The Western Response to the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

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The Western Response to the Ukraine-Russia Conflict

WTI Distinguished Lecture Steven Pifer, Director of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, Brookings Institution The Western Response to the Ukraine-Russia Conflict Tuesday, 14 June 2016, 13:00 – 14:30 Silva Casa Auditorium, World Trade Institute, University of Bern Hallerstrasse 6, 3012 Bern, Switzerland On 14 June, Steven Pifer, Director of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC will hold an afternoon lecture on “The Western Response to the Ukraine-Russia Conflict”. Prof. Manfred Elsig, Director NCCR Trade Regulation and Deputy Managing Director World Trade Institute will moderate the discussion. Participants are invited to ask questions and attend a reception at the WTI following the discussion. There is a possibility for one-to-one press interviews upon request. Abstract Russia’s seizure of Crimea and its subsequent regarding these issues on CNN, Fox News, CNBC, support for armed separatism in eastern Ukraine BBC, National Public Radio, and VOA, and his pose a fundamental challenge to the European articles have appeared in The New York Times, The security order. The European Union and United Washington Post, The National Interest, Financial States have responded with enhanced support for Times, Moscow Times, and Kyiv Post, among Ukraine as well as political and economic sanctions others. against Russia. In parallel, NATO has moved to A retired foreign service officer, his more than 25 bolster its deterrence and defense posture in its years with the State Department focused on U.S. east. The talk will review the steps that the West relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, has taken, assess their effectiveness, and describe as well as arms control and security issues. He further measures that Europe and the United served as deputy assistant secretary of state in the States should consider. Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs with responsibilities for Russia and Ukraine from 2001 to 2004, U.S. ambassador to Ukraine from 1998 to Biography of the Speaker 2000, and special assistant to the president and Steven Pifer is director of the Brookings Arms senior director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia on Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative and a the National Security Council from 1996 to 1997. In senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century addition to Ukraine, he served at the U.S. Security and Intelligence and the Center on the embassies in Warsaw, Moscow, and London, as United States and Europe in the Foreign Policy well as with the U.S. delegation to the negotiation program at Brookings. He focuses on arms control, on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Geneva. Russia, and Ukraine. He has offered commentary Participation is free of charge. Due to limited seating, please register here! .

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Steven Pifer
Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS POLICY PAPER Number 10, January 2009 Reversing the Decline: An Agenda for U.S.-Russian Relations in 2009 Steven Pifer The Brookings Institution 1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20036 brookings.edu Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS POLICY PAPER Number 10, January 2009 Reversing the Decline: An Agenda for U.S.-Russian Relations in 2009 Steven Pifer Acknowledgements am grateful to John Beyrle, Ian Kelly, Michael O’Hanlon, Carlos I Pascual, Theodore Piccone, Strobe Talbott and Alexander Versh- bow for the comments and suggestions that they provided on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to express my appreciation to Gail Chalef and Ian Livingston for their assistance. Finally, I would like to thank Daniel Benjamin and the Center on the United States and Europe for their support. Foreign Policy at Brookings iii Table of Contents Introduction and Summary . 1 The Decline in U.S.-Russia Relations . 3 What Does Russia Want? .................................. 7 An Agenda for Engaging Russia in 2009 . 11 Implementing the Agenda .................................21 Endnotes............................................... 25 Foreign Policy at Brookings v Introduction and Summary s the Bush administration comes to a close, Building areas of cooperation not only can advance AU.S.-Russian relations have fallen to their low- specific U.S. goals, it can reduce frictions on other est level since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. issues. Further, the more there is to the bilateral re- Unresolved and problematic issues dominate the lationship, the greater the interest it will hold for Rus- agenda, little confidence exists between Washington sia, and the greater the leverage Washington will have and Moscow, and the shrill tone of official rhetoric with Moscow.
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