The Power of the NPT: International Norms and Nuclear Disarmament of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, 1990-1994
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The Power of the NPT: International Norms and Nuclear Disarmament of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, 1990-1994 By Mariana Budjeryn Submitted to Central European University Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy and International Relations In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Philosophy Doctor Supervisor: Professor Alexander Astrov CEU eTD Collection Budapest, Hungary 2016 Abstract There is a lingering disagreement among scholars on how the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) affects nonproliferation and disarmament outcomes. Drawing on constructivist scholarship this dissertation locates the nonproliferation discourses at the cusp of domestic and international political spheres, and examines the role of the NPT in the cases of nuclear disarmament of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. In the wake of the Soviet collapse, these newly independent states inherited parts of world’s largest nuclear arsenal and were met with the expectation of the international community to disarm and join the NPT as non-nuclear- weapons states. The three states proceeded along very different paths toward fulfilling these expectations. Engaging the previously untapped archival sources, this dissertation reconstructs the nuclear discourses in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine and argues that, while much of decision-making about the fate of their nuclear inheritance was embedded in the negotiation of their new identity as a sovereigns state vis-à-vis Russia and the West, the NPT affected their denuclearization through a range of normative mechanisms by guarding a separate normative space for nuclear possession, allocating the burden of proof, providing the normative grammar of denuclearization, and legitimizing the pressure exerted by their interlocutors to conform with the nonproliferation regime. CEU eTD Collection i For my mother, Iryna Budzheryn CEU eTD Collection ii Acknowledgements Writing a PhD dissertation is at once a very lonely endeavor and a collective effort. The author of this work bears any and all responsibility for its shortcomings, while acknowledging that it would have been an impossible feat without the ever-present support of her family, supervisors, colleagues and simply kind well-wishers. Paul Roe and Alex Astrov have been with this project from its inception and provided supervisory guidance that helped shape this dissertation and make it better than it could have ever been otherwise. David Holloway has set an example worth aspiring to in every way. Bela Greskovits is responsible for planting the idea of a PhD in my head, and Erin Jenne for calling my initial PhD topic ‘nebulous,’ which led to my discarding it and conjuring up this one. Ukraine Scholars Fund, in the persons of Roman Protsyk and Lidia Dibrova, were the fairy godparents of this dissertation, providing financial support for research and conference travel when none was available elsewhere. My mother Iryna Budzheryn, who will never be able to read this dissertation, may have been the single most committed person to its successful and timely completion and had gone well beyond the call of parental duty to help achieve it. My deepest gratitude goes to my husband James Flynn and my children Anna, Lukas, and Maria CEU eTD Collection who co-inhabited the space and time in which this dissertation was researched and written. They took the plunge with me, endured my absent stares, learned to speak Nuclish (“the dog bolted out like a ballistic missile”), and imbued my life with meaning well beyond what any academic achievement could offer. iii Table of Contents Abstract i Acknowledgements iii List of Abbreviations vi Introduction 1 Chapter One. Great Expectations: NPT and Nuclear Restraint 7 Nuclear Weapons and the NPT 7 The Nonproliferation Norm and Nuclear Choices 14 Rationalist Theories 14 Constructivism 21 Research Question and Method 29 Conceptual Framework 30 Regulative mechanisms 33 Constitutive mechanisms 36 Case Selection 41 Chapter Two. Soviet Nuclear Disintegration: Succession or Proliferation? 45 Soviet Strategic Nuclear Forces 45 Nuclear Inheritance of Soviet Successor States 53 Ukraine 54 Kazakhstan 57 Belarus 57 Nuclear Weapons between the USSR and the CIS 59 CIS and Nuclear Weapons: “Joint” Command and “Single” Control 66 Soviet Disintegration as a Proliferation Problem 71 Soviet Disintegration as an Arms Control Problem 76 Legal Succession to START and NPT 79 New Start for START: The Lisbon Protocol 85 Conclusion: Soviet Nuclear Weapons between Past and Future 91 Chapter Two. Ukraine: Negotiating a Nuclear Exception 94 Introduction 94 Chernobyl, Declaration of Sovereignty and Nuclear Renunciation 101 From Renunciation to Ownership 110 CIS: Collective Insecurity 118 Establishing Military Sovereignty 123 Halt of Tactical Nuclear Weapons Transfers 127 Lisbon: Succession without Possession 136 Nuclear Ownership: Negotiating an Exception 140 Ukrainian-Russian Negotiations: Stillborn 143 CEU eTD Collection Kravchuk and the MFA: Rightful Entitlement to Compensation 147 The Rada: Political Hedging 152 Tolubko: Nuclear Deterrent 155 A Nuclear Exception 157 From Ownership to Renunciation 161 Conditional Ratification of START-I/Lisbon 169 The Trilateral Statement 172 Ratification of the NPT and the Budapest Memorandum 178 Conclusion: Ukraine and the NPT 183 iv Chapter Four. Belarus: Small State, Big Burden 187 Introduction 187 Chernobyl and the Belarusian Opposition 191 Declaration of Sovereignty and Nuclear Renunciation 195 Independence: Caution and Gradual Transition 199 START and NPT Succession: The Road to Lisbon 202 National Security Narratives: Between Neutrality and Russia 206 Neutrality and a nuclear-free zone 206 Alliance with Moscow 210 Nuclear Arms between Neutrality and Moscow 214 Belarus, Russia and the Nuclear Weapons 216 Ratification of START-Lisbon and the NPT 219 Rewards as Afterthoughts 226 Lukashenka and the Halt of Missile Transfers 229 Conclusion: Belarus and the NPT 233 Chapter Five. Kazakhstan: The Art of the Possible 236 Introduction 236 Enter Nazarbayev 242 Semipalatinsk and the anti-nuclear movement 244 Sovereignty, Independence and the (Absence of) Nuclear Stance 249 CIS as Union-Lite 256 Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Assertiveness 261 Islamic Connection 266 Temporary Nuclear State 268 Domestic Opposition to Disarmament 271 Toward Tashkent and Lisbon 275 From Assertiveness to Precaution 282 Clinton Diplomacy and NPT Ratification 285 Operation Sapphire 289 Nuclear Disarmament and Beyond 291 Conclusion: Kazakhstan and the NPT 294 Conclusion 298 Bibliography 312 CEU eTD Collection v List of Abbreviations ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ALCM Air-launched Cruise Missile BPF Belarusian Popular Front BSSR Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic CANWFZ Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone CFE Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CPU Communist Party of Ukraine CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty CTR Cooperative Threat Reduction Program HEU Highly Enriched Uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile INF Intermediate Range Forces Treaty INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research (of the US Department of State) JAF Joint Armed Forces [of the Commonwealth of Independent States] JCIC Joint Compliance and Inspections Committee JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action LEU Low Enriched Uranium MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs (of Ukraine) MP Member of Parliament NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council NAM Non-Allied Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NKVD Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del [People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs] NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapons State (under the NPT) NPT Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons) NSC National Security Council (of Ukraine) NWFZ Nuclear Weapons Free Zone NWS Nuclear Weapons State (under the NPT) PfP Partnership for Peace PNI Presidential Nuclear Initiatives PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty CEU eTD Collection SBU Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukraiiny [Security Service of Ukraine] SLBM Sea-launched ballistic missile SRF Strategic Rocket Forces [of the USSR] SSD Safe and Secure Disarmament of Nuclear Weapons START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Treaty on Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms), also referred to as START I UK United Kingdom UkrSSR Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic UNGA United Nations General Assembly vi UNR Ukrayinska Narodna Respublika [Ukrainian People’s Republic] UNSC United Nations Security Council US United States (of America) USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics CEU eTD Collection vii Introduction Few things have impacted the conduct on international affairs as much as nuclear weapons. Yet these weapons do not speak for themselves: they are developed, amassed or rejected by people acting in socio-political contexts, who collectively interpret their meaning and role in national and international life. One shared understanding of nuclear weapons is that they are dangerous for world security and their spread around the world must be curbed. This understanding provided the ethical underpinnings of the nuclear nonproliferation norm, formalized in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the elaborate international nonproliferation regime that developed around it. With 190 member states and few instances of noncompliance, the NPT is one of the most prominent and enduring international