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A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes

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A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes Matthew Kroenig A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes Matthew Kroenig ISBN-13: 978-1-61977-539-8 Cover photo: The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Pennsylvania (SSBN 735) returns to Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor following a routine strategic deterrent patrol. The new US Nuclear Posture Review of 2018 calls for placing low-yield nuclear warheads on US submarine-launched ballistic missiles. May 6, 2016. (US Navy/Lt. Cmdr. Michael Smith). This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The author is solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. April 2018 CONTENTS Executive Summary 2 Introduction 3 The Renewed Russian Nuclear Threat 5 The Gaps in US and NATO Nuclear Strategy 8 Weighing Possible Strategic Response Options 11 Toward a Better NATO Deterrence Strategy 16 Possible Objections 19 Conclusion 21 About the Author 22 A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes EXECUTIVE SUMMARY INTRODUCTION ow can the United States and its NATO allies report presents an analysis of possible approaches for ow can the United States and its NATO allies NATO must convince Russia that any use of nuclear deter Russian nuclear “de-escalation” strikes? deterring Russian nuclear de-escalation strikes and for deter Russian nuclear “de-escalation” strikes? weapons will not enable Moscow to achieve its goals, Russian nuclear strategy allows for the early negating Russian nuclear coercion. It argues that NATO According to the US government, Russian nu- but instead will result only in unacceptable costs for use of nuclear weapons in the event of a con- must convince Russia that any nuclear strike will not clear strategy calls for the early use of nuclear Russia. In particular, the United States and NATO must Hflict with NATO with the goal of forcing Western leaders lead to de-escalation, but will only result in unaccept- Hweapons in the event of a conflict with NATO with the be clear that nuclear de-escalation strikes will not lead to sue for peace or risk further, potentially catastrophic, able costs for Russia. In other words, the United States goal of forcing Western leaders to sue for peace or risk to de-escalation and will not deter NATO from pursuing nuclear escalation. Many Western scholars and analysts must threaten that Russian nuclear de-escalation strikes further, potentially catastrophic, nuclear escalation.1 In its war aims. They must threaten that Russian nuclear have recognized this threat but, to date, have not yet ar- will be met with a tough and credible response, and that other words, this strategy aims to place NATO on the de-escalation strikes will be met with a tough and cred- ticulated a clear deterrence strategy for addressing it. This the response could include a limited nuclear reprisal. horns of the dilemma of choosing between “suicide and ible response, and that the response could include a surrender.”2 This strategy presents problems for NATO, limited nuclear reprisal. They must also convince Russia not only in the event of a major war in Europe, but also that they have the will and the capabilities to follow on a quotidian basis. Russia has and will continue to through on that threat. This will require that the United employ nuclear coercion in a bid to deter NATO efforts States and NATO adjust and enhance their declaratory to counter Russian aggression in its near abroad, divide policy, strategic communications, alliance management, the Alliance, and achieve its goals short of conflict.3 war planning, and nuclear capabilities. Many Western scholars and analysts have recognized To arrive at this outcome, this report analyzes the full this threat.4 Some have begun to recommend solutions range of possible responses to Russian nuclear de-es- for dealing with this challenge, including options for calation strikes, including surrender, a convention- strengthening US and NATO nuclear capabilities.5 To al-only response, limited nuclear response, and massive date, however, this debate has glossed over many of nuclear retaliation. This report recommends that the the important strategy and policy considerations that threat of a limited nuclear reprisal must be emphasized should come before recommendations for capabilities. in US and NATO strategy as it may be uniquely able to After all, one must first decide on one’s strategy before provide a sufficiently costly and credible deterrent to one can know the capabilities required to fulfill the strat- the Russian nuclear threat. egy’s requirements. That is the purpose of this report. The recommended strategy does not seek to mimic This report presents an analysis of possible approaches Russian strategy and capabilities, but rather, in the for deterring Russian nuclear de-escalation strikes and words of Sun Tzu, to “defeat the enemy’s strategy.”6 for negating Russian nuclear coercion. It argues that Currently, Russian officials appear to believe that a lim- Russian strategy is premised on the notion that Russia ited Russian use of nuclear weapons would lead the has an advantage in three relevant areas: stakes, resolve, Western alliance to back down; the approach recom- and capabilities. The key to NATO’s response, therefore, mended in this report aims to disabuse Moscow of that must be to seek to address these three asymmetries. notion. Like with all US nuclear strategy, the purpose of 1 United States Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, February 2018), https:// media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF; Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De-escalation,’” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 13, 2014, http://thebulletin.org/why-russia- calls-limited-nuclear-strike-deescalation; Matthew Kroenig, “Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War,” Survival 57, no. 1 (2015): 49-70; Elbridge Colby, Nuclear Weapons in the Third Offset Strategy: Avoiding a Nuclear Blind Spot in the Pentagon’s New Initiative (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, January 2015); Elbridge Colby, “Russia’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications,” Fondation Pour la Recherche Stratégique, January 12, 2016; Elbridge Colby, “Countering Russian Nuclear Strategy in Europe,” Center for a New American Security, November 11, 2015, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/countering-russian- nuclear-strategy-in-central-europe. 2 Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Strategy and Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1957), http://thehill.com/policy/ defense/372531-mattis-defends-plans-for-new-nuclear-capabilities. 3 Matthew Kroenig, The Renewed Russian Nuclear Threat and NATO Nuclear Deterrence Posture (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, February 2016), 5; Matthew Kroenig and Jacek Durkalec, “NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence: Closing Credibility Gaps,” Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 25, no. 1 (2016): 41-49. 4 Sokov, “Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike ‘De-escalation’”; Kroenig, “Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War”; Colby, Nuclear Weapons in the Third Offset Strategy; Colby, “Russia’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy and Its Implications”; Colby, “Countering Russian Nuclear Strategy in Europe.” 5 Kroenig, The Renewed Russian Nuclear Threat and NATO Nuclear Deterrence Posture; Colby, “Countering Russian Nuclear Strategy in Europe.” 6 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964). 2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL ATLANTIC COUNCIL 3 A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes A Strategy for Deterring Russian Nuclear De-Escalation Strikes threatening a potential nuclear reprisal is not because alternatives for the United States and NATO and con- anyone is eager to fight a nuclear war. To the contrary, cludes that the optimal strategy must include the pos- THE RENEWED RUSSIAN it is to deter nuclear war in the first place. sibility of a threat of limited nuclear reprisal. Fourth, the report recommends a strategic approach for ad- The rest of the report proceeds in six parts. First, it ex- dressing gaps in US and NATO deterrence posture, NUCLEAR THREAT amines the challenge posed by Russia’s nuclear strat- including implications for strategy, declaratory policy, egy and capabilities. Second, it discusses the gaps in alliance management, war planning, and capabilities. his section examines the renewed Russian nu- fashion, however, it would also be leaving the West US and NATO deterrence posture that Russia’s strategy Fifth, it discusses possible counterarguments to these clear threat. This challenge has been examined much to lose. Western Europe and the United States aims to exploit. Third, the report weighs the possible findings. Finally, the report offers a brief conclusion. extensively elsewhere, so rather than repeat would remain intact. If Western leaders continued to this analysis, this section will present a brief prosecute the war, however, there is the danger of a Tsummary of Russian nuclear strategy and capabilities.7 broader nuclear exchange that could put Western pop- ulation centers at risk. The strategy, therefore, aims to During the Cold War, the West feared the possibility incentivize Western
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