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The Use of Special Envoys South African soft power and its regional leadership: The use of Special Envoys Professor Jo-Ansie van Wyk Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria. [email protected] SAIIA’s 80th Anniversary Foreign Policy Conference, Pretoria, 28-30 October 2014. Celebrations, Confessions, Caveats & Confusion • Celebrations: Octogenarians rule! • Confession: Work in progress as part of SAIIA Bradlow Fellowship • Caveat: Preliminary findings • Confusion: Special Envoy or Special Representative. Thus: used interchangeably here. Focus • Domestic-international foreign policy nexus • Focus on foreign policy at home and abroad • Special envoys as diplomats sui generis Some major trends in South African foreign policy • Major increase in diplomatic presence and international relations • Strong focus on African Agenda But also a significant Peace Agenda: Promotion of peace & security Thus a major trend in South Africa’s foreign policy focused on here: Peace diplomacy as an instrument of post-apartheid foreign policy Power • No longer focus on hard power only • Joseph Nye’s introduction of soft power • Thus: changes in content of equation: Power = Ability + Resources + Recognition • Soft power expressed in intangible/non- material elements of power such as status, prestige, influence & norms Six indicators of South Africa’s soft power 1. Preferences: For ethical foreign policy 2. Foundation: Normative foreign policy: peace, human rights, global equity, nuclear non-proliferation 3. Expectations: African leader, Gateway, Bridge Builder 4. Behaviour: Norm entrepreneur: blood diamonds (Kimberley Process), peace efforts etc. 5. Practices: Niche diplomacy: nuclear, peace etc. 6. Role: leadership: concentric (regional, continental & international) Expression of African Agenda as a Peace Agenda South Africa • Involved in – Multilateral peace-related efforts: UN & AU – Bilateral peace-related efforts: DRC, Sudan, Sierra Leone • President as peace-maker • Deployment of individuals such as Special Envoys, Mediators and Facilitiators • Employed as Special Envoy for OAU/AU & UN Special Envoy • Historic & universal diplomatic institution • Enjoys diplomatic immunities & privileges • Predominantly appointed by Executive • Also appointments by AU (Comorros, Sahel), EU (Great Lakes) & UN (Great Lakes, DRC) • UN Secretary General’s 44 Special Representatives Significance of South African Special Envoys • Appointed by President • Diplomatic instrument; especially in peace diplomacy • Thus: important instrument in ‘foreign policy toolbox’ • Address issue beyond reach of resident Ambassador • Representative of President • Charged with specific mission • Signals President’s preferences, prejudices, views & enhanced attention to particular issue • Thus: insight into inner circle of President & state’s priorities Presidential prerogative: Special Envoys Appointed by President in terms of S 84 of South African Constitution The President is responsible for appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular representatives. Thus confirms President as major foreign policy actor Presidential prerogative: Special Advisors Public Service Act empowers President to appoint Special Advisors to • Advise President on the exercise or performance of powers & duties; • Advise President on the development of policy; or • Perform other tasks appropriate in the exercise or performance of the President’s powers and duties. • Often Special Advisors graduated to appointment as Special Envoys Government rationale for employment of Special Envoys • Ethical foreign policy: Peace as norm (Mandela etc.) • Agenda: Realisation of African Agenda (Mbeki), improve relations (Zuma) • Identity: South African miracle (Nzo, Mbeki, Ramaphosa) • Memory as commodity: South African experience & expertise (Ramaphosa) • Solidarity: African/Southern peacemaker (Mbeki, Zuma) Qualifications for appointment • Struggle credentials • Loyalty and proximity (inner circle advantage) • Experience (in exile, ANC, Special Advisor, Cabinet, Government) • Gender (Male) All the Presidents’ men – and woman President Envoy Designation Presidential Area of deployment (Selection) Advisor Mandela Sydney Mufamadi Cabinet Minister Lesotho Mozambique DRC Zimbabwe Sudan (Darfur) Mbeki Aziz Pahad Deputy Minister Iraq Jacob Zuma Deputy President Burundi Charles Nqakula Cabinet Minister Yes Burundi Welile Nhlapo Diplomat Burundi Sydney Mufamadi Cabinet Minister DRC Kingsley Mamabolo Diplomat Great Lakes Region Zuma Mac Maharaj Cabinet Minister Yes Palestine Cyril Ramaphosa Deputy President South Sudan Sri Lanka SADC Facilitator (Lesotho) Aziz Pahad Deputy Minister Palestine Charles Nqakula Cabinet Minister Yes Sudan Zimbabwe Marius Fransman Deputy Minister Madagascar Lindiwe Zulu Diplomat Yes Zambia Zimbabwe Analysing and assessing South Africa’s Special Envoys Methodology, scope & limitations • Method: Qualitative. Interviews to be conducted. • Scope: Post-1994, peace diplomacy, exclude AU/UN appointments • Limitations: 1) For brevity’s sake: no outline of conflict where employed 2) Access to information Thus: an analysis and assessment based on cases where deployed Functions of South Africa’s Special Envoys • Collect information • Conflict prevention • Mediation • Promote dialogue • Formulate grievances • Negotiate • Make recommendations on issues and propose a course of action • Express grievances of parties before the international community Talks about talks Negotiations Agreement Indicator of Special Envoys’ success/failure • Identity • Interests: Self-defence and/or extension of influence • Leverage: Arguments and/or incentives • Impartiality: Perception of • Strategies: Communication between parties, delivering concessions • Formulation: Defining and/or refining issues • Manipulation: To determine certain preferred outcome Challenges to South Africa’s regional leadership 1. Applicability of South African peace model 2. Regional and conflict dynamics 3. Ambitions of other states 4. Resources: overstretch 5. Peace diplomacy as diplomacy sui generis 6. Limits of Special Envoys as diplomatic instrument Challenges to regional leadership (cont.) Regional and conflict dynamics Durable and Cessation of sustainable hostilities peace Disarmament, Special Envoys demobilisation, re-integration Peace Conflict agreement dynamics Regional dynamics Challenges to South Africa’s regional leadership • SADC’s outsourcing of peace efforts to South Africa • May contribute to perceptions of South African hegemony Challenges to regional leadership (cont.) Limits to South Africa’s Special Envoys Challenges of and limits to South Africa’s Special Envoys: Receiving states • Complexity and duration of conflicts • Unclear, wide or limited mandate • Resources (financial, logistical, technical) • Perceptions of South Africa’s impartiality • Nature of agreement • Durability of agreement • Lack of ‘after sales service’ Limits to South Africa’s Special Envoys: South Africa Some overlaps with receiving state: • Unclear, wide or limited mandate • Resources (financial, logistical, technical) Also: • Accountable to President, not to Cabinet, Parliament • Lack of transparency & accountability (mandate, finances, incentives) • Relations with Parliament & DIRCO Challenges to regional leadership (cont.) Peace diplomacy by Special Envoy Peace diplomacy by Special Envoys: Preliminary assessment Indicator Assessment Entry Often late entry, lacking early warning systems (Sudan) Envoy Quality and impartiality questioned (Zulu, Pahad), Ramaphosa (Sri Lanka) Mandate Always unclear, not publicised Norms Coexistence & reciprocity, commitment to peace Actors Multiplicity of actors: governments, opposition parties, non- state actors (all). Third parties: Zimbabwe military in DRC. Proposals Ceasefire (Mandela: Zaire), agreements Location In loco, ‘off-site’ (Sun City) Techniques Multilateral (Group of Special Envoys, Burundi) Results Declarations & peace agreements: Bujumbura Declaration, Magaliesberg Declaration etc. (Burundi), Sun City Accord (DRC), Global Political Agreement (Zimbabwe) Preliminary assessment of Special Envoys vis-à-vis South Africa’s soft power and regional leadership Mixed results due to: • Complexity and duration of conflicts • Presidential succession • Nature of mandate • Role of other actors (AU/UN/SADC, spoilers) • Nature of agreement (Inclusivity, participation, quality, terms, implementation, elections, type of government • Conflict trap Thank you. .
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