORATE ACTORS ................. 15 The Slovk Cohort ........................................................................................................................... 16 Slovk Clans ...................................................................................................................................... 19 Slovk Corporate Actors ................................................................................................................... 2 CHAPTER THREE: POWER AS A WEAPON: THE RETURN OF AUTHORITARIANISM ...... 25 The Power Mnstres and the Struggle for Power: Crses and Conspraces ................................ 26 The Power Mnstres and the Buldng of “Vertcal Power” ........................................................... 30 Strengthenng the State: Putn’s Mxed Record ............................................................................... 36 CHAPTER FOUR: POWER AS A RESOURCE: GUNS AND MONEY ........................................ 42 The Downsde of Putn’s Approach to State-Buldng: Corrupton and the Weak Rule of Law .... 42 The Commercalzaton of the Power Mnstres ............................................................................ 44 Slovk Clans and Bg Busness ....................................................................................................... 48 Popular Perceptons of the State: Lack of Trust ............................................................................... 5 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................ 54 Implcatons for U.S. Polcy .............................................................................................................. 56 Polcy Recommendatons: A New Framework for Engagng the Power Mnstres ..................... 59 TABLES AND FIGURES Fgure : Fragmentaton and Consoldaton of the Power Mnstres, 986-2006 ....................... 2 Table : Man Power Mnstres and Ther Approxmate Sze ......................................................... 2 Fgure 2: Natonal Defense and Securty & Law Enforcement Spendng ...................................... 12 Table 2: Average Tenure of Power Mnsters, n Months, January 992 - June 2007 ................... 13 Fgure 3: Mltarzaton of the Russan Elte .................................................................................... 16 Table 3: Federal Dstrcts and Power Mnstry Personnel, Md-2002 ............................................ 17 Fgure 4: Deaths From Terrorsm/Insurgency, Major Attacks, North Caucasus, 2000-2006 ..... 35 Fgure 5: Russa Freedom House Scores.......................................................................................... 37 Fgure 6: Poltcal Stablty/No Volence (World Bank Governance) ............................................. 38 Fgure 7: Government Effectveness (World Bank Governance) .................................................... 39 Fgure 8: Murders per 00,000 Populaton .................................................................................... 40 Fgure 9: Rule of Law (World Bank Governance) ............................................................................ 43 Fgure 0: Control of Corrupton (World Bank Governance) ......................................................... 44 Table 4: Polce Brbes “Prce Lst” 2002 ........................................................................................... 47 Table 5: Key Slovk n Bg Busness ................................................................................................ 49 Fgure : Trust n the Power Mnstres .......................................................................................... 52 v ABBREVIATIONS CFE – Conventonal Forces n Europe GDP – Gross Domestc Product GRU – Man Intellgence Drectorate (mltary ntellgence) GUO – Man Guards Drectorate GUSP – Man Drectorate for Specal Programs HEU – hghly-enrched uranum KBR – Kabardno-Balkara Republc KGB – Commttee on State Securty FAPSI – Federal Agency for Government Communcaton and Informaton FDSU - Federal Road Constructon Admnstraton FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency FPS – Federal Border Servce FSB – Federal Securty Servce FSIN – Federal Servce for the Admnstraton of Sentences FSKN – Federal Servce for the Control of the Narcotcs Trade FSNP – Federal Tax Polce Servce FSO – Federal Guard Servce FTS – Federal Customs Servce MChS – Mnstry of Cvl Defense and Emergency Stuatons MO – Mnstry of Defense MVD – Mnstry of Internal Affars NCO – Non-Commssoned Officer NGO – Non-Governmental Agency NKVD – People’s Commssarat of Internal Affars OAK – Unted Arcraft Constructon Corporaton OECD – Organzaton for Economc Cooperaton and Development OMON – Specal (Osobyy) Desgnaton Polce Detachment OMSN – Specal (Spetsial’nyy) Desgnaton Polce Detachment SBP –Presdental Securty Servce SSR – Securty Sector Reform SVR – Foregn Intellgence Servce VV – Internal Troops WMD – weapons of mass destructon v v INTRODUCTION hen Russan Presdent Vladmr Putn took power n 2000, strengthenng the state was hs central polcy goal. As hs second term as presdent wnds down, Putn has Wexpressed satsfacton wth hs achevements n ths area. A key component of Putn’s state-buldng efforts has been the ncreased power and promnence of state coercve bodes, referred to n Russa as the power mnstres (silovye ministerstva) or power structures (silovye strukturi). Smply put, power mnstres are those state agences n whch the personnel generally wear unforms and n whch some people carry guns. More precsely, these bodes are mltary, securty, or law enforcement bodes that possess armed unts or formatons. People wth power mnstry backgrounds are referred to as siloviki. Ths monograph provdes an overvew of Russa’s power mnstres and ther poltcal and economc role. As “Operaton Successor,” the effort to elect a Putn loyalst as presdent, moves nto ts actve phase for December 2007 parlamentary electons and March 2008 presdental electons, t s mportant to understand how the power and capabltes of these agences have changed under Putn, and how they mght nfluence Russan development under the next presdent. The presdent and the central executve, or the Kremln for short, has
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