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PABLO GILABERT Curriculum Vitae (March 2017) Department of Philosophy, Concordia University ❖ 1455 De Maisonneuve West ❖ Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3G 1M8 Tel

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PABLO GILABERT Curriculum Vitae (March 2017) Department of Philosophy, Concordia University ❖ 1455 De Maisonneuve West ❖ Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3G 1M8 Tel PABLO GILABERT Curriculum Vitae (March 2017) Department of Philosophy, Concordia University ❖ 1455 de Maisonneuve West ❖ Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3G 1M8 Tel. (514) 848 2424 ext. 2520 ❖ Email: [email protected] ❖ Web: http://www.concordia.ca/faculty/pablo-gilabert.html __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ACADEMIC POSITIONS Concordia University. Philosophy Department. Assistant Professor (2003). Associate Professor (since 2008). University of Montreal. Centre de Recherche en Ethique. Visiting Research Fellow (2018). Princeton University. Center for Human Values. Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellow (2011-12). Australian National University. Philosophy Program. Visiting Fellow (2008). Research Associate (2014). Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Buenos Aires. Law School. Visiting Scholar (2009). Oxford University. University College. HLA Hart Visiting Fellow (2007). EDUCATION New School for Social Research. Philosophy Department (minor field in Political Science), New York (1998-2003). M.A. (2000). Ph.D. with Honors (2003). Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität (University of Frankfurt). Philosophy Department. Doctoral studies and research as a DAAD fellow (2001-2). University of Buenos Aires. Philosophy Department. Licenciatura with Honors (1992-1997). PUBLICATIONS Book From Global Poverty to Global Equality. A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford University Press, 2012). Articles - “Dignity at Work.” Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law, ed. H. Collins, G. Lester, V. Mantouvalou (Oxford: Oxford University Press): forthcoming. - “Justice and Feasibility: A Dynamic Approach.” Political Utopias: Contemporary Debates, ed. M. Weber and K. Vallier (Oxford: Oxford University Press): forthcoming. - “Facts, Norms, and Dignity.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy: forthcoming. - “The Human Right to Democracy and the Pursuit of Global Justice.” The Oxford Handbook of Global Justice, ed. T. Brooks (Oxford: Oxford University Press): forthcoming. - “Reflections on Human Rights and Power.” Human Rights: Moral or Political? ed. A. Etinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press): forthcoming. - “Ability and Volitional Incapacity.” (With Nicholas Southwood). Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy: forthcoming. - “Justice and Beneficence.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 19.5 (2016): 508-533. - “Labor Human Rights and Human Dignity.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 42.2 (2016): 171-199. - “Global Moral Egalitarianism and Global Distributive Egalitarianism.” Ethics & International Affairs 29.3 (2015): 269-276. - “The Socialist Principle ‘From Each According To Their Abilities, To Each According To Their Needs’.” Journal of Social Philosophy 46.2 (2015): 197-225. - “Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Power.” Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, eds. R. Cruft, M. Liao, and M. Renzo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 196-213. - “Solidarity, Equality, and Freedom in Pettit’s Republicanism.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18.6 (2015): 644-651. - “The Capability Approach and the Debate between Humanist and Political Perspectives on Human Rights. A Critical Survey.” Human Rights Review 14.4 (2013): 299-325. - “How Should We Think About The Relation Between Principles and Agency?” Ethics & Global Politics 6.2 (2013): 75-83. - “Response to My Critics.” Les Ateliers de l’etique / The Ethics Forum 8.2 (2013): 121-132. (Symposium on my book From Global Poverty to Global Equality.) - “Comparative Assessments of Justice, Political Feasibility, and Ideal Theory.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15.1 (2012): 39-56. - “Political Feasibility: A Conceptual Exploration.” (With Holly Lawford-Smith). Political Studies 60.4 (2012): 809-825. - “Is There A Human Right to Democracy? A Response to Joshua Cohen.” Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia Politica / Latin American Journal of Political Philosophy 1.2 (2012): 1-37. - “Cohen on Socialism, Equality, and Community.” Socialist Studies 8.1 (2012): 101-121. - “Feasibility and Socialism.” The Journal of Political Philosophy 19.1 (2011): 52-63. - “Cosmopolitan Overflow.” The Monist 94.4 (2011): 584-592. - “Humanist and Political Perspectives on Human Rights.” Political Theory 39.4 (2011): 439-467. * Reprinted in B. Bix and H. Spector eds., Rights: Concepts and Contexts. Ashgate, 2012. * Reprinted, in French translation, in Philosophiques 42.2 (2015): 251-282. - “Kant and the Claims of the Poor.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81.2 (2010): 382-418. - “The Importance of Linkage Arguments for the Theory and Practice of Human Rights. A Response to James Nickel.” Human Rights Quarterly 32.2 (2010): 425-438. - “The Feasibility of Basic Socioeconomic Human Rights. A Conceptual Exploration.” The Philosophical Quarterly 59.237 (2009): 559-581. * Reprinted, in Spanish translation, in P. Dieterlen, ed., Los Derechos Economicos y Sociales. Una Mirada desde la Filosofia. Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico,. Mexico: 2010; pp. 175-210. - “Is There a Genuine Tension between Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism and Special Responsibilities?” (Co- authored with Arash Abizadeh). Philosophical Studies 138.3 (2008): 349-365. - “Global Justice and Poverty Relief in Nonideal Circumstances.” Social Theory and Practice 34.3 (2008): 411-438. - “Does Global Egalitarianism Provide an Impractical and Unattractive Ideal of Justice?” (Co-authored with Christian Barry). International Affairs 84.5 (2008): 1025-1039. - “Contractualism and Poverty Relief.” Social Theory and Practice 33.2 (2007): 277-310. - “Comentarios sobre la Concepción de la Justicia Global de Pogge” [Comments on Pogge’s Conception of Global Justice]. Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía 33.2 (2007): 205-222. (In Spanish) - “La Justice Globale, le Multiculturalisme et les Revendications des Immigrants.” [Global Justice, Multiculturalism, and the Claims of Immigrants]. Philosophiques 34.1 (2007): 41-60. (In French) - “Basic Positive Duties of Justice and Narveson’s Libertarian Challenge.” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 44.2 (2006): 193-216. - “Considerations on the Notion of Moral Validity in the Moral Theories of Kant and Habermas.” Kant-Studien 97.2 (2006): 210-227. - “Global Justice, Democracy and Solidarity.” Res Publica 12.4 (2006): 435-443. - “Cosmopolitanism and Discourse Ethics. A Critical Survey.” New Political Science 28.1 (2006): 1-21. - “The Duty to Eradicate Global Poverty: Positive or Negative?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7.5 (2005): 537-550. - “A Substantivist Construal of Discourse Ethics.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13.3 (2005): 405-437. * Reprinted in D. Rasmussen and J. Swindal eds., Habermas II (London: SAGE, 2009.) - “Should Discourse Ethics Do Without a Principle of Universalization?” The Philosophical Forum 36.2 (2005): 183-191. * Reprinted in D. Rasmussen and J. Swindal eds., Habermas II (London: SAGE, 2009.) - “Two Sets of Concerns about Heath’s ‘Pragmatic Theory of Convergence’.” Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 44.2 (2005): 383-390. - “The Substantive Dimension of Deliberative Practical Rationality.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 31.2 (2005): 185-210. 2 - “Política Dominatoria y Emancipatoria. Reflexiones Situacionales sobre Acción Política y Violencia.” [Politics of Domination and Politics of Emancipation: Situational Reflections on Political Action and Violence]. In F. Schuster, F. Naisthat, G. Nardacchione, S. Pereyra eds., Tomar la Palabra. Estudios sobre la protesta social y la acción colectiva en la Argentina contemporánea (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2005), pp. 129-150. (In Spanish) - “La Posible Reinvención de la Democracia en Argentina.” [The Possible Reinvention of Democracy in Argentina] El Rodaballo VIII.14 (Buenos Aires, 2002): 23-26. (In Spanish) - “La Reformulación de Habermas de la Teoría Crítica en Términos de una Teoría de la Acción Comunicativa.” [Habermas’s Reformulation of Critical Theory in Terms of a Theory of Communicative Action]. In F. Naishtat ed., La acción y la política: perspectivas filosóficas (Barcelona: Gedisa, 2002), pp. 171-194. (In Spanish) - “Marx y la Democracia.” [Marx and Democracy] Doxa IX.19 (Buenos Aires, 1999): 57-68. (In Spanish) - “Relaciones Sociales, Conflicto e Historia. Una Interpretación de ‘Dialéctica’ en Marx.” [Social Relations, Conflict and History. An Interpretation of ‘Dialectics’ in Marx]. In M.L. Femenías ed., Cuatro Concepciones de la Dialéctica (La Plata: Editorial Universitaria de la Plata, 1998), pp. 117-146. (In Spanish) - “Individuo Social y Autonomía en Marx.” [The Social Individual and Autonomy in Marx]. Cuadernos de Filosofia 44, Universidad de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires,1998): 51-60. (In Spanish) - “Algunas Notas sobre Elster, Marxismo e Individualismo Metodológico.” [Some Remarks on Elster, Marxism and Methodological Individualism]. Doxa VII.17 (Buenos Aires, 1997): 46-50. (In Spanish) Short reviews and some other short texts - “An Intellectual Laboratory for the Democratic and Cosmopolitan Left.” Philosophy & Social Criticism: forthcoming. - “Fundamental Ideas.” In The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, ed. by Jon Mandle and David Reidy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 306-307. - “Amartya Sen.” In The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, ed. by Jon Mandle and David Reidy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 765-767. - “The two Principles of Justice.” In The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, ed. by Jon Mandle and David Reidy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
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