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The War in Southern Afghanistan 2001 – 2008

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The War in Southern Afghanistan 2001 – 2008 The War in Southern Afghanistan 2001 – 2008 Carter Malkasian Jerry Meyerle Megan Katt Project sponsored by the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity CRM D0020874.A1/Final July 2009 Strategic Studies is a division of CNA. This directorate conducts analyses of security policy, regional analyses, studies of political-military issues, and strategy and force assessments. CNA Strategic Studies is part of the global community of strategic studies institutes and in fact collaborates with many of them. On the ground experience is a hallmark of our regional work. Our specialists combine in-country experience, language skills, and the use of local primary-source data to produce empirically based work. All of our analysts have advanced degrees, and virtually all have lived and worked abroad. Similarly, our strategists and military/naval operations experts have either active duty experience or have served as field analysts with operating Navy and Marine Corps commands. They are skilled at anticipating the “problem after next” as well as determining measures of effectiveness to assess ongoing initiatives. A particular strength is bringing empirical methods to the evaluation of peace-time engagement and shaping activities. The Strategic Studies Division’s charter is global. In particular, our analysts have proven expertise in the following areas: • Insurgency and stabilization • The full range of Middle East related security issues, especially Iran and the Arabian Gulf • The full range of Asian security issues • Maritime strategy • Future national security environment and forces • European security issues, especially the Mediterranean littoral • West Africa, especially the Gulf of Guinea • Latin America • The world’s most important navies. The Strategic Studies Division is led by Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt, USN (Ret.), who is available at (703) 824-2614 or [email protected]. The executive assistant to the director is Ms. Kathy Lewis, at (703) 824-2519. For questions regarding this document, please contact Carter Malkasian at [email protected] or (703) 824- 2204, or Jerry Meyerle at [email protected] or (703) 824-2632. Photo credit line: Marine Corps/Lance Cpl. Brian D. Jones Approved for distribution: July 2009 Carter Malkasian Research Team Leader Stability and Development Program This document represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy. Distribution limited to USG agencies and NATO. Specific authority: N00014-05-D-0500. Copies of this document can be obtained through the Defense Technical Information Center at www.dtic.mil Or contact CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123. Copyright © 2009 CNA UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO//REL NATO Contents Maps......................................................................................................................................................iii Figures ...................................................................................................................................................v Tables...................................................................................................................................................vii Introduction..........................................................................................................................................1 The War in Southern Afghanistan, 2001–2006 ...............................................................................3 How the Taliban Returned.............................................................................................................5 The Opposing Sides ...................................................................................................................5 Opportunity Lost: 2002–2004...................................................................................................8 The End of the Beginning: 2005 ............................................................................................13 The 2006 Taliban Spring Offensive: Open Warfare ................................................................17 Kandahar....................................................................................................................................17 Helmand.....................................................................................................................................19 The Shattered State...................................................................................................................22 The War in Southern Afghanistan, 2006–2008 .............................................................................23 Hardest Fighting since Korea, February to December 2006 ..................................................23 Canadians in Kandahar ............................................................................................................24 Stretched Out in Helmand.......................................................................................................25 Operation Mountain Thrust....................................................................................................28 Operation Medusa ....................................................................................................................28 Musa Qala: the Afghan Fallujah..............................................................................................29 Stemming the Tide, 2007–2008...................................................................................................31 Taliban Governance .................................................................................................................31 Clearing and Holding................................................................................................................33 Afghan Security Forces ............................................................................................................35 Afghan National Army ........................................................................................................35 Afghan National Police .......................................................................................................36 High Value Targeting ...............................................................................................................38 Collateral Damage.....................................................................................................................41 Afghan Governance .................................................................................................................42 Farah ...........................................................................................................................................44 Recapture of Musa Qala...........................................................................................................45 The Taliban Strike at Urban Areas.........................................................................................47 Kandahar and the Sarpoza Prison Break ..........................................................................47 Lashkar Gah and the Fall of Nad Ali ................................................................................48 Increasing American Presence in Rural Areas......................................................................49 Conclusion......................................................................................................................................51 A Brief History of the War in Farah: Southwest Afghanistan, 2002-2007................................55 2002-2005 .......................................................................................................................................55 Political Dynamics ....................................................................................................................56 Poppy..........................................................................................................................................58 UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO//REL NATO i UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO//REL NATO Paving of the Ring Road..........................................................................................................58 2006-2007 .......................................................................................................................................59 Expansion of the Insurgency ..................................................................................................59 Extortion and Corruption........................................................................................................63 Narcotics ....................................................................................................................................64 Iran..............................................................................................................................................66 Conclusion......................................................................................................................................67 Final Thoughts ...................................................................................................................................69 Index ....................................................................................................................................................71 ii UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO//REL NATO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO//REL NATO Maps Map 1) Tribal Divisions in Helmand and Kandahar ......................................................................4
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