The Normativity of Moral Contractualism: A Hegelian Solution A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in the faculty of Humanities 2019 Fred H Horton Social of Social Sciences Contents Section Page Abstract 5 Declaration 6 Copyright Statement 7 Dedication 9 Acknowledgements 10 Introduction 11 Chapter 1: An Instrumentalist’s Answer to the Question of Normativity 19 1.1 Introduction 19 1.2 Rational Choice Theory 21 1.3 A Disposition to Comply 31 1.4 What Sort of Motivation? 37 1.5 Conclusion 43 Chapter 2: Scanlonian Contractualism 45 2.1 Introduction 45 2.2 Scanlon’s Contractualism: An Overview 46 2.3 Scanlon’s Constructivism 53 2.4 Relativism and Convergence 60 2.5 Conclusion 70 Chapter 3: The Normativity of Deliberative Contractualism 71 3 3.1 Introduction 71 3.2 Deliberative Contractualism 72 3.3 The Question of Normativity 76 3.4 Some Concerns for Southwood’s Account 79 3.5 Conclusion 89 Chapter 4: Relational Formalism and German Idealism 91 4.1 Recap: The Shortcomings of Actually 91 Existing Contractualism 4.2 A Second Person Solution? 95 4.3 Thompson’s Alternative 101 4.4 Fichtean Themes in Contractualist Ethics 107 4.5 Conclusion 116 Chapter 5: A Hegelian Solution? 118 5.1 Introduction 118 5.2 Hegel’s Dialectic of Recognition 122 5.3 The Hegelian Thought Applied to Contractualism 134 5.4 Objections 140 5.5 Conclusion 154 Conclusion 156 Bibliography 158 Word Count: 60,569 4 Abstract The University of Manchester Fred H Horton The Normativity of Moral Contractualism: A Hegelian Solution June 2019 Moral contractualism is a branch of normative ethics that holds that our moral obligations to each other are determined by the principles that we would agree to in certain hypothetical, idealised circumstances. This thesis takes an in-depth look at this approach, in particular an aspect of it denoted the ‘question of normativity’. The question of normativity is concerned with how the conditions of the circumstances of the agreement come to constitute moral reasons for real world agents. It argues that existing contractualist approaches to the question of normativity fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the question of normativity, because the accounts of practical reason relied on to do so either fail to explain the binding of our moral requirements, or do so only at the expense of undermining contractualism’s ambitions to provide an account of morality’s foundations. It then attempts to provide a positive solution to the question of the form of normativity in the form of an account of agency inspired by the thought of G. W. F. Hegel. The claim is that an approach to agency inspired by what I call the ‘Hegelian Thought’ provides us with the tools for a plausible account of practical reason; one that makes sense of the interpersonal nature of this practical reason and is not hostage to a defeasible commitment to a substantive value. 5 Declaration No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning; 6 Copyright Statement i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes. ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance Presentation of Theses Policy with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made. iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior 7 written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions. iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=2442 0), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/about/regulations/) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses 8 Dedication To my Dad 9 Acknowledgements This work was funded through the University of Manchester’s Philosophy Studentship. For valuable support and discussion, I would like to thank my main supervisor, John O’Neill. And various stages throughout this project John has been joined by Steve de Wijze, Richard Child, Thomas Smith and Stephen Ingram. All have provided very helpful comments and encouragement about my work. Special thanks should also go to Joel Smith and Alan Hamlin for reading on commenting on drafts of the early parts of this thesis. I have also benefitted immensely from the comments and questions of those who attended the MANCEPT seminar and the Manchester Philosophy Research seminar (twice). The Philosophy and Politics communities at Manchester have been a further source of support and ideas. Lastly I would like to thanks my family, especially my mother, father, grandmother, Anne, Klaudia, and Tim for their support and encouragement. 10 Introduction Moral contractualism is, roughly, the idea that what makes an action permissible or impermissible is whether or not a principle that licensed it would be accepted or rejected by hypothetical agents in idealized circumstances. Various versions of this moral theory have been advanced, and the differences between them are largely explained by the assumptions made about the details of these circumstances and the nature of the agents in question. While these assumptions will have an impact on the principles that are licensed, this is not the focus of this thesis. Rather, the focus here is on what I am calling ‘question of normativity’: how do the specific conditions of the hypothetical agreement constitute moral reasons for real-world agents? Each account of contractualism relies on a particular conception of practical reason to answer this question. That is, they each have an account of the kinds of considerations that provide an agent with a reason to perform action ϕ. The conception of practical reason relied on must explain why the hypothetical agents would reach an agreement, the nature of that agreement, and how that agreement comes to provide (strong, binding) reasons for real-world agents. The contention of the first part of this thesis is that the conceptions of practical reason adopted by the different contractualist approaches are, in distinct ways, inadequate to the task of explaining the relationship between what constitutes a reason in the hypothetical circumstances and what constitutes a reason in the real-world. That is, they fail to answer the question of normativity. The second part of the thesis attempts to provide a positive solution to the question of the form of normativity in the form of an account of agency inspired by the thought of G. W. F. Hegel. The claim is that an approach to agency inspired by what I call the ‘Hegelian Thought’ provides us with the tools for a plausible account of practical reason; one that makes sense of the interpersonal nature of this practical reason and is not hostage to a defeasible commitment to a substantive value. Before outlining the plan of this thesis, I will say a bit about moral contractualism more generally and explain some terminology in a bit more detail. 11 * Contractualism has a long historical pedigree, and while the basic idea behind the thought experiment that characterises it is relatively stable, the details and purpose of it vary. It has been used as a means of grounding political authority,1 to determine the nature of the political institutions that we should strive for,2and as the basis for determining the obligations we have, as individuals, to each other.3 The basic idea that these various approaches share is that we ought to be governed by what we would agree to in certain hypothetical idealised circumstances. Rousseau wondered what we would will if we had the general interests of the wider community at heart. Rawls considered what kind of political arrangements we would want if we had no idea what our position or status would be in the community. These latter approaches have much to offer, but they are not the focus here. This thesis is concerned exclusively with moral contractualism; that is, the code that would be agreed to in order to regulate individual conduct. A successful contractualist account will explain what we ought to do in terms of what would be agreed in these hypothetical circumstances presumed. So the reason I should return the money I borrowed when I said I would is because if a group of agents were determining the code we ought to live by it is highly likely that a principle of repaying debts agreed to on time would be endorsed.4 But any moral contractualism that provides answers to such question must also explain why the requirements that are derived through this process are binding on the agents they apply to.