HPG HPG Policy Brief 50 Humanitarian December 2012 Policy Group

Talking to the other side Taliban perspectives on aid and development work in Afghanistan Ashley Jackson and Antonio Giustozzi

Key messages

• Taliban leaders have an established highlighted the often coercive Taliban policy on aid access that is relatively well attitudes towards civilians and raised understood by fighters on the ground. serious questions about the transfer of However, interpretations of this policy risk in aid agency approaches focused on are fluid and adherence is variable. gaining ‘community acceptance’. • While Taliban leaders convey greater • The withdrawal of international forces in openness towards aid agencies, 2014 will bring even greater uncertainty interviews revealed a deep distrust with regard to humanitarian access. and suspicion of aid agencies. This While negotiating with the Taliban related to their perceived partiality and presents formidable challenges, it is to criticisms of their effectiveness and likely to become increasingly important transparency. for aid agencies that wish to continue • Research with civilians and Taliban working in Afghanistan.

In the years immediately following the fall Kandahar, to examine these issues in depth. of the Taliban regime in 2001, aid agencies The study provides an overview of the Taliban’s were able to access the vast majority of structure and policies on aid access, and how Afghanistan. The subsequent resurgence of these policies are interpreted and implemented the Taliban, beginning in the south and east, at the local level.1 Ashley Jackson is a Research Fellow in saw heightened levels of violence and civilian the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG). casualties as well as a sharp rise in attacks Taliban structure and hierarchy Antonio Giustozzi is Visiting Professor in on aid workers. While aid agencies were the Department of War Studies at King’s intentionally targeted in this initial period of The Taliban are formally organised around two College London. Taliban revival, there appears to have been a main centres in Pakistan: Quetta, which is the shift indicating greater openness toward aid seat of the Political Commission, and Pesha- Overseas Development Institute actors in recent years. war, the seat of the Military and Finance Com- 203 Blackfriars Road, missions. Subordinate to these, the Taliban London SE1 8NJ Tel: +44 (0)20 7922 0300 Little substantive research has been conducted have established commissions dealing with Fax: +44 (0)20 7922 0399 on Taliban attitudes towards aid agencies. policy and strategy in various areas including aid This HPG Policy Brief summarises research agency engagement (through the Commission Websites: www.odi.org.uk/hpg and www.odihpn.org conducted in Afghanistan involving almost 40 for the Arrangement and Control of Companies interviews with the Taliban as well as more than and Organisations). They have also established 100 interviews with aid agencies and ordinary a code of conduct for their fighters, the Layha. Afghans, examining Taliban attitudes and 1 For the full research findings, see Ashley Jackson policies toward aid agencies and humanitarian and Antonio Giustozzi, Talking to the Other Side: and development work. Field research focused Humanitarian Engagement with the Taliban in on two provincial case studies, Faryab and Afghanistan, HPG Working Paper (London: ODI, 2012). HPG Policy Brief 50

Within Afghanistan, Provincial Military Comm- wide range of sources, including both the UN and issioners, with subordinate district-level Military the US government. According to Abas, ‘it doesn’t Commissioners, supervise Taliban operations and matter to us whether it is American money or the report to regional Military Commissions. Comple- money of the UN’, implying that agencies operating menting these military functions, Shadow Governors with this funding would be tolerated as long as act as the ‘civilian’ authority at provincial level, they followed the Taliban’s rules. However, many reinforcing the visibility of the Taliban as a viable local commanders exhibited negative attitudes alternative to the Afghan government. However, towards and suspicion of funding from International Shadow Governors have rarely been present on Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troop-contributing the ground since 2010 because of the high level of countries. threat from international forces and their influence is variable, with research indicating that military There does not appear to be marked discrimination figures exert greater authority. among project types or activities within official policy. However, some projects, such as road construction, In theory, military commanders and political figures were objectionable when they appeared to go at regional, provincial and district level should against military interests. Taliban at all levels adhere to what the leadership dictates. However, were also critical of aspects of humanitarian and the Taliban have a weak centre and as a movement development work for its perceived inefficiency is ‘federal’ in character. There appears to be a and partiality. There was also, perhaps predictably, tendency to use bodies such as the commissions strong resistance to Western notions of women’s and Shadow Governors as institutional lookalikes rights. These trends were more pronounced among for political propaganda purposes. The degree Taliban at the local level. to which they actually function and influence decision-making is variable, although interviews In order to register, aid agencies interviewed reported with provincial and district commanders showed liaising with interlocutors in Afghanistan or Pakistan some evidence of these structures playing a role at to gain access to the Taliban leadership. Once local level. In practice, personality, leadership and registered, agencies are advised to com-municate charisma have great importance across the various with provincial or local commanders in their areas Taliban networks. of operation. Local Taliban are then expected to monitor the implementation of aid agency activities Given the diversity among and across the various and agencies’ adherence to the rules. networks comprising the Taliban, leadership orders and decrees are framed in such a way as to satisfy This policy was fairly well understood by provincial the various components of the movement and Taliban leaders in both Faryab and Kandahar. prevent friction between the loosely assembled Registration at the senior level appeared to be parts of the organisation. This vagueness and critical; while some commanders were willing to the imprecise phrasing of policy allow room for strike local deals with unregistered agencies, these manoeuvre. Personal negotiations and relationships appeared precarious and vulnerable to disruption at all levels play an important role, as evidenced in by rival or hardline commanders. The Taliban at the variety of attitudes towards aid access. the local level also appeared to be capable of monitoring adherence to conditions for access and Taliban policy on aid access enforcing them. In many instances, Taliban reported monitoring projects through informants within aid Taliban leaders have an articulated policy on aid agencies. Projects appeared to be monitored for agency access. According to the Taliban Commiss- efficiency, and to ensure that aid agencies were not ioner for the Arrangement and Control of Companies engaging in ‘espionage’. As such, hiring local staff and Organisations, Qari Abas, agencies are required was seen as important: a commander in Panjwai to register with the Taliban at senior leadership pointed out that ‘when from 60 to 100 local people level. Registration requires agencies to meet several are involved in a project, how would they be able to conditions, including neutrality, respect for Taliban work for hidden targets?’. When rules are broken, concepts of ‘Afghan culture’ and, in certain circum- the consequences for aid agencies can be severe, stances, payment of tax. ranging from warnings or the temporary closure of projects to attacks on staff. The leadership was At the leadership level, the Taliban appear not to eager to stress that attacks on aid agencies were not discriminate between organisations, whether UN or indiscriminate, but local commanders nonetheless NGOs, Afghan or international. Indeed, a list of 26 appeared authorised to expel, attack or harass aid registered organisations provided by Abas included agencies. UN agencies, national and international NGOs and human rights organisations. Agencies that the While the political leadership may be attempting Taliban claim are registered rely on funding from a to give the appearance of a viable structure and

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an open attitude towards aid actors, their ability There was also a fear that aid agencies failed to ensure that military commanders and fighters to respect Afghan culture and Islamic values, at on the ground share these views is limited. least as defined by the Taliban. Western views of The vagueness and imprecision of ‘official’ women’s rights were the most contentious point, policy accord significant discretion to local com- and were widely seen as a prime example of manders. The rules are fluid and vary depending the apparent morally corrosive implications of on who is in charge, but several factors appear Western-defined ‘development’. A senior military critical in shaping access constraints, including commander in Faryab commented that ‘the UN personal experience of aid agencies and military and NGOs are talking about rights of women that pressure. they have made up themselves. They say women have the right to work with men, go everywhere, Taliban perceptions of aid agencies do what they want – but these are not the rights of women’. Similar views were expressed in Kandahar, In general, Taliban found it difficult to distinguish and both Taliban and aid agency staff reported between different actors, particularly at the local incidents where the Taliban exerted pressure on level (NGOs, UN agencies, the UN Assistance aid agencies, including banning female staff from Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), for-profit working in health clinics and schools. However, contractors, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) there appeared to be room for negotiation under and so on). In some instances, there were more some circumstances. Some aid workers reported favourable attitudes towards NGOs in general or that they were able to overcome initial Taliban specifically towards Afghan NGOs than towards the opposition to agencies working with women, and UN. Where commanders could distinguish between many felt that the Taliban would allow at least the various components of the UN, UNAMA was limited female employment or work with women seen less favourably than other agencies. UNAMA’s as long as ‘Afghan culture’ was seen as being support to the Afghan government is explicitly respected (for example, on the condition that described by some Taliban as compromising the female employees only work with Afghan women). position of all UN agencies. A minority of Taliban interviewed during this In general, there was a high degree of hostility research held positive views of aid agencies. Positive towards aid actors. Accusations of spying for associations were often directly related to personal foreign governments or being at their service experience: one fighter’s father, for instance, had were repeatedly expressed. Some more radical worked for a UN agency; a Taliban commander Taliban felt that, because NGOs cooperate with praised UN agencies and NGOs for providing school parties to the conflict, they were legitimate supplies and clearing irrigation ditches. Despite targets. Counterinsurgency tactics seem to have the widespread suspicion of aid agencies, these influenced the perceptions of some Taliban, comments underscore the importance of high-quality, particularly in Kandahar. Many reported that they needs-based programming and transparency. They had been amenable to granting aid agencies also suggest that experiences with one aid agency, access, but had changed their view when they whether positive or negative, are likely to influence saw agencies increasingly working only in Taliban views of aid agencies in general. government-controlled areas and coming into previously insecure areas after they had been Military pressure ‘cleared’. In many cases, this confirmed their suspicions of agencies being aligned with the While the political leadership of the Taliban favours government and ISAF. granting conditional humanitarian access, the military leadership often responds to increased The Taliban, and indeed many community members, military pressure by restricting humanitarian felt that aid was being distributed in an imbalanced access. The military leadership appears not to way, and that programmes were ineffective and explicitly violate official policy on humanitarian short term. In the words of one Faryab commander access, but such concerns are clearly subordinate from Almar district, aid agencies’ work was ‘totally to military objectives. For example, a commander disposable, not permanent’ and ‘they just help from Spin Boldak in Kandahar stated that aid you enough to survive’. There was also anger at access ‘changes in time of fighting between foreign the perceived ineffectiveness of aid, with one troops because we don’t trust them and we don’t commander from Maruf district commenting that let any NGOs have access to our areas’. ‘huge amounts are spent in Kandahar but we have not seen any project during the last decade that There were also more direct, and dangerous, has brought any positive change to our lives’. consequences for aid agencies. In several instances, Poor-quality projects reinforced suspicions that aid ISAF military operations appeared to have led to or agencies had ulterior motives. were used to justify attacks on aid agencies. After

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ISAF raids and airstrikes in Faryab, for example, a local Taliban used to be more cooperative, but Taliban commander claimed to have attacked NGO that recently arrived ‘Taliban from Pakistan are staff whom he believed had tipped off international oblivious to our suffering and now we can’t even forces. What proof he had to substantiate this think of development or relief work in our areas’. assertion was unclear. Aid agency staff may be the only ‘outsiders’ travelling to a certain village, and The role of communities underlying suspicions of aid agencies may make them the most likely suspects when something Aid agencies consistently reported relying on goes wrong. elders or other community members to arrange access with the Taliban. In certain circumstances, While military pressure led to constraints on access, pressure from communities and elders appeared to the inverse – that less military pressure led to induce Taliban commanders to allow access. This greater access – was not always true. In some cases only appeared to work where elders where either where the Taliban were strong and unchallenged, trusted by the Taliban, or local commanders were the military leadership attempted to place severe not predisposed to limit access. Even Taliban who restrictions on access. However, where the Taliban acknowledged that such negotiations had taken were weaker some commanders tended to grant a place were suspicious of elders advocating for measure of access in order to maintain community aid agency presence, fearing that they might be support. ‘corruptible’ by NGOs.

ISAF’s kill/capture campaign, targeting senior Interviews with elders and the Taliban highlighted and mid-level commanders, has led to increased the risks that elders faced in mediating on behalf of volatility in the Taliban command and resultant aid agencies. Those who vouched for aid agencies access challenges. Heavy losses sustained by the faced dangerous consequences if the agencies Taliban have led to a growing reliance on ‘foreign’ then violated the Taliban’s rules. A commander in fighters or the appointment of replacement Almar district of Faryab stated that, if an ‘NGO is commanders with few ties to local communities. spying or doing something against our law, then This research found substantial differences in we will punish the elders’. This calls into question attitudes towards aid agencies among local Taliban, the viability, both operationally and ethically, of who have largely pragmatic reasons for being part such approaches. In particular, there are serious of the insurgency, and Taliban from other parts of questions about the transfer of risk to community Afghanistan or from Pakistan and Uzbekistan, who members, who are being asked to put their lives at are more likely to be ideologically motivated. risk in order to obtain assistance.

Local Taliban saw hardline jihadists as disruptive Conclusion to aid access, in contrast to more moderate local Taliban, who were typically well-connected Engaging with the Taliban on issues of aid access with communities and more likely to listen is fraught with challenges, and the withdrawal of to appeals from elders. Fighters coming from international troops in 2014 will bring even greater outside also generally had little regard for the uncertainty. Yet findings from this research clearly Taliban’s political leadership. This was particularly demonstrate the need for aid agencies to enhance pronounced in Kandahar. Aid agency sources their understanding of this issue and pursue more reported harassment and hostile behaviour by rigorous and structured approaches to working in Pakistani Taliban from Baluchistan in the first Taliban areas. While engagement with the Taliban half of 2012 – a timeframe corresponding to a presents formidable risks and challenges, pursuing Taliban surge into southern Afghanistan aimed a structured, informed approach to humanitarian at instilling vigour into the insurgency. One elder dialogue is increasingly critical for agencies in Shah Wali Kot district in Kandahar stated that committed to continuing to work in Afghanistan.