How Pretoria Wages War on Africa by Aziz Pahad

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How Pretoria Wages War on Africa by Aziz Pahad maam mam How Pretoria wages war on Africa by Aziz Pahad The apartheid regime has embarked on a the 1982 Defence White Paper Magnus concerted and co-ordinated campaign of Malan (Minister of Defence) stated that: economic, political and military destutili­ "It is alarming that more and more sophis­ sation in Southern Africa. The gravity of ticated weapons are pouring into the situation is reflected by the communique neighbouring countries" and that "serious of the heads of Governments of the Front consideration should now be given to the Line States (meeting in Maputo, March possibility of conventional warfare." 1982) which noted that "The invasion and Prime Minister Botha gave some military aggression, the utilisation of armed indication of South Africa's intentions bandits and agents, the acts of sabotage and when he stated that "We are moving more economic blackmail, the massive and and more in the direction in which the state subversive propaganda campaigns conducted of Israel has already been since 1948," by South Africa are proof that there is and went on to warn that "South Africa's currently an undeclared war situation sphere of influence" extends to all its engendered and supported by South Africa." neighbours in Southern Africa. It is becoming increasingly clear that Pik Botha (Foreign Minister) spelt this the regime is developing a massive capacity out more blatantly when he arrogantly not only to hold back the revolutionary declared that "Hie existence of a ring of advances in South Africa and Namibia but marxist states ... around South Africa was also to subvert and undermine the gains inimical to South Africa's interests. '* This already achieved in Southern Africa. The situation he said, could not be tolerated. use of conventional war is becoming a After announcing that South Africa central component of this regional strategy. would have to open up a "second front", Using the 'big lie' techniques of Goebbels Magnus Malan issued a warning that the they justify their aggression by claiming "slogan in Africa should be: Obtain that the neighbouring countries pose a communist assistance and terrorist organisa­ military threat to them. In the preface to tions to launch so called liberation 21 i#W has production of minerals we all must It is in South Africa that the west's have." most important regional interests are at The Reagan nominee to become head stake - both our tangible economic and of the US Aims Control and Disarmament strategic interests and also our political Agency, Kenneth Adelman (presently and moral interests in non-violent change". deputy to Jean Kirkpa trick that other great On taking office, Reagan said, "Can we 'human rights campaigner* and 'freedom abandon a country which has stood with us fighter*, and friend of the US and South in every war we have fought, a country that African intelligence services) is reported to strategically is essential to the free world? It have said that if South Africa acquired movements and the end result is perish in nuclear anti-submarine weapons, these could misery." be helpful to the west in protecting the Cape South Africa is imposing its own version shipping route. He went on to say that such of the Monroe doctrine. This aggressive weapons could be turned into nuclear militarist strategy has been intensified since bombs to deter a land attack. the defeat of Portuguese colonialism and Given such open and brazen support the attempts to establish genuine people's by the Reagan administration it is hardly democracies, leading to the socialist trans­ surprising that the South African 1982 formation of Angola and Mozambique; since the winning of independence in Defence White Paper concluded that "there Zimbabwe; since the attempts by the Front are encouraging signs that the USA is once line States to break out of the economic again prepared to play an active role as stranglehold of South Africa through the leader of the West." For South Africa, SADCC, and as a result of the intensified this has meant extensive cooperation in the resistance in South Africa and Namibia. exchange of intelligence and military personnel and information. There has been Imperialist Collaboration a gradual relaxation of the ban on military South Africa's reactionary role by and and military-related equipment from the large coincides with imperialist strategy US - for example, the Cyber 75 variety of for world domination and exploitation. computers, which can be used to model The Reagan administration, under the nuclear explosions, has been supplied smokescreen of anti-communism, anti- to Armscor or its subsidiaries, and US sovietism and "anti-terrorism", has launched broken played a key role in helping South a world wide counter-revolutionary Africa buy almost 100 tons of enriched offensive, and sees the apartheid regime as uranium. Export credit guarantees have the instrument for achieving its global been resumed by the US government, and strategy on the African continent. In 1980 the Americans were largely responsible for Crocker (U.S. Assistant Secretary of State the granting of a 1.2 billion dollar loan to for African Affairs) concluded that, South Africa from the IMF in 1982. In "Washington could no longer simply enjoy Namibia the USA is spearheading attempts its varied interests in Southern Africa. It to halt the process of liberation. American would have to work actively to pre-empt subterfuges were revealed when, in a secret Soviet-backed revolutionary change.** He memorandum to Haig in 1981, Crocker later went on to say that the "American stated that racist South Africans must be stance towards the Republic of South told of the US willingness to open up a Africa is inevitably the centrepiece of our new chapter in their relationship, based regional policy... South Africa is by any upon strategic reality and South Africa's definition an important regional power, position in that reality. He went on to say and it is by far the most important country that the Namibian problem was a primary 22 in the Southern African region. obstacle to this new relationship, and that 'SOUTH AFRICA HAS PROVED TO BE ONE OF THE NV3ST SIGNIFICANT STABILIZING FACTORS IN TMe RGfrtOfV'- fAAR*s sreyrv- SAAMMSSAPOK "we are willing to work with them to find for imperialist global strategy, and an internationally acceptable settlement specifically for subversion, exploitation which will not harm their interests." and destabilisation of the African This active and open collaboration of continent; the Reagan-Thatcher administrations has * limit support given to the ANC and undoubtedly encouraged the terrorist use of SWAPO. their muscle, and is turning Southern Africa * physically eliminate the ANC and into one of the most critical flashpoints SWAPO; in international politics. In the last few yean there has been a steady escalation in the regime's use of South African aggression affects virtually economic sabotage and terrorism, the whole of Southern Africa, and even commando raids and large scale military farther afield, as the attempted coup in the invasions, the strategic objectives being to: Seychelles and the bombing of the ANC office in London showed. A brief look will * maintain dominance of the region and give some indication of the nature and prevent any socio-economic changes; extent of this, and the serious challenge confronting not only the peoples of * maintain racist South Africa as a base 23 Southern Africa but the entire international Angola had once again obliged us to divert community. a great part of our manpower, material and financial resources to strengthening our Economic pressure defence capability, thereby jeopardising a The colonial legacy has resulted in the fact number of projected development targets." that the economies of almost all countries Conservative estimates show that since in the region are interlinked with that of 1975 the losses Angola suffered because of South Africa. South Africa's dominant South African aggression amounted to a position in this relationship has been used staggering sum of 10 billion dollars. extensively to put pressure on these states. Other consequences, in terms of human In 1981 at a very crucial moment, suffering , ill health, loss of schooling, mal­ racist South Africa unilaterally terminated nutrition, unemployment, displacement of a preferential trade agreement (dating back millions, cannot be calculated fully. to 1964) with Zimbabwe. It simultaneously recalled about 80 railway trucks and diesel Military aggression engines on long term loan to Zimbabwe Since the mid 60's the apartheid regime has Railways (this had a disastrous effect on the adopted a highly aggressive and transport of the maize harvest). interventionist policy towards its Recently the racists warned Lesotho neighbours. that unless she toed the line the job oppor­ Between 1967 and 197S it was tunities for Lesotho citizens in South estimated that over 4000 South African Africa would be jeopardized (it is estimated troops supported by armoured cars, heli­ that at present 40% of Lesotho's GNP copters and planes were actively involved comes from wages earned by Lesotho in Zimbabwe. There were over 1000 South citizens working in South Africa). African troops involved with the Portuguese However, the most dangerous disruption in Mozambique and in 1969 under a has been through the systematic destruction Portuguese-South African agreement a joint of the socio-economic structures. Roads, command system was established in Angola railways, bridges, electric and water supplies, to direct South African air reconnaissance oil refineries and depots, factories, dams and troop transport activities against and agricultural projects have been attacked Namibia and MPLA guerrillas. and destroyed. To cite but a few examples: However a new dimension was added The road, rail and oil pipeline in 1975 when over 6000 South African connection between Zambia and Mozam­ troops and foreign mercenaries invaded bique is continuously attacked.
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