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Afghanistan Anti-Government Elements (Ages) European Asylum Support Office Afghanistan Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) Country of Origin Information Report August 2020 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office Afghanistan Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) Country of Origin Information Report August 2020 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). PDF ISBN: 978-92-9485-648-7 doi: 10.2847/14756 BZ0220563ENN © European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 2020 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyright statements of the respective third parties. Cover photo: © ResoluteSupportMedia/Major James Crawford, Kandahar, Afghanistan 11 April 2011 url CC BY 2.0 Taliban fighters met with Government of the Republic of Afghanistan officials in Kandahar City, 11 April 2011, and peacefully surrendered their arms as part of the government's peace and reintegration process. 4 — AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT Acknowledgements This report was drafted by the European Asylum Support Office Country of Origin Information (COI) Sector. The following national asylum and migration departments and organisations contributed by reviewing this report: Denmark, Danish Immigration Service The Netherlands, Office for Country Information and Language Analysis, Ministry of Justice ACCORD, the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation It must be noted that the review carried out by the mentioned departments and organisations contributes to the overall quality of the report, but it does not necessarily imply their formal endorsement of the final report, which is the full responsibility of EASO. AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 5 Contents Acknowledgements..................................................................................................................4 Contents .................................................................................................................................5 Disclaimer ...............................................................................................................................7 Glossary and abbreviations .......................................................................................................8 Introduction ............................................................................................................................9 Terms of Reference ..............................................................................................................9 Methodology .......................................................................................................................9 Structure and use of the report.............................................................................................9 Map ...................................................................................................................................... 10 1. General overview ............................................................................................................... 11 1.1 Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) ................................................................................ 11 1.2 Negotiations on the Doha Agreement with the Taliban ................................................... 12 1.2.1 Motivations and targeting patterns since the Doha Agreement ................................. 13 2. The Taliban ........................................................................................................................ 16 2.1 Structure and leadership ............................................................................................... 16 2.2 Strength, presence, territorial control, and capacity ....................................................... 19 2.3 Objectives .................................................................................................................... 20 2.4 Recruitment strategies ................................................................................................. 21 2.4.1 Child recruitment ................................................................................................... 21 2.5 Human rights violations and abuses............................................................................... 21 2.6 Targeted individuals ..................................................................................................... 22 2.6.1 Members of the Afghan security forces and pro-government militias ........................ 22 2.6.2 Government officials and those perceived as supporting the government ................. 24 3. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)................................................................................. 29 3.1 Structure and leadership ............................................................................................... 29 3.2 Strength, presence, territorial control, capacity .............................................................. 30 3.3 Objectives .................................................................................................................... 32 3.4 Recruitment strategies ................................................................................................. 33 3.5 Human rights violations and abuses............................................................................... 34 3.6 Targeted individuals and recent attacks ......................................................................... 34 3.6.1 Hazara Shia ............................................................................................................ 34 3.6.2 Sikhs ...................................................................................................................... 34 3.6.3 Other examples of treatment of opponents, including perceived ‘infidels’, ‘apostates’, spies or other insurgents ................................................................................................. 35 6 — AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT 4. Other AGEs ........................................................................................................................ 36 4.1 Haqqani network .......................................................................................................... 36 4.2 Al Qaeda and affiliates .................................................................................................. 37 4.3 Foreign AGEs and fighters ............................................................................................. 38 Annex I: Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 40 Annex II: Terms of Reference .................................................................................................. 52 AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT — 7 Disclaimer This report was written according to the EASO COI Report Methodology (2019).1 The report is based on carefully selected sources of information. All sources used are referenced. The information contained in this report has been researched, evaluated and analysed with utmost care. However, this document does not claim to be exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned in the report, this does not mean that the event has not taken place or that the person or organisation does not exist. Furthermore, this report is not conclusive as to the determination or merit of any particular application for international protection. Terminology used should not be regarded as indicative of a particular legal position. ‘Refugee’, ‘risk’ and similar terminology are used as generic terminology and not in the legal sense as applied in the EU Asylum Acquis, the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained in this report. The drafting of this report was finalised 18 June 2020. Any event taking place after this date is not included in this report. More information on the reference period for this report can be found in the methodology section of the Introduction. 1 The EASO methodology is largely based on the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI), 2008, and can be downloaded from the EASO website: http://www.easo.europa.eu. 8 — AFGHANISTAN: ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS - EASO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT Glossary and abbreviations AAN Afghanistan Analysts Network AGE Anti-Government Element AIHRC Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission Apostasy The act of leaving Islam; a hudud crime punishable by death under sharia Emir Arabic word used for a commander fatwa A ruling or opinion given by the head of a religious community in Islam Hazara An ethnic group who are mainly Shia Islamic Emirate of The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was the state in Afghanistan from Afghanistan 1996 to 2001 under the Taliban ruling government. The Taliban still uses this name to refer to itself. ISKP Islamic State in Khorasan Province; affiliates of ISIL based in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Also called ISK. Jihad Islamic ‘holy war’ Kafir, kufr, kofaar An ‘unbeliever’ in Islam; label those deemed anti-Islamic; ‘foreign infidels’
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