The feathers of Cóndor: transnational State ,

exiles and civilian anticommunism in

Fernando Antonio López

PhD thesis

Supervisors:

Dr Peter Ross – Mr Günter Minnerup

University of New South Wales (UNSW)

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

School of Humanities

2014

PLEASE TYPE

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES

Thesis/Dissertation Sheet

Surname or Family name: López

First name: Fernando Other name/s: Antonio

Abbreviation for degree as given in the University 1240 – History: Doctor of Philosophy calendar: (Research)

School: Humanities and Languages Faculty: Arts and Social Sciences

Title: The feathers of Cóndor: transnational , exiles, and civilian anticommunism in South America

Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE)

On 25 November 1975, representatives of five South American intelligence services held a secret meeting in the city of . At the end of the gathering, the participating delegations agreed to launch Operation Cóndor under the pretext of coordinating activities, sharing information to combat leftist guerrillas and stoping an alleged advance of in the region. Cóndor, however, went much further than mere exchanges of information between neighbours. It was a plan to transnationalize State Terrorism beyond South America. This dissertation identifies the reasons why the South American military regimes chose this strategic path at a time when most revolutionary movements in the region were defeated and in the process of leaving the armed struggle and resuming the political path. One of Cóndor’s most intriguing features was the level of cooperation achieved by these governments considering the distrust, animosity and historical rivalries between these countries’ armed forces. The thesis explores these differences and goes further than previous lines of inquire, which have focused predominantly on the conflict between the Latin American leftist guerrillas and the armed forces, to study the contribution made by other actors such as civilian anticommunist figures and organizations, and the activities conducted by political active exiles and their supporters in numerous countries. This broader approach confirms that the South American launched the Cóndor Plan to systematically eliminate any kind of opposition, especially key figures and groups involved in the denunciation of the regimes’ human rights violations.

Declaration relating to disposition of project thesis/dissertation

I hereby grant to the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all property rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstracts International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only).

…………………………………………………… ……………………………………..……… ……….……………………...… ……… ……… ….… Signature Witness Date

The University recognises that there may be exceptional circumstances requiring restrictions on copying or conditions on use. Requests for restriction for a period of up to 2 years must be made in writing. Requests for a longer period of restriction may be considered in exceptional circumstances and require the approval of the Dean of Graduate Research.

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY Date of completion of requirements for Award:

THIS SHEET IS TO BE GLUED TO THE INSIDE FRONT COVER OF THE THESIS

Originality Statement

‘I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.’

Signed ……………………………………………......

Date ……………………………………………......

Word count: 91,656

Précis

On 25 November 1975, representatives of five South American intelligence services held a secret meeting in the city of Santiago, Chile. At the end of the gathering, the participating delegations agreed to launch Operation Cóndor under the pretext of coordinating counterinsurgency activities, sharing information to combat leftist guerrillas and stoping an alleged advance of Marxism in the region. Cóndor, however, went much further than mere exchanges of information between neighbours. It was a plan to transnationalize State terrorism beyond South America. This dissertation identifies the reasons why the South American military regimes chose this strategic path at a time when most revolutionary movements in the region were defeated and in the process of leaving the armed struggle and resuming the political path. One of Cóndor’s most intriguing features was the level of cooperation achieved by these governments considering the distrust, animosity and historical rivalries between these countries’ armed forces. The thesis explores these differences and goes further than previous lines of inquire, which have focused predominantly on the conflict between Latin American leftist guerrillas and the armed forces, to study the contribution made by other actors such as civilian anticommunist figures and organizations, and the activities conducted by politically active exiles and their supporters in numerous countries. This broader approach confirms that the South American dictatorships launched the Cóndor Plan to systematically eliminate any kind of opposition, especially key figures and groups involved in the denunciation of the regimes’ human rights violations.

Acknowledgments

It would have been impossible to complete this dissertation without the support of the people that helped me all these years in the , , , and Australia. I would like to acknowledge the help and assistance provided by the staff of the National Security Archive (NSA) at the George Washington University, in Washington D.C., and the staff at the National Archives (NARA), in Maryland. The volumes of material made available to me, as well as the staff’s friendly advice and guidance were priceless. In Asunción, Paraguay, I need to acknowledge the valuable help and warmth support provided by all the staff at the Centro de Documentación y Archivo (CDYA). I also want to extend a special thank you to Dr Martin Almada and his family for their kindness, valuable recommendations and for sharing their amazing stories with me. In , Uruguay, I want to thank the support provided by the staff of the CEIL-CEIU at the Faculty of Humanities of the Universidad de la República (UDELAR), and Drs Álvaro Rico and Clara Aldrighi. Their openness and willingness to facilitate material and suggest alternatives when it was not possible to meet my requests were outstanding. A similar token of appreciation for the same type of cooperation must go to Mr Álvaro Corbacho and his assistant Mariela from the Historical archive of the Foreign Relations Ministry. To all of them I will for ever be in debt. In Australia I must acknowledge the enormous support provided by my wife la negrita Graciela and her family. Without their understanding and cooperation, which at times required numerous sacrifices and large logistic exercises, it would have been impossible to complete this investigation. But more importantly, I want to thank my two supervisors, Dr Peter Ross and Mr Günter Minnerup. Their patience, understanding, and support during all these years have been incredible. Their hard work and high ethical standards have always been an inspiration and pushed me to go further, reaching goals that I never thought possible. Finally, I want to dedicate this humble work to my mother for always being there for me and my brothers, and for working hard to give us an education. Gracias vieja!

Table of Contents

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES ...... 2 Thesis/Dissertation Sheet ...... 2 THIS SHEET IS TO BE GLUED TO THE INSIDE FRONT COVER OF THE THESIS ...... 3 Introduction ...... 1 Chapter I ...... 39 From distrust and suspicion to mutual cooperation: the genesis of the Cóndor partnership ...... 39 Historical antagonisms ...... 41 Reasons for cooperation ...... 49 Exogenous factors ...... 49 Endogenous factors ...... 62 Cooperation at last ...... 98 Chapter II ...... 106 A convenient excuse: The Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (JCR) (Revolutionary Coordinating Junta) ...... 106 Historical background ...... 109 Early beginnings ...... 118 Early activities to establish the JCR’s infrastructure ...... 123 Internal analysis ...... 136 Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) ...... 136 Movimiento de Liberación Nacional- (MLN-T) ...... 148 Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) ...... 164 Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores-Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (PRT-ERP) ...... 186 The JCR ...... 216 The Arrests of Amilcar Santucho and Fuentes ...... 216 The military’s views and analysis ...... 222 Chapter III ...... 228 The fight goes on: the internationalisation of peaceful resistance to the South American regimes ...... 228 The US Congress and the Nixon administration...... 229 The South American exiles’ new tactics ...... 240

The Chilean resistance ...... 242 The Uruguayan resistance ...... 262 The Bolivian and Paraguayan exile communities ...... 277 Chapter IV ...... 287 The brotherhood comes together: the Radical Latin American Right (RLAR), its global connections and links with the Cóndor Plan ...... 287 Nixon and Kissinger’s interaction with the Communist World...... 292 Ford Administration ...... 304 US’s views on Latin American foreign policy by late 1975 ...... 305 The World Anticommunist League (WACL) and the Latin American Anticommunist Confederation (CAL) ...... 308 The Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League (APACL) ...... 312 Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) ...... 316 The founding of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) ...... 318 Nixon and WACL ...... 320 The Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana (CAL) ...... 322 WACL VII Congress in Washington DC ...... 341 WACL VIII Congress in Rio de Janeiro ...... 344 Conclusion ...... 356 Primary sources ...... 369 Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios Latinoamericanos-Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios Uruguayos (CEIL-CEIU), Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, Universidad de la República Uruguay ...... 369 CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD ...... 370 Documents Uruguayan Foreign Relations Ministry’s Archive, Montevideo, Uruguay ...... 374 Documents National Archives (NARA) College Park, Maryland ...... 375 Documents National Security Archive (NSA), (George Washington University, Washington DC) ...... 376 FOIA Documents Chile Declassification Project ...... 377 Documents State Department Wikileaks ...... 377 Documents Centro de Información y Archivo (CDYA) Paraguay ...... 377

Bibliography ...... 379

Introduction

Operation Cóndor was the codename given to what was secretly described by five South American intelligence agencies, and some US officials, in the mid-1970s as the coordinated sharing of intelligence between countries in the region to combat Marxist . However, this plan was much more than a simple exchange of information between friendly nations. It was a plan to systematically eliminate any kind of opposition, especially key figures and groups involved in the denunciation of the regimes’ human rights violations. Under the Cóndor umbrella, these intelligence services conducted operations in the participating countries and also the US and other European nations. As Patrice McSherry points out, this plan cannot be dissociated from the overall context of the global anticommunist alliance led by the United States during the .1 However, given that most writers in this field have clearly established that this plan’s roots and its conception are found in a much earlier period, it remains unclear why Cóndor was formalized in late 1975. It is also not easy to explain the high levels of cooperation between the South American armed forces and the coordinated use of state terrorism. Most of the participating countries had significant military and political confrontations, including war during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As a consequence of such conflicts, the relationships between these armed forces had been undermined by distrust and deep antagonisms during that period. An explanation for the formalization of the Cóndor alliance becomes even more difficult when one takes into account that the most prominent revolutionary movements2 were severely weakened or defeated by November 1975. At that time, only a small number of revolutionary groups remained committed to armed struggle in , including the Peronist and the

1 McSherry, P., (1999), ": clandestine Inter-American system", Social , 26(4): 144-174. 2 Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T) in Uruguay, Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) in Chile, and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in .

1

Trotskyite Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo-Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (ERP-PRT).3 Although the most active and militant groups in South America at the time, these organizations had also received important, if not lethal, blows after the launched Operación Independencia (), in early 1975.

Hence, this thesis aims to determine why the South American military regimes chose to transnationalize state terrorism at a time when most revolutionary movements in the region were defeated and in the process of leaving the armed struggle and resuming the political path to seek change. Two hypotheses will be tested to answer this question. The first is that these military regimes turned towards the coordinated use of state terrorism at that particular juncture because they, intentionally or unintentionally, grossly overstated the threat posed by the revolutionary movements and other political groups. The tendency to overstate the nature of a threat, according to Huntington, is imbedded in the role of the military man at the time of evaluating any threat to the state. According to this author:

The military man normally views with alarm the potency and immediacy of the security threats to the state … recognizes the continuing character of threats to the state, but he also stresses the urgency of the current danger. The goal of professional competence requires the military man to estimate the threat as accurately as possible. […] The military man’s views also reflect a subjective professional bias, the strength of which depends upon his general level of professionalism. This professional bias, or sense of professional responsibility, leads him to feel that if he errs in his estimate, it should be on the side of overstating the threat. Consequently, at times he will see threats to the security of the state where actually no threats exist.4 In democratic systems, such evaluations are usually balanced with the views of civilian actors and institutions. However, when Cóndor was formalized, almost no civilian institutions were in a position to moderate, exert influence over, or

3 People’s Revolutionary Army-Workers’ Revolutionary Party. 4 Huntington, S. P., (1957), The soldier and the state: the theory and politics of civil-military relations, Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, p. 66.

2

control the military’s evaluation of the situation. The only civilian authorities or influential figures in a position to exert any kind of influence over the military leaders supported the radical views of those regimes. Hence, in the absence of more moderate voices, the military regimes and their allies embarked on a mission to eliminate such threats in any way they thought appropriate, even to the extent of disregarding international conventions on human rights and laws concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. In addition to this, though most revolutionary movements were on the brink of collapse, the most radical factions within these organizations continued to engage in a rhetorical battle with the repressors. At times these groups even intentionally magnified their capabilities and state of readiness without realizing the implications of such actions.

The second hypothesis put forth in this dissertation maintains that the global solidarity campaigns with South American exiles generated numerous headaches for the military governments and further isolated them internationally. The military dictatorships in the faced an increased number of challenges by the mid-1970s. These regimes took advantage of the global political polarization generated by the Cold War to label those who opposed them as subversives or communists to discredit and neutralize their militancy and isolate them from the overall population. However, two important factors challenged these military governments: the exiles and the global human rights movement. The regimes underestimated the power and level of organization of the tens of thousands of South American exiles that had been forced to flee their countries as a consequence of the brutal repression and harsh economic policies. They also misjudged the emergence of the transnational human rights movement, which opened a new front for resistance to the South American dictatorships. The cooperation between the exiles and the transnational human rights networks helped to neutralize and undermine the regimes’ Cold War rhetoric and strategies. Thus, Cóndor can be seen as a secret tool established by the South American regimes, with support from the United States government and its intelligence agencies, as well as other

3

influential local and international elites, to harass the exiles and discourage them from continuing their activities. This hypothesis seems to better explain the targeting of non-revolutionary groups such as the Uruguayan Grupos de Acción Unificadora (GAU) (Groups of Unifying Action) and the Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo (PVP) (Party for the People’s Victory) in Argentina during 1976- 1977; or the 1976 of by the Chilean intelligence services in Washington DC, among many others.

Clarifications

Before discussing the pertinent literature, it is necessary to make a number of clarifications. The first one concerns the way in which this investigation will approach this so-called operation. Official documents and most scholars in this field describe Cóndor as an ‘operation’. The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the US Military defines an operation as “a piece of organized and concerted activity involving a number of people, especially members of the armed forces or the police…”.5 However, under the Cóndor umbrella, the participating military regimes carried out what can be described as a complex web of sub-operations or activities within and outside their borders. A more appropriate term to describe and to include such activities would be what the same dictionary defines as ‘Operation Plan’, or “Plan…for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession...”.6 Thus, for the purpose of this investigation, and to facilitate the discussion of such sub-operations, this study considers Cóndor as a plan, rather than an operation. The term ‘plan’ allows a more appropriate discussion of the

5 Operation, (2001), The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military, Oxford Reference Online, Oxford University Press, online, available at http://www.oxfordreference.com.wwwproxy0.library.unsw.edu.au/view/10.1093/acref/978019989158 0.001.0001/acref-9780199891580-e-5763?rskey=xHZwNc&result=2, [accessed 28/07/2008]. 6 Operation plan, (2001), The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military, Oxford Reference Online, Oxford University Press, online, available at http://www.oxfordreference.com.wwwproxy0.library.unsw.edu.au/view/10.1093/acref/978019989158 0.001.0001/acref-9780199891580-e-5783?rskey=St5I7G&result=1, [accessed 28/07/2008].

4

different operations carried out throughout the period here discussed.7 Finally, it is necessary to point out that the translations of all the primary and secondary sources in Spanish cited in this dissertation were conducted by the author. Hence, any mistakes or inaccuracies are his responsibility alone.

To facilitate the identification of possible gaps within the literature, the pertinent studies and writings are divided in two main groups: writings on the Cóndor Plan and those focusing on the National Security Doctrine. Other important issues such as, Soviet-Latin American relations, CIA operations, US military training of Latin American armed forces, literature focussing on social, political and economic matters in each country, the human rights movement and its connections with the South American exile communities, and a number of anticommunist groups and organizations from different parts of the world will be discussed in the different chapters of this dissertation.

The discovery of the Archives and Pinochet’s

Although the Cóndor Plan was officially launched in late 1975, little was known at that time about its dimensions or far-reaching consequences. An extensive wall of secrecy protected any information about it and, for decades, those responsible for its creation and implementation denied its existence in the public domain. Until the 1990s, most of the knowledge gathered on the repression and disappearance of victims came from the works of a few academics and journalists. These investigations relied on the testimonies of victims of the repression and their families, or the few documents that emerged from investigations of some of the most notorious crimes committed under the Cóndor umbrella. The fall of several regimes, and the subsequent transition to democracy in those countries, facilitated new information about the repressive nature of these dictatorships. Two important events provided a valuable source of material for furthering studies of the Cóndor Plan in the 1990s: the discovery of the Archivos del Terror (The Terror Archives) in Paraguay; and Spanish

7 For example, Operation Morgan and Zapatos Viejos (Old Shoes) in Uruguay, and in Chile.

5

Judge Baltasar Garzón’s request for extradition of General in October 1998.

The first documents revealing the official existence and true dimensions of the Cóndor Plan were discovered in Paraguay in 1992.8 Immediately after the fall of the Stroessner regime, Martín Almada, a Paraguayan lawyer kidnapped in 1974 by Paraguayan security forces operating in Argentina and held in custody until 1977, began his campaign to find information about his arrest and the death of his wife.9 This search led him, and other victims, to a building holding thousands of secret documents from the Paraguayan intelligence service known as La Técnica.10 Keith Slack, one of the first investigators to evaluate the contents of this archive, argued that “speaking strictly form a documentation point of view, the evidence found … strongly suggest[ed] the existence of formal organized repression across international borders, but the definitive ‘smoking gun’ [was] not contained within the archive”.11 Slack presented a detailed analysis of the material held at this archive but his search for a smoking gun undermined his final analysis and underestimated this archive’s value. Despite his legalistic evaluation, however, the author acknowledged its importance for future studies. Since its discovery, the Archivos del Terror have

8 McSherry, P., (1999), "Operation Condor", p. 150. 9 The Paraguayan intelligence services recorded Almada’s sessions and then repeatedly played them back over the phone to coerce his wife to give information about her husband’s activities. As a consequence Almada’s wife suffered a heart attack and died a few months after his arrest. For further readings on this particular case, see Calloni, S., (1999), Los años del lobo: Operación Cóndor, , Ediciones Continente: Peña Lillo; Calloni, S., (2001), Operación Cóndor: pacto criminal, México, La Jornada, Chapters 2 and 10. 10 The material held at La Técnica accounts for: “some 700,000 files referring to Stroessner’s actions; 740 books catalogued with a system of numbers and letters; 115 books with daily guard reports; 181 archive boxes and 204 cardboard containers [holding] documents and reports of diverse origin; 574 files with information about political parties, trade unions, maps, controls, etc; 8,369 individual files of detainees held in the Department of Information: Technical Section and Judicial Department. In addition to these, there is a library which contains the books and magazines obtained in [armed forces’] raids; 543 cassettes with recordings of panels, conferences, sermons, speeches, and talkback radio programs. [The archives also contain] some 28 register books with names [and police records], lists of union leaders, and others from the period prior to Stroessner.” Calloni, S., (1999), Los años del lobo, p. 35. 11 Slack, K, (1996), "Operation Condor and human rights: a report from Paraguay's Archive of Terror", Human Rights Quarterly, 18(2): 492-506, p. 506.

6

been a key source of material for researchers, as well as for the prosecutors of crimes committed by the Paraguayan armed forces and other military regimes involved in the Cóndor plan. More importantly, the archives provided the first key documents linking US government and security agencies like the CIA and FBI to the regional repression.12

Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón’s investigation of crimes committed under the Cóndor umbrella also revealed new information on this topic and led to the declassification of thousands of US documents. This inquest, particularly the crimes involving the Chilean , led to a request for the extradition of General Augusto Pinochet during his last visit to England.13 Garzón’s appeal prompted the Chilean dictator’s arrest by Scotland Yard, while he underwent treatment at a London private clinic in 1998. After several months of house arrest in London, Pinochet managed to avoid extradition to as he was, controversially, found unfit to stand trial due to health concerns. Despite this outcome, Judge Garzón continued with his investigation and requested the US government to release all possible information regarding the Cóndor Plan. Consequently, the Clinton administration made available three tranches of declassified documents, the first of which came out in June 1999.14

Garzón’s ground breaking court case, as McSherry points out, threw “new light upon the issue of human rights violations and on the Western side of the Cold War…”.15 Furthermore, the Pinochet Case, as it became known, marked a radical shift in the way in which crimes

12 McSherry, P., (1999), "Operation Condor", p. 150. 13 Garzón’s investigation also included the crimes committed by the Argentine military junta during the . In 1997 the Spanish judge initiated court proceedings to investigate the dead and disappearance of 330 Spanish citizens in Argentina during this period. In the same year, Judge Garzón ordered the detention of General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri (last president of the military junta). Consequently, the latter had to remain in Argentina and could not travel abroad for fear of detention. See Nilson, C. M., (1998), Operación Cóndor: Terrorismo de Estado en el Cono Sur, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Lohlé Lumen, p. 127. 14 McSherry, P., (2002), "Tracking the origins of a State Terror network: Operation Condor", Latin American Perspectives, 29(1): 38-60, p. 40. 15 McSherry, P., (1999), "Cross-border terrorism: Operation Condor (Report on Chile: Twilight of the General: Chile After the Arrest of Pinochet)", NACLA Report on the Americas, 32(6): 34-35.

7

against humanity were prosecuted. When assessing its importance, Australian lawyer Geoffrey Robertson (QC), who has been involved in several high profile cases related to human rights violations, argued that

The Pinochet Case was momentous because – for the first time – sovereign immunity was not allowed to become sovereign impunity. The great play of sovereignty, with all its pomp and panoply, can now be seen for what it hides: a posturing troupe of human actors, who when off-stage are sometimes prone to rape the chorus…Pinochet’s crimes in this class were no more Chile’s business than they were Britain’s business or Spain’s business: they were committed against humanity in general because the very fact that a person can order them diminishes the human race…16 In other words, state officials like Pinochet and many others responsible for committing crimes against humanity would, in theory, no longer be able to hide behind the shield of national sovereignty or diplomatic immunity. This legal precedent provided new avenues to overcome the barriers imposed by the military regimes involved in Cóndor.17 More importantly, it led to further court cases, and with them, the release of more documentation and evidence that became important sources for future researchers. The documents discovered at the Paraguayan archives and those obtained by Judge Baltasar Garzón reinforced the findings of several Truth Commissions18 carried out throughout the Southern

16 Robertson, G. Q.C., (2002), Crimes against humanity: the struggle for global justice, London, Penguin Books, p. 399. 17 Countries such as France, Spain, and have taken advantage of the precedent created by the Pinochet Case to prosecute several military officers involved in crimes against French, Spanish, or Italian nationals during the Cóndor years. 18 For a thorough analysis of the format and outcome of several Truth commissions carried out in the last two decades of the 20th century, see Méndez, E. J., (2007), a la verdad: lecciones de las experiencias Latinoamericanas de relato de la verdad, Historizar el Pasado Vivo, online, avaliable at http://www.historizarelpasadovivo.cl/es_resultado_textos.php?categoria=Verdad%2C+justicia%2C+ memoria&titulo=El+derecho+humano+a+la+Verdad.+Lecciones+de+las+experiencias+latinoamerica nas+de+relato+de+la+verdad#acapite, [accessed on 20/01/2010]. There is an English version of this article entitled, Méndez, E. J., (2006), The human right to truth: lessons learned from Latin American experiences with truth telling; in Borer, T. A, (2006), Telling the truths : truth telling and peace building in post-conflict societies, Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press.

8

Cone of in the eighties and early nineties.19 They also provided new leads to further explore the ramifications of this plan.

These events, however, are not the only sources of information for studies in this area. The political changes taking place in South America in the late 1990s and during the first decade of the new millennium propelled new investigations of the human rights violations that took place in the previous decades. Most of the newly elected centre-left governments in the region (e.g. Argentina, , Uruguay, and Bolivia) have allowed judges and lawyers to expand the scope of their investigations dealing with the abuses carried out by the military regimes in the sixties and seventies.20 As a consequence, new court cases have been opened and more information has become available. Nonetheless, until now, no other event produced the volume of documents and evidence made available by the Terror Archives and Baltasar Garzón’s investigation.

19 See the findings of Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (C.O.N.A.D.E.P), (1984), Nunca Más, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Editorial E.U.D.E.B.A; , Archdiocese of São Paulo (Brazil) and J. Dassin, (1986), Torture in Brazil: a report, New York, Vintage Books; Servicio Paz y Justicia Uruguay, (1989), Uruguay nunca más: informe sobre la violación de derechos humanos (1972-1985), Montevideo, S.E.R.P.A.J; Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, C., P. Berryman and University of Notre Dame-Centre for Civil and Human Rights, (1993), Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, Notre Dame, Published in Cooperation with the Center for Civil and Human Rights, Notre Dame Law School, by the University of Notre Dame Press. 20 See for instance court cases in Argentina dealing with the Masacre de Fátima, (the Fatima Massacre); the court cases in Uruguay against army officer Hugo Troccolli and that country’s judiciary’s request for his extradition from Italy, and those of Retired General Gregorio Álvarez (key officer during the early years of the repression and last dictator prior to the transition to democracy), ex-President Bordaberry, ex Colonel Raúl Calcagno (for crimes committed under the Cóndor Plan), and the case dealing with the possible poisoning of Cecilia Fontana de Heber (wife of a prominent Uruguayan politician). These are only a few of the investigations undertaken in the first half of 2008. (Sources: El Pais [Uruguayan newspaper], La República [Uruguayan newspaper], Últimas Noticias [Uruguayan newspaper], and Página 12 [Argentine newspaper]. The Argentine judiciary is in the vanguard in the region and continues to investigate and process court cases dealing with the crimes of the military junta in that country. In 2013, the Argentine government and other human rights advocates also initiated numerous court cases directly linked to Cóndor and the clandestine detention centres used by the South American security forces under this multilateral plan on Argentine soil. For further readings on the ESMA, Cóndor, Automotores Orletti court cases see Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (C.E.L.S.), (2007), "C.E.L.S. Juicios: Crimenes del Terrorismo de Estado- Weblogs de las causas", online, available at http://www.cels.org.ar/wpblogs/ingles, [accessed on 16/08/2011].

9

Writings on Cóndor

Although many have written about the Latin American militaries and their political formation, only a few have focused specifically on those involved in the Cóndor plan as a group. This has been predominantly due to the lacunae created by the wall of secrecy surrounding this plan. The legal barriers created by immunity laws introduced by military juntas prior to their fall, or by politicians immediately after as part of the process of transition to democracy, also enhanced this gap in the Cóndor member countries. Patrice McSherry and Raúl Molina Mejía studied the institutionalization of impunity in various Latin American countries during their transition to democracy. They defined state impunity as “freedom from accountability or punishment for state crimes or abuses of power” and described how such impunity was institutionalised in different ways throughout the continent.21 Since their introduction, these laws became an insurmountable obstacle to the process of achieving reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, and limited the scope of any investigation concerning human rights abuses carried out by these dictatorships.

The wall of secrecy began to crumble during the late and early 1990s with the return to democracy and the launch of new investigations. Without doubt, the studies of the anatomy of State terrorism and, especially, of the Cóndor Plan greatly benefited from the academic works of Patrice McSherry22 and the investigations of writers such as , , Samuel Blixen, José Luis Méndez Méndez, and Stella Calloni, to

21 Namely: “civil-military pacts of transition, executive decrees and pardons, amnesties or other legislation, and military court decisions.” McSherry, P. and M. R. Molina, (1999), "Introduction to 'Shadows of State Terrorism: impunity in Latin America'", Social Justice, 26(4): 1-12, p. 1. 22 McSherry, P., (1999), "Cross-border terrorism"; McSherry, P., (1999), "Operation Condor"; McSherry, P., (2000), "Preserving hegemony: National Security Doctrine in the Post-Cold War era", NACLA Report on the Americas, 34(3): 26-34; McSherry, P., (2001 ), "Operation Condor: new pieces of the puzzle", NACLA Report on the Americas, 34(6): 1-2; McSherry, P., (2002), "Tracking the origins of a State Terror network"; McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin America, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc; McSherry, P., (2007), "Death squads as parallel forces: Uruguay, Operation Condor and the United States", Journal of Third World Studies, 24(1): 13-52.

10

name just a few.23 McSherry was the first to study Cóndor from an academic perspective. She identified the shortfalls of “liberal theories of pluralism and democracy” and Marxist theories in explaining how some states resort to the use of terrorism to achieve their goals.24 According to the author, Stohl’s discussion of realist theories, which imply that “states are obliged to use whatever means necessary to protect national security and state survival”, seemed to better explain why states resort to the use of terrorism to achieve some objectives.25 In the context of the Cóndor Plan and, particularly, the Cold War, the military regimes in the Southern Cone considered the protection of national sovereignty from any internal or external threat (mostly from leftist revolutionary movements) as an important aspect of national security in their respective countries. Thus, they set out to neutralize those threats at any cost, even at the expense of allowing foreign intelligence services and international terrorists to operate freely within their own national territories.

National Security also addressed economic development and almost every area of policy-making undertaken by those governments. These regimes gave particular emphasis to the notion of the internal enemy, which was a distinct feature introduced to the United States’ National Security Doctrine (NSD) in the early 1960s and adopted by the Latin American militaries in their own countries. The concept of the internal enemy implied that these nations faced a threat from within their own borders. As a consequence of the Cold War, most South American governments and local elites considered the Latin American Communist parties and the left in general as a threat during the sixties and seventies. These regimes, and more importantly, several US

23 Blixen, S., (1998), Operación Cóndor: del Archivo del Terror y el asesinato de Letelier al caso Berríos, Barcelona, Virus Editorial; Calloni, S.; (1999); Los años del lobo; Calloni, S., (2001), Operación Cóndor; Dinges, J., (2000), "The dubious document (brief article)", Columbia Journalism Review, 38(5): 10; Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years: how Pinochet and his allies brought terrorism to three continents, New York, New Press; Kornbluh, P., (2004), : a declassified dossier on atrocity and accountability, New York, New Press; Méndez Méndez, J. L., (2006), Bajo las alas del Cóndor, La Habana, Editorial Capitán San Luis. 24 McSherry, P., (1999), "Operation Condor", p.145. 25 Ibid, p.147.

11

administrations, argued that the would support, financially and logistically, those parties to overthrow long-standing liberal democracies in the region and introduce communist governments in Latin America. As McSherry points out, these governments interpreted this as a direct challenge to Western, Christian civilization.26 Thus, the military regimes used any tool at their disposal, including state terrorism, to prevent the spread of , and any other threat that could challenge their economic or political interests. Within this context, any action, no matter how brutal or illegal, was justified to protect the national security of those countries. It is for these reasons, as McSherry points out, that realist theories are useful when trying to explain and understand the actions carried out by the Cóndor members.

The writers that have focused on Cóndor (McSherry and Calloni in particular) directly challenged the widely accepted views that for decades portrayed counterinsurgency operations in the region, and particularly the Cóndor Plan, as a legitimate response to the widespread Marxist insurgency in the Southern Cone. Most officers within the Latin American armed forces and conservative politicians, as well as several US government officials during the 70s and 80s supported, and continue to support today, the latter view. The investigations conducted by McSherry, Calloni and Dinges led to the consolidation of a new paradigm which, more appropriately, describes the Cóndor Plan as a secret intelligence network formally established in November 1975 by the intelligence services of Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia27 and supported by the Brazilian junta and the US government of the time.28 Although most authors place this plan within the context of the Cold War, Patrice McSherry and Stella Calloni are the ones who most eloquently identify and explain the this plan’s connections with the overall global

26 See McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, pp. 1-34. 27 and joined the Condor network in 1978. 28 Brazil supported the formalization of this plan in November 1975 and attended that secret meeting as observers. However, the Brazilian security forces did not join this plan officially until 1976.

12

anticommunist campaign carried out by the US and its allies in the 1950s and 1960s.

This intelligence network has been officially described by the regimes and their supporters as a legitimate effort to combat several subversive groups in the region. However, it had far more sinister ramifications. The Cóndor Plan “represented a striking new level of coordinated repression among the anticommunist militaries in the region”, which enabled them to “share intelligence and to hunt down, seize, and execute political opponents in combined operations…” throughout the Americas and in Europe.29 McSherry concluded that, to do so, the Cóndor members developed parallel structures relying on paramilitary groups and high-profile rightist terrorist organizations, in addition to a widespread network of clandestine detention centres, bypassing the frameworks established by international law regarding human rights.

McSherry has used the “conceptual construct of the parallel state” drawing attention to “the secret forces and infrastructure developed as a hidden part of the state to carry out covert counterinsurgency wars”. 30 More importantly, she demonstrated that Cóndor was a “top-secret component of a larger inter-American counterinsurgency strategy – led, financed, and overseen by Washington – to prevent and reverse social and political movements in Latin America in favour of structural change”.31 This study’s detailed analysis of the implementation of terror by the states and their close cooperation with paramilitary groups and rightist/fascist organizations is indeed a valuable contribution. Until its publication, that secret relationship and its links to Cóndor had escaped the attention of academics and other researchers.

There is almost unanimous agreement among scholars on what Cóndor was. However, some offer different explanations on the specific role of the Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria (JCR) or Revolutionary Coordinating Junta

29 McSherry, P., (1999), "Operation Condor", p.145. 30 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, p. 241. 31 Ibid.

13

as one of the main reasons for this plan’s creation. Authors like John Dinges (and Peter Kornbluh to a lesser degree) argue that, prior to the 1975 founding meeting, a number of guerrilla groups in South America32 were in the process of reorganising and preparing a counteroffensive against the military regimes.33 Dinges claims that this new regional revolutionary movement played a considerable part in the establishment of the Cóndor Plan. Patrice McSherry also acknowledges the existence of the JCR. However, she maintains that the former authors overstate the role of this revolutionary organization in the process that led to the formalisation of Cóndor. Dinges argues that the arrests of Anibal Santucho of the Argentine ERP and Isaac Fuentes of the Chilean MIR, in Paraguay, triggered the multilateral operation between Paraguay, Argentina, Chile and the United States that led to the discovery of the JCR’s operational plans, months before the meeting in Santiago, Chile.34 Stella Calloni35 and Patrice McSherry36, on the other hand, argue that, if anything, the arrests served as an excuse for the military regimes to formalise the already existent multilateral cooperation among them, as most of these revolutionary groups were in bad shape and already defeated. As John Dinges points out, little is known about this particular revolutionary organization and further research is needed to clarify its role in the establishment of Cóndor.

The support provided by a number of high-ranking US officials in the Nixon and Ford administrations to the South American dictators is amongst the most controversial issues around Cóndor. Despite the empirical evidence incriminating these administrations, this particular point has been intensely debated by scholars and ex US officials and has generated a series of heated

32 Namely the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T) from Uruguay; the Ejército de Liberación del Pueblo (ELP) from Bolivia, the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) from Argentina, and the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) from Chile. 33 See Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, pp. 50-60; Kornbluh, P., (2004), The Pinochet file, pp. 43-56. 34 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years. 35 Calloni, S., (1999), Los años del lobo; Calloni, S., (2001), Operación Cóndor. 36 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states.

14

exchanges between some of them. A clear example of this debate took place immediately after the publishing of Peter Kornbluh’s The Pinochet File.37 Based on the documents released in 1999 by the Clinton administration, this particular book exposed US participation in the systematic destabilisation of the democratically elected government of and its support for the subsequent military coup carried out by General Augusto Pinochet. More importantly, it highlighted the earlier aspects of the Cóndor Plan. A review of this book by Kenneth Maxwell38 in the Journal was angrily criticised on two occasions by William Rogers39 who dismissed any suggestion that the US played a part in this coup.40 According to Maxwell, and William Rogers consider “the accusation that the United States played a role in Pinochet’s bloody overthrow […] of the democratically-elected government of Salvador Allende [as] a ‘myth’ which is “lovingly nurtured by the Latin American left”.41

The editor of Foreign Affairs, under ‘alleged’ strong pressures from Henry Kissinger, did not allow Maxwell to reply to Rogers’ last letter to the editor, which contained much inaccurate information. Although several prominent academics wrote to the editor supporting Maxwell’s right of reply, the journal opted to end the debate, letting Rogers’ comments stand

37 Kornbluh, P., (2004), The Pinochet file. 38 Maxwell K., (2003), "Other 9/11: the United States and Chile, 1973", Foreign Affairs, 82: 147- 151. 39 Rogers served as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (October 1974 – June 1976) and Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs (June 1976–January 1977) under then- Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Douglas, M. and S. Abruzzese, (2007), William D. Rogers is dead at 80; planned U.S. policy in Latin America, , New York, The New York Times Company, online, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/30/us/30rogers.html?_r=0, [accessed 22/10/2014]. 40 Rogers, W. D., (2004), Fleeing the Chilean coup [comments], Foreign Affairs, 83(1): 160-175. 41 Maxwell, K., (2004), "The case of the missing letter in Foreign Affairs: Kissinger, Pinochet and Operation Condor", The Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies Working Papers on Latin America, 04/05(3): 1-31, p. 5.

15

unchallenged.42 Consequently, Maxwell resigned his position as book reviewer in this journal and published an extensive letter in the David Rockefeller Centre answering Rogers’ attacks and highlighting the inaccuracies of his remarks.43 In 2013, the National Security Archives published a series of US government’s declassified documents which confirm that Henry Kissinger ‘urged President to overthrow the democratically elected Allende government in Chile…’44 These documents vindicated Maxwell’s argument and further incriminated Henry Kissinger.

The denial by ex US officials such Henry Kissinger and William Rogers, and their respective hostile reactions, illustrate the difficulties faced by researchers when investigating this sensitive issue. It is necessary to emphasise, however, that not all US politicians and government officials supported their government’s policies and attitudes towards Latin America in general. To illustrate this point one can refer to the works of Senator Wayne Morse, Chair of the State Foreign Relations Subcommittee for the American Republics, who worked hard in the years prior to the formalization of Cóndor to convince “Congress to deliberately limit the scope and details of American Military assistance”.45 Others, including Senator Frank Church, Democratic chair of the Senate Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs, Congressman Schroeder and Congressman Ted Kennedy also worked hard to limit US support for anticommunist military regimes in the region.46 Notwithstanding these politicians’ prominent work, the views of government officials like Kissinger and Rogers prevailed at the time. Despite these debates, Peter Kornbluh’s work

42 Coatsworth, J., A. Fishlow, R. Kaufman, M. Muse, R. Rennie, R. Roett, T. Skidmore, P. Sigmund, C. Smith, A. Stepan and N. Truitt, (2004), : letter to the editor, Foreign Affairs, 83(2): 187. 43 Maxwell, K., (2004), "The case of the missing letter in Foreign Affairs", pp. 1-31. 44 (2013), "Kissinger and Chile: the declassified record", Kornbluh, P. editor, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing No. 437, online, available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/, [accessed 26/122013]. 45 Lauderback, D. M, (2004), The United States Army School of the Americas: mission and policy during the Cold War Ph.D., The University of Texas at Austin, p. 120. 46 Ibid, p. 295.

16

clearly reveals that the US government was actively involved in the circumstances that led to military coup in Chile on 11 September 1973, severely weakening the arguments of those like Rogers and Kissinger.

Peter Kornbluh investigated the Nixon administration’s motives for overthrowing President Salvador Allende, its support for the military coup headed by Pinochet, and even some aspects of the Cóndor plan.47 However, these events cannot be interpreted only as a one-way imposition from the United States. The US government did play an important part in precipitating some of these events. Yet, the military leaders and other influential local elites involved in this process supported and executed these plans to achieve their own personal gains (e.g. perpetuate their position of power, geopolitical ambitions, political and economic interests, etc.). For instance, after the 1973 coup, the Chilean military as an institution greatly benefited from the economic assistance provided by several US Aid programs. The military government also received considerable assistance and loans from other international organizations, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the , and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Therefore, the stakes were high not only for the Nixon Administration, but also for the Chilean military and the local elites that benefitted from this financial aid. More importantly, these objectives would have not been consolidated without the support of local elites, as well as other transnational actors, who had their own economic and political interests.

The works of Samuel Blixen and José Luis Méndez Méndez also made important contributions to the studies on Cóndor. Blixen’s Operación Cóndor: Del Archivo del Terror y el Asesinato de Letelier al Caso Berríos confirmed that the most secretive aspect of this plan, phase III operations, were not completely deactivated after the notorious assassination of Orlando Letelier and his assistant Roni Moffitt, in Washington DC in 1976, as was first thought.48 The 1992 assassination of Chilean scientist and ex-DINA agent , in a

47 Kornbluh, P., (2004), The Pinochet file. 48 Blixen, S., (1998), Operación Cóndor.

17

coordinated effort between Uruguayan and Chilean elements of the armed forces, in Uruguay, illustrate that Cóndor’s Phase III operations remained very much in place well into the 1990s. Blixen further explored the works of Berríos and Michael Townley49 to develop gas in a project code-named Plan Andrea.50 Because of its qualities,51 this gas was produced to carry out Letelier’s assassination. However, due to operational problems, those in charge of the operation dropped this option and decided instead to plant a bomb in the politician’s car. Other investigations have suggested the possible links between this gas and the deaths of other high profile figures such as the Brazilian ex- presidents Joao Goulart and de Oliveira.52 However, there is no conclusive evidence yet of the use of sarin gas in these cases and more research is needed to explore such a possibility.

Blixen’s work shows how the very same tactics and operations carried out in the Cóndor Plan to eliminate high profile figures opposing the military regimes were used years later against one of Cóndor’s own agents to erase incriminating evidence. Furthermore, as Stella Calloni points out, the subsequent investigations of the Berríos case exposed the fragile state of the democratic governments that succeeded the military regimes. When these governments attempted to investigate the Berríos case, hard-line senior officers within the Uruguayan and Chilean armed forces made it clear that they would not allow any investigation of this matter, and directly threatened those governments if they went ahead with their inquiries.53

49 Townley was the DINA agent responsible for the assassination of General and other high profile figures during the Cóndor years. He also had connections with the CIA. See Martorell, F., (1999), Operación Cóndor, el vuelo de la muerte: la coordinación represiva en el Cono Sur, Santiago de Chile, Lom Ediciones, chapter II. 50 This secret plan aimed to develop a way to produce quantities of this gas to be used in case of a possible war between Chile and Argentina for example. 51 Death induced by Sarin gas produce symptoms very similar to those produced by a heart attack and the gas leaves no identifiable trace. 52 See the works of Uruguayan journalist Roger Rodriguez regarding the deaths of ex-Presidents of Brazil, Joao Goulart and Juscelino Kubischeck. 53 Calloni, S., (1999), Los años del lobo, p. 202.

18

José Luis Méndez Méndez, on the other hand, focused on another of the most secret features of what McSherry has identified as the parallel structures developed by these military regimes: the close links between the Cóndor states and rightist terrorist groups. 54 Méndez provides a detailed investigation of the close associations between the Chilean Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA) (National Intelligence Directorate) and Cuban anti-Castro terrorists living in , , such as , the Novo brothers, Posada Carriles and Virgilio Paz. Although McSherry had previously identified the connection between DINA and several Cuban anticommunists55, Méndez further confirms that Chile, and the CIA, actively participated in the creation of the Centro de Organizaciones Revolucionarias Unidas (CORU) (Centre of United Revolutionary Organizations).

CORU was established in 1976 by members of several Anti-Castro organizations who met in the city of Bonao, . CORU united and coordinated the clandestine work of the counterrevolutionaries, with direct support from the CIA. Méndez confirms that Orlando Letelier’s fate was also decided at that meeting.56 This particular finding directly challenged those who maintained that the US government knew nothing about the Letelier assassination until after it had occurred. The author also discusses the role played by the anticommunist in the attempt to assassinate the Chilean Christian Democrat . All the authors within the field have discussed at length DINA’s connection with the Leighton case. However, Méndez focused his attention on the activities and operations conducted by the anti-Castro Cubans within this operation. The latter were responsible for cleaning up all traces incriminating the Chilean DINA in the assassination attempt. This study added a further dimension to Cóndor by placing the spotlight on the Anti-Castro organizations and their connections with the US,

54 Méndez Méndez, J. L., (2006), Bajo las alas del Cóndor. 55 See McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, pp. 157-159. 56 Méndez Méndez, J. L., (2006), Bajo las alas del Cóndor, pp. 64-95.

19

Chile and some of the most virulent sectors of the radical Latin American Right. Arguably, this investigation’s most important contribution is that it reveals and documents the criminal activities and acts of terrorism conducted by these Cuban exile organizations in conjunction with the Chilean junta. However, by focusing on these groups, Méndez draws attention to only a small section of the entire secret network of non-state actors who lent their support to, and in some cases even worked with, the Cóndor intelligence agencies.

The political changes throughout Latin America in the past decade and the subsequent release of thousands of secret documents produced by South American intelligence agencies during the sixties, seventies and eighties brought about important developments regarding studies of the Cóndor plan. Latin American scholars have begun to study other aspects of the Cóndor plan and regional military cooperation during this period of dictatorial rule. While McSherry, Dinges, Calloni, Kornbluh, and others explore the US role in the process that led to the formalization of the Cóndor plan, a number of Latin American scholars have chosen to analyse what Nilson César Mariano described as the “MERCOSUR of Terror”.57 These authors do acknowledge the prominent role played by the United States in influencing the political developments in the region, including Cóndor; however, they have shifted attention from the US as the hegemonic powerhouse to explore the role of local elites, individuals and the political, economic and military aspects of the South American dictatorships. They have also begun to analyse the Cold War from a Latin American perspective. These investigations have enriched the process of building the historiography of this particular period. They also uncovered a much more complex image of the South American political situation at the time, as well as the regional power relations involved in this Cold War environment. These studies demonstrate, among other things, that the US’s interests for the region within the context of the Cold War did not always coincide with those of the South American dictators and local elites, particularly, in the early-to-mid

57 See Nilson, C. M., (1998), Operación Cóndor, chapter I, pp. 15-23.

20

1970s. These authors also address the influential power struggles between countries in the Southern Cone, giving particular emphasis to the geopolitical ambitions of the Brazilian junta.

The work of Tanya Harmer on the Inter-American theatre of the Cold War falls well into this latter category.58 Harmer maintains that the Cold War in Latin America went beyond the clash between the East-West axis. It also included two well defined axes: the first formed by and Chile, and the second by the US and Brazil. The clash between them reached its climax in 1973 with the overthrow of President Salvador Allende in Chile. Although Harmer’s work addresses the US role within this context, she emphasises the role of the Brazilian junta and its attempt to establish Brazil as an active and influential power player in the Southern Cone. The Brazilian military junta followed with concern political developments in Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay and Argentina during the early 1970s. Harmer maintains that Brazilian intelligence analysts believed that the South American Left had achieved important gains and that those countries immediately drew closer to .59 Such alliances, the Brazilians believed, had the potential to weaken the Inter-American defence system and open the door to the spread of communism in the entire continent.

Thus, Brazil deepened ties with the United States to break a potential leftist encirclement and set out to maintain the region free of communism. Subsequently, in the early 1970s, the Brazilian junta actively cooperated and conspired with Chilean anticommunist elites and that country’s military to overthrow President Allende. They also intervened in Bolivia to overthrow the progressive government of General Juan José Torres, and in Uruguay during and after the 1971 election.60 Harmer’s work focuses predominantly on the period 1970-1973. However, her detailed analysis of this period and the actors

58 Harmer, T., (2011), Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press. 59 See Ibid, pp. 1-19. 60 Brazil also supported the Stroessner regime in Paraguay and actively sought to undermine the Peruvian government headed by General Velasco Alvarado.

21

involved illuminate the circumstances that led to increased military intervention and cooperation in the Southern Cone. Furthermore, it provides a more accurate view of Brazil’s position in the region at the time.61 Until recently, the Brazilian junta has been portrayed as a soft regime, often distant from political developments in the region or more civilized than their Chilean, Uruguayan, Paraguayan or Argentine counterparts. Although Harmer does not mention the Cóndor plan, her work aids understanding of, and contextualizes, the emergence of Cóndor and Brazil’s participation in it. Brazilian representatives attended the November 1975 meeting as observers and officially joined the plan in 1976. Since the mid-1960s, and with some rare exceptions like the 1971 presidential , Brasilia has successfully managed to hide its involvement. Furthermore, the Brazilian military allowed the other countries to take the initiative and stayed in the background until Cóndor was fully operational. Only then did the Brazilian junta agree to adopt a more proactive role, becoming a full member of the plan.

The new court cases against military leaders in Uruguay and Argentina, as well as the opening of secret archives of Brazilian intelligence agencies like the Dirección de Orden Político y Social (DOPS) (Directorate of Social and Political Order), gave scholars more material to expand their investigations. Authors like Vania Markarian, Álvaro Rico, Enrique Serra Padrós, Ananda Simoes Fernández, Caroline Silveira Bauer, Jorge Christian Fernández, Silvia Visconti and Universindo Rodríguez Díaz, analysed this material and made important advances and discoveries regarding the origins of Cóndor and military cooperation throughout the region, particularly between the two major geopolitical rivals in the Southern Cone, Brazil and Argentina. These authors identified the most important actors in this transnational state terrorist network and confirmed that its origin predated the mid-1970s. Enrique Serra Padrós, for instance, focused on repressive cooperation in the region of Rio Grande Do

61 See Harmer, T., (2011), Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, pp. 20-48.

22

Sul.62 This investigation helped to dismantle the myth regarding the Brazilian junta’s soft image. Padrós’ study of demonstrated how actively agencies such as the DOPS operated not only in Brazil, but also in Uruguay and Argentina.63

Despite numerous limitations and difficulties encountered by these authors, their studies provide great insight on several structural aspects of this plan and its place within a much broader and complex Inter-American theatre of the Cold War. Regardless of any difference in terms of what role the South American revolutionary organizations played in the formalization of this plan, these scholars unanimously agree on what Cóndor was, as well as its objectives. Yet, it is still not clear why the Cóndor alliance was formalized at that particular time. Filling this gap is one of this dissertation’s goals.

Writings on the National Security Doctrine (NSD)

The US’s National Security Doctrine (NSD) played an important part in the professional transformation of the Latin American armed forces, particularly those that participated in the Cóndor plan. The different training courses developed by the US government, especially those focusing on internal security and counterinsurgency familiarized these militaries with the concepts and ideals preached by this doctrine. Subsequently, the armed forces in the region departed from the traditional professionalism based on European military doctrines and developed their own doctrines based on the US’s NSD. This transformation led to the emergence of a different form of militarism from the mid-1960s. Its most

62 This is the border between Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. During the sixties and seventies, Rio Grande do Sul became a key source of concern for the Brazilian junta due to the possible arrival of leftist guerrillas and opposition leaders from Uruguay and Argentina. Thus, the regime’s intelligence services operated heavily in this area and frequently cooperated with their neighbouring counterparts to monitor and conduct operations against exiles and opponents. 63 For further readings on the investigations conducted by these authors regarding Cóndor’s historiography see McSherry, P., M. Slatman, E. Serra Padrós, A. Simoes Fernández, C. Silverira Bauer, J. C. Fernández, S. Visconti and U. Rodríguez Díaz, (2012), Dossier: Coordinaciones represivas en el Cono Sur de América Latina (1964-1991), Taller segúna época. Revista de sociedad, cultura y política en América Latina, Buenos Aires, 1(1): 1-302.

23

radical and violent manifestations materialized in the 1970s with the regimes that took part in the Cóndor Plan.

The end of World War II precipitated significant changes to the distribution of global political and economic power. Pre-War Western European hegemons, such as Britain and France, emerged from the conflict severely weakened and on the brink of bankruptcy. The USA, on the other hand, strengthened and consolidated its global economic, political and military power. This transformation came about thanks to the significant expansion of US economic and military interests around the globe during the war.64 The end of hostilities allowed the US to position itself as an almost unchallenged hegemonic power, closely followed by the Soviet Union. In the late 1940s, the US government underwent a comprehensive re-evaluation of its entire political and defence infrastructure to improve and tailor appropriate responses to the threats derived from the new environment.

With the introduction of the National Security Act 1947 (NSA-1947), the US government strengthened its institutional bureaucracy that would be, from then on, in charge of overseeing the various aspects of security involved in the protection of its interests at home and abroad. The creation of the National Security Council (NSC) was the most important outcome produced by this document. The NSC would be responsible for advising the US President

…with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.65

Saul Landau, a strong critic of the National Security Doctrine, argues that some of the greatest flaws in this document, and the NSD in general, were the vagueness of the concept ‘national security’ and, the high level of secrecy

64 McSherry, P., (2000), "Preserving hegemony, p. 28. 65 United States Government, (1947), National Security Act of 1947, Act of July 26, 1947 (As Amended), U. S. S. Council, Washington, D.C., USG, online, available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/nsaact1947.pdf, section 101, [accessed 17/01/2011].

24

introduced to protect ’s interests.66 However, the implementation of broad and vague definitions made this doctrine flexible enough to accommodate almost any perceived threat to the national interests of the State and very attractive to policymakers.

Although NSA-1947 strengthened the US’s national security bureaucratic infrastructure, the strong and distinct anticommunist features of the NSD did not become part of government policy until the introduction of NSC- 68, in 1950.67 The latter, according to McSherry, defined the struggle between the USSR and the US as a fight to achieve global hegemony.68 Supporters of the NSD maintained that the Cold War had produced a world in which the US capitalist system was the epitome of good, reacting against the aggressive expansion of Soviet Communism. The NSC-68 maintained that:

…The Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, anti-thetical [sic] to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war.69

Therefore, the US developed measures and policies to protect itself, its allies, as well as Western Christian civilization and from the so called communist threat. These policies also served more pragmatic purposes like protecting US interests around the world, consolidating hegemonic power, and gaining access to key natural resources and economic markets.

66 See Landau, S., (1988), The dangerous doctrine: national security and U.S. foreign policy, London, Westview, pp. 45-47. 67 See: McSherry, P., (2000), "Preserving hegemony", pp. 26-55; Pion-Berlin, D., (1988), "The National Security Doctrine, military threat perception, and the 'Dirty War' in Argentina", Comparative Political Studies, 21(3): 382-407. 68 McSherry, P., (2000), "Preserving hegemony", p. 28. 69 U. S. Government, (1950), N.S.C.-68: United Sates objective and programs for National Security (7 April, 1950), (N.S.C.), Washington D.C., online, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm, part I, [accessed 19/12/2011].

25

The Cóndor military regimes took advantage of this rhetoric to legitimise their repressive activities against their opponents. These governments accused and student leaders, human rights activists, social movements, religious organizations and political contenders seeking social, economic and political reform of being communists. That simple title allowed the dictatorships to unleash unrestrained violence against them with the aura provided by that global crusade to save civilization from the communist menace.

The triumph of the Cuban led President Dwight Eisenhower and his advisors to re-think the United States’ defence strategies for the rest of the continent. Until then, the US’s main concern had been the possibility of a total nuclear war against the Soviet Union. After the 1959 events in Havana, the USG understood that “hemispheric defence against massive external attack [was no longer] a legitimate defensive posture”. Instead US officials feared that Cuba would “…foment insurrection in the region. Internal security in Latin America therefore, needed to be maintained with US direction”.70 From that moment, the US sought to prevent Latin American countries from recreating the Cuban experience.71 Several US officials understood that the key to prevent that from happening would be the stimulation of economic development for the region.

Such views were heavily influenced by the ideas advanced by Walt Rostow regarding economic development in his Non-Communist Manifesto.72 According to Rostow, development would stimulate key institutions in the underdeveloped world. Such process would allow those economies to take off, generating “the momentum necessary to make development self-sustainable”.73 Rostow and others, however, predicted that this process would be difficult and

70 Lauderback, D. M., (2004), The United States Army School of the Americas, p. 110. 71 See Rabe, S., (2012), The killing zone: the United States wages Cold War in Latin America, New York, Oxford University Press, chapter 5, pp. 85-113. 72 Rostow, W. W., (1960), The stages of economic growth: a non-commuinst manifesto, Cambridge, University Press. 73 Walt Rostow in Lauderback, D. M., (2004), The United States Army School of the Americas, p. 44.

26

some ‘false-starts’ would occur.74 Hence, it was vital to focus on those countries’ internal security to prevent communism from taking advantage of the social discontent created by such false-starts. To meet such challenges, US policymakers refined the principles and objectives of the NSD by converging a wide range of theories from different fields.

Tapia Valdez argues that “the Leninist theory of the State, the fascist theory of society and the Liberal-socialist concept of general mobilization for war” had a profound ideological influence over this doctrine.75 Other authors maintain that the NSD is comprised of several theories which can be framed in three distinct areas: Counterinsurgency, Geopolitics, and Security and Development.76 From the early sixties onwards, the Latin American armed forces that participated in the Inter-American defence system accepted and embraced the teachings and indoctrination contained in the counterinsurgency theories delivered by the US government. The US implemented various tactics and measures (ranging from increased military aid to win over and secure supporters, diplomatic negotiations, and/or direct coercion) to encourage these armed services to embrace these changes.

According to Pion Berlin, the counterinsurgency branch of the NSD was heavily influenced by the theories developed during the 1950s and 1960s by French and US specialists in response to tactics implemented by revolutionary guerrilla groups in places such as Vietnam, Algeria, and Cuba.77 The Latin American regimes used counterinsurgency to “monitor restive populations and ‘dissuade’ political or social opposition…”.78 Several military regimes

74 Rostow and Milik in ibid. 75 Tapia Valdes, J., (1980), El Terrorismo de Estado: la Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional en el Cono Sur, México, Editorial Nueva Imágen, p. 26. 76 See for instance, the works of Landau, S., (1988), The dangerous doctrine; Calloni, S., (1999), Los años del lobo; Calloni, S., (2001), Operación Cóndor; Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years; McSherry, P., (2000), "Preserving hegemony”. 77 Pion-Berlin, D., (1988), "The National Security Doctrine, military threat perception, and the 'Dirty War' in Argentina", p. 386. 78 McSherry, P, (2000), "Preserving hegemony", p. 28.

27

throughout the continent, with both direct and indirect support from the US government and local elites, used these tactics to obliterate any kind of opposition to the political, social and economic policies introduced by these juntas. They were also used against anyone seeking to alter the balance of power that favoured traditional oligarchies and powerful national and transnational economic elites.

The US military developed and implemented special training programs, including in counterinsurgency, to spread the NSD to other nations and indoctrinate their militaries. These programs led to what Mario Carranza defined as a “political-military dependency and ideology”. According to this author, the “anti-guerrilla courses in , the Military Assistance Program (MAP)…” and several other similar programs imparted during those years “…transformed the Argentine and Brazilian Armed Forces [and several others in Latin America] in guardians of the dependency structures…”.79 In other words, under the pretext of protecting Western Christian values, the Latin American armed forces became the guardians of US political and economic interests in the continent. They also protected the interests of local elites who for decades tied their countries’ economic development to the United States.

In the late 1940s, the US set up a large network of military education centres and training programs both on US soil and abroad, to train military personnel from friendly nations. Many authors have identified the United States Army School of the Americas (USARSA) (hereto forth School of the Americas (SOA)) in the as one of the main centres responsible for training many of the Latin American army officers, intelligence agents and paramilitary groups that participated in the Cóndor Plan.80 Marcus Lauderback, however, challenged such conceptions arguing that SOA played a minor part in

79 Carranza, M. E., (1978), Fuerzas armadas y estado de excepción en América Latina, México, Siglo Veintiuno Editores, p. 88. 80 See, for instance, Blixen, S., (1998), Operación Cóndor, pp. 7-15.

28

the overall process of training Latin American armed forces.81 He also pointed out that the indoctrination was not a one-way process imposed by the United States, as most of the Latin American armed forces also sought access to those training programs. Moreover, he argued that from a logistical and economic point of view, several US presidents and military chiefs preferred to use Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to train armed forces in host countries. Clara Aldrighi clearly illustrates this point with her study of the influence of US advisors such as Dan Anthony Mitrione in training the Uruguayan police and other intelligence services in Uruguay and Brazil.82

Although Lauderback’s investigation places SOA within a much broader training bureaucracy, this does not diminish the impact of the training imparted by this particular institution to Latin American military personnel. For instance, SOA trained approximately one thousand military officers and soldiers from Uruguay between 1949-1996 (among several other courses, 78 officers and soldiers participated in counterinsurgency courses, more than 120 received training on internal security and 36 undertook military intelligence training).83 Most of those who received training at SOA became instructors for future generations of officers and soldiers in their own countries. Hence, regardless of SOA’s position within the overall US training bureaucracy, its impact was greater than what Lauderback suggests.

Though the US became the largest provider of counterinsurgency training for the Latin American armed forces, there were two other important sources for this type of training. The first one came from the French School of counterinsurgency. Until the late 1940s, the Latin American armed forces were strongly influenced by European military doctrines. While the US’s NSD replaced those doctrines, some European military literature continued to be used

81 See Lauderback, D. M., (2004), The United States Army School of the Americas. 82 Aldrighi, C., (2007), La intervención de Estados Unidos en Uruguay (1965-1973): el caso Mitrione, Montevideo, Trilce. 83 Derechos, H. R., (2008), "S.O.A. students and instructors from Uruguay 1949 - 1996", online, available at http://www.derechos.org/soa/uy4996.html, [accessed 15/08/2008].

29

at many South American War Academies, particularly in Brazil and Argentina. The contacts between the Argentine and the for training and indoctrination purposes began to develop in the mid-to-late 1950s. The French military’s experiences in the Algerian and Indo-China wars helped to develop and refine counterinsurgency warfare in that country and also in Latin America.84

The other source for counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, as well as political warfare training for Latin America, came from . This school was also influential for Latin America, despite being much smaller than its US and French counterparts. Its existence is barely noticed by Latin American scholars tracing the origins and influence of counterinsurgency in the continent. The anticommunist Taiwanese party (KMT) and the Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League (APACL) founded the Peitou academy in the late 1950s, with US assistance, to train Asian military personnel, politicians and civilians in the art of unconventional warfare. When APACL joined forces with other anticommunist forums around the world to establish the World Anticommunist League (WACL), the Peitou academy began to receive trainees from other parts of the globe. The relationship between the Peitou academy and the Latin American anticommunist chapters began in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The main centre to coordinate the selection and travelling arrangements of South American trainees was in Paraguay under the supervision of Antonio Campos Alum, president of WACL’s Paraguayan

84 Gen. became one of the architects of the French Counterinsurgency School. A veteran of the and responsible for the counterinsurgency operations against leftist revolutionary forces in Algeria, Trinquier wrote several books on this subject. His work “Modern Warfare” or “La Guerre Moderne”, first published in 1961, attracted the interest of military officers all over the Western hemisphere. His views influenced not only US military doctrines, which found their way to SOA, but also those of many Latin American armies, particularly that of Argentina. The French School of Counterinsurgency was introduced in Argentina in the mid-to-late 1950s at the Argentine War Academy and, from there, delivered to military personnel from other South American countries. For further readings on the works of Gen. Trinquier, see Trinquier, R., (1961), La Guerre moderne, , La table ronde; Trinquier, R., (1964), Modern warfare: a French view of counterinsurgency, London, Pall Mall P; Trinquier, R., (1976), Les maquis d'Indochine, 1952-1954, Paris, Editions Albatros; Trinquier, R., (1978), Le temps perdu, Paris, Albin Michel; Trinquier, R., (1980), La guerre, Paris, Albin Michel; Trinquier, R., (1984), Le premier bataillon de berets rouges: Indochine 1947-1949, Paris, Plon.

30

chapter.85 The three schools introduced counterinsurgency indoctrination, with minor variations, across Latin America. Subsequently, the Cóndor partners used the counterinsurgency teachings delivered by the US, French and Taiwanese schools to hunt down their opponents.

The increased participation of the Latin American armies in their countries’ political lives became one of the most distinctive features of these militaries influenced by the NSD. Most armed forces in the continent had intervened in the political affairs of their nations during the late 19th and 20th centuries, often by carrying out military coups. Most of those militaries frequently returned to the barracks and kept away from overt political participation. However, there were some exceptions such as the case of the military coup carried out by nationalist factions within the Argentine armed forces in 1943 headed by Generals Pedro Ramírez and Edelmiro Farrell. This regime lasted from 1943 until 1946. There were also times when the military was not overtly involved in government but exerted strong influences over civilian administrations. A clear example of such circumstances can be identified in the same country during the administration of . During this period the armed forces repeatedly obstructed several of his policies and indirectly influenced his administration. Despite these exceptions, the Latin American armed forces usually returned to their barracks after a brief period of intervention. 86

In 1957, Samuel Huntington introduced the concept of military professionalism in his work The Soldier and the State.87 He argued that the notion of a-politicism among the armed forces was a central element of the professional armies and that “the keystone to a professional military [was] its

85 See Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League: the shocking expose of how terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American death squads have infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League, New York, Dodd Mead, p. 140. 86 Bolivia is also a clear exception. 87 Huntington, S. P., (1957), The soldier and the state.

31

subordination to civilian authority”.88 However, as the Cold War intensified and with the introduction of the National Security Doctrine, the armed forces throughout the region became more active in the political lives of their countries. The NSD maintained that the military could make an important contribution towards the process of policy making.89 Huntington, who had strongly argued in favour of an a-political professionalism, began to identify significant changes in the political role of the armed forces as the Cold War evolved and with the emergence of revolutionary warfare.90

These changes began to materialise with the 1964 military coup that ousted President Joao Goulart in Brazil, and the 1966 military takeover carried out by Juan Carlos Onganía in Argentina. The kind of militarism seen in those countries, as Tapia Valdez and Carranza illustrate, became more permanent in nature.91 Alfred Stepan and Guillermo O’Donnell provide lengthy analyses of these particular military governments and their works are central for understanding the structural changes introduced by this new kind of militarism.92 Carranza argues that international or exogenous factors, such as the Cold War and the NSD, coupled with the internal social and political conditions in Latin American countries, led those more permanent military governments to evolve into two kinds of military dictatorships: Progressive or Regressive.93 Progressive dictatorships such as those seen in Peru from 1968 to 1975, or in

88 Samuel Huntington in Oxtoby, K. L, (2004), Smoke and mirrors: the Dirty War and Argentine military professionalism, Master of Arts, University of Calgary, p. 3. 89 The US National Security Council (NSC) provides a clear example, as the armed forces played, and continue to play today, an important role in developing and implementing policies concerning national security. 90 See for instance: Huntington, S. P., (1962), Changing patterns of military politics, New York, Free Press of Glencoe. 91 Carranza, M. E., (1978), Fuerzas armadas y estado de excepción en América Latina; Tapia Valdes, J., (1980), El Terrorismo de Estado. 92 See O'Donnell, G., (1988), Bureaucratic : Argentina 1966-1973, in comparative perspective, Berkeley, University of California Press; Stepan, A. C., (1971), The military in politics: changing patterns in Brazil, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Guillermo O’Donnell branded the new militarism as Bureaucratic Authoritarianism. 93 Carranza, M. E., (1978), Fuerzas armadas y estado de excepción en América Latina, pp. 111- 121.

32

Bolivia from 1970 to 1971 adopted distinctive features, such as the introduction of land reform and the nationalisation of banks and mineral resources. They also displayed signs of anti-imperialist ‘revolutionary-’.94 Regressive dictatorships, on the other hand, aligned themselves with the US and its economic policies (e.g. Brazil in 1964, Argentina in 1966) and adopted a number of distinct fascist characteristics such as,

…a) a government with unlimited power aligned with the monopolist capital and the dominant elites; b) elimination of political pluralism; c) suppression of any point of view that might politically disturb the regime [and] press censorship […]; d) institutionalization of terror and torture; e) repression of any independent action of the working class: suppression of independent state trade unions [and the in general], imprisonment and exile of union leaders, and control of union elections.95 Carranza limited his discussions to the cases of Argentina and Brazil in the 1960s. However, all the military regimes that took part in the Cóndor plan fall within Carranza’s description of regressive dictatorships.

Thus, the National Security Doctrine and the Cold War played major roles in the professional and ideological formation of the armed forces that took part in Cóndor. The NSD is, arguably, one of the strongest links between the US and the latter plan. This doctrine, tailored by the US government, transformed the Latin American armed forces. The different training courses, particularly those focusing on internal security and counterinsurgency, became key avenues for the distribution of concepts and strong anticommunist ideals preached by this doctrine. Counterinsurgency tactics and theories helped in shifting the focus of attention towards internal security, as put forward by the US government in the early 1960s. As a consequence, the armed forces in the region developed a new form of militarism. Although the latter first appeared in the mid-1960s, its most radical and violent manifestations surfaced in the 1970s in the regimes that took part in the Cóndor Plan.

94 Ibid, pp. 97-100. 95 Ibid, p. 110.

33

Methodology

This investigation relies predominantly, but not exclusively, on the study of various official documents, memorandums, and internal communications between the various intelligence agencies and other government departments participating directly or indirectly in this plan. A large number of these documents are held at the Centro de Documentación y Archivo (CDYA) (Terror Archives), in Paraguay and the National Security Archive (NSA), at the George Washington University, in Washington DC. The latter also include a series of collections with declassified documents, memorandums, and cables from President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger regarding Chile and the government of Dr Salvador Allende. Other archival sources in the United States include the CIA’s CREST database and the documents of the (OPS), held at the National Archives (NARA), in Maryland. The archival work also included a series of official diplomatic documents and communications from the Uruguayan government held at this country’s Foreign Relations Ministry’s Historical Archive, in Montevideo, Uruguay. An important pool of internal documents, communications and other material concerning the leftist urban guerrilla MLN-Tupamaros and the Uruguayan exile community were consulted at the Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios Latinoamericanos Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios Uruguayos (CEILCEIU), at the Universidad de la República (UDELAR) in Montevideo.

To investigate the sensitive issues related to national security and secret counterinsurgency operations such as those seen in Cóndor is a considerable challenge. As McSherry points out, a “key element of counterinsurgency strategy is Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), which use propaganda [among several other tactics] to muddy the waters and deliberate misrepresentation to conceal a ’s perpetrator”.96 The intelligence services involved in Cóndor frequently produced documents with the deliberate intention of not

96 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, p. xxvii.

34

revealing key aspects of those operations or simply to falsify information to mislead anyone investigating them.97

It is also a challenging task to scrutinize the declassified documents released by the US government. Several fragments of these documents have been highly censored, hiding sensitive, and possibly incriminating information. Thus, it is necessary to implement a methodology that helps to address these challenges. This investigation implements a similar approach to that used by McSherry in her Predatory States, which consisted of “triangulating confessions and statements by Cóndor operatives who have come forward with the oral histories of survivors98 and a large assortment of documents from declassified US archives”99, as well as from the Paraguayan CDYA, the CEILCEIU and the Uruguayan Foreign Ministry’s historical archive in Montevideo, Uruguay.

The number of countries involved in this plan also presents a considerable challenge. To carry out a comprehensive study of all the nations involved in it requires a time scope and space much greater than that allowed by this investigation. As the main aim here is to determine why these countries decided to transnationalize state terrorism in November 1975, the study focuses on the countries responsible for the formalization of this plan, namely Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Those officially joining in later years, such as Brazil, Ecuador and Peru, are briefly discussed but (except Brazil) are not central to the study.

Chapter Structure

Before discussing the Cóndor Plan, it is necessary to determine how the five original founders of this plan arrived at the secret Santiago meeting of

97 The case of the 119 Chilean citizens killed in Buenos Aires by members of the Argentine and Chilean intelligence services provides a clear example. These are known as Operation Colombo. See McSherry, P., (1999), "Operation Condor", p. 156.

98 Already provided by the truth commissions of Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Chile and Bolivia, as well as other secondary sources containing these testimonies. 99 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, p. xxvii

35

November 1975. This issue is addressed in Chapter I, which provides a basic historical background and explores the social, political and economic situation of each country in the early-to-mid 1970s. The complex, and at times conflictive, relationships between the South American armed forces are also discussed here to further demonstrate the uniqueness of Cóndor and to contextualize the unprecedented levels of cooperation developed by these regimes during this period. Chapter II focuses on the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (JCR). It explores the circumstances that led to the emergence of this multilateral revolutionary organization, and the level of threat it posed to the military regimes in the Southern Cone of Latin America. This is done to test the hypothesis that these regimes transnationalized state terrorism because they misrepresented (intentionally or unintentionally) the security threat posed by the JCR. A secondary objective of this chapter is to further explore the debate regarding the JCR’s role in the formalization of the Cóndor Plan.

The third chapter focuses on the peaceful resistance and activities of the South American exiles. The latter’s contacts with the emerging human rights movement represented a major departure from previous armed strategies and a significant shift in the struggle against the military dictatorships. It generated a considerable number of problems for the military regimes, which responded with a number of repressive measures to neutralize the threat posed by the exiles. The chapter also focuses on the debate between the US Congress and the Nixon and Ford administrations in the mid-1970s and discusses the numerous problems faced by the political refugees in the host countries, along with their interaction with the transnational networks for the defence of human rights.

Chapter four dedicates particular attention to an area that has been neglected by current literature: the non-state actors like the most conservative and radical segment of the Latin American Right (RLAR). The South American regimes formalized the Cóndor plan; however, they were not alone in this process. These dictatorships received considerable support from influential right wing figures and groups in their respective countries, the continent and other

36

parts of the world. The chapter analyses the RLAR’s connections with the Cóndor regimes and other international anticommunist forums that lent their unconditional support to these dictatorships and encouraged them to further increase repression of their opponents. The object is to further confirm that the military governments transnationalized state terrorism at that particular time to coerce the exiles and discourage them from engaging with the human rights movement. The chapter demonstrates that the complex political environment cannot be reduced to the clash between the armed forces and the revolutionary organizations, or that the rest of the population remained passive. People were not hostages of these dos demonios (two demons), as is often claimed. The two demons hypothesis neglects two important facts: 1) several people like those involved with the RLAR and other anticommunist organizations supported these regimes and their repressive measures. Thus, they have their share of responsibility in this process of violent radicalization, a responsibility that until today remains not acknowledged; 2) that even though armed resistance was almost obliterated during this period, other social actors including students, academics, artists, workers, trade unions, religious groups, etc. continued to stage varied acts of resistance to the military regimes. Such acts demonstrate that people did not stay passive or oblivious and that many were not intimidated by the repression, despite the high costs involved in such types of resistance.

The conclusion revisits the most significant aspects of each chapter to confirm that the intelligence services of Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Bolivia and Paraguay formalized the Cóndor alliance on November 1975 to launch a coordinated offensive against their opponents, particularly prominent exiles involved in the denunciation of these regimes’ human rights violations. It also demonstrates that the materialization of this multilateral cooperation was far more complex than first thought and that the authorship of the Cóndor plan cannot be attributed exclusively to these five armed forces. Unlike most studies of Cóndor, this dissertation focusses attention on the role played by civilians and anticommunist groups in encouraging and supporting the repressive measures of these military governments. With their moral and material support, these

37

civilian actors became indirect partners in this alliance and facilitated the functioning of Cóndor’s repressive infrastructure.

38

Chapter I

From distrust and suspicion to mutual cooperation: the genesis of the Cóndor partnership

This chapter aims to determine how it was that military and political leaders in the Southern Cone of Latin America were ready to unite under the Cóndor banner when, historically, there appeared to be more to divide them than unite them. To achieve this it is necessary to trace the process that encouraged a radical shift in the relationship between the armed forces and governments that formalized the Cóndor Plan in 1975. This is key to understanding the significant levels of cooperation achieved by these militaries in the mid-1970s, especially with regard to defence and economic and political matters. Without this level of cooperation it is unlikely that a project like Cóndor could have materialized or reached such proportions. The fact that between the late-19th and mid-20th centuries the relationships between these militaries (both under democratic rule and dictatorial military regimes) were strongly influenced by distrust and suspicion made this multilateral cooperation a considerable achievement. That distrust had developed from past military confrontations as well as nationalist defence doctrines, frequently of European origin, that prepared these armed forces to protect their nations from external threats.1

This situation changed considerably with the end of World War II as a number of factors, endogenous and exogenous to the Southern Cone of Latin America, began to develop and influence the political and military landscape of the region. The onset of the Cold War and the subsequent introduction of the National Security Doctrine (NSD) by the government of the United States of America kick started the process that encouraged these armed forces to build

1 Such doctrines claimed that external threats could materialize in the form of an invasion by foes from other continents. They also included possible confrontations with neighbouring countries as a consequence of historical territorial disputes. Furthermore, Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay were exposed to frequent geopolitical struggles for power between the largest countries in the region, Argentina and Brazil, which had considerable economic and political ramifications for the smaller countries.

39

closer ties. Between the end of WWII and the late 1950s, the US government began to set the foundations and infrastructure that would allow strategic close cooperation between these militaries. These efforts achieved modest results, as distrust, suspicion and strong nationalist feelings continued to influence their interactions. The doctrinal change introduced by the US government in the early 1960s shifted attention from external to internal threats and began generating an environment that encouraged cooperation. These exogenous factors, however, did not suffice to unite these militaries. The former had to be complemented with a number of endogenous reasons inherent to each of the five South American countries for that cooperation to take place. These internal factors included economic, political and security considerations, as well as a number of problems that increasingly challenged the legitimacy of the regimes and isolated them both locally and internationally. Only then did full cooperation occur.

The Chapter is divided in four sections. The first briefly addresses a number of key factors that fuelled suspicion and distrust amongst these armed forces. These historical antagonisms include wars that led to bitter territorial disputes, as well as the geopolitical ambitions of the major power players in the Southern Cone of Latin America. The second focuses on the factors exogenous to the region that led towards increased military cooperation throughout the continent. These were mainly the role of the US government in establishing the Inter-American Defence System and providing Counterinsurgency training to the Latin American armed forces in the 1960s and 1970s. The third section focuses on the challenges faced by each country in the mid-1970s, which developed into the important endogenous factors that encouraged cooperation between these armed forces. The fourth and final section focuses on the increased cooperation in the Southern Cone regarding economic and security matters. The number of countries involved in the Cóndor Plan makes it difficult to address all the issues affecting each particular regime in just one chapter. Issues such as the activities of leftist guerrillas or the human rights campaigns conducted by South American exiles and their supporters are only mentioned in

40

brief in this chapter. These, however, are discussed in greater detail in later chapters.

Historical antagonisms Wars and territorial disputes

The origins of the distrust and bitterness amongst the South American armed forces are closely linked to vicious and bloody armed confrontations between neighbouring countries during the late 1800s. Geopolitical power struggles between the larger nations in the region, as well as international third parties such as European governments and/or major foreign economic interests, were the catalysts for major armed confrontations and territorial disputes. Conflicts such as the Triple Alliance War, the , and The Chaco War are clear examples of these states of affairs. They left difficult obstacles to overcome and made it difficult to find solutions to these territorial disputes. More importantly, they fuelled distrust, bitterness and deep feelings of animosity amongst these militaries during the late 19th and most of the 20th century, which seriously undermined the possibility of cooperation between them.

The Triple Alliance War (1864-1870) between Paraguay and the governments of Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, had devastating consequences for Paraguay and contributed considerably towards shaping the future relationships between armed forces in the region. As Carlos Miranda points out, the causes of this conflict were quite complex.2 Fearing a possible invasion by Brazil and Argentina, President Francisco Solano López of Paraguay adopted a series of measures to upgrade his country’s military.3 He also joined forces with the Uruguayan Blanco political faction amid concerns of a potential alliance

2 Miranda, C. R., (1990), The Stroessner era: authoritarian rule in Paraguay, San Francisco, Westview Press, p. 37. 3 Francisco Solano López took office after the death of his father, the “Exellentisimo” Carlos Antonio López, in 1862. The latter ruled the country for eighteen years (1844-1862), after the Paraguayan Congress granted him power for life. For further readings on the government of Carlos A. López and his predecessors, see Sondrol, P. C., (1992), "The emerging new politics of liberalizing Paraguay - Sustained civil-military control without democracy", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 34(2): 127-163.

41

between Argentina and Brazil, which could further isolate smaller countries like Paraguay and Uruguay.4 In 1864, Brazil sent a military force to Montevideo to ensure the victory of a pro-Brazilian faction in the civil war that had erupted in Uruguay. Although Francisco Solano López complained and demanded that Brazil withdraw its forces from Uruguayan soil, the Brazilian government dismissed his requests. Consequently, Paraguay declared its support for the Blanco faction. When the Paraguayan military invaded a number of Argentine provinces in its way to Montevideo, the governments of Brazil and Uruguay joined forces with Argentina in what became known as La Triple Alianza (The Triple Alliance).5 The conflict ended after López was killed by the allied forces in the battle of Cerro Corá, in March 1870. The war left Paraguay on the brink of collapse with a massive debt and a large part of its male population dead.6 The country’s economy collapsed, as did its political institutions7, while the governments of Brazil and Argentina occupied and kept more than 150,000 square kilometres of Paraguayan soil.8

Although the alliance between Argentina and Brazil was decisive in winning the war, their partnership did not last long as their geopolitical ambitions to dominate the rest of the region became a source of confrontation and competition between them. From then on, their geopolitical ambitions frequently influenced and shaped governmental/military relations between them, and with their smaller neighbours.9

4 The Blancos opposed the government of Venancio Flores in Uruguay, which had openly sided with the governments of Brazil and Argentina to remain in power. 5 Keen, B. and K. Haynes, (2004), A , New York, Houghton Mifflin, pp. 196-197. 6 Lewis, P. H., (1980), Paraguay under Stroessner, North Carolina, The University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill, p. 19. 7 Miranda, C. R., (1990), The Stroessner era, p. 4. 8 Hanratty, D. and S. Meditz., (1988), "Paraguay: a country study", online, available at http://countrystudies.us/paraguay/, [accessed 18/02/2010]. 9 For instance, General Stroessner repeatedly exploited those historical geopolitical tensions to his advantage during the negotiations for the Itaipú and Yacyretá Hydroelectric projects with Brazil and Argentina respectively. See Nickson, A., (1982), "The Itaipú hydro-electric project: the Paraguayan perspective", Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2(1): 1-20.

42

Historical antagonisms are also present in the ongoing territorial dispute between Chile and Bolivia, which has its roots in another significant conflict of the 19th century: La Guerra del Pacífico (the Pacific War). The latter began in 1879 when the Chilean government officially declared war against Bolivia and Peru, and lasted until 1883.10 Chile emerged victorious from the conflict and, as in the Triple Alliance War, the defeated nations suffered significant losses of territory.11 Bolivia in particular lost its sovereignty over vital territories, including access to the Pacific Ocean. This war produced deep antagonisms between Chile, Bolivia and Peru which seriously hindered their inter- government/military relations during most of the 20th century and undermined any possible solution to this matter.

Deep antagonisms also developed from 20th century conflicts like The Chaco War, between Bolivia and Paraguay.12 The hostilities began in the early 1930s when the Bolivian army increased its military presence on the border with Paraguay. During that period the Bolivian government ordered the establishment of new military posts in the Chaco region, believed to contain

10 The dispute began in 1878 when the Bolivian congress sought to introduce a tax on a British company for the exploitation and exports of sodium nitrate from the border region with Chile. The British-Chilean company pressured the Chilean authorities to intervene in their favour. Chile claimed that such action was in violation of the 1873 accord, signed by the Bolivian government and the British company. The accord granted tax exemptions to the latter for more than two decades to extract sodium nitrate. This situation was further complicated by a “secret” defence alliance established by the governments of Peru and Bolivia in the early 1870s to protect each other against a possible war with Chile. Diplomatic tensions between the three nations continued to grow throughout 1878. The nationalisation of the British-Chilean company by the Bolivian government added an extra international dimension to the dispute, as the British government sided with Chile and threatened intervention. For a detailed analysis of the causes of the Pacific war, and its international economic and diplomatic ramifications, see Bonilla, H., (1979), "La dimensión internacional de la Guerra del Pacífico", Desarrollo Económico, 19(73): 79-92. 11 Keen, B. and K. Haynes, (2004), A History of Latin America, p.231. 12 The origins of the Chaco Boreal dispute are also linked to territorial clashes of the late 19th century. Since then Bolivia has claimed sovereignty over this territory. For a detailed account of the clash between Bolivia’s claims and the geopolitical interests of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, as well as the interests of international third parties such as the government of the United States of America and oil corporations such as the Standard Oil Company, see Child, J., (1983), "The American Southern Cone: geopolitics and conflict", Proceedings of the conference of Latin Americanist Geographers, 9: 200-213.

43

large oil reservoirs.13 The war broke out in 1932 and the Paraguayan military emerged victorious in 1935, re-gaining some of its lost prestige. More significantly, the Guaraní nation obtained important territorial gains of up to 52,000 square kilometres in the Northern Chaco region.14 The victory served as an important morale boost for the Paraguayan military and helped to mitigate the psychological damages caused by the Triple Alliance War. For the Bolivian army, on the other hand, the results were quite different. Its reputation decreased dramatically with the defeat and it struggled to recover from it afterwards. That situation continued unchanged until the early 1950s when the new Revolutionary government disbanded the entire military in 1952.15

The dispute over the territory gained by Paraguay after the Chaco War remained unresolved for more than 70 years.16 In that period, the governments of Bolivia and Paraguay failed to reach an agreement while their armed forces continued to distrust each other. Although the relationship between them slightly improved over the years, the memories of the Chaco War frequently generated tensions. Arguably, the period with friendlier approaches and improved understanding took place when dictators of similar idological inclination ruled both nations.17 Yet, this did not suffice to find common ground to solve the border dispute.

Geopolitical ambitions

Geopolitics and its supposed scientific connotations became popular in the early 1920s and the 1930s in Europe. Karl Haushoffer developed the notion

13 For a detailed list on the different hypotheses regarding the causes of the Chaco War see Lee Christman, C., (1969), "The Chaco War: a tentative bibliography of its diplomacy", The Americas, 26(1): 54-65. 14 Hanratty, D. and S. Meditz., (1988), "Paraguay: a country study". 15 See Alexander, R., (1982), Bolivia: past, present and future of its Politics, New York, Praeger, p. 34. 16 Fuentes, F., (2009), "Bolivia, Paraguay settle 74-year border dispute", online, available at http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/41551, [accessed on 6/02/2013]. 17 That is, when General ruled in Paraguay and Colonel headed the military government in Bolivia.

44

of Geopolitik in , defining it as “the scientific basis of the art of political action in the fight of life or death of State organs for living space”.18 This discipline perceived states as living organisms in constant competition with other rivals to secure their survival. This interpretation served Nazi officials to justify their expansionist foreign policy. After the end of WWII, scholars from all over the world discredited Haushoffer’s geopolitical school and the discipline lost most of its initial thrust and academic relevance.

Geopolitical thinking, however, remained highly popular as a discipline amongst the South American armed forces during the 1960s and 1970s. While the German school influenced most of these militaries during that period19, Argentina, Brazil and Chile were the three major contributors towards geopolitical thinking in the region.20 Their objectives and strategies to protect their countries’ ‘espacio vital’ (vital space) shaped the way in which they interacted with their neighbours. On rare occasions these goals accommodated friendlier ties. In most cases, however, they saw each other as competitors and even enemies. This made it difficult for them to develop relationships of trust with rival neighbours. Similarly, these three countries’ ties with smaller buffer states like Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay depended on how these smaller nations fitted their overall geopolitical strategy.21

18 Reboratti, C. E., (1983), "El encanto de la oscuridad: notas acerca de la geopolítica en la Argentina", Desarrollo Económico, 23(89): 137-144, p. 139. 19 The German geopolitical influence amongst some Latin American armies is no coincidence. Until the early 1960s, and before the doctrinal change introduced by the United States, most armies in the region continued to be influenced by old German/Prussian military doctrines. This was the case with Argentina and Chile. 20 Argentina and Brazil developed their own geopolitical schools and formed a considerable volume of work on this issue at their prestigious War Academies. Although Chile did not have a specific school of Geopolitics, this discipline was quite popular with the armed forces. Some senior military officers like General Augusto Pinochet wrote a number of works on Chilean geopolitics which were quite influential in the formation of future junior officers at the Chilean War Academy. 21 Helder Gordim da Silvera’s work on the Chaco War clearly illustrates this issue by identifying the hidden connections between the geopolitical interests of Brazil and Argentina in this conflict. These countries’ reactions to the conflict and their respective attitudes towards the parties involved were developed to protect their own interests. This study also reveals how these geopolitical objectives and ambitions led to deep animosity between these militaries. See Gordim da Silveira, H.,

45

Argentina and Brazil competed for hegemonic control of the Southern Cone. According to John Child, the Brazilian geopolitical ambitions focused on security and development, as well as on:

the integration of all national territories, the ‘march Westward’ into the Amazon heartland; the security of the South Atlantic, and concern with the Atlantic Narrows, West Africa, and Antarctica; access to the energy and natural resources Brazil lacks; the rivalry with Argentina in the River Plate Basin; and the search for great power status (grandeza).22

Argentina’s armed forces, on the other hand, have always been suspicious of Brazil’s expansionist ambitions and, from the end of World War II, its strong ties with the United States. Argentine officials described that relationship as the US-Brazil Axis and they perceived it as a serious destabilizing factor or threat to Argentina’s leadership ambitions in the region.23 The Argentine military also focused on the development of nuclear capabilities for energy and defence purposes.24 In addition, the country had territorial disputes with Chile over the strategically located Beagle Straits in the Southern Atlantic, and in some areas of Patagonia.25

(2009), "Brazilian military vision of the Chaco War: projection, geopolitics and international rivalry in South America", Antíteses, 2(4): 649-667. 22 Child, J., (1979), "Geopolitical thinking in Latin America", Latin American Research Review, 14(2): 89-111. 23 CIA: Office of National Estimates, “Argentina: Perón returns”, Secret, Memorandum, 2 August 1973, available at CIA-RDP85T00875R2000120042-7, released 08/02/2007, [accessed 29/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 24 For a detailed analysis of Argentina’s nuclear ambitions and its position in the nuclear race with Brazil see Redick, J. R., (1975), "Regional nuclear arms control in Latin America", International Organization, 29(2): 415-445. 25 Calvert, P., (1989), "Argentina: the primacy of Geopolitics", The World Today, 45(2): 33-36. General Augusto Pinochet discussed the rivalry between Argentina, Brazil and Chile in his work Geopolítica de Chile. According to the general, the Argentine geopolitical school claimed that some South American countries were subordinated to Argentina due to their geographical position. The cases of Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile, according to him, clearly illustrated this situation. All these countries needed to cross Argentine territory to access the Atlantic Ocean. Argentina meanwhile was interested in obtaining access to the Pacific because, argued Pinochet, “a great power [needed] to have shorelines on both Oceans.” The general also argued that Argentina expected to exert control over the smaller countries rich in minerals to secure access to vital resources. The book displays a similar

46

Chile’s geopolitical ambitions clashed with the interests of the two major powers, as well as with those of other countries in the region. These objectives consisted of maintaining the territorial gains obtained in the Pacific War and on achieving influential political, military and naval might in the South Pacific to secure control of the Straits of Magellan and Cape Horn and to reach Antarctica.26 General Cañas Montalva, editor of the Revista Geográfica de Chile and influential figure in Chile’s geopolitical thought, urged the Chilean military to “focus and fulfil its responsibility of controlling the South Pacific. Its access to both oceans places it in a unique position of reaching [the] status of world power. The neglect of this duty … could be filled by Argentina.”27 Some senior officers within the Argentine armed forces and even politicians from both major parties expressed the same views regarding Argentina’s territories in the southern Patagonian region. They claimed that this particular land should be occupied and developed or run the risk of its being taken by Chile. However, as Peter Calvert argues, this was highly unlikely “since there [were] simply not very many Chileans to fill it”.28

The smaller nations that joined the Cóndor partnership (i.e. Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay) also had well defined objectives. Uruguay’s main geopolitical goals included acting as a political buffer between Argentina and Brazil and taking advantage of their rivalry. The Uruguayan armed forces also expressed concern regarding the US-Brazil Axis, which placed this small country closer to an alliance with Argentina. Bolivia, on the other hand, wanted to break its landlocked status and reach the sea, try to recuperate some of the territories lost to Chile in the Pacific War and to Paraguay after the Chaco War, and to somehow neutralize the alliance between Paraguay and Brazil.29

approach towards Brazil’s geopolitical ambitions. See Pinochet, A., (1978), Geopolítica de Chile, México, CID Editor. 26 Child, J., (1979), "Geopolitical thinking in Latin America", p. 102. 27 Ibid, p. 103. 28 Calvert, P., (1989), "Argentina: the primacy of Geopolitics", p.34. 29 Child, J., (1979), "Geopolitical thinking in Latin America", pp. 105-107.

47

Paraguay meanwhile sought to hold on to the territories obtained in the Chaco War and monitor Bolivia’s activities.30 The Paraguayan armed forces also sought to protect the country’s limited access to the Atlantic Ocean and followed with suspicion the geopolitical ambitions of Argentina and Brazil.31

Confrontations such as the Triple Alliance War, the Pacific War, the Chaco War, and the subsequent longstanding territorial disputes between these countries became the foundation of a historical trend that generated strong scepticism and deep antagonisms amongst South American governments and militaries in the 19th century and most of the 20th. Each military force had its own geopolitical vision for its nation state. These visions or objectives took into account the power and ambitions of other countries in the region. On some occasions, as with the wars above described, or with other issues where two or more countries shared common interests, this allowed some degree of cooperation between some of them. Most of the time, however, the historical antagonisms and geopolitical ambitions prevailed. These feelings of animosity and distrust undermined any type of regional cooperation, particularly with regard to military objectives. It would have been impossible under these conditions to develop a plan requiring high levels of cooperation like those achieved during the duration of the Cóndor Plan. When these historical antagonisms and geopolitical struggles are taken into account, the Cóndor Plan becomes even more puzzling.

30 Child, J., (1983), "The American Southern Cone: geopolitics and conflict", p. 210. 31 Francisco Martorell argues that the Paraguayan intelligence services accepted DINA’s invitation for the November meeting in Santiago to monitor the Argentine and Brazilian services’ ambitions. Martorell, F., (1999), Operación Cóndor, el vuelo de la muerte: la coordinación represiva en el Cono Sur, Santiago de Chile, Lom Ediciones.

48

Reasons for cooperation

Exogenous factors Evolution of US relations with Latin America

External factors, especially the political context generated by the US’s foreign policy towards the region and the rest of the world, also conditioned the relations between Latin American armed forces. These countries’ relations with their northern neighbour evolved within the framework generated by the and the Good Neighbour policy. The US government introduced the former in 1823 to prevent European expansion into the New World and “the translation to the Western Hemisphere of forms of government alien to American ideals”.32 This policy, however, became a tool to exercise police power by the US government, which translated into open military intervention in several Caribbean and Central American countries.33 That approach generated deep resentment towards the US. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt announced the Good Neighbour Policy in the early 1930s to change this situation. His administration supported the principle of non-intervention in the internal political affairs of countries and respect for their national sovereignty. Stephen Rabe argues that the latter policy was “not simply rhetoric. The US not only renounced intervention and interference in domestic [Latin American] politics, but it actually did not intervene or interfere” during this administration.34 This, however, was not entirely the case in Nicaragua, for example, where the Roosevelt administration helped to establish the National Guard and supported the Somoza dictatorship. Furthermore, it can be argued that with the Good Neighbour policy US intervention shifted from military to political intervention.

32 C.M.C., (1942), "Latin America and the War II", Bulletin of International News, 19(14): 597- 605. 33 Stephen Rabe argues that “during the first third of the twentieth century, the US carried out thirty armed expeditions in the Caribbean basin….” Rabe, S., (2012), The killing zone: the United States wages Cold War in Latin America, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 8. 34 Ibid, p. 19.

49

Despite its intervention in Nicaragua, the US government’s foreign policy shift generated new hopes for a more and friendly relationship between the USA and the rest of the Americas. In the 1930s, countries seeking to speed up a process of Pan-American integration held several conferences of American Foreign Ministers in Argentina, Peru, Panama and other Latin American nations. These meetings set out the foundations for future Inter-American relations, particularly in the area of continental defence. The latter issue was further consolidated at the July 1940 meeting held at Havana, Cuba. The participating delegations presented a joint declaration “to deal with a possible repercussion in the Western Hemisphere [of WWII], condemning any transfer of sovereignty in that hemisphere to a non-American State as against American sentiments and principles and the rights of American States to maintain their security and political independence”.35

Efforts by the US government to achieve efficient working relations between the Latin American militaries increased in the early 1940s as WWII gained momentum. Many US officials believed that the historical tensions and lack of cooperation between these armed forces could undermine the US’s sphere of influence over the region. This issue became more pressing when the War touched US soil. Douglas Wingfield argues that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour led to important changes in Inter-American relations and continental defence policies. The Japanese attack raised numerous questions about the vulnerability of the region. These concerns were discussed at the Third Meeting of Consultation in Rio de Janeiro, in 1942. The participating delegates agreed to organize a meeting in Washington DC for “a commission composed of military and naval technicians appointed by each of the governments to study and to recommend to them the measures necessary for the defence of the continent”.36

35 C.M.C., (1942), "Latin America and the War II", p. 598. 36 Wingfield, D. D., (1968), The Inter-American Defence College: an assessment of its activities, Ph.D, University of Maryland, p. 4.

50

One of the most important outcomes of the Washington DC meeting was the official formation of the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB), which proceeded to develop strategies and mechanisms to improve continental defence.37 This board enabled the US to influence and indoctrinate Latin American armed forces and keep the region closely aligned to the US.38 The IADB and its annual Conference of American Armies (CEA), in conjunction with other US military programs slowly reduced or weakened the doctrinal ties between the Latin American and European armed forces.39 After the end of WWII and in the following decades, the US became one of the main providers of military hardware for the region with programs like the Military Assistance Program (MAP). It also trained Latin American military personnel at the Inter- American Defence College (IADC), the US Army School of the Americas (SOA) – better known as The School of the Americas – in the Panama Canal Zone, and other military teaching facilities on US soil. The US also used Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and advisors to train personnel in host countries.40

WWII precipitated an important shift in the balance of power around the globe, as well as a considerable change to US foreign policy. The war weakened the old European imperial powers, while the United States and the Soviet Union emerged from it as the sole competing super powers. In this new environment, the US government introduced radical changes to its foreign policy amid fears of

37 Ibid. 38 Between 1943 and 2012, the IADB had thirty-two presidents. Thirty of them were US senior military officers. See: Inter-American Defence Board (I.A.D.B.), (2012), "Galería de Presidentes", online, avaliable at https://sites.google.com/a/jid.org/iadb/el-consejo-de-delegados/biografia-del- presidente/galeria-de-presidentes, [accessed 23/06/2012]. 39 These countries also relied on European nations for the purchase, delivery and maintenance of equipment, machinery and weapons. For further readings on the historical doctrinal ties between the American armies and Europe, see Huntington, S. P., (1957), The soldier and the state: the theory and politics of civil-military relations, Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 40 For a detailed discussion of the activities of SOA and MTTS see: Lauderback, D. M., (2004), The United States Army School of the Americas: mission and policy during the Cold War Ph.D., The University of Texas at Austin.

51

a soviet communist expansion into the Western Hemisphere.41 In early1947, the Truman administration adopted the first steps promising economic and military assistance to nations threatened by communism.42 The new policies also included the formation of strategic anticommunist defence alliances in the Western Hemisphere to prevent and repel any potential soviet expansion. This commitment materialized in Europe in 1949 with the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which further complemented the for urgent economic aid. The Latin American anticommunist military alliance materialized in 1947 with the signing of the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (or Rio Pact).43 This was, however, as far as the US would go in terms of aid for the region. There would be no Marshall Plan for Latin America. Instead, the US government fixated on regional military security and directed most of its efforts and resources toward Europe and Asia.44 This aspect of US foreign policy disappointed several Latin American governments, including those that had helped the US and the allies during the war. Latin America supplied Europe and the US with raw materials at low prices for the duration of most of the war.45 These countries expected that their help would be reciprocated with much needed economic assistance.

The National Security Doctrine (NSD)

As tensions between the two superpowers escalated in the late 1940s, the US government continued to re-adjust its foreign policy and military doctrines. Within this environment, the Truman administration produced one of the most influential documents for the country’s future foreign policy in the context of the

41 Rabe, S., (2012), The killing zone, p. 21. 42 Ibid. 43 McSherry, P., (2005) Predatory states: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin America, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., p. 36. 44 Except on a number of occasions, like during the , the Soviet Union always recognized that Latin America was under The US sphere of influence and avoided any direct intervention in the region. Rabe, S., (2012), The killing zone, p. xxx. 45 See introduction to Harmer, T., (2011), Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, pp. 1-18.

52

Cold War: National Security Council Paper-NSC No. 68/2, of 1950. The document discussed the circumstances that led to a dramatic shift in the world’s balance of power and identified the Soviet Union as a dangerous threat.46 US officials feared the potential repercussions of the soviet approach, particularly in the Third Word. The government of the United States of America addressed these concerns with three strategic goals for the latter region: “ (or reversal) of communism; expansion of capitalism and prevention of the spread of noncapitalist systems; and ensuring political alignment with the United States”.47

These objectives and the Cold War in general had significant implications for US-Latin American relations. US officials perceived the region as another theatre of this global confrontation, though not the most important. The protection of Europe and Asia from communism became the Truman administration’s and its successors’ main priority. In this context, Latin America should stay anticommunist and closely aligned with the United States. However, some US officials like George F Kennan from the State Department, distrusted Latin American governments and doubted their capability to meet these objectives. Kennan also warned the State Department that democratic rule was not applicable to most Latin American countries.48 The failure of these Latin American governments could easily lead to a proliferation of communist states, dangerously compromising US interests.

Hardliners within the US government and its armed forces maintained in the 1950s that the new Cold War environment demanded tougher defence

46 NSC-68/2 in Campos, J. H., 2nd, (2005), The state, terrorism, and national security discourse: forging the state in a time of terror, in the face of fear, Ph.D., University of Hawaii, p26. 47 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, p. 36. 48 Kennan maintained that it was “unlikely that there would be any other region of the earth in which nature and human behaviour could have combined to produce a more unhappy and hopeless background for the conduct of human life”. According to Tanya Harmer, “he saw the region as an unfortunate blend of Indian civilization, Spanish conquerors, and ‘Negro slave elements,’ all of which proved to be ‘handicaps to human progress’ and contributed to ‘exaggerated self centeredness and egotism – in a pathetic urge to create the illusion of desperate courage, supreme cleverness, and a limitless virility where the more constructive virtues are so conspicuously lacking.” George Kennan in Harmer, T., (2011), Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, p. 42.

53

strategies. The secret 1954 Doolittle Report clearly illustrated this strategic shift. It argued that to win the Cold War the US should “learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy [its] enemies by more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used against [the US]”.49 These methods were introduced into Latin America with fatal consequences for thousands of people. US officials interpreted Latin Americans’ protests and demands for change as part of communist plots to subvert and undermine US influence in the region. Hence, they neutralized them by overthrowing governments and replacing them with political or military authorities more friendly towards the US. Quite frequently these actions had nothing to do with the humanitarian mission of preventing communist expansionism or saving Western Civilization. The latter became convenient excuses to mask intervention in Latin America and other parts of the world to protect US political and economic interests, as well as those of large US corporations like the United Fruit Company and influential oil companies.50

From the end of WWII until the 1950s the US government courted Latin American militaries claiming that they were instrumental for the protection of the region from a possible soviet invasion, even if the possibility of such invasions was almost non-existent. Despite some modest support to local communist parties, Moscow identified Latin America as the US’s backyard as most of the region had strong ties with the United States. Thus, until the 1960s, the USSR was not involved in the region and did not pursue any ambitious foreign policy for Latin America.51 Despite this, the US government continued to associate local grievances and demands for change, including social and agrarian reforms, with soviet plots or communist activities. The overthrow of

49 Doolittle Report in, McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, p. 37. 50 Guatemala became the US’s first laboratory to experiment with these new type of tactics in Central America during 1954. For further reading on this matter see Ferreira, R. G., (2010), Guatemala y la Guerra Fría en América Latina (1947-1977), Guatemala, Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Regionales. 51 For an analysis of the possibilities of a soviet invasion during the 1950s and 1970s see Harmer, T., (2011), Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, chapter 5, pp. 149-189.

54

the Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz, in 1954, marked the beginning of an era of frequent US intervention in Central and South America during the next four decades.52

The US recognized that the Latin American armed forces had been significant actors in the political lives of their respective countries and that they could be reliable partners in the Cold War. Like its immediate predecessors, the Eisenhower administration used the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and other similar programs to train, equip, indoctrinate and prepare the Latin American armed forces against external foes (mainly the Soviet Union). While historical antagonisms and geopolitical ambitions continued to generate tensions amongst these armed forces, the perceived threat of a soviet invasion as portrayed by the United States served as an incentive for closer cooperation between them and their northern neighbour. The military aid, training and hardware made available to these armed forces served as yet another strong inducement to go along with and accept US claims regarding the soviet threat.

The views regarding external threats began to change in the late 1950s, particularly after Vice President Richard Nixon’s “good will trip” throughout Latin America and the victory of the Cuban Revolution.53 The latter challenged the US government’s entire set of policies and strategies regarding continental defence.54 Eisenhower and his advisors worried that other countries would follow Castro’s example and were concerned over what they described as communist adventurism in the region.55 Consequently, this administration began to draft policies that addressed the issue of internal security in Latin America. According to Samuel Huntington, these new policies paid a great deal of attention to the issue of subversion, which he defined as “the effort to weaken or destroy the state by forces operating within its territorial and institutional

52 See Ferreira, R. G., (2010), Guatemala y la Guerra Fría en América Latina (1947-1977). 53 Lauderback, D. M., (2004), The United States Army School of the Americas, p. 120. 54 The Cuban Revolution is discussed and analysed in greater depth in the next chapter of this dissertation. 55 Lauderback, D. M., (2004), The United States Army School of the Americas, p. 139.

55

confines”.56 This strategic shift began to transform the way in which the Latin American armies interacted with each other and the way they perceived their counterparts.

The new policy, however, had an important flaw. As Patrice McSherry and Raúl Molina Mejía point out, “the ‘internal enemy’ thesis encouraged the militaries to focus on their own citizens as potential national security threats”.57 The US government modified its training programs to show these militaries how to address the new developments. It standardized training manuals and military courses to facilitate and speed up the structural and ideological homogenisation of armies all over the continent.58 The Eisenhower administration began this ideological and strategic shift, while President Kennedy and his successors completed the process. Only then did the Latin American armed forces fully assimilate and implement the concept of an internal enemy, as presented by the new training curricula and accept its full strategic ramifications.59 Authors like Brian Loveman have argued that traditionally Latin American militaries had already focused on the internal enemy and domestic security prior to the Cold War.60 Although this argument is correct, the defence policies that emerged with the outset of the Cold War added a new dimension to the traditional defence role of the Latin American militaries, which, until then, focused on possible conflicts with neighbouring countries due to territorial disputes and/or potential invasions from non-American nations.

After the 1959 Cuban revolution, the US government sought to prevent the replication of similar events in the continent. President Kennedy understood

56 Huntington, S. P., (1957), The soldier and the state, p. 1. 57 McSherry, P. and M. R. Molina, (1999), "Introduction to 'Shadows of State Terrorism: impunity in Latin America'", Social Justice, 26(4): 1-12, p. 5. 58 For further readings on these changes in the training curricula see Lauderback, D. M., (2004), The United States Army School of the Americas, pp. 232-269. 59 Schoultz, L., (1987), National Security and United States policy toward Latin America, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, p. 19. 60 See: Loveman, B., (1999), For la Patria: politics and the armed forces in Latin America, Wilmington, Del., SR Books.

56

that several decades of neglect by US governments in terms of economic aid undermined economic development across Latin America. Demands for financial aid from the United States had gone unheard before, during and after WWII. This situation had a number of potential ramifications for the United States. Many Latin American governments were dissatisfied with the United States’ policies towards the region. This strained US-Latin American relations and undermined US leadership within the IADB and the Organization of American States (OAS). More importantly, this economic neglect had exacerbated poverty, underdevelopment and discontent throughout the continent. Many officials within the Kennedy administration feared that leftist groups within those countries could exploit these conditions and channel them towards the formation of new revolutionary experiments like that of Cuba. The Kennedy administration tailored a new set of policies directly aimed at encouraging a process of economic development for Latin America. This process would help change the deep structural, social, and economic deficiencies of the continent.61

The Alliance for Progress

On March 13 1961, President Kennedy announced the formation of the Alliance for Progress to address decades of insufficient economic aid and mend the relationship between the US and the Latin American Republics.62 Influenced by social science theories such as those developed by Walter Rostow, the administration expected that economic advancement and modernization would become an effective deterrent against communism. The Alliance for Progress would provide financial aid to “urban, middle class leaders who favoured democracy, universal education, and state policies that promoted economic development and social welfare”.63 Financial assistance would be sustained until the Latin American countries reached a certain level of stability and development. US officials optimistically predicted that in a period of ten

61 Schoultz, L., (1987), National Security and United States policy toward Latin America, p. 19. 62 Lauderback, D. M., (2004), The United States Army School of the Americas, p. 158. 63 Rabe, S., (2012), The killing zone, p. 90.

57

years the entire region would reach impressive levels of economic growth of up to five percent annually.64 Yet, as Philip Agee points out, the Alliance for Progress failed to live up to its expectations. Economic growth lingered well below all predictions in most countries and the much-needed structural changes did not materialize.65

It is true that a sharp decline in the terms of economic trade for Latin American products in the global market partly caused the region’s failure to reach such levels of growth.66 Nevertheless, the failure of Kennedy’s ambitious program cannot be attributed to this reason alone. Most social structures remained untouched despite the progressive promises of change made by President Kennedy and his successor Lyndon Johnson. The pattern of land distribution stayed very much the same even in those very few countries where land reform was implemented. For instance, in Chile, one of the countries that performed better in the Alliance for Progress, the implementation of land reform was rather superficial. As in most of Latin America, the majority of land expropriated was semi arable and left large latifundios untouched.67 The aggressive nature of the US’s internal security policies, and the way local anticommunist elites and military dictators exploited them to maintain an

64 According to Rabe, ‘Kennedy delivered over $600 million in emergency economic aid to Latin America in early 1961. [That year], … Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon informed Latin American delegates that they could count on receiving $20 billion in public and private capital over the next ten years, ‘the decade of development’… combined with an additional $80 billion that Latin Americans could reasonably expect to generate in internal savings. Latin American nations would achieve a real economic growth rate of 2.5 percent a year. Administration officials chose to be publicly cautious; they actually expected that growth might reach 5 percent a year. Marvellous changes would flow from foreign aid and economic growth… Latin Americans would witness a five- year increase in life expectancy, a halving of the infant mortality rate, the elimination of adult illiteracy, and the provision of six years of primary education to every school-age child’. Ibid, p. 86. 65 Agee, P., (1975), Inside the Company: C.I.A. diary, Harmonsworth, England, Penguin Books, p. 504. 66 For instance, Rabe maintains that, in order to generate the $80 billion on domestic savings mandated by the Alliance, Latin America needed to sell on the global markets their primary products – coffee, sugar, bananas, copper, tin, lead, zinc, and oil. But the prices of these tropical foods and raw materials declined in the 1960s even as the prices of imported industrial machinery and finished goods, the very things needed for economic development, rose. The price of coffee, Latin America’s chief export, fell from ninety cents a pound in the 1950s to thirty-six-cents a pound in the early 1960s. Rabe, S., (2012), The killing zone, p. 94. 67 See MacEóin, G., (1975), Chile: the struggle for dignity, London, Coventure, p. 81.

58

environment that favoured their interests, and those of the United States, became an important flaw in Kennedy’s project for Latin America.

Counterinsurgency

Because the changes proposed by the Alliance for Progress would not happen overnight, the US complemented its economic development roadmap for the region with a strong emphasis on internal security. The latter sought to control the potential frustration and discontent of Latin American people, as well as possible subversive groups that could exploit that discontent to promote violent uprisings. As a response to the Cuban Revolution and other developments in South East Asia, the Kennedy administration developed a new National Security Doctrine (NSD) with “an aggressive new counterinsurgency strategy to confront the global threat of communist subversion”.68 Pion Berlin points out that the Counterinsurgency (CI) doctrine was developed in the 1950s by the French armed forces during their campaigns in the Algerian and Indo- China Wars.69 The US Military embraced and further refined these tactics in the early 1960s.

Kennedy’s NSD attributed roles to the armed forces that went beyond mere military strategies and tactics. Latin American militaries became directly responsible for controlling internal security in their respective countries – a role that in most nations was traditionally allocated to the police – by focusing on two major areas: the implementation of Counterinsurgency tactics against guerrillas, and Civic Action to capture the hearts and minds of the people. This new version of the NSD expanded the armed forces’ political role and participation in their country’s economic development to address any social and economic grievances amongst the population. This sought to deny the Marxist insurgents a pool of potential fighters amongst disgruntled citizens. The military’s participation in their countries’ economies became one of the most

68 Ojeda, A. E., (2008), The trauma of psychological torture, Westport, Conn., Praeger, p. 29. 69 Pion-Berlin, D., (1988), "The National Security Doctrine, military trhreat perception, and the “Dirty War” in Argentina", Comparative Political Studies, 21(3): 382-407, p. 386.

59

salient features of the Latin American regimes influenced by the NSD. The military governments of Paraguay, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina (with Generals Onganía first, and later with General Rafael Videla), and even in the early stages of the Pinochet regime clearly demonstrate this feature. Some of these NSD military governments (e.g. Paraguay, Bolivia, and Argentina) increased the size of their public sectors and managed large government-owned companies.70

Counterinsurgency (CI) became the strategy of choice to fight the global conflict generated by the Cold War. US instructors taught their Latin American trainees that “domestic subversion and international communism were two sides of the same coin”.71 They developed tactics to neutralize the guerrillas’ influence over peasant and urban populations in the Third World. Counterinsurgency theorists such as General Trinquier72 considered those Third World societies as being “infected by clandestine organisms that penetrated like a cancer into [their] midst”. Therefore, it was necessary to target that population to root out the enemy. According to McSherry, the Kennedy administration’s CI doctrine proposed four distinct avenues to root out the enemy:

1) the organization and use of closely controlled indigenous paramilitary and irregular forces, networks of informants […] and intelligence gatherers; 2) the expansion of the state intelligence organizations to monitor and control society; 3) the use of political-ideological criteria to determine friendly and hostile sectors of society; 4) the use of terror (later called counterterror) to control society and eliminate opposition leaders; the use of [Psychological Warfare] PSYWAR to manipulate the political

70 For a case study of a Latin American NSD government other than Brazil and Argentina, see James Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra’s detailed discussion of the role of the armed forces in Bolivia’s economy and the influence of the National Security Doctrine over the Banzer regime. Malloy, J. M. and E. Gamarra, (1988), Revolution and reaction: Bolivia, 1964-1985, New Brunswick, Transaction Books, p. 101. 71 Pion-Berlin, D., (1988), "The National Security Doctrine, military threat perception, and the “Dirty War” in Argentina", Comparative Political Studies, 21(3): 382-407, p. 387. 72 General Trinquier was heavily involved in the Counterinsurgency campaign conducted by the French military forces in the Algerian War against local insurgency during the 1950s. See Trinquier, R., (1964), Modern warfare: a French view of counterinsurgency, London, Pall Mall P.

60

climate and prepare a population for violence through black propaganda and/or the use of fear.73

Kennedy’s counterinsurgency doctrine emphasised these principles and that administration used its various military training programs to inculcate them in Latin American militaries.

Counterinsurgency training was not limited to military personnel alone. Local police departments also received these training programs as many of them played an important part in the fight against urban leftist guerrillas. In addition to the already discussed military training facilities in the Panama Canal Zone, the United States and in host countries, the US government established the Office of Public Safety (OPS) to train police forces in Latin America and other parts of the world. The OPS was a sub-branch of the US Agency of International Development (USAID) and became key in the delivery of training on Internal Security matters. Prior to the introduction of Kennedy’s new NSD to Latin American soil, police departments looked after internal security matters in most countries. The emergence of urban and rural guerrilla organizations during the 1960s and 1970s led these police departments to cooperate and work in conjunction with the armed forces to combat these groups. In other countries such as Brazil and Uruguay, to name only two, the military took over the police departments and dominated their forces. Thousands of Latin American police and military officers attended courses at the Inter-American Police Academy (IAPA) in the Panama Canal Zone, while OPS advisors delivered similar courses in the host nations. In countries such as Bolivia, Brazil and Uruguay, OPS advisors linked to the CIA and US military advisors upgraded police and military procedures, as well as defence infrastructure, to meet the new Internal Security demands. Under the banner of the Alliance for Progress and USAID, OPS advisors helped local police departments to establish new Intelligence

73 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, p. 12.

61

branches and trained them in various techniques, including the use of torture, as well as counterinsurgency tactics.74

The teachings at the different training centres in the Panama Canal Zone and other military installations in the US brought together students and trainees from different countries. The US government expected that the interaction between them at these centres would “result in increasing communication and cooperation between countries”.75 All these programs, as well as the political environment generated by the Cold War and the spread of the NSD into the Latin American armed forces’ own military doctrines, served as exogenous factors that encouraged the cooperation between militaries. This helped to protect and secure US interests in the region, as well as those of local anticommunist, political, military and business elites aligned with, or simply benefiting from, the US’s Cold War ideology. Yet, these alone did not suffice to trigger the level of cooperation achieved in the mid-1970s under the banner of the Cóndor Plan. It took more than a decade and a number of endogenous factors for this cooperation to fully materialize.

Endogenous factors

The emergence of factors inherent in each Southern Cone country resulted in an increase of economic and military cooperation between the future Cóndor partners from the early to mid 1970s. It is true that the threat posed by leftist guerrillas (both real and imagined) served as an incentive for military cooperation during that period.76 The intention here, however, is to shift the

74 For a detailed discussion of the functioning and ramification of the OPS program in Uruguay, see: Aldrighi, C., (2007), La intervención de Estados Unidos en Uruguay (1965-1973): el caso Mitrione, Montevideo, Trilce. 75 Lauderback, D. M., (2004), The United States Army School of the Americas, p. 201. 76 This particular topic has produced a marked debate within the literature on Cóndor, which will be addressed in greater detail later in this dissertation. John Dinges, for example, argues that the South American militaries genuinely believed that these groups posed a real threat to their countries. Patrice McSherry, on the other hand, maintains that these armed forces bluntly exaggerated the threat and that the reasons for the formalization of Cóndor had little to do with the threat of guerrilla activities. See: Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years: how Pinochet and his allies brought terrorism to three continents, New York, New Press; McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states.

62

attention from the guerrilla activities to focus on other internal factors that led to increased cooperation between these regimes. These endogenous factors included considerable economic difficulties and legitimacy problems with these governments’ own constituencies. Most of these military governments had sizable support among the bourgeoisie and the middle sectors, which enhanced their legitimacy. Therefore, these regimes had to deliver to them to secure their ongoing support. Yet, the economic problems affecting most of these countries made it difficult for the military governments to maintain some of the promises made to those constituencies. In short, the loss of such support could further undermine their legitimacy and lead to their demise. The future Cóndor partners also had to deal with the international isolation that ensued as a consequence of their human rights violations.77 Thus, these governments sought to neutralize the damaging effects of these problems by increasing economic and military cooperation with each other. Despite the historical antagonisms and differing geopolitical ambitions, these armed forces reached the conclusion in November 1975 that cooperation between them was necessary for their survival. In other words, ‘united we stand, divided we fall’ became the motto.

Paraguay

By the mid-1970s, the Paraguayan military government headed by General Alfredo Stroessner had been in power for two decades and faced very few problems that could threaten its grip on power. The regime had easily defeated all guerrilla organizations and controlled the opposition parties by allowing only limited political participation.78 President Stroessner secured the

77 The regimes’ human rights violations and the emergence of the Global Human Rights Movement (GHRM) are discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV. 78 In the early 1960s, members of the Febrerista and Liberal political forces living in Buenos Aires grew frustrated after being in exile for so many years. They organized two guerrilla organizations with logistic and political help from the Venezuelan government of President Rómulo Bentancourt and also, though to a much lesser degree, from the new Cuban Revolutionary government. These guerrilla organizations were the Movimiento 14 de Mayo (14th of May Movement) and the Frente Unido de Liberación Nacional (FULNA) (United National Liberation Front). Both were extremely weak and plagued with organizational and logistical problems. Thus, the regime’s armed forces defeated them quite easily. The groups failed to rally support in the rural areas due to the large number of Paraguayan peasants associated with the py nandi thugs (Guarani for “the bare foot ones”).

63

support of the country’s largest political force (i.e. the ) which gave an aura of legitimacy to his administration. His party amended the Paraguayan constitution in the 1960s to extend the regime’s longevity indefinitely. The country’s promising economic prospects during that time facilitated the introduction of this constitutional amendment. Many Colorado followers attributed this positive economic outlook to the government of General Stroessner. All these factors helped the latter to strengthen his grip on power and remain as the undisputed leader of the Colorado Party and, more importantly, the ruler of Paraguay.

From the early to the mid-1970s the regime expanded economic cooperation with a number of South American countries. That cooperation paid dividends as Paraguay’s economy grew steadily thanks to the construction of a number of bi-national hydroelectric projects, including Itaipú with Brazil, and Yacyretá and Corpus Christi with Argentina. These projects helped the dictator attract support from influential sectors of the population and allowed him to stay in power without any serious danger during this period. It is true that the spoils of the economic boom did not reach the poorest sectors of Paraguayan society, and that this generated discontent with, and dislike of, the government.

These were part of the Guión Rojo or Guionistas faction of the Colorado Party and carried out the functions of a paramilitary group. Their numbers reached up to 150,000 and spread throughout the country to defend the government and prevent the advance of communism in Paraguay. Moreover, by the time the guerrillas entered Paraguay, Interior Minister Edgar Insfran had already established a wide network of pyragües (spies and informants from the Colorado Party) who worked together with the Paraguayan Police’s intelligence services to keep the government informed of suspicious communist activities. This network covered the country and had also infiltrated the Paraguayan exile communities in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Europe. The pyragües became a key component of the regime’s repressive infrastructure and an effective mechanism to spread fear amongst the Paraguayan population, as no one knew who was targeted by pyragüe surveillance. This network became a valuable asset when the regime joined the Cóndor plan, as it gathered most of the intelligence on the activities of Paraguayan exiles in Argentina. For further readings on the activities of these leftist organizations and the paramilitary groups associated with the Stroessner regime see Comisión de Verdad y Justicia (C. D. V. Y.J.) (2008), Informe Final: las responsabilidades en las violaciones de derechos humanos, Asunción, Paraguay, Editorial J.C. Medina, Vol 6, pp. 33-34; Comisión de Verdad y Justicia ( C. D. V. Y.J), (2008), Informe Final: las principales violaciones de derechos humanos, Asunción, Editora J.C. Medina, Vol. 2, p. 170; Lewis, P. H., (1980), Paraguay under Stroessner, p. 167; Lewis, P. H., (1982), , , and Dictatorship in Paraguay, California, Praeger, chapters 1-3; Nickson, A., (1989), "The overthrow of the Stroessner regime: re- establishing the status quo", Bulletin of Latin American Research, 8(2): 185-209, p. 191.

64

However, the regime resorted to harsh repression and extra-legal measures to control any kind of dissidence and to intimidate its opponents.

Only the Ligas Agrarias (Agrarian Leagues), influenced by the Paraguayan Catholic Church, presented some degree of challenge to the regime’s legitimacy in the mid-seventies. These groups had connections with some of the most progressive elements in the Paraguayan Catholic Church. They organized a number of programs to improve living conditions in rural areas, and supported literacy programs and organizational skills development for peasants. The Leagues also supported a number of groups demanding land reform and the elimination of latifundios. Such demands directly threatened the interests of a small but influential segment of Stroessner’s constituency, the large landowners. Therefore, the security forces and thugs linked to the Colorado Party violently disrupted the activities of the Agrarian Leagues and those groups seeking land reform. The Paraguayan armed forces exploited the Cold War environment linking the Agrarian Leagues to alleged soviet plots to overthrow the government. This allowed the security forces to quickly control these groups, arrest or kill numerous of its members, and force others to join the Paraguayan exile community in the neighbouring countries and Europe. Subsequently, the government banned the Agrarian Leagues altogether, and Stroessner remained in power unchallenged.79 Of the five Cóndor partners, the Paraguayan government faced the least internal threat in 1975.

Bolivia Unlike its Paraguayan counterpart, the Bolivian military regime headed by Colonel Hugo Banzer faced a number of challenges that threatened its grip on power by the mid-1970s. These challenges, however, had little to do with the threat posed by leftist guerrilla groups such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) (National Liberation Army). Instead, the government experienced considerable legitimacy problems. After the collapse of the

79 Comisión de Verdad y Justicia (C. D. V. Y.), (2008), Informe Final: síntesis y caracterización del régimen, Asunción, Paraguay, Editora J C Medina, Vol. 1, Parte II, section on Agrarian Leagues (Ligas Agrarias).

65

coalition government formed by conservative parties, the private sector and the armed forces, the regime became increasingly isolated. By 1974, the country experienced numerous economic problems and a mounting foreign debt. These issues undermined the government’s economic credentials and strained relations with its supporters and allies. Subsequently, the regime resorted to the fabrication of alleged guerrilla threats to remain in power and maintain control of the country. Banzer also faced the termination of OPS aid which, though small, would weaken the security forces, and endangered his relationship with the armed forces and his position as president. These internal factors led the regime to increase cooperation with neighbouring countries to boost its image and try to gain support from the population.

Colonel Hugo Banzer came to power after overthrowing the progressive government of General Juan José Torres on 20 August 1971.80 To gain some form of legitimacy, the new dictator formed a coalition government named Frente Popular Nacionalista (FPN) (Nationalist Popular Front) with other traditional parties.81 However, power stayed firmly in the hands of the military

80 President Torres took office after a brief succession of coups and countercoups in late 1970. His administration tried to break or reduce US influence in Bolivia, nationalized a number of US oil companies and mines, re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba and obtained financial aid from the Soviet Union. Torres established a more flexible industrial relations system than his predecessors and tried to restore the relationship between the government and the poorest sectors of society. His government also expelled the US Peace Corps volunteers amid rumours of their participation in plotting to overthrow him. All these policies generated deep resentment amongst the most conservative elements of Bolivian society and the armed forces. Subsequently, the latter two, with support from the US and Brazilian governments, staged the coup that brought Colonel Hugo Banzer to power. General Torres meanwhile sought refuge in Chile first, and then Argentina, where he became one of the high profile victims of the Cóndor Plan. See Calloni, S., (1999), Los años del lobo: Operación Cóndor, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Continente: Peña Lillo, pp. 117-123. 81 The Banzerato, as the regime was known, had two distinct periods: the political alliance known as the Nationalist Popular Front (FPN) (1971-1974), and Banzer’s authoritarian rule (1974-1978). The FPN coalition included political parties like the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) and the rightist/fascist Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB), the armed forces and a number of representatives from the private sector. The MNR was formed in 1941. From 1952, and thanks to the strong support of the peasantry and mineworkers, this party became the largest and most influential political force in the country. The popularity and ideological diversity of its founding fathers (i.e. Victor Paz Estenssoro, Hernán Siles Suasso, Juan Lechin Oquendo, and Walter Guevara Arze) attracted support from all sectors of Bolivian society and helped the party to remain in power until 1964. The Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB), on the other hand, was a small, yet influential, rightist political party sympathetic to the Spanish fascist Falange. Colonel Banzer and the Bolivian armed

66

as it kept control of key ministries such as Defence and Interior. Factionalism and power struggles considerably weakened the FPN government and, eventually, different views regarding economic policies precipitated its collapse in 1974. This allowed Hugo Banzer and the military to finally obtain absolute control over the country.

Apparent success on the economic front became one of the regime’s (1971-1974, 1974-1979)82 most publicly promoted features. However, James Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra, together with Robert Alexander, challenge this image for two main reasons. Firstly, the regime’s economic policies placed a heavy burden on workers and peasants; and secondly, the brief prosperity was quickly followed by a dramatic increase of the country’s foreign debt.83 Malloy and Gamarra argue that towards the end of the 1970s, “the economy had little more to show than exhausted mines, depleted petroleum reserves, declining agricultural outputs, stalled construction projects, and a massive foreign debt”.84 The latter increased from US$ 481.7 million in 1970 to 824.4 million in 197585, and reached US$ 3,404 million in 1982.86 The economy’s deterioration isolated the regime and undermined its legitimacy, as some of its most influential financial and political backers gradually withdrew their support.87

forces expected that the inclusion of these parties in the FPN coalition, particularly the MNR, would provide some legitimacy with the Bolivian people. 82 According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Bolivia’s GDP growth in 1971 reached 4.94%, 5.91% in 1972, 6.91% in 1973, 6.1% in 1974, 5.3 % in 1975, and 6.8% in 1976. Inter-American Development Bank in Malloy, J. M. and E. Gamarra, (1988), Revolution and reaction: Bolivia, 1964-1985, New Brunswick, Transaction Books, p. 233. 83 See Alexander, R., (1982), Bolivia, pp. 99-113. 84 Malloy, J. M. and E. Gamarra, (1988), Revolution and reaction, p. 72. 85 Morales, J. A. and J. D. Sachs, "Bolivia's economic crisis", in Sachs J. D., (1989), Developing country debt and the world economy, , University of Chicago Press, pp. 57-79, table 3.6: Bolivian External Debt, 1970-85, p. 66. 86 Sandoval Rodríguez, I., (1987), El proyecto político militar 1971-1982: el estado de la seguridad nacional en Bolivia, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, Universidad Boliviana Gabrial Rene Moreno, pp. 89-92. 87 In addition to the economic problems, the regime struggled to gain support from the peasantry. From August 1971, Banzer tried to follow the steps of the popular governments of General René Barrientos (1964-1965, 1966-1969) by strengthening ties between the armed forces and the peasantry to gain legitimacy. In order to achieve that, however, he had to neutralise other competing forces like the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) (Nationalist Revolutionary Movement). The

67

The collapse of the FPN coalition in 1974 dealt a considerable blow to the government’s legitimacy.88 The CIA reported at the time that, although there were no substantial attempts to oust the regime after it banned all political parties, it was by no means secure. The government was “on a shaky financial footing, and [Banzer’s] popularity [appeared] to be at its lowest point since he took office nearly four years ago”.89 The regime turned its attention towards foreign policy in an attempt to revert the sharp decrease in popularity and the subsequent legitimacy problems at home. Banzer focused his efforts on finding a solution to one of Bolivia’s oldest geopolitical ambitions: to gain an outlet to the Pacific Ocean.90 This gave the military and Banzer the opportunity to extend their time in office. Arguing that the country was at a critical historical juncture, and closer than ever before to reaching a solution of this matter, the president asked the nation to support the government. He suspended the 1975 elections indefinitely, claiming that an electoral campaign by the newly arranged political parties would only disrupt the pursuance of this important goal.

MNR’s largest support base came from the peasantry. While Banzer allowed this party to function in the urban centres, he banned it from campaigning in the rural areas. Consequently, Hernán Siles Suazo, the other prominent leader of the MNR, left the party and the government coalition and established the Leftist Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNRI). Suazo’s departure took away a considerable number of supporters amongst the peasantry which further reduced the regime’s support base. For a detailed analysis of the relation between Banzer and the MNR see: Alexander, R., (1982), Bolivia, pp.108-112. 88 After the introduction of yet another devaluation of the Bolivian currency in late 1973, the prices of numerous products and commodities increased sharply by early January. The measure was most felt among peasants who began to protest against it. In response, President Banzer mobilized the armed forces to quickly end the protests. The confrontation reached its most dramatic point in January 1974 with the “Massacre of the Valley” where the military killed numerous peasants. These events ended any remaining good relations between the government and the peasantry. Painter, J., (2002), Obituary: General Hugo Banzer Suarez; Bolivian dictator who took up democracy, The Independent, London, in SOA Watch, online, available at http://www.soaw.org/about-the- soawhinsec/13-soawhinsec-graduates/1732, [accessed, 10/01/2010] . 89 CIA, “Bolivia: Banzer and the politics of instability”, Intelligence Memorandum, No. 1035/74, May 28, 1974, available at: CIA-RDP85T00353R000100050009-2, released 09/05/2002, [accessed 24/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 90 See: Alexander, R., (1982), Bolivia: past, present and future of its politics, pp. 111-112.

68

A number of factors suggested that a final agreement on this issue could be reached.91 Pinochet’s willingness to resume diplomatic ties with Bolivia and his early sympathetic remarks regarding the territorial dispute were encouraging. However, the negotiations stalled shortly after they began and the issue remained unresolved.92 Both governments failed to reach an agreement on a satisfactory territorial exchange that would allow Bolivia to obtain passage to the sea and, on the other hand, to compensate Chile for its apparent territorial loss. According to the CIA, one of the main problems undermining the negotiations was that Pinochet offered Bolivia the port of Arica. However, “this [was] former Peruvian territory and Chile [was] committed by a treaty signed in 1929 to consult with Peru before ceding any territory…”.93 Peru would not accept Pinochet’s offer of transferring Arica to Bolivia.94 Although the negotiations stalled shortly after they began and the issue stayed unresolved, they provided Banzer with an opportunity to regain control of the country, even if his government’s legitimacy was at its lowest ebb since 1971.

91 Both regimes shared similar ideological views and, most importantly, the Brazilian government of General was quite active in mediating these negotiations. See: CIA, “Weekly Review special report: Brazil’s changing foreign policy”, Secret, 23 August 1974, No. 636, available at CIA-RDP85T00875R001500070004-1, released 25/09/1999, [accessed 24/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 92 This issue continues to be a difficult obstacle to be sorted out by both countries. In 2006, for example, Bolivian President resumed discussions with his Chilean counterpart, . However, the negotiations stalled once again with the election of President Sebastián Piñera in January 2010. 93 CIA, “Bolivia: Banzer and the politics of instability”, Intelligence Memorandum, No. 1035/74, May 28, 1974, p. 6. Also, the Peruvian government, headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, was diametrically opposed to the ideological views of the Chilean Junta. This directly challenged any territorial discussions between Pinochet and Banzer. The government of Peru was amongst the few remaining progressive military regimes in the Southern Cone of South America. During this particular period (i.e. 1973-1974) there were a number of nationalist governments with distinct leftist progressive features. In addition to that of Peru, was the Ecuadorian military government, headed by General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara. The latter came to power in a bloodless military coup launched in February 1972 and remained in power until 1976. For that reason, and also due to the historical hostile rivalry between the two nations since the Pacific War, the Chilean Junta considered the Peruvian government as a dangerous threat, so much so that the Chilean intelligence agency DINA developed plans to overthrow the Velasco regime. See Calloni, S., (2001), Operación Cóndor, p. 97. 94 In addition, it was rumoured that the land offered by the Banzer regime to compensate Chile’s territorial loss was rich in mineral resources. Most people at the time believed that, if the exchange went ahead, Bolivia’s losses would be far greater than its gains. See Maryorga, R. A. and S. Gorman (1978), "National-Popular state, state capitalism and military dictatorship in Bolivia: 1952-1975", Latin American Perspectives, 5(2): 89-119, p. 113.

69

The regime also improved Bolivia’s relations with the United States, which boosted its international legitimacy. This became Banzer’s most important achievement on the foreign policy front as it secured vital economic and military aid, as well as US moral support for his government. US officials praised the Banzerato arguing that:

The aberration that distinguished the regimes of Banzer’s immediate predecessors, Ovando and Torres would make Banzer’s foreign policy appear successful. He has improved relations with the US by limiting gratuitous Anti-American rhetoric and by arranging compensation for the nationalisation of various US businesses. At the same time, he has improved ties with his more conservative neighbours – forging a mutually advantageous economic relationship with Brazil and attempting to reopen long broken relations with Chile.95

On the other hand, US officials were also aware of Banzer’s growing unpopularity and anticipated that the regime’s good fortune would soon run out. Sooner or later, the CIA predicted, “Banzer probably [would] leave office in the same extra-constitutional fashion in which he took power. His ouster [would] be swift …. [and] provide the same kind of conservative, pro-US leadership”.96 These predictions were quite accurate. Colonel Hugo Banzer was ousted in 1978 by a military coup headed by General Juan Pereda Asbún.

In addition to the economic difficulties and legitimacy problems, the regime experienced a sharp reduction of military aid from the US’s Office of Public Safety (OPS) program. The US Congress ordered the latter’s termination in 1974, after discovering links between OPS advisors and cases of torture and other human right violations in Vietnam, Latin America and other Third World countries.97 Although the program was not as comprehensive as those in other countries of the region, it sufficed to reorganize, equip and train Bolivia’s

95 CIA, “Bolivia: Banzer and the politics of instability”, Intelligence Memorandum, No. 1035/74, May 28, 1974, p. 5. 96 Ibid, p. 8. 97 This program proved quite beneficial for Bolivia during the Barrientos era. However, it was repeatedly interrupted during the Ovando and Torres regimes, only to be revived during the Banzerato.

70

national police and maintain the regime’s repressive infrastructure. Following the US Congress’ decision, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) requested its OPS station in Bolivia to give a final evaluation for the country and make the necessary arrangements for the program’s termination. This became known as Bolivia’s “Phase out report”.98 Among other things, the latter made a comprehensive assessment of the country’s security situation and confirmed that the Banzer administration had repeatedly exaggerated the threat posed by leftist guerrillas.99 This allowed the regime to repress workers, students and any kind of opposition to stay in power.100

The government’s lack of legitimacy and its increased isolation, as well as the country’s economic hardships, were the predominant internal factors that led the Bolivian armed forces and Colonel Hugo Banzer to set aside historical antagonisms and engage with its neighbours.

Uruguay

Despite its civic/military appearance, the regime that took power in Uruguay in June 1973 shared some similarities with neighbouring dictatorships. It followed their same ideological path, used the same repressive measures to control the population, and experienced similar challenges. Following the 27 June coup the Uruguayan military kept the president as a mere figurehead to provide some degree of legitimacy to the new government. The armed forces’ image had been strengthened (locally and internationally) after their victory over

98 AID-OPS, “Termination phase-out study public safety project – Bolivia”, Washington DC, May 1974, in RG 286: Records of the AID 1961- Office of Public Safety/Office of the Director/Programs Surveys and Evaluations 1959-1974 (Argentina-Ceylon)/Box 1 (NND 9053511; Bolivia File), available at NARA, College Park, Maryland. 99 According to this report, Banzer had fabricated alleged guerrilla plots and masked real social discontent with allegations of subversive activities of leftist groups within the labour and student movements. 100 The CIA confirmed the report’s finding a year later when it stated that “…the Banzer regime has been known to have created fictitious subversive threats in order to shore up public support…” Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Latin American Trends”, Secret, December 17 1975, p. 3, available at CIA-RDP79T00865A002300400002-2, released 04/09/2002, [accessed 24/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD.

71

the leftist guerrilla groups in 1972. That victory translated into key support from some sectors of Uruguayan society when the military took over the country the following year.101 However, that support decreased after the junta decided to maintain President Juan María Bordaberry.102 The latter became Uruguay’s president after a narrow victory over the Nationalist Party and the leftist coalition at the 1971 election.103 The narrow victory, and claims of fraud in the election, undermined Bordaberry’s legitimacy during his presidency. That unpopularity increased when the armed forces chose to keep him as head of state. During the following two years, and despite repressive security measures, the labour and student movements repeatedly challenged the government as the regime’s economists struggled to improve the country’s economic situation. Despite some tensions with Brazil during the early 1970s, the anticommunist Uruguayan regime maintained relatively good relations with its neighbours. This situation made it easier for it to engage economically and militarily with its counterparts when Uruguay’s economic situation deteriorated in the mid-1970s.

The governments of the United States, Argentina and Brazil followed the Uruguayan election with great interest. The Broad Front coalition capitalized on the disenchantment and frustration of the Uruguayan people to form a relatively coherent political force, which attracted prominent moderate figures across the entire political spectrum. This made the leftist coalition a serious threat not only to the political ambitions of the traditional conservative political forces, the

101 These included: business sector, members of the middle class, bourgeoisie, and elites who feared the emergence of a communist state in Uruguay, if the guerrillas took over the government. 102 Bordaberry served as Agriculture Minister for President Pacheco Areco. Pacheco’s presidency was characterized by a severe deterioration of the country’s economy and security situation. During this period Uruguay witnessed the emergence of a number of leftist urban guerrillas, including the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T) (National Liberation Movement- Tupamaros). As a consequence, the Pacheco administration announced harsh security measures to combat subversion. The repression of students and the labour movement made the president highly unpopular with the population and led him to abandon his re-election campaign. Pacheco chose Juan Maria Bordaberry, to replace him as the presidential candidate for the Colorado Party. 103 The Frente Amplio (Broad Front) coalition included the two major parties of the Uruguayan left (Partido Socialista (PS) and Partido Comunista del Uruguay (PCU)), several dissident factions of both traditional parties, numerous representatives of the Catholic Church, as well as the labour and student movements.

72

Blanco and Colorado parties, but also to US interests in Uruguay and the region.104 Argentina and Brazil, too, feared that a leftist victory in Uruguay could have serious ramifications in their own territories.105 Just a year before, Dr Salvador Allende had been elected president in Chile and his coalition established a socialist government. Many feared that a second leftist electoral victory would trigger a domino effect leading to similar examples in the region. The Brazilian junta was among the most active governments in the Southern Cone attempting to prevent Uruguay from going left. According to McSherry, it “planned to invade Uruguay in a plan named Operation 30 hours” if the Broad Front won that election.106 The plan became public through numerous media outlets and further complicated the presidential race.107 Subsequently, the

104 According to US ambassador Charles Adair, the Front’s political platform sought to introduce: “…Changes in the economic and social structure [such as] …independent planning in the national economy with social objectives, in order to contribute to the necessary structural transformation and to the integrated development of the country; … a policy of nationalisation [which] could take the form of (either) state enterprises or other forms …based on participation by private producers and workers, whichever [provided] maximum efficiency and economic dynamism”. Charles Adair to State Department, “Political platform of the ‘Frente Amplio’, AIRGRAM 23 March 1971, Montevideo, in RG 286: Records of the AID 1961- Office of Public Safety/Latin American Branch/Country file Uruguay 1956-1974 Box 109 (NND 937601); File IPS – 2 General Information/Uruguay, available at NARA, College Park, Maryland. 105 US Ambassador Lodge to State Department, “Uruguayan Situation”, Secret Telegram 27/08/1971, Buenos Aires, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB71/doc4.pdf , in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 71, [accessed 27/03/20109]. 106 The name “30 Hours” referred to the time it would take the Brazilian armed forces to invade Uruguay. The Brazilian junta organized this operation in early 1971 as a contingency plan in case of a leftist victory in the Uruguayan election. See McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, p. 56. 107 The deterioration of the internal security in Uruguay prior to the election further complicated the political environment. On 6 September 1971, more than one hundred Tupamaros (including several key leaders of the organization) escaped from prison. Three days later, President Pacheco ordered the military to take over the fight against the guerrilla groups. From then on, both the Army and the National Directorate of Information and Intelligence (DNII) of the Montevideo Police Department launched an all out assault to root out subversive elements within the student and labour movements, and the population in general. US OPS advisors actively participated in this campaign. For further readings on these developments see Lessa, A., (2005), Estado de Guerra: de la gestación del golpe del 73 a la caída de Bordaberry, Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo; McSherry, P.,(2007), "Death squads as parallel forces: Uruguay, Operation Condor and the United States", Journal of Third World Studies, 24(1): 13-52. With regard to the activities of OPS advisors in Montevideo see Aldrighi, C., (2007), La intervención de Estados Unidos en Uruguay (1965-1973); USAID-OPS Montevideo to AID/W, “Public Safety Report October 1971”, AIRGRAM 17 November 1971, Montevideo, A-155, in RG 286: Records of the AID 1961- Office of Public Safety/Latin American Branch/Country file Uruguay IPS 2-1 to IPS 2-3 1964 to 1974 Box 110 (NND 937601); File IPS 2-2 /Monthly Reports/Uruguay 1968-1971, available at NARA, College Park, Maryland.

73

Colorados achieved a controversial narrow victory over the Blanco Party amid claims of fraud, missing ballot boxes, and with the State of Emergency Measures still in place. The Broad Front came in third with only 304,275 votes.108

The security situation deteriorated after the election, while the new president explored new strategies to break his political isolation. On 1 January 1972, the Tupamaros ended the cease fire and launched a new wave of operations in the department of Paysandú.109 Meanwhile, the narrow victory left the new president without a clear parliamentary majority, which made it difficult for his administration to govern the country. Bordaberry approached Blanco leaders to form a coalition government but his attempts failed because he refused to agree to the six points demanded by Wilson Ferreira and his faction to normalize the country’s situation.110 As a last choice, Bordaberry formed an alliance with the military, which was established in the Boiso Lanza pact. Although the agreement eased the country’s political stagnation, Bordaberry paid the high price of transferring a great deal of power to the armed forces.111 From then on, the military dictated the country’s political direction.

In addition to the Paysandú campaign, the Tupamaros launched an unprecedented attack against the government’s military and paramilitary apparatuses. This clash led to the organization’s defeat and compromised the country’s political future.112 The new campaign began in February, after the

108 The Colorado Party defeated the Blancos by only 12,802 votes. Latin American Review of Books, (1974), Generals and Tupamaros: the Struggle for power in Uruguay 1969-1973, London, Latin American Review of Books Ltd. 109 Blixen, S., (2005), Sendic, Montevideo, Edicioines Trilce, p. 227. 110 These included: 1) National pacification and substitution of the state of war for legal means to handle the country’s situation; 2) Dismantling of the parallel repressive organisms of the state, returning to the Armed Forces and the Police all their functions; 3) Agrarian Reform legislation; 4) Nationalisation of banks; 5) the development of an Education Organic Law; and 6) Resources for the municipal governments. 111 See Lessa, A., (2005), Estado de Guerra, pp. 96-102. 112 Mauricio Rosencof’s testimony in (2005), Raúl Sendic: Tupamaro 1925-1989, [DVD], Director Figueroa, A., Montevideo, Buen Cine Producciones.

74

MLN-T kidnapped and interrogated police agent Nelson Bardesio about his connections with the death squadron.113 On 16 March, those MLN-T leaders who were not in prison launched “Plan Hipólito” against key members of the .114 Almost a month later, on 14 April, the organization shocked the country with one of its most violent and daring actions yet: the execution of four accused members of the death squadron.115 The government responded quickly, killing eight Tupamaros in direct clashes with the military, arresting several of its key leaders, and capturing most of the organization’s hideouts and important documents. The following day, President Bordaberry suspended all individual liberties and declared a State of Internal War, giving unprecedented powers to the armed forces.116

Throughout the year, some senior officers grew increasingly frustrated with the President’s inability to control the economic crisis. After a brief respite in early 1972, inflation increased again, reaching 94.7% by the end of the year.117 While a number of senior commanders remained loyal to the

113 The Escuadrón de la Muerte (death squadron) was responsible for the summary executions of members of the student movement and the MLN-T, as well as acts of violence against leftist politicians, family and friends of suspected Tupamaros See: USAID-OPS Montevideo to AID/W, “Public Safety Report February 1972”, AIRGRAM 14 March 1972, Montevideo, A-25, in RG 286: Records of the AID 1961- Office of Public Safety/Latin American Branch/Country file Uruguay IPS 2-1 to IPS 2-3 1964 to 1974 Box 110 (NND 937601), File IPS 2-2 /Monthly Reports/Uruguay 1972, available at NARA, College Park, Maryland. 114 Most of the founding leaders of the MLN-T (i.e. Raúl Sendic, Mauricio Rosencof, Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro, and José Mujica) who were in jail strongly opposed the decision. They argued that it would be suicide to engage with the death squadron that way because the armed forces would intervene to defend its members. For further readings on this discussion see Caillabet, C., (2008), "14 de abril de 1972: una fecha de plomo", online, available at http://memoriaviva5.blogspot.com/2008/08/14-de-abril-de-1972.html, [accessed 21/09/2009]. 115 The executed were Under Secretary of the Interior Ministry Acosta y Lara, two police officers from the DNII, and one navy captain, all of them identified by Bardesio as members of the death squad. See: Benítez, M., (2004), “El Escuadrón”, Montevideo, CX36 Radio Centenario, online, available at http://www.radio36.com.uy/entrevistas/2004/07/310704_dcumento_9.htm, [accessed 20/o7/2008]. 116 Under this law, the military courts were given jurisdiction over subversives. See: USAID-OPS Montevideo to AID/W, “Public Safety Report March 1972”, AIRGRAM April 14, 1972, Montevideo, A-35, in RG 286: Records of the AID 1961- Office of Public Safety/Latin American Branch/Country file Uruguay IPS 2-1 to IPS 2-3 1964 to 1974 Box 110 (NND 937601); File IPS 2-2 /Monthly Reports/Uruguay 1972. 117 Alicia Melgar & Walter Cancela in C.E.I.L.C.E.I.U. , "Cronología ampliada", [unpublished], Montevideo, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias-UDELAR, p. 690.

75

constitution and intended to return to the barracks after controlling the country’s security, others wanted to further expand the political role of the armed forces.118 The first signs of division amongst the three branches came in early February 1973 when the navy refused to accompany a coup attempt launched by the army and the air force.119 Though the plot failed and the president managed to stay in office, the government’s position weakened considerably.

By June 1973, the security forces had become increasingly impatient with parliament for not implementing in full their recommendations to deal with the guerrillas.120 Relationships between the executive and the legislature finally broke down when the military accused Broad Front Senator Enrique Erro of maintaining close contacts with the MLN-T guerrillas.121 The armed forces asked parliament to lift this senator’s political immunity so he could face a military tribunal. The Congress’ refusal to do so led to the dissolution of parliament and the subsequent civic/military coup of 27 June.122 While Bordaberry remained president, the military controlled the government.123 The labour and student movements responded with a that lasted fifteen

118 For instance, Generals like Gregorio Álvarez and Esteban Cristi, among several others, believed that the Uruguayan political elite was severely discredited and lacked the leadership necessary to steer the country out of the crisis. 119 While the rebellion failed, the coup plotters achieved an important victory as the constitutionalist navy commander resigned from his position. His successor immediately aligned with his counterparts in the other branches. This facilitated their unification and sealed the president’s fate. 120 See Frank Ortiz to AID/W, “Public Safety Report March 1973”, Airgram 13 April 1973, Message A-32, p. 1, in Record 286/Records of the Agency for International Development 1961- (NND 911800), Office of public safety/office of the director/ General Records 1957-74/ 8-G Uruguay Box 4; File Uruguay Monthly Reports July 1972-April 1974. 121 Senator Erro was, originally, a member of the Blanco Party. He broke ranks with that party in the 1960s to join the Socialist Party and other groups establishing the Unidad Popular (UP). In 1971 he joined the Broad Front and was elected senator. 122 Davis, W. C., (1995), Warnings from the far south: democracy versus dictatorship in Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile, Westport, Connecticut, Praeger, p. 50. 123 This was a distinct feature that initially differentiated the Uruguayan dictatorship from its neighbouring anticommunist counterparts at the time (i.e. Brazil, Paraguay and Bolivia).

76

days, occupying education centres as well as factories and workplaces.124 Consequently, the junta outlawed the labour federation CNT and the armed forces arrested the strikers to restore order and maintain control of the country.125

Defeating the Tupamaros, dissolving the general assembly and claiming a major victory over the labour and student movements allowed the new civic/military regime to maintain its grip on power. Although some sectors of the middle class and bourgeoisie supported the regime, that support depended on the ability of the armed forces and the president to improve the country’s economic situation. Even though the regime’s façade of a civilian figurehead gained it international recognition (at least for a while), the armed forces’ repressive measures, the decision to keep Bordaberry and the increasing economic difficulties decreased its legitimacy at home. This situation led to more protests, short labour and student strikes, acts of defiance and lack of support from most opposition parties. As a consequence, the government relied heavily on the implementation of state of emergency laws to keep control over the population and neutralize dissent.126

Like its Bolivian counterpart, the Uruguayan junta claimed that the current situation did not generate the proper conditions for political activity and suspended all political parties.127 Initially, Bordaberry drafted a plan for the return to democratic rule and the rehabilitation of political parties for 1976. However, his plan vanished in the next two years as the military made clear its

124 For a detailed discussion of the General Strike, see: Rico, Á., (2005), 15 días que estremecieron al Uruguay: golpe de estado y huelga general: 27 de junio-11 de julio de 1973, Montevideo, Uruguay, Editorial Fin de Siglo. 125 Franck Ortiz to AID/W, “Public Safety Report June 1973”, Airgram 20 July 1973, Message A- 67, p. 9, in Office of Public Safety/office of the director/ General Records 1957-74/ 8-G Venezuela Uruguay Box 4; File Uruguay Monthly Reports July 1972-April 1974, available at NARA, College Park, Maryland. 126 For furhter readings see Lessa, A., (2003), La revolución imposible: los Tupamaros y el fracaso de la vía armada en el Uruguay del siglo XX, Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo; Lessa, A., (2005), Estado de guerra; Rico, Á., (2005), 15 días que estremecieron al Uruguay. 127 Morelli, L., (2004), En alta y clara voz, Montevideo, I. Rosgal, p. 17.

77

intention to expand its mandate beyond that year.128 All the Cóndor partners, including Uruguay, distrusted politicians and considered them unfit to solve the endemic problems affecting their respective countries. Therefore, the Uruguayan junta avoided the possibility of handing power to them by indefinitely suspending elections. There were also strategic considerations behind this decision. The harsh security and economic policies implemented by the military, and the discredited image of the Colorado Party, would certainly favour the Nationalist Party and the Broad Front if the 1976 elections went ahead.

Hence, the Uruguayan civic/military regime headed by Juan María Bordaberry experienced a legitimacy crisis and faced mounting economic problems by the mid-1970s. Despite their victory over the guerrilla groups, the armed forces kept the security measures in place to justify and mask its repression against any kind of opposition. However, the economic problems generated discontent amongst the population, which began to question the government’s economic credentials. The ban on political parties and the military’s attempts to perpetuate its time in office led many moderate and conservative figures to withdraw support for the regime and, particularly, for the president. These problems, coupled with the mounting international pressures and the gradual reduction of military and financial aid from the US government, placed Bordaberry and the armed forces in a difficult and vulnerable position. In response the regime turned towards its neighbours to increase economic and military cooperation in an attempt to solve the economic problems at home and regain some local and international legitimacy.

Chile

The military junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet in Chile also faced economic challenges that undermined its legitimacy by the mid-1970s and had the potential to endanger its long-term plans. Economic hardship and

128 Lessa, A., (2005), Estado de guerra, pp. 247-269.

78

discontent affected the middle sectors that had supported the coup. To remain in power, the regime relied on harsh repressive measures to keep dissent and its opponents under control. The increasing international condemnation after the coup further damaged the regime’s legitimacy and exacerbated the problems at home. In this environment the junta and the Chilean armed forces increased military and economic cooperation with its neighbours in an attempt to stimulate the economy and strengthen its legitimacy in the region to break the international and local isolation.

The victory of Dr Salvador Allende and his (UP) leftist coalition in 1970 had been a momentous development for Chile’s political history and for the Cold War. The new socialist administration directly challenged the interests of local elites, as well as US geopolitical ambitions in the region and the world. In response, the Nixon administration, together with its allies in Chile immediately set out to get rid of the UP government.129 After all previous attempts to prevent Allende’s inauguration had failed, the Nixon administration understood that it would be too risky for the US to carry on with plans for an overt military coup. Instead, Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger targeted Chile’s economy to undermine the Allende Administration and, hopefully, prompt its demise. Thus, while maintaining “cool but correct” relations with Chile, the US government sought to “make [its] economy scream” urging international creditors and financial institutions to cut all aid to this country until its economy dried up.130 While, officially, the US adopted a wait and see policy131, the Brazilian anticommunist regime took the

129 The United States already had identified Dr. Allende and the Chilean left as a potential threat in the mid-1960s. The US government had invested a great deal of effort and resources to prevent Allende’s victory in the 1964 elections. The CIA and the US embassy in Santiago, together with local elites and anticommunist groups, implemented a series of covert/overt operations to undermine the leftist coalition and strengthen the electoral chances of the conservative centre-right candidate. 130 Sergeyev, F., (1981), Chile: C.I.A. big business, Moscow, Progress Publishers, p. 99. 131 Secretly, on the other hand, the Nixon administration encouraged and supported Brazil’s intervention in Chile and elsewhere as a ‘proxy force’. See: Harmer, T., (2012), "Brazil's Cold War in the Southern Cone, 1970–1975", Cold War History, 12(4): 659-681.

79

initiative, actively plotting with local Chilean elites and the armed forces to overthrow the UP government.132

The clash between anti-Allende forces and the government reached a significant crossroads during the Congressional elections scheduled for 4 March 1973. The Chilean opposition and the US government expected that Allende would lose most of its support base as a consequence of the economic crisis and the numerous problems affecting the nation. 133 However, the UP emerged victorious, attracting 44% of the total votes. Even though opposition parties retained a majority in the senate and the deputy chambers, the government improved its position in both houses. Thus, as Gary McEóin points out, the chances of toppling Allende through the legal means of a congressional impeachment vanished.134 On 11 September 1973, the Chilean military, under the command of General Augusto Pinochet finally moved against the UP government and deposed president Allende, who died during the air raids against the La Moneda presidential palace. These events marked the dramatic end of a period of hope encapsulated in Chile’s socialist project, and inaugurated one of the darkest chapters in this country’s history.

The armed forces established a new government headed by a four-man military junta representing the four branches of Chile’s armed forces.135 Shortly after, “the military commanders closed Congress, censored the media, purged the universities, burned books, declared political parties outlawed if Marxist or in recess otherwise, and banned union activities”.136 The Brazilian and

132 For further readings on the role of the Brazilian junta in the 1973 Chilean military coup, see Harmer, T., (2011), Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War. 133 Uribe, A., (1975), The black book of American intervention in Chile, Boston, Beacon Press Boston, p.125. 134 MacEóin, G., (1975), Chile, p. 144. 135 The four members were General Augusto Pinochet from the army, Air Force commander in Chief , Admiral José Merino from the navy, and General Duran from Carabineros. 136 F. A. S. Intelligence Resource Program (IRP), (1998), "National Intelligence Directorate (D.I.N.A.) - National Information Centre (C.N.I.)", online, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/chile/dina.htm, [accessed 04/07/2010].

80

Uruguayan dictatorships immediately congratulated Pinochet for his victory, officially recognized the new regime and pledged their support for the Junta.137 This gave Pinochet and the regime some degree of legitimacy amid otherwise strong international condemnation. In the days after coup the security forces arrested thousands of people and held them at detention centres like the National Stadium.138 To justify the repression the regime claimed that it acted to prevent Plan Zeta, allegedly designed by Allende loyalists to carry out a self-coup, followed by a comprehensive assassination plan against Allende’s opponents, supposedly scheduled for 17 September.139

As in Paraguay, Bolivia and Uruguay, the alleged discoveries of violent guerrilla plots became an effective excuse for the Pinochet regime to maintain the state of siege measures and defend its legitimacy. The 1974 Chicago Commission of Enquire on human rights abuses by the Chilean Junta reported the existence of at least four plans similar to Plan Zeta (Plan Zulu, Plan Mariposa (butterfly), Plan Lautaro, and Plan Leopard).140 The junta tried to convince the population that “thanks to the armed forces, Chile was able to avoid the bloodbath planned by the violent mercenaries, murderers and foreign political agitators”.141 Such announcements helped spread fear and uncertainty among the population and allowed the military to continue to hunt Allende supporters and opponents in general.

The regime’s repression became more systematic and selective by 1974. The creation of the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA) (Directorate of

137 See CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 14 September 1973, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A0252000110001-9, released 15/01/2004, [accessed 04/05/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 138 Most of these detainees were tortured and many were executed or made to disappear by the military. 139 International Documentation ( I. D. O. C.), (1974), Chile under military rule: a dossier of documents and analyses compiled by the staff of I.D.O.C., New York, IDOC, p. 16. 140 Chicago Commission of Enquire on human rights abuses by the Chilean Junta in ibid, p. 61. 141 Weigert Reimann, E. and F. Sánchez Rivas, (1976), Las fuerzas armadas de Chile: un caso de penetración imperialista, Havana, Editorial Ciencias Sociales, p. 158.

81

National Intelligence) played a key role in this transformation. This agency began to operate soon after 11 September. In a short period of time it became one of the most powerful agencies within the Chilean armed forces with a great deal of operational autonomy. It also played a leading role in promoting security and defence cooperation between armed forces in the region.142 Francisco García Naranjo described DINA as a “specialized group with the mission of eliminating those opposing the regime. It was capable of carrying out surveillance, kidnappings and torture of detainees with ample powers and unlimited prerogatives.”143 Under the command of Colonel , DINA became the junta’s secret police and was responsible for the murder and torture of thousands of UP members and opponents to the regime.144 General Pinochet appointed Contreras as head of the secret agency on 24 February 1974 and, on 14 June, the passage of Decree Law No. 521 made the agency official.145

The junta set out to eliminate all traces of Allende’s socialist experiment. It also targeted other political parties from the right, particularly, the Christian Democrats (PDC). Even though the latter had supported the coup, Pinochet and other hardliners blamed the Frei administration for creating the conditions or “paving the way” for Allende’s victory in 1970.146 The Junta saw the entire political elite as a weakened and discredited caste, and believed that a new election would lead to the same vicious cycle; that is, a victory for the PDC, which, in time, would result in a new Marxist government. To break this cycle, Pinochet banned the Marxist parties and declared all other parties in recess. The

142 See Martorell, F., (1999)., Operación Cóndor, el vuelo de la muerte, chapters II and III. 143 García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas: opción y obstinación de la guerrilla chilena (1965-1988), Morelia, Michoacán de Ocampo, México, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, Departamento de Historia Latinoamericana, p. 171, 144 F. A. S. Intelligence Resource Program (IRP), (1998), "National Intelligence Directorate (D.I.N.A.) - National Information Centre (C.N.I.)". 145 General Augusto Pinochet and Manuel Contreras had more than professional ties. The former was a close friend of Contreras’ family and the godfather of one of his daughters. 146 Correa, R. and E. Subercaseaux, (1990), Ego Zum: Pinochet, Santiago, Chile, Zig Zag S.A, p. 69.

82

general made it clear that the junta would stay in office indefinitely.147 As in Bolivia and Uruguay, this situation would endure until a new generation of political leaders was strong enough to resume control of the country. After banning political parties and neutralizing the threat posed by armed groups, the junta began dismantling all legislative traces of Allende’s socialist experiment. The country’s deep economic problems, however, made this a delicate process.

While the junta’s high command achieved general consensus about taking the country into a market economy, they could not agree on how to do so. Meanwhile, Chile’s economy continued to deteriorate and evolved into a serious economic recession by 1975. This occurred in spite of a generous and steady flow of loans and aid from the US and other international institutions. Marcus Kurtz points out that when the military took over the country “foreign reserves were virtually gone; the fiscal deficit stood at more than 30 percent of GDP, and inflation topped 600 percent”.148 The government adopted “a harsh austerity program and [instituted] policies designed to [transform] the country [into] a market economy”.149 The US government, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international financial institutions, made the implementation of such measures a standard precondition for the delivery of aid, as well as the granting of new lines of credits and loans to countries around the world.150

147 This issue generated tensions amongst the four members of the Junta. General Leigh wanted the military to remain in power for a period of five-to-seven years approximately. The armed forces would use that time to “eliminate the Marxist cancer” from Chile and improve the country’s economy. At the end of this period, the regime would hand power to a civilian authority and return to the barracks. This, according to Leigh, would win the people’s support for the armed forces and highly increase its popularity. However, like General Alfredo Stroessner, in Paraguay, Pinochet wanted to remain in power indefinitely. Gradually, he took control of the country and diminished the powers of the other junta members. See: Varas, F., (1979), Gustavo Leigh, el general disidente, Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua. 148 Kurtz, M., (1999), "Chile's Neo-Liberal revolution: incremental decisions and structural transformation, 1973-89", Journal of Latin American Studies, 31(2): 399-427, p. 407. 149 CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 6 December 1973, p. 11, released 15/10/2003, [accessed 04/05/2009], available at CIA- RDP79T00975A025800020001-3, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 150 The South American regimes that formalized the Cóndor alliance followed similar paths regarding the implementation of austerity measures to control their economies. These measures,

83

While Chilean government officials and their supporters agreed to implement these measures, there were different views on how quickly the market economy should be established. The two well-defined camps within the regime (i.e. the corporatists and the neoliberals)151 maintained heated debates regarding the depth of the austerity plan.

Finally, in December 1973, the government announced a set of austerity measures recommended by the IMF. In late 1974, the CIA reported that, as a result of this plan:

a) Almost all price controls were removed to encourage domestic industrial production, and programs were initiated to increase agricultural output. b) A stabilization program was instituted to cut the budget deficit and reduce the growth in the money supply. c) Wage increases were restricted, and strict labour discipline imposed, particularly in the copper mines. d) The escudo was devaluated. e) Many expropriated firms were scheduled for return to their former owners. f) Compensation was arranged for Cerro and Anaconda corporations, and negotiations continued with Kennecott […] i) A repayment formula was negotiated with Chile’s chief foreign creditors.152

however, placed a heavy burden on workers and the most disadvantaged sectors of society, generating discontent and anger towards these regimes. 151 The Corporatists included senior officers and civilian technocrats in the ministerial cabinet who wanted to implement similar economic policies to those introduced by the Brazilian regime and other neighbouring countries. General Leigh and Raúl Saez were the strongest advocates of this alternative. The neoliberals, on the other hand, called for a strict free market economy with very little State participation. This camp included a number of technocrats influenced by the economic theories of Milton Friedman and a group of economists from the Chicago University in the US, and the Catholic University in Chile, known as the . Authors like Peter Winn argues that these economists were close to the anti-Allende camp and the military even before the September coup. According to this author, ten economists, most of them neoliberals, had been asked in late 1972 to prepare a plan for a post-coup economic policy for the navy, which was initially in charge of the economy for the junta. Coordinated by Roberto Kelly, a retired navy officer who would become head of ODEPLAN, the planning ministry, they created a promarket strategy known by its code name El Ladrillo, the Brick. Even earlier, during 1971-1972, aided by funds from the CIA, another group of economists of similar bent had prepared a post-Allende program for the SOFOFA (Sociedad de Fomento Fabril), Chile’s manufacturers’ association. Most of these economists, including the key Chicago Boys, would later be prominent policymakers under the Junta. Between 1973 and 1980s these camps competed against each other to influence the regime’s decisions on economic issues. See: Winn, P., (2004), Victims of the Chilean miracle: workers and in the Pinochet era, 1972-2002, London, Duke University Press, p. 62. 152 CIA, “Chile: The Junta Struggles for economic recovery”, Intelligence memorandum, Secret, ER IM 74-10, August 1974, Copy No. 89, p. 1, released 17/05/2002, [accessed 04/05/2009], available

84

The IMF immediately rewarded the regime by granting new loans and lines of credits to the value of US$ 95 million.153 In addition, governments and international institutions granted Chile almost US$ 470 million in foreign loans between 11 September 1973 and 1974. These included US$ 49 million from the US to purchase corn and wheat. The Brazilian junta granted US$ 62 million, US$ 12 million of which was to be used for the purchase of sugar from that country. Argentina provided a further US$ 35 million to buy reproductive cattle (US$ 20 million) and agricultural machinery (US$ 15 million). Meanwhile, the World Bank pitched in with US$ 18.25 million and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) contributed a further US$ 201 million.154 Chile’s creditors complemented this help by allowing the regime to renegotiate the foreign debt.

Despite all this support, Chile’s economy continued to stagnate. The austerity measures led to a dramatic increase in the cost of living and inflation reached 750 percent by the end of 1973. The CIA reported that

…despite a healthy increase in the minimum wage, working-class consumers are finding it increasingly difficult to afford even the barest necessities. Middle-income groups are also being hit hard. These conditions have been worsened in many cases by large- scale dismissals of relatively unproductive and politically suspect employees hired under the Allende Regime…155

Members of the junta recognized the unpopularity of the austerity plan and knew that it carried potentially dangerous political costs, which could lead to a civil at CIA-RDP85T00875R001700070010-2, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 153 CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Secret, No. 7831/73, 6 December 1973, released 19/04/2006, [accessed 04/05/2009], available at CIA- RDP85T00875R001500140043-0, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 154 See Table 3, “Foreign Credits Granted Chile, September 1973-1974”, in Petras, J. and M. Morris, (1975), The United States and the overthrow of the Allende government, New York, Monthly Review of Press, p. 144. 155 CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 6 December 1973, released 15/10/2003, [accessed 04/05/2009], available at CIA- RDP79T00975A025800020001-3, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD.

85

war. Thus, the regime launched an aggressive media campaign to sell the plan, win support from the Chilean people and blame the Allende government for all of Chile’s economic problems.

No amount of public relations or propaganda, however, could hide the fact that the economic package did not work. Economic stagnation continued.156 As the junta struggled to resolve these problems, it toughened repressive measures to maintain its grip on power. This, however, created a new set of problems on the international front. In the aftermath of the 11 September coup, thousands of Chileans fled the country to avoid being arrested, tortured or killed by the military. This created numerous headaches for the junta as many of these refugees began to denounce these human right violations.157 The denunciations led to increased international pressures and isolation, as well as the subsequent loss of important military and economic aid from 1974 onwards.

The economic problems and the international isolation threatened the Junta’s objective of holding power for a long period of time. The severe economic problems and the regime’s inability to stimulate the economy despite massive influx of foreign aid and loans raised questions about the junta’s economic credentials and undermined its legitimacy. The implementation of harsh austerity measures generated discontent amongst the workers and even the middle sectors, which had supported the military coup. To divert attention the regime resorted to the same tactics as its Paraguayan, Bolivian and Uruguayan counterparts. It announced the discovery of Marxist plots seeking to destabilize the country, and the DINA and other intelligence agencies tried to link the

156 By late 1974, the country’s foreign debt reached US$ 4 billion and the regime continued to face a large list of challenges. According to CIA predictions, it would “at least be several years before Chile’s balance-of-payments position improves significantly.” CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 6 December 1973, p. 12. As a high priority, the regime attempted to reduce imports and increase the exports of its most profitable mineral resources. The government endeavoured to find a solution for the shortages of agricultural products and reduce import expenditures for these products. To achieve the required level of exports the government had to increase the productivity of the mining sector, the country’s main source of income. However, most mines lacked equipment and technicians and their infrastructure was deficient. 157 The activities of the Chilean refugees are discussed in greater length in Chapter III of this dissertation.

86

government of to these plots. However, even the CIA doubted the veracity of the junta’s claims regarding Cuba’s participation.158 In response the Chilean junta momentarily set aside old geopolitical rivalries and antagonisms to accept economic assistance and political support from its main competitors in the region, Argentina and Brazil.159 It also developed friendlier relations with the Banzer regime and, especially, the Bordaberry civic/military dictatorship. This economic and political cooperation evolved to include closer ties regarding defence and security assistance.

Argentina

In the mid-1970s Argentina was the only country in the Southern Cone of Latin America with a democratic government still in place. However, that government had been weakened and discredited by severe internal factionalisms and power struggles between the right and left wings of the Peronist movement, as well as a fragile security situation. These factionalisms had intensified with the return of Juan Perón from his long exile in 1973 and, after his death in July 1974, led to an upsurge in violence and bitter internal divisions within the government. Meanwhile, after ruling the country in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the military had been debilitated and discredited. When they handed power to civilian authorities in 1972, the armed forces returned to the barracks and ceased overt political participation. The country’s security and political deterioration after the death of President Juan Perón in June 1974, however, gradually strengthened the military’s image and drew them back to the political arena. Their success over the guerrilla groups in 1975 earned them considerable support from large and influential sectors of Argentine society, as well as from neighbouring anticommunist military governments.

158 See Central Intelligence Agency-CIA, “Latin American Trends – Staff Notes”, C 145, Secret, No. 0537/75, November 26, 1975, available at CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120052-0, released 17/05/2002, [accessed 04/05/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 159 See Table 3, “Foreign Credits Granted Chile, September 1973-1974”, in Petras, J. and M. Morris, (1975), The United States and the overthrow of the Allende government, New York, Monthly Review of Press, p. 144.

87

By 1972, ample sectors of Argentine society, including the labour and student movements, and followers of the proscribed political parties, had became increasingly frustrated with the military government headed by General Alejandro Lanusse and demanded the restoration of the country’s democratic institutions. To counter its critics and restore its legitimacy, the junta introduced the Gran Acuerdo Nacional (GAN) (Great National Accord), which offered to lift the ban on political parties and allow their leaders to prepare for elections. While the amnesty allowed the to resume political activities, General Lanusse refused to lift the ban on the party’s leader Juan Perón and did not authorize him to run for president.160

On 16 November 1972, Perón returned to Argentina for the first time since 1955 to officially appoint Héctor Cámpora as the presidential candidate of the newly established Frente Justicialista de Liberación (FREJULI) (Justicialist Liberation Front). Though the coalition included all sectors of the Peronist movement and other minor political parties, the movement’s left wing dominated the alliance and backed Perón’s choice for presidential candidate.161 Despite some internal resistance from the party’s right wing, Perón’s decision to appoint Cámpora as his successor paid off. FREJULI won the March 1973 elections with almost 50% of the votes.162

160 The regime accompanied these concessions with a set of harsh repressive measures to target leftist parties and ensure that the military would transfer power to a secure government (i.e. a non- leftist government). In other words, the regime sought to eliminate, by any available means, all potential Marxist threats prior to the election. 161 The left wing included a number of moderate centre-left groups, the combative unions, the Peronist Youth (JP), and a number of guerrilla groups. Out of the five guerrilla organizations that embraced armed struggle in Argentina throughout the sixties and mid-seventies, only the Trotskyite Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) (People’s Revolutionary Army) did not have ties with the Peronist movement. The remaining four had direct connection with the Peronist movement’s left wing and remained loyal to ex-President Juan Perón. These included Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación (FAL) (Liberation Armed Forces), Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas (FAP) (Peronist Armed Forces), Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) (Revolutionary Armed Forces), and the Montoneros. The latter remained the most influential and the strongest among the Peronist armed groups well into the mid-1970s. See Larraquy, M. and R. Caballero, (2002), Galimberti: crónica negra de la historia reciente de Argentina, , Aguilar; Larraquy, M., (2007), López Rega: el Peronismo y la Triple A, Buenos Aires, Punto de Lectura, p. 227. 162 Rock, D., (1987), Argentina 1516-1987: from Spanish colonization to Alfonsín, [2nd edition], Berkeley - Los Angeles, University of California Press, p. 359.

88

Héctor Cámpora took office on 25 May and, while he spent less than two months in office, his administration achieved a number of important outcomes, particularly on the foreign policy front.163 Yet, the internal power struggles within the government and the Peronist movement limited the president’s accomplishments in the local arena. The movement’s right wing repeatedly challenged his authority and sought to expel the left wing from the Justicialist party. Perón’s personal assistant, José López Rega, played a prominent role in fuelling these internal disputes.164 His influence and power increased quite rapidly after his appointment – at Perón’s direct request – as Minister of Social Welfare in the Cámpora administration.165 Furthermore, López Rega plotted with the party’s right wing to slowly isolate those he considered a threat to Perón’s interests.166 These threats included the Peronist Youth (JP), Montoneros, and Cámpora himself.

The disputes intensified when Perón returned to the country in June 1973 and quickly evolved into a deep political crisis that would last more than two years.167 The Cámpora administration, the entire Peronist movement, and,

163 It released all political prisoners, ended Perón’s eighteen years of exile, and began to establish Argentina’s position as a key political power player in Latin America. The Justicialist government resumed diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba and tried to reduce, or neutralize, Brazil’s political influence in the Southern Cone. Some US officials argued that such moves, particularly the relationship with Havana, had the potential to undermine US interests in the continent. The anticommunist Brazilian junta also expressed the same concerns and followed the developments in Argentina closely. The Cámpora administration also established economic ties with Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and other nations in the Third World. For a US detailed analysis of President Cámpora’s foreign policy see CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 21 July 1973, p. 14, released 01/06/2005, [accessed 04/05/2009], available at CIA-RDP79T00975A024900060001-9, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD; Moneta, J. C., (1979), "La política exterior del Peronismo: 1973-1976", Foro Internacional, 20(2): 220-276. 164 During Perón’s long exile in Spain, Rega gained considerable influence on the ex-President and developed close ties with key figures of the Peronist right wing. 165 From 1973 onwards, he diverted funds from the ministry’s budget to finance para-police rightist armed groups linked to the Alianza Anticomunista Argentina (AAA) (Argentine Anticommunist Alliance), also known as the Triple-A. 166 See Larraquy, M. and R. Caballero, (2002), Galimberti, pp. 377-500. 167 Perón’s own tactics to undermine possible contenders and remain the undisputed leader of the Justicialist Party also fuelled these internal divisions. Depending on the political environment and circumstances, he sent contradictory messages and signals to different factions. In this way, the leader controlled the tempo of the resistance to the military regimes and dealt with internal opponents

89

according to the CIA, “even some of Perón’s political opponents” believed that Perón was “the only one who [could] restore order and get things moving”.168 Thus, many expected that his return would finally bring stability to the country. On 20 June 1973, more than 500,000 people gathered near the Ezeiza airport to welcome their leader.169 When followers of the Peronist Youth and Montoneros arrived in the area, associated with the event’s organisers opened fire on them.170 It is true that Cámpora was in agreement with the strategy of being replaced by Juan Perón as soon as possible, following the return to democracy. The violent clashes at Ezeiza, however, aggravated the internal political crisis within the Justicialist party and prompted the sudden end of the newly established government. The powerful right wing labour central headed by Ignacio Rucci demanded that the president leave his position, while General Perón showed little support for Cámpora at that crucial time. Thus, he resigned in July 1973. Raúl Lastiri, President of the Chamber of Deputies and López Rega’s son-in-law, became the provisional president and made the necessary arrangements for a new election on 23 September. All factions unanimously agreed that Perón should be the presidential candidate but there was no consensus on who would second him in the formula.171 The solution came with

when necessary. The cases of John William Cooke – leader of the Peronist resistance between 1955- 1969 – and Augusto Timoteo Vandor – CGT’s Secretary General – are clear illustrations of these tactics. See: Larraquy, M. and R. Caballero, (2002), Galimberti, pp. 64, 81-134. 168 CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Secret, No. 40, 15 June 1973, p.3, released 27/08/2003, [accessed 29/04/2009], available at CIA- RDP79T00975A024700130001-3, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 169 The crowd included elements from the Peronist Youth (JP), the trade union movement, Montoneros, and members of the right wing. These factions’ physical position at this event was representative of the internal divisions and the power struggles of the time. The vast majority of those on the stage and its immediate surroundings belonged to the right wing of . Most of them had connections with the Minister for Social Welfare López Rega, the CGT’s Secretary General José Ignacio Rucci, Police Commissioner Alberto Villar, organizer Norma Kennedy and, Lieutenant Colonel Jorge Osinde (creator of the para-police squads that joined the Triple-A) to name only a few. 170 The incident became known as the Ezeiza massacre. 171 Some, including Perón, argued that the leader of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) (Radical ), Ricardo Balbín, should be the Vice-President. This option, however, threatened the interests of the Peronist right wing. Perón was already 78 years old and his health was very fragile. If he died or was incapacitated, the presidency would go to the UCR. This outcome would shift the

90

the selection of Perón’s wife, Isabel Martínez de Perón (Isabelita) as a safe alternative.172

Although the formula Perón-Perón won the election with a comfortable 60% of the votes, the victory did not put an end to the violent disputes between factions. Two days after the election, the Montoneros killed the CGT’s Secretary General, Ignacio Rucci.173 A few days later, Perón publicly urged his supporters to re-gain control of the movement and purge the Marxist infiltrators. When Juan Perón began his third presidential term on 17 October 1973, López Rega, the trade union bureaucracy, and other influential conservative sectors of Argentine society, moved quickly to consolidate their influence over the new administration.174 The CIA recognized Rega’s influence over the Perón family, as well as his ambitions to wield power, and accurately predicted that he would be a major political player if the president died.175

However, Perón’s sharp shift to the right during this period cannot be attributed only to the deeds and plotting of López Rega and his associates. Other factors included the changing political landscape of the region. By the time he took office, in October 1973, rightist military regimes ruled most countries in the Southern Cone.176 This threatened to isolate Argentina and

balance of power in favour of the Radicales and severely undermine the Peronist Party’s position, particularly its right wing. See Larraquy, M. and R. Caballero, (2002), Galimberti, p. 208. 172 , J., (1976), "The Peronist Left, 1955-1977", Journal of Latin American Studies, 8(2): 273-296, p. 286. 173 Rucci’s role in the Ezeiza massacre, his campaign against Cámpora, and his close ties with the Peronist right made him a priority target for this organization. Montoneros also targeted López Rega. In fact, almost every leftist guerrilla group linked to the Peronist Party, and the Trotskyite ERP, considered him a high priority target for assassination. However, the tight security around him, and the repression these organizations began to experience from 1974, made that task impossible. See: Larraquy, M. and R. Caballero, (2002), Galimberti, p. 210. 174 Their first move was to purge their opponents from the federal and provincial governments, which resulted in violent confrontations between leftist armed groups and para-police death squads. 175 United States Intelligence Board (USIB), “National Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, No. 631, 29 June 1974, p, 10, released 01/06/2005, [accessed 29/04/2009], available at CIA- RDP79T00975A026700010020-3, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 176 Including Paraguay (with Stroessner since 1954), Bolivia (with General Hugo Banzer since 1971), Uruguay (with the civic/military regime headed by President Juan María Bordaberry since

91

enhance Brazil’s influence. This led President Perón and his advisors to adjust his government’s ideological stand. While his government continued its diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba, it maintained friendly relations with neighbouring countries to achieve one of the main objectives of Perón’s foreign policy: to re-assert Argentina’s position as an influential local power player. To achieve this, the Perón administration sought to neutralize, or at least reduce, the influence exerted by the United States and Brazil by maintaining good diplomatic relations with other regional countries.177

Despite the political crisis within the government and the administration’s good relations with its neighbours, Argentina became an attractive safe haven for large numbers of political refugees and exiles from other countries of the Southern Cone. On the other hand, the government of Isabel Perón, the para-police groups like the Triple-A and the Argentine armed forces wanted to eliminate from the country anything and anyone associated with Marxism or with connections to local or foreign leftist parties. In addition, the authorities disliked the presence of numerous foreign leftist exiles and wanted to get rid of them as soon as possible.178 The neighbouring military governments, on the other hand, were preoccupied with the activities of these exiles, particularly their denunciation of these regimes’ human rights violations. Thus, the Argentine government, its security forces and the neighbouring counterparts found common ground and a powerful incentive to set aside historical antagonisms and geopolitical tensions and cooperate with each other to target exiles in Argentina. The deterioration of the country’s internal security allowed that cooperation to flourish.

June 1973), Chile (with the military Junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet since September 1973). 177 CIA: Office of National Estimates, “Argentina: Perón Returns”, Secret, Memorandum, 2 August, 1973, p. 15. 178 For instance, the Triple-A and high ranking officers in the SIDE intelligence agency began to cooperate with DINA agents to target Chilean exiles living in Argentina. See Martorell, F., (1999), Operación Cóndor, el vuelo de la muerte: la coordinación represiva en el Cono Sur, Santiago de Chile, Lom Ediciones, chapter III.

92

From late 1973, rightist armed groups operated with complete impunity in complicity with branches of the security forces and other government institutions like the Ministry of Social Welfare. The leftist guerrilla groups, on the other hand, responded by stepping up their operations. These tit-for-tat violent exchanges intensified in 1974. In January leftist guerrilla groups, including those associated with the Peronist movement, began a new campaign, which included the abduction of a number of industrialists and other high profile figures.179 On 20 January, the Trotskyite Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) (People’s Revolutionary Army) launched an attack against the Azul military barracks to capture its arsenal and force a government response.180 The following day, the Triple-A’s leadership officialised the organization’s creation with a public communiqué. The group took responsibility for the terrorist attack against Senator Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen, prominent lawyer and member of the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) (Civic Radical Union), and asserted that the organization’s decisions represented “the direct and indirect orders and wishes of Argentina’s maximum leader, Lieutenant General Perón, without any intermediaries”. The communiqué concluded with a list of prominent figures to be executed, which included “Colonel Cesio; Monsignor Angeleli, Bishop of La Rioja Province; as well as other prominent politicians”.181 According to Luis Vicens the Triple-A carried out 2,000 assassinations between 1974 and mid- 1975.182

President Perón exacerbated the country’s political and security crisis when he strongly condemned the leftist guerrillas and completely ignored the activities of the groups linked to the Triple-A and López Rega. Immediately after the ERP’s attack against the Azul military barracks, the government “sent

179 In January 1974, Montoneros kidnapped the prominent industrialist brothers Juan and Jorge Born. The organization collected more than ten million dollars from this operation. See Larraquy, M. and R. Caballero, (2002), Galimberti, chapter XII, pp. 215-232. 180 This operation is discussed at length in the next chapter. 181 Vicens, L., (1983), Loperreguismo y Justicialismo, Buenos Aires El Cid Editor-Fundación Para la Democracia en Argentina, p. 123. 182 Ibid.

93

to Congress a project to reform the Penal Code with sentences far more severe than those applied by [the Lanusse regime] against the guerrilla groups”. 183 In response, eight deputies from the Peronist Youth resigned from their positions to show their disagreement with the direction adopted by the president. The political crisis worsened when President Perón suffered a number of heart attacks in late June and subsequently died on 1 July 1974. Vice President Isabel Perón succeeded him, as established by the Argentine constitution, and immediately reshuffled the ministerial cabinet to include a number of key figures closely associated with López Rega.184

Perón’s death exacerbated the violent internal struggle for power between factions of the Peronist movement. The Triple-A launched an all-out assault against the Montoneros, the Peronist youth, and the leftist elements within the labour bureaucracy. According to Alicia Servetto, the groups linked to López Rega

…carried out more than 400 assassinations and kidnappings of political and cultural figures, lawyers of political prisoners, journalists, youth leaders, prominent labour leaders and trade union activists, as well as militants of revolutionary organizations…. Between July and August 1974, the organization carried out one assassination each 19 hours.185

This violence prompted a strong reaction from the Montoneros and non-Peronist guerrillas like the ERP, which further weakened the security situation.

As a consequence of her close ties to López Rega and his entourage, as well as for her inability to solve the political crisis, Isabel Perón lost support from key segments of the population, including the student movement, a number of important labour federations, and even members of the Justicialist party.

183 Larraquy, M. and R. Caballero, (2002), Galimberti, p. 215. 184 Some of the new ministers included Alberto Rocamora, linked to Rega’s son in law Raúl Lastiri, Adolfo Savino, Argentina’s Ambassador in Italy and Oscar Ivanissevich, a Peronist veteran who would be in charge of purging universities of Marxist penetration. See: Vicens, L., (1983), Loperreguismo y Justicialismo, p. 145. 185 Servetto, A., (2008), "Memorias de la intolerancia política: las victimas de la Triple-A (Alianza Argentina Anticomunista)", Antitesis, 1(2): 439-454, p. 445.

94

Isabelita tried to regain some legitimacy for her government and support from the population by granting the military further powers to defeat the guerrilla groups and control the security situation. This, however, did little to improve the president’s popularity. By December 1974, the US embassy in Buenos Aires began to predict the government’s imminent fall. US Ambassador, Robert Hill, “informed [his superiors in Washington DC that the Argentine government] could remain in power for no more than eight-to-ten months”.186 By then, it had become difficult for López Rega to maintain his influence over the president. Several sectors of the opposition, the trade union movement, and the armed forces identified him as a major obstacle to the restoration of stability in the country, and demanded his resignation.

The sharp deterioration of the country’s security situation brought the military back to the political arena. The armed forces increased their demands for further powers after Montoneros killed Police Commissioner, and one of the founders of the Triple-A, Alberto Villar, in November 1974. President Isabel Perón finally caved in to those pressures when the ERP launched a series of operations in Tucumán Province a few months later. In February 1975, the Argentine government announced decree No. 261/1975, which gave the armed forces the authority to seek and destroy the Marxist guerrilla groups. Soon after, the military launched Operation Independence to obliterate the guerrillas in Tucumán.187 The counterinsurgency campaign succeeded and the military achieved all its objectives within a few months. That success helped restore the armed forces’ image and gradually increased their support base amongst the business sector, right wing newspapers and other media outlets, the Catholic Church, members of the middle class and large landowners. After the ERP’s desperate attempt to open a new guerrilla in Buenos Aires on May 1975, President Perón authorized the army to extend Operation Independence’s

186 Ambassador Robert Hill in Larraquy, M., (2007), López Rega, p. 319. 187 These activities are discussed in detail in Chapter II.

95

mandate.188 The political strength of the Armed Forces increased in 24 July 1974 when López Rega resigned and left the country.189 This allowed it to finally gain direct influence over the president. Rega’s fall from power, however, did not end the activities of the Triple-A.190

A number of economic problems worsened the political crisis and decreased the president’s support base. Juan Moneta states that, by 1974, Argentina’s foreign debt had reached 25% of its GDP and it continued to increase at a rate of US$ 1 billion per year.191 In May 1975, the CIA reported that the security instability had led to a considerable reduction of foreign investments. Exports decreased considerably during the early months of the year, which had a direct impact on the government’s ability to service its debt. The country’s reserves

…fell from a peak of more than US$ 2 billion [in June 1974] to around US$ 1.2 billion by the end of February [1975]. Since then the decline has quickened and reserves have reportedly slipped another US$ 400 million. … [Intelligence analysts predicted that] Argentina [faced] stagnating or even declining production during the latter part of … [1975]. Increasing unemployment and losses in real incomes would bring increasing political problems to Mrs Perón’s already shaky government and could trigger a

188 See Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", online, available at www.cedema.org/uploads/4778_1_junta_de_coordinacion_rev.pdf, [accessed 3/08/2010], p. 13. 189 According to the CIA, “…the armed forces had direct intervention on that issue. This was the first intervention in the political crisis, which began when the Interior Minister was not allowed to enter the presidential palace to talk to the President. The three chiefs of the armed forces then ordered that all the bodyguards in the presidential house [who were directly linked to López Rega’s para- police groups] be disarmed and that the president’s security be taken by the presidential guard.” United States Intelligence Board (USIB), “National Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, No. 631, 29 June 1974, released 01/06/2005, [accessed 29/04/2009], available at CIA- RDP79T00975A026700010020-3, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 190 The military junta that took power in March 1976 immediately recruited members of the organization and made them part of its repressive machinery during the early stages of the Dirty War. 191 Moneta, J. C., (1979), "La política exterior del Peronismo",p. 233.

96

major crisis by yearend [sic] as labour becomes more demanding, growth falters, and consumers despair.192

The CIA’s political and economic analysis proved to be accurate. The labour movement launched a series of strikes demanding wage increases, which the government granted in November that year to avert possible riots.193

In this complex environment the military began to emerge as a possible alternative to replace the weak and delegitimized government of Isabel Perón. Operation Independence shifted the momentum of the armed struggle in favour of the armed forces. At the end of the year, the majority of the leftist guerrillas had been defeated. Even though the Montoneros still carried out some operations, the organization’s efficiency had declined sharply. In October 1975, the organization launched a failed attack against an army installation in Formosa Province. In response, the president finally authorized the armed forces to take full responsibility for the fight against the remaining guerrilla groups. The introduction of “Decree 2770 gave the army virtually unlimited power... to execute any military and security operations that might be necessary for the purpose of annihilating the action of subversive elements”.194 This allowed the armed forces to unleash their entire counterinsurgency might to wipe out the guerrilla groups.

The uncertainty generated by the fragile security situation led many to cautiously support the military’s re-entry into the political arena, believing that only the armed forces could bring much needed stability. The government of Isabel Perón lost legitimacy and the internal power struggles led to the paralysation and collapse of the country’s democratic institutions. The

192 CIA-Staff Notes, “Latin American Trends”, Secret, No. 0509/75, 14 May 1975, p. 2, released 08/08/2001, [accessed 29/04/2009], available at CIA- RDP79T00865A000900340002-5, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 193 See: CIA-Staff Notes, “Latin American Trends”, Secret, No. 0534/75, 5 November, 1975, p. 1, released 08/08/2001, [accessed 29/04/2009], available at CIA- RDP79T00865A002100100002-7, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 194 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 112.

97

government’s introduction of harsh security legislation from 1974 handed power over to the armed forces and paved the way for the March 1976 coup.

Cooperation at last

The need of the two largest countries in the region to access the necessary energy resources to sustain their economic and industrial growth served as an incentive to increase economic cooperation in the Southern Cone of Latin America. Argentina and Brazil negotiated with their neighbours to build a number of large hydroelectric projects to meet their energy demands.195 Paraguay and Uruguay obtained important economic benefits from these projects and secured access to a sustainable supply of electrical power for the future. However, the negotiations for these projects were not free of challenges and led to a number of diplomatic crises between Argentina and Brazil, which eventually subsided.196 Arguably, the Stroessner regime benefited the most from the hydroelectric boom, at least in the short term. In April 1973, Paraguay and Brazil signed a treaty to build the Itaipú dam on the Paraná River, one of the

195 They also raced to obtain nuclear capabilities, not only for electricity production, but also for military purposes. This race exacerbated tensions and generated a number of diplomatic crises between the two large nations, with the US government and other Latin American countries. For further readings on the nuclear race and diplomatic tensions between Argentina and Brazil see: Resende-Santos, J., (2002), "The origins of security cooperation in the Southern Cone", Latin American Politics and Society, 44(4): 89-126; Oberg, J., (1975), "Third world armament: domestic arms production in Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and India 1950-75", Instant Research on Peace and Violence, 5(4): 222-239; Solingen, E., (1993), "Macropolitical consensus and lateral autonomy in industrial policy: the nuclear sector in Brazil and Argentina", International Organization, 47(2): 263-298; Bandeira, L. A. M., (2006), "Brazil as a regional power and its relations with the United States", Latin American Perspectives, 33(3): 12-27; Mendoza, D. H. D. and A. M. Vara, (2006), "Political storms, financial uncertainties, and dreams of “big science:” the construction of a heavy ion accelerator in Argentina", Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 36(2): 343-364. 196 This was the case with the hydroelectric projects of Itaipú (Paraguay and Brazil), Corpus Christi and Yacyretá in Paraguay (Paraguay and Argentina). The Argentine military junta and the Stroessner regime signed the agreement to build the Corpus Christi dam in 1971, while the Perón administration and the Paraguayan government signed the Yacyretá treaty on December 1973. From 1970-1976, the two governments maintained heated discussions, as Argentina complained that size and location of the Itaipú dam would seriously reduce the production capabilities of the Yacyretá and Corpus Christi projects. For further readings on the tensions between Argentina and Brazil regarding the Yacyretá and Itaipú projects see Nohlen, D. and M. F. B, (1981), "Cooperación y conflicto en la Cuenca del Plata", Estudios Internacionales, 14(55): 412-443; Da Rosa, J. E. (1983), "Economics, politics, and hydroelectric power: the Paraná River basin", Latin American Research Review, 18(3): 77-107.

98

largest hydroelectric projects in the world. Its production capacity would reach 12,600 Megawatts upon completion in the early 1980s. Paraguay absorbed only a small portion of the project’s output due to its small electricity demands. Hence, it would sell its remaining share to Brazil obtaining substantial revenues in the long term.197

While Itaipú helped Paraguay to secure a reliable source of electricity power, its benefits in the short term lay in the substantial influx of capital entering the country. With a predicted cost of US$ 19 billion, the project generated approximately 100,000 jobs across several sectors (construction, transport, tourism, finance, etc.).198 Andrew Nixon estimated that, just in the construction industry, the project created up to 16,000 jobs for unskilled Paraguayan labour.199 The building industry and the manufacture of products necessary for the completion of this project grew twofold in three years. Furthermore, “the entry of foreign capital prompted a marked growth in the financial sector, as the number of banks, finance companies, exchange centres, insurance companies and real estate agents” proliferated rapidly.200

Similarly, Uruguay cooperated with Argentina and Brazil in the construction of a number of hydroelectric projects on the Uruguay and Negro Rivers. During the 1950s and 1960s these countries’ governments tried to reach an agreement for the construction of a hydroelectric dam on the Uruguay River. Nevertheless, strong disagreements on a number of technical issues and on national sovereignty prevented both nations from reaching an understanding. The negotiations gained momentum in the early 1970s and both nations finally agreed to build the Salto Grande Dam. Its construction began in April 1974 and concluded in 1979. In May 1973 the Uruguayan government established a

197 Payne, D., (1990), "A Latin last hurrah", Society Abroad, 27(2): 47-52, p. 47. 198 Hanratty, D. and S. Meditz., (1988), "Paraguay: a country study", online, available at http://countrystudies.us/paraguay/, [accessed 18/02/2010]. 199 Nickson, A., (1988), "Tyranny and longevity: Stroessner's Paraguay", Third World Quarterly, 10(1): 237-259, p. 243. 200 Boccia Paz, A., (1997), La década inconclusa: historia real de la O.P.M., Asunción, El Lector, p. 64.

99

commission to develop a new hydroelectric project on the Río Negro (Black River). The project became known as the Palmar Dam but did not start until 1976 when the government of Brazil provided large amounts of capital and technology to complete its construction. Both projects allowed Uruguay to further expand its electricity capabilities and generate much needed jobs for its stagnant labour market. The Salto Grande project also gave the Uruguayan government the opportunity to sell any remaining output to Argentina. Despite the differences and controversies surrounding these projects, and the ensuing small diplomatic tensions, the Itaipú, Corpus Christi, Yacyretá, Salto Grande and Palmar projects helped to improve economic relations between Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil.201

The Uruguayan regime also expanded economic ties with its Bolivian counterpart. From 1974-1975 the Foreign Relations ministers of the Bordaberry and Banzer administrations held a number of meetings in the cities of Montevideo and to establish a Mixed-Commission to deal with matters concerning regional economic integration, and bilateral relations between the two nations. The commission made recommendations on areas such as reciprocal commerce, commercial and financial mechanisms, other forms of joint economic activities, port facilities, air traffic, waterways traffic, petroleum and oil derivates, and technical assistance.202 During these meetings, the Uruguayan government offered Bolivia a “depot at the Port of Montevideo to hold up to 10,000 tons of general cargo in transit to Bolivia free of charge….”.203 The measure allowed the landlocked nation to partially break its geographic isolation and gain limited access to the strategic port of Montevideo and the Atlantic ocean.

201 See Nohlen, D. and M. F. B, (1981), "Cooperación y conflicto en la Cuenca del Plata", pp. 412- 443. 202 Departamento de Integración Económica, “Declaración conjunta formulada por los señores Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de Uruguay y Bolivia, Doctor Juan Carlos Blanco y General Alberto Guzmán Soriano, Respectivamente”, Documento Informativo No. 2, Montevideo, Marzo de 1975, pp. 1-3, in Folder 24 “Uruguay-Bolivia”, Box 32: “Embajada de Uruguay en Chile”, available at Uruguayan Foreign Relations Ministry’s archive, Montevideo, Uruguay. 203 Ibid.

100

At the end of this round of negotiations, the two nations agreed to “…support efforts to provide the Inter-American System with efficient mechanisms in the economic, social and cultural areas through the proper utilization of their available technical, financial and human resources”. They also acknowledged the importance of “acting in a coordinated manner on the multilateral economic negotiations and in all those concerning cooperation for the economic development … [of Latin America]”.204 President Bordaberry became one the strongest advocates in the Southern Cone of regional integration. In early 1975 he made a number of official trips to neighbouring countries to further promote the cause of economic cooperation.205

The Pinochet regime followed its counterparts’ path and sought closer ties with its neighbouring countries during 1973-1975, and Chile resumed diplomatic relations with Bolivia. Pinochet also travelled to Paraguay and established a friendly relationship with the government of Alfredo Stroessner. The junta also expanded its economic and diplomatic relationship with Uruguay. Both governments presented a unified voice and political front regarding Cuba and the international human rights campaigns against these regimes at several OAS meetings during 1973-1975. As stated earlier in this chapter, Chile benefited greatly from its economic ties with Brazil. It obtained millions of dollars in loans and economic aid from that country. In November 1974 alone the Brazilian junta granted US$ 40 million in credits and loans, which it extended in the following years.206 The gains from these projects served as a strong incentive for these nations to cooperate with each other, as they helped mitigate the effects of their economic problems and, over time, could boost their legitimacy at home. However, that cooperation took place mostly at bilateral levels.

204 Ibid, p. 2. 205 Bordaberry’s official trips are further discussed in Chapter IV of this dissertation. 206 El mostrador, (2013), "Documentos secretos revelan que Brasil financió al régimen de Pinochet", online, available at http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2013/03/05/documentos- secretos-revelan-que-brasil-financio-al-regimen-de-pinochet/, [accessed, 07/03/2013].

101

The issue of security generated the greatest degree of multilateral cooperation, which reached unprecedented levels by the mid-1970s. As Patrice McSherry, John Dinges, Stella Calloni and, José Luis Méndez Méndez demonstrate, security cooperation gained momentum in the early 1970s. During that period the security apparatuses of the yet unnamed future Cóndor regimes held numerous conferences and work meetings. Their intelligence services even carried out a number of joint clandestine counterinsurgency operations.207

The willingness to cooperate by the South American militaries became evident at the XI Conference of American Armies (CEA), held in Montevideo, in late October 1975. This meeting played a key part in the process that led to the formalization of the Cóndor Plan, and the ramifications of its secret content reverberated beyond Montevideo. Immediately after the CEA conference on 6 November 1975, the Uruguayan embassy in Santiago reported that some professional university sectors in Chile, and civilian authorities of the Pinochet regime manifested “their approval of the efforts to coordinate [security activities across the region] when there is a reactivation of subversive groups that work with support from abroad”.208 The Chilean Defence Minister, “General Herman Brady [welcomed] … the strong decision [reached at the XI CEA Conference] to combat extremism”, which was considered a necessary task to re-establish order and development in the region.209 The memorandum confirmed that the Uruguayan and Chilean governments shared a common view regarding these matters and revealed their willingness to obtain further support from other South American countries.

207 McSherry, P., (2002), "Tracking the origins of a State Terror network: Operation Condor ", Latin American Perspectives, 29(1): 38-60. 208 The ambassador is referring here to the alleged increase of guerrilla activities and, indirectly, to the JCR. Ambassador Roberto González Casal to Minister Juan Carlos Blanco, Memorandum No. C- 877/75, 6 November 1975, in Folder 6 “CEA Conferencia de Ejércitos Americanos en Montevideo 21/10/75”, Box 33: “Uruguayan Embassy in Santiago, Chile”, available at Uruguayan Foreign Ministry’s Archive, Montevideo, Uruguay. 209 Ibid.

102

Julio César Villaverde reported that high-ranking military officers from fifteen American nations, including the US210, participated at the XI CEA conference, in Montevideo. The topics addressed included “the subversive activities and the communist infiltration in the region”. According to Villaverde, the delegates held secret discussions regarding “the anti-subversive struggle and Marxist infiltration in the continent…”211 In a further article, he claimed that “the more important points of the agenda were concerned with the implementation of ‘joint measures to contain the guerrilla activities and the communist infiltration’” in Latin America, particularly, in the Southern Cone.212

At the conference’s inauguration, the Commander in Chief of the Uruguayan Army, Lieutenant General Julio Vadora, “strongly attacked Marxism, and particularly the Communist Parties, accusing them of ‘bombarding’ the Americas with a campaign”.213 The defamation campaigns referred to the South American exiles’ denunciation of the regimes’ human rights violations in front of the US Congress and other international fora. As a consequence, the dictatorial regimes of Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and, particularly, Chile began to be strongly pressured from abroad in 1974-1975 regarding the harsh repressive measures they employed against their populations. These campaigns isolated the future Cóndor regimes, damaged their legitimacy, and led to diplomatic crises with Western governments.

The October 1975 XI Conference of American Armies generated consensus amongst Latin American Armed forces to increase cooperation efforts

210 At the time, Lt. Gen. Gordon Sumner from the US Army was the President of the Inter- American Defence Board-IADB. Inter-American Defence Board (I.A.D.B.), (2012), "Galería de Presidentes". 211 Villaverde, J. C., “Ejércitos-Principal Diurno”, Document L17, in Folder 6 “CEA Conferencia de Ejércitos Americanos en Montevideo, 21/10/75”, Box 33: Uruguayan Embassy in Santiago, Chile, available at Uruguayan Foreign Ministry’s Archive, Montevideo, Uruguay. 212 “Ejércitos-Principal Nocturno”, Document L202, in Folder 6 “CEA Conferencia de Ejércitos Americanos en Montevideo, 21/10/75”, Box 33: Uruguayan Embassy in Santiago, Chile, available at Uruguayan Foreign Ministry’s Archive, Montevideo, Uruguay. 213 Villaverde, J. C., Document L203, in Folder 6 “CEA Conferencia de Ejércitos Americanos en Montevideo, 21/10/75”, Box 33: Uruguayan Embassy in Santiago, Chile, available at Uruguayan Foreign Ministry’s Archive, Montevideo, Uruguay.

103

on security matters.214 The Bordaberry and, especially, the Pinochet regimes welcomed this development and took further measures to consolidate this collaboration. The following month, the Chilean intelligence agency DINA fine tuned the details with their South American counterparts at the secret meeting of intelligence services in Santiago.

As shown in this chapter, the future Cóndor partners started to develop more cooperative relationships in the early seventies, particularly, on economic and security matters. This cooperation increased steadily, despite the historical antagonisms, geopolitical rivalries, and old territorial disputes that had divided them since the 19th century. The political environment generated by US policy towards the region, the Cold War, the introduction of the NSD, the efforts by the US government and the Brazilian junta to prevent another Cuban revolution in Latin America, as well as a strong counterinsurgency and anticommunist indoctrination served as exogenous factors to encourage cooperation among the armed forces in the Southern Cone. These, combined with endogenous factors such as regime legitimacy and economic problems, deep political crises, guerrilla activity, and the local isolation faced by each of these military governments led them to reassess their relationships with neighbouring counterparts and increase cooperation to strengthen their position.

Although it was not easy to set aside the historical antagonisms and feelings of distrust, the South American regimes felt they had to in order to survive. These dictatorships faced two possible outcomes: unite and survive, or let old resentments continue to divide them until they perished as a consequence of international pressures. The main security threat for these regimes in 1975 did not come from guerrilla groups. It came from mobilized social groups within their societies, as well as the political opponents abroad and exiles who denounced the security forces’ human rights violations. The future Cóndor

214 In fact, the issue of regional cooperation began to be discussed amongst South American armies in the early 1970s and continued to gain momentum in the following years. These armed forces held numerous meetings and conferences to discuss the necessary arrangements for the implementation of such security projects. See Martorell, F., (1999), Operación Cóndor, el vuelo de la muerte, chapters I and II, pp. 5-35.

104

partners needed an appropriate cover to justify the hunt of these opponents and the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (JCR) provided the perfect excuse to do so.

105

Chapter II

A convenient excuse: The Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (JCR) (Revolutionary Coordinating Junta)

Despite claims to the contrary by the South American regimes and their supporters, the multilateral revolutionary project known as the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (JCR) (Revolutinary Coordinating Junta) never posed a serious threat to the South American dictators. Rather than a project to unleash guerrilla warfare throughout the region, the JCR became a convenient excuse for the regimes to transnationalize state terrorism. The Cóndor armed forces did not overestimate this organization’s level of threat. By November 1975, the five intelligence agencies that met in Santiago, Chile, knew about the JCR’s weak status. Despite this, they exaggerated its importance to justify the secret transnationalisation of repression against their opponents, especially the militant exile community.

For the South American revolutionary groups, the consolidation of the Chilean Junta demonstrated the failure of the peaceful road to socialism. By then, Argentina had become a safe haven for thousands of refugees who managed to escape the repression in Chile and other neighbouring countries.1 Among these refugees were surviving leaders and members of the most prominent South American revolutionary organizations.2 These groups lost momentum after the military governments in the region had inflicted severe blows to their infrastructures. The armed forces arrested or killed their most prominent leaders, and captured arms, ammunitions and financial resources. Those who managed to escape faced the difficult task of rebuilding their

1 Many chose this destination because it was close to their own country, which would make it easier to return when the political situation improved. Others simply did not have the financial resources to seek refuge in other countries beyond the region. 2 These were: the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) (National Liberation Army), from Bolivia; Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) (Revolutionary Leftist Movement), from Chile; and the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Tupamaros (MLN-T) (National Liberation Movement – Tupamaros), from Uruguay.

106

organizations in exile. This new generation of young and inexperienced leaders lacked the preparation to lead the armed struggle. These changes had profound ramifications for the revolutionary groups and severely weakened their overall infrastructure and effectiveness.

Despite the limitations, these organizations were determined to continue the struggle. As John Dinges points out, they were “…organizing an international underground alliance and … gearing up to wage guerrilla war against the military regimes”.3 The task, however, was extremely dangerous and difficult. It is in this environment that members of the MLN-Tupamaros, ELN, MIR and the Argentine ERP-PRT established the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (JCR) (Revolutionary Coordinating Junta) to develop new strategies for resistance to the dictatorial governments in the region.

Despite this project’s importance, only a small number of authors have dedicated much attention to the JCR.4 This gap undermines any attempt to identify the causes that led to the emergence of the Cóndor Plan. In her work Predatory States, Patrice McSherry gives a detailed analysis of the Cóndor plan and its historical connections to the overall Inter-American Defence System, and

3 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years: how Pinochet and his allies brought terrorism to three continents, New York, New Press, p. 4. 4 Some of these authors include: Calloni, S., (1999), Los años del lobo: Operación Cóndor, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Continente: Peña Lillo; Calloni, S., (2001), Operación Cóndor: pacto criminal, México, La Jornada; Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia: historias de vida y militancia en el M.L.N.-Tupamaros 1965-1975, Montevideo, Ediciones de la ; Slatman, M., (2009), Una doctrina militar contrarrevolucionaria para la nación Argentina: análisis de la discursividad oficial del ejército Argentino durante la Guerra Fría (1957-1976), VIII Reunión de antropología del Mercosur: diversidad y poder en América Latina, Buenos Aires, Universidad Nacional de San Martin-UNSAM; Slatman, M., (2010), Revisando una hipotesis: las relaciones entre la emergencia de la Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria y la estructuración de la Operación Cóndor (1972-1978), IX Encuentro nacional y III Congreso Internacional de Historia Oral de la República Argentina: "Los usos de la Memoria Oral y la Historia Oral", Argentina, Asociación de Historia Oral del Norte Argentino-AHONA; Slatman, M., (2010), "Para un balance necesario: la relación entre la emergencia de la Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria y el Operativo Cóndor. Cono Sur, 1974- 1978", Testimonios 2: 78-100; McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin America, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years: how Pinochet and his allies brought terrorism to three continents, New York, New Press.

107

to other US counterinsurgency operations in Europe after WWII.5 However, there is an important omission in her discussion: the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (JCR). A similar situation can be identified in John Dinges’ The Cóndor Years.6 Although he discusses this multilateral revolutionary organization, he neglects a number of important contextual elements that led to its consolidation. As a result, his analysis tends to over-emphasize the threat posed by this revolutionary organization. This chapter aims to address the existing gaps left by these two prominent works by looking at the internal situation of the groups that went on to form this multilateral organization.

Dinges’ discussion of the JCR is not wrong. His analysis includes important aspects in its process of formation, some of the plans and operations carried out by the participating organizations, and its resources. This is all correct and the surviving members’ testimonies and other documents corroborate his findings. Even the South American regimes that participated in the Cóndor plan used similar analogies to argue that the JCR, and the guerrilla groups involved in it, were indeed dangerous threats to their countries’ national security.7 Most authors dealing with this organization, including Dinges, focus on theoretical, ideological and political issues surrounding the JCR. However, these discussions fail to address another important and more practical element: the internal situation of those organizations that established the JCR.

While the JCR leadership’s revolutionary goals and courage were impressive, they grossly overestimated the organization’s capabilities. They set a large number of objectives while lacking the necessary manpower, infrastructure and resources to achieve them. On the other hand, and regardless

5 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin America, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 6 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor Years. 7 See, for instance: Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, (1976), Las Fuerzas Armadas al pueblo oriental, Montevideo, República Oriental del Uruguay, Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, Vols. 1-2; Tróccoli, J. N., (1996), La ira de Leviatán: del método de la furia a la búsqueda de la paz, Montevideo, Uruguay, Innomedia; Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino: la guerrilla marxista en Tucumán, Buenos Aires, N. Márquez.

108

of their intentions, the South American militaries grossly exaggerated the threat posed by the JCR. Although they portrayed this organization as dangerous, it seems unlikely that they were not aware of its real fighting capabilities. In fact, intelligence reports from the Uruguayan Intelligence Services (OCOA-SID and the Police (DNII)) show that the Uruguayan authorities and their counterparts in Argentina and Chile were well aware of all these developments.8 Despite claims to the contrary, the project of continental revolution was nothing more than an ambitious dream put forth by four guerrilla organizations struggling to survive.

The JCR was a joint effort by some South American leftist guerrillas to solve the problems generated by the ideological divisions within the Latin American left. It was also an attempt to continue the projects envisioned by Ernesto to export the socialist revolution. However, a closer look at the organizations’ internal situation reveals that there were also more urgent and pragmatic motives for them to join forces. This internal analysis demonstrates that the JCR was a desperate and ill coordinated effort to resist the regimes’ brutal repression. The intelligence agencies that formalized the Cóndor Plan used the first two reasons to justify this plan’s creation and the subsequent brutal repression. In other words, the regimes linked the formation of the JCR directly to the Latin American left and their Marxist allies in other continents, and portrayed it as the continuation of Cuba’s plans to export socialist revolution to the rest of the continent.

Historical background

The history of the JCR cannot be isolated from the overall historical context of world communism during the 1960s and 1970s. Numerous factors

8 In November 2011, the Uruguayan Government released, on line, the latest update of the investigation regarding the human rights violations carried out by the Uruguayan dictatorship (1973- 1985). This work contains a number of key intelligence reports from 1974-1975 that confirm that the Uruguayan authorities and those from Argentina and Chile were well aware of the weak state within the revolutionary forces. See: Presidencia de la República Oriental del Uruguay, (2011), Actualización de la investigación histórica sobre detenidos desaparecidos, Uruguay, Presidencia de la República, online, available at, http://www.presidencia.gub.uy/wps/wcm/connect/presidencia/portalpresidencia/comunicacion/inform es/investigacion-historica-sobre-detenidos-desaparecidos, [accessed, 20/12/2011].

109

within this context influenced the ideologies and views of this organization’s leadership. Some of the most influential factors can be traced back to the 20th Congress of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party (SUCP), the Cuban Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party (CHCP).9

Following the death of Stalin, the Communist world experienced dramatic changes. One of the most influential transformations took place at the 20th Congress of the SUCP, in 1956, when Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev, announced a new party line based on the of capitalism and socialism, officially abandoning armed struggle as a revolutionary tactic.10 The new strategy sought to strengthen11 and consolidate socialism within the Soviet Union and in those countries already with a socialist government. According to Theotonio Dos Santos, the new approach also included alliances “with democratic forces (even the conservative ones) in the industrialized countries and a nationalist and democratic broad front with the national bourgeoisie in the colonial and peripheral world”.12 Although most communist parties around the world, including those in Latin America, aligned with Khrushchev’s position, the new approach did not result in a global united socialist front. Further divisions and tensions continued to emerge.

The Chinese Communist Party (CHCP) became one of the strongest critics of Khrushchev’s line. Among other things, the CHCP repudiated the Soviet’s abandonment of armed struggle and remained loyal to Mao’s concept of Prolonged Popular War13, which was a specific kind of people’s armed struggle

9 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", online, available at www.cedema.org/uploads/4778_1_junta_de_coordinacion_rev.pdf, [accessed 3/08/2010], pp. 8-10. 10 Ibid. p. 8. 11 There were Communist parties in Latin America already implementing a similar policy of promoting and participating in cross-class and multiparty coalitions before Krushchev’s new line. The Chilean Communist party (PCCH) was one of them. See: Flores, J. R. and M. Loyola, (2000), Por un rojo amanecer: hacia una historia de los comunistas chilenos, Magyar ISBN Iroda, Orszagos Szechenyi Konyvtar. 12 Dos Santos, T., (1980), Imperialismo y dependencia, México, Ediciones Era, p. 274. 13 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 8.

110

that sought to achieve victory by wearing out the enemy in a long war. For the Chinese or Maoists the peasantry would play a prominent role in defeating the enemy forces and consolidating the socialist revolution. They accused the soviet communists of being reformists and rejected their views of a led by an elite (the Chinese communists opposed both the idea of peaceful coexistence and a revolution led by the Communist Party). The ideological confrontations between the two major communist powers spread and produced deep divisions and factionalisms within several leftist parties and other revolutionary organizations around the world, including Latin America. The victory of the Cuban Revolution further exacerbated these confrontations.

In 1959 a small group of revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro and Ernesto Che Guevara launched an armed revolt that led to the defeat of ’s dictatorship. Against all odds, a small group of guerrillas challenged an entire army and a US backed government, and won. This event “stirred the entire Latin American left and factionalised it even further”.14 Many leftist groups enthusiastically welcomed the victory.15 Patrice McSherry argues that the revolution “sent shock waves through the region, igniting new social movements (including several guerrilla organizations), as well as right-wing reactions”.16 Until then, Latin American leftist parties had been peripheral in the worldwide theoretical discussions and ideological schisms of the communist movement. Although an intricate part in the lives of leftist parties in the region, these discussions focused mostly on the theoretical aspects of how the socialist revolution would be implemented.17 The experiences of the

14 Rosencof, M., (2003), La Rebelión de los Cañeros, Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo, p. 83. 15 The Cuban revolution also attracted the attention of European intelligence agencies like the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). In the early 1960s, the latter hired the services of Walther Rauff, one of the SS officers responsible for the development of the mobile gas chambers. After the war Rauff settled in Chile where he kept a low profile. Jan Friedman argues that, in 1960-1962, the BND hired him to spy on Fidel Castro. See: Friedmann, J., (2007), New research taints image of Desert Fox Rommel, Spiegel Online International, Germany, Spiegelnet Gmbh, online, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,484510,00.html, [accessed 23/5/2012]. 16 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, p. 3.

111

directly challenged these parties’ assertions and demonstrated that the revolution could also triumph in the continent.

Dos Santos argues that the Cuban revolution “helped to radicalise liberal and anti-imperialist movements which began to seek socialist transformations and consider guerrilla struggle as a necessary strategy to achieve a ”.18 Regis Debray’s theory of the guerrilla foco was paramount in this process and found one of its most fervent supporters in Ernesto Che Guevara.19 In general terms, the strategy maintained that a reduced number of guerrilla fighters could act as the catalyst of a socialist revolution. According to Eduardo Rey Tristan, this vanguard’s actions would gain people’s support and weaken the opponent’s armed forces. More importantly, it would unmask the reactionary nature of current regimes, which would lead to the subsequent loss of any popular support for them.20

John Dinges maintains that the experiences in the Sierra Maestra led Comandante Che Guevara to believe that a small guerrilla foco could

… set the fuse of countrywide, even continent wide uprisings of the poor and middle classes. It was a revolution that would spread and spread, by example, by ideology, by house-to-house and factory-to-factory organizing, and most of all by what they called la lucha armada, or armed struggle.21

The foco strategy became popular in Latin America and prompted the emergence of several leftist guerrilla groups that tried to develop their own version of the Cuban experiment.

17 Some maintained that the objective and subjective conditions were not present in most of Latin America to launch a socialist revolution, while others believed that the conditions were present. There were also heated debates about who would be responsible for leading the revolution (i.e. the proletariat, the peasants, or a political party). 18 Dos Santos, T., (1980), Imperialismo y dependencia, p. 275. 19 In the mid-1960s Debray worked as a Philosophy professor at Havana University. In 1967, he joined Che Guevara’s campaign in Bolivia. 20 Rey Tristan, E., (2006), A la vuelta de la esquina: la izquierda revoluicionaria Uruguaya, Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo, pp. 57-58. 21 Dinges, J. (2004), The Condor Years, p. 42.

112

The new organizations shared a common attraction towards the foco concept. However, this did not necessarily mean that they all had the same ideology. The revolutionary organizations that established the JCR had very different ideological views when it came to identifying the appropriate path towards achieving a socialist revolution. Although these groups frequently cooperated with each other during the late 1960s and early 1970s, at times their different ideological positions prevented them from deepening those ties.

For instance, while some leaders of the Uruguayan MLN-T came from the Socialist Party, they avoided defining themselves in socialist factional terms. This enabled them to attract members and groups from various political organizations in the early stages of formation, including dissident factions of the rightist conservative Colorado and Blanco parties. They disagreed with the Soviet Communists and their political line of peaceful coexistence. On the other hand, they agreed with some specific points of Mao’s theories of revolution. However, they believed that in Uruguay the conditions were not ripe for launching a rural guerrilla campaign. While they were strong supporters of Che Guevara, they disagreed with his emphasis on rural or mountain warfare and went on to establish one of the most successful urban guerrilla organizations in the region.22

The Chilean MIR, on the other hand, dedicated a great deal of effort to the formation of a political party that worked in conjunction with the organization’s military branch. The Bolivian ELN and the Argentine ERP-PRT were similar. Despite any structural variations, however, all the groups embraced, more or less, the principles of the foco tactic. They challenged the hegemonic position of the communist parties in their own countries. Debray’s

22 For further readings on the Uruguayan MLN-T, see Huidobro, F., (1987), Historia de los Tupamaros, Vol 2, Montevideo, Editorial MZ ltda; Huidobro, F., (1988), Historia de los Tupamaros, Vol 1, Montevideo, TAE; Huidobro, F., (1988), Historia de los Tupamaros, Vol 3, Montevideo, TAE; Huidobro, F., (2004). En la nuca: historia de los Tupamaros, Montevideo, Banda Oriental; López, F., (2007), The emergence and radicalization of the Unión de Trabajadores Azucareros de Artigas (U.T.A.A.): origins of the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (M.L.N.-T.), Honours Degree, University of New South Wales UNSW; Labrouse, A., (1973), The Tupamaros: urban guerrillas in Uruguay, Victoria, Australia, Penguin Books.

113

theory did not place the Communist Party at the vanguard of the revolutionary process, which was not well received by the Latin American communists.23 Consequently, the latter frequently criticised and confronted these guerrilla organizations.

The Cuban Revolution also changed the dynamics of US-Latin America relations. The government of the United States perceived this event as a direct challenge to its hegemony, including its economic and political interests. Therefore, in the early 1960s, the US increased its support to Latin American governments by building up “their security forces – particularly the police but also the military – and by putting down the extreme left”.24 The emergence of several guerrilla organizations prompted a shift in strategies to address the threat posed now by an ‘internal enemy’. These changes were introduced within the framework of the National Security Doctrine (NSD) and had a profound influence on the ideology of the Latin American security forces. Patrice McSherry describes the NSD as “…a politicised doctrine of internal war and counterrevolution that targeted the enemy within [which] gave the militaries a messianic mission: to remake their states and societies and eliminate ‘subversion’”.25 During the 60s and 70s, the armed forces and conservative anticommunist governments in the region associated almost every single act of dissidence or social discontent with a direct communist attempt to subvert society. During this period, the anti-Castro governments in the continent

23 See: Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, (1976), Las Fuerzas Armadas al pueblo oriental, Montevideo, República Oriental del Uruguay, Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, Vol. 1, p. 174. In 1976, the Uruguayan junta published a Two-volume work entitled Las Fuerzas Armadas al Pueblo Oriental. This presented the Uruguayan military’s version of their fight against the leftist guerrilla groups in that country, particularly the MLN-Tupamaros. This source reveals the regime’s ideological position but its overall academic value is controversial. The analysis and, particularly, the conclusions presented in this work need to be crosschecked and evaluated in conjunction with other sources. The book was published at a time when the Uruguayan Junta was being widely criticised for its human rights violations, and is an attempt to “explain” the real situation in Uruguay to the rest of the world. It makes deliberate omissions, contains inaccurate factual information and relies on the testimonies (i.e. information extracted under severe torture) of prisoners. 24 Agee, P., (1975), Inside the Company: C.I.A. diary, Harmonsworth, England, Penguin Books, p. 137. 25 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, p. 3.

114

became increasingly worried about Cuba’s growing ties with the Soviet Union and with other leftist guerrilla groups.26 Between the mid-to-late 1960s Cuba’s role as a political power broker in the continent increased considerably, particularly, after the 1966 Tri-Continental meeting in Havana.

The Tri-Continental and OLAS

The Tri-Continental Conference was held in Havana from 3-15 January 1966. It was Cuba’s attempt to overcome the deep ideological differences within the world communist movement and begin a new era of cooperation between revolutionary forces. Its main objective, according to Anibal Garzón, was to “unite the anti-imperialist and sovereign principles of … Asia, Africa and Latin America”.27 The participating delegates focused mostly on the common political, social, and economic aspects of the anti-imperialist struggle in the three continents.28 They also acknowledged the need to exploit all avenues to achieve their goals, including the use of armed struggle, if necessary. While this important gathering encouraged the formation of a united revolutionary front, the strategies should be tailored to the internal conditions and needs of each country.

Within the Latin American theatre, this conference emerged as a direct challenge to the US influenced Organization of American States (OAS). It proclaimed that those revolutionary movements that managed to become

26 Regarding Havana’s relationship with the Soviet Union, it is necessary to point out two important events that took place in the early 1960s: the US’s failed attempt to invade Cuba with a group of CIA-trained anti-Castro Cubans from Miami at Playa Girón (also known as the Bay of Pigs), and the 1963 . These events led the US to reconfigure its foreign policy toward the rest of the continent to contain the growing influence of Cuba. 27 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 9. 28 They proclaimed their right to: “…root out all vestiges of imperial economic domination and build their own economies … ; the right to control the basic national resources; to nationalize the banks and vital enterprises; to have state control over foreign trade and exchange; [to encourage] the growth of the public sector, as well as the reconsideration and repudiation of the spurious and anti- national debts that have been imposed upon their economies. To implement real agrarian reforms that eliminated feudal and semi-feudal properties; to promote agrarian development strategies that improved the living conditions of peasants and agricultural workers and that contributed towards improving the national economy and exports.” Principles of the Tri-Continental in Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, (1976), Las Fuerzas Armadas al pueblo oriental, Montevideo, República Oriental del Uruguay, Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, Vols. 1, p. 134.

115

governments should not be obliged to respect the agreements and decisions reached under the banner of this regional organism. The US and its friends in the region interpreted this statement as a dangerous move towards promoting subversion. These fears were further confirmed in May 1967 when Che Guevara sent his famous “Message to the Tri-Continental” in which he argued that:

… It is the path of Vietnam; it is the path the people must follow, it is the path that America will follow … the groups in arms could form something like the Juntas de Coordinación [Coordinating Juntas] to make the work of Yankee more difficult and facilitate their own cause.29

Guevara’s suggestion would be fully embraced a few years later by the founders of the JCR.

At the Tri-Continental Conference, the Latin American left enunciated important conclusions regarding the form and shape of the continental struggle for liberation. According to Rey Tristan, that revolution would be:

1) Continental, because there was an objective revolutionary situation in Latin America determined by the socio-economic conditions of the continent; 2) Socialist, because there was no other possible path towards development given the structural conditions of dependency; and 3) linked to the movements of national liberation of the Third World, because it [was] part of the global war of liberation of the people against imperialist oppression.30

To promote and support the activities of newly emerged national liberation movements, the Tri-Continental created a new organism: the Latin American, Asian and African Solidarity Organization (OSPAAAL).31 Despite its

29 Che Guevara’s message to the Tri-Continental in Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p 2. 30 Rey Tristan, E., (2006), A la Vuelta de la esquina, p. 56. 31 OSPAAAL signified the “union between revolutionary organizations from 82 countries, with a total of 600 delegates. With its headquarters in Havana, the organization was responsible for the coordination and implementation of numerous cultural, economic and political programs to directly and indirectly support those national liberation movements. Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 9.

116

enthusiastic launch, however, the organization could not overcome the conflicts affecting the international communist movement. Both, the Soviet and Chinese communist parties attempted to exert their influence over OSPAAAL.

Frustrated by the constant divisions, a number of Latin American revolutionary leaders met “privately with the Political Bureau of the Cuban Communist Party and agreed to create an independent organization outside the Tri-Continental: the Latin American Solidarity Organization (OLAS)”.32 Its first conference was held on 31 July 1967, also in Havana city. The resolutions taken by the participating delegations accelerated the process of consolidation of several revolutionary groups in the continent. For the conservative governments in the region, this was yet further proof of the growing threat posed by the Cuban government. At this conference Fidel Castro officially proclaimed his government’s intention of exporting the revolution and encouraged cooperation between revolutionary groups.

OLAS stated that it was a fundamental right of the Latin American people to carry out a revolution and linked it to the continent’s historical struggle for independence. However, in this new era, Marxism- provided the necessary tools and ideological direction of the struggle. OLAS’s first Conference also outlined the organization’s vision of how best to achieve these goals. Resolution number five made it specifically clear that “armed struggle constituted the fundamental line of the Revolution in Latin America”.33 Cuba pledged its unconditional support for revolutionary groups and encouraged solidarity and collaboration between them. The new strategy, however, suffered an important set back the following year when the Bolivian security forces and their allies captured and killed Che Guevara.

32 Ibid. 33 OLAS Resolution number five in Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, (1976), Las Fuerzas Armadas al pueblo oriental, Montevideo, República Oriental del Uruguay, Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, Vol. 1, p. 142.

117

Che Guevara in Bolivia

Che’s death in Bolivia had an important short-term ramification: it led Fidel Castro to implement a dramatic change to his foreign policy. The euphoric revolutionary fervour ignited by OLAS lost its momentum and the organization’s influence decreased. As Garzón states, “the continental union of the armed struggle was not achieved and the wrestling between its approval and disapproval marked the beginning and the end of the OLAS”.34 The failure of the Bolivian foco led Fidel Castro to re-think his strategy of exporting the revolution to other countries. From then on, he lowered his revolutionary rhetoric and sought to establish a more friendly relationship with the Soviet Union and other communist parties in the region. To do so, the Cuban government reduced its overt cooperation with guerrilla movements, pledged support for the peaceful coexistence line, avoided direct confrontation with the USSR and criticised the Chinese communists.35

Despite Cuba’s foreign policy changes, however, the bases for the creation of the JCR had already been established. The Cuban government’s actions through the Tri-Continental, OSPAAAL and OLAS had planted the seeds for the foundation of this multilateral revolutionary project. The increasing military repression in the region in the sixties and, particularly, in the early seventies delayed its growth as the various guerrilla groups struggled to function.

Early beginnings

The guerrilla groups that officially established the JCR, in 1974 began to collaborate with each other in the late 1960s. During that period many of those organizations’ documents frequently cited the concept of continentalidad or the

34 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 9. 35 League for the 5th International, (1991), "Cuba: the final domino?", online, available at http://www.fifthinternational.org/content/cuba%E2%80%94-final-domino, [accessed 09/08/2010].

118

continental aspects of the revolutionary struggle.36 Yet, while this goal led them to seek and develop connections with other groups, they lacked a specific multilateral strategy that would allow them to operate simultaneously towards a common goal. Ex-Tupamaro leader, Henry Engler pointed out that his organization had contacts with the ELN, the Argentine Montoneros, the ERP, the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP) and with the Chilean MIR. This, according to Engler,

…[did] not necessarily mean that we agreed with their [ideological/political] line or the way in which these groups operated. Instead, we maintained a critical attitude towards them. The ties were sporadic and not too intense. On some occasions we refused to carry out actions in Uruguay that would signify direct support for the tactical line of some Argentine group. Some other times we provided assistance for specific actions that coincided with our views. The Argentine organizations also helped us on many occasions. This was particularly the case during the 1972 debacle in which they offered a lot of support. [However] we tried, as much as possible, not to use it…37

It is true that the guerrillas displayed solidarity towards other revolutionary groups. Yet, they carried out most of their operations within their own territorial boundaries and avoided intervening in the internal affairs of other countries.38 More importantly, these organizations did not have the appropriate infrastructure or resources to complete such an ambitious goal.

The bilateral connections between the South American guerrillas increased in the late 1960s. However, numerous geographical, strategic and ideological factors continued to limit these contacts to mere logistical arrangements. Shortly after the death of Ernesto Che Guevara, the Bolivian

36 For instance, the Tupamaros’ Document-One, which outlined the ideological direction of the organization, included this concept as one its objectives. 37 Henry Engler in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia: historias de vida y militancia en el M.L.N.-Tupamaros 1965-1975, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, p. 179. 38 In the 1960s and the early 1970s, some of these organizations sent militants to other countries to help guerrilla groups. However, these numbers were limited to a handful of members. The reasons for this included, Nationalism, different views regarding national liberation (e.g. , anti- colonialism, etc.), different levels of development of Latin American countries, xenophobia, cultural differences and ethnicities, etc.

119

army defeated the ELN. Consequently, a small number of guerrilla survivors escaped from Bolivia and sought refuge in Chile in February 1968. Garzón argues that the relationship between the ELN and the Chilean MIR began to develop during this brief period.39 The following year, the ELN’s leader, Inti Peredo, met with the leadership of the Argentine PRT in La Paz. After Inti’s death (on 9 September 1969), his brother Chato Peredo became the ELN’s new leader. The latter maintained his brother’s strategic and tactical policies and sought to expand the organization’s ties with others in the region. He also met with Raúl Sendic, leader of the Uruguayan MLN-T to establish links with that organization.

The new contacts, especially with the Tupamaros, generated immediate results for the . The relationship was extended in 1970 when the MLN-T intensified its urban guerrilla activities against the government of President Pacheco Areco. The new campaign included the capture of the Navy’s Training Centre (CIM) on 29 May to steal its arsenal.40 The Tupamaros sent some of the captured arms to the ELN. In July 1970 the Bolivian revolutionaries wrote to their Uruguayan counterparts. In that letter, Chato Peredo explained to the Tupamaro leadership that their collaboration “…helped [the ELN] to resume [its] activities and was an important morale boost for [its] militants”.41 The letter, however, also outlined the strategic differences between the two organizations. While the Bolivians promised to imitate the MLN-T’s example,

39 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 15. 40 In only two hours, a small number of guerrillas, led by Sendic, captured this military base and stole its entire arsenal, without a single shot being fired. The MLN-T members involved in this operation left the navy base with a total of 190 Springfield carabins, 120 rifles Garand M-1, six AR- 15 rifles, two mountable machine guns, two Reissing automatic rifles; fifty .45 calibre hand guns; 180 brand new 38 calibre revolvers, ninety demolition grenades, 130 gas and smoke grenades, 70.000 bullets and ammunition , radio equipment, and anti gas masks and diving gear. For further readings on this and other operations carried out by this organization see Blixen, S., (2005), Sendic, Montevideo, Ediciones Trilce, p. 195. 41 Peredo, C., “Carta al MLN-Tupamaros”, file ELN Bolivia, in folder MLN-T Documentos Organizaciones Políticas (1), available at CEIL-CEIU, UDELAR, Montevideo, Uruguay.

120

they made it clear that they would do it in a different field: the mountains, instead of the urban centres. This particular strategic factor became a recurrent obstacle in the process of deepening relations between the South American guerrillas.

The 1970 victory of President Salvador Allende in Chile marked an important qualitative change for the region’s political landscape, as it made it easier for the leadership of a number of South American guerrilla groups to meet and exchange views and information. This also created new challenges for the guerrilla groups. Although Chile provided a favourable setting for these interactions, the new political situation represented an important setback for their overall revolutionary objectives. Allende’s victory demonstrated, though temporarily, the possibility of establishing a socialist government through peaceful means. This issue revived and exacerbated the old ideological clashes of the 1960s. The outcome strengthened the communist and socialist parties and their views regarding the feasibility of the electoral road to achieve victory. Meanwhile, the guerrilla groups that remained committed to armed struggle as the only means to achieve a socialist revolution were weakened. Most, particularly the Chilean MIR, had to step back and scale down their armed operations to allow Allende’s socialist experiment to take its course.42 Hence, during 1971-1973 these organizations focused mostly on strengthening their ties and exploring the possibilities of coordinating operations at a regional level. It is during those years that the first concrete steps towards the establishment of the JCR took place.

The first serious attempt to establish multilateral ties between these groups took place in early November 1972. According to Garzón, “eight members of MIR’s Political Commission, three leaders of the PRT, including its leader, Roberto Santucho, and three senior leaders of the MLN-T, met in

42 A similar situation took place in Uruguay during the 1971 election. At the time, the Tupamaros stopped their activities to allow the leftist Frente Amplio or Broad Front coalition to participate in the political race. Although the MLN-T supported the Broad Front, it predicted that the leftist coalition would not win the election. They remained committed to armed struggle.

121

Santiago, Chile”.43 Miguel Enríquez, leader of the Chilean MIR and considered by many authors as one of the main ideological and intellectual driving forces behind the formation of the JCR44, argued in favour of the creation of a new internationalist organization.

Enríquez and Santucho strongly supported the consolidation of this multilateral project and placed the JCR at the same level as the Third and Fourth internationals. According to John Dinges, they believed that,

… just as the Third International was the communist party’s instrument to defend the soviet revolution, and the embodied ’s idea of permanent revolution in many countries, the JCR was the Fifth International representing Latin America’s continent wide revolution.45

In theory, the JCR had the potential to ignite and reinvigorate revolutionary fervour throughout the region. In practice, however, this proved too ambitious. A myriad of deficiencies and practical problems plagued this organization’s path and prevented it from achieving that goal. Despite these shortcomings, the alliance “would begin with the three groups present at that meeting and [would] coordinate the revolutionary struggle in the Southern Cone of Latin America based on their own acquired experience in people’s struggle”.46 These groups’ leaderships agreed to implement a number of practical measures leading towards the establishment of a multilateral revolutionary organization: the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (JCR).47

43 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 16. 44 See Dinges, J. (2004). The Condor years; Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor"; Santillana, R., (1999), "Miguel Enríquez y la J.C.R.", Online, available at www.archivochile.com/America_latina/JCR/JCR_de/jcrde0005.pdf, [accessed 20/08/2010]. 45 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 52. 46 Santillana, R., (1999), "Miguel Enriquez y la J.C.R.", p. 2. 47 These measures included writing a joint declaration, editing a new political magazine (named Che Guevara), organizing joint schools for future guerrilla cadres, and developing joint projects and international relations. Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 16.

122

The ELN officially joined this project at a subsequent meeting held in June 1973 in Argentina. Garzón maintains that of all the participating organizations the Bolivians were the weakest due to the repression conducted by Hugo Banzer’s regime.48 A brief look at the internal conditions of the other organizations, however, demonstrates that this assertion is not entirely correct. It is true that Banzer had been in power since 1971 and that the other countries, more or less, remained under democratic rule. Yet, other organizations experienced worst conditions than the ELN. For instance, by early 1973, the MLN-T had suffered a series of defeats including the capture of all its founding leaders.

The revolutionary groups began to reconstruct their infrastructure to overcome their weaknesses. To do so, according to John Dinges, “each organization had been sending cadres to Chile for military and ideological training in camps deep in the mountain, at Cajón del Maipo”.49 In early 1973, the four organizations established an International School of Cadres in the region of Viña del Mar, run by the Chilean MIR. However, as Chile’s security situation deteriorated during the year, the Chilean revolutionaries dedicated most of their strength and resources to deal with the growing threat against the Allende Administration. Although this was yet another setback for the consolidation of the JCR, its members continued to work towards completing the goals outlined in the previous meetings. By August, the four guerrilla groups were ready to formalise the alliance and, until 11 September 1973, the JCR’s headquarter stayed in Santiago. After the coup, however, the leadership escaped to Buenos Aires.

Early activities to establish the JCR’s infrastructure

The JCR’s leaders sought to strengthen its contacts abroad and secure a substantial cash flow that would allow them to achieve their objectives. First,

48 Ibid. 49 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, pp. 50-51. The latter, however, is not really deep in the mountains and, instead, readily accessible from Santiago, in the foothills of the Andes.

123

they tried to extend their network of contacts beyond the Southern Cone. The Tupamaro Efraín Martínez Platero led a small department responsible for dealing with the organization’s international relations.50 As Dinges points out, there was some logic behind this appointment.51 The South American guerrilla leaders wanted to use the MLN-T’s international reputation and well-established revolutionary credentials to enhance the JCR’s profile. In 1973-1974, Martínez Platero travelled to Cuba, as well as to other countries in Africa and Europe. However, the results were disappointing.

Platero wanted to gain Fidel Castro’s support for this multilateral project. JCR leaders understood that Castro’s blessing was extremely important for the future of the organization, as it would give an important boost to the JCR’s revolutionary credentials and could open the door for future contacts with other groups around the world. This, however, became a very difficult task. In an interview with Dr Clara Adrighi, Martínez Platero reminisced about this trip to Cuba and revealed the numerous problems the JCR had to face.

Shortly after his arrival to Havana, Platero contacted high-ranking intelligence officials of the Cuban government and Fidel Castro himself. In those meetings, the Cubans expressed their dislike for the PRT’s participation in the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria. Fidel Castro told Platero “with you [i.e. the Uruguayan MLN-T] to death, you have a future. But forget it chico if you think we are going to support something in which the people from the PRT are involved. Why? Because they are Trotskyists”.52 When Aldrighi pointed out to Platero that the Cubans, to some degree, had also supported the PRT at the time, he agreed. However, he quickly pointed out that “yes …. [t]he Cubans

50 EfraínVásquez Platero had been a member of the MLN-T since 1963 and became one of its leaders in 1969. He was arrested twice and on both occasions managed to escape from the famous Punta Carretas prison in Uruguay. Once in exile, he became one of the founding leaders of the JCR and was responsible for this organization’s international relations. For further readings on Platero’s revolutionary carreer see: Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la Insurgencia. 51 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 56. 52 Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la Insurgencia, p. 369.

124

supported the PRT but in a completely different way than the Montoneros and us [the MLN-T]”.53

Platero’s discussion of Cuba’s relationship with the Chilean MIR is also revealing. He states that the Cuban assistance to this group was rather limited. The Cubans believed that the

…PRT and the MIR carried out a form of Marxism-Leninism that was not in tune with the conditions in Latin America at the time. They [the Cubans] even discussed this with us [MLN-T]. ...[They] believed that the revolutionary process in Latin America had to be softened. It could not be like theirs. They said that our natural ally within the region was the Montoneros due to their distinctive form of ‘revolutionary and progressive nationalism...’54

The ideological differences between Havana and the Chilean MIR indeed limited their relationship and interaction. However, there were other pragmatic factors that Platero failed to address. Among these was the friendship between Fidel Castro and President Salvador Allende. Castro urged Allende to prepare his people for armed struggle and to increase ties with the MIR to defend his government against potential attacks from the opposition. However, Allende remained committed to the peaceful road to socialism and avoided armed confrontation with his rivals. While the Cuban leader disagreed with the Chilean President’s strategy to consolidate his socialist revolution, he respected his decision. Therefore, Fidel limited his support to the miristas, when compared to other organizations, as he did not want to compromise his good relationship with the Chilean president.55

Platero also spoke about the ideological and strategic reasons behind the tensions between the Cubans and the PRT. In terms of ideology, the latter

53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between Fidel Castro and Salvador Allende, see Harmer, T., (2011), Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.

125

aligned itself, at least until 1973, with the Trotskyite IV international.56 The Cubans, on the other hand, remained close to the Soviet Communist Party, which, to put it mildly, was highly critical of the Trotskyites. There were other practical and strategic issues behind that tension. Cuba relied heavily on Moscow’s aid and Castro was not ready to compromise that vital lifeline by helping an organization that followed an opposing political line.

Castro also took into account his relationship with the Argentine government. At the time, the Perón administration was one of the few governments in South America maintaining economic ties with Cuba. Perón refused to join the economic embargo imposed by the US. In 1973, he signed a bilateral trade agreement with Cuba to the value of US$ 1.2 billion.57 Hence, Castro did not support the PRT, and by extension, the JCR, as that organization was openly fighting against the Perón government. Enrique Gorriarán Merlo, one of the leaders of the PRT-ERP, once described President Perón as a “bourgeois reformist”.58 All these issues played against Platero’s mission. He left Havana with only modest support from the Cubans. Fidel Castro agreed to provide asylum for refugees and assistance in helping them escape from the military repression. The Cuban leader offered to provide guerrilla training but he refused to give any further help with arms and ammunitions.

Trip to Africa and Europe

Not everything was negative about Platero’s trip to Cuba. His connections with high-ranking government officials in that country facilitated contacts abroad. When the Cubans offered to arrange meetings with other governments, Platero suggested Algeria among other nations.59 Thus, the quest to rally support for the JCR extended to Africa and to European nations. Dinges gives a good overview of the JCR representative’s activities in Europe. This

56 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 18. 57 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor Years, p. 207. 58 Enrique Gorriarán Merlo in ibid, p. 59 59 Martínez Platero in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la Insurgencia, p. 371.

126

revolutionary organization built most of its “international network [in that continent] with offices in Paris, Lisbon, , and Bonn”.60 However, until recently, the African connections with the JCR remained almost unknown.

In late 1973 Platero and two Tupamaros61 visited Algeria and Libya, and then, in early 1974, Paris and Sweden on the way back to Argentina. The African leg of the trip, however, produced similar results to those obtained in Cuba. Like Fidel Castro, the Algerian authorities remained sceptical about lending support to the JCR, mostly due to the PRT’s participation in it. Once in that country, the South American delegates met the chief of the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLNA). Although the latter admired the Tupamaros, he abstained from supporting the JCR.62 In the end, argues Platero, the Algerians gave “us a little bit of money so we could move around Europe, but only for the Tupamaros. They only donated 20,000 Francs, which were mostly used to help people in Sweden.”63 While this African nation provided limited material and logistical support for the JCR, the Algerian government granted political asylum to a number of Uruguayan doctors linked to the MLN-T.

Platero and his companions travelled to Libya in early 1974, hoping to obtain better results. For the JCR’s representative, the response was slightly positive, “because the Libyans got involved in anything that could promote trouble and guerrilla”.64 Yet, their optimism quickly vanished as that support suggested a long-term project rather than immediate assistance. Platero argues that “for us that was bad because we needed the help right away, while our militants were being captured by the military”.65 The Libyans did not commit to a specific timeframe. It is likely that they preferred to wait to see how the JCR evolved before giving any substantial assistance to the organization.

60 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 85. 61 Beto Gabino Falero and Walter Machado. 62 Martínez Platero in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la Insurgencia, p. 375. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid, p. 372. 65 Ibid.

127

In Sweden, the JCR’s representative contacted MLN-T members who had escaped from Uruguay and Chile, and tried to organize the Swedish branch of the JCR. There, Pedro Dutra, one of the MLN-T leaders who found political asylum in that country, informed Platero of the Tupamaros’ plans to kidnap Colonel Ramón Trabal in Paris.66 The JCR international delegate argues that when the Uruguayan military found out about this plan, they took the initiative and killed Trabal to put the blame on the MLN-T.67 The plan was to kidnap the Uruguayan military attaché and take him to Cuba, via Algeria. However, the plan did not eventuate. The Algerian government adamantly refused to participate in it, or in any other JCR project. 68

Some authors maintain that the Uruguayan junta got rid of Trabal by sending him to France. For instance, McSherry argues that

Trabal, former head of military intelligence, had opposed the hard-line faction of the Uruguayan armed forces led by Julio Vadora, and had opposed President Bordaberry’s decision to declare illegal the major labour union, Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT), in 1973. [He] had also overseen secret peace negotiations with members of the Tupamaros.69

On the other hand, some MLN-T members and even the Cuban government believed Trabal was sent to France to set up an intelligence network to monitor Tupamaro activities. In fact, some evidence seems to suggest that Trabal

66 In 1974, Colonel Ramón Trabal was sent to France by the Uruguayan Junta to work as military attaché. Before the June 1973 coup, Trabal was the chief of the Army Intelligence services. Some argue that he was sent to France because of his refusal to participate in the more obscure aspects of the repression in Uruguay. On December 19, 1974, he was murdered in Paris. The Uruguayan junta immediately blamed the Tupamaros. Yet, there is no evidence to confirm that accusation. For further readings on this issue see Calloni, S., (2001), Operación Cóndor, p. 24; Israel, S., (2002), El enigma Trabal, Montevideo, Uruguay, Ediciones Trilce. 67 Until recently, ex-dictator Juan María Bordaberry continued to blame the Tupamaros for this crime, despite the fact that there is no evidence of any MLN-T involvement in it. See Lessa, A., (2005), Estado de guerra: de la gestación del golpe del 73 a la caída de Bordaberry, Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo, p. 287. 68 Platero in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la Insurgencia, p. 371. 69 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, p. 140.

128

monitored the activities of a number of leftist militants in London.70 Regardless of the circumstances that took Colonel Trabal to Paris, his death brought about another important qualitative change to Uruguay’s repression. As McSherry states, “with Trabal’s murder, an officer who had represented an alternative vision for the Uruguayan Army – as had [generals] Schneider and Prats of Chile – was eliminated, and a pretext created for more repression against the left”.71

Hence, Platero’s trip on behalf of the JCR did not live up to its expectations. Despite the organization’s attempts to promote itself as the one continuing Che Guevara’s revolutionary legacy in Latin America, few people shared their enthusiasm. The world’s leftist movement had little intention of supporting the organization’s plan to revive armed struggle in the Southern Cone. Platero’s requests for arms, ammunition and other resources to increase the organization’s fighting capabilities were dismissed. Although the PRT was the strongest of the groups in this multilateral project, many refused to support the JCR due to the Argentines’ Trotskyite ideological inclinations.

The pilgrimage to Cuba, Africa and Europe failed to obtain a single gun to enhance the organization’s arsenal. However, the JCR’s ambassador did not come back empty handed. He attracted the solidarity of several European leftist parties and organizations. These facilitated and promoted the organization’s propaganda machine, became very effective in denouncing the crimes of the South American regimes, and were active in arranging asylum for its members.72 This solidarity was an important morale boost for the JCR. It was not sufficient, however, to keep the organization alive.

Kidnappings

Due to the modest support received from abroad, the JCR had to rely on itself to obtain funds. Its most notorious operations were the kidnapping of three

70 A small number of documents at the CEIL-CEIU archives in the Uruguayan UDELAR, and in the Uruguayan Foreign Relations Ministry’s archives seem to support this hypothesis. 71 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, p. 140. 72 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, pp. 85-86.

129

important industrialists in Argentina, conducted by the ERP-PRT and the Tupamaros.73 In total, the JCR collected approximately US$ 22 million from these operations. Paradoxically, while the money was an important asset for the guerrilla group, its distribution generated numerous problems and confrontations between members. The funds were to be distributed amongst the ELN, MIR, MLN-T and the PRT-ERP. The Chileans, however, did not receive their share of the booty.74

Roberto Santillana maintains that the PRT gave more than a million dollars earmarked for the Chilean MIR to the Tupamaros Lucas Mancilla and Martínez Platero. However, the author claims that they “never delivered the money, they appropriated it”.75 These actions had serious consequences for the Chileans as they were unable to carry out basic activities such as providing protection for leaders and militants. Santillana further argues that the Tupamaros who stole that money “helped the enemy, they betrayed the revolutionary principles and their actions paved the way for the death and heroic fall of one the most important Latin American revolutionary leaders in the last few decades: Miguel Enríquez”.76

73 The ERP carried out the kidnappings while the MLN-T provided security and surveillance. According to an MLN-T’s leader in Buenos Aires, whose nom de guerre was Domingo, they collected US$ 5 million in ransom from the kidnapping of the manager of Swiss Air in Argentina, and US$ 16,600 million from that of Victor Samuelson. The latter was a US citizen working as a senior manager at an Argentine oil company. See: Domingo in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la Insurgencia, p. 355. 74 The circumstances surrounding this issue are controversial and remain unclear. Once the JCR leaders agreed on how to split the money, they asked the MLN-T to deliver the portion assigned to the MIR. However, those funds never reached their destination. It is not clear how much money was allocated to the MIR. According to testimonies of numerous members of both organizations this sum ranged between US$ 1.2 million and US$ 5 million. According to Domingo, it was possible that some of the “renunciantes” kept some of that money. However, that amount was not more than US$ 70,000. [The renunciantes were a group of four Tupamaro leaders who abandoned the organization. They had different views on what strategy the MLN-T should follow after its defeat in 1972. Thus, they broke ranks with the MLN-T and established a new political organization named Nuevo Tiempo (New Time).] See Domingo in ibid, p. 359. 75 Santillana, R., (1999) "Miguel Enriquez y la J.C.R.". 76 Ibid.

130

Santillana’s claims about the total amount and the Tupamaros’ involvement in this action coincided with the testimonies of some surviving MLN-T members. However, his accusation against Efraín Martínez Platero appears to be incorrect. The latter argues that the PRT kept most of the US$ 22 million to build up its own infrastructure. More importantly, as mentioned in earlier paragraphs, he was in Europe trying to obtain support for the JCR when these events took place. It is unlikely, then, that he played any part in this saga. After his arrival from Europe, between March and April 1974, the people from MIR told Platero that

… they did not receive the money the MLN was supposed to give them. [He asked] all the MLN-T leaders what happened with that money. Their answer was that it had been delivered but there was a plan between the MLN-T and the MIR…of an infrastructure to transport people between Chile and Argentina. The plan was developed to reduce the possibilities of their militants being captured by the military.77

The Tupamaros claimed that the plan involved the purchase of buses and airplanes to transport militants into exile across the Andes, and to provide important logistical resources to the MIR.78 However, the Chileans denied the existence of such a plan and did not believe the Tupamaros’ excuses.79

It is also likely, as Clara Aldrighi suggests, that the Uruguayan military officers involved in the Cóndor Plan stole that money.80 The author makes a direct connection between the military officers and the assassination of ex-

77 Martínez Platero in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la Insurgencia, p. 375. 78 When asked about the money, Kimal Amir, one of the renunciantes, argued that it was extremely expensive to provide assistance for the clandestine militants. The organization had to pay “rent for secure houses, food, transport and the most basic things for those forced to live underground, which cost millions”. Kimal Amir in ibid, p. 447. 79 Santillana, R., (1999), "Miguel Enriquez y la J.C.R.". 80 There were several other cases where Uruguayan officers were involved in robberies and extortion while carrying out clandestine operations in Argentina. See: Rodríguez, R., (2006), La patota de la O.C.O.A. robó y trajo al Uruguay 7 millones de dólares en 1976, La Republica, Montevideo, 4pixels, online, available at http://www.larepublica.com.uy/politica/212555-todos-los- crimenes-de-automotores-orletti-no-estan-amparados-en-la-ley-de-caducidad, [accessed 12/10/2011].

131

Tupamaro leader in exile William Whitelaw.81 Several testimonies linked Whitelaw to the MIR’s money during 1974-75. Shortly after, with the Cóndor Plan in full swing, the Uruguayan military kidnapped, tortured and murdered Whitelaw and his wife, together with two prominent Uruguayan politicians in Argentina, Zelmar Michellini and Gutiérrez Ruiz. Several Tupamaros who were held in clandestine detention centres in Argentina, maintain that the Uruguayan officers frequently asked about the money during interrogation sessions. It is likely, as Aldrighi asserts, that these Uruguayan military officers played a part in this event.82

The missing funds affair was an important setback for the JCR. Although the MIR and the Tupamaros remained officially on good terms, tensions between members continued to exist. More importantly, Platero resigned his position in the JCR as a direct consequence of this event.83

Arms factory

The JCR had also to secure armaments. The Chileans and the Argentines were the most actively involved in this area, followed with a modest contribution by the MLN-T. The MIR supplied an arms factory and explosives. According to Dinges, “a team of Chilean engineers and metal workers had meticulously copied the design of the Swedish submachine gun, the Karl Gustav, which was a standard issue weapon to Chile’s Carabinero police”.84 They also “worked up the manufacturing specifications for hand grenades, a grenade launcher, and light mortar”, which they expected to have ready in early

81 William Whitelaw was a leader of the renunciantes. Prior to his resignation from the MLN-T, he was in charge of the organization’s logistics in Argentina. For a detailed collection of documents regarding Whitelaw’s assassination by the Uruguayan armed forces in Argentina see: Rico, Á., (2008), Investigación histórica sobre la dictadura y el terrorismo de estado en el Uruguay, Montevideo, Universidad de la Republica Oriental del Uruguay,pp. 639-648. 82 For a further discussion of this hypothesis see Aldrighi, C., (2001), La izquierda armada: ideología, ética e identidad en el M.L.N.-Tupamaros, Montevideo, Ediciones Trilce; Aldrighi, C (2009), Memorias de la Insurgencia. 83 Martínez Platero in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, p. 375. 84 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 55.

132

1974.85 While some of the Tupamaro members who found refuge in Chile also attempted to build explosives and grenades, the quantities were limited and the grenades dangerously unstable.86 Access to arms continued to be one of the major challenges for most organizations involved in the JCR.87

The JCR tried to acquire arms to complement its arsenal with the ransom money collected from the kidnappings. However, things turned sour for the organization, once again, as the deals never materialised and the money disappeared. Domingo maintains that, in Argentina, [the Tupamaros] never had any arms. He mentions that

[t]here was a DC 3 (plane) loaded with guns supposed to land in Buenos Aires. But it never arrived. [The dealers] kept the money. They took the money and did not deliver the weapons. It was a contract between the Montoneros, the PRT and us [Tupamaros]. [The shipment was supposed] to contain four million dollars in arms. They were contraband arms, but I don’t know if they were from the US or from Argentina…88

Following these events, the JCR’s leadership explored other means to increase its arsenal. Here, the Argentines played a key role. In early 1974, the ERP launched an assault against a military garrison in Buenos Aires. The guerrillas wanted to obtain arms to use them in future operations. There were two main ways in which the organization attained weapons: arms factories and stealing them from the security forces. Authors such as Nicolás Márquez89 in

85 Ibid. 86 According to Martínez Platero, a Tupamaro member died while secretly testing a grenade manufactured by the organization in the region of Arica, Chile. Platero in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, p. 366. 87 For the Chileans, this limitation became evident immediately after the 11 September coup when members of the MIR and other leftist groups tried to organize armed resistance. While they had access to a number of weapons and explosives, they were unable to match the overwhelming force and resources of the Chilean military. In her discussion of the events of 11September 1973, Luz Arce revealed the numerous difficulties they faced when attempting to launch the armed resistance. See Arce’s discussion about the “Vietnam explosives” manufactured by a group of Chilean workers. Arce, L., (2004), The inferno: a story of terror and survival in Chile, Wisconsin, The University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 21-22. 88 Domingo in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la Insurgencia, p. 356. 89 Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino: la guerrilla marxista en Tucumán, Buenos Aires, N. Márquez.

133

Argentina and Wilson Craviotto90 in Uruguay frequently use those arms factories to portray the South American guerrillas as a dangerous threat.91 However, these discussions omit a number of important details. For instance, it is not clear how many guns were manufactured or how accurate and efficient they were. It is also not clear if those factories produced the necessary quantities or if they had the necessary manpower and materials to produce them.

Fernández Huidobro’s analysis of one of the MLN-T’s actions gives an interesting insight on this issue, and it can be extrapolated to the other guerrilla groups within the JCR as they faced similar challenges.92 According to the ex- Tupamaro leader,

…at some point, the war starts taking industrial proportions. For instance, how many spikes did we need to puncture the trucks’ tires? You can stop a car with spikes, but a military convoy requires that you cover kilometres of highway with them. You need all of Uruguay’s metal workers manufacturing spikes. In other words, you cannot make a war without the workers being mobilized for it. At the same time we needed to solve the challenges of popular insurrection. How do you arm a popular army? What do you answer to the mobilized masses resisting the military coup, when 15,000 people ask you for weapons? Where do you get them? And how do they use them?... [at the time] we thought we [were] going to [kill] the milicos93with hand guns.

90 Craviotto, W., (2005), Testimonios de una época: la verdadera historia jamás contada Montevideo, Zonalibro. 91 In his book El Vietnam Argentino, Márquez frequently refers to the ERP’s arms factories and, at least once, the famous JCR1 machine gun. In 1974 the JCR established an arms factory which began to develop a machine gun for the organization. However, the Argentine armed forces discovered its location and the ERP members were forced to abandon it. Thus the whole project of manufacturing the famous JCR1 ended as quickly as it started. See Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino. 92 First, [argues Huidobro] we asked ourselves: what arms do we have? We were six [people]. A sub-machine gun, an AR-15 and a few handguns from the navy. We had ammunition for, more or less, a three-minute battle. Only two long guns; the rest were just handguns. We were posted in the highway. That was where the trucks with 400 soldiers would come and we would have to stop them. It was obvious that we needed arms. Thus, we decided to blow up the bridge in the Pando stream. We contacted the explosive laboratory [and] they sent an expert in explosives to calculate the necessary quantities to blow up the bridge. We needed so many explosives to do only minor damage to the bridge that even the entire organization working in the laboratory would not have been enough. Fernández Huidobro in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, p. 80. 93 Milicos is a popular colloquial term used in Uruguay and Argentina when referring to the military.

134

That was a childish thing called militarism, but it was not even enough to match up [the knowledge] of any junior officer graduated from the ....94

Huidobro’s analogy reveals a common flaw amongst all these groups: they developed ambitious goals but their military strategies were not thoroughly thought through. While they managed to inflict losses on the military and carried out a number of high profile operations, these were not enough to unsettle the armed forces’ position of power.

In March 1974 the leaders of the PRT-ERP, MIR, MNL-T, and the ELN released a joint declaration “of their decision to join efforts in a Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR)”.95 The announcement was published in the first issue of Che Guevara, the organization’s official magazine, later that year. The March announcement signaled the beginning of a new wave of operations in the region. During the rest of the year, the guerrilla groups involved with the organization launched simultaneous offensives in their respective countries. According to Dinges, the

Tupamaros, following the directives of their leaders imprisoned in Uruguay, were to strike with a counteroffensive planned for May Day 1974. With wars breaking out almost simultaneously in four countries, it was thought, the military would face internal rebellion, be thrown on the defensive, and eventually collapse.96

The armed forces, however, quickly controlled these actions and the revolutionaries’ gamble failed to ignite the continental revolution.

Before any further discussion of the JCR’s activities, it is necessary to focus attention on the operational status of each guerrilla group at that crucial time. This evaluation is necessary, among other things, to determine if the organization had any real chance of achieving its objective. More importantly, as

94 Fernández Huidobro in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, p. 80. 95 First public joint declaration of the JCR in Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, (1976), Las Fuerzas Armadas al pueblo oriental, Montevideo, República Oriental del Uruguay, Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, Vol. 1, p. 452. 96 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 55.

135

the next section in this chapter will demonstrate, the South American armed forces were well aware of their activities and knew about their operational status. This is important because, even today, coup apologists, including a number of politicians and military officers involved in the Cóndor Plan, continue to argue that the armed forces did not know about this issue. The Cóndor members argued that this operation was established to defend their nations against an imminent wave of guerrilla violence. However, a brief overview of the internal conditions demonstrates that, instead, the operation was a definite pre-emptive strike to, once and for all, obliterate those organizations and anyone opposing the military.

Internal analysis

Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)

Origins

Of the four organizations that joined the JCR in the early 1970s, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) (National Liberation Army) was one of the weakest in terms of military strength and organizational structure. It was also the most intimately connected to the legacy of Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara.97 The ELN emerged as a direct consequence of the latter’s attempt to initiate the guerrilla struggle in South America. In late 1966, Che entered the jungles of Bolivia to establish a new guerrilla foco.98 The attempt failed and had disastrous consequences not only for Guevara, but also for the hopes of achieving the continental revolution. However, the conditions surrounding his

97 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 13. 98 Che Guevara wanted to achieve two main objectives when he decided to establish a guerrilla foco in Bolivia. First, his small guerrilla group would replicate the experiences of the Sierra Maestra by overthrowing the Bolivian regime. The subsequent victory would further validate Debray’s foco theory and would encourage other groups in the region to do the same. Second, Che considered Bolivia’s land-locked geographical situation and its borders with other countries as an excellent strategic point to establish a guerrilla-training centre. Revolutionaries from all over the continent would be trained there and go back to their respective countries to implement the strategies and tactics learned at that centre. See Prado Salmón, G., (1990), The defeat of Che Guevara: military response to guerilla challenge in Bolivia, New York, Praeger.

136

death transformed him into a powerful figure. His ideas and views on revolution, and his martyr status, inspired most leftist revolutionary organizations in the continent, particularly, those that went on to establish the JCR.

The Bolivian foco

After his disappointing trip to Africa, Che returned to Cuba. Once there, he arranged with Fidel Castro to establish a new guerrilla foco in South America. In October 1966 Che chose Bolivia for the new revolutionary expedition due to its strategic geographic situation.99 The foco included a number of militants from the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) and had direct connections (at least in the early stages) with the party’s top leaders. Among the Bolivian contingent were the brothers Inti and Coco Peredo, two young PCB members who joined the guerrillas disappointed and frustrated with the factionalism that had paralysed the Bolivian left and with its reluctance to support the guerrilla struggle.

In the early stages of this expedition and despite their inexperience, the guerrillas inflicted a number of casualties on the armed forces. They took advantage of their first successful ambush against the Bolivian military to officialise the creation of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). On 23 March 1967, Che wrote Comunicado No. 1: Al Pueblo Boliviano (To the Bolivian People).100 The communiqué concluded with a call to “workers, peasants, intellectuals and all those who [feel] that the time to respond to violence with violence [has] come; … to rescue a country sold in portions to the Yankee monopolies and to improve the living conditions of our [starving]

99 Deutschmann, D., (2008), Che: a memoir by Fidel Castro, Melbourne, Ocean press, p. 32. 100 This was the organization’s first official document and contained a list with the names of the armed forces’ casualties in that operation.

137

people…”.101 From then on, the rebels became popularly known in Bolivia and the rest of the world as the ELN.

With the assistance of the CIA, US military advisors, and ex-Nazis like , the Bolivian military quickly improved its performance.102 This, in conjunction with other problems within the guerrilla camp precipitated the foco’s dramatic end. The armed forces captured and executed Guevara and other members of his group at on 9 October 1967. Che’s critics argue that the main reason for the failure was that he did not understand the Bolivian social and political situation.103 Others more accurately attribute the defeat to a wide range of tactical and strategic blunders. These blunders not only led to the foco’s demise but had a direct impact on the ELN’s future. Despite their efforts, those who succeeded Che and Inti Peredo were unable to correct some of these tactical flaws and mistakes. Their inexperience led them to commit the same errors as their predecessors, with devastating consequences for the organization.

Following the events of 9 October, the organization was reduced to only ten men. Inti Peredo and the Cuban Harry Pombo Villegas took over the leadership and reaffirmed their commitment to continue the struggle.104 As a first priority, however, they sought to escape from the area. The ordeal lasted several months and, in the process, three more members died during clashes with the military.105 With help from a number of peasant families and friends, the remaining seven men arrived to La Paz in January 1968.

101 ELN’s Comunicado No. 1 in Peredo, I., (1971 ), Mi campaña con el Che, Buenos Aires, Edibol, Pp. 68-70. 102 Klaus Barbie (The Butcher of Lyon) arrived in Bolivia shortly after the end of WWII. He was close to the Barrientos regime and provided counterinsurgency training and advice to the Bolivian armed forces. Kai Herman argues that Barbie was actively involved in designing the counterinsurgency campaign to hunt Che Guevara. See: Kai Herman in (2007), My enemy's enemy, dir. MacDonald, K., , The Weinsteing Company: 87 Mins [DVD]. 103 See Castañeda, J., (1998), Compañero: life and death of Che Guevara, New York, Vintage. 104 Peredo, I., (1971 ), Mi campaña con el Che, p. 123. 105 Assmann, H., (1971), Teoponte: una experiencia guerrillera, Oruro, Bolivia, CEDI, p. 20.

138

Encouraged by its successful campaign at La Higuera the armed forces moved to eliminate the guerrillas. To avoid this, Inti urged his men to seek refuge abroad. On 17 February, five guerrillas (three Cubans and two Bolivians) crossed the Chilean Border.106 A week later they contacted two politicians from the Chilean Communist and Socialist parties who secured their official political asylum. Shortly after, Dr Salvador Allende accompanied the five Cubans to Tahiti and, from there, they returned to Cuba.107

The reorganization of the ELN

Inti stayed in La Paz and began the difficult task of reorganising the ELN to maintain the armed struggle in Bolivia. This marked the beginning of the second stage or chapter in the organization’s history. However, the limited resources and the leader’s precarious security situation made this task extremely difficult. Once the government found out that the ELN’s leader remained in the country, the armed forces moved swiftly to identify his whereabouts. Since its creation, the organization had only managed to develop a small support base in the cities of La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz. Inti sought to increase the ELN’s membership by recruiting militants from all over the country.108 He also held meetings “with the most progressive elements from diverse parties109 … [except with] the Maoists [because] Inti had always [disliked them]”.110

In June, after finishing his draft of the organization’s first document under this new era, Inti travelled abroad. During 1968-1969 the ELN’s leader and some fellow members established contact with other South American revolutionary groups. In Chile, while waiting to complete the paperwork for their official exile in Cuba, the Bolivian guerrillas contacted numerous Chilean leftist organizations, particularly, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left

106 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 14. 107 Lara, J., (1972), Guerrillero Inti Peredo, México, Editorial Diogenes S.A., p. 115. 108 Ibid, p. 117. 109 These contacts included the Christians, Christian Democrats, socialists, and communists. 110 Lara, J., (1972), Guerrillero Inti Peredo, p. 117.

139

(MIR).111 In July 1968, the organization made an abrupt re-entry into the public domain to demonstrate that the guerrilla foco was alive and well. Peredo published the ELN’s famous document Volveremos a las montañas (we will return to the mountains), which had broad dissemination in Bolivia and the rest of Latin America.112 The manifesto restated the organization’s commitment to Che’s foco strategy.113 The following month, Inti arrived in Havana to assess the progress of the training of those militants who would later join him in the struggle. Before his return to Bolivia, Fidel Castro offered help to ensure the successful reactivation of the Bolivian foco. Inti rejected the offer, arguing that the Cuban people had already sacrificed enough for the Bolivian cause. He believed that in this new stage the ELN should rely on its own means to carry out the struggle. According to Lara, the Cubans only provided training to 80 ELN members during this period.114

The reorganization had three important “axes” (Bolivia, Chile and Argentina).115 The majority of those 60-80 militants who trained in Cuba were from Bolivia, “followed by some twenty Chileans … ten Argentines, [and] seven or eight Cubans”.116 Most of the time spent on the island was dedicated to guerrilla training, while the theoretical and ideological preparation of the

111 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 15. 112 Assmann, H., (1971), Teoponte: una experiencia guerrillera, p. 21. 113 Mensaje Inti Peredo, “Volveremos a las montañas”, Julio 1968, file ELN Bolivia in folder MLN-T, Documentos Organizaciones Políticas (1), available at CEIL-CEIU, UDELAR, Montevideo, Uruguay. 114 Lara, J., (1972), Guerrillero Inti Peredo, pp. 119-121. 115 The Bolivian axis was headed by Inti and then by his brother Oswaldo Chato Peredo. The group included several ex-communists, Trotskyites from Hugo González’s sector and other independents. The Chilean axis, on the other hand, was led by the Socialist militant Elmo Catalán, while the Argentine one was under the command of Antonio and other cadres like Carlos Olmedo who went on to establish the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) (Revolutionary Armed Forces). However, the Argentine axis did not join the ELN’s latter operations. 116 Rodríguez, G. O., (2010), De Ñakaguazú a Teoponte: la guerrilla guevarista en Bolivia. Los Tiempos.com, Bolivia, Editorial Canales, online, available at http://www.lostiempos.com/oh/actualidad/actualidad/20100725/de-nakaguazu-a-teoponte-la-guerrilla- guevarista-en_81654_154911.html, [accessed 21/11/2010].

140

militants was scarce.117 This was yet another recurrent flaw in the organization and one of its major weaknesses. Despite their strong will to carry out the revolution, the leaders (i.e. Inti and, later, his successor Chato Peredo) were unable to overcome this limitation. This issue re-emerged in the early seventies and placed the organization in a very weak position at the time of joining the JCR. Its ideological weakness made the ELN permeable or susceptible to the influence of other organizations such as the Chilean MIR and, particularly, the Argentine PRT-ERP.118

By May 1969, the ELN was ready to resume its activities. Those who were trained abroad returned to Bolivia after crossing the Chilean and Argentine borders. However, by then, the Bolivian intelligence services and the CIA had infiltrated the organization and were able to collect vital information about its urban infrastructure.119 In July the security forces arrested several members of the ELN’s urban team and captured a large number of weapons and important documents.120 Furthermore, the armed forces killed two high-ranking cadres of the ELN after setting a trap in one of the houses used by the organization to hide Inti Peredo and other clandestine militants in the city of Cochabamba. The deaths of Maya (Rita Valdívia Rivera) and Victor (Enrique Ortega) severely affected the organization’s morale. The military discovered most of the ELN’s hiding places in the city, which compromised Inti’s security.121 As in the previous Ñakaguazú campaign, the organization lost an important part of its urban infrastructure. Consequently, Inti returned to La Paz where he tried to re- build his network of contacts and safe houses.

117 Ibid. 118 See: Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor". 119 Lara states that José Gamarra, a senior ELN official in the city of Cochabamba, was a CIA informer who passed important intelligence to the Bolivian armed forces. See: Lara, J., (1972), Guerrillero Inti Peredo, pp. 124-126. 120 Rodríguez, G. O., (2010), De Ñakaguazú a Teoponte. 121 Lara, J., (1972), Guerrillero Inti Peredo, pp. 125-132.

141

In early September 1969, Peredo published a new document to neutralize the armed forces’ propaganda campaign. The military took advantage of its successes in previous months to announce the government’s imminent victory over the guerrillas. Inti acknowledged that

… [the organization] trusted sectors which were ideologically weak. That weakness […] facilitated the penetration by the enemy, [as well as] the betrayal [of several ELN members]. [T]he culprits will be sanctioned [and] the traitors … will be judged like Honorato Rojas was, for his vile and miserable conduct. Those who tortured or humiliated our comrades will experience the same fate.122

The effort, however, proved fruitless as the military was already closing in on the ELN’s leader.

Death of Inti Peredo

On 9 September the security forces killed Inti Peredo during an intense battle. 123 This event dislocated the new guerrilla foco before its initiation and abruptly concluded the second chapter in the ELN’s history. The leadership’s responsibility fell on the shoulders of his younger brother, Oswaldo Chato Peredo who had recently returned to Bolivia from Chile to join the ELN.124 By then, however, the country’s political situation had experienced a radical turn that undermined the ELN’s reorganization process. The death of General Barrientos in April 1969 generated a power vacuum. The crisis subsided after General Ovando took control of the country and his administration announced a National Revolutionary Development Model (MNRD). The latter sought to revive some of the most important nationalist features of the 1952 revolution.125

122 Mensaje de Inti, Septiembre de 1969, file ELN Bolivia, in folder MLN-T Documentos Organizaciones Políticas (1), available at CEIL-CEIU, UDELAR, Montevideo, Uruguay. 123 Lara, J., (1972), Guerrillero Inti Peredo, p. 135. 124 According to Hugo Assmann, Chato Peredo graduated as a doctor at the “Patricio Lumumba” University in Moscow and until recently he resided in Chile with his mother. See: Assmann, H., (1971), Teoponte: una experiencia guerrillera. 125 Corbell, C., (1972), "Military institutional development and sociopolitical change: the Bolivian case", Journal of International Studies and World Affairs, 14(4): 339-435.

142

The consolidation of the Ovando regime further isolated the ELN. Although he lacked his predecessor’s charisma, General Ovando’s nationalisation of the Gulf Oil Company and his apparently conciliatory approach towards the labour movement increased his popularity.126 This affected logistical support for the ELN that came from neighbouring countries. With the political change in Bolivia and the radicalisation of the struggle in Argentina after the Cordobazo, most of those forming the Argentine “axis” abandoned the foco to join the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) and the PRT. According to Rodríguez, the latter group also had reservations about Chato’s ability to lead the struggle.127

The Teoponte Guerrilla

Despite the unfavourable environment and the considerable lack of resources, Chato Peredo and a group of 75 militants agreed to continue with Inti’s project. In April 1970, the organization attempted to reinitiate its armed activities by launching an operation against a brewery but with little success. The guerrillas’ financial situation received an important boost after the Uruguayan MLN-Tupamaros gave them several thousand dollars obtained in an operation against one of the wealthiest families in Uruguay.128 Shortly after, the ELN released a new document entitled Volvimos a las montañas (We returned to the mountains). In this manifesto, the young guerrilla leaders (i.e. Chato Peredo, Tani Wilka Kolque, Jorge Ruiz Paz, Felipe and Luis Barriga Luna) critiqued the Ovando regime. They acknowledged some positive aspects of the new administration (e.g. nationalisation of Gulf Oil company), but they stated that such changes were not enough. The ELN leadership also tried to demonstrate a clear line of continuity by restating their commitment to Che’s foco theory and announcing their return to the mountains.

126 Malloy, J. M. and E. Gamarra, (1988), Revolution and reaction: Bolivia, 1964-1985, New Brunswick, Transaction Books, p. 47. 127 See Rodríguez, G. O., (2010), De Ñakaguazú a Teoponte. 128 See Efraín Martínez Platero in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, p. 365.

143

In May 1970, Regis Debray wrote to the ELN’s high command arguing that the conditions for such a move were not appropriate. Instead, he suggested improving recruiting mechanisms, increasing the organization’s internal security and accumulating forces until better conditions were present.129 Although Chato welcomed the suggestions, he was determined to continue the mission. On 19 July 1970 the ELN inaugurated a new guerrilla foco near the Teoponte region.130 The operation marked the beginning of yet another brief and tragic chapter in the organization’s history. Despite the guerrillas’ early enthusiasm, the new foco experienced the same fate, if not worse, than its 1967 predecessor. The campaign lasted only three months. By 1 November 1970, the guerrillas had been almost obliterated.131 The ELN’s infrastructure was weak, and plagued with deficiencies from day one. The organization did not have enough resources and several of its members lacked proper training.

Despite the guerrillas’ strong commitment to the revolutionary foco, the task overwhelmed them. The group’s morale plummeted after long marches through the harsh terrain to evade the military. As a consequence, many deserted the expedition and surrendered to the authorities, only to be killed and have their bodies mutilated by the soldiers.132 Food was scarce and several guerrillas starved to death while others died as aconsequence of numerous illnesses caught in the jungle. Like Che’s expedition, the Teoponte guerrillas broke into two groups, weakening the organization’s fighting capabilities. More importantly, the military’s encirclement severed their ties with the city, a key

129 “Carta de Regis Debray al ELN de Bolivia”, file ELN Bolivia, in folder MLN-T Documentos Organizaciones Políticas (1), available at CEIL-CEIU, UDELAR, Montevideo, Uruguay. 130 The operation began soon after the guerrillas took over a US owned mine. Their intention was to capture US employees and take them to the mountains. However, when the guerrillas discovered that no US employees were present at the time, they kidnapped three German workers instead. Their goal was to use the hostages to negotiate the release of ten imprisoned ELN members. Despite pressures from the US government, the Ovando regime agreed to negotiate with the ELN and released the prisoners in exchange for the three . 131 See: Cartagena, J. T., (2010), A 40 años de la guerrilla de Teoponte, Los Tiempos.com, Bolivia, Editorial Canales, online, available at http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20100718/a-40-anos-de-la-guerrilla-de- teoponte_80984_153516.html, [accessed, 28/11/2010]. 132 Assmann, H., (1971), Teoponte: una experiencia guerrillera, Oruro, Bolivia, CEDI, pp. 49-69.

144

asset to maintain communications and access to supplies. According to Chato Peredo, the organization underestimated the severe ramifications of this issue. Their only link with the urban centres was a small electric radio that did not function.133 While the group received some degree of cooperation from miners and peasants, the organization lacked cadres able to carry out political work and effectively channel that support in favour of the struggle. The death of Francisco (Néstor Paz Zamora), described by Assmann as the ELN’s theoretician during the campaign, exacerbated this problem.134 By late October, only nine members remained from the original contingent.

A welcomed lucky break helped their faith when the country experienced a new political development. On 5 October, a rightist military coup deposed General Ovando’s government. The new regime lasted only twenty-four hours and was replaced by a progressive military junta headed by General Juan José Torres. 135 As one of its first measures, the new administration agreed to respect the lives of ELN survivors. As Ernesto Carmona points out, this pronouncement went against the reactionary sectors of the armed forces that had applied the “doctrine of taking no prisoners”.136 President Torres allowed the remaining guerrillas to travel to Chile where the government of Dr Salvador Allende granted them political asylum.137

Once in exile, Chato Peredo produced an extensive document in which he analysed the causes that had led to the foco’s defeat. In it, he acknowledged that the organization had been unable to learn from previous mistakes and identified the numerous deficiencies that undermined the foco. The guerrilla

133 Peredo C., “Conclusiones sobre la experiencia de Teoponte”, Diciembre 1970, p. 54, file ELN Bolivia, in folder MLN-T Documentos Organizaciones Políticas (1), available at CEIL-CEIU, UDELAR, Montevideo, Uruguay. 134 Assmann, H., (1971), Teoponte: una experiencia guerrillera, p. 170. 135 Corbell, C., (1972), "Military institutional development and Sociopolitical Change", p. 425. 136 Several ELN members had been tortured, assassinated and buried in undisclosed locations as a direct consequence of this policy. See: Carmona, E., (2010), "Teoponte, la otra guerrilla guevarista en Bolivia", online, available at: http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=39799, [accessed 9/11/2010]. 137 Cartagena, J. T., (2010), A 40 años de la guerrilla de Teoponte.

145

leader also promised to, yet again, reorganize the ELN and continue the struggle.138 Nevertheless, the damage had already been done as the foco’s demise had generated mixed reactions across Bolivia. While some expressed sympathy and support for the guerrillas, others harshly criticised them, particularly, its leader.139

During his time in exile, Peredo dedicated all his efforts and energy towards restoring the organization’s infrastructure and reputation, despite the numerous new challenges. Most of the militants had gone into exile and, consequently, the organization remained almost irrelevant during the rest of the Torres administration. More importantly, by the time Colonel Hugo Banzer established his rightist anticommunist dictatorship in August 1971, the ELN was unable to respond to, or take advantage of, this new political development. The situation continued unchanged during the following five years. In 1973-1974, the ELN “… supported a number of demonstrations in the ... Cochabamba Province but were successfully repressed by the forces of President Hugo Banzer”.140

Chato Peredo published a number of documents and attempted to revive the ELN. The organization intensified its contacts with its South American counterparts and helped form the JCR.141 However, the ELN never recovered the strength it had enjoyed in the early days of Che’s Ñakaguazú expedition. Due to its military and ideological flaws, the organization remained the weakest member within this regional revolutionary alliance. Consequently, the elenos became susceptible to the influence of their counterparts, particularly, the

138 Peredo, C. “Conclusiones sobre la experiencia de Teoponte”, p. 58. 139 Amongst the strongest ELN critics were the relatives of those who perished in this operation. Retired General René Quiroga, for instance, blamed Chato Peredo for the death of his sons. According to him, the ELN’s leader did not “have any authority to make a human evaluation of those who, unfortunately, can no longer speak for a glorious cause…Chato may know about his profession [as a doctor], but as a guerrilla chief he has been a complete failure.” Ret. Gen. Rene Quiroga in Assmann, H., (1971), Teoponte: una experiencia guerrillera, p. 87. 140 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 84. 141 See: Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor".

146

Argentine PRT. John Dinges maintains that by the mid-1970s the Bolivian guerrillas had reorganised at the urging of the JCR, as the Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores de Bolivia (PRT-B) (Revolutionary Workers Party of Bolivia).142 As with their Chilean and Uruguayan counterparts, the ELN’s resolution came about as a consequence of the divisions that had emerged following its defeat. In the mid-1970s, and after extensive debates and autocríticas (self-criticisms), all these organizations concluded that their respective debacles were due to the lack of a Marxist Leninist party within their infrastructure. To resolve this deficiency, and, particularly, to mirror their Argentine counterparts, the Bolivian guerrillas created the PRT-B. Some Tupamaros describe this event as the ELN’s own “Viña del Mar” symposium143, making a direct parallel between the experiences of both organizations.

As shown in this section, the ELN had faced a myriad of challenges since its origins in 1967. Although the guerrillas enjoyed a number of early successes during the Ñakaguazú campaign, they were quickly defeated and their leader executed. Despite numerous attempts, the successors of Che Guevara and Inti Peredo were unable to effectively revive the organization. The failure of the 1970 Teoponte campaign was a heavy blow for the revolutionary project in Bolivia. From then on, Chato’s attempt to rebuild the ELN’s infrastructure produced only modest results and the organization never regained its original strength. As a consequence of its weakness and lack of a coherent ideological platform, the only thing the ELN was able to contribute towards the formation of the JCR was its proud heritage connection with Latin America’s most influential revolutionary figure: Comandante Ernesto Che Guevara.

142 Dinges, J. (2004). The Condor Years: How Pinochet and His Allies Brought Terrorism to Three Continents, New Pr. P. 84. 143 Kimal Amir in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, p. 439. In early 1973, a group of Tupamaro leaders met in Chile to assess the status of the organization and decide which political direction the organization should take. The meeting generated divisions and had important ramifications for the MLN-T’s future. The outcomes of the Viña del Mar Symposium are discussed later in the section addressing the MLN-Tupamaros.

147

Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T)

Origins

The origins of the MLN-T are closely linked to early attempts to organize the rural labour movement in Uruguay’s northern region of Bella Unión, during the early 1960s. There, Raúl Sendic, a young socialist union organizer, helped to establish the Unión de Trabajadores Azucareros de Artigas (UTAA) (Union of Sugarcane Workers of Artigas).144 The government’s repression of this union led Sendic and his followers to adopt radical measures to protect the sugarcane workers. These measures included the decision to create the Coordinador or Coordinator, which became the MLN-T’s predecessor.145

By the mid 1960s, Uruguay had experienced the effects of a deep social, economic and political crisis. This, coupled with the government’s refusal to meet the sugarcane workers’ demands, led to the radicalisation of this trade union. During the 1960s the workers, accompanied by their families and supporters, carried out five 600 km-long marches from Bella Unión to Montevideo. The government’s indifference towards the marchers and the heavy-handed security measures unleashed against them fueled the subsequent politicisation of this trade union.146 In a short period of time, the UTAA, supported by Sendic and his followers, transformed its local demands into a progressive political project of national proportions. This transformation also generated a number of structural changes within the Coordinador. Sendic and some of his followers understood that the only way to support the sugarcane

144 López, F., (2007), The emergence and radicalization of the Unión de Trabajadores Azucareros de Artigas (U.T.A.A.): origins of the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (M.L.N.-T.), Honours Degree, University of New South Wales UNSW. 145 The new organization was a fusion of different political factions from the right, left and centre of Uruguay’s political spectrum. 146 Blixen, S., (2005), Sendic.

148

workers and their political project was to take up arms.147 They established the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T).148

Mid-to-late 1960s: actions and ideology

The Tupamaros’ popularity grew significantly during the period 1965- 70. The organization gained international notoriety for its daring operations and reputation as a well-established revolutionary organization.149 Their ideological flexibility differentiated the organization from most leftist groups in Uruguay and helped consolidate its success.150 The infighting within the Uruguayan left had debilitated its political cohesion. This situation translated into poor results during elections. While the Tupamaros were also ideologically and theoretically influenced by the different trends and shades of Marxism, they avoided falling into the same dogmatisms that characterised these parties. This was

147 Other factions, however, disagreed and believed that it was still possible to achieve their goals by peaceful means. 148 For further readings on the origins of the Tupamaros movement see: Huidobro, F., (1988), Historia de los Tupamaros, Vol. 1, Montevideo, TAE; Huidobro, F., (1988), Historia de los amaros, Vol. 3, Montevideo, TAE; Aldrighi, C., (2001), La izquierda armada; Merenson, S., (2003), Ser Peludo: una etnografía histórica de tránsitos y pasajes en la construcción de un sujeto social (Bella Unión, República Oriental del Uruguay, Montevideo, Departamento de Antropología Social: Facultad de Humanidades y de la Educación, Universidad de la República; Rosencof, M., (2003), La rebelión de los cañeros; Huidobro, F., (2004), En la nuca: historia de los Tupamaros, Montevideo, Banda Oriental; Merenson, S., (2004), ""Peludos", "caramelos" y "sucedidos". La Importación del campo y los trabajadores rurales en la construcción de un pasado para la militancia tupamara Montevideana", Lucha Armada, 1(1): 1-25; Merenson, S., (2005), Apuntes sobre la jerarquía "peludo", "pequeño productor", "gringo" en la frontera uruguaya-argentina-brasilera" Tránsitos, pasajes y representaciones, VI Reunión de Antropología del MERCOSUR,Montevideo. 149 See: Labrouse, A., (1973), The Tupamaros: urban guerrillas in Uruguay, Victoria, Australia, Penguin Books. 150 During the 1960s the Uruguayan left was not immune to the schisms and confrontations that affected other leftist groups around the world. Within the various parties forming this political sector there were groups aligned with the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence (namely: the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU)). There were also those like the Socialist Party who rejected the Soviet line and pursued a more nationalist form of socialism. Between these two poles there was a myriad of organizations and revolutionary groups pledging their ideological support to the ideas of , the Cuban Revolution and , and other Marxist Leninist variations.

149

demonstrated by the few documents written by this organization in this period.151 This flexibility attracted militants from different political sectors.152

Until 1970, the MLN-T executed a specific type of armed operation. This sought to strengthen the organization’s revolutionary image and attract the support of the Uruguayan people.153 The strategy worked quite well as these activities increased the Tupamaros’ popularity and discredited the already unpopular Pacheco administration. In response, the government tightened security measures and increased repression against Tupamaro members and supporters. Towards the end of the decade the clash between security forces and the MLN-T intensified, especially after a small group of Tupamaro members besieged the small city of Pando for a brief period of time.154 The organization had reached its highest peak in popularity and strength by 1970.

However, the guerrillas’ main opponent had also improved its repressive infrastructure after the Pacheco administration announced radical changes to its security apparatus. Since the early 1960s, the Uruguayan government, with close assistance from the US Office of Public Safety (OPS), had embarked on a process of reshaping its entire police intelligence infrastructure. US cooperation with the Uruguayan government included the deployment of OPS Advisor Dan Anthony Mitrione to this country in 1969. His arrival coincided with an

151 The Tupamaros wrote only five major documents during mid-1960s and early 1970s. See: Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T), (2003), Actas Tupamaras, Argentina, Cucaña Ediciones. 152 The Tupamaros had members from dissenting factions of the country’s two major conservative parties (Blancos and Colorados), ex-members of the Christian Democrats, Socialist and Communist Parties, as well as members of various trade unions and other religious groups. 153 They revealed cases of corruption incriminating high profile figures of Uruguayan society. They also carried out robberies of banks and some of the wealthiest families in the country and stole trucks loaded with food from a major supermarket to distribute the contents amongst the inhabitants of shantytowns. 154 See: Huidobro, F., (1987), Historia de los Tupamaros, Vol 1, Montevideo, Editorial MZ ltda.; Huidobro, F., (1988), Historia de los Tupamaros, Vols 1&3, Montevideo, TAE; Aldrighi, C., (2001), La Izquierda Armada.

150

increase in the use of torture during the interrogation of detainees by the Uruguayan police and the emergence of far-right paramilitary organizations.155

As a direct response to these issues, the Tupamaros kidnapped Mitrione on 28 July 1970. The guerrillas wanted to exchange the OPS advisor for a number of imprisoned MLN-T members. The organization set a short deadline for the exchange of prisoners and warned that a negative response from the government would result in Mitrione’s execution. According to documents released under the US Freedom of Information Act in early August 2010 President Nixon asked his Uruguayan counterpart to threaten the Tupamaros with killing Sendic and other high ranking leaders of the organization, if Mitrione was executed.156 The US government also considered the political ramifications throughout the region of a possible negotiation with the kidnappers and urged Pacheco not to cave in to their demands. Following the Uruguayan government’s refusal to negotiate with the MLN-T, the guerrillas executed Mitrione in August 1970.157

From then on, the country’s security situation changed dramatically. The government strengthened its anti-terror laws and extended state of siege measures. The latter resulted in a gradual increase of the armed forces’ participation in the fight against the MLN-T. A new paramilitary organization named the Escuadrón de la muerte or death squadron began to hunt down guerrilla members and leftist civilians.158 These developments led to a significant loss of momentum in the Tupamaros’ guerrilla campaign. Mitrione’s execution shocked the Uruguayan people and cost the organization the loss of

155 See Aldrighi, C., (2007), La intervención de Estados Unidos en Uruguay (1965-1973): El caso Mitrione, Montevideo, Trilce. 156 (2010), Nixon pidió a Pacheco que mataran a Sendic si mitirone era ejecutado, La República, Montevideo 4pixels, online, available at http://www.larepublica.com.uy/politica/420170-nixon-pidio- a-pacheco-que-mataran-a-sendic-si-mitrione-era-ejecutado, [accessed 1/09/2010]. 157 Aldrighi, C., (2007), La intervención de Estados Unidos en Uruguay (1965-1973), chapter 5, pp. 64-83. 158 See McSherry, P., (2007), "Death squads as parallel forces: Uruguay, Operation Condor and the United States", Journal of Third World Studies, 24(1): 13-52.

151

many supporters.159 The Uruguayan government, under the close guidance of the US OPS advisory team, took advantage of this and used all means available to discredit the organization. Although Mitrione’s execution damaged its Robin Hood like image, the MLN-T entered the 1970s filled with confidence. Most of its leaders believed that the organization was ready to begin a new phase in its overall revolutionary struggle. This optimism was short-lived.

During 1970-1971 the Tupamaros continued to annoy and embarrass the Uruguayan government. Despite the gradual increase in participation by the armed forces, the urban guerrillas kidnapped several high profile figures and revealed numerous cases of corruption.160 On 6 September 1971, 110 Tupamaros, including Raúl Sendic and other founding leaders of the organization, escaped from the Punta Carretas jail. Consequently, on 9 September … the government “…decreed the Armed Forces’ intervention in the fight against subversion, with the mission of planning, executing and conducting the operations to eliminate subversive activities”.161 In other words, as Álvaro Rico points out, “the Uruguayan government officially handed control of the country’s internal security to the military”.162

Some sectors of the Uruguayan left strongly criticised the Tupamaros’ radicalisation.163 The tensions intensified during the months preceding the 1971

159 At the time, many Tupamaros believed that the decision was correct. Today, however, some members acknowledge that it was a strategic error. According to Fernández Huidobro: “... the mistake was not made by the new leadership, but the old one, which was the one that imposed the deadline. The new leadership only carried out the orders. We made a huge political mistake, because it transformed what was supposed to be a large battle in a quick decision; of just a few hours. It gave a formidable tool to [President] Pacheco. Only by saying ‘I will not negotiate’ it was necessary to kill Mitrione. That’s what happened. After you set a deadline, you have to carry on with it. If not, you are just [bluffing]”. Fernández Huidobro in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, p. 73. 160 They also conducted more kidnappings, including those of the British ambassador to Uruguay, Geoffrey Jackson, the Brazilian Consul, Días Gomide, and the US-AID advisor, Claude Fly. 161 Tróccoli, J. N., (1996), La ira de Leviatán: del método de la furia a la búsqueda de la paz, Montevideo, Innomedia, p. 54. 162 Rico, Á., J. P. Barrán and G. Gaetano, (2007), Investigación histórica sobre detenidos desaparecidos: contexto represivo, coordinación regional, centros de reclusión y testimonios, Montevideo, Dirección Nacional de Impresiones y Publicaciones Oficiales, p. 151. 163 Especially, the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU), which supported Moscow’s line of peaceful coexistence and rejected armed struggle. For further readings on the views of the PCU, see

152

election. The Communists joined other leftist parties to form the Frente Amplio or Broad Front. Although the Tupamaros believed that the chances of victory for the leftist coalition were non-existent, they stopped their armed activities to increase the Broad Front’s chances.164 While the leftist coalition obtained the best result ever, it came third in the overall ballot count.

Bordaberry’s victory did little to improve the country’s security situation as he followed the same hard line as his predecessor. The Tupamaros resumed their armed activities shortly after the election. This time, however, they faced a much tougher opponent. The military’s unrelenting pressure pushed the Tupamaros to make mistakes that had important consequences for the organization. These blows severely weakened the organization’s infrastructure, as security forces arrested or killed several of its members. Second, and most importantly, as a direct consequence of these mistakes the organization lost significant popular support.165 The organization fought against two strong enemies, the government’s security forces and the death squadron. The latter launched an assassination campaign against alleged MLN-T members.166

the writings of the party’s leader, Rodney Arismendi: Arismendi, R., (1962), Problemas de una revolución continental,Montevideo, Pueblos Unidos; Arismendi, R., (1967), América Latina: campo de lucha o base de agresión, Montevideo, Comisión Nacional de Propaganda del Partido Comunista; Arismendi, R., (1968), Conversación con los jóvenes: algunos temas en debate acerca de nuestra revolución, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Comisión de Propaganda del Partido Comunista; Arismendi, R., (1969), Insurgencia juvenil, Montevideo, Ediciones Pueblos Unidos. 164 After numerous controversies, Juan María Bordaberry won the election by a small margin and became the next president. 165 One of these errors took place nearly two months before the 1971 election. On 6 September, more than one hundred Tupamaros escaped from the Punta Carretas prison. Among them were the original leaders of the organization, including Raúl Sendic, Fernández Huidobro and Mauricio Rosencof. Instead of resuming his position as MLN-T leader, Sendic re-joined the organization as a simple militant combatant to avoid tensions with the new leaders. He had spent several months in jail, which, some argued, prevented him from seeing the situation outside. This was a serious mistake as the leadership that remained in charge of the organization was young and lacked experience. An even greater error was the assassination on 21 December 1971 of a rural worker who discovered one of the organization’s hiding places. The new leaders decided to kill this rural worker with an overdose of Pentothal. The organization paid a high price for this decision. It lost much of the support of the Uruguayan people. These, added to other mistakes that took place during 1971, contributed towards the organization’s demise in 1972. See Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia. 166 In early 1972, the MLN-T kidnapped Nelson Bardesio, a police photographer who worked as an informant for the CIA. After his interrogation the police agent revealed the names of members of the

153

On 14 April 1972, the Uruguayan guerrillas conducted a succession of attacks against members of this paramilitary organization.167 Although the operation achieved its goal of eliminating members of the squadron, it had severe ramifications for the organization’s future. The military’s response was ruthless and swift. On the same day, security forces raided several places across Montevideo. These led to the arrests of leaders and the capture of important documents, hiding places, and arm caches. The armed forces also killed several Tupamaro members during these operations.168

To ease the military pressure in Montevideo and allow the organization to reorganize, the MLN-T launched a series of operations in the countryside.169 However, the military discovered and quickly neutralised these plots.170 The final blow for the organization came with the arrest of Raúl Sendic in September 1972 during the famous Almería raid. While the Tupamaros tried to reorganize their forces and launch a new counteroffensive the following year, such actions were futile. The balance of power had decisively tilted in favour of the military. As Huidobro states, Raúl Sendic was the last “old” [leader] that remained free.

After his fall, a handful of young boys with little experience [formed the organization’s leadership]… After Almeria not one, but three leaderships were captured (i.e. the main leadership, the death squadron. While, years later, Bardesio argued that his testimony was extracted under duress, his declarations, at the time were confirmed by the head of the Uruguayan Senate, Dr. Gutiérrez Ruiz. See: Aldrighi, C., (2007), La intervención de Estados Unidos en Uruguay (1965-1973). 167 Consequently, the MLN-T killed navy captain Ernesto Motto, police sub-commissioner Oscar Delega and his driver, and ex-undersecretary of the Interior Ministry Armando Costa y Lara. Except Delega’s driver, all the victims had links with the infamous death squadron. See Blixen, S., (2005), Sendic, p. 242. 168 One of these raids led to the discovery of the Amazonas street house, one of the MLN-T’s hiding places, and the arrests of Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro, one of the old leaders of the organization, and David Cámpora. For Cámpora’s accounts of this events see: González Bermejo, E., (1985), Las manos en el fuego, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental. 169 These included the Cacao and Collar plans. See Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, (1976), Las Fuerzas Armadas al pueblo oriental, Vol. 1, pp. 484-521; Blixen, S., (2005), Sendic, chapters 15-19, pp. 216-290. 170 During this period, high ranking officers of the armed forces and leaders of the organization detained in a number of military bases held negotiations to arrange a possible end to hostilities. The Tupamaros even assisted the military in investigating high profile corruption cases. However, these negotiations ended shortly after.

154

substitutes, and their respective substitutes). The “old ones” were already in jail.. Thus, in total, we lost four leaderships [in a very short period of time].171

It is true that between the Almería raid and the June 1973 military coup, the Tupamaros continued to fight.172 However, every operation was quickly overshadowed by the high costs involved in its implementation. This resulted in the death or arrest of numerous members and the capture of key information. Even more damaging for the organization was the security forces’ infiltration of its infrastructure to recruit a number of members (even Amodio Pérez, one of the leaders) as informants. The latter gave the armed forces valuable information and participated in raids that led to the arrests of several members of the organization. In time, these activities precipitated the organization’s defeat.

Alfonso Lessa has identified three gravitational factors that accelerated this process: the organization’s growing reliance on violence, which eroded its image for the majority of the Uruguayan people; the armed forces gaining full control of the country’s internal security; and the betrayal by two of its members, Amodio Pérez and Piriz Budes, who passed highly sensitive information to the military that helped to disarticulate the organization.173

Beyond 27 June 1973

The defeats of 1972 left the organization in complete disarray, deeply divided and with most of its remaining members seeking refuge abroad. While several countries gave political asylum to MLN-T members, the largest numbers went to Cuba, Chile, Argentina and, Sweden.174 Small splinter groups attempted to reorganize the organization’s infrastructure in each country. However, numerous limitations hindered their efforts. It is impossible here to discuss at

171 Fernández Huidobro in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, p. 71. 172 Mostly the armed forces and their supporters maintain this argument. See for instance: Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, (1976), Las Fuerzas Armadas al pueblo oriental, Vols. 1-2; Tróccoli, J. N., (1996), La ira de Leviatán; Tróccoli, J. N., (1997), La hora del depredador: una historia del Uruguay de los años perdido, Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo. 173 Lessa, A., (2005), Estado de guerra, p. 17. 174 There were also smaller colonies in a number of African countries and in Europe.

155

length each of the factions that emerged within the MLN-T between its defeat in 1972, and 1975.175 However, it is necessary to briefly discuss some of the more influential factions to illustrate the status of the organization at the time it joined the JCR. The Uruguayan Junta and its supporters maintained that the Tupamaros joined this regional revolutionary group as a strong, well-organized and cohesive organization. As the following paragraphs will demonstrate, however, such assertions are untrue.

Factions

After its defeat, the organization divided into two large groups: those who remained in Uruguay and those who went abroad. Those who stayed in Uruguay further split into two major camps. On the one hand were those still free and attempting to rebuild the organization. They were a small number of people and their main objective was to help members escape the country. The remaining MLN-T elements in Uruguay were in jail. With the exception of seven old or original leaders, the vast majority of captive Tupamaros remained at the Libertad prison.176 The armed forces held the former as hostages at different military installations between 1973 and the early 1980s.177 As the years went by, several factions began to emerge among the Libertad detainees.

Ex-Tupamaro member, Raúl Rodriguez argued that, by 1975, the organization was divided in three main factions: the Orthodox, the Trotskyites [also known as Tendencia Proletaria or Proletarian Trend], and the Seis-

175 Clara Aldrighi provides a good overview of the myriad of micro-organizations that emerged within the Tupamaros during those years See Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia. 176 Libertad was a maximum security prison opened in 1973 by the military government to keep the most dangerous detainees. 177 Among the seven leaders were Raúl Sendic, Mauricio Rosencof, José Mujica and, Fernández Huidobro. The military kept them in solitary confinement and frequently relocated them to different military installations. For a detailed account of the experiences of the seven hostages see: Rosencof, M. and F. Huidobro, (1987), Memorias del Calabozo, Montevideo, TAE, Vols. 1-3. The security forces also held 11 women hostages during the period 1972-1976. Until recently, the stories of these female hostages have not been addressed by scholars and other authors. In 2012, Marisa Ruiz and Rafael Sanseveiro published for the first time in Uruguay a series of interviews with these ex- hostages, reflecting upon their situation within the organization, their tensions with some leaders, and their treatment by the armed forces. See Ruiz, M. and R. Sanseviero, (2012), Las rehenas: historia oculta de once presas de la dictadura, Montevideo, Fin de Siglo.

156

puntistas (six points). The greatest divergences between them came from the way in which they analysed and interpreted the causes of the organization’s defeat. Rodriguez argues that the orthodoxy’s “auto-critic” was rather light and states that those who belonged to this faction were not Marxist-Leninist. The Trotskyites considered the whole MLN-T as a disaster and were against everything. For them, maintains Rodriguez, “everything was wrong. The Broad Front and even Cuba were wrong”.178 Most of the members held in La Libertad strongly resisted the Trotskyite position, and a group of them put forward a six- point political platform. This faction became known as the Seis-puntistas. According to Mario Teti Izquierdo, this group distanced itself

… from the Tendencia Proletaria (proletarian trend). As a response to the latter’s criticisms towards the “old” leadership, the former group put forward a theoretical platform for the reorganization of the MLN-T. The famous six points consisted of: 1) recognition of the Soviet Union as the international [revolutionary] vanguard; 2) recognition of Cuba as the [revolutionary] vanguard in Latin America; 3) recognition of the MLN as the [revolutionary] vanguard in Uruguay; 4) the need of an alliance between the Tupamaros and the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU); 5) the validity of armed struggle in the country; and 6) the recognition of the “old leaders” as the only genuine and authentic leadership of the MLN.179

Space constraints prevent this chapter from further exploring issues such as the way in which these factions interacted with each other in prison and their views on events beyond the precinct walls. However, it is necessary to make a number of clarifications. First, the military was well aware of what was happening inside the jail and the prisoners’ communications with other members outside. Intelligence officers at the Libertad and Punta Carretas jails regularly intercepted messages written on minute pieces of paper.180

178 Raúl Rodríguez in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, p. 405. 179 Mario Teti Izquierdo in ibid, p. 221. 180 Ex-navy officer, Jorge Tróccoli who was the S2 (intelligence officer) of the FUSNA (Uruguayan navy’s version of the US Marines), argued that the armed forces knew everything about what was going on in Libertad. See Tróccoli, J. N., (1996), La ira de Leviatán.

157

Secondly, it is important to recognise how much the organization had changed. As shown in earlier paragraphs, one of the MLN-T’s most distinct features had been its flexibility. This allowed its members to work with other groups of different ideological makeup. However, all that changed dramatically after the 1972 defeat. From then on, the MLN-T underwent the same kind of bickering and dogmatisms that had eroded the cohesion of the leftist parties during the sixties. These divergences made it extremely difficult for the organization, or what was left of it, to function effectively. The factionalism extended beyond Libertad to those living abroad.181

Some of the most significant changes in the MLN-T abroad took place in Chile, Cuba, Argentina, and European countries. Many of the Tupamaros who found refuge in Chile had close connections with the UP government and the Chilean MIR.182 In early 1973, they held an important meeting in Viña del Mar to discuss the causes that prompted the organization’s demise and to decide its future. The leadership183 identified two important reasons for the defeat: first, the organization gave too much emphasis to military issues and neglected work with the masses; and second, the organization lacked a clear ideological definition which would allow it to undertake that work with the masses. Hence, they decided that the MLN-T would embrace Marxism-Leninism as the organization’s main ideology. They also agreed to build a political party to

181 Few documents and sources better illustrate these divisions and their damaging impact on the organization than those held at the Uruguayan CEIL-CEIU, UDELAR. These contain internal communications and documents from the numerous factions (e.g. Tendencia Proletaria, seis- puntistas, Neuvo Tiempo, etc), including those in Cuba, Chile, and Argentina. See: Colección David Cámpora, MLN-T Exterior, Balances e Informes, 1974-1977. 182 For instance, William Whitelaw met with Salvador Allende in several occasions and had good relations with members of the GAP (Group of Friends of the President) and also the Chilean MIR. Numerous Tupamaros exiled in Chile lived in colonies near Santiago and, on a number of occasions, worked together with MIR members in different social projects of the UP government. See Aldrighi, C., (2009, Memorias de la insurgencia. 183 Among these leaders were Lucas Mansilla, Kimal Amir, Andrés Cultely, William Whitelaw and Luis Alemañy. After the coup in Chile, they went to Argentina. Once there, they abandonned the Tupamaros and became the faction known as “los renunciantes” (the resigning ones). They rejected the armed struggle and formed a new political group known as Nuevo Tiempo (New Time).

158

attract the support of the masses and complement the organization’s military objectives.

There were several interpretations of the Viña del Mar meeting. The old leaders believed that the turn towards Marxism-Leninism was part of a survival mechanism, as it helped those living in Chile find an explanation for the debacle. Like factions in the Libertad prison, the Chilean branch was in complete disarray and sought answers to what had happened, even if those answers took the organization further away from its origins and ideological roots. Since its beginnings, the Tupamaro leadership had pursued a socialist model with distinct nationalist features and refused to transform the MLN-T into a Marxist-Leninist organization.184

Fernández Huidobro clearly illustrated this point when asked what the old leadership thought about the organization’s new ideological direction:

I think that [members] like Raúl [Sendic] or myself, were against all that. For that reason, we had … [a lot of] internal problems. We were … branded as mad men and ideological eclectics. For example, El Bebe [i.e. Raúl Sendic] never supported the idea of Dialectical Materialism. He militated against the . For El Bebe, Lenin and shit were the same thing. [But]..he spoke and argued with heavy facts and opinions, like Rosa Luxemburg, unknown in Uruguay at the time. It was hard to argue with Raúl, because he had read everything. Much more than those who read only Martha Harnecker – two pages – and then argued with god and the entire world. …[they underestimated Sendic’s knowledge], while [he] was the best theoretician amongst all of them. 185

Hence, when the Chilean MLN-T branch took the organization in that direction, they received criticisms from everywhere.

184 The Tupamaros disliked the Soviet Union’s reformism and the concept of peaceful coexistence. While they admired Fidel Castro, Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution, they rejected their emphasis on rural guerrillas. They believed that the revolution in Uruguay had to be tailored to the country’s needs and not based on a specific “fit-all” model. 185 Fernández Huidobro in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, p. 77.

159

The resolutions taken at the Viña del Mar meeting had important ramifications for the future of the organization. Leaders like Luis Alemañy argue that the meeting sought to put an end to the armed struggle and resume the political path.186 Almost all the delegates present at this meeting recognized the importance of political activities and the need for a political party. Nevertheless, they failed to agree on which party would be the most suitable to implement these activities on the organization’s behalf.187 The turn towards Marxism- Leninism brought some sectors of the MLN-T in Chile closer to the MIR and the Argentine ERP-PRT. Some argue that the latter groups strongly influenced the Viña del Mar meeting.188 Others, on the other hand, maintain that the meeting was a logical step, particularly because the revolutionary process in Uruguay experienced a significant qualitative change after 1972.189 Regardless of the reasons for the meeting, the fact remains that the Tupamaros were in disarray and not at the same ideological level of the MIR or the PRT. Anibal Garzón argues that the latter two, particularly the Argentines, were much stronger than the Tupamaros at the time and it is likely that these organizations played an influential part in the MLN-T’s change of direction.190 Those who did not agree with the Viña del Mar resolutions condemned the meeting and developed further splinter groups.191

186 Luis Alemañy in ibid, p. 330. 187 Some called for the creation of a new Marxist-Leninist Party. Others argued that Uruguay already had a Marxist-Leninist Party (i.e. the Uruguayan Communist Party-PCU). Thus, they called for an alliance between the MLN-T and the PCU. 188 See: Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor". 189 See, for instance, the views of Samuel Blixen and Juan José Domínguez in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia. 190 Most of the Tupamaros that joined the JCR came from this faction. Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 20. 191 The shift towards Marxism-Leninism and the emphasis on the proletarianization of petit- bourgeois leaders and members generated tensions among the Tupamaros living in Chile. Some members lived in refugee camps close to the Andes mountains while other leaders remained in Santiago, living in comfortable apartments. Some also argue that there were tensions between a number of MLN-T leaders and the Chilean MIR. The former claimed that the had a better relationship with President Allene and the GAP than with the MIR. A number of Tupamaros argue that, prior to the military coup, the MIR tried to keep the Tupamaros away because they

160

Factionalism emerged also among those Tupamaros exiled in Cuba. However, the differences between these factions were, arguably, not as intense as those seen in Chile or Argentina. Most of the Uruguayan revolutionaries remained on good terms with the Cuban government and agreed with the organization’s turn toward Marxism-Leninism. Furthermore, encouraged by Fidel Castro, this group urged other MLN-T militants to establish an alliance with the Uruguayan Communist Party.192 A small group known as the “Perdurit 2” colony, however, criticised Fidel Castro and the Cuban Communist Party for their lack of support of the Uruguayans. This group wanted to resume the armed struggle in Uruguay as quickly as possible. However, the Cubans, by then closely tied to the Soviet Union, refused to provide any kind of assistance towards that goal. Cuba’s commitment to support the Latin American revolutionaries stayed strong.193 However, Fidel Castro understood that the moment was not favourable for the guerrilla groups. The Cuban leader continued to lend his support by providing guerrilla training and, particularly, political asylum for these refugees.

In March 1975, the Perdurit 2 colony wrote to the MLN-T’s Central Committee (CC) asking the organization to officially break relations with the Cuban Communist Party and made an official complain to the government of Fidel Castro for the Cubans’ lack of support of the MLN-T.194 This action was strongly criticized by all other sectors of the organization, within and outside Cuba. Shortly after this letter, a group of Tupamaros living in Buenos Aires wrote to the MLN-T’s Central Committee (CC) openly criticising this colony for compromised the MIR’s objectives. See the testimonies of Tupamaros who lived in Chile prior to 11 September 1973 in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia. 192 In May 1974, the Cuba “Regional” wrote to other members explaining why an alliance with the PCU was a good idea. See: “Cuba 1974”, in Colección David Cámpora, box: MLN-T Exterior, folder: Balances e Informes 1974 (1), available at CEIL-CEIU, UDELAR, Montevideo, Uruguay. 193 See the views of Manuel “Barbarroja” Piñeiro, ex-Chief of Cuban Intelligence services and head of the Latin America Department. Piñeiro, M. B., (2006), Che Guevara and the Latin American Revolution, Melbourne-New York, Ocean Press. 194 Documento de la Colonia Perdurit 2, Marzo, 1975, in Colección David Cámpora, box: MLN-T Exterior, folder: Balances e Informes 1975 (1), available at CEIL-CEIU, UDELAR, Montevideo, Uruguay.

161

trying to blame the Cuban Communist Party for the shortfalls of the MLN-T. The communiqué was particularly virulent against a minor anti-Cuban faction in Argentina that supported the views of the Perdurit 2 people.195 Despite the activities of this colony, the overall relationship between the Tupamaros and the Cuban government remained on good terms. Furthermore, the vast majority of MLN-T members living in Cuba agreed with the shift towards Marxism- Leninism and supported the idea of an alliance with the PCU, and the abandonment of armed struggle.

After 11 September 1973, most MLN-T members in Chile sought refuge in other countries.196 The majority went to Argentina where they resumed their activities and tried to rebuild the organization. This nucleus included those who continued to work with the remnants of the Chilean MIR and the PRT to establish the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria. However, the struggle between factions continued and led, among other things, to the emergence of two important political organizations: Nuevo Tiempo (New Time) and Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo (PVP) (Party for the People’s Victory). The former emerged as a consequence of the confrontation between the Trotskyites or Tendencia Proletaria and some sectors of the organization.

The Trotskyites continued to blame the petit bourgeois leaders for their lack of proletarian experience. Consequently, these leaders left the organization in 1974.197 The group became known as los Renunciantes (the resigning ones) and was formed by Lucas Mansilla, Kimal Amir, Luis Alemañy and, William Whitelaw. Immediately after leaving the MLN-T, they established a new political organization called Nuevo Tiempo (New Time). The Renunicantes believed that the Trotskyites’ attempts to continue the armed struggle were

195 Carta al Comité Central (CC), “Denuncia contra Cuba”, 14 de Marzo 1975, in Colección David Cámpora, box: MLN-T Exterior, Folder: Balances e Informes 1975 (1). 196 Some Uruguayans were arrested and taken to the national stadium and other detention centres, while others were simply killed by the armed forces. 197 For further readings on the ideological differences between the Tendencia Proletaria and the Renunciantes see: Documento de la Colonia Perdurit 2, Marzo, 1975, in Colección David Cámpora, box: MLN-T Exterior, folder: Balances e Informes 1975 (1), available at CEIL-CEIU, UDELAR.

162

suicidal. They understood the strength of the military regimes in the region and the lack of conditions for a new guerrilla campaign. In principle, they agreed with the JCR, but only with the propaganda activities and the denunciation of human rights violations by the regimes in international fora in the US and Europe. On the other hand, they criticised the PRT’s involvement in the internal affairs of the MLN-T, and its control of the JCR.198 More importantly, one of this faction’s members was at the centre of the controversy regarding the missing money, discussed earlier in this chapter.199

These confrontations also led to the emergence of the PVP. By 1974, most members of the MLN-T understood the futility of all efforts to continue the armed struggle. This group of Tupamaros predicted that every attempt to enter the country would lead to the capture or death of these members.200 Hence, they developed contacts with other groups and parties from left and centre-right in exile to create a new political party. Negotiations went on during 1974-1975 and, finally, in early 1976, the Party for the People’s Victory (PVP) was created. McSherry describes the latter as “a leftist, but not a guerrilla, organization, which worked to oppose the military regime”.201 For that reason the Uruguayan junta considered this group a dangerous threat and used Cóndor’s infrastructure to neutralize its activities.

The analysis of the different MLN-T factions presented in this section is limited and by no means includes the myriad of splinter groups that emerged during those years. However, the ones outlined here were, arguably, the most influential. Despite the numerous limitations, this brief discussion serves to

198 See section D: El Comité Central, el fraccionalismo y la participación del PRT y la JCR, in ibid. 199 See: Part 2 of Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia. 200 In late 1974 and early 1975 the Tupamaros linked to the JCR, particularly those from the Tendencia Proletaria, sent a number of members to Uruguay. Their mission was to create a basic infrastructure to fight against the dictatorship. However, these groups were quickly captured by the armed forces and led to the discovery of key documents and resources of the organization. These failures confirmed the predictions of those who went on to establish the PVP. 201 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin America, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, p. 123.

163

highlight a number of important issues. Firstly, and most importantly, only a small group of Tupamaros joined the JCR. The vast majority of its members understood that the time for arms was not ripe and they decided to abandon the armed struggle to resume the political path. Secondly, the organization never recovered from the 1972 defeat. From that time the MLN-T failed to work efficiently. Those who took control of the organization after the old leaders’ arrest were young and lacked ideological formation and experience. This led to profound divisions within its ranks, as well as a series of strategic blunders and an overall weakening of the organization. It is in this environment that the Tupamaros joined the MIR, ELN and PRT to form the JCR.

Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR)

Origins

The disappointing results of the Acción Popular (AP) (Popular Action) leftist coalition in the 1964 presidential election, divided the Chilean left. The Communist Party (PCCH) accused the AP coalition of not being broad enough, as it did not include sectors from the petit-bourgeoisie. This, according to the PCCH, led to the AP’s defeat. Hence, and to have better chances in the next election, they sought the inclusion of political groups that represented that particular social segment, namely the Christian Democrats and the Radical Party.202 The Socialist Party (PS), on the other hand, questioned the viability of the electoral process to win power. Some of its leaders turned towards a more radical path, which included the implementation of armed struggle.203 The disputes within the world socialist movement also influenced these differences. That is, the Communists followed the reformist line and broad front strategies promoted by the Soviet Union, while the Socialists pushed for a more radical and nationalist form of socialism.

202 Pérez, C., (2003), "Historia del M.I.R: si quieren guerra, guerra trendrán", Estudios Públicos, 91(Invierno): 5-44, p. 12. 203 The new party line was introduced at the Linares (1965) and Chillan (1967) congresses. Ibid.

164

With the victory of the Cuban Revolution still fresh in their minds, many were convinced that the only alternative for Chile was to develop an Andean version of the Sierra Maestra. The Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) (Movement of Revolutionary Left) emerged from this debate. Its gestation began with the unification of two leftist groups: the Vanguardia Revolucionaria Marxista (VRM) (Marxist Revolutionary Vanguard) and a Trotskyite organization known as the Partido Obrero Revolucionario Chileno (PRTC) (Chilean Workers’ Revolutionary Party). The VRM included a number of splinter groups from the Communist and Socialist parties and most of its members were university students.204

Activities prior to the 1970 election

These organizations joined forces and established the MIR on 15 August 1965. Its internal structure consisted of a National Secretariat, led by Enrique Sepulveda, and a 21-member Central Committee.205 The latter included prominent figures such as, Luciano Cruz Aguayo, , Andrés Pascal Allende, Arturo Villabela, Nelson Gutiérrez, and the brothers Miguel and Edgardo Enríquez.206 After two years, and despite its radical discourse, the National Secretariat followed a similar political line to those of Chile’s major leftist parties. This frustrated some of its members and led to the emergence of two camps within the organization: the tradicionalistas (traditionalists) and the no tradicionalistas (non-traditionalists). The former, according to Salazar, was formed by the Trotskyites and ex-communists while the latter included ex-communist/socialist youths.207

204 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 11. 205 Marlene Martínez, Á., (2006), La experiencia política de los militantes del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (M.I.R): motivaciones, práctica partidaria y división de la militancia. Chile (1973-1988). Licenciatura en Historia, Universidad de Chile, online, available at http://www.cybertesis.cl/tesis/uchile/2006/Martínez_m2/html/index- frames.html, [accessed 12/10/2009]. 206 Pérez, C., (2003), "Historia del M.I.R", p. 13 207 Gabriel Salazar in Marlene Martínez, Á., (2006), La experiencia política de los militantes del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (M.I.R).

165

The clash between the two camps reached its climax at the organization’s Third Congress, in 1967. There, MIR’s most militant faction broke ranks with the moderate group led by Enrique Sepulveda. As a consequence, the latter was voted out of his position as MIR’s National Secretary and was replaced by Miguel Enríquez, a student organizer from the Concepción University.208 From then on, the MIR radicalised its position and began to compete with the country’s traditional left in a race to become Chile’s Marxist-Leninist vanguard. Like most Latin American revolutionary groups at the time, MIR’s main political objective was to use force to rid Chile of national and foreign capitalism. According to MacEóin, Miguel Enríquez and his followers “stood for militant class struggle, insisting that the haves would use all force at their disposal before yielding power, and that consequently the have nots must arm for the inevitable conflict”.209

The organization tried to gain the support of those sectors of society most disadvantaged by the existing economic and social structures. In time, and with the appropriate training, these sectors would become “the future cadres of a Revolutionary Army”.210 Marlene Martínez argues that MIR’s new structure “required militants that would transform the organization into a party able to penetrate” those sectors.211 This differentiated the Chilean revolutionaries from their Uruguayan counterparts.212 MIR’s Comisión Política (CP) (Political Commission) directed the political work, while its Comisión Militar (CM) (Military Commission) dealt with the organization’s military operations.213 Both

208 Pérez, C., (2003), "Historia del M.I.R", p. 13 209 MacEóin, G., (1975), Chile: the struggle for dignity, London, Coventure, pp. 22-23. 210 MIR’s Declaration of Principles in Marlene Martínez, Á., (2006), La experiencia política de los militantes del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (M.I.R). 211 Ibid. 212 While the Uruguayan Tupamaros’ strength and popularity was based on their ideological flexibility, they lacked a political party to direct and channel the activities of the masses. 213 Marlene Martínez, Á., (2006), La experiencia política de los militantes del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (M.I.R).

166

branches worked together and coordinated, as much as possible, their activities to meet the goals set by the leadership.

Despite its radical views and hostility towards the Frei administration, the organization maintained its legal status until the late 1960s. Most of its armed activities consisted of bank robberies and the funds obtained in those operations helped to build the organization’s infrastructure.214 That legal status, however, ended in 1969, when a number of conservative media outlets in the city of Concepción criticised the organization’s criminal activities. MIR retaliated by kidnapping Hernán Osses Santa María, one of the journalists responsible for that campaign, for a short period of time and later released him naked in the city centre.215 The kidnapping and the increasing number of bank robberies prompted a strong reaction of the Frei administration, which forced the organization to go underground.216

Although the miristas slightly modified their strategies to function as a clandestine group, they continued to grow and, by the end of the decade, they had developed a considerable infrastructure. MIR became quite popular amongst the people living in shantytowns, particularly in Santiago city, and with the peasantry and rural workers. Its organizers worked with these groups and helped them to occupy or expropriate a number of properties. The latter activities came as a direct consequence of President Frei’s inability to properly implement the land reform legislation passed by the Chilean Congress during his administration.217

Like other South American revolutionaries during the 1960s, MIR had close connections with the government of Fidel Castro. A number of its

214 Pérez, C., (2003), "Historia del M.I.R", p. 14. 215 Pérez, C., (2004), "Años de disparos y tortura (1973-1975): Los últimos días de Miguel Enríquez", Estudios Públicos, 96(primavera): 355-382, p. 357. 216 Marlene Martínez, Á., (2006), La experiencia política de los militantes del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (M.I.R). 217 That inability emerged from the land reform legislation itself, which was a compromise with the political right. The administration could not afford to pay in cash and that stopped the reform.

167

members, including its military leader Coño Aguilar (Arturo Villabela), travelled to Cuba in 1967 to receive military training. When he returned to Chile, Villabela became actively involved in the formation of MIR’s Fuerza Central (FC) (Central Force). The latter functioned as a clandestine internal structure and included militants trained in special tasks like arms and explosives manufacturing, as well as intelligence and counterintelligence activities.218

1970 Presidential Election

The organization reached an important crossroad as the 1970 presidential election approached. Its leadership had to choose between two alternatives: a) cease all military activities and support the UP coalition, or b) disregard the election and continue their activities in preparation for armed struggle in a very near future. After careful consideration, and intense pressures from other sectors of the Chilean left, they agreed to support the Unidad Popular.219 This support, however, did not materialize as a consequence of a change of heart in the views of Miguel Enríquez and his followers regarding a socialist revolution. Although they acknowledged that Marx’s writings considered the possibility of a peaceful transition towards socialism, the organization believed that the necessary conditions for such change were not present in Chile. There was, instead, some strategic reasoning behind MIR’s decision. As MacEóin points out, by supporting the UP, MIR sought to “… provoke the ‘imperialist counteroffensive’ and thus, ‘radicalise’ the [revolutionary] process”.220 However, the miristas paid a relatively high price for this support. They lost political and military momentum when they momentarily halted all armed activities to improve UP chances at the ballots. Despite this setback, the strategy

218 Ibid. 219 Other South American guerrillas went through similar situations. For instance, in Uruguay’s 1971 presidential election, the Tupamaros had to decide if they would support the Frente Amplio leftist coalition or continue the armed struggle. 220 MacEóin, G. (1975), Chile, p. 75.

168

paid off and Dr Salvador Allende won that election, though by a narrow margin.221

Many believed that this victory confirmed that the peaceful road to socialism could be achieved after all. While the miristas welcomed the victory, and indeed benefited from it222, they had some reservations about the new government’s future. The organization considered Allende’s presidency an important first step towards the creation of a socialist state in Chile. Nonetheless, they urged the new administration to replace all of Chile’s traditional institutions with new ones that would facilitate the implementation of the UP’s socialist program. MIR’s leadership believed that as long as the government maintained the old institutions, the Chilean peaceful road to socialism would fail.

Activities during the UP government

President Allende agreed with several aspects of MIR’s political goals. Nevertheless, the relationship between them was difficult, particularly from late 1972 onwards. Once the president took office, MIR did not resume armed activities.223 Instead, the organization played two main roles during the UP period. Firstly, it became actively involved in the government’s security and intelligence apparatus, operating as a parallel intelligence and counterintelligence organization. The Military Commission, especially the Central Force, kept a close watch over the activities of the Chilean right to

221 Although MIR’s support was important for Allende’s victory, it is necessary to point out that the UP’s presidential candidate also received support from other leftist groups and sectors of Chilean society, which helped to consolidate that victory. 222 Shortly after Allende was sworn in as President, his government released all political prisoners and allowed MIR to resume its legal status. From then until June 1973, MIR functioned as a legal organization. This allowed it to expand its political work with the poorest sectors of Chile’s society. On the other hand, it had damaging consequences for its military future. Unlike other organizations such as the Tupamaros, ELN, or ERP-PRT, the MIR had little underground experience. It only functioned as an underground organization for a brief period of time during the late sixties. This had a devastating effect immediately after the coup. 223 That decision came after the death of one of its members in a confrontation between mirista young militants and the communist youth at the Concepción University, on 2 December 1970. Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 11.

169

counteract and neutralise its plots to overthrow the government. Secondly, MIR continued its political and military work with the masses. The organization had developed an entire political structure to carry out this work.224

MIR organizers were quite effective in mobilizing popular groups. They split the political work into four main areas or fronts. The first was the Movimiento de Pobladores Revolucionarios (MPR) (Movement of Revolutionary Inhabitants or settlers), which targeted people living in the poorest suburbs around Santiago. From 1971 to 1973 this front participated in the creation of the famous cordones industriales (industrial districts strategically positioned across Santiago’s periphery and near key industrial areas). Led by MIR organizers, the inhabitants of these cordones expropriated a number of properties and pressured the UP government to expand its nationalisation policies.225 They also played an important part in MIR’s strategy to defend the government against a possible coup. According to Roberto Moss, the miristas created a total of 11 cordones industriales and six important camps across Santiago alone.226

The miristas also established the Frente de Trabajadores Revolucionarios (FTR) (Front of Revolutionary Workers) to challenge the

224 Miguel Enríquez and other leaders of the organization understood that the right and its foreign ally (the US government) would use every means available to sabotage the UP government. The MIR also questioned the State’s security apparatus suitability to protect the socialist experiment. The assassination of General Schneider, the coup attempt carried out by General Viaux and a group of renegade military officers during the Tacnazo, and the CIA’s campaign to prevent Allende’s being sworn in by the Chilean Congress, justified this evaluation. The miristas maintained that the revolution’s defence rested with the popular masses (i.e. the workers, peasants, and the poorest sectors of society). These, according to the MIR, would be the only sectors able and willing to defend Allende. Hence, in addition to its role as a parallel security intelligence agency, the MIR focused on providing military and political training to those sectors. See Marlene Martínez, Á., (2006), La experiencia política de los militantes del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (M.I.R). 225 In 1973, for example, some of these camps demanded that President Allende nationalize a number of factories and allow workers to run them. See CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 21 July 1973, p. 5, available at CIA- RDP79T00975A024900060001-9, released 01/06/2005, [accessed 04/05/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 226 Roberto Moss in García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas: opción y obstinación de la guerrilla chilena (1965-1988), Morelia, Michoacán de Ocampo, Mexico, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, Departamento de Historia Latinoamericana, p. 78.

170

hegemonic influence of the communists and socialists over the labour movement. They also created the highly militant Frente de Estudiantes Revolutionarios (FER) (Front of Revolutionary Students). Its members usually got involved in violent fights with communist militants for control over Chile’s universities. The fourth and final front was the Movimiento de Campesinos Revolucionarios (MCR) (Movement of Revolutionary Peasants), which helped peasants and Mapuche Indians to organize themselves, and to occupy and expropriate land.227

Although these fronts attracted a considerable number of followers and achieved important successes228, they did not diminish the overall influence of the other major leftist parties. More importantly, they failed to produce the disciplined and well-organized front of the masses that the organization had promised as revealed during the UP government’s darkest hour: 11 September, 1973. The MIR also used those fronts to organize mass rallies and other popular protests as an act of defiance against the anti-Allende sectors. This generated tensions with some members of the coalition government, particularly with the communists.229 The PCCH was among the most moderate in the alliance and continued to follow the political line of their soviet counterparts. Since the 1964 defeat, they had expanded their broad front strategies to attract the progressive elements of the Christian Democrats and other conservative parties.

227 Ibid. 228 They expropriated and became involved in the management of factories; established education and health centres to assist the population in the camps; provided security and developed informal legal courts to address issues such as crime, alcohol, and domestic violence. See: discussion about “los sin casas” (the homeless) in International Documentation ( I. D. O. C.), (1974), Chile under military rule: a dossier of documents and analyses compiled by the staff of I.D.O.C., New York, IDOC, p. 51. 229 For a clear example of the opposing views and tensions within the UP coalition towards MIR’s activities see: CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Secret, No. 042, 4 December 1971, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A020600070001-5, released 21/08/2003, [accessed 29/04/2009], IA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD.

171

The PCCH believed that MIR’s violent activities and radical discourse isolated the government from key sectors of the middle class. The MIR and the most radical factions of the Socialist Party, on the other hand, argued that

… the strategy of an alliance with the middle class was counter- revolutionary and that mass mobilization was the only way to raise class consciousness, establish effective peasant participation and force the agro-bureaucrats and UP politicians to carry out a socialist revolution.230

As time went by, the confrontations between these camps intensified. The communists repeatedly criticized the MIR and urged the president to stay away from them, whilst the miristas and socialists accused the PCCH of sabotaging Chile’s socialist experiment. Meanwhile, President Allende remained at the centre of this dispute and struggled to maintain unity within the UP coalition.

The government’s projects and policies prompted the reaction and radicalisation of the rightist anti-Allende groups. The far-right Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Freedom) became one of the most violent and actively involved in attempts to overthrow Allende.231 This group usually operated in the cities and major urban centres. Meanwhile, several rightist organizations, particularly those formed by the wealthy landowners, began a series of armed campaigns in the countryside. Those affected by the government’s land reform policies created Guardias Blancas (White Guards) to resist the expropriation of their properties, using violence against peasants and Mapuche Indians on several occasions.232 This escalation in violence led MIR’s leadership to step up the organization’s armed activities in support of the peasants and the Mapuche.

230 MIR’s National Secretariat in Winn, P., (2004), Victims of the Chilean miracle: workers and neoliberalism in the Pinochet era, 1972-2002, London, Duke University Press, p. 149. 231 This organization also acted in conjunction with the armed forces in the kidnapping and killing of several leftist members. See: Memoria Viva, (1985), "Declaración Jurada: Andrés Antonio Valenzuela Morales", online, available at www.memoriaviva.com/culpables/agentes/valenzue.htm, [accessed 23/09/2010]. 232 See García Naranjo’s discussion of MIR’s activities with the Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario (MCR) (Peasants Revolutionary Movement). García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas, pp.64-95.

172

By the end of 1972, and for most of 1973, the security situation continued to deteriorate. The divisions within the UP government intensified as its members failed to agree on how to bring this situation under control. Every measure towards the completion of the socialist political program met the strong resistance of the opposition and the rightist groups. The communists urged the president to slow down the pace of his socialist program and capitalise on its achievements to lure the moderates within the opposition. 233 The MIR and the socialists, on the other hand, wanted to go further. As Miguel Enríquez had predicted, the right’s reaction intensified as the UP government implemented its socialist projects.

For the miristas, the final showdown was near. Its leaders reached this conclusion after a rogue mechanized military unit and members of Patria y Libertad attempted to overthrow the government on 29 June 1973.234 However, under the command of General Prats, those who remained loyal to the constitution quickly controlled the rebels. After this event MIR abandoned its legal status and went underground to organize an armed resistance movement. For Miguel Enríquez and his subordinates, the only alternative to save Chile’s socialist government was to deepen those reforms. These would trigger a succession of events and polarise the country in such a way that the military would be forced to intervene, in defence of the wealthy oligarchy and the country’s old institutions. At that particular time, according to MIR’s evaluation, the organization would mobilize the masses and lead them in the final showdown with the armed forces. While the leadership expected that battle to be hard, in the end the Chilean people would emerge victorious and the socialist revolution would triumph.

Since its creation, the organization’s political work had focused on preparing the masses for that particular moment. Likewise, its military arm

233 Richard Gott in International Documentation ( I. D. O. C.), (1974), Chile under military rule, p. 16. 234 Colectivo Taller de Reflexión, (1991), Informe Rettig y Fuerzas Armadas, Santiago, Chile, PAS, Taller de Reflexión, pp. 29-30.

173

delivered training and developed armed factories and explosives to equip them. In theory, all the conditions were set for the confrontation between the revolutionary forces and the reactionary camp. The most radical factions within the UP reached a similar conclusion. Despite the government’s anti-violence position, some coalition members collected a number of weapons and ammunition to form an armed resistance. Yet, as García Naranjo points out, these were only a reduced number and these preparations were far from resembling an appropriate military defence plan.235 The MIR leadership’s analysis had two major flaws: on the one hand, it misjudged the enemy’s power and willingness to fight, while, on the other, it overestimated the strength of the masses. These flaws became clear on 11 September 1973.

The Coup

The bombing of La Moneda by the armed forces and the subsequent death of President Allende marked the abrupt end of Chile’s socialist experiment. As soon as the military moved to overthrow the UP government, MIR’s leaders tried to activate the armed resistance. According to Carballo Castro,

At 7 am, MIR’s Political Commission met at San Miguel (in Santiago’s north), to decide what to do. Meanwhile, two other leaders, Nelson Gutiérrez and Andrés Pascal Allende, went…to the Cuban embassy, took [a number of] guns and began to distribute them in the cordones industriales in a vehicle from the Ministry of Housing. Around 10 am, the men most wanted by the military met in a factory…in the Cordon Vicuña Mackennan. They were…[Miguel] Enríquez, Bautista Van Schowen, Andrés Pascal and Nelson Gutiérrez. In the factory’s courtyard almost a hundred militants waited for instructions. A Ford pickup truck loaded with AK rifles [entered the factory]. One of the GAP men took them from Tomás Moro [the Presidential Residence]. Suddenly, the Carabineros and the Special Forces appeared and the combat began. [After a short but intense skirmish, the armed forces; arrested several members and killed many others, while a few of them] … departed towards La Legua.236

235 García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas, p. 162. 236 Carballo Castro in Pérez, C., (2003), "Historia del M.I.R", p. 162.

174

The organization only had a small number of fighters to face an entire army. According to Cristián Pérez, 400 men from the Central Force formed this small group. While they were ready to fight, only 50 men had the appropriate combat gear.237

The guerrillas carried out similar attempts throughout the country. However, their efforts to spark a nationwide armed resistance failed as the armed forces moved swiftly with overwhelming force to destroy any remnants of the organization. The excessive use of force sought to deter others from taking arms against the regime. Despite predicting the final showdown with the reactionary forces and preparing the masses to defend themselves for several years, MIR’s attempts proved fruitless at that critical juncture. Most of its military and political infrastructure crumbled in a few days and the organization failed to develop an effective response to the unrelenting repression. According to Luz Arce, other leftist organizations experienced similar challenges. 238

Miguel Enríquez quickly realized that the organization was at a disadvantage and that the entire Chilean left was in disarray. The military arrested thousands of leftist militants immediately after the coup239, while several UP political leaders sought refuge in numerous embassies across Santiago. These leaders understood that their efforts to oppose the coup would

237 Pérez, C., (2004),"Años de Disparos y Tortura (1973-1975)", p. 359. 238 Luz Arce was a member of the Socialist Party who also worked with the GAP. After her arrest, she worked as a DINA collaborator. See Arce, L. (2004), The Inferno. 239 The CIA reported that, in addition to the National Stadium, the Junta held prisoners in other places such as Chile’s Military School, Chacabuco, Valparaiso, Dawson and Quiriquina islands, as well as other public jails and “various army installations and police stations.” See: CIA-Directorate of Operations, “Off Mil count of prisoners under detention as of 31 December 73”, Information Report [not finally evaluated intelligence], No. 2623-200-2, 11 January 1974, pp. 1-2, approved for release 11/06/1999, available at CREST/FOIA online, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000345049.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2010].

175

be more effective if they stayed alive. Once abroad and safe, they immediately initiated an international campaign to oppose the military regime.240

MIR’s leadership interpreted those moves differently. While most of Chile’s political elite went into exile, the miristas launched their famous declaration: “El MIR no se asila!” (MIR does not go into exile).241 The guerrillas considered the act of seeking political asylum as a betrayal of the revolutionary struggle. By staying and fighting the military Junta, MIR pursued a number of objectives: firstly, the leadership wanted to gain the support of those opposing the new regime and become the undisputed revolutionary vanguard in Chile, and secondly, they wanted to discredit those political leaders that went into exile.242 MIR’s Political Commission announced its intention of building a People’s Revolutionary Army “capable of defeating the military dictatorship and conquering power... [to] establish a revolutionary government of peasants and workers which would complete the tasks of the proletarian revolution”.243 However, the miristas paid a high price. From a militaristic and strategic point of view, the decision to stay in the country was a deadly mistake. Its militants became easy prey for the armed forces, resulting in the unnecessary death of several key leaders and other members.

Shortly after the military took over the country, Miguel Enríquez ordered a tactical retreat and reorganization of the guerrilla infrastructure. Nevertheless, the lack of underground experience and some of its members’ security indiscretions made this an extremely difficult and dangerous task. Marlene Martínez states that the detention of one militant could give away the position of other members “… to the counterinsurgency forces. This [led to the quick

240 They formed an effective peaceful resistance movement abroad, participated in numerous rallies in Europe and the US, gave speeches and produced reports on Chile’s Human Right situation under the military regime, etc. 241 Pérez, C., (2004), "Años de disparos y tortura (1973-1975)", p. 358. 242 García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas, p. 165. 243 MIR’s Political Commission in Pérez, C., (2004), "Años de disparos y tortura (1973-1975), p. 360.

176

obliteration] of MIR’s structures and allowed DINA to pin point Miguel Enríquez’s location”.244

The resistance carried out a number of armed operations against the military across the country in the days following the coup. These were closely monitored and regularly reported by the CIA station in Santiago.245 Yet the military quickly neutralized these attempts, inflicting severe blows to the organization’s infrastructure. By the end of September the skirmishes had declined and armed resistance slowly died out. This situation continued unchanged during 1974-1975. Cristián Pérez describes this period as MIR’s cold winter.246 The organization suffered its greatest losses during this period and began to reconsider its position about going into exile. Before reaching this important shift in strategy, however, the leadership made a number of serious mistakes, especially in overestimating the damage caused by those detainees who collaborated with the DINA and the Servicio de Inteligencia de la Fuerza Aérea (SIFA) (Air Force Intelligence Service).247

244 Marlene Martínez, Á., (2006), La experiencia política de los militantes del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (M.I.R). 245 See: CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 13 September 1973, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A0252000100001-0, released 20/01/2003, [accessed 04/05/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD; CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 14 September 1973, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A0252000110001-9, released 15/01/2004, [accessed 04/05/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD; CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 15 September 1973, available at CIA- RDP79T00975A025200120001-8, released 15/01/2004, [accessed 04/05/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD; CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 17 September 1973, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A025200130001-7, released 15/01/2004, [accessed 04/05/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 246 Pérez, C., (2003), "Historia del M.I.R., p. 18. 247 Andrés Morales’ testimony about his activities as a member of SIFA briefly illustrates the role played by collaborators in the repression against MIR and other leftist organizations. See: Memoria Viva, (1985), "Declaración Jurada: Andrés Antonio Valenzuela Morales", online, available at www.memoriaviva.com/culpables/agentes/valenzue.htm, [accessed 23/09/2010].

177

Informants and collaborators

The information provided by these informants and collaborators resulted in the severe weakening of the MIR so, by the time of the formalization of the Cóndor alliance in November 1975, the organization was no longer a threat to the military. This is a highly sensitive topic, not only for the miristas, but also for surviving members of the Tupamaros, ELN, ERP-PRT, and for other revolutionary groups in Latin America. Even today, the issue generates heated discussions and divisions amongst ex-guerrillas, and academics daring to analyse it.248 MIR’s leaders knew that the armed forces relied heavily on the use of torture to obtain information from detainees; however, they believed that the high levels of discipline and ideological preparation of its militants were strong enough to endure the harsh interrogation sessions carried out by DINA agents.

The MIR regarded those who caved in to DINA’s pressures and became collaborators as traitors. The latter were immediately ostracized from the organization and could be severely punished.249 This, one can argue, was a considerable misreading of the reality surrounding the prisoners. The leadership underestimated the torturers’ brutality and overvalued the detainees’ human capabilities to resist such duress. The organization adopted an inflexible and radical position while the information provided by the collaborators to DINA and SIFA played a key part in the organization’s defeat.

248 A clear example of these confrontations took place in Uruguay with the publishing of a controversial book written by ex-Tupamaro member Julio Marenales. See: Terra Noticias, (2010), Ex Tupamaro cuestiona a quienes se llaman progresistas, TELAM, 16/09, online, available at http://noticias.terra.com.ar/internacionales/ex-tupamaro-cuestiona-a-quienes-se-llaman- progresistas,1a2cde059ea1b210VgnVCM3000009af154d0RCRD.html, [accessed 22/7/2013]. The debate resurfaced in 2013, after Amodio Pérez (ex-Tupamaro leader who collaborated with the military) published a series of letters in the Uruguayan media to defend his position. See (2013), ¿Qué dice la carta de Amodio Pérez?, La República, Montevideo, 4Pixels, online, available at http://www.lr21.com.uy/politica/1097881-que-dice-la-carta-de-amodio-Pérez, [accessed, 4/05/2013]. 249 In some severe cases, the punishment included the death penalty. See: Marlene Martínez, Á., (2006), La experiencia política de los militantes del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (M.I.R).

178

The contrasting experiences of survivors like Luz Arce and Carmen Rojas clearly illustrate the magnitude of this controversy.250 The former was an ex-GAP (Grupo de Amigos del Presidente) (Group of Friends of the President, from the Socialist Party) who worked for DINA after her arrest. The latter, was a mirista who, despite being brutally tortured, refused to betray her friends. While Luz Arce was not a MIR member, the circumstances that led her to work for DINA were similar to those of miristas. It is also safe to argue that, due to DINA’s hatred towards this organization, MIR members’ interrogation sessions were in some cases worse than those endured by Arce.251 Carmen Rojas’ testimony, on the other hand, illustrates her views – and by extension, those of the organization – towards other MIR members who worked as collaborators and the damage they caused to the organization’s infrastructure.

Immediately after her arrest, DINA agents took Arce to a clandestine detention centre. For a short period of time, she resisted the harsh interrogation methods and did not provide any information that could compromise other GAP members. However, her will to resist did not last long. The DINA transferred her to another clandestine detention centre known as 38 Londres Street. 252 Once there, she was gang raped by several agents, tortured numerous times and received threats that her family, particularly her son, would be killed if she refused to collaborate.253 In the end, she could no longer endure these pressures and accepted to work for DINA.254 Some understood the difficult situation she

250 Rojas, C., (1988), Recuerdos de una mirista, Montevideo, Deltaller; Arce, L., (2004), The inferno. 251 For a detailed discussion of the various torture methods implemented by the Chilean armed forces see: Colectivo Taller de Reflexión, (1991), Informe Rettig y Fuerzas Armadas; Taller de Reflexión, Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos, (1999), Nunca más en Chile: síntesis corregida y actualizada del informe Rettig, Santiago de Chile, LOM Ediciones: Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos-Fundación Ideas. 252 Arce, L., (2004), The inferno, p. 37. 253 After one of these torture sessions, Arce felt ill and was taken to the Military Hospital, only to be raped again on several occasions by a male nurse. 254 During her time as a collaborator she worked with intelligence agents to hunt down those close to her organization and other members of the Chilean left. She also worked as a lecturer in Marxism at Chile’s War Academy and spent time in Montevideo, Uruguay, and in another undisclosed South American country as a spy for DINA’s successor, the Central Nacional de Intelligencia (CNI)

179

went through. However, Arce has been harshly criticised by many others for betraying the Socialist Party, the GAP, and the UP.255 The same happened to other male and female collaborators, especially to MIR members. Regardless of the rights or wrongs of their decision, the collaborators played a key part in the demise of their respective organizations. They provided the intelligence agencies enough information to arrest numerous members and leaders of their organizations as well as key infrastructure, resources and weaponry.

Important captures

The collaborators’ work, combined with the regime’s unrelenting repression led to the arrest of numerous high-ranking figures. The hunt for MIR members intensified after DINA’s creation in November 1973 producing immediate and devastating results. One of the first important blows was the detention of José Gregorio Liendo, (Commandante Pepe) and a group of miristas.256 This operation led to the seizure of ordnance and key documents. The information obtained from these detainees’ interrogation led to the incarceration of more leaders. The next major blow came on 13 December 1973 when the military captured Bautista van Schouwen (member of MIR’s Political Commission and one of the founding leaders of the organization) and his assistant, Patricio Munita.257 Van Schouwen’s arrest was an important victory for the regime. The intelligence services kept secret his incarceration for several weeks to allow agents to interrogate him intensely. When asked by the International Red Cross about his destination, government representatives denied any knowledge of his whereabouts. CIA officials in Santiago, however, reported to their superiors in the US that DINA agents appeared to be

(National Central of Intelligence). For further readings on these activities, see: Arce, L., (2004), The inferno. 255 Here it is necessary to point out that, after the Pinochet regime finished, Arce willingly volunteered to testify against DINA in a number of court cases. She provided valuable information that led to the identification of key torturers and helped to identify the, until then unknown, final destination of several disappeared people. 256 García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas, p. 170. 257 Pérez, C., (2003), "Historia del M.I.R.", p. 19.

180

responsible for his execution and that the junta planned to announce that he was killed while trying to escape from prison. US officials also predicted that “if other leaders such as Miguel Enríquez and Victor Toro [were] captured, they [would] also be executed”.258

Two competing intelligence agencies (DINA and SIFA) conducted the repression against the miristas. However, tensions began to develop between them in 1974. DINA, under the command of Manuel Contreras, was closely aligned with General Augusto Pinochet.259 SIFA, on the other hand, pledged its support to the military junta, but its loyalty remained with the Air Force’s commander in chief, General Gustavo Leigh. Pinochet and Leigh represented two different and powerful camps within the regime.260 This competition affected the two intelligence services. Thus, SIFA launched a series of operations against MIR with two main purposes: firstly, to neutralize DINA’s monopoly over counterinsurgency operations; and secondly, to obtain a leverage which would allow Air Force commanders to hold secret negotiation with MIR leaders.

Consequently, the guerrilla members became a precious prey for the competing forces. In March 1974, SIFA agents captured MIR’s military chief, Coño Aguilar (Arturo Villabela). The following month they arrested Victor Toro, Roberto Moreno and Luis Retamar, all of whom were key leaders of the organization, and kept them at the Air Force’s War Academy (AGA). SIFA sought to negotiate with MIR and proposed to release those prisoners held at the AGA. In exchange, they requested that MIR lay down its weapons and

258 CIA-Directorate of Operations, “Army arrest/execution of MIR leader Vonschowen, Carabinero concerns of HR abuse”, Information Report [not finally evaluated intelligence], No. 2692-15-4, 31 January 1974, approved for release 11/06/1999, available at CREST/FOIA online http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000345055.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2010]. 259 Martorell, F., (1999), Operación Cóndor, el vuelo de la muerte: la coordinación represiva en el Cono Sur, Santiago de Chile, Lom Ediciones. 260 See Sergeyev, F., (1981), Chile: C.I.A. big business, Moscow, Progress Publishers, p. 9.

181

surrender.261 However, the parties involved failed to reach an agreement and MIR’s leadership withdrew from the negotiating table.

The hunt for miristas intensified in the following months. The security forces inflicted another important blow to the organization later that year when DINA arrested Lumi Videla262, Sergio Pérez and other MIR members. Cristián Pérez argues that between September and October 1974, 21 of Miguel Enríquez’s closest friends were detained, “of whom only three survived”.263 After intense torture, most of these detainees provided the information that led to the arrest of MIR’s maximum leader.

According to the CIA, the capture of Miguel Enríquez was a combination of luck and perseverance by DINA’s agents. On 1 October, MIR members carried out a bank robbery in a desperate attempt to obtain funds. This action triggered a large security operation by the armed forces, which produced several arrests. By chance, on 5 October DINA agents discovered the house where MIR’s leader was hiding. After an intense battle, the security forces killed Miguel Enríquez.264 This was the organization’s greatest loss and it never recovered from it. The regime’s important victory, however, did not change the dynamics of the repression. It maintained the initiative and continued to strike against the guerrillas to prevent them from reorganising.

261 The communications bridge for this negotiations was maintained through Laura Allende (Dr Salvador Allende’s sister) and Monsignor Carlos Camus. Pérez, C., (2004), "Años de disparos y tortura (1973-1975), p. 371. 262 DINA agents detained Lumi Videla and took her to a number of clandestine detention centres. Despite severe torture, she refused to betray her friends and the organization. Consequently, her captors killed her and threw her naked body in the grounds of the Italian embassy. The killers left a note suggesting that Lumi Videla was executed because she betrayed the organization. Testimonies of other fellow detainees who saw Lumi at the various detention centres confirmed that she never gave any information to the torturers. Her brutal assassination and the way in which her body was disposed of at the Italian embassy sent a chilling warning to those living in exile. For further readings on Lumi Videla’s case see: Rojas, C., (1988), Recuerdos de una mirista, pp. 75-77; Arce, L., (2004), The inferno, pp. 163-164. 263 Pérez, C., (2003), "Historia del M.I.R.", p. 20. 264 CIA-Directorate of Operations, “Death of Miguel Enríquez, head of MIR”, Intelligence Information Cable, Information Report [not finally evaluated intelligence], 2974-316-4, 25 October 1974, approved for release 11/06/1999, available at CREST/FOIA online http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000345097.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2010].

182

The organization responded quickly in an attempt to mitigate and pre- empt the devastating psychological ramifications of the events that occurred on 5 October. The day after Miguel’s death, his brother Edgardo Enríquez released an urgent nine-point communiqué. This document reassured MIR members and the Chilean people that the organization’s capability to fight stayed intact.265

The responsibility of leading the organization fell on the shoulders of President Salvador Allende’s nephew, Andrés Pascal.266 Given the severity of the security situation, his task was difficult. Throughout most of the following year, MIR’s new Secretary General tried to maintain the same strategic line as his predecessor. The organization kept its commitment to stay in the country and continued to fight against the regime. It also tried to improve its relationship with other leftist parties including the PCCH, the Socialists and even the Christian Democrats (PDC) to broaden the resistance movement, but with little success.267 Despite these efforts, there was yet another devastating blow in store for the miristas.

Early in 1975, the regime staged what can be described as an effective piece of psychological warfare. On 19 February military authorities held a press conference in which four known members of the MIR announced the organization’s capitulation.268 They argued that they did not “want any more deaths or detainees. To continue the resistance in these conditions [was] suicidal”. They also maintained that “the regime’s only objective was to find

265 See García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas, p. 187. 266 Pérez, C., (2003), "Historia del M.I.R.", p. 21. 267 See Edgardo Enríquez’s speech at an event organized by the Committee to support the revolutionary struggle of the Chilean people, held on 5 February 1975 in Paris. At that rally, Enríquez outlined the organization’s failures and achievements. Although he recognized the regime’s unrelenting repression, the leader tried to diminish its damaging impact. in that speech, he asked representatives of other Chilean leftist parties to join MIR in the armed resistance to the regime. Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (M. I. R.), (1976), MIR: dos años en la lucha de la resistencia popular del pueblo Chileno 1973-1975, Madrid, ZERO S.A., pp. 401-410. 268 These members were José Carrasco, Cristián Mallol, Humberto Manateaux and Hector González.

183

reconciliation and national unity”.269 The conference continued with a detailed balance of the organization’s infrastructure. The four detainees reported that “from MIR’s Political Commission and the Central Committee, nine members were dead, 24 were in prison, ten were in exile, one was expelled and eight were fugitives”.270 The Chilean Junta held a second press conference two days later to confirm the organization’s defeat and that “26 other members agreed with the capitulation”.271

The announcement created uncertainty and exacerbated the divisions at all levels of the organization.272 Some detainees refused to surrender. Those who did surrender were “repudiated and considered traitors” and would face severe punishment, including the death penalty. 273 The uncertainty was even greater amongst those who were not in jail. To bring the situation under control the leadership released an urgent communiqué on 26 February. They announced that the four members had been “judged and sentenced to death for treason … [and for] consciously and actively collaborating with the dictatorship”.274 The communiqué generated tensions and division among the remaining members, which further weakened the organization.

269 García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas, p. 193. 270 MIR’s rendition in Cavallo Castro, A., M. Salazar Salvo and O. Sépulveda Pacheco, (1990), La historia oculta del régimen militar: Chile 1973-1988, Santiago de Chile, Editorial Antártica, p. 60. 271 Ibid. 272 These operations were not exclusive of the Chilean intelligence apparatus. Throughout the early-to-mid 1970s the Brazilian services also implemented similar operations with great success and devastating consequences for the leftist organizations in that country. The “desbocados” (the open- mouthed or those detainees who spoke at staged TV interviews to renounce the guerrilla struggle and speak in favour of the Brazilian military government) generated havoc within the Brazilian leftist movements. Several of these desbocados caved in to pressures from the intelligence services and, generally to save their relatives or friends from death or torture, agreed to speak in front of the cameras to express their repentance and support for the regime. The Brazilian leftist groups and most of their respective members considered the desbocados as traitors and ostracised them from the organizations. These controversial views and divisions continue today. Nilson César Maríano provides a detailed discussion of these matters in Brazil. See Nilson, C. M., (1998), Operación Cóndor: terrorismo de estado en el Cono Sur, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Lohlé Lumen, pp. 139-170 273 Rojas, C., (1988), Recuerdos de una mirista, p. 73. 274 Communiqué of MIR’s Central Committee in García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas, p. 194.

184

In this environment the leadership implemented a number of measures to reorganize its infrastructure with limited success. As part of this initiative, the organization sent Edgardo Enríquez and other members to Argentina to re- establish ties with the PRT-ERP. The Chileans sought to gain combat experience with their counterparts and build a basic infrastructure. However, in October 1975 DINA discovered the house where Andrés Pascal and other high- ranking members of MIR’s Political Commission stayed. After an intense battle, the security forces killed, wounded or captured a number of leftist guerrillas. Pascal Allende escaped and sought refuge at the Costa Rican Embassy.275 This decision had profound ramifications for the MIR. It further split the organization into two main groups. On the one hand were those who believed that Andrés Pascal had betrayed the organization.276 On the other hand, some believed that the Secretary General’s decision to flee the country was wise. If he stayed in Chile, it was certain that the military would kill him. This segment within the organization believed that Pascal Allende’s exile opened a new front to fight against the regime.277 Hindsight reveals that the MIR Secretary General adopted the right decision given the precarious security situation. However, at the time, the move deepened the divisions within the organization. It took the leadership two years to recuperate from this debacle.278

The miristas arrived in the mid-1970s at a similar situation as the Tupamaros and the ELN. Since 1973 the Chilean armed forces had inflicted serious damages to MIR’s infrastructure. The unrelenting repression led its leaders to make a number of fatal strategic and tactical mistakes. The heavy

275 Pérez, C., (2004), "Años de disparos y tortura (1973-1975)", p. 380. 276 Two years after MIR made its famous declaration of not going into exile, its leader broke that promise. As García Naranjo points out, many militants believed that “Pascal Allende had forgotten his high responsibility, walking over the cadavers of those compañeros who never surrendered to go into exile and escape from the country”. García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas, pp. 201- 202. 277 Ibid. 278 During 1977-1978 they launched a new offensive against the regime. However, it was ill prepared and ended as quickly as it had begun. The organization suffered another important defeat as those who entered the country with the mission of putting together a basic infrastructure were captured by the armed forces.

185

number of casualties and the loss of key figures such as Miguel Enríquez and other founding leaders left the organization in complete disarray. Their fall created a power vacuum which facilitated the emergence of a new generation of leaders. However, their inability to communicate with other militants made it extremely difficult for them to determine what to do or how to proceed. The situation was further aggravated by the eroding effect of those members who went on to collaborate with the regime’s intelligence services. They not only helped to arrest other members, but also gave the regime valuable insight into the structure, capabilities, and weaknesses of the organization. By monitoring the interaction between the detainees held at the various detention centres, and the detailed reports from the collaborators, the armed forces were always one step ahead of MIR. Furthermore, that information gave them a clear and accurate understanding of the organization’s internal situation and how to exploit it in their favour. It is in this chaotic environment and with these severe deficiencies that the miristas joined the JCR.

Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores-Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (PRT-ERP)

Origins

Of all the revolutionary organizations that established the JCR, the PRT- ERP was the largest and, arguably, the most militarised. However, despite these distinct features, this guerrilla group faced the same challenges that affected their revolutionary counterparts. Its history is filled with controversies, which are, in part, a product of the complex ideological divisions, political twists and turns, as well as strategic and tactical changes implemented by its leaders and militants at the time. In the 1960s and 1970s the organization struggled to maintain a coherent ideological line. This, it can be argued, strengthened the PRT but also became one of its most serious weaknesses. It strengthened it because it made the organization flexible enough to obtain the support of, and make strategic alliances with, various leftist groups. This flexibility, however,

186

made it difficult for its leaders to define a clear ideological and political plan to carry out the organization’s projects.

The PRT’s ultimate goal was to take state power and establish socialism. Nevertheless, the way in which the organization would achieve this goal was confusing. This was the area where the PRT was most vulnerable to criticism from friends and foes, in Argentina and abroad, especially after the armed forces launched their aggressive counterinsurgency campaign in 1975. Until then, however, three important factors compensated for this weakness: the PRT’s disciplined military structure, the commitment of its militants to the guerrilla struggle, and its strength in the student and labour movements.279

FRIP

Before becoming the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT) (Workers’ Revolutionary Party), the organization underwent a process of amalgamation of two political groups: the Frente Revolucionario Indoamericano Popular (FRIP) (Popular Indo-American Revolutionary Front) and Palabra Obrera (PO) (Workers’ Word). While both organizations merged to form the PRT, they maintained their own ideological and political lines, which created numerous confrontations and divisions later on.

On 9 July 1961 the brothers Francisco René, Oscar Asdrubal and Mario Roberto (Robby)280 Santucho, together with a small number of friends, founded

279 There were numerous revolutionary organizations in Argentina during the sixties and seventies. However, due to its military strength and, particularly, its participation in the JCR, the discussion here will focus exclusively on the PRT-ERP. Other groups like the Montoneros, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) (Revolutionary Armed Forces), etc., are included as part of the overall political background, or when they interact with the PRT. The following paragraphs trace the history of the PRT-ERP from its origins until the beginning of its demise in 1975. 280 According to Daniel de Santis, Roberto Santucho was a student of Economics at the Tucumán University. He was responsible for the creation of the Movimiento Independiente de Estudiantes de Ciencias Economicas (MIECE) (Independent Movement of Economic Sciences Students). The organization emerged as an alternative to the hegemonic ideological trends amongst university students during those years: humanism, integralism and reformism. His innovative plan sought to extract the students from a strict and close university framework, to merge them with the labour movement. Santucho wanted the unification of the student-labour forces, which represented a complete change of the University’s politics at the time. De Santis, D., (2009), Entre Tupas y Perros: un debate con Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro y Luis Mattini sobre Tupamaros y el P.R.T-E.R.P., Buenos Aires, Ediciones RyR, p. 35.

187

the Frente Revolucionario Indoamericano Popular (FRIP) in the province.281 The organization carried out political work and with the masses, predominantly amongst the sugarcane and forestry workers, as well as with the residents of the poorest barrios (shantytowns).282 As with most Latin American revolutionary organizations, FRIP’s leadership was inspired, among other things, by important political developments in the continent during the early 1960s.

Daniel de Santis argues that the Cuban Revolution in particular played a key part in this organization’s ideological radicalisation.283 The FRIP accused Argentina’s traditional leftist parties of being reformists and betraying the revolutionary struggle. As one of its most influential leaders, Roberto Santucho emphasised taking action, rather than wasting time in endless theoretical discussions. Pablo Pozzi maintains that this was FRIP’s most important contribution to the PRT. This emphasis on action led to the emergence of a more practical than theoretical style of militancy. However, this prevented its militants from developing their own political analysis and limited their ability to debate with other Marxists groups.284

Despite its ambitious goals, the organization grew at a very slow pace. Between its creation in 1961 and 1965, the FRIP focused on two main activities: attracting new members and strengthening the organization’s political platform. During this process, the fripistas attracted a conglomerate of minor leftist groups with varied ideological backgrounds, including the influential Partido Obrero Trotskista (POT) (Trotskyite Labour Party). Though the POT was not the largest

281 Ibid, p. 36. 282 Like the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the origins of the PRT are closely linked to Argentina’s rural labour movement, particularly, a number of industrial disputes carried out by sugarcane workers in the country’s north. 283 Ibid. 284 Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas : el P.R.T-E.R.P-la guerrilla Marxista, Buenos Aires, Eudeba: Universidad de Buenos Aires, p. 63.

188

amongst these groups, it was the most active and radical faction within the FRIP. More importantly, it had strong connections with the IV International.285

Palabra Obrera (PO)

In early 1965, the POT experienced a number of internal divisions, which resulted in the emergence of a splinter group called Palabra Obrera (PO) (Workers’ Word), led by Nahuel Moreno. The latter had strong ties with Argentina’s rural labour movement, mainly in the Tucumán province. These links went as far back as 1959 when Moreno and his group supported a series of strikes carried out by the Federación Obrera Tucumána de la Industria del Azúcar (FOTIA) (Sugar Workers' Federation of Tucumán).286

PRT ties with the IV international

In July 1964, FRIP and the Trotskyite Palabra Obrera (PO) agreed to organize a joint National Congress, which would be held six months later in January 1965. There, both organizations joined forces to establish the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT) (Workers’ Revolutionary Party).287 Pozzi states that, from the beginning, the PRT adopted the form of a Cadres Party instead of a Mass Party.288 Despite this agreement, however, the groups led by Robby Santucho and Nahuel Moreno tried to exert their political influence over the organization. This struggle for power thwarted the

285 In very general terms, the IV international emerged to counter Capitalism and . It upheld and promoted Trotsky’s principles of “Permanent Revolution” (i.e. a socialist revolution headed by the proletariat or working class) and the need for the globalisation of the socialist movement. According to Trotsky, a socialist state would not be able to stand by itself. In order for it to survive and resist the pressures of capitalism, it had to be accompanied by the emergence of other socialist states around the world. See: Trotsky, L., (1932), "In defence of october: a speech delivered in Copenhagen, Denmark in November 1932", online, available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1932/11/oct.htm, last updated 4/3/2007, [accessed 17/10/2010]. 286 Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 56. 287 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 13. 288 According to Pozzi, a “Cadres Party” implies that all its members belong to any of its structures and act or participate regularly. In this way, they are “revolutionary professionals.” On the other hand, the “Mass Party” splits its followers into distinct categories: militants (those who act or participate) and members. The Cadres Party focuses on class struggle, while Mass Party is close to the normal electoral parties. Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 186.

189

coexistence of Santuchistas and Morenistas, and Moreno quickly became one of the most influential intellectual figures within the PRT.289 For a brief period his Trotskyite faction dominated the PRT’s ideological debate.

Argentina’s social and political situation deteriorated in 1966. The Onganía regime’s policies led to the closure of several ingenios azucareros (sugarcane plantations) during that year. This triggered a number of strikes in Tucumán, which were strongly repressed by the armed forces. As a consequence, PRT leaders began considering a possible shift towards an armed struggle to support the sugarcane workers in that province. Yet, it would take the organization two more years to officially embrace this position.

According to de Santis, the PRT’s internal debate during that period gravitated around the issue of whether the conditions existed for such a tactical shift. Both, the FRIP and the PO agreed that the armed struggle was the only viable path towards a socialist revolution. However, while the former believed that the conditions were present in Argentina, the latter did not.290 These discussions delayed the organization’s final decision regarding this strategy. The discussions intensified after the Tricontinental meeting in Havana and the creation of OLAS in 1967. From then on, the PRT began to radicalise its plan to obtain power.

Ideology of PRT – anti-intellectualism

Critics of the organization frequently point out that most PRT leaders and members lacked a clear understanding of Marxist theories.291 De Santis, however, adamantly rejects these claims and argues that the PRT developed its own definition of Marxism-Leninism, independent from other Maoist or Stalinist parties.292 The organization maintained its ideological flexibility,

289 Ibid, p. 59. 290 De Santis, D., (1998), A Vencer o morir: P.R.T-E.R.P. docuemtnos, Vol.1, Buenos Aires, Eudeba Universidad de Buenos Aires, p. 11. 291 For further readings on this issue, see: Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas. 292 De Santis, D., (2009), Entre Tupas y Perros.

190

absorbing “all the trends emerging from Revolutionary Marxism without committing” itself to any one in particular. Its leaders, particularly those aligned with Robby Santucho, adapted the “Marxist methodology and experience” to meet the demands of Argentina’s unique social and political environment. 293 However, the organization’s increasing reliance on armed activities, and its insufficient theoretical depth, limited this process.

To discredit the organization’s political and ideological legacy, Márquez describes the PRT as an “… expanding tribe of leftist extremists”.294 This statement, however, oversimplifies the organization’s ideological and political history. As de Santis points out, the PRT-ERP’s leadership dedicated a considerable amount of resources and effort to the intellectual and ideological education of its members. According to this author,

[t]he leadership strongly encouraged the militants to study. We read everything and, within Marxism, we studied the classics. It was not recommended or forbidden (they never prevented anyone from reading anything) to read manuals or summaries, either the soviets or those of María Harnecker. […] We had at least three levels of political formation schools and two of military formation, with more than one centre for those of the first level…295

This freedom had a debilitating consequence for the PRT. Pozzi argues that the organization developed an important and rich praxis throughout its brief history. However, it failed to transfer the lessons obtained from that experience to the theoretical field. Militants and cadres were left to interpret the organization’s political line based on their own understanding and experience. This resulted in “permanent tensions between demo-populists and socialists, between the political and militarist lines…between the schematics and the flexible ones, and led to [political] hesitation and paralysis”.296

293 Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 55. 294 Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino, p. 24. 295 De Santis, D., (2009), Entre Tupas y Perros, pp. 51-52. 296 Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 125.

191

Influence of Che Guevara

Arguably, one of the most important influences for Roberto Santucho and other PRT leaders was Che Guevara. The organization, for instance, sent a number of cadres to help Guevara’s guerrilla foco in Bolivia.297 However, although Guevara’s revolutionary legacy strongly influenced Roberto Santucho, he disagreed with Che’s foco theory. Márquez argues that the difference between Guevarismo and Santuchismo was that Che Guevara considered that the establishment of a guerrilla foco in the jungle and mountains was sufficient for revolutionary success.298 On the other hand, Roberto Santucho believed that a guerrilla struggle needed to be supported and directed by a political party. 299 The latter would be responsible for guiding the armed struggle and working with the masses, particularly the labour movement. This work took place in factories and other industrial centres to support workers during industrial disputes and raise political awareness amongst them.

As a direct consequence of the Bolivian foco’s demise and the death of Che Guevara, the PRT split into two main strategic and tactical lines: a) a group supporting the armed struggle, called El Combatiente (The Combatant); and b) La Verdad (The Truth), which emphasised political work. Roberto Santucho led the PRT Combatiente, while Nahuel Moreno headed the PRT Verdad. The strategic divergences around the need to radicalise the organization’s revolutionary methods by fully embracing the armed struggle increased during

297 The PRT helped to create the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) (Army of National Liberation) in Argentina to give the Bolivians logistical assistance. After Che’s capture and subsequent execution at La Higuera in 1967, the Bolivian foco ended and the surviving Argentine guerrillas returned to the PRT. See Piñeiro, M. B., (2006), Che Guevara and the Latin American Revolution, Melbourne-New York, Ocean Press, pp. 28-30. 298 Cuban officials and people who knew Ernesto Che Guevara challenge this interpretation of Che’s foco strategy. According to Cuba’s ex-Chief of intelligence, Manuel Barbarroja Piñeiro, Che Guevara maintained that the guerrilla foco by itself would not win the revolution and that it was necessary to accompany the guerrilla struggle with political work with the masses. See: Piñeiro, M. B., (2006), Che Guevara and the Latin American Revolution, p. 47. 299 Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino, p. 28.

192

1967.300 While the Morenistas did not reject guerrilla theory, they did not see it as part of a prolonged revolutionary war.301 Within the PRT, Moreno became one of the strongest critics of Guevarismo, describing Che as a sectarian, mechanistic and revolutionary petit bourgeois.302 The discussions continued leading to the strategy of armed struggle taking centre stage the following year.

PRT IV Congress

On 25-26 February 1968, the PRT held its IV Congress. The organization’s decision to embrace armed struggle became one of the most important resolutions to emerge from the meeting. This was done from an internationalist point of view (i.e. aligned with the Trotskyite IV International), ‘demolishing’ the foquista line by placing the Party above the guerrilla.303 Consequently, a number of militants and leaders began to discuss the need to create a People’s Revolutionary Army, which would be directly subordinated to the PRT. The issue further exacerbated tensions between the Combatiente and La Verdad factions and resulted in Moreno’s departure from the PRT. On 6 March the El Combatiente magazine published the resolutions adopted by the IV Congress and launched a direct attack against Nahuel Moreno and his followers. In a short article entitled “La Verdad Apócrifa” (The Apocryphal Truth) the organization stated that

[t]he minority clique that broke away from our Party has appropriated the Party’s printing press … For this reason, the traitors of the revolution continue to edit ‘La Verdad’, which ceased to be the PRT’s [press organism] to become [the media outlet] of this petit bourgeois sect…304

Moreno’s departure had two important ramifications. First, the PRT lost one of its most influential intellectuals and, second, Roberto Santucho became the

300 In January that year, the leaders of the Tucumán Regional proposed the organization’s national leadership to launch an armed campaign by creating a rural guerrilla in the Tucumán province. 301 De Santis, D., (2009), Entre Tupas y Perros, p. 46. 302 Nahuel Moreno in De Santis, D., (1998), A vencer o morir, Vol. 1, p. 117. 303 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor"], p. 13. 304 El Combatiente in De Santis, D., (1998), A vencer o morir, Vol. 1, p. 138.

193

organization’s main leader. From then on, the guerrillas’ armed activities increased dramatically. In 1969, the PRT and other revolutionary organizations such as the Peronist Montoneros and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) (Revolutionary Armed Forces), were actively involved in the Cordobazo.305 The uprising increased the PRT’s popularity with a number of trade unions in Córdoba and other provinces. As a direct consequence of the Cordobazo, General Onganía resigned and General Roberto M Levingston replaced him as head of the military junta.

PRT V Congress – Creation of the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP)

During its V Congress (29-30 July 1970), the PRT decided to create the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP) (People’s Revolutionary Army), and the organization became known as the PRT-ERP. The ERP’s program sought Argentina’s national and social liberation.306 In order to achieve this, the guerrillas stepped up their military activities to complement the organization’s political work. For instance, ERP cells working in different factories carried out operations to support the workers during industrial disputes. In some cases they kidnapped senior managers of factories pressuring companies to negotiate with the workers.

305 The Cordobazo was a civil uprising that began with an industrial dispute in the Córdoba province. PRT critics, like Nicolás Marquez, portray the organization’s participation in this event as a barbaric act. The Marxist guerrillas, according to Márquez, took advantage of the social tensions in the region to provoke an uprising that would end with the creation of a Marxist state in Argentina. This author, however, fails to point out that Onganía’s regime harshly repressed the strikers with brutal force prior to these incidents. The workers, supported by the guerrilla organizations, responded by calling for a national strike. See: Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino, p. 22-23. 306 The ERP’s program also called for the: ‘rupture with the pacts that bind [the country] to the US and other foreign countries; establishment of a Social Democratic government system [and a] People’s Revolutionary government, directed by the working class […]; rupture with all agreements with the [IMF], Inter-American Development Bank [IDB] and with all other organizations of imperialist control and penetration; expropriation without compensation and nationalisation of all enterprises with imperialist capital and of those national capitals supporting it; nationalisation of Banks and Credit […] agrarian reform […] alphabetisation of the population, [to then] establish obligatory secondary education and opening of universities to the people through massive scholarships programs; elimination of unemployment and re-opening of factories closed during the past decade … absolute freedom of religion [and] elimination of the bourgeois army, the police and every other repressive organism and their replacement with the People’s Revolutionary Army’. ERP program in De Santis, D., (1998), A vencer o morir, Vol. 1, pp. 183-185.

194

At the PRT’s V Congress, Santucho presented his famous Minuta Sobre Internacional (Minute About International) in which he clearly stated the organization’s goals.307 In it, the guerrilla leader maintained that:

… it is evident that, for an organization like ours, there is no other alternative than fighting … for the construction of a new revolutionary International … For that fight to produce [concrete results], it is necessary, before anything, to win the respect of the revolutionary workers … [through the] development of the revolutionary war in our country and [maintaining] the closest ties with the revolutionary national liberation movements of Latin American and the world.308

Although Roberto Santucho re-stated his support and commitment to the IV International, he outlined the flaws that prevented it from becoming a truly international revolutionary vanguard. He suggested that the organization should introduce reforms and create a new International. The latter should resemble the III Leninist International309, but with the innovation of absorbing the theoretical contributions of the Vietnamese, Chinese, Cuban, Korean, and Albanian Parties.310

A few years later, Santucho put his vision for a new international into practice with the creation of the JCR, which he described as “the V International, alternative to the IV”.311 This alignment with the Trotskyite global movement, however, generated a wide range of problems for the JCR and, particularly, for the Argentine guerrillas. Immediately after its V Congress, the PRT-ERP deepened its ideological and political direction by basing itself on

307 The Minutas were a specific type of internal political documents within the PRT. 308 Minuta Sobre Internacional in De Santis, D., (1998), A vencer o morir, Vol. 1, p. 177. 309 Lenin ‘believed that the only way the socialist revolution could be successful was by socialist revolution occurring throughout the world’. To coordinate and achieve this goal, he helped to establish the Communist International (COMINTERN) in March 1919, which became known as the III International. The latter lasted until 1943. See The Communist International (1919-1943), Marxist , online, available at https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/index.htm, [accessed, 8/01/2014]. 310 Minuta Sobre Internacional in De Santis, D., (1998), A vencer o morir, Vol. 1, p. 180. 311 Roberto Santucho in Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 19.

195

the teachings of Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh and [particularly] Che Guevara. As a direct consequence of this ideological shift, Guevara’s revolutionary legacy regained influence over the PRT’s strategies and tactics.

Relations with Cuba

Some within the Argentine military argue that the rupture with the IV International cost the organization the loss of key international support.312 However, there are a number of mistakes in this interpretation. First, it was Nahuel Moreno’s faction that broke away from the International. Robby Santucho and the PRT Combatiente maintained ties with the IV international. Second, the reason why the PRT lost international support was precisely because of its connections with the IV International. Due to this loss of support, Santucho attempted to attract Cuban help by embracing the Latin American revolutionary Marxist ideals313, that is, the revolutionary principles that emerged from the Tricontinental and OLAS. However, the relationship between the PRT and Fidel Castro was quite complex, particularly, after the death of Che Guevara. From then on, Cuba shifted its foreign policy towards accommodating the views of the Soviet Union regarding peaceful coexistence. Nevertheless, from its beginnings, the PRT had been a strong critic of Soviet reformism. Furthermore, as revealed by the testimony of Tupamaro leader Efraín Martínez Platero, the PRT’s Trotskyite influence hampered its relationships not only with Cuba but also with socialist nations in Africa and Europe.314

While the Cuban government maintained contacts with the PRT and gave sanctuary to some of its leaders and militants, it avoided providing support for its military struggle. Instead, the Cubans recommended those who went on to join the JCR to associate with the Montoneros. This organization’s

312 See, for instance, File: Lt. Col. Ramírez (chief of intelligence destacamento), “Intelligence Report” [no date], in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box II, available at National Security Archive (NSA), George Washington University, Washington D.C. 313 File: Lt. Col. Ramírez (chief of intelligence destacamento) “Intelligence Report”. 314 See comments of Efraín Martínez Platero in Aldrighi, C, (2009), Memorias de la Insurgencia, p368-369.

196

‘progressive nationalism’, argued Fidel Castro, made it a natural ally for the South American guerrillas.315 In the mid-1970s, the CIA identified economic pragmatism, rather than ideological difference, as the main reason behind this apparent break between Cuba and the Argentine revolutionaries. According to this agency, “[t]he economic ties Cuba has developed with Argentina are too important to risk by giving significant support to the existing revolutionary groups”.316 Economic considerations might have influenced Fidel Castro’s decision. However, one cannot underestimate the ideological, political and strategic differences between Fidel Castro and the PRT, and the qualitative political changes that took place in Latin America after the death of Che Guevara. It is likely that these factors played a greater part at the time of providing military support to the PRT-ERP than mere economic considerations.

In 1971 the ERP launched a number of operations and Roberto Santucho participated in many of them. In August that year the armed forces captured the ERP’s leader in Córdoba and transferred him to a prison in Buenos Aires. The arrest had a considerable impact on the organization’s strategic and political activities. Benito Urteaga became the PRT-ERP’s interim leader during Santucho’s incarceration. Pozzi argues that, based on his perceptions and on communications with the leadership in prison, Urteaga began working towards developing a legal political line leading to the possibility of participating in a future election. However, the Party frequently changed its direction during this time, which translated into a confusing political position with regard to the future electoral process.317

Santucho’s imprisonment had two important outcomes for the organization. Firstly, it weakened the organization’s political line. Secondly, it

315 Fidel Castro as quoted by Efraín Martínez Platero in ibid. P. 369. 316 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The status of Cuban subversion in Latin America”, No. 0545/75, 2 May 1975, available at CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070044-5, released 14/09/2000, [accessed 25/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 317 Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 388.

197

allowed him to develop important strategic ties with other Argentine revolutionaries inside the prison.318 As a direct result of those contacts, the PRT prisoners escaped from the Rawson Prison with other members of the Peronist Montoneros and Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (FAR) (Revolutionary Armed Forces) in August 1972.319 Among the escapees was Robby Santucho. The government of President Salvador Allende granted political asylum to six of the ex-detainees.320 Later that year, these travelled to Cuba, following a decision from the Cuban government to grant them political asylum. However, this was as far as the Cubans would go and refused to provide any further assistance beyond limited military training. The break out from Rawson prison, however, was not entirely successful. The armed forces arrested sixteen escapees and executed thirteen of them in what became known as the Trelew massacre. The three who survived and managed to escape reported the executions.321

1973 Elections

The election of Hector José Cámpora paved the way for Juan Domingo Perón’s return from exile. The former took office on 25 May 1973 but remained as Argentina’s president for only two months.322 His resignation on 13 July opened the door for a new election and allowed Perón to stand for the presidency. Most revolutionary organizations ceased their armed activities and agreed to support the political process. The PRT, however, as an anti-Peronist group continued its revolutionary project and did not participate in the

318 Including members of the FAP, FAR, and some of the most leftist sectors of the Montoneros. 319 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 13. 320 For further readings on this event see Blixen, S., (1988), Treinta años de lucha popular: conversaciones con Gorriarán Merlo, Montevideo,Editorial Contrapunto, chapter 4. 321 Despite the overwhelming evidence collected since then, Márquez argues that the executions were another carefully staged lie by the Marxists to discredit the armed forces. In general terms, he maintains that if it was an execution, why did the armed forces permit three detainees to survive? Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino, pp. 35-36. However, the author omits from his analysis that, later on, the armed forces kidnapped and made to disappear the thee survivors (1977, 1979 and the last one in 1982). 322 During that period, Cámpora granted an amnesty to all political prisoners and resumed diplomatic and economic ties with the Cuban government.

198

elections.323 The organization accepted the truce offered by Cámpora and stated that they would not attack the president or the police forces. However, they declared that the ceasefire did not include the armed forces and that operations against them would continue.324 Some sectors of the PRT considered the possibility of contesting the election by presenting a presidential candidate. However, this alternative was quickly dismissed by the leadership in favour of continuing to work with the masses outside the electoral process.325

The two most prominent organizations (i.e. PRT-ERP and Montoneros) had opposing views regarding Juan Perón’s influence over Argentina’s labour movement. These generated tensions between the two groups. According to Márquez, the PRT saw Perón as having an anaesthetic effect over the workers. Although the Montoneros were in partial agreement with this point, they believed that the Peronist movement could be reformed. They remained loyal to the entrismo strategy, which sought to infiltrate the Justicialist Party and introduce reforms from within, transforming it into a Socialist Party.326 The perretistas, on the other hand, argued that Perón was closely aligned with Argentina’s most reactionary and conservative sectors and that his return to office would not benefit the working class. Santucho pointed out that these groups’ behaviour during the Ezeiza Massacre327, and Perón’s response to this

323 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor". 324 Here it is necessary to point out that the PRT saw the armed forces as a repressive tool at the service of Argentina’s bourgeoisie. This analysis, however, was not random or capricious. Instead, the PRT’s leadership based this view on the military’s behaviour during previous dictatorships. According to Gorriarán Merlo, the Argentine armed forces continued to be “a force separated from Argentina’s society and opposed to its current political process.” Blixen, S., (1988), Treinta años de lucha popular, p. 185. 325 For a detailed discussion of the PRT views of the democratic process and the elections see: Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, chapter 10. 326 See Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino, pp. 39-49. 327 When Perón returned from exile, on 20 June 1973 more than half million people gathered at the Ezeiza Airport to welcome him, including members of the right and left wings of the Peronist Party. The celebrations ended abruptly when elements of the right wing open fire on the crowd, deliberately targeting members of the party’s left wing, killing at least 13 people and wounding hundreds more. This event became known as the Ezeiza Massacre.

199

event, confirmed these views.328 The day after the massacre, the president spoke on radio and television and blamed the progressive sectors of Peronism for these events. However, not a single word of condemnation was applied to the Peronist right wing groups, who, as Gorriarán Merlo points out, were responsible for the massacre.329

Raúl Alberto Lastiri became Argentina’s new president after Cámpora’s resignation. He continued in office until October that year and directed preparations for the new presidential election that allowed Juan Perón to run for office. Although his presidency lasted only a few months and maintained some of his predecessor’s progressive policies,330 Lastiri made a sharp turn towards the right, prompting the radicalisation of the leftist guerrilla organizations, particularly the PRT-ERP.331 In early September, the perretistas resumed guerrilla activities, launching an attack against an army medical garrison in Buenos Aires.332 The objective was to capture large quantities of weapons and ammunition.333 These activities, however, did not stop the presidential election scheduled for later that month. On 23 September Perón won the ballot with a comfortable and unprecedented 60% of the votes. The following day, the Lastiri administration declared the ERP illegal and the organization went underground.334

328 See: Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, chapter 10. 329 Blixen, S., (1988), Treinta años de lucha popular, p. 192. 330 The Lastiri administration continued to have relations with Cuba and granted millions of dollars in loan to the Castro government. 331 Lastiri’s father in law was José López Rega, founder of the infamous far-right terrorist organization known as the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA). 332 De Santis, D., (2009), Entre Tupas y Perros, p. 69. 333 Lewis, P. H., (2002), Guerrillas and generals: the "Dirty War" in Argentina, Westport, Connecticut, Praege, p. 92. 334 Pastore, M., (2010), La utopía revolucionaria de los años '60, Buenos Aires, Ediciones del Signo, pp. 111-112.

200

President Perón took office on 12 October and the direction of his future political position became evident immediately. De Santis argues that, as soon as it took office, the Perón administration went on to introduce

…reforms to the Criminal Code, restored repressive legislation, introduced laws in favour of trade unions’ bureaucratic leaderships, protected the activities of paramilitary groups, and permitted López Rega to organize the AAA from within the Ministry of Social Welfare.335

These events confirmed what Santucho had said all along: in this new term in office, Perón would side with the reactionary forces and not with Argentina’s proletariat. In response, the PRT-ERP unleashed a series of military actions towards the end of 1973, ending the truce that had been in place since May.

Azul Barracks Attack

The organization started 1974 with a reinvigorated commitment to the armed struggle. On 19 January the ERP’s Héroes de Trelew (Trelew’s Heroes) Company attacked the Azul military barracks in Buenos Aires province.336 However, the operation failed to achieve its main objective: to capture the garrison’s arsenal. Consequently, the guerrillas “lost four men … and ERP leaders criticized Gorriarán’s conduct of the battle”.337 Despite the military failure, the operation produced an important political victory for the PRT-ERP. It was a clear show of force and sent a direct challenge to the Perón government and its security forces. Furthermore, as John Dinges points out, the ERP used the Azul battle to announce the creation of the JCR, on 14 February.338 From then on, the leadership had to deal not only with the complexities of running the guerrilla campaign at a national level, but also with coordinating and dealing

335 De Santis, D., (2009), Entre Tupas y Perros, p. 68. 336 El Combate de Azul, Parte de Guerra No. 1 in De Santis, D., (1998), A vencer o morir, p. 135. Enrique Gorriarán Merlo, the ERP’s military commander, led the eighty-men strike force during the assault. 337 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, pp. 58-59. 338 Ibid, p. 59.

201

with their South American counterparts. This task required considerable resources and energy, making things even more difficult for the leadership.

The operations against military installations continued throughout 1974. The organization’s documents and communiqués, published in several of its media outlets, demonstrate the leadership’s awareness of the country’s social and political deterioration and of the government’s increasing isolation from the masses.339 To accelerate this process, and to keep the pressure on President Perón, the PRT-ERP opened a new rural front in the Tucumán province. For that specific purpose, the organization established the Compañía de Monte Ramón Rosa Jiménez (Ramón Rosa Jiménez Forest Company) between February and March 1974. This represented a significant change of strategy and had profound ramifications for the future of the organization. The perretistas did not neglect their work with the masses, especially with the labour movement. De Santis states that “encouraged by its quick growth [and weight] amongst workers from large factories, the PRT participated in the most important industrial disputes at the time”.340 However, the activities in Tucumán slowly absorbed the organization’s energies and resources and led to a gradual dissociation between its political and military objectives. Consequently, the PRT-ERP was unable to effectively channel the strength of the growing mass movement into a coherent and effective political force.

339 See De Santis, D., (1998), A vencer o morir, chapters 3-4. 340 For instance, in the automotive and metallurgic industries of Córdoba, Rosario and Laguna Paiva, Eaton, Tensa, Insud, Idiel, Santa Rosa, Tamet Rigellau, [and] Propulsora in Buenos Aires. Also in the large proletarian actions of Villa Constitución, amongst the oil workers of Cutral-Co and Plaza Huincul [ and] in the struggles of the sugarcane proletariat in Tucumán and Salta. These were complemented with the successive congresses of the Anti-Imperialist Front and for Socialism, led by the PRT [which] continued to attract increasing numbers of compañeros, six thousand during the fourth congress held at Sáenz Peña, in the Chaco province. Eight thousand at the fifth in the city of Cordoba, where the presidential formula Agustin Tosco – Armando Jaime was proposed, which failed to materialise. Finally, in mid 1974, more than 25,000 militants and activists filled the stands of the Club Tiro Federal Stadium, in the city of Rosario. De Santis, D., (2009), Entre Tupas y Perros, p. 69.

202

Rural Front Tucumán

The decision to open a rural guerrilla front in the Tucumán province was not a random measure. The PRT-ERP had been operating in this province for a few years and gained considerable experience. More importantly, the organization’s leadership believed that the region’s geographical and political characteristics made it suitable for this endeavour.341 After establishing the Ramón Rosa Jiménez Forest Company in the Tucumán mountains, its militants descended on the urban centres to carry out political work and military operations.342 The Tucumán rural front sought to create a liberated zone in that region and establish a dual power. At first, this power would compete with the local government to then progressively expand throughout the country. These activities would speed up the formation of a National and Social Liberation Front.343

The rural front made important gains that year. Arguably, the taking of Acheral on 30 May 1974 was one of its most important successes.344 On that day, the Forest Company entered this town and captured the police station, telephone office, train station, and several points of access to the town.345 The operation represented yet another important show of force and a considerable strategic step forward in the PRT-ERP’s revolutionary process. It attempted to combine the organization’s rural and urban activities. Until July that year, the local and federal police, with the support of the armed forces, conducted the government’s anti-subversive campaign. However, they were unable to

341 Some of these favourable conditions included: high population density, impoverishment and overexploitation of workers, an impenetrable forest, plenty of water and a previous work carried out by the PRT. Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 294. 342 Key for their success was wining the hearts and minds of the population. To do this, the guerrillas bought products from local small businesses at much higher prices than those normally charged in the local market. They also carried out operations in support of local trade unions during industrial disputes and delivered blankets and food to those living in the poorest areas. 343 File: Lt. Col. Ramírez (chief of intelligence destacamento), “Intelligence Report”. 344 This operation share similarities with the Tupamaros’ taking of Pando city, in the late 1960s. See Gilio, M. E., (1972), The Tupamaros guerrillas, New York, Ballantine Books; Labrouse, A., (1973), The Tupamaros, pp. 73-75. 345 PRT-ERP Al Pueblo Argentino in De Santis, D., (1998), A vencer o morir, p. 220.

203

effectively stop guerrilla activities in the region. Santucho and other ERP leaders believed that nothing could stop the consolidation of a liberated zone.

President Perón died on 1 July 1974. His wife, María Estela Martínez de Perón (popularly known as Isabel or Isabelita), was appointed Argentina’s new president on 30 June. From then on, the country’s social, economic and political crisis deepened quickly. Strongly influenced by José López Rega, the new president introduced several changes to the ministerial cabinet, which signified a further sharp turn to the right.346 The emergence of the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (AAA) and its increasing terrorist activities, in conjunction with members of the police and the armed forces, exacerbated the security problems.

In this environment, the PRT-ERP achieved its greatest level of popularity and strength towards the end of 1974. Taking advantage of the growing military momentum, the leadership decided to complement the activities in Tucumán with attacks on several military installations. Roberto Santucho and other leaders strongly believed that the struggle for power was quickly evolving into a generalized war. Despite the loss of several militants, the perretisas continued to grow and gained considerable support from the masses. Pozzi argues that, by then, the PRT-ERP had established “important infrastructure in Córdoba, Rosario, La Plata and Buenos Aires. In Tucumán and Santiago del Estero its militants had already been working with the masses for more than ten years.” On the other hand, in areas such a Corrientes, Misiones and Patagonia, the achievements were more modest.347 This rapid growth, however, began to expose weaknesses at all levels of the organization’s infrastructure and created numerous problems for its leaders.

Despite its initial successes and the guerrillas’ popularity across the country, the rural front had severe deficiencies. In the early stages of this campaign, the militants’ high morale and willingness to participate in the armed

346 Blixen, S., (1988), Treinta años de lucha popular, p. 196. 347 Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 197.

204

struggle compensated for these serious shortages. One of these deficiencies emerged from the number of guerrillas forming the front. Some argue that the Forest Company in Tucumán was formed by a small number of combatants, while others state the opposite. For instance, Márquez concludes that the front had a total of 11,500 members, between combatants and sympathisers.348 However, the actual number of combatants was much smaller than this. Army General Ricardo Flouret, for example, states that the numbers oscillated between 200 to 300 guerrillas.349 Pozzi argues that the Forest Company was formed by some 50-100 militants.350 These numbers coincide with those suggested by ex- ERP’s leader Gorriarán Merlo. He states that the front never had more than 100 insurgents during the year-and-a-half in which it was operational.351 Hence, while the organization was highly popular among trade unions and the student movement in Tucumán, that popularity did not translate into new militants willing to join the Forest Company. The small number of guerrillas was one of the rural front’s first deficiencies.352

The small number of combatants also raises questions about the PRT- ERP’s objective in establishing a liberated zone. Despite claims to the contrary, it was unlikely that only 50-100 combatants would be able to establish, or much less defend, a liberated zone in Tucumán, particularly, given the complexities of its topography and its vast territory (more than 22,500 square kilometres).353 This led to Santucho and the PRT-ERP being harshly criticized by other left organizations. Osvando Coggiola, for example, argues that

348 Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino, pp. 132-136. 349 Interview with Gen Ricardo Flouret in May 1985, in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box III, Tucumán File, available at National Security Archive (NSA), George Washington University, Washington DC. 350 Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 289. 351 Blixen, S., (1988), Treinta años de lucha popular, p. 204. 352 It is true that, for a brief period, other organizations such as FAR and Montoneros carried out armed operations to support the ERP’s rural front in Tucumán. However, these activities lasted only a few months and failed to evolve into a much larger front as was hoped by the guerrillas. 353 This becomes even more evident when one takes into account that, only to encircle the guerrillas in the mountains, the armed forces mobilized thousands of soldiers. This was in addition to the manpower required to control the rest of the territory.

205

…when the situation was at its worst, the [PRT-ERP’s] foquista leadership made [more efforts to] conceal it. [They reported to] its militants, those who were in jail, [as well as the rest of the world] fantastic news about the military successes, ‘victories of the Forest Company’ (which was on the brink of transforming Tucumán into a ‘liberated territory’… [and that the organization] would request the UN to recognize it)…354

If anything, the weaknesses of this rural front further isolated the PRT-ERP from the population in Tucumán and the rest of the country.

In his final evaluation of this campaign, Pozzi identified further problems. He argues that the organization did not have a clear correlation between its political and military objectives. As time went by and, particularly, after the military launched Operación Independencia, the PRT-ERP’s leadership was absorbed in running military operations, neglecting work with the masses. In addition to this, most of the front’s combatants arrived from other parts of the country and did not know much about Tucumán’s terrain, which generated important problems for the front. The several testimonies collected by Pozzi clearly reveal that most of those who came from the large urban centres struggled to adapt to the harsh terrain and the poor living conditions of the guerrilla camps. This poor adaptation sometimes hindered the guerrillas’ mobility.355 Militants from other South American revolutionary organizations also joined the Forest Company to gain experience in guerrilla operations as part of the JCR. The South American regimes used this fact to exaggerate the threat posed by the guerrillas.356 In fact there were very few combatants and, more importantly, the armed forces detained or killed most of them shortly after the Argentine military took the initiative in 1975.

354 Coggiola, O., (1986), El Trotskismo en la Argentina (1960-1985), Buenos Aires, Biblioteca Política Argentina, p. 130. 355 For a detailed explanation of these deficiencies see: Pozzi, P., (2001) Por las sendas Argentinas, chapter 11. 356 See, for instance, the Uruguayan armed forces’ views on the JCR and the activities of Uruguayan subversives in Argentina. Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, (1976), Las Fuerzas Armadas al pueblo oriental, Vol. 1, pp. 451-453.

206

The PRT-ERP’s leadership underestimated the armed forces’ growing strength. It is true that the organization knew that the army exploited the situation in the region to gain budget concessions from the government. The funds allocated to the armed forces increased from US$ 217 million in 1967 to US$ 514 million in 1970. By 1974, the military’s overall budget reached US$ 600 million.357 This did not include other forms of financial assistance such as the US Military Assistance Program (MAP). The increase in the 1974 budget went ahead despite subsequent cuts of US MAP funds. Yet, while the PRT- ERP’s leadership was aware of this dramatic increase, they failed to understand its impact on the armed struggle. More importantly, as Pozzi argues, the leadership did not perceive the “… army’s anti-guerrilla tactical and strategic evolution”.358 These budget increases are frequently overlooked by critics of the PRT-ERP. Rather, critics usually focus on the millions of dollars obtained by this organization from numerous kidnappings. The PRT-ERP collected more than US$ 20 million from those operations. These funds, however, were split with the other JCR partners. Even if the organization had kept the entire bounty, this was nowhere near enough to match the strength or resources of the Argentine military.

Operation Independence

1975 brought an important change in the struggle for power between the guerrillas and the Argentine State and marked the beginning of the ERP’s demise. On 5 February, the government of Isabel Perón introduced Decree No. 261, giving the armed forces full control over the fight against the guerrillas in Tucumán. Article 1 stated that “the Army’s general command [would] proceed to execute the necessary military operations to neutralize and/or annihilate the activities of the subversive elements acting in Tucumán Province”.359 On 8

357 El Combatiente in Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 311. 358 Ibid, p. 310. 359 File “6/15/06” FOIA “Desarrollo de la lucha contra el terrorismo”, p.1, in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box II, available at National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington DC.

207

February 1975 the Argentine Army launched Operativo Independencia (Independence Operation). The latter consisted of three well-defined stages: Phase one (between February and June, 1975) consisted of the isolation of the guerrillas from the rest of the population and on intelligence gathering. Phase two (between June and October) involved the constant harassment of the insurgents. In this stage, the counterinsurgency forces entered the mountains to hunt down the guerrillas. Once the insurgency was obliterated, the operation moved on to Phase three (from October 1975 onwards) to secure and consolidate the victory.360

Generals Acdel Edgardo Vilas and led the operation. The former initiated and completed stage one. Initially, the strategy consisted of waiting for the guerrillas to come out of the jungles and focusing on the Tucumán population to eradicate all support for the insurgents. Shortly after his arrival in Tucumán, General Vilas publicly stated that the forces under his command would exterminate the guerrillas using non-conventional methods.361 By non-conventional methods he meant the use of counterinsurgency warfare tactics and other terrorist activities, in conjunction with far-right terrorists, to spread fear amongst the population. In other words, “the idea was to get rid of all guerrilla support. If that meant killing the lawyers of guerrilla defendants, so be it. ‘Make the people know that it would go very badly for them if they supported the guerrillas.’”362

The Triple A had already been operating in the area with the federal police and the armed forces by the time the army launched Operation Independence.363 General Flouret states that Vilas had the direct support of

360 Ibid, pp. 1-2. 361 Acdel Vilas in Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino, p. 30. 362 Interview with Gen Ricardo Flouret in May 1985, in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box III, Tucumán File, available at National Security Archive (NSA), George Washington University, Washington D.C. 363 Members of this organization kidnapped and assassinated members of the labour movement in Tucumán. The activities were mostly directed against members of the sugarcane workers’ trade union FOTIA. See: Interview with Mario Lucio Rodríguez, Secretary General of the sugar workers union in

208

López Rega and that a permanent communications channel existed between them. The general also created the first clandestine detention centre in the region and the country, “La Escuelita” (the little school) in Famaillá.364 Between February and June, the armed forces collected important intelligence about the PRT-ERP’s infrastructure from various sources (i.e. from the interrogation of detainees, collaborators, etc.). By then, the intelligence services had infiltrated several of the leftist organizations and trade unions linked to the guerrillas.365 This information led to a number of important arrests and more damage to the organization’s infrastructure.

In June the Army’s General Command introduced changes to Operation Independence. Vilas was succeeded by General Domingo Bussi, a hard liner who had spent time in Vietnam fighting alongside US forces. The new commander took a far more aggressive line than his predecessor and produced immediate successes. Some of his subordinates described him as “a despot, [with] no consideration, [as he] always maltreated his people...since he was a lieutenant”.366 His appointment as commanding officer of Operation Independence gave him the opportunity to put into practice all his knowledge of counterinsurgency warfare tactics.367 Tucumán became Argentina’s Vietnam and Bussi the Argentine version of General William Westmoreland.368

San José [after 1980], in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box III, Tucumán File, available at National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington DC. 364 Detainees were taken to this secret detention centre to be interrogated. 365 General Flouret, for example, argues that the intelligence services infiltrated the sugarcane workers trade union FOTIA and that one of its leaders was passing information to the military. As shown earlier in this section, this trade union had strong historical ties with the PRT. See Interview with Gen Ricardo Flouret in May 1985, in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box III, Tucumán File, available at National Security Archive (NSA), George Washington University, Washington D.C. 366 Ibid. 367 See Bologna, M., (2004), Los verdugos Latinoamericanos-las fuerzas armadas: de la Contrainsurgencia a la globalización, Civilización o Barbarie: Encuentro internacional “Desafíos y problemas del mundo contemporáneo”, Serpa, Portugal, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina. 368 General William Westmoreland commanded the US troops in Vietnam during 1964-1968.

209

The army implemented two parallel strategies in this province. The first consisted of pure counterinsurgency tactics to seek and destroy the PRT-ERP’s Forest Company. The second sought to address the social, economic and political problems in the province, which brought some infrastructural improvements.369 However, the army’s main strategy continued to be the implementation of counterinsurgency operations and of spreading fear amongst the population.370 The military’s success in this front encouraged the government to expand Operation Independence to the rest of the country. On 6 October 1975, the Executive passed Decree No. 2772, authorising the armed forces to widen its theatre of operations.371 A few days later, the Army’s General Command introduced Directive 404/75, which made official the guidelines contained in the previous Decree, and giving the Army exclusive jurisdictional control of the operation.372 Consequently, by late 1975 the guerrillas were almost eliminated.373

Urban Front Monte Chingolo

The army’s unrelenting pressure in the mountains of Tucumán inflicted severe losses on the PRT-ERP during the year and led its leadership to make

369 Some of the measures included: a) the creation of four towns (Captain Cáceres, Lieutenant Berdina, Sergeant Méndez, Private Maldonado), [each of them] with a civic centre, sports complex and barrios of 250-280 houses; b) Preparation and inauguration of 11 sports centres; c) construction and inauguration of 35 schools; d) construction of roads between the new towns and their connection with National Highway No. 38; e) installation of army mobile hospitals to conduct a sanitary census, vaccination and health attention. Lt. Col. Ramírez (chief of intelligence destacamento), “Intelligence Report”. 370 Ian Welsh defined these tactics as the ‘easy way’ of counterinsurgency strategy. Welsh, I., (2009), "Guerrilla warfare: the way of the weak", online, available at http://www.ianwelsh.net/guerrilla-warfare/, [accessed 24/09/ 2010]. 371 File “6/15/06” FOIA “Desarrollo de la lucha contra el terrorismo”, in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box II, available at National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington D.C. 372 Directiva del Comandante General del Ejército Nro. 404/75 (Lucha contra la subversion), in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box II, available at National Security Archive NSA, George Washington University, Washington DC. 373 See Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino, pp. 249-264.

210

numerous tactical and strategic mistakes.374 Like the Tupamaros in Uruguay during 1972, the Argentine guerrillas tried to open new guerrilla fronts to ease the pressure exerted by the military over the Forest Company in Tucumán. Santucho and other leaders believed that the situation in Argentina was ripe for this kind of operation and that a military coup was imminent.375 They also believed that a massive popular movement would emerge to resist the military takeover. To prevent a civil war (which would damage their economic and political interests) the Argentine bourgeoisie would cave in to popular pressures and the coup would be averted. This, however, turned out to be a serious misreading of the situation. As Pozzi argues, throughout Argentina’s history “the bourgeoisie’s tendency [when faced by] revolutionary danger has always been to unite and turn towards a government with strong authoritarian and repressive features”.376 This is exactly what the Argentine bourgeoisie did from 1974.

The PRT argued in favour of obtaining weapons and ammunition to arm the masses as a way of preventing a military coup. On 23 December 1975, approximately 200 guerrillas launched an attack against the Army’s Arsenal Battalion 601, in Monte Chingolo, Buenos Aires to capture the garrison’s entire arsenal.377 This action became known as the Frente Urbano Monte Chingolo (Monte Chingolo’s Urban Front). According to de Santis, the seized arsenal would be used to establish a “Forest Battalion, a second rural front in Tucumán, an urban battalion in Buenos Aires and numerous urban companies”.378 The

374 During July and December, the PRT suffered numerous blows to its infrastructure, including the destruction of its national printing network, the capture of its National Infrastructure apparatus, including its leader; …the almost total obliteration of its Tucumán regional and the disarticulation of its organization in the smallest cities, the permanent arrests of militants, and the Ciernes Forest Company’s failure…Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 383. 375 Throughout October and November 1975, several trade unions and student organizations were mobilized throughout the country (i.e. strikes, marches, riots, etc.). 376 Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 385. 377 That is, 900 FAL rifles with 60,000 rounds of ammunition, 100 M-15 with 100,000 rounds of ammunition, six 20mm anti-air cannons with 2,400 shells, 150 sub-machine guns, etc, totalling approximately 20 tones. De Santis, D., (2009), Entre Tupas y Perros, p. 76. 378 Ibid.

211

operation, however, failed completely. While most of the guerrilla managed to escape, the organization was unable to recover from the internal political crisis that arose immediately afterwards as a consequence of this debacle.

The military knew about the plan to attack the garrison, a key reason for the failure of Monte Chingolo. The security forces had developed an impressive intelligence network during Operation Independence’s Phase one. The Economist reported that “the massacre of hundreds of guerrillas and civilians living in the vicinities and the failure of the Monte Chingolo operation…was due to the excellent information provided by the military’s infiltration of the guerrillas…”.379 Subsequently, the PRT-ERP suffered the same fate as its South American counterparts. Intelligence agents infiltrated its ranks and created havoc in its infrastructure, prompting the death and capture of numerous militants, desertions, and the recruitment of numerous informants.

The loss of military momentum generated paralysis and a deep internal crisis amongst leaders and cadres. According to intelligence reports, this crisis was exacerbated by the following factors:

a) loss of popular support; b) significant number of casualties amongst its personnel, including its most experienced leaders; c) important loss of material, armament and propaganda infrastructure; d) deficient financial situation; e) considerable loss of combat efficiency; f) uninterrupted series of significant operational failures in both, its rural (Tucumán) and urban (Monte Chingolo) fronts.380

This seriously affected the morale of its combatants, and their will to carry on fighting quickly diminished, especially in the immediate aftermath of the March 1976 coup. The final blow for the PRT-ERP came shortly after the military took over the country when the security forces detained and killed Robby Santucho and several other leaders.

379 The Economist in Coggiola, O., (1986), El Trotskismo en la Argentina (1960-1985), p. 129. 380 File “6/15/06” FOIA “Desarrollo de la lucha contra el terrorismo”, in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box II, available at National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington D.C.

212

Relationship with other organizations

Before concluding this section, it is necessary to briefly address another important issue: the relationship between the PRT and members of the other organizations that joined the JCR. This is another topic that generates controversies and heated debates amongst surviving members of these organizations. One of these debates took place between Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro and Daniel de Santis in 2009.381 Huidobro argues that after its military defeat in 1972, the Tupamaros were in complete disarray. Furthermore, the MIR and, particularly, the PRT quickly influenced those who escaped to Chile and Argentina. This ideological and political influence led to a dramatic transformation of the MLN-T, taking the organization away from its original structure and prompting its disintegration.382 De Santis strongly rejects that claim and criticises the sources used by Huidobro to reach that conclusion.383 He denies that the PRT carried out an ideological colonization of the MLN-T, or any other organization for that matter.384 However, the testimonies of several ex-Tupamaros exiled in Argentina and Chile seem to confirm Huidobro’s claims.385

Similar arguments exist of the PRT’s influence over the other organizations participating in the JCR. Due to its political and military strength,

…the PRT-ERP initiated a process of transformation in the other three organizations. [The perretistas criticised the] MIR for its lack of proletarianization and for hesitation in resuming the

381 In 2001, Huidobro published the first edition of Historia de los Tupamaros: En la Nuca. Between then and 2004, five editions have been produced by its publisher. In it, the ex-Tupamaro leader analyses the causes that had led to the defeat of the Tupamaros and also the relationship between its militants in exile and other revolutionary organizations like the Chilean MIR and the Argentine PRT-ERP. 382 See Huidobro, F., (2004), En la nuca. 383 De Santis argues that Huidobro’s claims are based on Luis Mattini’s historical analysis of the PRT, which does not necessarily reflect the “true” story of the organization. He describes Mattini as one of the PRT’s renunciantes, making a direct comparison with one of the most controversial MLN- T factions. 384 De Santis, D., (2009), Entre Tupas y Perros, p. 89. 385 See: Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, pp. 179-216.

213

armed struggle during the Pinochet dictatorship. They also described the Tupamaros as petit bourgeois democratic nationalists and the ELN as a guerrilla group without a defined political line.386

Thus, as Garzón states, a better name to accurately describe the JCR’s structure would have been Junta de Subordinación Revolucionaria (JSR) (Junta of Revolutionary Subordination).387

The issue of ‘proletarianization’ also generated tensions between some sectors of these organizations. The PRT-ERP had strong views regarding class struggle and, particularly, about the negative influence of the petit bourgeoisie in the revolutionary process. According to Pozzi, “a militant with theoretical capacity was seen as ‘argumentative’ or simply as an ‘intellectual’, which was equated to ‘petit-bourgeois’”.388 Their class origin prevented them from understanding the hard living conditions of workers in general. Thus, the PRT sought the proletarianization of these militants, that is, it sent them to work in factories and live in the marginal towns to experience the workers’ hardship. For the PRT, proletarianization

…was not only to gather experience in factories. There were also some practical objectives behind it, like taking revolutionary theory and socialism to the working class [as well as to] organize the cell and the party’s committee in the factory […] However, this work was not a dogmatic scheme, it was flexible.389

De Santis emphasises the positive and enriching aspects of this experience for many PRT members, including himself. However, the issue was far more complex than this and the outcomes were not always as pleasant for members of the PRT, and for those of other organizations.

The experiences of the Uruguayan and Chilean revolutionaries reveal that, on many occasions, the PRT took the issue of proletarianization to extreme

386 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 19. 387 Ibid, p. 18. 388 Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 133. 389 De Santis, D., (2009), Entre Tupas y Perros, p. 50.

214

levels.390 According to Huidobro, Walter González, an old leader of the Uruguayan sugarcane trade union (UTAA), saw in one of the proletarianization colonies another compañero “straightening thousands of nails…Surprised, he asked what he was doing: – The Party decided that my main petit bourgeois defect is the lack of perseverance. [Hence] they gave me this task…until I correct myself”.391

Not even the leaders of these organizations were exempt from this experience. After the death of Miguel Enríquez, his brother, Edgardo went to Argentina to expand MIR’s ties with the PRT-ERP. Once there, the latter’s leadership “decided to take him to a barrio obrero (workers’ suburb) to live in a precarious house without hot water”. This was done so he could learn about “the living conditions of the working class. His position as MIR’s leader and his middle class origins [argued the PRT leadership] affected [MIR’s] ideology [which demonstrated a clear] lack of proletarianization”.392 While the four organizations kept working together, this issue created tensions that hindered the functioning of the PRT and, particularly, the JCR.

The PRT-ERP had rapidly become one of Argentina’s most influential revolutionary organizations in the 1960s and, above all, during the first half of the 1970s. However, its frequent change of strategies, ideological divisions, and the subsequent lack of theoretical depth exposed a number of severe weaknesses. These weaknesses were exacerbated by the army’s intervention in the conflict and the subsequent launch of Operation Independence. This provoked an increased dissociation between the organization’s political and military goals. While the PRT-ERP was popular with the labour and student movements, the organization struggled to transform this popularity into an effective political or military force. By mid-1975 most of the leadership’s efforts were directed towards keeping the organization alive and combative rather than on the JCR.

390 See Clara Aldrighi’s interviews with Tupamaros who witnessed the hardship experienced by several militants regarding this issue. Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, p. 266. 391 Huidobro, F., (2004), En La Nuca, p. 43. 392 Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", p. 20.

215

The JCR

Following the publication of the JCR’s first document, the four participating organizations agreed to launch a series of simultaneous operations in their respective countries during 1974. With these actions, the JCR leaders hoped to spark the continental revolution. However, the South American regimes’ response was swift and brutally efficient. The armed forces arrested those responsible for rebuilding the guerrilla infrastructure shortly after they entered their countries. More importantly, the analysis of their internal situation reveals that each organization faced the unrelenting repression of the armed forces, and numerous internal divisions by the end of that year. In addition, Efraín Platero’s earlier trips to Cuba, Africa and Europe failed to gain the much- hoped international support for the JCR’s guerrilla struggle. The organization’s leaders made a new attempt to attract supporters for the cause during the following year.

The Arrests of Amilcar Santucho and Isaac Fuentes

After Platero’s resignation from his position as JCR’s ambassador in 1974, the leadership appointed Roberto Santucho’s brother, Amilcar Latino of the PRT, and Jorge Isaac Fuentes, of the Chilean MIR to replace him. In May 1975, Robby and other leaders of the JCR agreed to send a new mission in search of support for the organization. However, the operation failed when the Paraguayan police captured both members at the town of Enramada while entering that country by bus. The reasons behind the trip remain unclear. Stella Calloni, for example, suggests that both Amilcar Santucho and Jorge Fuentes crossed the Paraguayan border in an attempt to escape the brutal repression of Operation Colombo and the activities of the Triple A in Argentina.393

Paraguayan Intelligence documents confirm that Amilcar was “detained on 16/5/1975 (…) for having an Argentine leftist newspaper (…) [and that he]

393 For further readings on this version see: Calloni, S., (1999), Los años del lobo: Operación Cóndor, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Continente: Peña Lillo; Calloni, S., (2001), Operación Cóndor: pacto criminal, México, La Jornada, pp. 85-102.

216

presented himself to the authorities under the name of Juan Manuel Montenegro”. The Chilean Isaac Fuentes Alarcón or Ariel Nodarse Ledesma, on the other hand “(…) [was] detained on 17/5/75 (…) for accompanying Amilcar Latino Santucho Juarez during his trip”.394 Although several testimonies in Chile395 and Paraguay396 confirm the duo’s arrest by the Paraguayan security forces, none of them clearly establish the motive for the journey. Dr. Martín Almada argues that, while sharing a prison cell with Amilcar Santucho, the latter told him that his intention was to travel to Europe with Fuentes.397 However, there is no mention in this testimony of what kind of activities they would carry out there or who they would contact.

Only Luis Mattini’s testimony sheds some light on the purpose of this operation. Yet, even his statement is at odds with other JCR documents. According to the ex-PRT-ERP leader, the mission

… was an incursion as well as an informational trip to carry out a survey of the level of determination (voluntad) of the Latin American revolutionaries. It was like a preliminary probe. Afterwards they were supposed to deliver a report and then go out again to cement alliances or memberships – also move [the JCR’s Headquarters] to Venezuela.398

394 Note here the difference on the day of detention of both prisoners. While some argue that they were captured at the same time, this document shows that Santucho was arrested first, while Fuentes was detained the following day. Grupo de Averiguaciones in Comisión de Verdad y Justicia (C. D. V. Y.J), (2008), Informe Final: Síntesis y Caracterización del Régimen, Asunción, Paraguay, Editora J C Medina, Vol. 1, part II, pp. 219-220. 395 See caso Isaac Fuentes in Colectivo Taller de Reflexión, (1991), Informe Rettig y Fuerzas Armadas, pp. 866-867; Centros de Estudios Miguel Enríquez, (2009), Fuentes Alarcón, Jorge Isaac, Archivo Chile: historia político social-movimento popular, Santiago, Chile, CEME, online, available at http://www.archivochile.com/Memorial/caidos_mir/F/fuentes_alarcon_jorge.pdf, [accessed, 17/01/2010]. 396 Comisión de Verdad y Justicia (C. D. V. Y.J), (2008), Informe final: síntesis y caracterización del régimen, Asunción, Paraguay, Editora J C Medina, pp. 219-220. 397 Dr. Martín Almada in Poder Judicial de la Nación, (2004), Causa No. 13.445/99 "Videla, Jorge Rafael y Otros s/Privación Ilegal de la Libertad Personal y Otros", Juzgado Nacional en lo Criminal y Correccional Federal 7, Buenos Aires, Poder Judicial Nacional, online, available at http://www.cels.org.ar/common/documentos/procesamientos_septiembre.doc, [accessed 29/10/2010]. 398 Luis Mattini in Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 87.

217

However, Mattini’s testimony contradicts what the organization had stated a few months before the trip took place. On February 1975, in the Che Guevara magazine’s issue No. 2, the JCR stated that

The internationalist unity of the Latin American vanguard, the main thrust of the JCR, is a strategic element of the people’s struggle for liberation in our continent. … This is the way in which our sister organizations from Peru, Venezuela, Guatemala, Brazil, Paraguay, Mexico, Colombia, Nicaragua, Santo Domingo and El Salvador see it, [and] with whom we have established relations for the purpose of unification.399

If the JCR’s claims in this magazine are correct, then the attempt to find out the level “of determination of the Latin American revolutionaries” or “preliminary probe” was an unnecessary and dangerous risk. Right at this time, the repression in Argentina neared its climax (prior to the 1976 coup) and Operation Independence approached the completion of Phase One. By then, the Argentine armed forces had developed an extensive intelligence network and had detailed information about the PRT-ERP’s strengths and weaknesses.

Regardless of the intention, the arrests of these two figures sparked the multilateral cooperation between the intelligence services of four countries (i.e. Argentina, Paraguay, Chile and the United States). More importantly, it speeded up the process that led to the formalization of the Cóndor Plan. After their arrest at Enramada, Santucho and Fuentes were immediately transferred to the infamous Investigations Department in Asunción. Once there, Paraguayan intelligence agents interrogated the two detainees. According to John Dinges, the proceedings “revealed information about the JCR structure in a half-dozen European countries and of the solidarity infrastructure being set up all over Latin America, Europe, and the United States”.400

The Paraguayan authorities found a small book with a list of addresses in numerous countries, including the US, among Fuentes’ belongings. The

399 Che Guevara magazine in De Santis, D., (1998), A vencer o morir, Vol. 1, p. 366. 400 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 89.

218

Paraguayans shared that information with the US Legal Attaché (FBI representative) at the US embassy in Argentina, .401 Subsequently, the latter contacted “his main police source in Chile, General Ernesto Baeza, about the JCR arrests”.402 The Paraguayans also informed their Argentine counterparts about Santucho’s arrest. Shortly afterwards, José Osvaldo Ribeiro (Rawson), a member of Argentina’s Secretaría de Informaciones del Estado (SIDE) (Secretariat of State Information), sent a questionnaire for Alicia (Amilcar Santucho) to the intelligence agents in Paraguay.403

Rawson’s questionnaire reveals that the Argentine army knew about this trip before the arrests of Santucho and Fuentes. Amilcar’s daughter told SIDE agents about it after her capture and severe torture. The Argentine agent wanted to know as much as possible about the JCR’s hideouts. He knew about Santucho’s knowledge regarding the organization’s financial connections and suggested the possibility of establishing links for future negotiations. The questionnaire also showed interest in the JCR’s catálogo número 2 (catalogue number 2). It is highly likely that by catalogue number 2, Rawson referred to issue number 2 of the Che Guevara magazine, published in February 1975.404

By the time of Santucho’s arrest, the Argentine security forces had already inflicted serious blows on the organization, and intelligence agents closely monitored its published material. Much of the information disclosed in this magazine was part of the organization’s propaganda infrastructure.

401 Scherrer had close ties with Benito Guanes Serrano, a high-ranking official of the Paraguayan armed forces’ intelligence services. 402 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 91. 403 The original Spanish version of this document can be found at the Paraguayan Terror Archives, Asunción, Paraguay. Its digital version can be accessed on line at the National Security Archive- NSA’s website, Osorio, C. and M. Enamoneta, (2007), Rendition in the Southern Cone: Operation Condor documents revealed from Paraguayan “Archive of Terror”, online, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB239d/index.htm, [accessed 17/01/2012]. 404 This document has been cited earlier in this chapter. In it, the JCR announced its ties with several Latin American organizations. See: Che Guevara magazine in De Santis, D., (2000), A vencer o morir: P.R.T-E.R.P. documentos, Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, Vol 2, p. 366.

219

However, it also contained important announcements regarding activities of the JCR. High-ranking Cuban officials had previously questioned the organization leadership’s decision to publish such information.405 Ex-ERP militant and member of the Cuban intelligence service, Jorge Masetti, confirmed that the Cuban government strongly disagreed with the publication of this material. This was mainly “because Cuba maintained that it was necessary to establish a real and effective coordination, but without making it public…because making it public gave the enemy an excuse to repress it…” in coordination with its allies.406 In other words, the Cuban government argued that the organization revealed too much detail about its activities and contacts, which in time would be used by the armed forces’ intelligence services against them.

The JCR’s leadership, on the other hand, maintained that the publication of such information (e.g. contacts with other organizations in Latin America and other regions, etc.) was necessary to demonstrate that the organization was serious about its internationalist objectives. The JCR, and particularly the PRT, dismissed the Cubans’ advice and continued with this tactic. It is possible then, that the information contained in the magazine Che Guevara’s issue number 2 attracted Rawson’s attention and he was trying to trace it and confirm it through Amilcar Santucho.407 If that was the case, it confirms Cuba’s fears and exposes yet another weakness of the JCR.

The questionnaire also reveals that the Argentine army wanted to know details about the JCR’s communication system, the names of leaders and key figures, its cadres and leaders training centres, their location, and numbers of students. SIDE was also aware of important political developments within the

405 For further readings on the relationship between Fidel Castro and the JCR and, particularly, with the PRT. see: Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas; Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia. 406 Jorge Masetti in Lessa, A., (2003), La revolución imposible: los Tupamaros y el fracaso de la vía armada en el Uruguay del siglo XX, Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo, p. 132. 407 Other questions in Rawson’s questionnaire about the contacts with other organizations throughout the continent and about the political developments within the Bolivian ELN are further evidence of this.

220

Bolivian ELN and the creation of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores (PRT-Bolivia) (Bolivian Workers’ Revolutionary Party). Rawson asked Santucho to clarify how much influence the Argentine PRT exerted over the Bolivian ELN. The last questions in this interrogation sought to determine the whereabouts of Roberto Santucho. The SIDE agent hinted at the possibility of negotiating with the PRT leader.408

The Paraguayans received SIDE’s questionnaire and, based on its content, proceeded to interrogate Amilcar. They also received a similar set of questions from the Chilean DINA for Jorge Fuentes. Shortly after this, intelligence agents from both countries travelled to Asunción to extract further information from the prisoners. Dinges argues that “after several sessions of torture, the two arrested were taken to the offices of Pastor Coronel [Chief of the Investigations department during the Stroessner regime] for more questioning with the presence…” of intelligence officers from those countries.409

Paraguayan authorities held Amilcar Santucho for several years while Pastor Coronel tried to extradite him to Argentina in exchange for Paraguayan citizens living in the neighbouring country.410 After intense pressure from international human right organizations and other governments around the world, the Stroessner regime released Santucho and allowed him to travel to Sweden where he was granted political asylum. Jorge Fuentes was less fortunate.411 In September 1975, the Paraguayans handed him to DINA agents who secretly took him to Chile for further questioning. Several testimonies of

408 S.I.D.E’s Questionaire for Alicia (Amilcar Santucho), July 1975, in Osorio, C. and M. Enamoneta, (2007), Rendition in the Southern Cone: Operation Condor documents revealed from Paraguayan “Archive of Terror”, online, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB239d/index.htm, [accessed 31/10/2010]. 409 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 97. 410 See: Pastor Coronel to Gral Francisco Britez, Letter (no date), Asunción, Paraguay, Doc. No. 0246F0370, in Box documentos recuperados, File Dpto VII, available at Terror Archive (CDYA), Asunción, Paraguay. . Museo de la Justicia – Centro de Documentación y Archivo-M-CDYA (Terror Archive), Asunción, Paraguay. 411 Calloni, S., (2001) Operación Cóndor, p. 196.

221

surviving prisoners identified Jorge Fuentes at , one of DINA’s clandestine detention centres.412 According to García Naranjo, he was taken from this camp on 12 January 1976 and dissappeared.413

The information extracted from the two detainees helped the South American armed forces to confirm and exchange much of the information they already had about the JCR.414 More importantly, it gave them vital information that would lead to the arrest of prominent JCR figures like Roberto Santucho, other PRT-ERP leaders, and Edgardo Enríquez from MIR. John Dinges argues that, “for these intelligence services, these arrests highlighted the benefits of multilateral cooperation and would result, in the successive months in …” the Cóndor Plan.415

The military’s views and analysis

Earlier in this chapter it was stated that there are two paths to explain the origins of the JCR. The first places the organization within a specific historical context and portrays it as a logical evolution of the principles established by the Tricontinental, OLAS, and Che Guevara. The intelligence services participating in the secret Santiago meeting of November 1975 used this argument to justify the formalization of the Cóndor Plan. This line suited the regimes’ political

412 See: Colectivo Taller de Reflexión, (1991), Informe Rettig y Fuerzas Armadas. 413 García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas, p. 209. 414 Throughout 1974 and 1975, for example, the Uruguayan and Argentine security forces worked together to capture members of the MLN-T living in Buenos Aires. In February 1974, Major Manuel Cordero from the Uruguayan Army’s intelligence service SID, presented a detailed report on the relationships and contacts between the MLN-T and other organizations in neighbouring countries. The report stated that, in a joint operation carried out by the Argentine and Uruguayan intelligence services, more than 150 persons were arrested. This operation, argued Mayor Cordero, resulted in “the loss of very important cadres almost impossible to replace”. The arrests not only were severely detrimental for the Uruguayan Tupamaros but also for the other organizations involved in the JCR. See: Documento de la División de Ejército III elaborado por el Mayor Manuel Cordero sobre las relaciones existentes entre el MIR (Chile), el PRT-ERP (Argentina), ELN (Bolivia), MLN (Uruguay) y la formación de la Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria (JCR), February 1974, Uruguay. In Presidencia de la República Oriental del Uruguay, (2011), Actualización de la investigación histórica sobre detenidos desaparecidos, Uruguay, Presidencia de la República, online, available at http://www.presidencia.gub.uy/wps/wcm/connect/presidencia/portalpresidencia/comunicacion/inform es/investigacion-historica-sobre-detenidos-desaparecidos, [accessed 19/04/2012]. 415 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 97.

222

interests. It allowed them to link the JCR to a much larger Marxist international plot to take over the continent and justify their actions as a genuine defensive strategy. The second path towards interpreting the JCR’s origins emerges from the close scrutiny of the four revolutionary organizations participating in this project. It is true that their documents referred to these historical connections, particularly with Che Guevara. However, examination of their internal situation demonstrates that their participation in the JCR was plagued with deficiencies. Instead of a logical historical evolution, the JCR was a desperate and futile attempt to keep the organizations alive.

While Dinges acknowledges that the JCR “never presented a serious threat to the dictatorships…” he argues that “it is undeniable that the military services gave high credence to the information they were exchanging in secret among themselves”.416 The second part of this statement seems to suggest that the armed forces misinterpreted the level of threat posed by the JCR. However, this was highly unlikely. The intelligence services of the Southern Cone were well aware of the level of threat posed by each organization. The bilateral and multilateral connections between these agencies had already been cemented through the early 1970s. Furthermore, their ability to infiltrate the various organizations and the recruitment of informants gave them accurate intelligence about the guerrilla groups’ internal problems.417 The arrests of numerous militants in Bolivia, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay and Argentina provided additional details about the guerrillas’ status. A number of operations carried out by the armed forces also demonstrate that they knew about the internal divisions within the organizations and set out to exploit them.418

416 Ibid, p. x. 417 See Tróccoli, J. N., (1996), La ira de Leviatán; Tróccoli, J. N., (1997), La hora del depredador; Lessa, A., (2003), La revolución imposible; Arce, L., (2004),The Inferno. 418 See, for instance, the assassination of Lumi Videla and Operation Colombo (the assassination of 119 Chilean citizens by the Pinochet regime and the Argentine Triple A) in Chile, the assassination of Michellini, Gutiérrez Ruiz, Whitelaw and his wife by the Uruguayan agents in Argentina, etc.

223

Analysis of the guerrillas’ internal situation also provides evidence of the JCR’s actual strength in terms of manpower and helps to tear down the myth created by the regimes and their apologists regarding this issue. The militaries involved in the Cóndor Plan claimed that the JCR was a large organization that posed a dangerous threat and, as such, they had to take drastic measures to neutralise it. Critics of the revolutionary organizations have used this argument to support the repressive measures conducted by the security forces.419 Yet, the available documents from that secret meeting of 25 November 1975 in Santiago, which gave birth to the Cóndor plan do not mention the actual strength in terms of manpower of the JCR.

It is true that the JCR’s objectives sought to bring together these groups and develop new strategies to resist the dictatorial governments, and to bring about continental revolution. However, the leaders grossly overestimated their capabilities. They set a large number of objectives while lacking the necessary manpower, infrastructure and resources to achieve them. The analysis of the internal situation of each organization presented in this chapter demonstrates that, by the mid-1970s, the Bolivian ELN was very weak. After the failure of the Teoponte attempt to re-launch the rural guerrilla, the organization was almost annihilated. Only a few members managed to escape to Argentina and were experiencing their own Viña del Mar. That is, they were in the process of embracing Marxism-Leninism and creating a workers’ party (the Bolivian PRT). The Chilean MIR was in a similar situation. After 11 September 1973, its leadership announced that the organization would not go into exile. The Chilean armed forces took advantage of this situation and obliterated almost its entire infrastructure. By 1975 only a handful of combatants remained in Argentina, including one of its leaders, Edgardo Enríquez.

Following their defeat in 1972, most of the surviving Tupamaros escaped to Chile. However, after the 11 September 1973 coup, the remnants of the

419 See, for instance: Clarridge, D. R. and D. Diehl, (1997), A spy for all seasons: my life in the CIA, New York, Scribner; Craviotto, W., (2005), Testimonios de una época: la verdadera historia jamás contada; Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino.

224

Uruguayan guerrillas travelled to Cuba. Alfonso Lessa argues that 400 militants formed this group. On the other hand, the armed forces estimated that, by 5 December 1974, the MLN-T’s contingent in Cuba neared 600 members.420 They received training in rural guerrilla warfare and their task was to return to Argentina. From there, they would enter Uruguay to launch a counter offensive against the Bordaberry regime.421 The Uruguayan armed forces estimated a further 200-300 MLN-T members had taken refuge in Argentina. However, Efraín Platero argues that the actual number in that country did not exceed 50 militants.422 The more modest estimate of the number of Tupamaros in Cuba and Argentina was, approximately, 450. The higher number was close to 900 militants.

After the arrest of numerous MLN-T members in Argentina in 1974, the Uruguayan Army and Police intelligence services developed plans to prevent any resurgence of guerrilla activity in the country. In June 1975 the two security services secretly launched Operación Conejo (Operation Rabbit) to capture members of the MLN-T who returned from abroad, particularly from Argentina, to re-establish the organization and work within the framework of the JCR. After this operation, the armed forces arrested or killed a number of members and the organization was almost completely destroyed. The proletarian faction (in charge of the MLN-T, the strongest at the time, and the one most involved in the JCR project) was almost eliminated in Uruguay and in Argentina.423

The Argentine PRT-ERP remained the strongest of all the organizations within the JCR. Military intelligence reports state that during 1974-1975 its

420 Servicio de Información y Defensa (SID), Memorándum I-40/974 in Lessa, A., (2003), La revolución imposible, p. 306. 421 Ibid, p. 130. 422 Efraín Platero in Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia, p. 372. 423 See Mayor José Nino Gavazzo (Servicio de Información y Defensa) and Crio. Hugo Campos Hermida (Dirección Nacional de Información e Inteligencia-Brigada de Narcóticos y Drogas Peligrosas), “Operación Conejo”, Memorandum de Información Conjunto No.1/975, Montevideo, 14 de Junio de 1975, in Presidencia de la República Oriental del Uruguay, (2011), Actualización de la investigación histórica sobre detenidos desaparecidos, p. 97.

225

combative membership totaled approximately 5,000-6,000.424 De Santis and Pozzi also mention a total of 5,000-6,000 fighters during 1973-1975.425 Other sources connected to the IV international at the time maintain that the actual number of combatants in the PRT-ERP never exceeded more than 2,500. Hence, for the purpose of this analysis, the PRT-ERP’s strength ranged between 2,500 and 6,000 members throughout the country. The figures from the MLN-T and the PRT-ERP provide a rough estimate of the JCR’s potential strength. Excluding the people from MIR and ELN426, and the JCR’s Europe regional427, it is possible to estimate that the organization’s combined force ranged between 2,950 and 6,900 combatants. However, not all members of this potential pool carried out operations for the JCR.

At first glance, and assuming that every single combatant available in each organization formed part of the JCR’s force, which was certainly not the case, these figures seem impressive. However, even the highest number of JCR combatants (i.e. 6,900) was nowhere near the number of soldiers of each of the South American armies. The Paraguayan armed forces’ combined strength of 16,600, the smallest of the five countries that joined the Cóndor Plan, was much higher than that of the JCR.428 Furthermore, if the total personnel of the security forces in the Southern Cone (i.e. army, navy, air force, and police) were combined (as they were under the Banzer, Pinochet, Bordaberry, Stroessner and Videla regimes during the Cóndor Plan) the combined defence forces easily exceeded those of the JCR. According to Military Balance, the total armed

424 File “6/15/06” FOIA, “Desarrollo de la lucha contra el terrorismo”, p. 8, in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box II, available at National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington DC. 425 De Santis, D., (2009), Entre Tupas y Perros, pg. 69; Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas, p. 23. 426 As mentioned earlier, by 1975, the two organizations were only able to provide a small number of guerrillas to the JCR. 427 The European Regional of the JCR focused on providing some financial, material and logistical support to their counterparts in the Southern Cone. However, they were not actively involved in any armed activities. Their main tasks consisted of the denunciation of the South American regimes’ human right violations and to assist militants to escape the repression in the Southern Cone. 428 (1976), "Latin America", The Military Balance, 76(1): 62-69, pp. 67-68.

226

forces of each Cóndor member consisted of 132,800 in Argentina, 22,000 in Bolivia, 79,600 in Chile, 16,600 in Paraguay, and 22,000 in Uruguay, which gives a total combined force of 273,000 military personnel.429 These figures do not include the manpower provided by other parallel forces such as the right wing terrorist organizations that cooperated with these regimes (i.e. anti-Castro Cubans, Triple-A, -P2, Patria y Libertad, etc.). Consequently, even the JCR’s most exaggerated number was no match against the South American military complex.430

The intelligence services that gathered at that November 1975 meeting in Santiago knew all this information quite well. Their ability to infiltrate those organizations gave them a clear picture of their status. They knew about the damage caused by internal divisions, as well as the new leaderships’ inexperience and their recurrent tactical mistakes. More importantly, they were also aware that the PRT’s ties with the Trotskyite movement severely isolated the JCR from the international socialist and communist world, and particularly from Cuba.431 Yet, the South American militaries grossly exaggerated the threat posed by the JCR. The latter became a convenient excuse for the Cóndor members to join forces and launch a coordinated and deadly offensive to destroy, once and for all, any kind of opposition, including the exiles involved in the denunciation of human rights violations.

429 Ibid, pp. 62-69. 430 This comparison is strictly limited to the number of combatants. The disparities between forces becomes even greater when issues such as military budget, resources, logistics, etc. are taken into account. 431 Regarding the relationship between Cuba and the JCR, see: Ejército Nacional-Departamento II (INF), “Actualización de la situación (MLN-T), Montevideo, 21/07/1975, in Presidencia de la República Oriental del Uruguay, (2011), Actualización de la investigación histórica sobre detenidos desaparecidos, p. 105.

227

Chapter III

The fight goes on: the internationalisation of peaceful resistance to the South American regimes

This chapter seeks to determine why five South American countries agreed to transnationalize state terrorism at a time when the leftist guerrillas had already been defeated. By November 1975 the struggle against the military governments had changed. The overwhelming repression within the Southern Cone and the inability to confront the armed forces militarily led the Latin American left, especially those leaders and militants in exile, to embrace different tactics. These parties and organizations shifted from a stated intent to institute socialism via armed and violent means or even through the ballot box, focusing instead on the denunciation of the regimes’ human rights violations. By doing so the South American left hoped to discredit and ultimately prompt the fall of these regimes and move towards a democratic transition in which it would be able to resume political activities and participate in elections. This tactical shift gained momentum in the mid-seventies and was abetted by the growing human rights movements in the developed countries, especially the US. Therefore, Cóndor was not a response to the real or perceived threat posed by the leftist guerrillas. Rather this plan was established primarily to intimidate the exiles involved in the denunciation of human rights and to eliminate as many leftist leaders as possible, regardless of their methods of struggle.

This chapter traces the origins of the human rights debate in the US to then focus on the activities of the South American exiles and how they joined forces and coordinated activities with other international actors to denounce the regimes’ excesses. Between 1970 and 1975 there were only a handful of organizations dedicated to the defence of human rights in Argentina. In those years, and notwithstanding the country’s deep political crisis and volatile security situation, the Argentine exile community was relatively small and, arguably, contributed very little to the emerging global human rights

228

movement.1 For that reason, the latter are only mentioned in brief in the chapter and the discussion focuses predominantly on the Chilean, Uruguayan, Bolivian and Paraguayan exile communities.

The US Congress and the Nixon administration

An important development evolved in the United States in the early 1970s that began to undermine the international image of the regimes and helped to shift momentum in favour of their opponents. During that period and, particularly from 1974, an intense debate took place between the US Congress and the Nixon and Ford administrations regarding the involvement of US security officials in human rights violations abroad. As a direct consequence of this debate, the US Congress sought to include the issue of human rights in US foreign policy and condition the delivery of aid to other countries based on respect for human rights. Presidents Richard Nixon and , and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, adamantly opposed mixing human rights and foreign policy, arguing that it was counterproductive.

Kissinger argued that a closed doors approach to human rights, away from public scrutiny, produced better results. 2 Even this approach, however, generated problems for the State Department. In early 1974, for instance, tensions emerged between the Secretary of State and members of his staff. During a meeting to discuss US military assistance to Chile, US Ambassador David H. Popper questioned a number of Chilean military officers about torture and other human rights violations. Popper’s questions infuriated Kissinger who immediately cabled the ambassador ordering him to “cut out the political science

1 This movement did not take off in that country until after the arrival of the military junta headed by General Rafael Videla, in 1976. The formation of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo organization in 1977 brought about significant quantitative and qualitative changes to the Argentine human rights movement. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo became an international icon and, arguably, one of the leading organizations in the peaceful resistance to the regime. 2 Henry Kissinger in Keys, B., (2010), "Congress, Kissinger, and the origins of human rights diplomacy", Diplomatic History, 34(5): 823-851, p. 823.

229

lectures”. 3 As James Petras and Morris Morley state, “Popper was only following a congressional resolution attached to the foreign aid bill, which Kissinger felt he should disregard”.4

The revelations of human right violations by US military and CIA personnel during the Vietnam War, as well as the participation of OPS advisors in the training of armed forces in South America and other parts of the world in the implementation of torture, led the US Congress from 1973 to adopt a series of measures to prevent the recurrence of such events. It urged President Nixon and the State Department to cut military and financial aid to armed forces and governments responsible for severe human right violations. Subsequently, the South American regimes lost, among other things, the aid provided by the US Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the Office of Public Safety (OPS). While these losses were important to the regimes, there was a greater ramification emerging from this debate on human rights: the gradual reduction of public and official support from the US government amid the US Congress’ intense scrutiny of the South American military governments’ human rights records.

The US and human rights in the early 1970s

Kenneth Cmiel argues that, prior to the arrival of President in the White House, in January 1977, “there was a phenomenal burst of human rights activism in the United States”.5 This activism, however, was not a spontaneous event. It was part of a long process that began in the 1960s. The mass protests and political activism that occurred during that period generated some of the necessary conditions for the emergence and proliferation of the human rights movement in the USA. The Civil Rights Movement (CRM) and the growing opposition to the Vietnam War were the main driving forces behind

3 Petras, J. and M. Morris, (1975), The United States and the overthrow of the Allende government, New York, Monthly Review of Press, p. xvii. 4 Ibid. 5 Cmiel, K., (1999), "The emergence of human rights politics in the United States", The Journal of American History, 86(3): 1231-1250, p. 1233.

230

the mass protests that took place in the 1960s. These protests intensified as the interests of the two movements slowly began to merge towards the end of that decade.6 That merger met strong resistance, particularly from some sectors of the CRM. While the most prominent and radical figures and organizations within the movement began to unite their objectives and demands with the anti- war activists in the mid-sixties, the moderates rejected, and sometimes even condemned, that merger.7 Those barriers began to dissipate at the end of the 1960s and, subsequently, they agreed to support the anti-war cause. This put further pressure on the Nixon administration and US politicians in general to end the war.

Daniel Ellsberg’s release to the media of the Pentagon Papers8 in 1971 revealed secret aspects of US policies in Vietnam. These revelations generated outrage and sparked more demonstrations, protests and further investigations. From then on, the US Congress adopted a more active and decisive role in balancing and controlling the powers of the president and the State Department. Vania Markarian argues that

Senators Edward Kennedy, James Abourezk and Frank Church, as well as the representatives Edward Koch, Tom Harkin and Donald Fraser sought to strengthen the [US Congress’] participation in the development of the government’s foreign

6 The Civil Rights movement included a number of radical militant groups like the Black Panthers and, towards the late 1960s, the Weather Underground Organizations (WUO), as well as other prominent figures like Malcolm X who stirred mass demonstrations all over the country with their strong speeches regarding these issues. According to Herbert Heines “most black radicals rejected racial integration and strict nonviolence to some degree.” Haines, H., (1984), "Black radicalization and the funding of Civil Rights: 1957-1970", Social Problems, 32(1): 31-43, p. 34. 7 The radicals argued that the War was taking a disproportionate number of casualties amongst black soldiers and, therefore, it was necessary for the Civil Right movement to expand its activities and join forces with Anti-War activists. The moderates like the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), on the other hand, preferred to avoid such a move. Some, influenced by the Cold War environment, believed that to question the government’s war policies was unpatriotic and insulted the black soldiers’ commitment to protect their country. Others believed that the conflict in Vietnam was part of foreign policy. Hence, they argued, to shift attention from the local social grievances of black people to the anti-war protests was suicidal for the Civil Rights movement. For a detailed discussion of the moderates’ activities and views within the Civil Rights movement see: Simon, H., (2003), "The response of the moderate wing of the Civil Rights Movement to the war in Vietnam", The Historical Journal, 46(3): 669-701. 8 New York Times, (1971), The Pentagon papers, Boston, Boston: Beacon Press.

231

policy, questioning the decisions of the Executive branch and those of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.9

The investigations of human rights violations in Vietnam and other parts of the world conducted by these Congressmen attracted wide support for the issue of human rights, even from a number of conservative, anticommunist Republican and Democrat politicians.

In 1973 House Representative Don Fraser chaired the first congressional hearing on the topic of human rights.10 The 1974 Democratic victory at the midterm elections, which “seated a freshman cohort with a strong interest in human rights and congressional empowerment”, abetted Fraser’s work and granted him greater powers to conduct investigations.11 In the next three years the US Congress passed a set of important laws and amendments aimed at deterring foreign allies from carrying out human rights violations, including the Jackson-Vanik amendment of 1974 and those introduced by Tom Harkin during 1975-1976.12 The South American regimes continued to receive aid from the Nixon and Ford administrations, and from other key international monetary institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank until 1977, despite this legislation.13 However, the work conducted by the US Congress brought

9 Markarian, V., (2004), "De la lógica revolucionaria a las razones humanitarias: la izquierda uruguaya en el exilio y las redes transnacionales de derechos humanos (1972-1976)", Cuadernos del CLAEH,(89): 1-25, p. 15. 10 Cmiel, K., (1999), "The emergence of human rights politics in the United States", p. 1235. 11 Keys, B., (2010), "Congress, Kissinger, and the origins of human rights diplomacy", p. 826. 12 The Jackson-Vanik amendment tied “most-favoured nation trade status to respect for the right to emigrate”, and the Tom Harkin amendments “agreed to stop economic assistance to any country that routinely violated certain human rights and to oblige US representatives to the Inter-American Development Bank and African Development Fund to vote down any loans to regimes guilty of gross violations of human rights.” Cmiel, K., (1999), "The emergence of human rights politics in the United States", p. 1235. 13 Of the five future Cóndor regimes, the Chilean was the one that continued to receive considerable financial aid from both administrations. According to Stephen Rabe, the US government granted the Pinochet regime “$48 million in commodity credits to purchase wheat and corn. Between 1974 and 1976, Chile received $132 million in Food for Peace (PI. 480) grants…. Chile also received $30 million in US economic assistance for housing…[while] the rest of Latin America received only $4 million in housing aid. Loans and credits also flowed from international lending agencies. During its first three years, the military government received $238 million in loans from the IDB, whereas the Allende government had received only $11.6 million. The Chilean

232

unwanted attention for the South American regimes, undermined their legitimacy and isolated them further from the international community.14

The US Congress’ investigations and subsequent pressure to cut aid to South American regimes came at a particularly difficult time for the future Cóndor partners, especially for the Chilean and Uruguayan governments. As shown in chapter I, and despite the considerable financial aid, most of these regimes faced serious economic challenges during this time, were ostracized by the international community, and experienced considerable legitimacy problems at home and abroad. This unwanted attention from the US Congress exposed the regimes’ human rights violations, which further undermined their image and legitimacy. Furthermore, the US Congress urged the White House and the State Department to avoid public displays of support for the regimes from 1974.15 The US government had to make statements that acknowledged CIA connections with these armed forces and the agency’s activities in those

military went on a buying spree, ordering $100 million in new equipment and spare parts. Chile emerged as the fifth largest customer in the world for US military hardware. In 1974-1975, nearly nine hundred Chileans trained at the School of the Americas in Panama. Rabe, S., (2012), The killing zone: the United States wages Cold War in Latin America, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 137-138. 14 The US Congress gave the State Department specific guidelines to determine when countries should be identified as human rights violators. US diplomats and advisors working at embassies all over the world, and especially in the Southern Cone of Latin America, had to follow those guidelines and report on each country’s performance regarding the protection or violation of human rights. That evaluation would determine these countries’ future suitability for receiving military and financial aid from the US. These assessments frequently generated tensions between the US embassy and the assessed governments, and also between the State Department and Congress. 15 However, nothing changed at the private level. The White House and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger continued to support the regimes, even after the formalization of the Cóndor plan. In early 1976 Kissinger met with General Pinochet, before the OAS meeting in Santiago, Chile. Kissinger informed the Chilean Junta that he was going to address the issue of human rights violations in his speech to comply with the US Congress’ demands. However, he told the Chilean dictator that the US government continued to support what the Junta was doing and that the Chilean government was the victim of an international Marxist campaign. Kissinger gave similar private support to the Argentine junta shortly after it took over the country and unleashed a Dirty War against its opponents. Komisar, L., (1999), Kissinger Declassified, The Progressive, online, available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Kissinger/KissingerDeclassified.html, [accessed 1/03/2013].

233

countries, as well as to make statements defending human rights in order to accommodate the demands of the US Congress.16

Amid growing international isolation, the regimes expected public support from the US government. The loss of that public backing left the regimes exposed to further international campaigns. This issue will be explored further in the next chapter. However, it is necessary to point out here that the South American military governments claimed that they had saved the region from communism and had exterminated Marxism.17 Yet, rather than thanking these military governments and helping them to mitigate the effects of the international human rights campaigns, the regimes believed that the US had turned its back on them.18

The success of the investigations conducted by the US Congress depended on accessing key documents and evidence. However, Richard Nixon, his Secretary of State, and the US’s intelligence apparatus cooperated very little with these inquiries. The US Congress, therefore, relied on alternative sources such as grass roots groups, religious organizations, and other entities in the

16 For instance, on 16 September 1974, President Ford acknowledged covert operations in Chile, which added to the mounting evidence against the Chilean junta. That evidence included the Inter- American Commission on Human Rights (ICHR) of the Organization of American States (OAS) report of "grievous violations of human rights" in Chile, on 25 October 1974. Subsequently, on 30 December the US government cut military aid to Chile See U.S. Senate Select Committee, (1975), Covert action in Chile 1963-1973: staff report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Report), Washington D.C, US Senate, online, available at http://www.archives.gov/declassification/iscap/pdf/2010-009-doc17.pdf, [accessed 03/07/2011]. 17 They made that claim repeatedly, even though the guerrilla groups did not pose any serious threat at the time. 18 The measures implemented by the US Congress during 1974-1975 disappointed and angered the future Cóndor partners. Some, such as the Uruguayan Junta, attempted to use the Cóndor infrastructure to assassinate US Congressman Edward Koch, in 1976. Throughout 1974-1976, Koch played a key role in focusing the spotlight on the Uruguayan Junta’s record on human rights violations, which led to the cutting of financial and military aid in 1976. As a consequence, and with the Cóndor Plan in full swing, the Uruguayan intelligence services planned to send a team to Washington to assassinate him. However, the CIA found out about the plot and informed Koch that the Uruguayan military wanted to kill him. When the regime appointed two senior officers to work in Washington DC later that year, the US State Department refused to accept their credentials. The two officers were heavily involved in the operations carried out by the Uruguayan military under the Cóndor banner. Hence, the plan to assassinate Edward Koch was called off. See Serbin, K., (2005), "Behind Pinochet's reign of terror: torture chamber", Christian Century, 122(1): 28-34, p. 29.

234

United States for reliable information.19 The Congressmen also tapped into the emerging transnational networks of solidarity with victims of human rights violations in other parts of the world, particularly those linked to South American exiles.

Amnesty International (AI) had strong connections with those transnational networks. The organization was established in London in 1961 and quickly gained international prominence due to its campaigns in defence of human rights for political prisoners or prisoners of conscience. Its US branch, Amnesty International USA (AIUSA), was founded in the mid-1960s but went through a difficult period in its early stages due to the small number of members and a lack of resources. The revelations of human rights abuses in the Vietnam War, the overthrow of President Allende in Chile and the Watergate scandal, led to an upsurge in AI’s membership and financial resources, and to a more organized structure.20 From the early to mid-1970s, Amnesty developed an important network of contacts with the South American exiles and served as a key source of reliable and up to date information regarding the regimes’ human rights violations for the US Congress.

Congressional hearings and the CIA

The Congressional hearings also sought to make the US intelligence services more accountable. Between 1971 and 1974, the US Congress asked the CIA’s Director William Colby to attend a series of sessions to answer questions about operational matters. In early 1974 he faced a new round of enquiries, which helped to draw the public’s attention to the issue of human rights. These sessions questioned the head of the CIA’s Operations Department on a wide range of matters, including the military coup in Chile, the in Vietnam and several other issues concerning CIA covert operations. However,

19 Kenneth Cmiel argues that in the early-to-mid 1970s the number of organizations and groups interested in human rights grew quite sharply. See: Cmiel, K., (1999), "The emergence of human rights politics in the United States", p. 1234. 20 For a detailed discussion of the evolution of the US branch of Amnesty International (AIUSA), see Markarian, V., (2004), "De la lógica revolucionaria a las razones humanitarias".

235

Colby answered the questions vaguely and revealed little about the true scope of those operations. For instance, when questioned about the Phoenix Program, Colby claimed that it was

… designed and started in […] 1968 in order to bring some degree of order and regularity to a very unpleasant, nasty war that had preceded it […] It provided procedures by which the identification of the leaders, rather than the followers, became the objective of the operation. […] Over two and half years of the Phoenix program there were 29,000 captured; there were 17,000 defected; and there were 20,500 killed, of which 87% […] were killed by regular and paramilitary forces and 12% by police and similar elements.21

Here, Colby presented a rather benign picture of this program and, more importantly, he watered down the agency’s overall role in it.

In reality, Phoenix “was a computerized counterinsurgency program that used assassination, terror, and psychological warfare to decimate civilian sympathizers of the revolutionary Viet Cong”. 22 According to Stella Calloni, gangs of anticommunist civilians operated in conjunction with the South Vietnamese security forces to systematically torture their detainees under the banner of the Phoenix program.23 Patrice McSherry goes further and argues that US personnel provided “lists of suspects, participated in , and supervised, controlled, and financed the program”.24

Colby’s evasive testimony and lack of cooperation, particularly regarding the CIA’s campaign in Chile, angered members of Congress, as well as the public present at the hearings, and resulted in a series of heated exchanges between him and members of the panel. Nancy Stein’s intervention was a clear

21 Centre for National Security Studies, “William Colby testimony before US Congress”, 13 September 1974, available at CIA-RDP88-01315R000200010008-7, pp. 5-6, released 17/05/2002, [accessed 04/05/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD 22 McSherry, P., (2002), "Tracking the origins of a State Terror network: Operation Condor", Latin American Perspectives, 29(1): 38-6-, p. 44. 23 Calloni, S., (1999), Los años del lobo: Operación Cóndor, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Continente: Peña Lillo, p. 19. 24 McSherry, P., (2002), "Tracking the origins of a State Terror network", p. 44.

236

illustration of that indignation and also of the intensity of the human rights debate in the US Congress at the time. She argued that

… CIA activities have led to the overthrow of governments in Guatemala, Brazil, Bolivia, and now Chile, the details of which you know better than any of us, Mr. Colby. To achieve its goal, the CIA has infiltrated, distorted, and attempted to destroy the political, social, and economic lives of the people of the third world. [The agency has] resorted to terror and . We know that the CIA conducted the training of foreign police in Texas under the auspices of the Office of Public Safety so that they learned to make bombs and conduct terrorist actions against their own people. We know about your … Phoenix [program] in Vietnam which resulted … [in] 20,500 people murdered, and similar programs elsewhere. But all of these programs won’t work, because we are talking about the struggle of the people for their own independence and self-determination. […] The US, in fact, has had to resort to the imposition of fascist governments around the world because of the strength of the peoples [sic] movement. […] There was the plunder of Mexico, the occupation of Puerto Rico, the intervention in the Dominican Republic, the Bay of Pigs, and many other acts that our America does not forget and will never forgive. There is Shell, Esso and Standard Oil, United Fruit, and ITT, the money of Mr. Rockefeller and Mr. Ford, and there is the CIA which, with Papy Shelton, Mitrioue [sic] and Siracusa25, and now you, Mr. Colby, have left indelible evidence of the oppressive and overpowering policies of the US against the popular movement in Latin America…26

Colby dismissed the accusations and, in a later hearing that year, argued that the “US [had] the right to act illegally in any region of the world, gather information in other countries…” and even intervene in Chile’s internal affairs if it was necessary to protect US interests.27

25 Stein refers here to OPS advisor Dan Anthony Mitrione and US Ambassador to Uruguay Ernest Siracusa. 26 Nancy Stein in Centre for National Security Studies, (1974), “William Colby testimony before US Congress”, pp. 19-20. 27 William Colby in Calloni, S., (1999), Los años del lobo, p. 19.

237

The Watergate scandal

The US human rights movement also benefited from the indignation that emerged as a consequence of the Watergate scandal. The latter began to unfold in 1972 and ended with the impeachment and resignation of President Richard Nixon in early August 1974. On 17 June 1972, five men broke into the Democratic Party National Headquarters located at the Watergate building, to wiretap the offices of this political party. The president had appointed CIA operative Howard Hunt to direct the operation. The burglars, known as the Plumbers, were four Cuban exiles from Miami and a US citizen, all of whom were connected to the CIA. After the arrests, Nixon ordered this agency to obstruct the FBI’s investigation to protect the country’s national security. However, when the damaging ramifications for the intelligence agency became clear, its top leaders refused to do so. As a consequence of the event’s public notoriety and the severity of the charges, the US Congress launched an investigation in May 1973.28

During the Watergate hearings, Howard Hunt revealed details of his previous secret operations with the plumbers for the White House on US soil. These controversial covert activities included those carried out against Daniel Ellsberg. After the leaking of the Pentagon Papers, Nixon set out to undermine Ellsberg’s credibility. The president ordered the FBI to investigate all aspects of his life, including obtaining data from his psychiatrist so as to launch a public campaign to undermine his character. When the doctor refused to provide that information, Nixon sought to obtain it through other means. Hence, Howard Hunt and the plumbers broke into Ellberg’s psychiatrist’s office abetted by the CIA.29

The congressional hearings on Vietnam and Chile had demonstrated to the US public the impact of CIA clandestine activities on thousands of people

28 See Weiner, T., (2008), Legacy of ashes: the history of the C.I.A, London, Penguin, pp. 368-375. 29 Ibid, p. 378.

238

around the world. The Watergate hearings, on the other hand, revealed that covert operations had been implemented on US soil against US citizens. David Wise argues that the Watergate scandal

…dramatically demonstrated the dangers posed by secret intelligence agencies when their personnel, resources, and methods are employed in the American political process…. President Nixon created his own secret police force – the Plumbers and their apprentices – to conduct covert operations against domestic ‘enemies’, real and imagined.30

The implementation of this type of operations on US soil, under direct orders of the White House, stunned politicians and society in general. And the president’s admission that he had ordered the CIA to obstruct justice in the name of national security was the last straw. Consequently, Nixon resigned on 8 August 1974.31 Vania Markarian argues that the indignation generated by the congressional hearings’ findings and the Watergate scandal led many people in the United States to join Amnesty International and gave further impetus to the US human rights movement.32

Nixon’s resignation and his replacement by vice president Gerald Ford, however, did little to change US foreign policy, despite considerable popular discontent. President Ford shared the same views as his predecessor regarding CIA covert activities. Shortly after his appointment, he defended the US intervention in Chile, claiming that such operations “were in the best interest of the people of Chile and, certainly, in our own best interest…”. He further stated that he was not “going to pass judgment on whether it [was] permitted or authorized under international law. It is a recognized fact that historically, as well as presently, such actions are taken in the best interests of the countries

30 Wise David, “Covert operations abroad: an overview”, 9/12/74, p.2, available at CIA-RDP88- 01315R000200030007-6, released 17/05/2002, [accessed 04/05/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 31 Weiner, T., (2008), Legacy of ashes, p. 386. 32 Markarian, V., (2004), "De la lógica revolucionaria a las razones humanitarias", p.12.

239

involved”.33 Two years later, Ford “reiterated US support of military intervention … when he warmly recognized” the Argentine military junta.34 Henry Kissinger remained in his position as Secretary of State and he continued to argue against mixing human rights and foreign policy, at least when dealing with Latin America and other parts of the Third World. Hence, the struggle between Congress, the White House and the State Department continued. More congressional hearings and investigations followed in the next two years, and the human rights movement in the US continued to gain momentum and strength. This ongoing debate and public attention provided the South American political exiles a space in which they could effectively voice their grievances in the United States. These activities put more pressure on the military juntas ruling the Southern Cone. Despite the support displayed by President Ford and the State Department, the exiles’ denunciation of human rights violations and the global solidarity campaigns in support of South American exiles undermined the regimes’ legitimacy and isolated them from the international community.

The South American exiles’ new tactics

The term ‘exile’ can be defined in several ways and, depending on the approach adopted by scholars, such definitions include a wide range of variations or categories. Mario Sznajder and Luis Roniger argue that “research has delineated exile as the removal of opponents in a state framework as a result of confrontational politics”.35 Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines exile as the “enforced removal from one’s native land according to an edict or sentence; penal expatriation or banishment; the state condition of being penally

33 Schoultz, L., (1987), National Security and United States policy toward Latin America, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, pp. 284-285. 34 Lauderback, D. M., (2004), The United States Army School of the Americas: mission and policy during the Cold War Ph.D., The University of Texas at Austin, p. 289. 35 For a detailed analysis of the term ‘exile’ in Latin America, particularly that of ‘political exile’ see Sznajder, M. and L. Roniger, (2007), "Political exile in Latin America", Latin American Perspectives, 34(4): 7-30.

240

banished; enforced residence in some foreign land”.36 Yet, the reasons for many South Americans going into exile during this particular period were quite complex and cannot only be reduced to pure political reasons. As a consequence of the brutal repression and the military governments’ inability to improve their country’s economy, hundreds of thousands of people went into forced or voluntary exile in numerous countries around the world. Among them there was a nucleus that is not specifically addressed by the previous definitions: those who chose to leave their countries as a consequence of the sharp economic deterioration that emerged with the implementation of strict austerity measures.37 The South American exile community during that period was made up of economic as well as political exiles and refugees.38

Not all exiles had an active political participation in the resistance or the human rights movement. The difficulties of adapting to a new and completely different life in exile, among other reasons, led many South Americans to abstain from social or political activities in the host countries. Adriana Espinoza argues that exile meant an “abrupt rupture of life projects; the loss of social and emotional networks […]; the end of active participation in the everyday life of one’s country and, therefore, the loss of personal history, biography, and a sense of identity”.39 Many exiles had been arrested by the security forces and spent time in prison before they fled their countries. During that time, they were brutally tortured and/or witnessed the harsh treatment or assassination of friends, relatives or other detainees. These psychological traumas were usually aggravated by the distressful experience of having to flee their country, either voluntarily or by force, to restart their lives in an alien environment. These

36 Oxford English Dictionary, (2013), "exile, n.1", Oxford University Press, online, available at http://www.oed.com.wwwproxy0.library.unsw.edu.au/view/Entry/66231?isAdvanced=false&result=1 &rskey=wsca41&, [accessed 14/03/2013]. 37 See Shayne, J. D., (2009), They used to call us witches: Chilean exiles, culture, and , Lanham, Lexington Books, p. 18. 38 This category included right wing exiles such as those who left Chile during the Allende administration. 39 Adriana Espinoza in Shayne, J. D., (2009), They used to call us witches, p. 19.

241

traumatic experiences had profound psychological ramifications for those individuals and led to numerous problems, including alcoholism, domestic violence, Post Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD), and a plethora of other mental health illnesses.40 For these reasons many exiles avoided participation in any kind of political activity abroad, particularly those involving the denunciation of human rights violations. This segment of the South American diaspora is not included in this discussion. Instead, the term ‘exile’ is used in this chapter to indicate those who were politically active in the host nations41 regardless of their motives for migration42, that is, despite being either political or economic exiles.

The exile community that maintained resistance to the military regimes was not a monolithic bloc and did not function as a cohesive force, particularly in the early stages of the human rights movement. All the factionalisms and divisions between the guerrilla groups and the left political parties continued in exile. These groups could not agree on how to conduct resistance from abroad, or how to address the issue of human rights violations by the regimes. Some dismissed the emerging movement and refused to portray their fallen comrades as victims of human rights violations. Instead, they considered them martyrs of the revolutionary struggle. Others understood the strategic potential behind the human rights movement, as well as its global scope and agreed to set aside differences to tap into that powerful network of contacts.

The Chilean resistance

The Chilean exiles played a gravitational role in the gestation of the process of international opposition to the South American military regimes that

40 Derek Summerfield argues that PTSD “is a formulation increasingly evoked to describe the psychological responses over time, frequently years, following exposure to extreme and unusual traumatic events, commonly wars or catastrophes. Summerfield, D., (1991), "The psychosocial effects of conflict in the Third World", Development in Practice, 1(3): 159-173, p. 162. 41 Predominantly from leftist parties and organizations but also exiles from centre right parties. 42 This definition is borrowed from Dr Vania Markarian and her studies of the Uruguayan exile community during the 1970s and 1980s. See Markarian, V., (2004), "De la lógica revolucionaria a las razones humanitarias, p. 1.

242

established the Cóndor Plan. Shortly after the 11 September coup, the Junta presided by General Augusto Pinochet introduced Law-decree 81, which granted the regime unrestricted powers to expel citizens from Chile.43 The military used this legal measure to get rid of people linked to the Allende administration, and opponents from other political parties. Tens of thousands of Chileans were expelled from the country as a direct consequence of this decree. Many went to Argentina, at the time the only country with a democratic government in the region, while others sought refuge in Cuba, the US, , and in countries across Europe, Africa, Asia and Oceania. According to Thomas Wright, “two hundred thousand Chileans, nearly two percent of the national population, went into exile for political reasons in at least 110, and possibly as many as 140 countries on all continents” during the Pinochet era.44

The implementation of forced exile and harsh repressive measures allowed the Chilean regime to quickly gain control over the country and secure its grip on power. Law-decree 81, however, created new sets of problems for the government. The junta, as Mario Sznajder points out, underestimated the ramifications of this measure and the power of the exiles. The latter, upon their arrival in the host countries, “reconstructed a dense network replicating their former political organisations on the local, regional, national, and international plane”.45 In some places, support organizations had already been established by locals when the exiles arrived. For instance in Australia, the Chilean Solidarity groups predated the arrival of exiles.46 Thanks to the work of the exiles and their supporters, evidence of the regime’s crimes accumulated in the offices of international Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) like Amnesty International (AI) and the International Red Cross (IRC). That evidence also

43 Sznajder, M., (2007), "Differential institutional dynamics: a comparative analysis of the Chilean and Uruguayan political diasporas", Revista de Ciencia Política, 27(1): 46-66, p. 48. 44 Wright, T. C., (2007), State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and international human rights, New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., p. 68. 45 Sznajder, M., (2007), "Differential institutional dynamics", p. 51. 46 See Montenegro Martín, G. A., (1994), Thesis for Masters Degree: "The Australian solidarity campaign with Chile 1973-1990", Sydney, University of New South Wales.

243

reached the (UN), the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the US Congress, among other international fora. The exiles that remained politically active worked and interacted with a supportive international community to pressure the regime. That pressure sought to put an end to the repression and allow foreign observers to investigate the conditions of political prisoners held in several detention centres across the Andean nation.

The information that emerged from the Congressional hearings about the CIA’s activities in Chile angered many US politicians and people throughout that country. From the outset, several US senators condemned the coup and, on 3 October 1973, the Senate introduced an amendment to the US Foreign Aid bill to address the situation in Chile.47 Pinochet, his supporters, and even the so called moderates within the regime, strongly criticised the measures implemented by the US Congress. General Gustavo Leigh, for instance, openly described a number of US politicians as ‘fellow travellers’ of communism.48

The regime’s leaders took every opportunity to discredit their critics abroad and divert attention from Chile by pointing the spotlight on the human

47 This amendment was sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy and recommended that the US President should: “(1) … deny Chile any economic or military assistance, other than humanitarian assistance, until he finds that the government of Chile is protecting the human rights of all individuals, Chilean and foreign as provided in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the convention and protocol relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant international legal instruments guaranteeing the granting of asylum safe conduct, and the humane treatment or release of prisoners. (2) The president should support international humanitarian initiatives by the United Nations High Commissioner and the Red Cross to insure the protection and safe conduct and resettlement of political refugees, the humane treatment of political prisoners and the full inspection of detention facilities under international auspices. (3) The president should be prepared to provide asylum and resettlement opportunities under appropriate provisions of the immigration and nationality act to a reasonable number of political refugees. (4) The president should support and facilitate efforts by voluntary agencies to meet emergency relief needs. And, (5) the president should request the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to undertake an immediate inquiry into recent events occurring in Chile…”. See Sec. State WASHDC to AMEMBASSY Santiago, “Senate resolution on aid to Chile”, Telegram, 04 October 1973, pp. 1-2, available at CIA- RDP75B00380R000600170031-8, released 30/08/2001, [accessed 04/05/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 48 General Leigh in Maestre Alfonso, J., (1978), El libro rojo del presidente Pinochet y C.I.A., Madrid, Akal, p. 53.

244

right violations committed by communist countries such as Cuba or the Soviet Union.49 On 24 September 1975, the CIA reported that

Chile also has not forgotten Pinochet’s call on the Soviet Union and Cuba to free some of their political prisoners. Santiago has been collecting names of prisoners from friends and relatives and urging international organizations to press Moscow and Havana on the issue. Foreign minister Carbajal probably will raise the matter anew in his upcoming speech to the UN General Assembly.50

Like its counterparts in the region, the Chilean regime portrayed itself as the victim of a worldwide conspiracy conducted by international Marxism.

On 21 March 1974, the CIA agreed with the Chilean military government regarding the international human rights campaigns. Despite the evidence revealed during the Congressional hearings, the agency argued that the Junta

… has been the target of numerous charges related to alleged violations of human rights. Many of the accusations are merely politically inspired falsehoods or gross exaggerations – the junta has not been bloodthirsty. The government has given first priority to repressing perceived security threats, however, and respect for human rights has been a secondary consideration. … Many of the accusations regarding the military government’s lack of respect for human rights are traceable to a world-wide communist orchestrated campaign to discredit the junta. Some of these claims are simply false, others are exaggerations or distortions of reality. On the other hand, junta president Pinochet’s blanket

49 This became a recurrent mantra amongst Chilean officials. Pinochet and other members of the Junta frequently demanded that the United Nations and the US Congress display the same passion for human rights towards the Soviet Union and Cuba. On this issue see Varas, F., (1979), Gustavo Leigh, el general disidente, Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua; Correa, R. and E. Subercaseaux, (1990), Ego Zum: Pinochet, Santiago, Zig Zag S.A. This stand, however, was not exclusive of the Pinochet regime. All the Cóndor partners went on to implement similar tactics to divert attention and dismiss pressures from the international community. 50 CIA, “Chile: prisoner release program underway”, Latin American Trends, Secret, 25 September 1974, approved for release 11/06/1999, available at CREST/FOIA online http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000343985.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2010].

245

assertion that ‘human rights have not been violated in Chile’ overstates the junta’s case.51

Anyone who dared question the junta’s official statements regarding human right issues became an enemy of the Chilean State and accordingly vilified. The local media, strongly aligned with the regime, widely publicised those vilifications and also set out to discredit, at least in Chile, the image of “the US Senate (infiltrated by Marxists), Senator Edward Kennedy (agent of international Communism) [and] the Ford Foundation (not only infiltrated but controlled by Marxists, including admitted communists)…”52

Pinochet also denied accusations of military involvement in the disappearance of hundreds of Chileans. Instead, he argued that the Marxists had orchestrated a campaign of false kidnappings and detentions. Those who were supposedly detained by the military had “travelled to Argentina where they [carried] out military training before joining guerrilla groups. The so-called ‘disappeared’ [argued Pinochet, were] not a responsibility of the military, but of their own comrades”.53 Meanwhile General Leigh continued to claim that everything was part of an international communist plot to discredit the good work of the Chilean armed forces. In the words of this general, the communists “have used the easiest and most economic system to destroy [the regime’s] image: Calumny”.54

In early 1974, the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) officially requested General Pinochet to report on the status of political prisoners and to put an end to summary executions and torture. In an interview with a local journalist, however, Pinochet explained his decision to ignore the UNHRC’s

51 CIA, “Aspects of the situation in Chile”, Secret, No. 1030/74, March 21, 1974, pp. 2-5, available at CIA-RDP85T00353R000100030005-8, released 07/05/2002, [accessed 29/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 52 Article in La Segúnda newspaper in International Documentation ( I. D. O. C.), (1974), Chile under military rule: a dossier of documents and analyses compiled by the staff of I.D.O.C., New York, IDOC, p. 60. 53 General Pinochet in Maestre Alfonso, J., (1978), El Libro rojo del presidente Pinochet y C.I.A, p. 53. 54 General Gustavo Leigh in Varas, F., (1979), Gustavo Leigh, el general disidente, p. 80.

246

letter. He told the interviewer, “I can assure you that we do not have executions here. We have normal trials. Courts operate independently. We have issued statements explaining that a firm hand does not mean cruelty. It means justice”.55 In an attempt to improve the country’s image abroad, the regime allowed a small number of international observers to witness a number of trials against armed forces personnel indicted on subversion charges. General Leigh argued that the proceedings were carried out in accordance with Chilean military law and that each detainee had access to a lawyer.56 However, the observations of former US Attorney General Ramsey Clark categorically demolished that argument.57 Despite this, and to save some of its international legitimacy, Pinochet and his peers continued to deny all charges and framed them within the elaborated context of the worldwide communist plot.

The internal front

Hours after entering La Moneda presidential palace, the military set out to consolidate its control over the country. As a first priority, the security forces unleashed all their military might to hunt down any remnants of armed groups such as the Grupo de Amigos del Presidente (GAP) (Allende’s presidential

55 General Pinochet in CIA, “General Pinochet interviewed in human rights violations-Doc also mentions-Santi”, 11 March 1974, approved for release 27/09/1989, online, available at CREST/FOIA online, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000040256.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2010]. 56 Varas, F., (1979), Gustavo Leigh, el general disidente, p. 81. 57 Clark and other observers travelled to Chile in late May, 1974 at the request of the US National Council of Churches. Their task was to witness the proceedings carried out by the junta against 67 armed forces personnel of the Allende government. According to Mr Clark: “The five trials I witnessed […] were lawless charades … A lawyer who dared to question whether his client had been tortured was banned from further practice there among other penalties…. General Orlando Gutiérrez, the air force fiscal, or prosecutor, presented his entire case by reading from the Dictamen, or indictment and witness statements, nearly all by defendants and their co-defendants. All were elicited under circumstances so inherently coercive, whatever the techniques employed, as to make them questionable by any standard. No witness testified. No prosecution witness was present to be challenged by cross-examination. No defendant presented a single witness in his defence or spoke a word himself. No family was permitted to be present and whatever the reasons, the room was virtually empty except for one morning when a first-year law class form the attended a single trial. The press, nearly all Chilean, sat in the balcony. A few foreign observers attended part time, and personnel form the army monitored the trials.” General Ramsey Clark in International Documentation ( I. D. O. C.), (1974), Chile under military rule, pp. 73-74.

247

guard) and the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR). The regime complemented these measures with the complete disarticulation of all social groups and organisations linked to the former UP government, and any other that could pose a threat to the regime, including non-leftist political parties and organized labour. Despite this difficult and hostile environment, new groups began to emerge seeking to curtail the regime’s brutality and defend the human rights of political prisoners.58 The Chilean Catholic Church and other religious groups, with financial support from the World Council of Churches and other international organisations, played a central role in the formation of these groups.59 These human rights organizations in Chile gathered vital information and documentation for the international solidarity campaigns, and helped to isolate the regime and undermine its legitimacy at home and, especially abroad.

After 11 September the UNHCR, the World Council of Churches, through its representative to Chile, and representatives from evangelical churches petitioned the Junta to permit the creation of an organisation to evacuate the up to 15,000 non-Chilean political refugees residing in Chile and threatened by persecution. The initiative resulted in the creation of the National Committee for Aid to Refugees (CONAR), which facilitated the safe exodus of approximately 4,000 refugees by 1974.60 In addition to this organization, numerous Catholic, Jewish, Orthodox, Lutheran, and evangelical leaders established the Comité de Cooperación para la Paz en Chile (COPACHI) (Committee of Cooperation for Peace in Chile) in October 1973 to assist victims of political persecution and their families, and refugees.61 The Catholic Church’s rather amicable relationship with the military junta allowed these

58 A clear example of this situation can be identified in the findings of the Chicago Commission of Inquiry of 1974. After a fact finding mission to Chile, the Commission reported that it had obtained (a) written depositions of family members, b) eyewitness accounts, c) testimonies of released prisoners detailing the nature of wounds inflicted. As of 11 December 1973, there [had] been at least 42 published reports of more than 410 persons killed ‘while attempting to escape’. Ibid, p. 59. 59 Wright, T. C., (2007), State Terrorism in Latin America, p. 55. 60 Pamela Lowden in Loveman, M., (1998), "High-risk collective action: defending , Uruguay, and Argentina", American Journal of Sociology, 104(2): 477-525, p. 488. 61 Brian Smith in ibid, p. 489.

248

organizations to carry out their work without major obstructions from the regime, at least in the early months of their creation.

The government-Church relations, however, began to deteriorate as the number of victims continued to increase in the months that followed the coup. From then on, the regime did everything possible to undermine the works of CONAR and COPACHI and accused them of having a Marxist political agenda.62 Pinochet asked the Catholic Church’s hierarchy to disband COPACHI after this organization intervened in favour of four MIR militants in late 1974. Eventually, this religious human rights group ceased all operations in 1975. This, however, did not mean the end of activities in defence of human rights. COPACHI was replaced by Vicaría de la Solidaridad, which together with La Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias (FASIC) (Foundation of Social Assistance to Churches) continued to provide assistance to those affected by the repression.63 Though their success was modest in terms of curtailing the regime’s brutality, these organizations saved thousands of lives when the levels of repression were at their highest. More importantly, groups like CONAR, COPACHI, and their successors played an important role in passing information to their contacts abroad to maintain international pressure on the regime and undermine its image and legitimacy.

The Chilean exiles and the transnational global human rights networks

The Chilean exile community organized several campaigns to denounce the regime’s human rights violations. The new military government expected the tens of thousands of exiles scattered all over the world to remain quiet and avoid taking part in political activism against the junta.64 However, as Julie Shayne states, “…this tactic partially backfired given that the exiles formed

62 Wright, T. C., (2007), State Terrorism in Latin America, p. 55. 63 Loveman, M., (1998), "High-risk collective action", p. 489. 64 One of the key reasons behind this logic was that most exiles had relatives and friends still living in the country. Any activity carried out abroad could have serious consequences at home, as the security forces could take, and they often did, reprisals against those relatives and/or friends.

249

countless organisations in the more than one hundred countries where they fled.”65 As soon as they settled in the host nations, numerous exiles began to provide testimonies, organize marches, carry out activities to embarrass the regime, publish newsletters and reports, lobby governments to discontinue diplomatic relations with the military junta and, promote economic boycotts of key Chilean exports such as wine and mineral products. Individually, some activities were more successful than others. As a whole, however, they generated numerous problems for the Chilean junta.

Despite considerable problems, the campaigns organized by the exiles achieved important outcomes in their early years (i.e. 1973-1977). Thomas Wright and Rody Oñate Zúñiga suggest that the exile community became an important component of the new “external front” in the struggle against Pinochet. According to these authors, the Chileans “worked tirelessly in the political arena to keep the repression and human rights violations practised by the Pinochet dictatorship in the news and to pave the way for the eventual restoration of democracy”.66

The levels of organisation amongst the exiles were quite significant, notwithstanding countless logistical deficiencies. Shayne argue that, regardless of its geographical position around the world, the Chilean Solidarity Movement had two primary goals: “(1) to provide material and (2) political support to the anti-Pinochet movement in the interior”.67 By the late 1970s, this external front had accomplished substantial cuts of financial and military aid to the military junta, particularly after President James Carter took office in the United States.68

65 Shayne, J. D., (2009), They used to call us witches, p. 129. 66 Wright, T. C. and R. O. Zúñiga, (2007), "Chilean political exile", Latin American Perspectives, 34(4): 31-49, p. 38. 67 The exiles organized events to collect funds and sent all the money to Chile. Shayne, J. D., (2009), They used to call us witches, p. 72. 68 Until then, and despite the intense work carried out by Congress throughout 1973-1976, the US government continued to support the South American military regimes. This situation changed considerably with the arrival of President Carter into the White House. According to Thierry Meyssan, the new president sought to “put an end to his predecessors’ practices…and … eliminate Latin American authoritarian regimes”. While its achievements towards the latter goal were modest,

250

It is unlikely that the work of the Chilean exiles would have been as successful without the existence of a receptive international community. Allende’s victory and his distinct socialist experiment, described by him as the revolución a la chilena con empanadas y vino tinto (revolution a la chilena with empanadas and red wine69) had captured the attention of large numbers of people all over the world. To them, the outcome of the 1970 election confirmed that the peaceful road to socialism was possible. More importantly, it provided a valid alternative to the radical revolutionary theories and strategies that had emerged in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution. Allende’s victory demonstrated that it was possible to defeat a long-standing capitalist model such as that present in Chile by abiding by the rules of a democratic . For those in Europe and other parts of the world wanting to achieve change without resorting to more violent and radical methods, the revolución con empanadas y vino tinto became an attractive alternative. On the other hand, the CIA’s activities to sabotage Allende’s government, Nixon’s support for General Pinochet and the subsequent brutality displayed by the armed forces immediately after the coup sparked international outrage. In countries such as Canada, England, France, Sweden, New Zealand, Australia, as well as those within the Soviet Union, and even in the United States of America, to mention only a few, thousands of people immediately mobilized in one way or another in solidarity with the Chilean people and to welcome political refugees. 70

the new administration was more sympathetic than its predecessors to the issue of human rights. This allowed the Latin American exiles and political refugees all over the world, particularly the Chileans and Uruguayans, to engage more efficiently with the US government and obtain further substantial results. Meyssan, T., (2007), "La Liga Anticomunista Mundial, Internacional del crimen", online, avaliable at http://www.kaosenlared.net/noticia/liga-anticomunista-mundial-internacional-crimen, [accessed 15/02/2011]. 69 The Chilean empanadas are traditional meat and onion pies and were cited by President Allende to illustrate the distinct nationalist shape of the socialist revolution in Chile. See: Wright, T. C. and R. O. Zúñiga, (2007), "Chilean political exile", p. 39. 70 See: Wilkinson, M. D., (1992), "The Chile solidarity campaign and British government policy towards Chile, 1973-1990", Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe/European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, (52): 57-74; Loveman, M., (1998), "High-risk collective action; Sznajder, M. and L. Roniger, (2007), "Political exile in Latin America"; Wright, T. C., (2007), State terrorism in Latin America; Wright, T. C. and R. O. Zúñiga, (2007), "Chilean political exile", Camacho, F., (2006), "Los asilados de las Embajadas de Europa Occidental en Chile

251

In Australia, for instance, the solidarity campaigns with Chile began during the Allende years and intensified after the 11 September coup. The labour movement in this country played a prominent part in helping the Chilean exiles and campaigning against the Pinochet regime.71 As Ann Jones indicates, “the Chilean Solidarity Campaign was […] the first large-scale Australian union involvement in a Latin American campaign and the longest solid commitment to an international solidarity movement by Australian unions.”72 An Australian delegation formed by labour organizers and other activists travelled to Chile in early 1974, after the Chilean junta reluctantly agreed to authorize a twelve-days visit to monitor the human right situation in the country.73

When they returned to Australia the delegates wrote a report for their respective unions. They also produced a 4-page newsletter entitled “Twelve days in Chile”, which was published in seven languages around the world.74 They held several meetings throughout the country to raise awareness about what was taking place in the Andean nation under military rule. The report produced by the delegation also served as a key source of evidence for a number of international campaigns taking place at the time. The pictures taken by the delegation of the Chilean unions’ buildings confiscated by the military were tras el golpe militar y sus consecuencias diplomáticas: el caso de Suecia", Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe/European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, (81): 21-41; Shayne, J. D., (2009), They used to call us witches. 71 The Australian Trade Union movement was highly active during the sixties, seventies and, eighties and participated in numerous and varied campaigns, including the anti-Vietnam War, civil rights, and against the regime in South Africa. 72 Jones, A., (2007), "'Sindicalistas Australianos': a case study of international trade unionism", Labour History, 93(November): 197-212, p. 200. 73 During that period they met with the Interior Minister, General Óscar Bonilla and asked him several questions about the situation of political prisoners and trade unions. They also were granted authorisation to visit the National Stadium – used by the security forces as a concentration camp where several prisoners were tortured and murdered – and the Chacabuco prison in the Atacama Desert, which held numerous trade unionist inmates. The delegation met with the archbishop of Santiago, Raúl Silva Enríquez who arranged meetings with Chilean trade unionists and other people who lived in the underground. Australian diplomats also facilitated contacts with several refugees seeking asylum at various embassies across Santiago. Rayner, M., (2010), Solidaridad!, Australia, Radio National, aired 31/01/2010, online, available at http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/hindsight/solidaridad/3108534, [accessed 28/03/2013]. 74 Jones, A., (2007), "'Sindicalistas Australianos'", p.209.

252

accepted as evidence at the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) inquiry of the junta’s human rights violations held in Geneva later that year.75

Jones maintains that the “Australian Trade Union delegation to Chile of 1974 was a significant incident in the history of trade union internationalism”.76 It can also be argued that it contributed considerably to the global resistance against the Pinochet regime and, during the following years, to the resistance to the South and Central American rightist dictatorships. Its impact extended far beyond this country’s territorial borders. The Australian campaigners pressured the regime to release several political prisoners and not to harass those seeking refuge in Australia. They also lobbied the Australian government to withdraw its recognition of the military junta, and to increase the intake of political refugees from Chile. Subsequently, the Australian government withdrew its ambassador to Santiago. As a consequence of the solidarity campaign and the activities of the Solidarity Committee, the Chilean national airline LAN Chile was refused landing rights in Australia and in New Zealand. The Australian Seamen’s Union staged boycotts and banned products to and from Chile. Michelle Rayner states that

… from music concerts and street theatre on building sites, to what is possibly the longest trade boycott ever undertaken, the Chile Solidarity movement in Australia sustained its protest campaign until the ultimate demise of the Pinochet Regime in 1989…. For 17 years no load of wheat went to Chile. It was the longest boycott Pinochet had to face.”77

Jim Baird further adds that the ILO inquiry led to the expulsion of Chile from the organization in 197478, which was yet another considerable blow to the regime’s legitimacy at home and abroad.

75 Baird, J., (2007), After the coup: the trade union delegation to Chile, pp. 18-22, in (2007), Vintage reds: more stories of rank and file organising, Sydney, roughreds.com, online, available at http://roughreds.com/twopdf/baird.pdf, [accessed 20/09/2013]. 76 Jones, A., (2007), "'Sindicalistas Australianos'", p. 209. 77 Rayner, M., (2010), Solidaridad!. 78 Baird, J., (2007), After the coup, p. 22.

253

Michael Wilkinson’s work on the Chilean Solidarity Campaign in Britain reveals similar outcomes to those achieved in Australia. However, the Chilean exiles in England met more resistance from British authorities in 1973 than their Australian counterparts.79 Some Tories within the conservative Heath administration held the same anti-Allende views of President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the United States. They blamed the Marxist president and his UP government for “bringing Chile to the brink of economic ruin, of undemocratic practices and plots to allow the Communists to take over the country by assassinating military leaders. [Furthermore,] Chilean refugees were considered ‘subversives’ who ‘should go to Cuba’”.80 A similar situation occurred in Canada where its government recognized the junta and refused to increase the quota of refugees.81 The victory of the Labor Party in the 1974 elections changed England’s political landscape and produced a more favourable environment for the exiles. From then on, and thanks to their work with the British trade union movement and members of the Labor Party, the exiles and their supporters were finally able to exert some influence over the government’s policy towards Chile.82

The British solidarity campaign with Chilean people achieved important results. One of the most significant victories came when the Labour government announced that it would not make any further arms sales to the Pinochet regime, or provide training to its military personnel.83 The ban, however, applied only to

79 Although the Withlam administration in Australia recognized the junta, it was more flexible than the British government in accepting Chilean refugees. 80 Dame Hart in Wilkinson, M. D., (1992), "The Chile solidarity campaign and British government policy towards Chile, 1973-1990", p. 65. 81 The government’s position changed quite quickly, as the exile community and local grass root organizations convinced the authorities to adopt a more flexible stand to allow more refugees. The exiles also obtained substantial cuts to military and trade contracts between Canadian corporations and the regime. For further readings on these issues, especially the solidarity campaign in Vancouver, see Shayne, J. D., (2009), They used to call us witches, pp. 93-132. 82 See Wilkinson, M. D., (1992), "The Chile solidarity campaign and British government policy towards Chile, 1973-1990", pp. 61-62. 83 Lobbying against the sale of arms and equipment was a common feature of several solidarity campaigns around the World. In the US they led to the cutting of Military Assistance Program (MAP) aid and other forms of military assistance. In Canada the Solidarity Committees pushed the

254

future deals and did not include previous contractual obligations between the two countries.84 During 1974-1976, Chile was due to receive a number of naval vessels and submarines that it had purchased from British contractors prior to the military coup. On this issue, Chilean exiles received immediate support from the labour movement, particularly, the trade union and workers involved in the construction of these vessels. That support helped to pressure the British government and led to the subsequent ban on future arms sales and training. However, the Labour administration delivered the vessels claiming that the country was obliged to meet its contractual obligations.85 The Australian and British Solidarity Campaigns illustrate the importance of a sympathetic international community, especially of trade unions and grass roots organizations, to support the Chilean people. These examples were replicated in more than 100 countries (though with some differences in terms of size, success and efficiency) and helped to further isolate the junta and undermine its international legitimacy.

The Chilean exiles’ ability to organize amongst themselves allowed them to interact with other groups and the international community. Fernando Montupil describes how in Europe the exiles established a series of political and cultural organizations, including Chile Democrático in Rome, the Instituto Para el Nuevo Chile and the Centro Salvador Allende in Laussane, el Comité Salvador Allende in Stockholm, the Centro de Estudios Salvador Allende in Madrid, the Comité Chileno Anti-Fascista y Chile Democrático in London and

government to ban the sale of airplane engines and spare parts to the . On the latter issue, see Shayne, J. D., (2009), They used to call us witches, p. 40. 84 Wilkinson, M. D., (1992), "The Chile solidarity campaign and British government policy towards Chile, 1973-1990", pp. 61-62. 85 Many British politicians claimed that not to do so could jeopardize the country’s arms sales to the rest of Latin America and result in the loss of thousands of British jobs. According to Wilkinson, powerful economic lobby groups wanting to expand trade relations between Chile and England also influenced this decision. Ibid.

255

Chile Democrático in Paris.86 The leftist parties that had formed the UP coalition also re-established their political structures in the host nations.

Good organization, however, did not mean that the exiles unanimously agreed on how to conduct the resistance. The entire Chilean left (both inside and outside Chile) was plagued with the same political divisions as during the Allende era. These ideological clashes, as Wright and Oñate point out, were “exacerbated by the blame-laying for the UP’s defeat. Communists, Socialists, Miristas and other groups developed their own theses, and groups often divided over the differing interpretations”.87 However, the strong repression in South America and the inability to challenge the Chilean military militarily led these parties to reassess their strategies and explore new alternatives for the resistance. The common struggle against the junta held these organizations united and allowed them to work reasonably well together, in spite of their ideological differences and rivalries.88

Chile Democrático (Democratic Chile), with headquarters in Rome, quickly became one of the most prominent organizations among those established by the Chilean exiles. It was founded three months after the 11 September coup by representatives from all the Chilean leftist parties that went into exile, and some sectors of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) (Christian Democratic Party). The latter’s inclusion strengthened the image of Chile Democrático as an organization with a broad political base and helped to deter criticisms that portrayed it as a mere conglomerate of leftist groups. The PDC had strongly opposed the government of Salvador Allende and even supported the military coup. However, once the regime banned political parties and some Christian Democrat politicians were arrested by the security forces or expelled from the country, the PDC joined the resistance to the military junta. With branches in more than 80 nations, Chile Democrático’s work was

86 Fernando Montupil in Sznajder, M. and L. Roniger, (2007), "Political exile in Latin America", p. 50. 87 Wright, T. C. and R. O. Zúñiga, (2007), "Chilean political exile", pp. 31-49. 88 Similar divisions existed amongst other South American exiles.

256

predominantly oriented towards re-establishing democratic rule in Chile. However, the organization also circulated information about the regime’s human rights violations and lobbied international organs and fora. It also “published the most influential exile periodical, Chile América, and gave material support to the Chilean human rights movement that developed under the protection of the Catholic Church’s Vicaría de la Solidaridad.89

The testimonies of high profile Chilean figures in front of international fora and mass rallies complemented the work of the abovementioned organisations and also caused considerable damage to the image of the military junta. Many UP politicians who survived the regime’s repression or were released from the numerous concentration camps in Chile went into exile and were frequently invited to share their experiences. Among these politicians were , leader of the Chilean Socialist Party, and prominent communist member, .90 Altamirano’s testimony was widely publicised in Mexico and in several European newspapers and led to strong public repudiation of the Chilean military government.91

Hortensia Bussi de Allende, widow of the overthrown president, became an important figure for the resistance to the junta and provided an important boost to the solidarity campaigns all over the world. She travelled across the Americas, Europe, the Soviet Union, Oceania and other parts of the world to promote the cause of Chilean resistance. In England, for instance, her visits mobilized tens of thousands of people who gathered to hear and support her message. Wilkinson argues that on the first anniversary of the coup, some “10,000 attended a demonstration in London on the 15th of September 1974,

89 Wright, T. C. and R. O. Zúñiga, (2007), "Chilean political exile", p. 40. 90 After escaping certain death in the aftermath of the September coup, Altamirano went to Cuba and then travelled to Europe to campaign against the Pinochet regime. 91 See Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years: how Pinochet and his allies brought terrorism to three continents, New York, New Press, p. 129.

257

addressed by Madame Hortensia Allende, who became a figurehead, returning to head demonstrations in September 1975, 1976, 1977 and 1979”.92

Mrs Allende also played an influential role in the formation of the Russell Tribunal II. The Second Bertrand Russell Tribunal on repression in Brazil and Latin America began in early 1974 with subsequent sessions up to the late 1970s.93 Originally, this tribunal was created to investigate the human right situation in Brazil during the military dictatorship. However, at the request of Hortensia de Allende, the investigation was extended to include Chile. Finally, the Tribunal’s organizers agreed that, in addition to Brazil and Chile, the inquiry should include the military regimes of Bolivia and Uruguay. For the Chilean investigation, the organizers collected vital information on the excesses of the Pinochet regime from a number of exiles.94 The findings were widely publicised across Europe and other parts of the world and caused further embarrassment to the Juntas and international condemnation of the regimes.

The campaigners also staged protests against the Chilean junta at major sporting events such as the 1974 FIFA World Cup in West Germany.95 The

92 Wilkinson, M. D., (1992), "The Chile solidarity campaign and British government policy towards Chile, 1973-1990", p. 58. 93 The first Bertrand Russell Tribunal (BRT) was held in the early 1960s to investigate the US and South Vietnamese forces’ human right violations during the Vietnam War. The success of its findings earned the BRT international recognition and resulted in the creation of similar initiatives. 94 Among them were: Raúl Ampuero, a lawyer and Member of the Unión Socialista Popular- USOPO (Socialist Popular Union) – though a supporter of the leftist UP coalition, USOPO was not part of Allende’s government – ; Alejandro Pizzorusso, another prominent Chilean lawyer; Ariel Dorfman, Argentine-Chilean novelist and human rights activist who served as cultural advisor to President Salvador Allende; and Franz Hinkelammert, a prominent economist and theologian who taught at the Chilean Catholic University between 1963-1973. The Chilean witnesses against Chile were: Luis González Rodríguez and Grimalda Sanchez. For a detailed account of these testimonies see: Jerman, W., (Editor), (1975), Repression in Latin America: a report on the first session of the Second Russell Tribunal-Rome, April 1974, Nottingham, Bertrand Russel Foundation & Spokesman Books, pp. 62-110. 95 The regime had already been embarrassed by the circumstances that led to the national team’s qualification to the tournament. As Wolfgang Kraushaar points out: “The Chilean team owes its participation to somewhat scandalous circumstances. The Soviet Union had refused to play the return match in the qualifying round because the Chilean military had used the Estadio Nacional de Chile in the capital Santiago […] as a concentration camp, abusing, torturing and murdering thousands of political prisoners. On 20 November 1973, Austrian referee Erich Linemayr awarded the Chilean team ‘victory’ in what was probably the most absurd international match ever held. In front of 15,000 spectators, mostly soldiers, the players ran out unopposed onto the pitch, kicked the ball around

258

Solidarity Committees in Germany organized the campaign “Chile Sí, Junta No!” and the first protests began during the match between West Germany and Chile on 14 June. Organizations such as the Maoist League Against Imperialism and the Trotskyite Group of International Marxists (GIM) had acquired 1,500 tickets for the demonstrators. A “chorus in Block 41 east [began] to chant ‘Chile Si, Junta No!’ displaying flags and banners with slogans condemning the Pinochet regime” when the Chilean anthem was played.96 The last major protest in the World Cup took place on 22 June at the match between Chile and Australia. Activists invaded the pitch and used the TV coverage to promote the Chilean people’s cause. According to Wolfgang Kraushaar, the game’s interruption “was broadcast live on Chilean TV… [however] after a few minutes [the junta] decided to interrupt the broadcast and superimpose a notice announcing a ‘technical difficulty’…”97

The Junta’s reaction

The global Solidarity Campaigns generated numerous problems and challenges for the Pinochet regime. Thomas Wright argue that to “counter the negative foreign reaction, the Junta established the Dirección de Información Exterior (Foreign Information Directorate) to purchase favourable coverage in media around the world through US public relations firms”.98 Thus, the struggle between the Pinochet regime and its opponents became a fight for legitimacy at international level. In most countries, the Chilean diplomatic corps became public relations agents for the regime. For instance, the Chilean Ambassador to Australia and his personnel wrote editorials and appeared in other media outlets

listlessly a few times and finally directed it into a deserted goal to make it 1:0. In this farce, athletes were once again occupying the locker rooms and lavatories which only recently had been used for interrogation and torture. Kraushaar, W., (2008), "Chile Si, Junta No!" Political protests at the 1974 FIFA World Cup, Mittelweg 36, Germany, Eurozine.com, online, available at: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-08-07-kraushaar2-en.html, [accessed 17/09/2012]. 96 Demonstrations were also held during the match between Chile and East Germany. 97 Kraushaar, W., (2008), "Chile Si, Junta No!" Political protests at the 1974 FIFA World Cup. 98 Wright, T. C., (2007), State Terrorism in Latin America, p. 56.

259

attempting to neutralize and discredit the solidarity campaigners in that country.99

The junta also organized a “good will trip” for its famous navy flagship the Esmeralda to improve the image of the Chilean armed forces abroad. However, the whole trip became, arguably, the regime’s worst public relations campaign. The Esmeralda was the training ship of the Chilean Navy Academy. After the coup, the vessel served as a detention centre where hundreds of Chileans were detained, tortured and even murdered by the security forces on board. News of the activities carried out on board the ship spread all over the world immediately after the coup. Therefore, at almost every port where the vessel arrived, locals and exiles staged marches and boycotted the activities organized by the junta to promote the good will trip. The ship docked in Brazil but experienced numerous problems in Ecuador, The Dominican Republic, and Panama. It was also refused entry to the ports of Spain and Israel. In San Francisco, “the dockworkers of the International Longshore Workers Union refused to tie up the ship. Instead …it docked at the Alameda navy air station some distance away, and was placed under tight security”.100 The same situation took place in Vancouver and the ship was subsequently diverted to Hawaii.

General Augusto Pinochet responded issuing specific orders to Chilean diplomatic personnel posted across Europe. On 23 August 1974, the chief of Chile’s Naval Mission to London held a secret meeting with 23 naval reserve officers to communicate the junta’s orders of monitoring the activities of

99 The editorials were published in important newspapers like the Canberra Times, The Australian, and the Sydney Morning Herald. Between late 1973 and 1975, the Chilean embassy in Australia published at least nine letters in these media outlets (the days were: 27/09/73, 30/11/1973, 14/12/1973, 8/2/1974, 14/2/1974, 23/1/1975 and 19/3/1975). They were written by the Chilean Ambassador to Australia, the embassy’s Charge d’Affairs, its press officer, and its military attaché, Navy Captain Jorge Baeza Concha. Upon the latter’s return to Chile in 1974, he was appointed Chief of the Major Command of the Chilean Navy’s 6th region. Chilean diplomatic staff continued to publish several letters throughout the following years. See: Montenegro Martín, G. A., (1994),"The Australian Solidarity Campaign with Chile 1973-1990", pp. 100-109. 100 See Vancourver Chilean Solidarity Committee (CSC) in Shayne, J. D., (2009), They used to call us witches, pp. 101-102.

260

Chilean leftist leaders all over that continent. Three days earlier, the CIA reported that “elements in the Chilean government [were] attempting to locate and assassinate major leftist leaders such as Carlos Altamirano … and Volodia Teitelboim … who [were] actively working abroad against the Junta government”.101 Altamirano became an obsession for Pinochet and his intelligence agency DINA and attempts to hunt him down intensified in late 1975 after the launch of the Cóndor plan.102

Despite the harsh repression conducted by the regime’s security forces at home, the exiles remained very much in touch with the internal front. While the latter’s main priority in the early stages was to help people escape and find asylum in other countries, it also produced valuable information and evidence on the country’s human rights situation for the exiles and the international community. That communication between both fronts (i.e. internal and external) produced up to date information for the global solidarity campaigns. The Chilean cause also gained international notoriety thanks to the existence of a sympathetic international community. The support provided by NGOs, such as Amnesty International, and the international labour and student movements helped the exiles to lobby governments, coordinate activities and exert considerable pressure on the Chilean junta. In response, the Pinochet regime increased cooperation with its neighbouring counterparts to neutralize the economic and political effects of that international isolation.

101 CIA-Directorate of Operations, “Attempts to locate General Secretary of the Socialist Party Altamirano & other Leftists”, Information Report [not finally evaluated intelligence], No. 2893-107- 3, 20 August 1974, approved for release 11/06/1999, available at CREST/FOIA online http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000345087.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2010]. 102 Méndez Méndez, J. L., (2006), Bajo las alas del Cóndor, La Habana, Editorial Capitán San Luis, p. 43.

261

The Uruguayan resistance

The internal front

The Uruguayan struggle against the dictatorial regime also had two fronts. However, the internal front was less developed and organized than the one in Chile. Immediately after the coup, the trade union and student movements, the parties involved in the Broad Front leftist coalition, and some members of the Blanco and Colorado parties, launched a general strike that lasted fifteen days and brought the country to a complete stand still. This event marked the emergence of Uruguay’s internal front. The labour central CNT established a ‘support group’ in Buenos Aires to obtain help for the resistance from neighbouring countries and international labour organizations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Prague. The Argentine Labour Central, headed by Ignacio Rucci, held a press conference to declare its support for the Uruguayan trade unionists shortly after the general strike commenced. Similar displays of solidarity came from numerous human rights organizations and political parties from Argentina, Chile and Peru, as well as from Cuba and countries in Europe.103 All these gave international legitimacy to the newly established Uruguayan internal front. These communication channels and transnational solidarity actions continued to grow in the following years and provided contacts and a key platform to launch the exiles’ future campaigns against the Uruguayan dictator.

Although the general strike was the highlight of this initial stage of peaceful resistance, its organizers called it off on 11 July 1973 as it failed to achieve its ultimate goal of convincing the armed forces to restore all democratic institutions.104 From then on, the military regime set out to disarticulate the two main pillars of the internal resistance, increasing the number of operations

103 Rico, Á., (2005), 15 días que estremecieron al Uruguay: golpe de estado y huelga general 27 de junio-11 de julio de 1973, Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo, pp. 61-63. 104 The strike was also called off due to internal divisions amongst the organizers.

262

against the labour and student movements. The security forces arrested thousands of leaders and militants, while killing others or forcing them to leave the country or seek refuge in foreign embassies. Hence, the internal front went underground and developed different tactics to resist the dictatorship. Several trade unions wrote reports about the regime’s human rights abuses and smuggled them to Argentina and other countries around the world. That information provided important evidence for several international campaigns against the dictatorship conducted by the exiles and their supporters.105 Despite this, however, the space for the Uruguayan internal front to resist the regime or engage in the defence of human rights was very limited.106

Until 1976, the Bordaberry regime presented a number of distinctive features that made it difficult for the resistance to function as efficiently as their Chilean counterpart. Uruguay became the country with the highest number of political prisoners in relation to its population in the entire Latin American continent. Yet, unlike Paraguay, Chile and later, Argentina, the Uruguayan regime adopted a civic/military government façade. While the armed forces ran the country, they kept Bordaberry as a figurehead to maintain some degree of legitimacy at home and abroad. With a death toll much smaller than Chile’s, and a civilian president still in place, the Uruguayan government initially

105 See Cores, H., (2002), Memorias de la Resistencia, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, pp. 145-147. 106 While the tough and selective security measures played an important part in creating this restricted environment, there were other pressing factors contributing to this outcome, including the limited contribution made by the Uruguayan Catholic Church, which was much less influential than its Chilean counterpart. After the coup this institution “maintained a position of official silence”, which was interpreted by the regime as a failure to cooperate with the military government. Furthermore, many within the Bordaberry administration maintained that the Church was infiltrated by communist elements that should be expunged. Consequently, the Uruguayan clergy was unable operate freely or to form organizations of the calibre of CONAR, COPACHI or the Vicaría de la Solidaridad. Brian Smith also attributes this situation to “the long-standing weakness of the Uruguayan Church, the heavily secularised culture in Uruguay, and the effective neutralization of the Church by an alliance among conservative Catholics, the press, and the military”. Smith, B. H., (1979), "Churches and human rights in Latin America: recent trends in the subcontinent", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 21(1): 89-127, p.122; See also the views of General Forteza in Loveman, M., (1998), "High-risk collective action", p. 500.

263

obtained recognition from many governments in the region and beyond Latin America.107

The political tactics implemented by the regime also undermined the internal front’s efficiency. From 1972 a number of Uruguayan political parties, including many of the Broad Front leftist coalition, held sporadic negotiations with the so-called Peruanista faction of the armed forces.108 Despite the June 1973 coup, these political parties believed that it was possible to negotiate with the military and restore democracy, even as they continued to demonstrate against the coup and condemn the excesses committed by the regime. These parties hoped that the Peruanistas would establish a progressive government with a development program similar to that offered by the Broad Front or the Nationalist Party. For these reasons, many within the Broad Front opted for a cautious wait-and-see tactic, rather than a frontal confrontation with the military.109 These interpretations changed from 1974 as the military’s intentions to stay in power became clear. When the armed forces targeted PCU leaders and militants, the party abandoned all negotiations with the regime and joined

107 This, however, did not mean that the international community remained oblivious to what was taking place in Uruguay. Several human rights organizations and other grass roots groups began to pressure the military regime and provide support for the exiles. See, for instance the campaigns carried out by Amnesty International. Amnesty International (1974). Annual Report 1973/74. London, Amnesty International, Amnesty International (1975). Annual Report: 1974/75. London, Amnesty International 108 The Uruguayan army pretended to be divided into two important factions: the hardliners, led by General Esteban Cristi, and the Peruanistas, led by General Gregorio Álvarez. The latter faction wrote communiqués number 4 & 7, which proposed the formation of a progressive and nationalist military government, similar to that headed by General Alvarado in Peru. However, this was a tactic used by the armed forces to win time and confuse the political parties until they took control of the country. See Lessa, A., (2005), Estado de guerra: de la gestación del golpe del 73 a la caída de Bordaberry, Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo, p. 21. 109 Vania Markarian also states that “… other leftists were either not yet concerned about these issues because they had not yet been harshly targeted by government repression (like the Communist Party) or too involved in blaming each other for the installation of the authoritarian regime (like the more radical groups and former guerrillas). Although the communists strongly rejected the government abuses, they did not characterize at first the regime on the basis of repression, but kept explaining human rights violations as ‘misbehaviours’ or ‘aberrations’ of a ‘fascist’ group inside the armed forces, according to previous ideas about its role in dependent capitalist countries”. Markarian, V., (2006), "From a revolutionary logic to humanitarian reasons: Uruguayan leftists in exile and human rights transnational networks", Cuadernos del CLAEH, 1, online, available at http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0797- 60622006000100002&lng=en&nrm=iso, [accessed 17/12/2012] .

264

the other political forces in the resistance. The PCU and the vast majority of the Uruguayan left suspended their political projects and ambitions, focusing instead on the denunciation of the military’s human rights violations to isolate the regime and discredit its international legitimacy.

The Uruguayan exiles

In the aftermath of the 27 June coup, thousands of Uruguayans fled to Argentina and other Latin American countries, particularly Cuba, Venezuela and Mexico.110 Most of the literature dealing with the Uruguayan exiles confirms that during the period 1973-1976 those in Argentina were amongst the most active in the resistance from abroad. These authors pay particular attention to the activities of a number of key political figures of the left and centre-right parties such as Wilson Ferreira Adlunate, Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz, and a small number of groups and organizations, including the Organización Popular Revolucionaria-33 (OPR-33) (Popular Revolutionary Organization) and the Revolución Obrero Estudiantil (ROE) (Student Worker Resistance.111

Like their South American counterparts, the Uruguayan exiles experienced deep divisions, and initially struggled to establish a . All the strategic, tactical and ideological debates that had factionalized the Uruguayan left during the sixties and early seventies deepened after the 27 June

110 Mexico became one of the countries with most South American exiles, particularly from Uruguay and Chile. While the Mexican government began to provide asylum as soon as the military took over in these countries, the largest numbers arrived in Mexico from late 1975. For a detailed study on the South American diaspora in Mexico, see Dutrénit Bielous, S. and G. Rodríguez de Ita, (2000), Tras la memoria: el asilo diplomático en tiempos de la Operación Cóndor, México, Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora & Instituto de Cultura de la Ciudad de México- Gobierno del Distrito Federal. 111 See Jaunarena, M., (1978), Uruguay vencerá: discursos, entrevistas y artículos de Zelmar Michelini, Barcelona, Editorial Laia; Wilson, F., (1986), El exilio y la lucha, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental; Markarian, V., (2004), "De la lógica revolucionaria a las razones humanitarias"; Markarian, V., (2005), Left in transformation: Uruguayan exiles and the Latin American human rights networks, 1967-1984, New York, Routlege; Markarian, V., (2006), "From a revolutionary logic to humanitarian reasons"; Markarian, V., (2006), Idos y recién llegados: la izquierda Uruguaya en el exilio y redes transnationales de derechos humanos, 1967-1984, Montevideo, Correo del Maestro/Ediciones La Vasija-Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios Uruguayo, Universidad de la República.

265

coup and during the time in exile. Though all leftist parties and groups agreed that it was necessary to form an effective and united resistance to the military junta, they could not agree on how to achieve this goal. The strongest differences amongst the leftists were based on how to engage with the emerging human rights movement. Some realized the latter’s potential sooner than others and were quick to tap into this transnational network. Others refused to do so based on ideological principles. Markarian argues that until the fall of Salvador Allende, and despite the coup in Uruguay, the vast majority of the Uruguayan left had some optimism about South America’s political future. With Allende still in power, and Héctor Cámpora’s victory in the Argentine presidential election of March 1973, a considerable number of exiles from the Broad Front maintained their original ideological stand and tactics.112 They believed that socialist governments would emerge in the continent. The situation in Uruguay was only a setback in the revolutionary process. Thus the Broad Front would continue resistance by any means available until the fall of the regime. This approach, however, started to change after the overthrow of Salvador Allende.

Following the 11 September coup in Chile many Uruguayan exiles residing in that country escaped to Argentina. The return to democratic rule in the latter country and the solidarity shown by the Argentine left, especially the most progressive sectors of the Peronist Party and other political groups and revolutionary organizations, encouraged the Uruguayan exiles to maintain their revolutionary stand against the Bordaberry regime. They re-organized quickly and established groups representing the various political parties and the myriad of different factions within them. In addition to those already discussed in the previous chapter113 were organizations such as the anarchist influenced Revolución Obrero-Estudiantil (ROE) (Student-Workers Revolution) and the Unión Artiguista de Liberación (UAL) (Artiguista Liberation Union).

112 Markarian, V., (2004), "De la lógica revolucionaria a las razones humanitarias, p. 3. 113 i.e. Nuevo Tiempo and Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo (PVP).

266

ROE was amongst the most active within the Uruguayan exiled political groups in Argentina. In origin it had strong ties with the Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios del Uruguay (FEUU) (Uruguayan University Students Federation), the labour federation CNT, and other armed revolutionary groups such as the anarchist Organización Popular Revolucionaria-33 (OPR- 33) (Revolutionary Popular Organization-33). argues that ROE organized activities to support the trade union’s resistance in Uruguay; helped the exiles in Argentina in whatever way they could; published a number of newsletters and other articles providing thorough reports on the political situation in Uruguay; engaged with members of other political parties, including non-leftist leaders like Wilson Ferreira; studied the reasons for the defeat of the Uruguayan left; and tried to develop new strategies for the future. ROE members demonstrated against the regime at football matches between Uruguayan and Argentine clubs.114 The group also organized two mass rallies in Buenos Aires against the Uruguayan dictatorship. The largest took place on 19 April 1974 and thousands of Uruguayans and Argentine supporters attended the gathering. The rally reflected the strong and defiant combative line adopted by some sectors of the Uruguayan left in exile. According to Markarian, “representatives of various parties and groups got united that day under slogans such as: ‘Resistance Will Defeat’, ‘Freedom or Death’ and ‘We Will Be Back’”.115

Despite a strong commitment to the revolutionary cause, ROE’s leadership struggled to finance the organization’s activities. To solve this problem, the group kidnapped a prominent Argentine businessman and demanded US$ 10 million from his family to secure his freedom.116 The funds allowed the organization to continue with its activities in support of the resistance. However, the large ransom attracted the attention of the security

114 Cores, H., (2002), Memorias de la Resistencia, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, pp. 145-147. 115 Markarian, V., (2004), "De la lógica revolucionaria a las razones humanitarias", p. 4. 116 Cores, H., (2002), Memorias de la Resistencia, p. 147.

267

forces from Uruguay and Argentina and made the organization a high priority target.117 Despite this, ROE joined other leftist groups to establish the Partido por la Victoria del Pueblo (PVP) (Party for the Victory of the People) on 26 July 1975.118 The latter became one of the strongest voices within the Uruguayan exile community and a key campaigner against the Bordaberry regime in Argentina and in European countries.

In October 1974, Senator Enrique Erro119 and a number of dissident factions of the Broad Front coalition established the UAL to consolidate what Markarian describes as “one of the oldest ambitions of the Uruguayan left”. That is,

… to give an organic shape to what was called since the late sixties the [corriente] ‘current’ or the [tendencia]‘tendency’, in reference to different sectors opposed to the Communist Party’s tactics; in particular to certain practices called ‘reformist’ and to their intention to approach a group of supposedly ‘democratic’ military men. They also distanced themselves from the [Broad Front] as they considered [that the latter] had the same posture as the communists.120

The organization’s most prominent figure, Senator Erro, strongly opposed any kind of negotiations with the armed forces. In his view, the resistance should be inflexible on this matter and should continue that way until the defeat of the dictatorship. Mario Sznajder argues that ROE, UAL and other sectors within the Uruguayan left in Argentina believed that engaging with “human rights NGOs,

117 Gerardo Gatti, one of ROE’s key leaders with connections to the OPR-33 and involved in the abduction, was kidnapped in 1976 by the Argentine and Uruguayan security forces. The latter engaged in a number of negotiations with the organization to obtain the US$ 10 million in exchange for the detainee’s freedom. However, negotiations stalled and Gatti, was made to disappear by the security forces. See Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, pp. 210-211. 118 Bayley, M. A., (2007), Un pueblo en lucha contra el fascismo: Frente Amplio-uno solo dentro y fuera de Uruguay en la resistencia a la dictadura, Montevideo, Ediciones Cauce, p. 56. 119 Senator Erro was originally a member of the Nationalist Party. In 1971 he withdrew from it and joined other politicians to create the leftist Broad Front coalition for the 1971 election and was elected senator for this party. Erro forged ties with the anarchists and with members of the MLN-T guerrillas. Just before 27 June 1973 he travelled to Argentina and avoided detention by the Uruguayan military. During his time in exile in Argentina he became one of the most active opponents of the dictatorship until the Argentine security forces arrested him in 1975. 120 Markarian, V., (2006), "From a revolutionary logic to humanitarian reasons", p. 4.

268

international organizations and groups of humanitarian and charitable activists in the developed world was […] a sign of revolutionary weakness and possibly a falling into the many traps set by Western Imperialism”.121

The death of President Juan Perón, the appointment of his wife Isabelita as the new president, the emergence of the Triple-A and the return of the Argentine security forces to the political arena represented a serious setback for the Uruguayan exiles and their struggle against the Bordaberry dictatorship. The Argentine armed forces detained Senator Erro in March 1975, together with other members of the ROE, OPR-33 and the PVP. As a consequence, the Uruguayan exiles abandoned, at least momentarily, their revolutionary ambitions and turned to international organizations, foreign governments and other transnational actors, for refuge and support. As Markarian concludes, the dramatic change in Argentina’s political situation and the arrests explain why these exiles changed their strategies and embraced the international human rights movement.122

The leader of the Nationalist Party, Wilson Ferreira, and the last president of the Uruguayan Chamber of Deputies, Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz, quickly became the most influential figures within the non-leftist opposition in Argentina. Following the 27 June coup, both politicians found refuge in Buenos Aires where they immediately organized and rallied support for peaceful resistance. Unlike most of the leftist groups, Ferreira and Gutiérrez Ruiz did not hesitate in engaging with as many international groups, human rights organizations and NGOs as possible.123 These activities helped to further

121 Sznajder, M., (2007), "Differential institutional dynamics", p. 59. 122 Markarian, V., (2006), "From a revolutionary logic to humanitarian reasons", p. 5. 123 Between 1973 and 1975, Ferreira travelled to many countries to promote resistance to the dictatorship. The number of trips abroad increased after the inauguration of the Cóndor plan in November 1975. Gutiérrez Ruiz helped the Uruguayan refugees in Argentina while working as a part time journalist and political analyst for a number of newspapers in Buenos Aires where he discussed the situation in Uruguay.

269

discredit and isolate the regime. Therefore, the two politicians became high priority targets for the Uruguayan security forces.124

Although the leftist groups did not always agree with Ferreira’s analysis of the country’s political situation, they generally had good relations with the Nationalist leader.125 This, according to Markarian, was a strategic move to broaden the political scope of the resistance, particularly as these groups began to shift their strategy towards the denunciation of human rights violations. 126 The move shared some similarities with the incorporation of the Christian Democrats into Chile Democrático. The contacts with Wilson Ferreira and members of his party allowed these groups to insulate their campaign against accusations that dismissed them as a Marxist plot. Ferreira made this point very clearly every time he spoke in international fora, particularly when he addressed the US Congress in 1976. On that occasion, the Nationalist leader stressed that he did not belong to any leftist party and that the repression in Uruguay targeted more than just Marxist groups or subversives.127

Among the Uruguayan leftists, Zelmar Michelini was the first to tap into the transnational human rights networks. He “understood that the of the human rights discourse in terms of could be used to put pressure on the Uruguayan military government, through international organizations and governments”.128 This shift, however, was gradual and did not represent a renunciation of the Broad Front’s political position and views

124 Wilson Ferreira and his family escaped from Buenos Aires soon after his colleague and friend Gutiérrez Ruiz was assassinated in 1976 in one of the many operations conducted by Uruguayan and Argentine intelligence services under the banner of the Cóndor Plan. 125 Immediately after the coup, and as the Labour Federation CNT launched the fifteen-day general strike, the leftist coalition Broad Front and the Nationalist Party formed an anti-dictatorial alliance. The pact was established in Montevideo and, despite some tactical and strategic differences, was maintained in exile for most of the duration of the dictatorship. For further readings on the Broad Front-Nationalist alliance see: Rico, Á., L. Senatore, L. Maggio, B. Rico, S. Fossati, M. Bengochea and R. Miguel, (1989), La resistencia a la dictadura 1973-1975, Montevideo, Editorial Problemas. 126 Markarian, V., (2006), "From a revolutionary logic to humanitarian reasons", p. 9. 127 See Wilson Ferreira’s testimony in Wilson, F., (1986), El exilio y la lucha, pp. 25-34. 128 Sznajder, M., (2007), "Differential institutional dynamics", p. 59.

270

regarding resistance to the Bordaberry regime.129 Zelmar’s concerns with the military’s growing human rights violations led him to reconfigure his approach to develop stronger ties with international organizations such as Amnesty International (AI) and the International Red Cross (IRC). According to Sznajder,

… he believed that international human rights organizations could be used by Western imperialism, but could also be effective in the opposite direction as a stage for denunciation of institutional repression and for raising support for its victims.130

This strategic change allowed him to gain access to important international organizations and fora where he could denounce the excesses of the Bordaberry regime. Zelmar participated in the 1974 Bertrand Russell Tribunal II (BRT-II), collecting information, testifying and also assisting with the statements of Ariel Collazo and Rubén Sassano, both members of the Uruguayan leftist Movimiento 26 de Marzo (26th March Movement).131 At this first session of the Russell Tribunal II, Michelini spoke in great detail of the systematic use of torture by the Uruguayan civic/military government.132

In early 1975, Professor Kenneth James Colby, of the University of Western Ontario, wrote to the Uruguayan dictator Juan María Bordaberry. The Canadian scholar and prominent human rights activist protested the treatment of seventeen men and women held hostage by the regime and told the president that “torture and dehumanization of prisoners [was] not worthy of a nation with

129 When interviewed by the Mexican newspaper El Día on August 1974, Michelini rejected the view that armed struggle was the only way out to solve the situation in Uruguay. However, he believed that the Uruguayan resistance should take notice of the example set by the Vietnamese people. He did not mention the issue of human rights. Instead, Zelmar used the interview to give a detailed analysis of the Uruguayan situation. According to Michelini, the fight should not be limited to struggle against the dictatorship, but also against the country’s entire social, political and economic regime. Michelini in Jaunarena, M., (1978), Uruguay vencerá, pp. 244-249. 130 Sznajder, M., (2007), "Differential institutional dynamics", p. 59. 131 See Jerman, W., (Editor), (1975), Repression in Latin America. 132 Jaunarena, M., (1978), Uruguay vencerá, p. 262.

271

a history like that of Uruguay”.133 The regime kept Colby’s letter from public scrutiny. However, media sources supportive of the regime quickly reproduced the dictator’s response in Uruguay and internatrionally. Bordaberry claimed that Colby was misinformed and that he surely had been misled by the “habitual international campaign of calumny and falsehood” against his government. He claimed that prisoners were treated well in model jails and also spoke of the advances of social justice, distribution of income, means of communications, and other alleged economic achievements in Uruguay under the new government.134

Senator Michelini got involved in the epistolary exchanges between Colby and Bordaberry. On 24 March, the Uruguayan senator wrote to the Canadian professor from his exile in Argentina.135 The extensive letter gave a detailed analysis of the political situation in Uruguay and exposed Bordaberry’s lies one by one. Michelini explained the different torture methods used against prisoners and gave a detailed account of specific cases. He also provided a list with numerous independent sources, including the IRC, to corroborate his accusations. The senator’s letter embarrassed Bordaberry, exposed the regime’s brutality, and further undermined its international legitimacy. As a consequence, and like Wilson Ferreira and Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz, Michelini became a high priority target for the Uruguayan security forces. The regime adopted a series of measures to neutralize his activities. Zelmar had established valuable contacts with a number of US politicians, including Senator Edward Kennedy, and in 1975 he received an invitation to testify at the US Congress. The Uruguayan authorities moved to prevent his visit to the US.

133 Inter- on Human Rights in Latin America, (1978), Violations of (1972-1976), Toronto, Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America, p. 39. 134 Ibid, p. 40. 135 Zelmar Michelini, “Carta al Profesor Kenneth James Colby”, Buenos Aires, March 24, 1975, in Jaunarena, M., (1978), Uruguay vencerá, pp. 263-290.

272

The Uruguayan embassy in Buenos Aires began to monitor the senator’s activities in that city and reported regularly to Foreign Minister Juan Carlos Blanco. On 3 April 1975, the diplomatic mission informed its superiors in Uruguay about the outcomes of a meeting with the Chief of the Argentine Department of Foreign Affairs, Police Commissioner Gattei. The latter informed the Uruguayan diplomats that senator Erro had been transferred to the Villa Devoto prison and that Zelmar Michelini would travel to the US at the invitation of Senator E. Kennedy.136 The following day, the Uruguayan Foreign Relations Ministry (FRM) asked the embassy to urgently send all available information regarding Zelmar Michelini’s trip to the USA.137 Later that month, the FRM cancelled the senator’s passport and gave orders to detain him if migration inspectors at airports detected any “anomaly in his documentation”.138 The move succeeded and Zelmar never made it to the US.139

Amnesty International played an active role in the solidarity campaigns with the Uruguayan people. The organization monitored political developments in Uruguay and helped spread the message of the Uruguayan exiles around the world. In 1974, AI delegates visited the country with members of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) on a fact-finding mission to determine the situation of political prisoners.140 After the trip, both organizations published a damning report against the Bordaberry regime as a consequence of

136 Secretario Agustín Ortega para Director General, Coronel (PAM) Walther Machado, Telex, URUBAIRES, Abril 3/1975, H12-4, in Box 2:9-21, File 1-1975: Confidenciales Telexes recibidos 1975, [accessed 20/09/2012], available at Foreign Relations Ministry’s Archive, Montevideo, Uruguay. 137 Diplomacia para URUBAIRES, Telex Cifrado Abril 4, 1975, in Box 2: 9-21, File H12-4 1975, [accessed 20/09/2012], available at Foreign Relations Ministry’s Archive, Montevideo, Uruguay. 138 URUBAIRES, “Zelmar Michelini”, Abril 23, 1975, in Box 2: 9-21, File H12-4 1975, [accessed 20/09/2012], available at Foreign Relations Ministry’s Archive, Montevideo, Uruguay. 139 The following year Michelini and Gutiérrez Ruiz fell pray of the Cóndor plan due to their activities against the regime. They were kidnapped in Buenos Aires by Argentine security forces in cooperation with their Uruguayan counterparts. A few days later their bodies were found together with those of MLN-T members William Whitelaw and his wife Rosario del Carmen Barredo inside a car on the outskirts of Buenos Aires. The four victims presented signs of severe torture and execution. The authorities planted leaflets attributing the deaths to alleged leftist guerrilla groups to avert any possible incrimination in the crime. 140 See Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America, (1978), Violations of human rights in Uruguay (1972-1976), pp. 33-34.

273

its mistreatment of political prisoners. The military junta immediately banned AI from returning to Uruguay. The ban, however, did not deter the organization from continuing its campaigns to protect the human rights of Uruguayan political prisoners. The highest point of AI’s activities for Uruguay came in 1976 with its important worldwide campaign against the use of torture in that country.141

International solidarity with Uruguayan exiles

The solidarity campaigns with the Uruguayan exiles were much smaller than those organized to support the Chilean political refugees. Silvia Dutrénit Bioulous, Marina Prieto Cardozo, and Vania Markarian have documented the history of the Uruguayan exiles and the solidarity campaigns in various countries in the Americas, Europe and the Socialist bloc.142 Their works

141 Preparations began in October 1975 and presented a considerable challenge for the organizers. Amnesty had acquired an international reputation for its non-ideological or non-political stand, which was key to the success of its campaigns all over the world. The organization did not make any distinction with regard to the political orientations of the victims. It focused purely on the defence of the basic human rights of the prisoners of conscience. When the organization began its preparation for the Campaign against torture in Uruguay, its headquarters recommended caution to those involved in this process. The London office suggested to the organizers that they “… may wish to involve Uruguayan exiles groups or ex-prisoners from Uruguay…However, great care should be taken in these cases so as not to allow your actions to be turned into political manifestations directed against the Uruguayan government. For this would not only give the government a too easy opportunity to discredit the whole campaign … but it would also damage [our] main purpose: to impress upon the government, with purely humanitarian arguments, that it does not need torture. We want them to stop using torture, not more but definitely also no less than that.” Amnesty International in Markarian, V., (2006), "From a revolutionary logic to humanitarian reasons", p. 11. This internal memorandum illustrates the complex relationship between this human rights organization and the leftist Uruguayan exiles, and the different goals they pursued. The exiles used the issue of human rights violations as evidence in their quest to demolish the regime’s legitimacy and, subsequently, get rid of the dictatorial regime. Amnesty International, on the other hand, did not necessarily seek government change. The organization was only interested in ending the violence and human rights abuses. 142 See Dutrénit Bielous, S., (1998), "La diáspora uruguaya y la historia nacional", Cuadernos de Marcha, XII(136):n/a; Dutrénit Bielous, S., and G. Rodríguez de Ita, (2000), Tras la memoria: el asilo diplomático en tiempos de la Operación Cóndor, México, Instituto de Investigaciones Dr José María Luis Mora & Instituto de Cultura de la Ciudad de México-Gobierno del Distrito Federal; Dutrénit Bielous, S., (2006), El Uruguay del exilio: gente, circunstancias, escenarios, Montevideo, Trilce; Markarian, V., (2004), "De la lógica revolucionaria a las razones humanitarias"; Markarian, V., (2005), Left in transformation; Markarian, V., (2006), Idos y recién llegados; Markarian, V., (2006), "From a revolutionary logic to humanitarian reasons"; Markarian, V., (2007), "Uruguayan exiles and human rights: from transnational activism to transitional politics, 1981-1984", Anuario de Estudios Americanos, 64(1): 111-140; Cardozo Prieto, M, (2011), "Era otro mundo, ¿o no? ", Amerika, (5), online, available at http://amerika.revues.org/2736#quotation, [accessed 21/09/2012].

274

confirm that a considerable segment of the Uruguayan diaspora did not remain idle or cave in to the coercion of the Bordaberry regime.

The Uruguayan exile community in the Soviet Union was small. Predominantly, the USSR provided asylum to members of the Uruguayan Communist Party (PCU) and to MLN-T members. While some arrived shortly after the 1973 coup, most did so following the instauration of the military junta in Argentina in March 1976. The first wave of Uruguayan exiles went to Ukraine and to Uzbekistan and, while the reception in those nations was friendly, the solidarity campaigns were limited to local factories and small gatherings.143 Other countries within the Soviet bloc such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) also welcomed refugees and helped the solidarity campaigns.

The exiles located in Geneva were amongst the most active in Europe due to this city’s strategic location. Geneva hosted numerous annual meetings of international fora and organizations such as the UN Human Rights Commission, UN Agency for Refugees (UNAR), ILO, Red Cross, the World Council of Churches, the International Jurists Commission and the International Federation of Human Rights. The exiles established the Groupe D’Information ed Solidarité Uruguay (Group of Information and Solidarity with Uruguay (GRISUR)) in late 1973 to liaise with these groups and give them current information on Uruguay.144 Because of these activities and its influential contacts, the group became one of the most important points of reference for the various solidarity campaigns with Uruguay across Europe.

Unlike with the Chilean diaspora, there are not many records of exiles organizing or demanding economic boycotts against the dictatorial regime in Uruguay. Only in a few cases did dockworker unions refuse to load or unload ships destined to or from Uruguay. The Soviet Union did refuse to purchase

143 See Ana Buriano in Dutrénit Bielous, S., (2006), El Uruguay del exilio: gente, circunstancias, escenarios, Montevideo, Trilce, section dealing with Uruguayan exiles in the Soviet Union. 144 For further readings on GRISUR see: Javier Gallardo and Guillermo Waksman in ibid.

275

meat from Uruguay in July 1974. However, boycotts were sporadic. Despite this, numerous campaigns in support of Uruguayan political prisoners and trade unions were held all over the world during this crucial period of 1973-1975.145 Frequent acts of solidarity were conducted in Italy, Bulgaria, England, Argentina, Russia, Venezuela, , Puerto Rico, Belgium, France, German Democratic Republic (GDR), the Federal German Republic (GFR), Portugal, Colombia, Denmark, Canada, India, North Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia, Mexico, Guyana, Honduras, Angola, Algeria, Cuba, Peru, Australia, New Zealand and other countries. These activities included writing letters to the Bordaberry regime demanding the release of such political prisoners as the leader of the leftist coalition Broad Front, General Liber Seregni, and the PCU’s leader, Rodney Arismendy.

The campaigns also included letters of solidarity with the Uruguayan National Labour Central (CNT) (Central Nacional de Trabajadores) and support for the numerous strikes and mass rallies organized by Uruguayan trade unions during this period. Radio Moscow and other international radio and TV networks regularly broadcast messages from high profile exiles and radio programs that analysed the political situation in Uruguay and the crimes committed by the regime. These messages even reached Uruguay as the Uruguayan Communists clandestinely broadcasted Radio Moscow through short wave transmissions. These programs helped many Uruguayans break the media blackout imposed by the regime and allowed them to obtain information about the international solidarity campaigns. The exiles and their supporters also produced newsletters, magazines, journals and leaflets to inform the international community about what was taking place in Uruguay.146

These international campaigns during the 1973-1975 period, coupled with the resolutions introduced by the US Congress after a number of

145 That solidarity continued to grow after 1976 as the regime stepped up the repression. 146 For a detailed chronology of activities in support of Uruguay throughout the period 1973-1975, see Rico, Á., et al, (1989), La resistencia a la dictadura 1973-1975, pp. 200-201.

276

Congressional hearings from 1974, put considerable pressure on the regime. They also increased its international isolation and undermined its legitimacy. In response, the Uruguayan dictatorship joined their South American counterparts to formalize the Cóndor alliance and carry out operations against their opponents abroad, particularly in Argentina, to coerce the exiles and disrupt their contacts with the transnational human rights networks.

The Bolivian and Paraguayan exile communities

Bolivian exiles

The Bolivian exile community, despite its small size, also developed a considerable resistance front against the Banzer regime. However, it took time for that resistance to consolidate. Unlike his Chilean and Uruguayan colleagues, Colonel Hugo Banzer maintained some level of political activity during the first phase of his government (i.e. during 1971-1974), which made the work of the resistance difficult and delayed the formation of solidarity campaigns with the Bolivian people. After the overthrow of General Juan José Torres, the new military regime banned all leftist parties and organizations and formed a coalition government with the conservative wings of the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) and the fascist Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB). This alliance, known as the Nationalist Popular Front (FPN), remained in place until late 1974.147 That civic/military façade provided the Banzerato some degree of domestic and international legitimacy.

Members of leftist parties and armed guerrilla organizations such as the ELN represented the majority of the Bolivian exile community during the FPN period (1971-1974). Their political and ideological views limited the amount of support they received from the international community. Many countries and governments around the world considered the FPN coalition a legitimate government and/or welcomed the banning of Marxist political parties altogether.

147 Alexander, R., (1982), Bolivia: past, present and future of its politics, New York, Praeger, p. 108.

277

After the 1971 coup, thousands of Bolivian leftists, including members of the trade union and student movements, were forced into exile. Most of them found refuge in Chile, Cuba and other Latin American countries, while the rest went to Europe and other parts of the world.

Although the Bolivian peaceful resistance formed an internal front, it struggled to operate efficiently during the Banzerato’s first phase. One of the many reasons for this was that, unlike its Chilean counterpart, the Bolivian Catholic Church adopted a timid neutral position and refused to engage in anti- government activities. Despite this, the Church did provide some support to political refugees. While most Catholic Bishops throughout the country welcomed the overthrow of General Torres, they unanimously maintained that “Church buildings were rightful places of asylum for politically persecuted persons”. Voices of dissent began to appear within this institution when the Banzer regime targeted the clergy in 1972.148 From then on, numerous , nuns, bishops and other religious leaders wrote letters to the regime protesting the excesses carried out by the armed forces. They also pressured the Church’s hierarchy to adopt a more decisive stand and set up a Justice and Peace Commission (CJP), which quickly became one of the most important organizations for the defence of . Brian Smith argues that over the next two years the CJP became Amnesty International’s most important contact in Bolivia, giving detailed information regarding human rights violations.149

Shortly after the coup, the Bolivian leftists formed the Revolutionary Anti-Imperialist Front (FRA). However, factionalism and poor organization crippled this Front. In 1972 the organization divided as a consequence of a clash between the leaders of the internal front and their colleagues in exile. According

148 Smith, B. H., (1979), "Churches and human rights in Latin America", p. 108. 149 AI also engaged in other activities affecting sensitive political issues embarrassing to the government. It “published over 301 articles in the press on human rights and pressured the government to issue a general amnesty for political prisoners. Public prayer vigils and fasts in criticism of government policies were also organized.” Ibid.

278

to the CIA, “the [FRA] … [lacked] both a unified command structure and clear lines of authority between its components at home and abroad”.150 The agency also reported that the Bolivian exiles in Chile experienced difficulties in maintaining good relations with other leftist groups and political parties. The intelligence report claimed that

[…] Chile’s orthodox communists may be tiring of supporting the exiles, and their failure to progress beyond verbal attacks on the Banzer regime could be a sore point with the extreme left. Moreover, many of the estimated 200-400 exiles are said to have concluded that they can accomplish little in Chile and are planning to try to return home.151

As a consequence of these divisions, and the lack of financial and logistical support, the Bolivian exiles’ activities against the regime had little success during this period. Most of them sought to establish the internal front and organize armed guerrilla activities to get rid of the regime. Nevertheless, the 11 September coup against President Salvador Allende disrupted these plans, as the Chilean security forces arrested several Bolivian exiles and forced hundreds more to relocate to other countries.

The situation changed in late 1974 when Banzer dissolved the FPN coalition government and banned all political parties. He accused the MNR’s leader Paz Estensoro of plotting to overthrow the government and expelled him from Bolivia. These measures allowed Colonel Banzer and the Bolivian armed forces to take absolute control of the country. The addition of Paz Estensoro and his supporters to the Bolivian diaspora expanded the latter’s political spectrum. However, Estensoro limited his work with the Bolivian leftists to a bare minimum. This reduced cooperation and lack of unity between leftist leaders and Estensoro limited the efficiency of the Bolivian peaceful resistance.

150 CIA: Directorate of Intelligence “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, 28 February 1972, C 197, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A021300040002-9, released 21/05/2003, [accessed 27/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 151 Ibid, p. 12.

279

The pattern followed by the Bolivian leftist exiles shares some similarities with that of Uruguay. Once the spaces for armed resistance closed down in Chile and later in Argentina, the exiles re-configured their strategies and engaged with the international human rights movement. International organizations such as AI and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) visited Bolivia in 1974 to monitor the human rights situation. The two organizations produced a comprehensive report and wrote to Colonel Hugo Banzer demanding an end to human rights violations. Amnesty gathered information from the Commission for Justice and Peace and several other sources within Bolivia and from the exiles. AI published this information in its Annual Reports of 1973-1974 and 1974-1975 and helped to debilitate the image of the regime abroad, particularly after the collapse of the FPN coalition government.152

A number of prominent Bolivian figures exiled in Europe during the early-to-mid 1970s participated in the Bertrand Russell Tribunal II (BRT-II).153 Their detailed testimonies and the documentation gathered by the prosecutors about the human rights situation in Bolivia, led the Tribunal to conclude that

… the assassinations, the , the arbitrary detentions, the degradation of those who have been deprived of work, of medical assistance, of food are both crimes committed against individual victims and attacks on the inalienable right of peoples to decide for themselves their own future – political, economic and social. This is the Tribunal’s concept of human rights.154

These conclusions clearly illustrated the repressive features of the Banzer regime and attracted more attention and condemnation from the international community.

152 See: Amnesty International, (1974), Annual Report 1973/74, London, Amnesty International; Amnesty International, (1975), Annual Report 1974/75, London, Amnesty International. 153 Among them were: writer and scientist Renato Prada Oropeza, Professor Marcelo Ramírez, journalist Mirna González, and Rolando Grebe. 154 Jerman, W., (Editor), (1975), Repression in Latin America, p. 158.

280

The Tribunal’s recommendations generated numerous problems for these military governments. According to Jerman William, the BRT-II agreed to join

all democratic forces in the world to do the following: 1) publicize what is going on in Latin America by all possible means, keeping interest in these problems alive by organizing meetings and demonstrations, publishing articles, etc.; 2) raise funds; 3) ask all other governments to suspend all military and economic assistance to the governments which have been condemned by the Tribunal; 4) launch a massive campaign for the liberation of political prisoners in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia; 5) apply pressure on the military junta in Chile to give safe-conducts to the political leaders who are still in asylum in embassies.155

The findings and resolutions were widely publicized in Europe and the US. That information and the international pressure challenged Banzer’s legitimacy and that of his South American counterparts.

Paraguayan exiles

The Paraguayan Comisión de Verdad y Justicia (CVJ) (Commission of Truth and Justice) estimated that during the entire duration of the dictatorship (1954-1990) there were approximately 20,818 Paraguayan exiles scattered throughout the region and other countries around the world.156 These numbers, however, excluded those who left Paraguay as a consequence of economic hardship. Amnesty International took the latter category into account in 1972 and estimated that the number of Paraguayan exiles had reached 800,000 and

155 In addition, the Tribunal would report its work and its conclusions to the UN Secretary General and to international bodies such as UNESCO, ILO, WHO, OAS, the Pontifical Justice and Peace Commission, the World Council of Churches, the International Confederation of Workers (CMT, Brussels), the World Federations of Trade Unions (FMS, Prague), the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CISL, Brussels), Amnesty International, the International Association of Democratic Jurists, the International Association of Catholic Jurists, the Permanent Secretariat of the Organization of Non-aligned States, international youth organizations, leagues for the defence of human rights, all governments, and all members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the USA. Ibid, p. 161. 156 See Comisión de Verdad y Justicia (C. D. V. Y. J), (2008), Informe final: síntesis y caracterización del régimen, Asunción, Editora J C Medina, Vol 1, part II.

281

that a third of them lived in the shanty towns or Villas Miserias on the outskirts of Buenos Aires.157 Regardless of the quantity or limitations, the Paraguayan exiles shared a number of common features with their other South American counterparts. When it became clear that armed struggle had failed, the exiles chose to undermine the regime’s legitimacy by engaging with the international human rights movement. These tactics proved more effective than previous guerrilla attempts and achieved important outcomes. For this particular reason the military regime perceived them as a considerable threat.

Despite all this, the Paraguayan exile community faced a number of important challenges as the longevity of the Stroessner dictatorship considerably weakened the resistance from abroad. By the mid-1970s the regime had been in power for almost twenty years and the Paraguayan exile community experienced some exhaustion from almost two decades of resistance. As time went by the struggle lost some of its momentum and it became difficult to maintain international support for the Paraguayan resistance, especially as new political developments began to take place in the region. The 1971 instauration of the Banzer regime in Bolivia, and the 1973 military coups in Uruguay and Chile diverted some of the international community’s attention from Paraguay. For that reason, the Paraguayan exiles had to work hard to maintain international support for their cause and avoid being overshadowed by the urgency generated by the other political developments in the region.

The vast majority of the Paraguayan diaspora found refuge in neighbouring countries such as Argentina and Uruguay.158 This geographical situation allowed the exiles to stay close to their country.159 Yet, that proximity became a potential death trap as the regime’s intelligence services developed a

157 Research Department Amnesty International, (1972), Paraguay in the seventies: a background paper, London, Amnesty International, p. 7. 158 There was also a very small community of Paraguayan exiles in Europe. 159 A large number of exiles sought refuge in these countries because their economic situation did not allow them to travel to further destinations. Initially, many exiles believed that the regime would eventually fall and they would be able to return to Paraguay. Thus they chose to remain nearby until that moment came.

282

wide network of informants or Pyragües in those countries, particularly in Argentina.160 Despite this, the exiles successfully organized a number of solidarity campaigns with the political prisoners supported by a sympathetic international audience. The Paraguayans received help from international organizations and fora such as the Argentine League for Human Rights (LADH), the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH), the International Secretariat of Jurists for Human Rights in Paraguay (SIGADEP), and the Human Rights Permanent Assembly (APDH). These (and other international organizations such as AI) helped the exiles, the political prisoners in Paraguay and the people’s peaceful struggle against the Stroessner regime.161

Like other South American exiles, the Paraguayans organized along the lines of their respective political parties. These included the Liberal and Febrerista parties, the Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP) and some dissident factions of the Colorado Party. These groups changed tactics after the defeat of all armed attempts against the regime in the 1960s. Their new approach accommodated political activities such as the formation of social movements and organizations for the defence of human rights, including the Agrupación de Lucha por la Libertad de Presos Poilticos (ALLPP) (Group for the Liberation of Political Prisoners), Militancia Contra la Dictadura en el Exilio (Militancy Against the Dictatorship in Exile), and other civic and religious organizations. These groups focused on collecting funds, financing publications against the dictatorship and, on some rare occasions, conspiring and launching armed incursions against the regime.162

In the early 1970s, Amnesty International paid considerable attention to the Stroessner regime’s violations of human rights. The organization engaged

160 For further readings on the activities of the Pyragües and other similar groups like the py nandi militias associated with the Colorado Party see Lewis, P. H., (1980), Paraguay under Stroessner, North Carolina, The University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill, pp. 35-36. 161 Comisión de Verdad y Justicia, (C. D. V. Y. J.), (2008), Informe Final: síntesis y caracterización del régimen, section: Exiliados. 162 Comisión de Verdad y Justicia, (C. D. V. Y. J), (2008), Informe Final: las principales violaciones de derechos humanos, Asunción, Editora J.C. Medina, Vol 2.

283

with opposition parties inside the country and with the exile community to collect evidence against the regime. In 1972 AI published a 17-page report on the human rights situation in Paraguay. The paper discussed the country’s economic situation, the regime’s history, the status of political parties, and the US’s political interference in that nation. It also addressed the situation of the opposition political forces outside Paraguay. Amnesty identified the Movimiento Popular Colorado (MOPOCO) (Colorado Popular Movement) as the strongest of the exile organizations. However, the NGO reported that the MOPOCO was plagued with internal dissention and also infiltrated by the Paraguayan intelligence services. This severely limited its ability to function or present an effective resistance to the Stronato. Despite this, Amnesty argued that “MOPOCO still [had] contacts in very high places in Paraguay, and it [was] generally acknowledged that Stroessner [regarded] their activities as a far greater threat than that from the Paraguayan Communist Party”.163

In general, the activities of the Paraguayan exiles and their supporters across Latin America and Europe were very limited when compared to those of the Chilean, Uruguayan or even the Bolivian exiles. Yet, they still gave information to international NGOs like Amnesty International, which damaged the image and legitimacy of the Stronato. For instance, in 1973 Amnesty gathered evidence from the Paraguayan exiles to lobby the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR) to ask for the release of a number of Paraguayan political prisoners. These activities continued over the next two years. Though time consuming, the tactic paid off and, in 1975, the Latin American Parliament met in , Venezuela, to discuss the situation in Paraguay and call for the release of political prisoners.164 The Stroessner regime considered the exiles an annoying and dangerous threat. The exiles’ activities

163 Research Department Amnesty International, (1972), Paraguay in the seventies, p. 7. There were also a number of demonstrations in favour of the Paraguayan people and political prisoners across Europe. When General Alfredo Stroessner visited West Germany in 1973 a delegation of Amnesty International delegates approached him and asked for the release of a number of political prisoners. Amnesty International, (1974), Annual Report 1973/74. 164 Amnesty International, (1975), Annual Report 1974/75, p. 76.

284

and their contact with Amnesty, other NGOs and the US Congress directly challenged Stroessner’s legitimacy abroad. Hence, the Paraguayan security forces joined the Cóndor Plan for the same reasons as their regional colleagues: to monitor the activities of its opponents abroad and harass them until they abandoned the campaigns, and to eliminate any kind of opposition.

As shown in this chapter, the struggle against the military governments experienced an important tactical transformation towards the mid-1970s. That transformation emerged as a consequence of the regimes’ defeat of the guerrilla organizations and also the lack of space where opposition political forces could function freely in most of South America. Despite considerable internal divisions and challenges, the exiles developed new strategies to take advantage of the emerging international human rights movement.

This shift began to change the dynamics of the struggle as the resistance to the regimes adopted international dimensions. Although the armed forces maintained an overwhelming military superiority over their opponents, the change of tactics presented numerous challenges for these dictatorships. The fight was taken away from the domestic battlefields where the military forces operated comfortably. The opposition directed the confrontation towards an international theatre where diplomacy, politics and wide information distribution became powerful and effective weapons to undermine the legitimacy of these regimes. The new theatre bogged down these dictatorships as they were unable to respond effectively to the advances of their opponents outside an armed combat environment where they had complete superiority. The regimes lacked the appropriate diplomatic or political skills to operate in this new environment of peaceful resistance and continued to respond militarily to the challenges of their opponents. The activities carried out by the exiles and their supporters became a recurrent source of annoyance for the military governments. They led to an increased international isolation of the South American dictators and a sharp deterioration of their domestic and international legitimacy. This situation made it difficult for local and international allies to maintain support for them.

285

The regimes tried to neutralize the bad international publicity generated by the solidarity campaigns, with modest results in the best of cases. Therefore, these were complemented with another more radical measure. They responded militarily, formalizing the Cóndor alliance to target the exile community and attempt to intimidate them and disrupt their ties with the transnational human rights networks.

Thus far, this dissertation has analyzed three important areas: the internal and external factors that encouraged economic, political and military cooperation between countries that went on to establish the Cóndor Plan; the level of threat posed by the JCR; and the activities conducted by the South American exiles. These demonstrate that the reason behind the transnationalisation of state terrorism from 1975 had little to do with the threat posed by the guerrilla groups involved in the Junta de Coordinación Revolucinaria (JCR). Rather, the military regimes used the JCR as a smoke screen to conceive and justify the operations against the exiles and opponents abroad. This conclusion might suggest that the formalization of the Cóndor alliance was a desperate initiative implemented purely by the military regimes and by the US government, or parts thereof, which played a key logistical and intelligence role, covertly. This, however, is not an accurate assessment of the situation. There is still one more factor to consider before completing this puzzle: those who supported and encouraged the military regimes to adopt more drastic measures against their opponents. This will be addressed in the final chapter to demonstrate that Cóndor was much more than a reactionary initiative implemented by the South American regimes.

286

Chapter IV

The brotherhood comes together: the Radical Latin American Right (RLAR), its global connections and links with the Cóndor Plan

This chapter focuses on two areas neglected by most of Cóndor and Cold War literature: the activities of the Radical Latin American Right (RLAR), and its connections with the South American military regimes. Before going any further, however, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the terms ‘right’ and ‘RLAR’. Magdalena Broquetas argues that, globally, the right ‘is not monolithic. It encompasses a group of styles of thoughts and modes of actions [that] include a wide scope of moderate and radical positions, which carry with them an heterogeneous ideological corpus.’1 That corpus includes variations of Liberalism, , Nationalism, and Neoliberalism2, combined with regional and local features. These variations have evolved into distinct right- wing lines of thoughts in the five continents, sharing certain commonalities and marked differences between them. The strong rejection of Marxism and Socialism became one of the strongest common denominators amongst the Radical Latin American Right and its global counterparts. However, the RLAR also presented marked differences from its international partners, which were determined by distinct cultural, political, and social factors.

The term ‘Radical’ is used here to accommodate the most aggressive groups and figures (in terms of rhetoric, discourse, and actions) within the Latin

1 Broquetas, M., (2012), "Los frentes del anticomunismo: las derechas en el Uruguay de los tempranos sesenta.", Contemporáñea: Historia y problemas del siglo XX, año 3, Vol. 3, (Dossier: Los caminos del autoritarismo en la segunda mitad del siglo XX en la América Latina), p. 16. 2 See Bienfait, H. F. and W. E. A. v. Beek, (2001), "Right and Left as political categories. An exercise in "Not-so-Primitive" classification", Anthropos, 96(1): 169-178.

287

American Right. It includes elements of what H. F. Beinfait and W. E. van Beek have defined as ‘extreme right’3, which consisted of organizations and individuals who embraced the practice of armed and terrorist activities as legitimate means to combat Marxism. A pool of individuals from different social, economic, and professional backgrounds, including businessmen, landowners, members of the middle and working classes, and clergymen, gave the RLAR a distinctly heterogeneous membership. The latter has been characterised, more or less, as conservative, virulently anticommunist, and pro- western. Most of its members held strong religious views associated with conservative Catholicism. They strongly condemned the progressive line embraced by some sectors of the Catholic Church after the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and the 1968 Conference of Latin American Bishops in Medellin, Colombia.4 All those included in the RLAR, with no exceptions, though with various shades and degrees, welcomed, supported or even worked with the anticommunist military regimes that spread throughout the continent from the 1960s. Furthermore, the RLAR’s most conservative and reactionary sectors played an important part in creating an environment that facilitated and encouraged the implementation and transnationalisation of state terrorism.

Even though many civilian actors associated with the RLAR actively participated in some of the crimes committed by these regimes, their activities have gone almost unnoticed by historians and other academics studying this particular period. More importantly, and with some rare exceptions5, the links

3 These authors define extreme right as “a militant and millenarian political ideology, espoused by numerous right wing groups and individuals, which maintains as an ideal the principle of ‘limited ’; this principle being articulated as opposition to ‘collectivism’ in government, international relations, modern social principles, and modern social structure and operation.” Ibid, p. 73. 4 See Rabe, S., (2012), The killing zone: the United States wages Cold War in Latin America, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 151. 5 Arguably, Argentina is the country that has achieved most advances in this area. In May 2013, the Argentine judiciary sentenced three ex managers of the Ford multinational in Argentina. These managers cooperated with the military regime during the late 1970s and provided black lists of trade union leaders and workers in the company to the intelligence services. Many of those included in the black lists were arrested, tortured, or made to disappear. The court case created an important legal precedent. It is the first of this nature against directors of a US multinational that cooperated directly

288

between the RLAR and the regimes have also been ignored by the Latin American judiciary system. Consequently, many of the individuals and groups who participated in the repression remain free and have never stood in front of a court of justice to answer questions about their participation in criminal activities linked to the military dictatorships.

The way in which Presidents Nixon and his successor Gerald Ford dealt with some parts of the Communist world (i.e. détente with the Soviet Union) helped to speed up the formalization of the Cóndor plan. The policies of détente prompted the Radical Latin American Right into action. That seemingly flirtatious relationship between the US government and the communist world, and the financial cuts to Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia introduced from 1974 and the cessation of training and aid programs like the Office of Public Safety (OPS) infuriated these regimes and their regional allies and drew them closer to each other.6 The South American Juntas were not ready or willing to relinquish power and allow their ideological and political opponents to resume activities in their countries. They therefore explored other avenues to break their isolation within the international community that had ensued as a consequence of the worldwide solidarity campaigns with the South American exiles. One of those avenues consisted in deepening ties with individuals and groups with similar with the regime’s crimes. Bullentini, A., (2013), Los ex gerentes procesados, Página 12, 22 Mayo 2013, Buenos Aires, online, available at http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-220551-2013- 05-22.html, [accessed 24/05/2013]. In October 2013, a group of relatives of victims presented a case in the US Supreme Court against a subsidiary of Mercedes Benz for the disappearances of Argentine employees working at Mercedes Benz Argentina during the period of the Dirty War. See: (2013), Argentine dictatorship human rights case involving Mercedes Benz reaches US Supreme Court, MercoPress, 15/05/2013, Montevideo, South Atlantic News Agency, online, available at http://en.mercopress.com/2013/10/15/argentine-dictatorship-human-rights-case-involving-mercedes- benz-reaches-us-supreme-court, [accessed 19/10/2013]. For a detailed list of court cases dealing with crimes against humanity in Argentina see: Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (C.E.L.S.), (2007), "C.E.L.S. Juicios: crimenes del terrorismo de estado-weblogs de las causas", online, available at http://www.cels.org.ar/wpblogs/ingles, [accessed 16/08/2011]. 6 Although the US Congress reduced and ceased aid programs like the MAP and the OPS, some aid continued to flow during those years. Some of the most conservative members of US government (including politicians such as Rep. Congressman Jesse Helms, prominent anticommunist figures like Roger Pearson, military officers, members of the CIA, and other anticommunist lobby groups like the John Birch Society (JBS) pressured the Nixon administration to continue delivering aid to support the regimes. See Bellant, R., (1991), Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party, Boston, Ma, South End Press, part III, pp. 59-89.

289

views, like those of the RLAR. These groups, and especially those that established the Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana (CAL) (Latin American Anticommunist Confederation) and the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), became key actors in the process that led to the formalization of the Cóndor Plan.

A great deal has been written about the Latin American left7, or the rightist Latin American regimes that proliferated throughout that continent in the sixties and seventies.8 In sharp contrast, the literature about the rightist organizations in those countries is scarce. There has been some research on some of the most prominent and notorious terrorist/paramilitary groups (like the Cuban anti-Castroites in Miami9, the Triple-A in Argentina10, and the Patria y

7 See, for instance Aguilar, L., (1968), Marxism in Latin America, New York, Alfred-A-Knopf; Alexander, R., (1969), Communism in Latin America, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press; Assmann, H., (1971), Teoponte: una experiencia guerrillera, Oruro, Bolivia, CEDI; Coggiola, O., (1986), El Trotskismo en la Argentina (1960-1985), Buenos Aires, Biblioteca Política Argentina; Blixen, S., (1988), Treinta años de lucha popular: conversaciones con Gorriarán Merlo, Montevideo, Editorial Contrapunto; Castañeda, J., (1994), Utopia unarmed: the Latin American Left after the Cold War, New York, Vintage Books; García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas: opción y obstinación de la guerrilla chilena (1965-1988), Morelia, Michoacán de Ocampo, Mexico, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, Departamento de Historia Latinoamericana; Aldrighi, C., (2001), La Izquierda armada: ideología, ética e identidad en el M.L.N.-Tupamaors, Montevideo, Ediciones Trilce; Aldrighi, C., (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia: historias de vida y militancia en el M.L.N.-Tupamaros 1965-1975, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental. 8 The list here is equally extensive. Some of these works include: International Documentation ( I. D. O. C.), (1974), Chile under military rule: a dossier of documents and analyses compiled by the staff of I.D.O.C., New York, IDOC; Petras, J. and M. Morris, (1975), The United States and the overthrow of the Allende government, New York, Monthly Review of Press; Lowy, M., E. Sader and S. Gorman, (1985), "The militarization of the State in Latin America", Latin American Perspectives, 12(4): 7-40; Sandoval Rodriguez, I., (1987), El proyecto político militar 1971-1982: el Estado de la Seguridad Nacional en Bolivia, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, Universidad Boliviana Gabrial Rene Moreno; Bareirosaguier, R., (1988), "The Stroessner era in Paraguay ", Historia, (496): 72-82; Conaghan, C. M., J. M. Malloy and L. A. Abugattas, (1990), "Business and the "boys": the politics of neoliberalism in the Central Andes", Latin American Research Review, 25(2): 3-30; Sondrol, P. C., (1991), "Totalitarian and authoritarian dictators-a comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner", Journal of Latin American Studies, 23(3): 599-620; Mara, F. O., (1998), "From dictatorship to democracy: the US and regime change in Paraguay, 1954-1994", Bulletin of Latin American Research, 17(1): 59-79; Resende-Santos, J., (2002), "The origins of security cooperation in the Southern Cone", Latin American Politics and Society, 44(4): 89-126. 9 Arboleya J., (2000), The Cuban counterrevolution, Ohio, Centre for International Studies Ohio University; Bardach, A. L., (2002), Cuba confidential: love and vengeance in Miami and Havana, New York, Random House.

290

Libertad in Chile11) but very little is known about these groups’ connections with anticommunist institutions such as the CAL and the WACL, or their links to the Cóndor regimes.

The few authors and political commentators who have ventured into this field have concentrated on these groups’ connections and terrorist activities in Central America in the late 1970s and during the 1980s. However, these studies tend to overlook CAL’s actions during its early years (i.e. in the early to mid- seventies). It will be argued here that the resolutions adopted at the numerous conferences held by this anticommunist forum during 1972-75 served as a blue print for the systematic repression implemented by the South American dictatorships under the banner of the Cóndor Plan.

First, the chapter addresses the way in which the Nixon and Ford administrations engaged with the communist world, especially with Cuba, during the period of détente. It also focusses on the political context that led to the emergence of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) in 1966, which is key to understanding the RLAR’s actions during the late sixties and seventies. This contextualization is important to determine how the RLAR interacted with other anticommunists beyond Latin America, including with the Asian Peoples Anticommunist League (APACL) and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) in Europe. The chapter then addresses the creation of the Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana (CAL) (Latin American Anticommunist Confederation) in 1972, and discusses the subsequent CAL and WACL congresses and resolutions in 1974-1975.

10 Vicens, L., (1983), Loperreguismo y Justicialismo, Buenos Aires, El Cid Editor-Fundación para la democracia en Argentina; González Janzen, I., (1986), La Triple-A, Buenos Aires, Editorial Contrapunto; Servetto, A., (2008), "Memorias de intolerancia política: las victimas de la Triple-A (Alianza Anticomunista Argetnina)", Anti-Tesis, 1(2): 439-454. 11 Petras, J. and M. Morris, (1975), The United States and the overthrow of the Allende government; Colectivo Taller de Reflexión, (1991), Informe Rettig y Fuerzas Armadas, Santiago, Chile, PAS, Taller de Reflexión; Kornbluh, P., (2004), The Pinochet file: a declassified dossier on atrocity and accountability, New York, New Press.

291

Nixon and Kissinger’s interaction with the Communist World

Despite their strong anticommunist views, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger12 did not hesitate in setting aside their rhetoric to make pragmatic concessions on a number of strategic issues that benefited US interests as they saw them. This apparent shift emerged within the environment generated by the politics of détente, which sought to ease tensions between the US and the USSR. Though the first steps towards this relaxation were taken in the early 1960s, the most important developments occurred during Nixon’s presidency. Some of the most significant outcomes included the 1972 SALT-I treaty between the US and the USSR to limit nuclear arsenals, and the Biological Weapons Convention and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, both signed in 1972.

Not everyone was optimistic about the benefits produced by this shift in US government foreign policy. The era of détente, and its subsequent outcomes, was not supported by a large number of critics, including members of the president’s own political party. Republican Senator Jesse Helms, for instance, frequently, and openly, questioned Nixon and Kissinger’s opening towards China and the USSR. At the 1975 Conference of the World Anticommunist League (WACL) held in Rio de Janeiro, Senator Helms directly blamed Dr Kissinger for weakening the US’s defence system with the SALT-1 negotiations.13 Helms claimed, without any supporting evidence, that

[a]t the beginning of the SALT-1 negotiations – the initiation of the so-called ‘policy of détente’ – the US had clear strategic superiority. But the hope of arms reduction which Doctor Kissinger held out restrained the US, while the Soviets continued massive production. Even today, few people realize that the soviets achieved overwhelming superiority in numbers of weapons and throw-weight during the protracted negotiations.14

12 First as his National Security Advisor and then as his Secretary of State. 13 Helms’ criticism of Richard Nixon continued long after the latter’s resignation due to the Watergate scandal. 14 Helms, J., (1975), "Internationalists preparing the world for war or Communism: address by Senator Jesse Helms at W.A.C.L. Conference on April 25", Intellgence Survey, 25(6): 1-8, pp. 2-6.

292

Helms speech at that conference suggests that the President and his Secretary of State developed a genuine soft spot towards Communism.15 However, this was far from the truth.

Although the US administration relaxed its political stand in Europe, for example, its anticommunist views and repudiation of that ideology cannot be questioned. Furthermore, the relaxation of international tensions generated by détente did not materialize in full across Latin America.16 As Clara Aldrighi argues, US foreign policy towards Latin America did not change. Until the mid- 1970s, the Latin American military forces continued to be trained and indoctrinated by the US at its various training centres17or in host countries. More often than not, they implemented what they learned in counterinsurgency and internal security courses to repress movements seeking genuine reforms. Over time, this led to military coups and the overthrow of democratic governments.18 In addition to its activities in Uruguay and Chile, the US government acted to prevent a so-called Marxist takeover of Argentina. In 1973-1974, Robert Hill, a staunch anticommunist with close connections to the CIA, was appointed US ambassador to Argentina and the CIA provided José López Rega and his Triple-A with information about the agency’s Plan Jakarta to overthrow President in Indonesia in 1965. As Ignacio González Janzen argues, the US intelligence agency believed that “there was a need for a ‘prophylactic coup’ to prevent a Marxist victory. López Rega had to become … Suharto …, save [President] Perón and guarantee Peronism’s ideological purity.”19 Latin American anticommunists, especially the RLAR, welcomed and supported the US government’s aggressive stand towards any administration that

15 Ibid. 16 See Harmer, T., (2011), Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, chapter 1, pp. 20-48. 17 Including the School of the Americas (SOA) in the Panama Canal Zone and the Ínter-American Defence College in Washington DC. 18 Aldrighi, C., (2007), La intervención de Estados Unidos en Uruguay (1965-1973): el caso Mitrione, Montevideo, Trilce, p. 383. 19 González Janzen, I., (1986), La Triple-A, p. 99.

293

deviated from the political direction dictated by the US, or challenged the interests of the RLAR. These policies helped the US government and the RLAR to remain on relatively good terms.

However, in the early 1970s President Nixon sent a number of mixed signals to Latin America, particularly regarding Cuba, which strained his administration’s relationship with his Latin American anticommunist allies. These mixed signals included the negotiations between these two countries to prevent the hijacking of airplanes, and the US government’s unclear position regarding the reintegration of Cuba to the Organization of American States (OAS) addressed at that organization’s meetings in 1974 and 1975. Consequently, the RLAR distanced itself from President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, expanded ties with other anticommunist groups in the US, Europe and Asia, and increased its overt support for the South American regimes. The following paragraphs address the complex and fragile relationship between the US and Cuba within the context of détente, which is key to understanding the reasons why the RLAR became more proactive in its anticommunist crusade.

Cuba

Diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States had been severely strained after the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. The small Caribbean island became a very uncomfortable issue and a constant source of annoyance and embarrassment to the White House. Many in the United Sates could not accept the fact that, despite its military might, the country had to live with a communist state at its doorstep. No US president was willing to allow this, particularly after the 1963 Cuban missile crisis. Every administration from 1959 sought, directly or indirectly, to get rid of Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution altogether.

Measures to achieve this objective included the failed invasion of Playa Girón (known in the US as the Bay of Pigs) and . The latter was a CIA plan, which included a wide range of attempts to assassinate

294

Fidel Castro and commit other acts of terror against Cuba’s economy.20 Other plots such as the proposed followed Operation Mongoose.21 While the US government never approved or implemented Operation Northwoods, the CIA and anti-Castro Cuban exiles executed watered down versions of many of the terrorists acts outlined in that proposal throughout the following decades as covert operations.22 These included the hijacking of planes, the bombing of foreign vessels and sabotage to disrupt the country’s agricultural production. Cuba has also accused the CIA and anti-Castro exiles in Miami of carrying out acts of biological terrorism.23

Even though US governments engaged with the Castro administration on a few occasions, President Nixon also maintained connections with the Cuban exiles. His relationship with some of the most radical and controversial figures within the Cuban exile community in Miami began in the late 1950s. Furthermore, as Krüger and Marshall state, the organizers of the “Bay of Pigs operation and the ensuing attacks on Cuba and Castro included Manuel Artime, Orlando Bosch, Felipe de Diego, and Rolando Martínez – the first a close friend

20 McSherry, P., (1999), "Operation Condor: clandestine Inter-American System", Social Justice, 26(4): 144-174, p. 148. 21 According to James Bamford, Northwoods “… called for innocent people to be hit on American streets, for boats fleeing Cuba to be sunk on the high seas, for a wave of violent terrorism to be launched in Washington DC, Miami, and elsewhere. People would be framed for bombings they did not commit, planes would be hijacked. Using phoney evidence all of it would be blamed on Fidel Castro, thus giving [Lyman Louis] Lemnitzer [Chairman of the between 1960— 1962] and his [personnel] the excuse to launch their war [to topple the Cuban communist government].” James Bamford in Bardach, A. L., (2002), Cuba confidential, p. 174. 22 FBI documents released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for the Chile Declassification Project provide numerous reports on anti-Castro terrorist groups carrying out such activities. See for instance: Anonymous to FBI, “Ignacio Novo Sampol”, report, 07/16/1979, Collection FBI Chile Declassification Project Tranche II, online, available at http://foia.state.gov/Search/results.aspx?searchText=ignacio+Novo+Sampol&beginDate=19790716& endDate=19790716&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber= , [accessed 13/12/2012]. 23 For further readings on this issue see: Tucker, J. B., (1984), "Gene wars", Foreign Policy, (57) (winter): 58-79, p. 59; and; González Menció, A., (2011), "Principales aspectos sobre las agresiones biológicas de los Estados Unidos contra Cuba", online, available at http://www.monografias.com/trabajos88/aspectos-agresiones-biologicas-estados-unidos- cuba/aspectos-agresiones-biologicas-estados-unidos-cuba.shtml, [accessed 8/03/2012].

295

of Howard Hunt’s, the last two future Watergate burglars”.24 More often than not during Nixon’s presidency, the anti-Castroite exiles used these ties to lobby the administration on matters concerning the government’s foreign policy towards the island, especially regarding the strict trade embargo imposed on Cuba.

It is true that the overwhelming majority of Cuban exiles shared a common dislike for Fidel Castro and his government. However, this is as far as one can go in terms of identifying commonalities in this large pool. As María Cristina García states, the “political views of the Cuban exile community in the US have never been monolithic”.25 Instead, according to this author, there are two well-defined camps: the dialogueros and the hardliners. The former includes those moderates who favour a dialogue with the Cuban government and a relaxation of the economic blockade. The latter, on the other hand, are adamant in their views and reject any kind of negotiation with Castro. The hardliners included groups of ex-members and supporters of the Batista regime, known as the Batisteros by the supporters of the Cuban Revolution and Fidel Castro.

Definition of terrorism

Since 1959, the hardliners have used any means at their disposal, including terrorism, to overthrow the Cuban government. Similar tactics were used to silence and harass those moderates who displayed any kind of leniency towards the Castro administration.26 According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) “[t]errorism is the unlawful use of violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any

24 Krüger, H. and J. Marshall, (1980), The great heroin coup: drugs, intelligence & international , Boston, MA, South End Press, pp. 144.145. 25 García, M. C., (1998), "Hardliners v. "Dialogueros": Cuban exile political groups and United States-Cuba policy", Journal of American Ethnic History, 17(4): 3-28, p. 5. 26 A number of moderate academic journals during the sixties and seventies asked for an end to the economic blockade. However, the hardliners branded them as “Communists” and “infiltrados”, and carried out acts of terrorism, violence and even assassinations against these moderates’ offices, houses, families and friends. See: Bardach, A. L., (2002), Cuba confidential, p. 114.

296

segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”.27 These were exactly the kind of activities the numerous radical anti-Castro organizations linked to RLAR engaged in throughout the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and, to a lesser degree, in the following decades.

The violence displayed by some of the hardliners was indiscriminate. Their organizations28 did not hesitate in targeting innocent civilians to achieve their goals. The 1976 bombing of the Cubana Airlines plane by Orlando Bosch, and other anti-Castroites, which killed 73 civilians, is a clear example of this indiscriminate violence.29 The hardliners became the most politically active within the exile community and exerted a strong influence on US policies towards the island. Their strong and violent activism silenced the dialogueros’ voices and many moderates avoided expressing their views for fear of retaliation.30 Because of their role in shaping US foreign policy towards Cuba and their virulent anticommunism, the discussion in this chapter will focus almost exclusively on the hardliners. Hence, the terms “hardliners”, “Batisteros” or radical Cuban exiles in Miami will be used interchangeably when referring to the members of these organizations.

The Accord on Plane and Vessels hijacking

Although diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba remained strained for much of Nixon’s presidency31, there were at least two occasions when the US administration appears to have contradicted the advice of the Cuban hardliners. The first involved the issue of plane hijacking during 1969-

27 FBI in Coady, C. A. J., (2004), "Terrorism and innocence", The Journal of Ethics, 8(1): 37-58, p. 38. 28 Some of the most notorious and violent organizations within this camp had links with the RLAR, including , Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano (MNC) (Cuban Nationalist Movement); Brigada 2506; ; Movimiento 17 de Abril (April 17 Movement); Frente de Liberación Nacional Cubano (FLNC) (Cuban National Liberation Movement) and ; Acción Cubana (Cuban Action). 29 See Blixen, S., (1998), Operación Cóndor: del Archivo del Terror y el asesinato de Letelier al caso Berríos, Barcelona, Virus Editorial, p. 47. 30 García, M. C., (1998), "Hardliners v. "Dialogueros"", p. 68. 31 And that of his successor, Gerald Ford, for that matter.

297

1973. The second took place prior to the 1974 Organization of American States (OAS) meeting in Quito, Ecuador. Most radical exiles recognized the administration’s anticommunist stand and supported its attempts to overthrow the socialist governments of Cuba and Chile (1970-1973), and progressive military governments like those of General Juan José Torres in Bolivia or General Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru. Yet a good number of Miami hardliners remained dissatisfied with the US government’s response to these two issues. Consequently, they deepened ties with other foreign anticommunist groups and pressured the US government to abandon its rapprochement with the Communist world, particularly with Cuba.

Throughout 1972-1973, the Nixon administration discretely engaged in negotiations with the Cuban government to deal with plane hijacking.32 Although by then the number of incidents was in decline, the issue continued to be a source of concern and embarrassment to both nations.33 The lack of diplomatic relations between the two countries, however, made any solution of this matter difficult. Hence, both governments discretely agreed to negotiate an agreement with third parties acting on their behalf.34 Already in 1970, the Cuban government had extradited a number of skyjackers to the United States. Despite this cooperation, one obstacle slowed down negotiations between the two countries: the inclusion of terrorist acts against ships and shipping lanes. The US government wanted the negotiations to focus purely on the hijacking of airplanes. The Cuban government, on the other hand, wanted the accord to set

32 Nelson Goosdell argues that had the US government wanted it the accord would have been signed at least three years earlier. Goosdell James Nelson, “Cuba-US hijacking accord near”, The Christian Science Monitor, 8 December 1972, available at CIA-RDP77-0043R000100030001-3, released 07/08/2001, [accessed 26/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 33 Approximately 79 plane hijacking-related incidents involving the US and Cuba occurred between 1968 and 1972. The peak was in 1969 when the number of hijackings reached more than 30. Wikipedia, (2013), "List of Cuba-US aircraft hijackings ", online, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Cuba%E2%80%93United_States_aircraft_hijackings, [accessed 9/03/2011]. 34 Jaroslav Zantovsky, Chargé d’Affaires of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, acted as the official Cuban representative in the United States, while the Swiss ambassador to Cuba acted on behalf of the United States in Havana.

298

strict guidelines for the punishment of acts of terror against ships and shipping lanes. These negotiations led to the US-Cuba Memorandum of Understanding on the Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels (MUHA&V) on 15 February 1973. It was expected to last five years, with the option to extend it by mutual agreement. The results were almost immediate. The number of hijackings declined considerably.35 Nevertheless, the accord had a short life as the Cuban government unilaterally withdrew from the agreement in 1976, after a group of anti-Castro hardliners placed a bomb on a Cubana Airlines aircraft that killed all seventy-three Cuban nationals on board.

The accord’s four resolutions clearly defined any acts of violence against airplanes and ships as a crime. It also established the legal guidelines to punish those responsible for such acts of terror. The second resolution stated that both countries agreed to implement the most severe “punishment […]” to any person involved in an “expedition which from its territory, or any other place, carries out acts of violence against aircrafts or vessels of any kind of registration coming from, or going to, the territory of the other party…”.36 The hardliners interpreted this agreement as a betrayal of their cause and lobbied the US President to re-consider his position.

These groups’ anxiety was justified, as that particular resolution threatened the success of their operations by punishing terrorist acts against Cuba, regardless of where they took place (i.e. in the US or any other country). The World Anticommunist League (WACL) strongly supported the hardliners. On 19 March 1973, the WACL asked all its members to send:

…messages to President Richard Nixon…protesting the second clause in the bilateral…accord against air piracy, which [forced] the US to process and punish those Cubans who [fought] for the

35 See: Wikipedia, (2013), "List of Cuba-US aircraft hijackings ". 36 (1973), "Cuba-United States: Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offenses", The American Journal of International Law, 67(3): 619-620.

299

salvation of the motherland, not only in North American territory but also in any other place.37

The anticommunist forum also sent letters with a similar tone to the OAS Secretary General.

Quito OAS Summit

The OAS Foreign Ministers meeting held in Quito from 8-12 November 1974 also generated tensions between the US government and the Cuban hardliners. This summit discussed the possibility of lifting the sanctions against Cuba and allowing it to re-join the OAS. Cuba’s membership had been suspended at the 1962 meeting in Punta Del Este, Uruguay.38 Although President Nixon had left the White House by the time of the Quito summit, the preparations for it, and intense lobbying by the Cuban exiles and the WACL, took place in the months prior to his departure.39 Nixon was heavily pressured by the Latin American anticommunist camp to maintain both Cuba’s suspension and the US economic blockade of the island.

The Mexican government strongly supported the normalization of relations with the Castro Government. A number of South American countries, and some members of the Cuban exile community, on the other hand, were disturbed by these developments. They considered the move to be a betrayal of their anticommunist crusade and accused President Nixon and, particularly, Dr Henry Kissinger of being communists. By 1970, many Latin American countries had re-established diplomatic relations with the island. Furthermore,

37 WACL’s letter to President Nixon strongly: “…condemned the treaty against air piracy between the United States and Communist Cuba, in which the American government promise to prevent any activity of the exiled Cubans against the regime of Fidel Castro; not only on North American soil, but ‘from any other place’, to such an extent that any patriot who does it will be judged and punished. [This is an] evident violation of other Latin American countries’ national sovereignty”. WACL, Circular No. 10, Marzo 19, 1973, Series 1972-1973, R198-F2591, available at Terror Archive (CDYA), Asunción, Paraguay. 38 Agee, P., (1975), Inside the Company: C.I.A. diary, Harmonsworth, England, Penguin Books, p. 222. 39 Nixon was re-elected for a second term in 1973. However, he resigned in August 1974 after the Watergate Scandal. His successor, Gerald Ford, adopted a similar foreign policy towards Latin America and even a more flexible posture towards Cuba.

300

already in 1971, the CIA reported that Fidel Castro had changed some of the more radical aspects of his foreign policy.40 As shown in chapters I and II, Castro’s support for guerrilla groups decreased considerably after the death of Che Guevara and that trend continued in the following years.

The analysis of the level of threat posed by Cuba in the lead up to the summit generated, at the very least, a marked disagreement between a number of US intelligence services. The CIA, with strong ties to the anti-Castro community41, argued that the island continued to be a serious threat. The Central America – Caribbean Branch of the National Intelligence Office (NIO), on the other hand, argued the contrary.42 At the time, the CIA and Richard Lehman, Director of the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), dismissed the latter analysis as a mere dissenting voice within the intelligence community.43 A few months later, however,

40 On 17 July 1971, the agency argued that “since 1968, Cuba has sharply reduced its support to Latin American Revolutionary groups while gradually expanding its government-to-government contacts.” Nevertheless, the document warned that “despite an emphasis on such actions […] Cuba continues to provide limited support – primarily insurgency training in Cuba – for some revolutionary groups”. CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 268, 17 July 1971, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A022300090001-4, released 25/06/2003, [accessed 29/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 41 For detailed discussions of the connection between anti-Castro Cubans and the CIA see Scott, P. D., (1972), The war conspiracy; the secret road to the second Indochina war, Indianapolis, Bobbs- Merrill; Scott, P. D., (1977), Crime and cover-up: the CIA, the Mafia, and the Dallas-Watergate connection, Berkeley, Calif., Westworks; Russell, D., (2000), C.I.A./Syndicate, Drug War: covert money, power & policy, online, available at http://www.drugwar.com/ciasyndicate.shtm, [accessed 9/11/2012]; Méndez Méndez, J. L., (2006), Bajo las alas del Cóndor, La Habana, Editorial Capitán San Luis; Scott, C. M., (2008), The Central Intelligence Agency: a documentary History, Wesport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press; Weiner, T., (2008), Legacy of ashes: the history of the C.I.A., London, Penguin; Scott, P. D., (2010), American war machine: deep politics, the CIA's global drug connection, and the road to Afghanistan, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 42 On 28 August 1974, the NIO stated that “Cuban subversion in Latin America – in all of its forms – is at its nadir […] Castro is not likely to endanger the gains he made in the region for the sake of any marginal subversive group, and probably will continue to find means of cooperating with most of the governments of the region, including some that he considers his ideological opposites…”. National Intelligence Office-NIO/Chief, Central America Caribbean Branch, “The limits of Cuban subversion in Latin America”, Memorandum, 28 August 1974, available at CIA- RDP79B01737A0021100110001-6, released 04/03/2001, [accessed 24/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 43 Ibid.

301

the CIA lowered its hostile tone and agreed with the NIO’s analysis. 44 Despite the CIA and the Cuban hardliners’ unrelenting campaigns to isolate the island, Cuba managed to attract the support of a number of Latin American nations before the Quito summit. Some of the Latin American governments set aside political rhetoric to enjoy the economic benefits from the resumption of diplomatic and commercial ties with the island. In May 1974, Argentina’s foreign minister, Alberto J. Vignes stated that “Cuba’s isolation is inadmissible and contrary to the best interest of the hemisphere...”.45 Until his death, President Perón “…pressed an intensive trade campaign with Cuba, extending a US$ 1.2 billion credit and then selling Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors cars produced in Argentina to Cuba”.46 The three US corporations, which were the ultimate indirect beneficiaries, discretely welcomed the deal. At least thirteen countries were willing to vote in favour of lifting the sanctions, while 9 opposed that move. The strongest opposition came from “Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, [Bolivia] and Paraguay [who, according to the (AP), were] reluctant to forget Mr Castro’s attempts to foment terrorist revolution in South America”.47

The Ford administration, on other hand, did not support the lifting of sanctions against Cuba but hinted that it would accept the majority’s decision at the summit.48 According to a CIA intelligence report dated 4 November 1974, the

44 The CIA reported in May 1975 that “Castro is unlikely, for the sake of any marginal subversive groups, to compromise the formal ties he has worked so persistently to acquire in Latin America or endanger prospective ties with governments that may soon restore relations with Havana. He will be increasingly mindful of Cuba’s improving image throughout the region and anxious to capitalize on it.” Central Intelligence Agency (CIA “The status of Cuban subversion in Latin America”, No. 0545/75, 2 May 1975, available at CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070044-5, released 14/09/2000, [accessed 25/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 45 Alberto J. Vignes in: Associated Press “Many OAS nations ready to welcome Cuba”, Christian Science Monitor, 29 May 1974, in CIA “News, Views and Issues”, No. 7, 31 May 1974, available at CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330006-5, released 08/08/2001, [accessed 28/04/2009],CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 See Binder David, “For Cuba, the O.A.S. is almost beside the point”, New York Times, 13 October 1972, available at CIA-RDP88-01315R000400130003-4, released 11/11/2006, [accessed

302

meeting’s outcome seemed unclear. It warned that, if not cautious, the US government could find itself in a difficult situation. 49 In the end, however, the anti- Castro camp claimed an important victory: Cuba stayed outside the OAS and the economic blockade continued.

The issue, however, was far from over, as new sets of challenges began to emerge for the Miami anti-Castroites and their anticommunist Latin American acolytes. After the meeting, Fidel Castro continued to play the diplomatic card. He stated that Cuba “must take into consideration the governments that voted against the blockade, … and if any of these governments decides to re-establish relations with Cuba, [the island would] have no objection”.50 During the rest of 1974 and much of 1975, President Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, continued to implement a pragmatic approach to the Cuban issue. Furthermore, Cuba was far from isolated after the Quito summit. According to the CIA:

… [t]welve governments – members of the Rio Pact – voted to lift OAS sanctions at [the meeting]; these included seven with which Havana now has relations – Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela – as well as five others – , Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. , , Guyana and the Bahamas were not present at Quito because they are not signatories of the Rio Pact, but Havana has relations with all four,

24/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 49 The agency predicted that [t]he OAS … [meeting would] probably run according to the plan of its sponsors and result in the end of the ten-year-old sanctions against Cuba. There [was], however, a significant risk that the conference may be contentious and inconclusive. If the minority wishing to maintain the sanctions press[ed] too hard on its case that Havana [was] still a subversive threat, Castro’s advocates [would] be tempted to counter with charges of US intervention in the hemisphere. Another problem [was the] confusion among the countries that normally follow[ed] the US lead on such issues. Unsure of the ‘correct’ course, many [were] inclined to abstain leaving the sponsors of the resolution up for vote increasingly uncertain that they [had] the two-thirds majority to win.” CIA, “Quito: not just another conference”, Intelligence Memorandum, Secret, No. 1143/74, 4 November 1974, C. 120, p. 2, available at CIA-RDP85T00353R000100110002-2, released 07/05/2002, [accessed 23/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 50 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The status of Cuban subversion in Latin America”, No. 0545/75, 2 May 1975, p.3, available at CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070044-5, released 14/09/2000, [accessed 25/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD.

303

and government-to-government relations have been so profitable that the Castro regime would have little motive for supporting subversives.51

Despite the meeting’s outcome, the Cuban hardliners’ interests and views continued to clash with those of the US government.

Ford Administration

Ann Louise Bardach maintains that President Ford and his administration carried out a “remarkable two-year diplomatic initiative” with Cuba, and that Henry Kissinger and his assistant William Rogers were the officials responsible for its implementation.52 This initiative was an important step and, had the project succeeded, the embargo could have been lifted by 1976.53 However, this was only the continuation of the complex US foreign policy implemented by the previous administration. Some of the outcomes emerging from the US-Cuba negotiations included “modifications to the embargo, allowing subsidiaries of US companies in third countries to trade with Cuba and no longer withholding aid from countries that traded with [the island]”.54 Talks between the two nations broke down in late 1975. However, they resumed once again under the Carter administration.55

Most Latin American anticommunists, and particularly those in South America, saw the US government’s attitude towards the communist countries as treachery. In response, they cooperated with each other and tried to form a number of strong anticommunist regional blocs, apart from the US government and other foreign powers.

51 Ibid. 52 Bardach, A. L., (2002), Cuba confidential, p. 235. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid, p. 256. 55 According to Myles Frechette, throughout that period the “US negotiated a fishing rights and a maritime boundary agreement, lifted its ban on transferring American currency to Cuba as well as on using an American passport to travel there, and granted visas to Cubans to come to the US on a temporary basis.” Myles Frechette in, García, M. C., (1998), "Hardliners v. "Dialogueros"", p. 17.

304

US’s views on Latin American foreign policy by late 1975

In a lengthy Intelligence memorandum dated 29 December 1975, the CIA analysed “Latin America’s changing foreign relations”. This document provides a valuable insight into a number of key political developments in the region and reveals the way in which this intelligence agency and some US government officials interpreted them. The report claimed that the Latin American governments, particularly those in the Southern Cone, had become more politically independent. The CIA argued that:

Once a fairly [reliable] bloc led by the US, the Latins now rarely ‘line up’, nor do they divide along predictable lines. They make concerted efforts, often successfully, to achieve consensus on certain economic issues so as to present a unified position in bargaining with the US or other parts of the developed world.56

These countries did distance themselves from the US on a number of economic and foreign policy issues. However, as shown at the 11th Conference of American Armies held in Montevideo in October 1975, the US and the Latins were not so far apart on military and security issues. The US welcomed and even encouraged multilateral cooperation, particularly on security matters.

For the agency, it was quite clear that the relationship between the US and the rest of the continent had been strained as a consequence of “Washington’s shift to détente without prior consultation with the actively anti- communist governments of the region”.57 With regard to the Chilean Junta, the report warned that the Pinochet regime was “increasingly embittered over Washington’s failure to embrace it […] believing that it [had] earned US

56 CIA, “Latin America’s changing foreign relations”, Intelligence Memorandum, C145, No. 0783/75, Confidential, 29 December 1975, available at CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060028-4, released 17/05/2002, [accessed 10/03/2010], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD. 57 It further argued that “A number of Latin governments continue to regard the communist camp as ideological lepers, but on the whole the region is considerably more relaxed about treating with a variety of other governments, including communist ones. Opening normal diplomatic relations with a communist state was a bold move for a Latin Administration only a few years ago. By now, the majority have diplomatic relations with the soviets. A dozen have them with China and with Cuba.” Ibid.

305

gratitude for freeing the hemisphere of a Marxist cancer”.58 This sense of isolation pushed the South American regimes closer to other like-minded groups throughout the region and the rest of the world.

In August 1976, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Harry W. Shlaudeman, confirmed the CIA’s conclusions. He informed the US Secretary of State of the political situation in the Southern Cone of Latin America. The report, entitled “ARA Monthly Report: The ‘Third World War’ and South America”, discussed the consequences of the regimes’ international isolation and the possible ramifications for the United States.59 The US official argued that

In response to [the international isolation, the regimes] are banding together in what may well become a political bloc of some cohesiveness. But more significantly, they are joining forces to eradicate ‘subversion’, a word which increasingly translates into non-violent dissent from the left and [centre] left. The Security forces of the Southern Cone…now coordinate intelligence activities, closely operate in the territory of one another’s countries in pursuit of ‘subversives’, [and] have established Operation Cóndor to find and kill terrorists of the [JCR], in their own countries and in Europe. Brazil is cooperating short of murder operations.60

This report not only confirms the emergence of a new far-right political bloc, but also reveals US knowledge of Operation Cóndor.61

The Uruguayan president, Juan María Bordaberry, was a strong advocate for regional unity as a response to the international isolation. In October 1975, he travelled to a number of countries in the Southern Cone urging his

58 ibid 59 Harry W. Shlaudeman – to – The Secretary of State, “ARA Monthly Report (July): The ‘Third World War’ and South America’, Unclassified, Department of State, Washington DC, 3 August 1976, [Argentina Project: S200000044- Box 4859-80D177], available at National Security Archive (NSA), George Washington University, Washington DC. 60 Ibid, p. 1. 61 The US government stated that it did not know of Operation Cóndor until after the assassination of Orlando Letelier in Washington DC in September 1976. Shlaudeman’s report was sent in August that year and officially acknowledged the existence of this Operation and its intentions.

306

counterparts to work together. He met with General Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay, Ernesto Geisel in Brazil, Col. Hugo Banzer in Bolivia, and Gen. Augusto Pinochet in Chile. The trip has gone almost unnoticed by a number of authors researching the Cóndor Plan.62 This, however, was an important event. It is true, as John Dinges argues, that the Chileans were among the most active in urging other intelligence services to share information and work together.63 Yet, Bordaberry’s trip in October set the foundations for the secret meeting that took place in Santiago the following month.64

The Uruguayan leader’s calls for unity found sympathetic ears among his regional counterparts. They all shared a common hatred of communism or anything resembling Marxism.65 According to the CIA, Bordaberry

…[hoped] to find allies to counter what he [viewed] was a world- wide Marxist campaign to discredit the staunchly anti-communist regimes. Also, he [saw] an urgent need to upgrade the region’s economic infrastructure, and he [hoped] to achieve that objective by creating a strong network of bilateral agreements. In recent months Bordaberry has signed accords with neighbouring governments to promote trade, transportation systems, and inter- connecting hydroelectric projects.66

The CIA also believed that the Chileans were the most receptive and appreciative of Bordaberry’s call for cooperation. More importantly, and because the two nations had “been targets of Marxist propaganda, there [was] a

62 Including Calloni, S., (1999), Los años del lobo: Operación Cóndor, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Continente: Peña Lillo; Calloni, S., (2001), Operación Cóndor: pacto criminal, México, La Jornada; Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years: how Pinochet and his allies brought terrorism to three continents, New York, New Press; and McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin America, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 63 See: Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, chapter 2, pp. 10-22. 64 Bordaberry’s South American tour took place just before the 11th American Armies’ conference, in Montevideo. 65 That hatred, however, did not prevent these governments from maintaining economic ties with the Soviets and/or China. 66 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Latin American Trends”, Secret, No. 0529/75, C. No. 121, 1 October 1975, p. 23, available at CIA-RDP79T00865A001900010002-0, released 08/08/2001, [accessed 24/04/2009], CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD.

307

feeling of kinship between them. Many [Uruguayan officials believed] that if Chile had not borne the brunt of these attacks, Uruguay would have been the preferred victim.”67

The World Anticommunist League (WACL) and the Latin American Anticommunist Confederation (CAL)

Authors like Scott Anderson and Jon Lee Anderson have identified the organizations and groups that established the WACL and have discussed their political evolution in the fifties and sixties.68 Their work, however, has one important blind spot when it comes to exploring the organization’s history in the early 1970s, particularly of its Latin American branch. This gap has undermined any attempt to study the relationship between the RLAR and the South American regimes at that crucial time of the formalization of the Cóndor alliance.

Most researchers of these anticommunist forums have focused on the notorious internal crisis, and the subsequent choreographed departure of the US branch from the organization in 1975.69 This literature then skips forward to the late seventies and eighties to address a wide range of issues.70 The narrative put forward by these authors describes the way in which the South American regimes shared Cóndor’s repressive infrastructure with the WACL and the Reagan administration to train the in their war against Nicaragua. Their work suggests that the relationship between the Cóndor regimes and the WACL began in the late 1970s and that any contact in previous years was low key and almost nonexistent. There is an almost complete omission of the WACL and CAL conferences that took place in 1974 and early 1975. To be fair, there is not

67 Ibid. 68 Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League: the shocking expose of how terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American death squads have infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League, New York, Dodd Mead. 69 WACL’s acceptance of Nazi sympathisers, fascists, war criminals and other controversial figures among its members prompted that alleged break. 70 See Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League, part II, pp. 119-274.

308

much information about the CAL and further research is needed on the activities of this organization. One of the few places containing information about the CAL is the Centro de Documentación y Archivo (CDYA) (Terror Archive) in Asunción. This archive contains the records of Dr Campos Alum, president of the Paraguayan WACL and CAL chapters, which includes minutes, communiqués, literature, and resolutions of the CAL and WACL conferences from the 1960s to the 1980s. The Alum Files provide a rare insight into this anticommunist network. A closer look at the resolutions and issues discussed at the 1974 and 1975 conferences reveal that the ties between the WACL, CAL and the South American regimes were more developed than suggested by Anderson and Anderson.71

It is argued here that the resolutions produced by the RLAR called for the creation of a plan of systematic repression that would reach all sectors of Latin America’s society. The South American military regimes, on the other hand, became its implementers and provided much of the manpower and logistics to carry it out. Furthermore, the regimes in the Southern Cone and the groups that came under the WACL/CAL umbrella began building this exclusive and violent partnership during 1974-1975, and not in the late 1970s. Due to internal crises and controversies, as well as differences and tensions with Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter, the forum remained in the background building and expanding its powerful network. However, the arrival of to the White House (1981-1989) facilitated its open emergence in the 1980s.

The Origin of the WACL

The creation of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) was the final stage in a lengthy process of strategic alliances and lobbying that began with the onset of the Cold War. Successive US governments and their intelligence agencies directly supported the development of these alliances to

71 Ibid.

309

monitor and prevent the advance of communism. WACL was established in 1966 with the merger of two influential anticommunist forums: the Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League (APACL) and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). As Anderson and Anderson illustrate, the role played by the Asian bloc in the formation of the WACL, and the controversial nature of some of its key leaders, cannot be underestimated. The authors argue that:

[in] the 1960s, five Asians made major contributions to creating and promoting a movement that would spread to nearly one hundred nations on six continents. One was a ruthless dictator who had seen his vast domain reduced to a tiny island through corruption and a series of military blunders. Another was a former communist who had saved his own life by turning in hundreds of his comrades for execution. Two were [Japanese] gangsters, the fifth was an evangelist who planned to take over the world through the doctrine of ‘heavenly deception’. …[In that order, they were] Chiang Kai-Shek, Park Chung Hee, Ryoichi Sasakawa, Yoshio Kodama, and the Reverend .72

These figures created and used a global network of contacts to dictate and maintain a specific political direction in Asia, as far away as possible from any progressive leftist orientation.

These forums were intimately connected with the US project known as the Stay Behind forces. Patrice McSherry is amongst the few authors who connect the dots between the Cóndor Plan and the latter project.73 Her research further exposed the ties between a number of European terrorist organizations and the Cóndor intelligence agencies. To a lesser extent, her investigation also explored the Asian connection, particularly with the Vietnam War. However, there is little mention of the role played by APACL or the ABN within this Cold War context. Researchers have neglected or overlooked this civilian aspect, focusing instead on the global official/unofficial intelligence infrastructures of the Cold War period. The active participation of APACL, ABN and CAL in this

72 Ibid, p. 46. 73 McSherry, P., (2005), Predatory states, pp. 38-51.

310

worldwide effort is fertile ground for future Cold War historians. Further research on these anticommunist fora could also provide a unique window to view the civilians’ contribution to the stay-behind programs.

Stay-behind forces

The stay-behind projects established throughout Europe were “part of a US led covert effort to set up authority structures parallel to (and often, opposed to) elected governments and democratic institutions”.74 Following the end of WWII, and amidst concerns of the advance of communism throughout Eastern Europe and the Far East, the US government began implementing a number of covert programs to roll back communism. According to Tim Weiner, the National Security Council introduced its Directive 10/2 of June 1948, which “called for covert operations to attack the Soviets around the world”.75 The programs developed under this directive included:

propaganda, economic warfare, preventative including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures…subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas, and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements…[to be done in such way that] any US government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US government can plausibly deny any responsibility…76 Many leftist organizations around the world, together with the sporadic publication of books written by ex CIA agents or double agents77, have exposed the existence of such activities. Yet, the US managed to keep secret the global scope of these projects relatively well for several decades.

74 McSherry, P., (1999), "Operation Condor", p. 152. 75 Weiner, T., (2008), Legacy of ashes, p. 33. 76 McSherry, P., (1999), "Operation Condor", p. 144. 77 See, for instance: Agee, P., (1975), Inside the Company; Hevia Cosculluela, M., (1988), Pasaporte 11333: ocho años con La C.I.A., Montevideo, Tupac Amaru Editorial-TAE.

311

After identifying parallels and connections between Cóndor and the Italian GLADIO78, McSherry concludes that there is enough evidence to suggest “… that key individuals formed part of a global anticommunist network that involved [Propaganda-Due] P-2, Cóndor, GLADIO, the CIA, and Defence and Intelligence Personnel in Western countries”.79 The author analyses the connections of intelligence agencies with a number of radical rightist organizations. However, there is little mention of a number of important partners in this process who made possible the formation and functioning of this global network: the APACL, ABN and, later the CAL. A closer look at these groups adds a further piece to unraveling this puzzle of the Cold War, and complements the work presented by McSherry.

The Asian Peoples Anti-Communist League (APACL)

In 1947, a number of high profile anticommunist figures from Taiwan, Korea and Japan, with direct assistance from the US government, established the APACL. This forum became an important lobby group for the anticommunist regimes ruling those countries. The Taiwanese and Korean governments in particular established a number of organizations to represent APACL in the United States. These lobbied actively to maintain a favourable US foreign policy towards South Korea and Taiwan. Their political influence quickly expanded throughout the sixties and seventies and they became a key oraganization for the training and indoctrination of military, political, and civilian leaders from all over the world on various issues such as counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare.

According to the US Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), APACL “had roots in the China Lobby, a group dedicated to stopping official international

78 GLADIO was a US sponsored covert operation that used terrorism and counterinsurgency tactics to undermine the Italian Communist Party. 79 McSherry, P., (1999), "Operation Condor", p. 154.

312

recognition of the Chinese communist government”.80 Although most US congressmen at the time disliked Chiang Kai Shek and his Kuomintang Party (KMT), he received a great deal of support from General Douglas McArthur and members of the US intelligence community. For instance, Ray Cline81, at the time chief of the CIA station in Taiwan, was in control of APACL’s chapter in that country.82 Official US support for the Taiwanese KMT government increased after the and both countries remained on relatively good terms until the early 1970s. With the inauguration of President Richard Nixon and his subsequent opening to Mao’s China, Taiwan lost some of the preferential treatment it had enjoyed in the previous decades. As a consequence, the relationship between the Taiwanese KMT government and the Nixon administration, especially with Henry Kissinger 83, deteriorated sharply.

The South Korean military regime headed by General Park, who took power in May 1961, and Reverend Moon’s played an important role in the APACL. In his military career, General Park had developed close ties with the Japanese occupation forces and had received extensive training in a number of Japanese military academies.84 It is during those years that Park developed the distinct ideological foundations that characterised and influenced the economic development program implemented

80 Institute for Policy Studies (I.P.S.), (1990), "World Anti-Communist League-W.A.C.L.", online, available at http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org/articles/display/World_Anti- Communist_League#P10587_2120949, [accessed 08/04/2011]. 81 Ray S. Cline worked for several US intelligence agencies within the Pentagon and the Defence Department. For many years he worked as the CIA’s chief of station in Taiwan where he developed close ties with the Kuomintang regime. He was actively involved in the creation of the WACL “and its US chapter, the US Council for World Freedom-USCWF”. John Simkin Ray Steiner Cline, Spartacus Educational, online, available at http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKclineR.htm , [accessed on 16/04/2011]. 82 Meyssan, T., (2007), "La Liga Anticomunista Mundial, Internacional del crimen", online, available at http://www.kaosenlared.net/noticia/liga-anticomunista-mundial-internacional-crimen, [accessed 15/02/2011]. 83Australian League Of Rights (A.L.O.R.), (1975), "The bell tolls in Asia", Intelligence Survey, 25(4): 1-8. 84 San José State University-Department of Economics, The Park Chung Hee regime in South Korea, online, available http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/park.htm, [accessed 19/04/2011].

313

under his rule in the 1960s.85 His government formed the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). From then on, APACL carried out several intelligence operations in the United States on behalf of the Korean CIA.

Equally controversial within APACL was the figure of Reverend Sun Myung Moon. Born in North Korea, he was arrested in the late 1940s as a consequence of his religious and political activities. At the end of the Korean War, he was liberated by UN forces from a North Korean labour camp. Subsequently he lived in South Korea where he became an active anticommunist and expanded his Unification Church (UC). He supported APACL and exploited the benefits provided by this network of contacts to spread his theological views and religious message, and advance his financial empire. Both the KCIA and Rev. Moon’s UC established the Korean Cultural and Freedom Foundation (KCFF) in the United States. According to Anderson & Anderson, that organization was the “legal and political front for [the UC and the KCIA] to get access to policy makers” in the US.86

In the late 1970s, accusations about tax irregularities and controversies surrounding many of the Reverend’s businesses87 caught the attention of the US Congress. The subsequent investigation by the Subcommittee on International

85 It is necessary to point out that General Park also joined the South Korean Workers Party, and was accused of being a communist and sentenced to death. Thus, there is a possibility that some of his views regarding economic development were inspired by the policies implemented by Joseph Stalin to achieve rapid industrialization in the USSR during the 1930s. 86 Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League, p. 67. 87 Rev. Moon’s business continued to grow during the late 1970s. In 2011, this conglomerate included companies associated with the Tongil group, such as Sunwon Construction in the building sector; Saeilo specialized in building management; Seil Travel in hospitality; Asia Forum in the seafood farming and distribution sector; Yongpyong Resort in hospitality, Ilsang Ocean Development in tourism, Il Shin Stone in the production of artistic items made of stone; Ilhwa soft drinks company; JC in manufacture and sale of metal surface and waste water treatment; Tongil Sports owns a soccer club; Pyeongong in agricultural projects; Pyongil Communications, specialists in the production of HD video services; and Tongil industries, specialising in auto parts. See Tongil Group, (2008), "Affiliated companies", online, available at http://www.tongilgroup.org/eng/02_sub/2c_sub00.php, [accessed 23/01/2013]. The Moon group also controls News World Communication, owner of United Press International (UPI) and the Washington Times. In the arms industry, Reverend Moon’s businesses include Kahr Arms, a small firearms manufacturer. This list does not include the extensive businesses operations across Latin America, particularly, in Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina.

314

Organizations of the Committee on International Relations concluded, among other things, that:

… (3) Among the goals of the Moon Organization is the establishment of a worldwide government in which the separation of church and state would be abolished and which would be governed by Moon and his followers. […] (6) The Moon Organization established the KCFF ostensibly as a non-profit foundation to promote Korean-American relations, but used the KCFF to promote its own political and economic interests and those of the ROK [Republic of Korea] Government. […] (8) A Moon Organization business is an important defence contractor in Korea. It is involved in the production of M-16 rifles, antiaircraft guns, and other weapons. […] (13) Although many of the goals and activities of the Moon Organization were legitimate and lawful, there was evidence that it had systematically violated U.S. tax, immigration, banking, currency, and Foreign Agents Registration Act laws, as well as State and local laws related to charity funds, and that these violations were related to the organization’s overall goals of gaining temporal power.88

Moon remained heavily committed to his anticommunist political agenda. He established the International Federation for the Extermination of Communism (IFEC) and its US branch, the Freedom Leadership Foundation (FLF). According to the US House of Representatives’ investigation, Moon’s conglomerate

… began to involve itself in anti-communist activities in the early 1960s. […] In the name of anti-communism, Moon’s followers allied themselves with powerful right-wing figures in Japan […] and openly participated in election campaigns there; lobbied on behalf of US military presence in Vietnam; canvassed congressional offices; [and] picketed in front of the UN…89

In 1974-1975 the Reverend’s anticommunist message, and that of APACL for that matter, found sympathetic ears amongst many Latin American regimes that

88 Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, (1978), Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Washington D.C, US House of Representatives, online, available at http://www.allentwood.com/articles/conclufraser.html, [accessed 20/04/2011] p. 388. 89 Ibid, p. 319.

315

had been isolated from the international community as a consequence of the human rights violations carried out by their security forces.

The Taiwanese established the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) in the 1950s.90 For several decades after its creation, this department trained local and foreign military officers at the Political Warfare Cadres Academy91 at Peitou, . Both South Korea and Taiwan used APACL as a platform to spread their knowledge and doctrines of psychological warfare, propaganda, unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency across Asia. Later, the same training and doctrines were made available to Africa and Latin America via the network of contacts established through the WACL.

Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN)

The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) was established in 1946 to organize and coordinate anticommunist activities in Central and Eastern Europe. This organization “claims direct descent from the Committee of Subjugated Nations, which was formed in 1943 by Hitler’s allies, including the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army”.92 Several organizations linked to ABN participated in the stay-behind projects already discussed in previous paragraphs. According to Meyssan, fascists from Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lithuania and other Eastern European nations united under the leadership of Yaroslav Stetsko. The latter had collaborated with the Nazi occupation forces in Ukraine and was accused of being responsible for the Lvov massacre on 2 July 1941 when 700 people, most of them Jews, were killed by Ukrainian Nazi collaborators.93

90 According to Anderson and Anderson, the GPWD runs “radio stations, publishing houses, and even movie studios. It also has counterintelligence units to locate subversives and psychological warfare units to supervise political warfare campaigns and promulgate propaganda, as well as civic affairs units for the purpose of infiltrating behind enemies lines during an invasion and generate support for the Kuomintang.” Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League, p. 57. 91 Also known as Fu Hsing Kang College. 92 Bellant, R., (1991), Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party, p. 73. 93 Meyssan, T., (2007), "La Liga Anticomunista Mundial, Internacional del Crimen".

316

Throughout the sixties, seventies and, particularly the eighties, the ABN remained very active in its endeavour to eliminate communism in Europe, and had the direct support of the United States government. Christopher Simpson states that

Captivated by a vision of the world in which any enemy of the communists was a friend of ours, the US public role in Eastern Europe during the Cold War consisted in large part in the creation of polarized crises in which east west cooperation became impossible, while the clandestine counterpart to this same policy often created secret alliances with war criminals, Nazis, and extremists.94

The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations played a key part in creating and maintaining these crises in Eastern Europe to prompt the fall of communism.

The ABN planned to fill the political vacuum left by the fall of the communist bloc with ABN sponsored governments. Like its APACL counterparts, the organization developed a strong lobby group in the United States to influence and obtain assistance from that country’s government.95 The relationship between the ABN and some of the most conservative right-wing organizations in the United States associated with the Republican Party had existed since before the end of WWII.96 However, the most beneficial period of this long lasting relationship took place under the Reagan administration.

94 Christopher Simpson in Bellant, R., (1991), Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party, p. 90. 95 These organizations included the “Slovak World Congress … the Bulgarian National Front, the Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, World Federation of Free Latvians, Croatian Liberation Movement, the Byelorussian Central Council and the Romanian Liberation Movement.” All of them were closely linked to the Nazi occupation forces. 96 That relationship lasted for several decades. In the late 1970s, for example, the ABN lobbied intensively amongst US politicians to boycott, sabotage, and obstruct a Department Of Justice’s investigation carried out by the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) regarding Nazi war criminals. ABN dismissed these investigations and claimed that OSI officers relied on testimonies of “Soviet” survivors. However, OSI investigations revealed that indeed some of those Nazi collaborators and members of the infamous “Iron Guard” were associated with the ABN and, more importantly, the CIA. For the later issue see: Ruffner, K. C., (2007), "C.I.A's support to the Nazi war criminal investigations: a persistent emotional issue", Centre For the Study of Intelligence-CSI, online, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi- studies/studies/97unclass/naziwar.html, [accessed 28/07/2013].

317

Within the anticommunist world, the ABN was portrayed as a legal and respectable organization, only interested in promoting its democratic and peaceful message across Europe and the rest of the world. Not all members of the ABN, or of the WACL for that matter, were Nazis, far-right terrorists or war criminals. While all of them were virulent anticommunists, some genuinely believed in peaceful coexistence of capitalism and communism. However, these remained a small minority. Behind the public image promoted by ABN and APACL was a less benign reality, particularly within the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. As Bellant argues, the latter was

[…] the high council for the expatriate nationalist groups that formed the police, military, and militia units that worked with Hitler during WWII. Some were organized as mobile killing teams that exterminated villages and sought to murder whole ethnic, racial, and cultural groups.97

The author also links these groups to the death squads that emerged in Guatemala and other Latin American countries in the sixties, seventies and eighties. 98

The founding of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL)

WACL’s creation coincided with the preparations for the famous Tricontinental in Havana and the assassination of one of its organizers representing the African Third World nations, Moroccan political leader Mehdi Ben Barka in Paris. 99 In this context, WACL’s creation became one of the many responses of the anticommunist world developed to stop what they understood as the expansion of a Marxist threat around the world. APACL and ABN joined forces to intensify their anticommunist struggle. To do so, they expanded beyond regional boundaries and developed new alliances with other anticommunist organizations. To coordinate the interactions between these organizations, they established the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) in

97 Bellant, R., (1991), Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party, p. 75. 98 Ibid. 99 Krüger, H. and J. Marshall, (1980), The great heroin coup, p. 32.

318

1966. The relationship between both groups, however, had existed since the late 1950s.100 As Meyssan points out, ABN’s leader, Yaroslav Stetsko, and the CIA’s chief of station in Taiwan, Ray S. Cline, supervised the creation of the Political Warfare Cadres Academy in 1958.101

WACL’s Latin American chapters organized and coordinated training for military officers and political figures in the region, especially during the late sixties and in the seventies. It is difficult to determine the exact number of Latin American trainees who attended these courses. This is an issue that requires further research. However, there is evidence confirming that anticommunist groups and individuals linked to the WACL established a financial institution in Asunción, Paraguay. This company was known as Financiera Urundey and, behind its legal cover, it arranged all the administrative paperwork to send Latin American military personnel, civilians and politicians to the Peitou academy in Taiwan.102 In the early seventies, Carlo Barbieri Filho, head of WACL’s chapter in Brazil, ran Financiera Urundey and he later became president of WACL at the crucial time when the Cóndor Plan was launched.

The Latin American trainees went to the Taiwanese academy to learn counterinsurgency tactics, as well as political and unconventional warfare. The US Army defined the latter as

…a term which includes the three interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare: evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states. Unconventional warfare operations are conducted within enemy or enemy controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.103

100 For instance, Yaroslav Stetsko attended several APACL conferences in the 1950s. 101 Meyssan, T., (2007), "La Liga Anticomunista Mundial, Internacional del Crimen". 102 Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League, p. 140. 103 Department of the Army, (1962), F.M: 33-5 Psychological Warfare, Washington DC, USG Printing Office, p. 112.

319

Ret. Major General, and future head of the WACL, John K Singlaub104 argues that these operations went beyond simple “…terrorism, subversion, and guerrilla warfare …”. They were far more elaborate and included other “such covert and non-military activities as sabotage, economic warfare, support to resistance groups, black and grey psychological operations, disinformation activities and political warfare”.105 The existence of Financiera Urundey and its training activities in Taiwan confirm that the South American regimes were on good terms with the WACL and its Latin American branch. Moreover, it reveals that the reciprocity between the RLAR and the military governments began much earlier than suggested by some authors.106

Nixon and WACL

Since its creation and until the early 1970s, WACL kept a low profile. However, in that period the organization established new chapters in various countries and extended its network of strategic contacts. In the mid-sixties and early seventies, WACL also organized conferences, symposiums and other similar gatherings. Its chapters lobbied their respective governments to maintain a steady flow of trainees to the Peitou academy in Taiwan. It also created a wide network of publishing houses, magazines, newspapers, and other media organizations, to ensure the maximum publicity possible for works by

104 Maj. Gen. Singlaub was a US Army specialist on unconventional warfare. He was involved with the CIA’s Phoenix Program in Vietnam and spent several years as the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Command in South Korea. He was dismissed from that position in 1978 when he openly criticised President James Carter for his intention of reducing the number of US forces at that post. After his retirement, Singlaub became president of the WACL and, in the 1980s, he played a key part in the training of Nicaraguan Contras and other death squads in Central and South America. See: Simkin, J., "John K. Singlaub", Spartacus Educational, online, available at http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKsinglaub.htm, [accessed 06/05/2011]. 105 Ret. Maj. Gen. John K Singlaub in Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League, p. 154. 106 See Krüger, H. and J. Marshall, (1980), The great heroin coup; Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League; Scott, P. D., (2003), Drugs, oil, and war: the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

320

anticommunist authors and specialists.107 However, the situation changed with the arrival of President Nixon in the White House.

As a direct consequence of his, at times, complex and contradictory foreign policy, WACL adopted a new and more aggressive role. The Nixon administration actively sought to destabilize democratic governments in South America. On the other hand, it recognized Mao’s China, negotiated on a number of occasions with Cuba and maintained the politics of détente with the Soviet Union. For WACL, all these threatened the very existence of the free world. After many years of enjoying preferential treatment from US governments, the Taiwanese and South Korean regimes, and their South American counterparts, felt abandoned and betrayed by Nixon’s foreign policy. Nixon and Kissinger’s new rapport with the communist world transformed some of these anticommunist regimes into social, political and economic pariahs, especially, those in South America.

Terry Meyssan argues that Nixon used WACL to expand US “counterinsurgency methodology throughout South East Asia and Latin America”.108 This suggests a rather friendly relationship between the President and the World Anticommunist League. This was not entirely the case. The Nixon administration did use and help KMT militias associated with APACL and WACL in South East Asia.109 It is also true that the KMT benefited politically and financially from the President’s War on Drugs and during the Vietnam War. However, this was as far as the relationship between Nixon and this anticommunist forum went in South East Asia. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were amongst the most virulent anticommunists in the US government and that virulent anticommunism continued during the Ford administration.110

107 This network was also used to discredit the Soviet Union and counter or sabotage any scientific, political or literary work emerging from the communist bloc. 108 Meyssan, T., (2007), "La Liga Anticomunista Mundial, Internacional del Crimen". 109 See: Scott, P. D., (2010), American war machine, chapters 3-6, pp. 63-142. 110 For a detailed assessment of the US government’s anticommunist policies for South America see Archive, T. N. S., (2006), "On 30th anniversary of Argentine coup new declassified details on

321

Yet, Nixon and Kissinger compromised their views in favour of pragmatic decisions that benefited US interests, particularly towards 1974.

In South America, Nixon and Kissinger overtly displayed their bitter anticommunist views, particularly until late 1973. They did not hesitate in supporting military governments to prevent the emergence of more socialist governments a la Salvador Allende.111 The WACL and, particularly, its South American chapters welcomed this approach. Nevertheless, Nixon’s policies of détente, the relaxation towards China, and particularly the negotiations with Cuba, strained the relationship between the president and the anticommunist camp. The WACL repeatedly accused the Nixon government (and later those of Gerald Ford and James Carter) of being infiltrated by communists and Jews.112 The radical anti-Castro groups, including those associated with WACL, went so far as to develop plans to assassinate Henry Kissinger in 1976 during his visit to Costa Rica.113

The Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana (CAL)

WACL’s Latin American chapters established the Confederación Anticommunista Latinoamericana (CAL) (Latin American Anticommunist Confederation) in the early 1970s. This new regional forum became a key hub of the radical Latin American Right (RLAR). The following section will focus on two important, yet rare documents: the“Leyes Funamentales de la CAL: Carta de Principios”114 (CAL’s Fundamental Laws: Charter of Principles) and

repression and U.S. support for military dictatorship", online, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB185/index.htm#19760326, [accessed 23/07/2011]. 111 See Aldrighi, C., (2007), La intervención de Estados Unidos en Uruguay (1965-1973), chapter 3, pp. 22-36. 112 See Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League, chapter 8, pp. 92-103. 113 Bardach, A. L., (2002), Cuba confidential, p. 185. 114 Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Leyes fundamentales de la CAL:carta de principios”, México, 29 de Agosto 1972, R108-F1543-1550, available at Terror Archives, Asunción, Paraguay.

322

the “Estatutos: disposiciones relativas a los miembros”115 (Statutes: arrangements concerning members). These documents reveal the organization’s hostility toward Marxism. CAL’s individual members and the organizations that came under its umbrella did not hesitate to use any means available, including violence, to achieve the ultimate objective outlined in these documents: the eradication of communism from the continent. The forum openly and repeatedly encouraged multilateral cooperation between governments, political parties, other anticommunist entities, and anticommunist military organizations to defeat what they interpreted as ‘Socialismo Marxista’ (Marxist Socialism). The CAL and its members became active participants in the process of violent political radicalisation that spread throughout the continent during the early to mid-1970s. More importantly, with these calls for unity, and the practical measures implemented by CAL’s chapters to achieve it, this regional anticommunist forum contributed towards setting up the foundations of what later became the Cóndor Plan.

Los Tecos

CAL’s origin is intimately connected to one of the most conservative, influential and secretive groups of Mexican society: Los Tecos (The Owls). The latter not only became the main driving force behind the formation of Mexico’s chapter of the WACL, but also of the continental forum (the CAL). Since its formation in the early 1900s and for most of the twentieth-century, Los Tecos has been an important and influential element of the Mexican Ultra-Right. Its membership included prominent figures of Mexican society such as bankers, politicians, members of the armed forces and the clergy. The Tecos exerted a great deal of influence on that country’s education institutions, particularly over the Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara (UAG) (Autonomous University of

115 Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Estatutos: disposiciones relativas a los miembros”, México, 29 de Agosto 1972, R108F1551-1565, available at Terror Archives, Asunción, Paraguay.

323

Guadalajara), which they helped to establish. Some of this group’s most influential members were actively involved in the UAG’s creation.

For most of the twentieth century, this group remained unknown to the vast majority of Mexicans and other Latin Americans. The organization only gained public notoriety in the 1980s when its far-reaching operations and network of powerful contacts were exposed. In a series of newspaper articles for , US journalist Jack Anderson reported that the group from Guadalajara, Mexico, [i.e. Los Tecos] used “its anticommunist credentials to ask money from the rich Arab countries….” to finance their crusade against communism.116

That, however, represented only the tip of the iceberg. Further articles directly linked this institution’s roots to Mexico’s political history. In a later work Anderson claimed that this “secret society grew from a counterrevolutionary force of the right wing known as Los Cristeros during the Mexican revolution, in the early twentieth-century”. This group functioned until the early 1930s and was initially established to defend the Church from a number of laws included in the Mexican constitution that considerably curtailed the religious freedoms of the Catholic Church. When Los Cristeros disbanded in 1933, a new and more radical organization emerged: Los Tecos.117 Since then, the new brotherhood has been actively involved in the country’s political life.118

Carlos Cuesta Gallardo was one of the most influential Teco members.119 Until the 1950s, Los Tecos were very close to the Catholic Church. However,

116 Jack Anderson in Alianza Estudiantil Prometeo (A.E.P), (2004), "El Legado de Hitler", online, available at http://www.legado-de-hitler.blogspot.com/ 2011, [accessed 02/09/2011]. 117 Sánchez Ortiz, J. J., (2010), "Sociedades secretas en México y su poder oculto en la política", online, available at www.sociedades-secretas-en-mexico-y-su-poder-oculto-en-la-politica-a32790, [accessed 29/07/2012]. 118 Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League, chapter 6, pp. 71-81. 119 He spent some time in Berlin studying the Nazi regime and developed close ties with important members of Hitler’s entourage in Germany and Europe, including Nazi collaborators such as the Ustashi and the Iron Cross. Upon his return to Mexico, Gallardo introduced the Nazi ideal to other Teco members and made the “Jews, Jesuits, and communists” their sworn enemies. See Alianza

324

after the end of WWII the group began to develop a new ideological pattern. The change came partly as a consequence of the organization’s fast growth and expansion beyond Mexican borders. Anderson & Anderson maintain that thanks to Gallardo and Julio Meinveille, a Jesuit who lived in Buenos Aires and was a fervent admirer of Adolf Hitler, the Tecos “became the spiritual mentors for many of the continent’s neo-Nazi movements and, eventually, the coordinators of death squads throughout Central America” in the 1980s.120 Soon after the end of WWII and throughout the following decades the Tecos expanded their network of contacts to include a wide range of fascist organizations. In Europe, for instance, they had contacts with the ex-Nazi organizations and collaborators that established the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). In South America, they developed close ties with the Argentine Tacuaras, which these authors defined as a “secret society of neo-Nazis”.121

As the Cold War progressed, tensions began to emerge between the most radical elements in the group and the Catholic Church. This situation reached one of its highest points during establishment of the Vatican II Council in 1962. The Tecos rejected this Council and argued that the Catholic Church had been infiltrated by communists and, particularly the Jews. That year, in order to undermine the Council’s attempt to include pressing social issues as part of its religious doctrine, the Tecos published a highly controversial book heavily loaded with anti-Semitic material.122 In it, the organization blamed Jews and Communists for almost everything in history. It claimed that

[t]here [were] crypto-Hebrew clergymen infiltrated in the Catholic Church, [as well as in the] Protestant and Orthodox

Estudiantil Prometeo (A.E.P), (2004), "El legado de Hitler". Gallardo openly hated Jesuits. Paradoxically, however, he remained a good friend of the Jesuit Priest, Julio Meinveille. 120 Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League, p. 73. 121 Ibid. 122 The three-volume book entitled “Complot contra la Iglesia” (Conspiracy against the Church) was authored by a fictitious Maurice Pinay. Pinay, M., (1962), Complot contra la Iglesia, México, Ediciones de la Identidad-Ediciones "Mundo Libre", online, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/24754883/Maurice-Pinay-Complot-Contra-La-Iglesia, [accessed on 6/09/2011].

325

Churches from the West and who [were] affiliated to communist parties. They [were] trying to confuse Christians by telling them that communism [was] not that bad and that one [could] reach an understanding with it. The mission of these Judases [was] to [trick] the free world into relaxing its defences and weakening the anticommunist resistance of those places where these so-called clergymen preached. [This strategy aimed to] facilitate the ultimate victory of Judaic Communism…123

The publishing of this book represented a major shift from the organization’s origins, and led to a number of internal power struggles among its members. Subsequently, the Tecos became more violent.124

Following the Tri-Continental in Havana, and the subsequent anticommunist counteroffensive that led to the establishment of WACL, the Tecos unified the Mexican anticommunist forces under the banner of the Federación Mexicana Anti-Comunista (FEMACO) (Mexican Anticommunist Federation).125 FEMACO became an official chapter of the World Anti- Communist League. At the heart of this new federation, the Tecos planted their seeds of religious fundamentalism, virulent anticommunism and anti-Semitism. More importantly, the Tecos and FEMACO became the driving force that led to the formation of the Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana (CAL).

From 1967, FEMACO began to liaise with its European and Asian counterparts, exchanging and reproducing anticommunist literature. This interaction allowed the Tecos, FEMACO, and the Mexican Anticommunist youth to publish their articles abroad. The European and Asian forums, on the

123 Ibid, p. 205. 124 According to Álvaro Delgado, the group divided in 1965 due to disagreements regarding the work of Paul VI. Those who supported the Pope formed the Yunque society, also known as Los Soldados de Dios (God’s Soldiers) or the Puebla Group. Like the Tecos, the Yunque society exerted strong influence over a number of universities, particularly the Puebla University. The Tecos, on the other hand, disliked Pope Paul VI and accused him of being a communist and a Jew. The split served as a way to purge some of the most moderate members from the organization and cleared the way for the adoption of new and more radical directions. See Delgado, Á., (2004), El ejército de Dios: nuevas revelaciones sobre la extrema derecha en México, México, D.F., Plaza & Janes, p. 39-47. 125 Spectator2006, (2007), "La O.N.U y los Tecos de la U.A.G.", Un Informe de la O.N.U. Sobre los Tecos, online, available at http://informe-onu.blogspot.com/2007_04_01_archive.html 2011, [accessed 7/09/2011].

326

other hand, did the same in the magazines, periodicals, and other publishing houses linked to the Tecos and FEMACO. This reproduction of material helped to create an aura of legitimacy for their works, activities and specialists.

The establishment of the Confederación Anti-Comunisa Latinoamericana

The Nixon administration’s negotiations with the communist world and its relationship with Cuba prompted the Latin American anticommunists, particularly those associated with the RLAR, to act. WACL entrusted the Tecos and FEMACO with the task of establishing the Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana. The new regional anticommunist forum was officially launched on 29 August 1972 in Mexico City. Its organizational structure consisted of a General Congress, a Coordinating Council, a Membership Commission and a General Secretariat. According to Katie Zoglin, “the Coordinating Council was comprised of representatives from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Cuban exiles”.126 The Secretary General and the Council were in charge of the Confederation during the period between General Congresses.127 According to CAL’s Charter of Principles, the Confederation was “an alliance of political parties and other anticommunist entities”.128 These entities encompassed a wide range of legal, secret, military, student, clerical, business, and other organizations, including anti-Castro political/paramilitary organizations such as Alpha 66.129 According to Anne Bardach, this “anti-Castro Commando group”

126 Zoglin, K., (2001), "Paraguay's Archive of Terror: international cooperation and Operation Condor", The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, 32(1): 57-82, p. 67. 127 Amongst the members of the Coordinating Council were figures like: Daniel and José Ferréira (Colombia), M. Carlos (Mexico), Martín Gutiérrez (Uruguay), Carlo Barbieri Filho (Brazil), Fernando (illegible surname) (Guatemala), Roberto Cordon (Guatemala), Adolfo (Tuncilar?) (Salvador), Armando Pérez Rousa (Cuba – Alpha 66), Carlos Podesta, Nicanor Fleitas, Antonio Campos Alum (all of them from Paraguay) and, Rafael Rodríguez (Mexico). See “Congreso Coordinador CAL”, R108F1463, available at CDYA, Asunción, Paraguay. 128 Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Leyes Funamentals de la CAL: Carta de Principios”, p. 1. 129 For further readings on the kind of entities that could join the CAL or have working relationships with the forum, see: Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Estatutos: disposiciones relativas a los miembros”.

327

was formed in 1961 by a handful of Cubans who disagreed with the ideological path of the government of Fidel Castro.130 Among its founders were Eloy Menoyo and Andrés Nazario Sargen. The latter “worked in different capacities, such as Organization Secretary in charge of maintaining training camps well supplied”.131 Sargen became the leader of Alpha 66 in 1968 and its representative delegate to the CAL after the creation of that regional forum in 1972.132

The charter clearly stated that the forum’s number one priority would be to ensure that communism did not take root in Latin America. To achieve this, associates would develop and execute “plans of actions aimed at frustrating the communist assault”. CAL members saw the governments of President Salvador Allende in Chile, and the progressive military regime headed by General Juan Velazco Alvarado in Peru, as clear manifestations of that communist assault. The Confederation believed that the anticommunist struggle had to target all levels of society. It would fight against Marxism, Socialism, and Communism and use any measures to destroy “the secret forces that spread” the Marxist ideology “around the world, as well as all its collaborators”.133

The forum promoted “mutual cooperation between political parties and anticommunist entities that [joined] the Confederation […].” The resolutions adopted at the various Conferences and Congresses, and the internal documents of CAL and WACL, confirm that the Latin American anticommunists believed that “the local Marxist organizations [received] help from big communist powers …” and the global Marxist movement. As shown in the previous chapters, however, the anticommunist camp rarely put forward any evidence to

130 Bardach, A. L., (2002), Cuba confidential, p. 227. 131 Alpha 66, (2005), "Our History: Cuban freedom fighters in quest of the liberation of our homeland ", online, available at http://www.walterlippmann.com/docs549.html, [accessed 03/11/2011]. 132 Nazario Sargen appears in Anderson and Anderson’s list of Who is Who within the WACL. See: Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League, p. 283. 133 Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Leyes fundamentales de la CAL: carta de principios”, p. 1.

328

substantiate these allegations. Despite this, the CAL believed that it was “impossible for the governments, political parties and anticommunist military organizations”, to defeat the communists on their own.134 According to CAL, the only way to effectively achieve this goal was to forge alliances and help each other.135 This level of mutual cooperation among Latin American anticommunists increased with the creation of CAL and reached its peak during the years in which the Cóndor Plan was operational.

One of the most significant goals outlined in CAL’s charter and, arguably, the one with the most far-reaching consequences, concerned the organization’s support of anticommunist governments. Over the next three years, this led to the imprisonment of tens of thousands of people throughout the region and the extrajudicial execution and forced disappearances of thousands more. The forum was committed to help these governments, particularly those in South America to “… eradicate the communist subversion in all its aspects, including that of the reds [i.e. communists] infiltrated in the catholic clergy”.136 Support also included countering the global campaign of the “crypto-communist international media” to discredit anticommunist regimes.137

CAL and its respective chapters described those held prisoners by the regimes as “… kidnappers, […] murderers and other [ordinary] criminals”. They also interpreted the international community’s demands for the liberation of political prisoners and other victims of the violent regimes as part of an orchestrated plot to release those criminals. The Confederation formalized

134 One of the most notorious “anticommunist military organizations” associated with the CAL in 1972 was Alpha 66. Other high profile groups like the Triple-A in Argentina, ARENA, MANO and other similar groups in Central America joined the CAL during the following years and decade. 135 Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Leyes fundamentales de la CAL: carta de principios”, p. 1. 136 For further readings on the repression against priests and nuns see: Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (C.O.N.A.D.E.P), (1984), Nunca Más, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Editorial E.U.D.E.B.A, online, available at http://www.desaparecidos.org/arg/conadep/nuncamas/indice.html, [accessed 19/07/2011]. 137 Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Leyes fundamentales de la CAL: carta de principios”, p. 1.

329

these views by including them in the forum’s Charter of Principles, and spread them throughout the continent via its chapters. The highest anticommunist governmental echelons across Latin America welcomed and embraced CAL’s views and support.138

Although the Charter strongly criticised the US government, the Confederation maintained ties with several US anticommunist groups, particularly those associated with the New Right.139 These groups included organizations such as the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade (CACC), the US Council for World Freedom (USCWF), The Conservative Caucus (TCC), the Council Against Communist Aggression (CACA), later known as the Council for the Defence of Freedom (CDF), and Accuracy In Media (AIM). All these organizations had direct ties with the New Right in the United Sates and with the WACL. Prominent figures within this New Right, like Roger Pearson and Congressman Jesse Helms, lent their unconditional support to the South American anticommunist military regimes.

CAL portrayed itself as politically neutral. The Charter also stated that this anticommunist network would not violate the sovereignty of the countries’ members to impose its desired political agenda. This, however, was far from

138 Official documents of the Paraguayan, Uruguayan, Argentine, Chilean and Bolivian regimes, contain almost verbatim reproductions of this argument. Even one of the founding documents of Cóndor also emphasises the “international” plot of the foreign Marxist media. See: Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (D.I.N.A.), (1975), Primera reunión de trabajo de inteligencia nacional Santiago, Chile, D.I.N.A. It is necessary to point out, however, that many anticommunist sectors of the militaries held these views already, as did the U.S. government or national security elements within it; such views appear in military documents beginning in the 1960s. See, for instance: Aparicio, F., R. García and M. Terra, (2013), Espionaje y Política: Guerra Fría, Inteligencia Policial y Anticomunismo en el Sur de América Latina 1947-1961, Montevideo, Ediciones B. 139 In the early 1970s the most radical sectors of the US right wing of politics began to react against the growing popularity of the “New Left.” Luis Maira argues that “the right wing circles [in the US] were able to consolidate, with all kinds of support, a supremacy that [would later transform] them into the nation’s most dynamic ideological trend of the late 1970s”. Maira, L., (1981), "Nota preliminar sobre la influencia (creciente) del pensamiento de la nueva derecha norteamericana en América Latina", Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 43(Número extraordinario): 1923-1943, p. 1924. The most radical and virulent anticommunists within the US’s New Right joined forces with the WACL and the CAL to pressure the US Congress in favour of the South American regimes. For further readings on the US’s New Right and its allies, see: Bellant, R., (1991), Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party, part III, pp. 59-88.

330

true. CAL actively sought to undermine and overthrow democratic governments to impose anticommunist dictatorial regimes. A clear example of this took place as the 1973 parliamentary elections in Chile approached. Raimundo Guerrero (prominent Teco leader and CAL’s Secretary General) urged all the anticommunist chapters to pressure the government of Salvador Allende demanding that the president “cease to intimidate and to threaten with unleashing the violence of his Marxist armies to impose his rule of blood and fire”. Letters should also be sent to General Carlos Prats

exhorting him to finish his complicity with the UP [government] or, honouring the glorious tradition of the Chilean Armed Forces, [resign] from his position as commander in chief. That way, [the armed forces would be able to] carry out the rights and obligations dictated by the constitution and prevent the Marxist cliques – who have deceived one third of the Chilean electorate – from destroying the democratic institutions and freedoms in the country.140

Shortly after General Augusto Pinochet took over the country, CAL extended its unconditional support to the new regime.

The forum and its various chapters in the continent dismissed the numerous reports of human rights NGOs and the international community concerning the brutal crimes committed by the armed forces.141 Instead, CAL chapters sent letters to Pinochet congratulating

… him for his decision to implement [strong] measures to extirpate Marxism from his country in favour of the Chilean people’s independence and freedom, and courteously [request] him to resist the communists’ pressures. […] We believe that to offer our support to the anticommunist government in Chile […]

140 See Raimundo Guerrero-Liga Mundial Anticomunista (WACL), “Re: Elecciones parlamentarias en Chile”, Memorandum, 21 de Febrero 1973, R198-F2587, available at Terror Archive (CDYA), Asunción, Paraguay. 141 A clear example of these crimes were those known as the “”, carried out shortly after the coup. See: Verdugo, P., (1989), Caso Arellano: los zarpazos del puma, Santiago, CESOC.

331

is one of the basic duties we have embraced in our Confederation.142

In its early years the forum repeatedly pressured the Nixon administration to alter its foreign policy, particularly in Latin America.

After the US Congress implemented cuts to the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in 1974, CAL launched an intense lobby campaign to pressure the Nixon administration.143 Until the early 1970s, the President remained on good terms with the RLAR, especially with the anti-Castro Cubans. However, most CAL members, particularly the Cuban exiles, felt that the performance of his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, undermined that relationship with the President. In October 1973, the Confederation’s Secretary General asked its members, allies and sympathizers to send telegrams to Nixon condemning Kissinger’s activities aimed at facilitating the “resurgence of Marxism in Chile”.144

This particular document, signed by Dr Rafael Rodríguez (CAL’s Secretary General at the time) reveals how much the RLAR disliked Kissinger. Most CAL members believed that President Nixon’s appointment of

Henry Kissinger as chief of the State Department [brought] as a consequence a change in the anticommunist policy of the United States of America towards Latin America. [This anticommunist policy was replaced with] one of collaboration with Marxism, due to Dr Kissinger’s well-known sympathy towards communism and the communists… [That sympathy had been] already shown in his ill-fated policy of approaching and collaborating with red China and with the Soviet Union, when he was a simple adviser to the president.145

142 WACL, Circular No. 12, 5 de Octubre 1973, RE: letter Nixon-Pinochet, R198-F2595, available at Terror Archive (CDYA), Asunción, Paraguay. 143 For further explanation of this decision adopted by the US Congress and the reasons that led to such drastic cuts in funds, see: Aldrighi, C., (2007), La Intervención de Estados Unidos en Uruguay (1965-1973), pp. 15-16. 144 WACL, Circular No. 12. 145 Ibid.

332

The communiqué claimed that the US Congress’ pressure on the Chilean junta to stop human rights violations dangerously weakened the new anticommunist regime and facilitated the resurgence of the Chilean Marxists.

Throughout 1972-1975 (or even in the late 1970s), not a single known document or internal communication of the Confederation mentioned any of the revolutionary leftist guerrilla organizations. Instead, the Latin American anticommunists focused on what they perceived as a more dangerous threat: Marxist propaganda. According to CAL, the communist “... international news agencies and the world press ... [had] unleashed a campaign to discredit the Chilean Junta ... [and] falsely [made] it look as if the new government [was] committing crimes and atrocities in its country...”146 During this period the regional forum developed a number of measures to counter perceived communist propaganda. The Latin American anticommunists benefited from their contacts with WACL. The latter offered a worldwide network of publishing houses, newspapers and several other media outlets willing to reproduce and spread CAL’s version of what was happening in the region.

The Confederation sought alliances with those who, “because of their power [could] destroy communism”, including governments, armed forces and civic/military movements that endeavoured to free their people from the Marxist yoke.147 These alliances also incorporated trade unions, political parties, and other anticommunist groups with a proven anticommunist record such as anticommunist civic organizations, labour confederations, confederations of rural workers’ trade unions, national student anticommunist confederations or federations, universities and technical institutes, clerical associations dedicated to the fight against the communist clergy, national associations of anticommunist intellectuals, technicians, professionals, artists and professors, the national associations of anticommunist bankers, industrialists and

146 Ibid. 147 Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Estatutos: disposiciones relativas a los Miembros”.

333

commercialists and also of small farmers, and all national anticommunist confederations or federations representing specific social sectors. CAL also welcomed newspaper and magazine chains, radio and TV networks, cinema corporations, and film companies.148

It is not possible to establish CAL’s exact number of members from the documentation held at the Terror Archives alone. Therefore, it is difficult to determine how large or strong the above mentioned network of contacts was in the mid-1970s. This is an area that requires further research. It is certain, however, that attendance at the 1974-1975 WACL and CAL conferences was high, with hundreds of delegates representing those groups and organizations mentioned in the previous paragraph. 149 Studies focusing on anticommunist groups in specific South American countries such as Uruguay and Argentina for example, identify the existence of strong anticommunist groups linked to the WACL and CAL. These authors also reveal these groups’ connections with, and influence over, the labour and student movements, as well as with prominent businessmen of both countries.150 Some of these prominent figures had direct connections with death squads and parapolice/paramilitary organizations, like the death squadron in Uruguay151 or the Triple-A in Argentina.152

148 Ibid. 149 See Australian League of Rights (A.L.O.R.), (1975), "Special report on World Anti- Communist League Conference", On Target, 11(27), online, available at http://www.alor.org/Volume11/Vol11No27.htm, [accessed on 24/10/2011]. 150 For a detailed analysis of the history of the anticommunist movement in Uruguay, which includes members of the Uruguayan business sector, the clergy, students, and trade unions, see: Aparicio, F., R. García and M. Terra, (2013), Espionaje y política: Guerra Fría, inteligencia policial y anticomunismo en el Sur de América Latina 1947-1961, Montevideo, Ediciones B. Many of these figures had direct or indirect links to the CAL. Other works and authors provide a similar overview in Argentina, including González Janzen, I., (1986), La Triple-A; Larraquy, M. and R. Caballero, (2000), Galimberti: de Perón a Susana, de Montoneros a la CIA, Buenos Aires, Grupo Editorial Norma; Larraquy, M. and R. Caballero, (2002), Galimberti: crónica negra de la historia reciente de Argentina, Madrid, Aguilar; Di Fonzo, L., (1983), St. Peter's Banker, New York, Mainstream Publishing Company (Edimburgh) Ltd. The latter work provides a detailed discussion of the links between high profile figures in Argentine society with notorious European anticommunist groups associated with the WACL and CAL. 151 (2009), Acusado. Miguel Sofía, empresario periodístico, es uno de los acusados: pidieron cuatro procesamientos por Crimenes de "Escuadron de La Muerte", 17 April, La Republica,

334

Two years after its creation, the Confederation had developed an impressive network of contacts thanks to its links to the World Anticommunist League.153 It had gained experience and had begun to function as a cohesive and effective pressure group in favour of the anticommunist cause. Despite early financial hardships, the General Secretariat and the Coordinating Council managed to implement most of the resolutions adopted at the Confederation’s initial congresses. Some of those actions were quite effective and, at times, some became a considerable source of annoyance/concern for the Nixon administration.154

At the 1973 CAL II Congress in Mexico, FEMACO announced a twenty-one point project to establish the Agencia de Comunicación Internacional (ACI) (International Communications Agency). This ACI, however, required considerable logistical and financial resources and demanded a great deal of coordination. For that reason, this venture became one of the main concerns of the Confederation and its chapters throughout the following years. The ACI would counter the negative information about the Latin American anticommunist regimes that originated, mostly, in Europe and the United States. To efficiently cover the entire continent, the region would be split into two main zones (North and South). Initially, the CAL Congress suggested that the North Zone’s headquarters should be located in Guatemala and the

Montevideo, 4Pixels, online, available at http://www.lr21.com.uy/politica/360501-pidieron-cuatro- procesamientos-por-crimenes-de-escuadron-de-la-muerte, [accessed 10/10/2009]. 152 Petroni, C., (2012), "Todos los Peronismos, el Peronismo (La Triple A: el terrorismo de estado Peronista - Capitulo de Contextualización del Libro)", Izquierda Punto Info, online, available at http://www.izquierda.info/libros/CAPITULO1.pdf, [accessed 21/10/2012], Larraquy, M., (2007), López Rega: el Peronismo y la Triple A, Buenos Aires, Punto de Lectura; Petroni, C., (2012), "Los Crimenes de la CNU/Triple A", Izquierda Punto Info, online, available at http://www.izquierda.info/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12212, [accessed 17/11/2012]. 153 For a detailed analysis of the type of organizations that joined the WACL and that formed part of that impressive network of contacts see Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League, part I, pp. 3-118. 154 See telegrams sent by the CAL urging President Nixon to abandon those negotiations, and CAL’s letters regarding the possible acceptance of Cuba back into the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1972-1975 in Colección Campos Alum, Carpeta 34, available at CDYA, Asunción, Paraguay.

335

South’s in Asunción. The former would service Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Santo Domingo and Mexico, while the latter would service Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru.155

Prior to CAL’s III Congress held in Rio de Janeiro in January 1974, the Confederation’s Secretary General, Raimundo Guerrero, sent a document to all chapters providing guidance and suggestions on the most pressing issues to be addressed. The Congress would be attended by the Anticommunist Civic Organizations’ Commission; the Mixed Commission for Science, Art, Universities and Schools; the Mixed Commission for Press, Radio, Television, Book Editorials and Printed Propaganda; the Commission for the Struggle Against the Communist and Subversive Clergy; the Plenary Commission; and the Budget and Auditory Commission. Guerrero’s document suggested that each of the commissions attending the Congress should:

1. Elaborate plans of action [to prevent] … Latin American States [from falling into the hands of] communism, [to fight] Marxist Socialism in all aspects and [everywhere] until achieving its final defeat. 2. Elaborate plans of actions to help the sincere anticommunist governments and organizations in their efforts to extirpate the communist subversion in all its aspects. 3. Elaborate plans of actions that would lead to the [consolidation of] CAL’s objectives outlined in point 1 of the [CAL’s] Charter of Principles.156 Guerrero also suggested that those “university employees and student leaders who attended the Congress and would be part of the Commission Against Subversion in Universities and Schools” should present “plans of actions to combat and extirpate the red subversion” in those educational centres.157 Journalists attending the meeting had to develop plans on how to best counter

155 Federación Mexicana Anticomunista (FEMACO), “Proyecto para fundar una ‘Agencia de Comunicación Internacional (ACI)”, Guadalajara, México, 1973, R108F1720-1726, p. 2, available at CDYA, Asunción, Paraguay. 156 Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Primer documento básico para delegados al Tercer Congreso de la CAL”, Guadalajara, México, 1973, R108F1760-1762, available at CDYA, Asunción, Paraguay. 157 Ibid, p. 1.

336

the use of mass media outlets by the “communists and their accomplices to … discredit the patriotic and anticommunist Governments …”. Book editors and experts in printed propaganda and other means of communication, on the other hand, should develop plans of action to “defeat the worldwide and local propaganda campaigns that the communists and their accomplices [implemented] in massive form to [achieve the victory of] … Marxism...”158 Guerrero’s message on behalf of CAL was very clear. All those who attended the Conference were encouraged to “present plans of action … to combat the Communist [activities] amongst workers, peasants, middle class, intellectuals, artists and technicians …”159 While it is not clear how many attended the CAL conference in Brazil, the resolutions passed at it show that those who did attend were determined to step up the pace and intensity of the anticommunist struggle.

The resolutions adopted at the 1974 CAL III Congress included the development of a propaganda plan for Latin America. Each anticommunist chapter would organize celebrations for “the first anniversary of the liberation of Chile” to boost the prestige of the Pinochet regime. The Coordinating Council continued to work on the establishment of the ACI. However, while the necessary arrangements were made to achieve that objective, the chapters would reproduce anticommunist propaganda and articles provided by the Latin American Editorial Fund (FONEL) (Fondo Editoral Laitnamericano) in Mexico.160 The Congress also agreed to extend the anticommunist struggle to include universities and the labour movement. Council members should inform

158 Ibid, p. 2. 159 Ibid. 160 FONEL articles were reproduced by the different chapters and also anticommunist organizations. This Fund continued to work during the following years, producing anticommunist propaganda. Its articles appeared not only in mainstream newspapers, but also in newsletters of other anticommunist organizations such as the Cuban Nationalist Movement (MNC) (Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano). For instance, in its 1976 January-February issue, El Nacionalista reproduced two articles from FONEL. See: (1976), Los Comunistas si creen en el Comunismo, El Nacionalista (órgano oficial del Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano-MNC), New Jersey, Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano; Tomás Ramírez Torres, (1976), La compleja moral Puritana del ciudadano Norteamericano, El Nacionalista (órgano oficial del Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano), New Jersey, Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano.

337

“Carlos”161 about the universities and schools where the anticommunists were strongest. The request also included a list with the names and addresses of “those leaders, professors or, student leaders, with whom [the Confederation] could make immediate contact to organize the anticommunist struggle at those centres, and their country.162 The Security Secretariat, headed by a Teco/FEMACO high ranking member, would prepare a document to show the anticommunist governments the different ‘systems’ available to solve security problems at universities. That document would also teach these governments how to “maintain control over the students”.163 The Secretariat Against the Red Clergy recommended that all members of the [Coordinating] Council should send a list to “Nicanor”164 with the names of anticommunist organizations and trade union leaders who could be invited to join the CAL’s anticommunist work.165 The CAL III Congress placed particular emphasis on the Marxist clergy. For the Confederation, the latter were predominantly adherents of Liberation Theology.166

CAL’s III Congress was followed by the WACL’s VII Congress in Washington DC. However, Zoglin argues that the meeting of the Coordinating Council of the Anti-Communist Confederation (CAL) was the most significant of these meetings.167 The “Synthesis of compulsory agreements for the members of the Coordinating Council” (“Sintesis the acuerdos obligatorios para

161 Generally, CAL documents used only first names. In this case, the document refers to “Carlos” Podestá from Paraguay. See “Congreso Coordinador CAL”, R108F1463. 162 Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Secretaría contra la subversión del clero Rojo”, 1974, R108F1448, available at Terror Archive (CDYA), Asunción, Paraguay. 163 Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Secretaría contra la subversión en universidades y escuelas”, 1974, R108F1459-1460, available at Terror Archive (CDYA), Asunción, Paraguay. 164 The document refers to Nicanor Fleitas from Paraguay. See: “Congreso Coordinador CAL”, R108F1463. 165 Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Secretaría contra la subversión del clero rojo”. 166 This religious and ideological trend began in the late sixties with the Vatican II Council (Vaticano Segúndo) and the 1968 Medellin Congress in Colombia. 167 Zoglin, K., (2001), "Paraguay's Archive of Terror", p. 67.

338

los miembros del Consejo Coordinador”)168 reveals that this ruling body adopted seven important resolutions, which outlined the activities to be carried out during the following years. Most of these resolutions focused on countering international Marxist propaganda. The last two, however, dealt exclusively with the clergy.

Resolution number six requested that all members of the Coordinating Council should send to the Secretariat Against the Red Clergy’s Subversion a list containing the names and addresses of those clergymen/women with proven anticommunist references. This list should also include those who opposed the “so called progressive trend that [had introduced] heresy and Marxism to the Church”.169 The seventh resolution, on the other hand, asked CAL members to “elaborate a separate list” containing the names of all communist clergymen/women, including those who preached Marxism and heresy. That list should be sent to the Secretary General. The latter would pass that information to those who needed it to carry out their anticommunist work.170

Zoglin stresses the importance and profound ramifications of this particular meeting. She argues that its purpose was “… to receive information and to exchange experiences to adopt methods that could be applied throughout the continent”.171 CAL agreed to share these black lists with those responsible for eradicating the red clergy from the Catholic Church, including the local armed forces and rightist paramilitary groups.172 This commitment was re-

168 Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Síntesis de acuerdos para los miembros del Consejo Coordinador”, 1974, R108F1447, available at Terror Archive (CDYA), Asunción, Paraguay. 169 Ibid. 170 Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Secretaría Contra la Subversión del Clero Rojo”. 171 Zoglin, K., (2001), "Paraguay's Archive of Terror, p. 67. 172 These blacklists resulted in the kidnapping, torture and execution of numerous priests and nuns in South and Central America from 1974 until 1980s. In Argentina, for example, this hatred toward the alleged ‘red clergy’ resulted in the assassination of fathers Mujica and Angelelli, the massacre of three priests and two Seminarists at the Pallotine order of St. Patricio in Buenos Aires, and the little known case of the disappearance of the Uruguayan priest “Padre Mauricio”, who lived in the shantytowns of Buenos Aires and worked as a municipal street sweeper. The most notorious

339

enforced at a subsequent meeting of the Confederation’s Coordinating Council in Guadalajara, on 10-12 July 1974.173 On 10 July the Council discussed the implementation of concrete measures to accelerate the execution of the resolutions adopted by the Commission Against the Subversion of the Red Clergy at CAL’s III Congress in Rio de Janeiro. The Coordinating Council concluded that the CAL should speed up the “recruitment of associations and personalities who [fought] against the Marxist subversion in the Church, in defence of the Catholic Orthodoxy”. It also sought the elaboration of plans to identify all the labour organizations led by anticommunist leaders and organize their joint action to repel the communist influence from the labour movement. The delegates attending the meeting urged these labour groups to support “…those governments fighting the communist infiltration…” The CAL Coordinating Council also showed interest in rescuing the schools and universities “controlled by communists [and helping to] defeat [leftist subversives] in those … centres in danger of being dominated by …” communism.174 The Uruguayan Martín Gutiérrez, member of the Coordinating Council, urged greater involvement from the business sector in the anticommunist struggle. The Confederation’s programs and activities envisioned for this new stage were complex, ambitious and expensive. The recruitment of the Latin American business sector was paramount to secure the needed funds for the completion of CAL’s objectives.

The documental evidence from the 1974 congresses helps to re-trace part of the Confederation’s elusive history. The 1972 Charter of Principles, the Statutes for Members, and the content of the resolutions adopted at these Conferences and meetings confirm that the CAL actively participated in the manifestation of this anticommunist hatred in Central America included the assassination of four missionary nuns and the murder of Archbishop Romero in El Salvador. All these criminal acts were fuelled by the kind of virulent anticommunist hatred promoted by the CAL, and were the most radical manifestations of the work of eradicating the red clergy from the Latin American Catholic Church 173 See Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Programa y agenda para la reunión del Consejo Coordinador de la Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana (CAL), del 10 al 12 de Julio de 1974”, Guadalajara, México, R108F1720-1731, available at CDYA, Asunción, Paraguay. 174 Ibid.

340

repression of the clergymen and women suspected of being communists.175 This evidence also illustrates how the RLAR provided intellectual and logistical support to the anticommunist regimes. This anticommunist network became a willing partner of a deliberate attempt to wipe out any traces of communism from Latin America. CAL directly, by implementing the 1974 resolutions, and indirectly, by supporting the regimes and calling for tougher measures, helped to create the conditions and the environment for the implementation of the Cóndor Plan.

WACL VII Congress in Washington DC

The resolutions adopted at CAL’s III Congress were passed in full at WACL’s VII Congress in Washington DC a few months later. At that meeting, the Mexican FEMACO, the Cuban Anti-Castroites and the Brazilian Chapter articulated the wishes and views of RLAR. The Mexicans wanted WACL to focus on three main areas. First, all WACL chapters should write to all the heads of states of the Organization of American States (OAS) urging them not to lift sanctions against Cuba.176 Second, they should condemn US Senator Edward Kennedy for being a communist accomplice by helping the Fidel Castro regime; and third, they should make those messages public through as many media outlets as possible.177

FEMACO asked the WACL to support in the strongest possible way the governments of “Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay, and congratulate them on their struggle against communism”. The Mexican delegates urged this global anticommunist forum to

175 Note: the commitment to eradicate Marxists from other places, including trade unions and universities, was a constant feature during the CAL and WACL conferences. 176 As shown earlier in this chapter, these actions put pressure on the US government and succeeded in preventing a number of Latin American countries from lifting sanctions against Cuba or accepting that nation back into the OAS at the Quito and Costa Rica meetings (1974 and 1975 respectively). 177 Raimundo Guerrero, “FEMACO, sujeta a la aprobación del VII Congreso de la WACL en Washington DC las siguientes resoluciones”, Guadalajara, México, 2 de Marzo de 1974, R108- F1406, available at Terror Archive (CDYA), Asunción, Paraguay,.

341

also condemn the propaganda fabrications against these governments “organized by the world press at the service of communism […] and all puppet organizations at the service of the Red Imperialism”.178 The Brazilian chapter, headed by the future president of the WACL, Carlo Barbieri Filho, added that the ongoing claims against the South American regimes were part of a Psychological Warfare campaign conducted by International Communism. The Brazilian delegation suggested that “only through union of the true anticommunist forces [would they] be able to diminish the bad effects of this powerful weapon”. They urged all members of the league to “assume the responsibility [of an uncompromising and unconditional support for] the true anticommunist governments”. 179

The Brazilian Junta welcomed the cooperation and support provided by CAL and WACL. The governments of the states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, for instance, hosted a number of CAL Conferences and other meetings during 1974 and 1975. Members of the regime, such as Admiral Faria (governor of Rio de Janeiro) and ex Justice Minister Alfredo Buzaid lent their support to, and actively participated in, WACL’s VIII Congress in 1975.180 The Brazilian junta had close ties with the Sociedade de Estudios Políticos, Econômicos e Sociais (SEPES) (Society of Social, Economic and Political Studies). The latter think tank, established and presided over by Carlo Barbieri Filho, provided advice and guidance to the junta, including on economic policies.181 On 3 September 1975, the US embassy in Brasilia reported that

SEPES was organized in 1962 in Sao Paulo. The organization is composed of students, professors and professional people who

178 Ibid. 179 Capitulo Brasileño de la WACL, “Proposición del capitulo Brasileño de la Liga Mundial Anticomunista al VII Congreso de la misma en Washington, D.C.”, 1974, Washington D.C., R108- F1433, available at CDYA, Asunción, Paraguay. 180 See Australian League of Rights (A.L.O.R.), (1975), "World Anti-Communist League Conference prepares for Counter-Offensive against Red advance", Intelligence Survey, 25(6): 1-8. 181 Valente, R., (2009), Célula anticomunista atuou no Brasil durante a ditadura, Folha de São Paulo, 15 November, São Paulo, Brasil, Empresa Folha da Manha LTDA, online; available at http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc1511200911.htm, [accessed 20/10/2011].

342

reject the ‘Materialistic Anti-National Doctrines of Communism.’ The Members reportedly advocate defence of Brazil’s National Customs and Christianity as the strongest bulwarks against communism. Approximately 100 members of SEPES attended the recent WACL Congress in Rio. SEPES sponsored a meeting of the Latin American Caucus of WACL in Rio in 1974 [i.e. CAL’s III Congress]. [Carlo Barbieri and his son Carlo Barbieri Filho] have reportedly provided, at least inpart [sic], the financing for the two International Anticommunist Congresses in Rio de Janeiro in the last two years. […] While SEPES was the official host organization for the WACL Congress considerable support for the Congress on the part of the GOB [Government of Brazil] was also evident. A number of current and former officials from all levels of the GOB attended Congress sessions and assumed places of honor on the platform. It was also rumored that the National Intelligence Service (SNI) provided substantial behind- the-scene backing for the Congress in terms of financing the transportation, translation, and administrative needs of the Congress. GOB support was especially evident in that the security furnished was provided by the Army secret police and the Department of Political and Social Order (DOPS).182 These connections, however, were not the only ones. High profile anticommunist figures representing organizations linked to WACL also established individual contact with other South American regimes to offer logistical and operational support.

For instance, on 29 April 1974, two prominent Italian anticommunists, Prince Junio Valerio Spicione Borghese and , met with General Augusto Pinochet and his head of police intelligence, Colonel Jorge Carrasco.183 Borghese was a senior Navy commander during the Fascist government of Benito Mussolini and had strong connections with far-right radical groups in Italy and Europe. Stefano Delle Chiaie was a leader of Avanguardia Nazionale (National Vanguard) and member of Ordine Nuovo

182 US Embassy Brasilia to US Embassy Santiago, “Visit to Chile of Brazilian Anti-Communist”, Telegram 3 September 1975, Confidential, online available at The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975BRASIL07678_b.html, [accessed 31/07/2013]. 183 Douglas, A., (2005), "Italy's Black Prince: terror war against the Nation-State", Executive Intelligence Review, 32(5), online, available at http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2005/3205_italy_black_prince.html, [accessed on 15/10/2013].

343

(New Order), two notorious Italian far-right organizations, responsible for numerous acts of terrorism in Italy and Europe, with connections to the WACL. The two visitors travelled to the Andean country to congratulate the Chilean junta for its victory over Marxism, to show solidarity with the military government, and to offer practical support to General Pinochet. The visit came at a very difficult time for the Chilean regime, which faced strong international condemnation as a consequence of its human right violations. The Chilean dictator met again with Delle Chiaie in Spain, during (or shortly after) the funeral of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco184, on 21 November 1975. After that meeting, Delle Chiaie began to work with the Chilean DINA, and participated in a number of assassination operations on behalf of this agency in South America and Europe.185 The Italian far right extremist and his anticommunist network also developed close ties with the regime of Colonel Hugo Banzer, in Bolivia, and with José López Rega and his Triple-A in Argentina.186

WACL VIII Congress in Rio de Janeiro

In 1975 the WACL, and particularly its Latin American branch, increased its activities in support of the South American anticommunist regimes. The Australian League of Rights (ALOR)187, WACL’s chapter in Australia,

184 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years, p. 127. 185 For further readings on the activities of Stefano Delle Chiaie in Europe and South America see: Berger, M., (1983), Historia de la Logia Masónica P-2, Buenos Aires, El Cid Editor-Fundación para la Democracia en Argentina; Stuart, C., (1984), Stefano Delle Chiaie, London, Magazine: Refract Publications. 186 See Stuart, C., (1984), Stefano Delle Chiaie, pp. 38-45. 187 ALOR was amongst the most active groups within Australia’s far-right. It established connections with the WACL in the early 1970s and, by 1975, acted as the League’s anticommunist chapter in Australia. It had connections with the anticommunist Croatian exile community linked to the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN). Among the Croat exiles linked to ALOR were ex- USTASHI members (Nazi collaborators during WWII). From the 1950s until the early 1970s, many of these Croatian exiles trained and worked with members of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO). The Croats with Nazi connections were responsible for a number of terrorist attacks in Sydney and Melbourne against the Yugoslav embassy and consulate. The partnership between these groups and ASIO reached an abrupt end during the Labor government of Gough Withlam (1972-175). For a brief outline of Australia’s various far-right organizations see Saleam, J., (2005), The Right-Wing underground in Sydney 1973-1977 (With emphasis on the Special Branch

344

predicted that this year would bring a momentous and radical shift in the global anticommunist struggle. 1975 would be, according to ALOR, ‘the year of showdowns’. The details and scope of this momentous shift were unveiled at WACL’s VIII Congress in Rio de Janeiro in April 1975. In June-July, ALOR, which had an active participation at the Congress188, discussed the strategic ramifications emerging from that gathering in its two media outlets (Intelligence Survey and On Target). In the June issue of Intelligence Survey ALOR summarized the topics discussed in Rio de Janeiro, and gave an account on some of the high profile figures present at the gathering.189 The following month, the journal On Target stated that “[t]he dominating note at the 1975 [Rio Congress] was the necessity for anti-Communists to take a much more positive stand in the face of the accelerating advance by International Communism”.190 Despite the successful activities carried out throughout 1974, the global anticommunist forum and its respective chapters believed that their had not finished and that the “communist” threat was still present. For the RLAR, this threat materialized in the form of communist propaganda.

According to Intelligence Survey, “[o]ver 500 delegates and observers from 64 nations and 20 international organizations” attended the Rio Congress on 23-26 April. Rio de Janeiro’s Governor, Admiral Faria Lima, presided at the Congress during the opening day ceremonies while ex-Minister for Justice,

FIles), Sydney, Radical Nationalism in Australia (R.A.D.N.A.T.),online, available at home.alphalink.com.au/~radnat/underground.html, [accessed 18/10/2011]. Saleam himself was a member of a radical fascist nationalist organization known as National Action. 188 According to the June Issue of Intelligence Survey, “The [VIII WACL] Conference unanimously charged the Crown Commonwealth Leagues of Rights with the responsibility of preparing a comprehensive report on how the Soviet Union and its satellites have been financed from the West, and what steps might be taken by the non-Communist nations to adjust their finance- economic policies to make possible a constructive offensive against the Communist challenge.” Australian League of Rights (A.L.O.R.), (1975), "World Anti-Communist League Conference prepares for Counter-Offensive against Red advance", p. 1. 189 Ibid, pp. 1-8. 190 Australian League of Rights (A.L.O.R.), (1975), "Special report on World Anti-Communist League Conference".

345

Alfredo Buzaid, also attended the gathering and addressed delegates.191 The conference concluded with a speech by US Senator Jesse Helms.192 The latter did not participate as an official envoy of the United States Government. However, his presence and the message contained in his speech represented the first concrete manifestations of this new change of pace in the anticommunist struggle.

The speech began with a brief outline of the momentous political crisis faced by the anticommunist world, putting particular emphasis on what Helms (and other members of the Republican Party) considered the failure of US foreign policy in Vietnam, South East Asia and other parts of the world. Because of that failure, he argued, it was “time for those of us who are profoundly concerned by the disintegration of the free world to leave off talking, to forego further analysis and discussion, and unite for action”.193 He pledged his admiration and support for the Brazilian and Chilean anticommunist governments and attacked some members of the Republican Party and the US government in general for their weak stand against communism. Most of that criticism was aimed at Vice-President Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The former, Helms argued, was “a man who [had] been overwhelmingly rejected by his party in every open convention in which he sought the Presidential nomination”.194 When referring to Kissinger, Helms stated that:

If I could judge the United States only by the activities of the United States Secretary of State, I think I might be tempted to be anti-American myself. … Dr Kissinger has espoused a policy that is so devoid of moral content that he has perpetually antagonized our closest allies and friends, betrayed their interest, and dismissed their concerns. His loyal clients have been our

191 Australian League of Rights (A.L.O.R.), (1975), "World Anti-Communist League Conference prepares for Counter-Offensive against Red advance", p. 1. 192 Helms, J., (1975), "Internationalists preparing the world for War or Communism: address by Senator Jesse Helms at W.A.C.L. Conference on April 25", pp. 2-6. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid, p. 4.

346

determined enemies who, time after time, have taken advantage of his empty ‘structures of peace’ to advance the cause of . I have tried very hard to see his great accomplishments, but I am still looking. What I see are stratagems and deals, and mechanical solutions which omit the pressing claims of liberation and freedom.195

Like most members of WACL and CAL, the US Senator despised the politics of détente, its outcomes, and the role Kissinger played in its implementation. According to Helms, the SALT 1 negotiations left the US government at a clear military disadvantage and the recognition of Mao’s China isolated his country from its other Asian allies. He considered the attempts to lift sanctions against Cuba as equally detrimental to US-Latin America relations. The Senator congratulated “[t]he courageous country of Chile” for its work against the “subversion […] supported by Cuban Communism” and urged his anticommunist colleagues to “not allow [themselves] to be pressured into precipitate action on […]” lifting sanctions against Cuba.196

This speech served as an important morale boost for the Latin American anticommunist camp. The relations between the CAL and US anticommunist groups had always been difficult.197 Helms’ presence and speech at the Rio Congress, however, offered hope for a much closer collaboration between the anticommunists groups from North and South America. The US Senator proposed a five-point road map that should include:

(1) An information program of international seminars and lectures which will highlight the importance of united action and the decision-making process in the free countries…(2) An appreciation of the importance of nationalism in the traditions of each country, and how it can be strengthened through co-

195 Ibid, pp. 4-5. 196 Ibid, p. 6. 197 In 1975, the North American chapter of WACL was established and Roger Pearson became its Secretary General. From then on, as Anderson and Anderson point out, the North American chapter began to develop tensions with its Latin American counterparts due to the presence of ex-Nazis amongst it ranks and also for the strong anti-Semitic direction adopted by the CAL. However, both groups and their respective chapters continued to work together for many years, before effectively severing all official ties. For further readings on the creation of WACL’s North American chapter, see: Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League, chapter 8, pp. 92-103.

347

operation and understanding. (3) A program of training in organizational techniques and counter-Communist action. This should include both strategy and tactics of group dynamics, a utilization of news media techniques, and preparation and distribution of organizational manuals. (4) Special attention should be given in each country to involving the decision-making circles in the policy goals of the organization…(5) we must emphasize the importance for close and continuing exchange on a personal basis of new developments and opportunities.198 This program sought to strengthen the anticommunist cause around the world and link the South American regimes to this global struggle. He repeatedly warned against the politics of détente and pointed out that:

…It [was] time … to organize to defeat such policies, and to work for liberation all over the world. The [WACL] must organize to have a continuing program that works to assist all freedom groups in organizing to resist Communism where it is an immediate threat and to change the policies of the decision- making circles in their own countries. We can no longer indulge in comfortable rhetoric, and in analyses that are meaningful only to us.199

Helms concluded by stating that “the people of the United States [stood] ready and willing to assist in whatever [was] going forward, and to put whatever abilities we have at your disposal”.200 His support served as a bridge to forge new alliances and friendships at a crucial time for the RLAR and, especially the South American regimes. His address at the WACL VIII Congress marked the beginning of a more dynamic and overt interaction between US rightists, particularly from the Republican Party, and the anticommunist world. According to Russ Bellant, the contacts between the RLAR and the strongest anticommunists groups in the United States continued to develop from 1975 onwards.201

198 Helms, J., (1975), "Internationalists preparing the world for War or Communism: address by Senator Jesse Helms at W.A.C.L. Conference on April 25", p. 5. 199 Ibid, p. 6. 200 Ibid. 201 See: Bellant, R., (1991), Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party, part 3, pp. 59-83.

348

Another important outcome of the 1975 Rio Congress was the appointment of Carlo Barbieri Filho as president of the WACL.202 Barbieri Filho made it a priority to strengthen and expand WACL’s global network of contacts during his tenure. He also adopted a series of practical measures to increase WACL’s cooperation with CAL and help the Latin American anticommunist camp. He emphasised the importance of close cooperation between CAL and the Latin American anticommunist governments. Shortly after his appointment, the president made a number of important trips. However, before discussing these trips and their outcomes, it is necessary to address another important development that took place in August 1975: the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki, also known as the Helsinki Accord.

The Accord represented a momentous occasion for the European theatre of the Cold War. It also had important ramifications for the anticommunist cause in other parts of the world, including for the South American regimes and the RLAR. The preparations for this conference began in July 1973. It took two more years for the participating delegations to approve the final document.203 The momentum created by the politics of détente fostered the conditions that allowed the US and the USSR to discuss a number of important matters and to avoid a new war in Europe. The delegates sought to find common ground on a number of matters and protect the European nations from any foreign invasion and ensure their sovereignty.204 More than thirty nations, including the US,

202 Australian League of Rights (A.L.O.R.), (1975), "World Anti-Communist League Conference prepares for Counter-Offensive against Red advance", p. 1. 203 The Soviet Union had called for a similar type of negotiations as early as 1954. However, at that time, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the government of the United States met the requests with strong scepticism. Fascell, D. B., (1979), "The Helsinki Accord: a case study", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 442(1): 69-76. 204 Some of these issues included: the sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from the threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of States; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; co-operation among states [and] fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. (1974), "Helsinki consultations text of the Conference Communique", The American Journal of International Law, 68(1): 181-193, p. 184.

349

Canada, the Soviet Union and all European nations (except ) reached a final agreement on 1 August 1975. The Accord secured, at least in theory, all the goals the delegations set out to achieve to prevent a nuclear war in Europe. It also addressed other key issues regarding respect of human rights, technological and scientific cooperation and economic relations.205 The Helsinki Accord left a significant legacy in the field of human rights that lasted until the late 1980s.206 It also secured, at least for a brief period, the recognition of the territorial boundaries established after the end of WWII.

All the parties involved in the negotiations met with enthusiasm the official approval of the final document. However, the Accord was repudiated all over the world by a bitter and skeptical anticommunist camp. For the WACL, the Helsinki Accord represented a direct blow to the anticommunist cause and the forum blamed the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger for it. ALOR’s views regarding this matter were representative of its anticommunist colleagues. For the Australian WACL chapter, the CSCE was

… arranged for the purpose of formally confirming the […] political status quo in Europe. This [meant] an acknowledgement of the right of the Soviet Union to enslave permanently the peoples of Eastern Europe […] Now Dr Kissinger […] has led President Ford to accept the . […] The treachery at Helsinki will of course, be applauded by the Rockefellers and other Wall Street groups. But the spirit of the enslaved peoples will continue to live on. It is the duty of every free person everywhere to make it clear to the victims of Communism that he or she does not accept the betrayal at Helsinki or anywhere else…207

205 (1975), Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe - Final Act. Helsinki, Finland Hellenic Resources Network HR-Net, online, available at http://www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html, [accessed 20/10/2011]. 206 As Anne F. Bayefsky et al argue: “Since [1975 there were] three follow-up meetings [regarding human rights within the framework of outline by the Helsinki Accord]: the first was held in Belgrade [1977-1978] … the second was held in Madrid [1980-1983] [and] the third was held in Vienna [1986- 1989]”. Bayefsky, A. F., L. Alexeyeva, M. M. Kampelman, M. Tabory, J. J. Maresca and A. H. Henkin, (1990), "Human Rights: the Helsinki process", Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 84(March 28-31): 113-130, p. 113. 207 Australian League of Rights (A.L.O.R.), (1975), "The Helsinki surrender", On Target, 11(28), online, available at: http://www.alor.org/Volume11/Vol11No28.htm#1a, [accessed 03/11/2011].

350

All WACL chapters, including the CAL, agreed with ALOR’s evaluation. To them, the Helsinki Conference represented another Communist victory. It also validated and justified the calls that had emerged from WACL’s VIII Congress regarding the need for stepping up the tempo in the anticommunist struggle. It is in this environment that Carlo Barbieri Filho began his official international tour to strengthen the WACL’s network of contacts.

Barbieri’s first stop was Chile where he extended the forum’s unconditional support to the Pinochet regime.208 On 27 August, the US embassy in Santiago reported that WACL’s president

Intends to offer GOC [Government of Chile] and Chilean Civic Organizations [such as Patria y Libertad (Mother Land and Freedom)] backing of his two organizations [WACL and SEPES] in order to counter campaign of propaganda against Chile launched by ‘Marxism’. Barbieri claimed that he had at his disposition international chain of information in 75 countries and direct contact with 40 governments. He also spoke of his excellent personal contacts with governments of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Jordan, and said that those countries and others are interested in investing Petro Dollars in Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and ‘now Chile’.209

The US embassy also stated that “Barbieri appears to be still another of serios [sic] of right wing persons who have come to Chile in support of GOC. If he were able to offer what he says he can, he could be of considerable use to GOC.”210 Shortly after Barbieri’s visit, the Chilean Mining Ministry ‘announced the financing of a US$ 300 million ammonia-urea plant in Chile by a Swiss petro-dollar backed bank. At about the same time, the Arab League announced that it would open its main Latin American office in […]

208 Valente, R., (2009), Célula anticomunista atuou no Brasil durante a ditadura. 209 US Embassy in Santiago to Secretary State Washington DC, “Visit to Chile of Brazilian Anti- Communist”, Telegram 27 August 1975, limited official use, online, available at The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975SANTIA05854_b.html, [accessed 01/08/2013]. 210 Ibid.

351

Santiago.”211 In general, the relationships between Chile and the Middle East remained on good terms during 1974-1976, despite a number of sensitive issues which generated diplomatic tensions with some Arab nations, especially regarding issues concerning Israel and Palestine.212

Barbieri’s next destinations included the United States and Saudi Arabia. Upon his return to Sao Paulo he sent a communiqué to all the WACL’s chapters reporting on the details and outcomes of this important tour.213 In the US, the WACL’s president established valuable contacts for the forum, and especially its Latin American branch. He met with Roger Pearson214 “president of the Council of American Affairs, [and] director of [the newly established] North American Regional Organization of the WACL”. 215 The president developed new ties with members of the US Congress, mostly from the Republican Party. He also “gave conferences to a large number of Parliamentary Assistants and deepened the relationships established with Senator Jesse Helms, during WACL’s VIII congress”.216

That visit to the US helped to increase ties with “organizations concerned with the studies of the problems related to Communism, as well as the preservation of the American Values and freedom for humanity”. These organizations included the “Intercollegiate Studies Institute, the Sons of the

211 Sharif, R., (1977), "Latin America and the Arab-Israeli conflict", Journal of Palestine Studies, 7(1): 98-122, p. 118. 212 On the one hand, the junta voted against Israel at the UN regarding the Israeli occupation in Palestine. On the other hand, The Observer reported in 1977 that, in the mid-1970s, Pinochet did not ‘abandon his links with the Israeli government. The Israelis are understood to be supplying Chile with antitank weapons and Israeli technicians have reportedly gone to Chile to train the Chilean forces in using their Israeli-made weaponry. The Observer, in ibid. 213 World Anticommunist League (WACL), “Viaje del presidente de WACL a US”, circular 011/75 PWA, Sao Paulo, Septiembre 1975, R198-F2616, available at Terror Archive (CDYA), Asunción, Paraguay. 214 Pearson became President of the WACL in 1978. 215 World Anticommunist League (WACL), “Viaje del presidente de WACL a US”. 216 Among the senators and US congressmen contacted by Barbieri were Senators Strom Thurnmond and James McClure, the President of the Senate Steering Committee, Senator James Buckley, Congressmen Larry McDonald, Steve Symms, Samuel Stratton, David Staterfield, and other high ranking representatives of the North American people.

352

American Revolution, Freedom Studies Centre, and the American Security Council (ASC)”.217 Russ Bellant argues that the latter

[…] has been called ‘The Cold War Campus’ and ‘the Heart of the Military Industrial Complex’… Its boards [were] filled with retired senior military officers, executives of major corporations, including some of the largest military contractors, and some New Right leaders.218

The ties between the American Security Council and the WACL, particularly with the CAL, proliferated rapidly in the aftermath of Barbieri’s trip to the US. This relationship peaked in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The latter period escapes the time scope addressed by this chapter. However, it is necessary to point out that the relationship between the ASC and the CAL, and their joint activities, had devastating consequences in Central America, particularly for Nicaragua.219 According to Bellant, the “the ASC [was] the clearinghouse for [helping] the Contras [in Nicaragua], new weapons programs, and lobbying for special projects, such as aid to Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA in Angola.”220

The WACL president’s visit to the US also included an official meeting with Mr Jack Maury, Assistant of the US Defence Minister.221 In his communiqué the president reassured all WACL chapters that he used every single opportunity during that visit to emphasise the urgent “help needed by the captive nations... behind the , for the republics of China [i.e. Taiwan] and [South] Korea...for Chile, example of liberation from the Marxist yoke [and] for Saudi Arabia...”222 The new contacts with the US radical anticommunist milieu were important, particularly for the Latin American RLAR.

217 World Anticommunist League (WACL), “Viaje del presidente de WACL a US”. 218 Bellant, R., (1991), Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party, p. 30. 219 For further readings on the connections between these anticommunist organizations in the United States of America and the Nicaraguan Contras, see Byrne, M., P. Kornbluh and National Security Archive (U.S.), (1990), The Iran-Contra affair--the making of a scandal, 1983-1988, Washington, D.C., National Security Archive and Chadwyck-Healey. 220 Bellant, R., (1991), Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party, p. 30. 221 World Anticommunist League (WACL), “Viaje del presidente de WACL a US”. 222 Ibid.

353

The increased ties between the WACL and the US New Right demonstrate that there were dissenting voices within the Republican Party and the US anticommunists in general trying to undermine the government’s policy of détente. Barbieri’s trip also represents a concrete manifestation of that change of pace in the global anticommunist struggle. His tour was a direct response to the calls for further action made at the Rio Congress. The new president became directly responsible for leading WACL into that new proactive and more aggressive era. He set out the contacts and alliances that would transform the forum into an umbrella of organizations and death squads at the service of anticommunist Latin American regimes. Barbieri Filho established a new important bridge linking RLAR to their counterparts in other parts of the world, particularly the United States. At first, this bridge gave them a unique opportunity to help the South American dictatorships to mitigate the effects of the international isolation that came as a consequence of the regimes’ human right violations. From 1976, as Anderson and Anderson have shown, the most radical elements within the forum’s Latin American chapter evolved into an active civilian/paramilitary arm of the Cóndor regimes.223

These anticommunist fora, especially the RLAR, developed a strong anticommunist brotherhood and made an important contribution towards the radicalisation of the military repression in South America. The documents and resolutions discussed in this chapter add a new dimension to the Cóndor Plan that goes beyond the military/guerrilla conflict to include the contribution made by civilians to this repressive process, and their participation in it. The analysis of the various WACL and CAL congresses, their subsequent resolutions and internal documents confirm that these groups supported and urged these regimes to target specific social sectors and groups. These documents also help to explain why the repression and state terrorism reached such levels in the Southern Cone. Cóndor did not happen only because the armed forces wanted

223 For a detailed list of figures, groups and organizations under WACL’s umbrella between the mid-to-late 1970s, see “The League List”, in Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League, pp. 275-285.

354

to generate total paralysis and submission by means of creating an environment of fear. There were also sectors of society (small as they might have been) that called, supported and actively participated in the hunt for alleged communists. Especially in Latin America, these groups sought to cleanse a society, which according to them, had been infected by Marxism.

355

Conclusion

As General Augusto Pinochet celebrated his sixtieth birthday on 25 November 1975, five South American intelligence services initiated a secret meeting in Santiago, Chile. That gathering began to consolidate a distinct political and military direction for the region. A few days later, the participating delegations agreed to launch the Cóndor plan, a multilateral anticommunist alliance to transnationalize state terrorism within and beyond the Southern Cone of Latin America. Officially, these agencies formalized this multilateral effort to stop Marxist subversion in South America, especially to obliterate the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). That formalization, nonetheless, took place at a time when the leftist guerrillas had already been defeated or were in the process of resuming the political path.

The Cóndor alliance signified the final step in a long process of change for the armed forces in the region. An alliance of that magnitude and that level of cooperation would have been almost impossible to achieve just a decade earlier. Only the combination of exogenous and internal Southern Cone factors led these regimes and their respective military forces to, momentarily, set aside historical rivalries and engage with their neighbours. Since the nineteenth century, the relationship between these militaries had been characterised by distrust and deep antagonisms. Wars and territorial disputes between countries, and competing geopolitical ambitions left deep feelings of animosity, distrust and rivalry among them. These factors kept regional military collaboration to a bare minimum throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The onset of the Cold War, however, led to a number of significant structural and ideological changes that encouraged military cooperation between countries.

This process gained momentum in the 1960s, after the Cuban revolution forced the US government to re-think its foreign policy towards Latin America. Several decades of economic aid neglect by the United States played a considerable part in enhancing the effects of poverty and underdevelopment

356

throughout the entire continent. 1 As a consequence, the victory of Fidel Castro and Comandante Che Guevara in the Sierra Maestra inspired a generation of young Latin American leftists and prompted them into action. Frustrated with the social, political and economic situations in their countries, and the constant ideological divisions and factionalisms within the traditional Left, these groups began to explore new alternatives. The Cuban example quickly became a beacon to guide, inspire, and spread revolution from the Caribbean to Tierra del Fuego. These leftist groups turned towards direct action and armed struggle hoping to awaken the dormant masses and bring about political and economic change in their countries.

President John F. Kennedy and his government took US-Latin America relations in a new direction in an attempt to contain the potential revolutionary wave throughout the continent. His administration established the Alliance for Progress to strengthen democracy and encourage economic development. It also re-shaped the country’s National Security Doctrine (NSD) and exported it to Latin America. This doctrine sought to address the threat posed by so-called ‘internal enemies’. The latter concept referred to any political opposition or socially conscious person, as well as alleged communist subversive groups or sleeping cells living amongst these countries’ populations. US officials, NSD supporters and local elites believed that these groups would exploit the generalized social discontent caused by economic underdevelopment to reproduce the Cuban revolution.

That shift of attention from external to internal enemies directly affected the relationship between armed forces in the region. The US tailored training courses and created or expanded its training infrastructure in the Panama Canal Zone and on US soil to familiarize and indoctrinate Latin American armed forces with the new doctrine. These not only helped to spread the NSD and counterinsurgency training, but allowed the trainees to develop ties with their

1 This situation was further exacerbated by the exploitation of natural resources and the establishment of an international economic system controlled by the US and American corporations.

357

Latin counterparts. The US government used this entire infrastructure to spread its calls for more cooperation between regional military forces. Such strategic cooperation was vital to address the new threats emerging within the Latin American Cold War theatre. The appearance of leftist urban or rural armed groups, the social, political and economic difficulties in these countries and the popular discontent led the armed forces to understand that they shared potential common internal enemies. These external factors created an environment that encouraged cooperation between Latin American military forces. These factors alone, however, did not suffice to dissipate the animosity or distrust amongst them.

It took almost a decade and a series of internal developments inherent to each nation to complement those external factors for that cooperation to fully materialize. By the late 1960s, the Alliance for Progress had failed to produce the prosperity it promised. Paradoxically, Kennedy’s efforts, and those of his successors, resulted in an increased number of military dictatorships. Consequently, by the early 1970s almost the entire Southern Cone was under military rule. Despite important US political and financial backing, these anticommunist regimes faced a number of common internal challenges and crises that threatened their position of power and endangered their future plans. These threats, however, had little to do with leftist guerrillas and more to do with their countries’ economic situation and the de-legitimization of the regimes. With the exception of Paraguay, all the future Cóndor partners experienced considerable financial and political crises by the mid-seventies. By 1974, and despite a considerable influx of economic aid from the US government and other international financial institutions, the military regimes of Uruguay, Chile and Bolivia struggled to control their respective economies. In most countries inflation reached three-digit levels, unemployment continued to increase, and their economies stayed almost stagnant. The underperformance of these economic policies carried a number of potential dangers for these regimes. Their inability to solve financial difficulties, especially those affecting key social

358

sectors and elites, could result in the withdrawal of support for the military governments by those elites.

These dictatorships shared a common anticommunist bond and disliked politicians, even those who had been their strongest allies. The armed forces blamed the political elites for all the problems affecting their countries. The Uruguayan civic/military regime headed by President Juan M Bordaberry and the Chilean Junta of Augusto Pinochet banned all political parties immediately after they took power. The Bolivian regime followed suit the following year, after the demise of the FPN coalition. The proscription of all parties, including traditional centre-left political forces, and the indefinite suspension of election confirmed that these governments intended to stay in power for long periods of time.2 This, however, clashed with the interests of groups and figures who had initially supported the regimes, such as the Christian Democrats in Chile, prominent figures of the Colorado and Blanco parties in Uruguay, or members of the MNR and even the fascist Falange Party in Bolivia. Hence, the financial difficulties challenged the regimes’ economic credentials and the decision to ban political parties directly undermined their legitimacy and cost them a number of key allies. These internal problems, particularly those of an economic nature, led these regimes to set aside differences and rivalries with their neighbouring counterparts and increase cooperation to encourage economic development and regain support at home.

It was not easy to abandon the historical antagonisms and feelings of distrust. Yet, the South American dictators had to in order to survive. In their view there were two possible outcomes: unite and survive, or let these antagonisms prevail and divide them until these governments eventually perished due to the economic and political problems at home and the activities of their opponents abroad. In this context, the launch of the Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria (JCR) and the arrests of Amilcar Santucho and

2 The Argentine junta followed the same path immediately after it took over the country in March 1976.

359

Isaac Fuentes in early 1975 provided a smoke screen or excuse to intensify the hunt for opponents beyond their territorial boundaries. In theory, the JCR had the potential to ignite and reinvigorate revolutionary fervour throughout the region. In fact, however, that goal was overly ambitious as a myriad of deficiencies and practical problems plagued this organization’s development and prevented it from achieving that goal.

Although authors like John Dinges and Peter Kornbluh have discussed the JCR in their works, they underestimated the organization’s deficiencies. 3 On the other hand, authors in the opposite camp who have supported the military regimes4 completely ignore them altogether. This important omission has allowed regime supporters and critics of the JCR to portray the organization as a serious threat and justified the harsh repression conducted by the armed forces. This position has distorted the historical analysis of this organization and the identification of the reasons for the formalization of the Cóndor alliance.

By the mid-1970s, most of the guerrilla groups that formed the JCR had been defeated by the armed forces, or had received mortal blows to their infrastructure. Their defeat caused numerous problems and tensions among members and led to internal factionalism. The latter translated into the formation of several splinter groups. Some believed in the feasibility of armed struggle, while others opted to resume the political path and established new parties. The guerrilla groups that established the JCR also lacked the necessary resources to launch and sustain a continental revolution. While the JCR received international support for its propaganda infrastructure and political projects in Europe, it could not rally support for armed struggle. The 1974 trip

3 Dinges, J., (2004), The Condor years: how Pinochet and his allies brought terrorism to three continents, New York, New Press; Kornbluh, P., (2004), The Pinochet file : a declassified dossier on atrocity and accountability, New York, New Press. 4 Craviotto, W., (2005), Testimonios de una época: la verdadera historia jamás contada, Montevideo, Zonalibro; Márquez, N., (2004), La otra parte de la verdad: la respuesta a los que han ocultado y deformado la verdad histórica sobre la década del '70 y el terrorismo, Buenos Aires, N. Márquez; Márquez, N., (2006), La mentira oficial: el setentismo como política de Estado, Buenos Aires, [s.n.]; Márquez, N., (2008), El Vietnam argentino: la guerrilla marxista en Tucumán, Buenos Aires, N. Márquez.

360

conducted by the organization’s ambassador, Efraín Martínez Platero, to Cuba, Africa and Europe failed to collect substantial funds or arms. Many governments, including those of Cuba and Algeria, limited their support for the project to a bare minimum, mainly due to the Argentine Trotskyite PRT-ERP’s connections with the JCR.

At the core of the debate regarding the JCR’s level of threat is how much the armed forces knew about the internal situation and operational status of the groups that participated in it. The intelligence services that gathered on November 1975 were well aware of these organizations’ situation. Since the early 1970s, the future Cóndor partners had infiltrated these guerrilla organizations and collected vital information that allowed them to defeat these groups. That infiltration also allowed the security forces to produce an accurate assessment of the internal status of each organization and exploit their weaknesses. The intelligence services of the armed forces also shared that information with counterparts at various bilateral and multilateral intelligence meetings throughout the early 1970s. The military knew about the damage caused by internal divisions, as well as the new leaderships’ inexperience and their recurrent tactical mistakes. The organizations had also been debilitated by those members who collaborated with the armed forces (either voluntarily or after intense coercive interrogation sessions). Despite this knowledge, the South American militaries grossly exaggerated the threat posed by the JCR. The latter became a convenient excuse for the Cóndor member countries to join forces and launch a secret coordinated offensive against any kind of opposition, especially against key figures abroad involved in the denunciation of these dictatorships’ human rights violations.

The succession of military coups in the Southern Cone throughout the early-to-mid 1970s resulted in large numbers of exiles. The expulsion of leftist leaders and militants, and other moderate centre right politicians, allowed these dictatorships to get rid of potential local opponents and strengthen their grip on power. However, these governments underestimated two important factors: the

361

exiles’ ability to re-organize, and the support of the international community for their cause. In time, and despite numerous challenges, divisions and lack of resources, the exiles’ activities posed a greater threat to these dictatorships than the armed guerrilla groups. The exiles’ work increased the regimes’ international isolation, which exacerbated the effects of economic and political problems at home.

By November 1975 the struggle against the military governments had changed. The overwhelming repression within the Southern Cone and the inability to confront the armed forces militarily led the Latin American left, especially those leaders and militants in exile, to embrace different tactics. These parties and organizations shifted from a stated intent to institute socialism via armed and violent means or even through the ballot box, and instead focused on the denunciation of the regimes’ human rights violations. They also joined forces with centre right political figures and groups, which, prior to the military coups and in normal circumstances, were rivals. These alliances increased the international legitimacy of the exiles’ activities and shielded their campaigns from their opponents’ accusations of being a mere Marxist plot. By doing this the South American left hoped to discredit and ultimately cause the downfall of these regimes and establish a democratic transition in which it might be able to resume political activities and participate in elections. This tactical shift gained momentum in the mid-seventies and was abetted by the growing human rights movements in the developed countries, especially in the US.

The South American exiles, particularly those from Chile and Uruguay, organized immediately after their arrival in the host countries and resumed their political activities, developing influential networks of contacts. With support from labour and student movements, political parties, and other international grass root groups and human rights organizations, they efficiently challenged and undermined the regimes from abroad. This diaspora faced numerous challenges, especially financial problems and logistical deficiencies. They also experienced internal political divisions due to diverse views on how to conduct

362

peaceful resistance, or how to engage with the emerging global human rights movement. However, their levels of organization and militancy, combined with the support provided by an international community formed, predominantly by grass roots groups, political parties and other organizations interested in supporting the exiles, helped compensate for those shortfalls. Numerous Chilean exiles and their supporters, for instance, provided testimonies, organized marches, carried out activities to embarrass the military junta, published newsletters and reports, lobbied governments to discontinue diplomatic relations with the regime and, promoted economic boycotts of key Chilean exports such as wine and mineral products. They successfully applied pressure on the governments of Canada and Great Britain, to name only two, to stop numerous military contracts and loans to the Pinochet government. The Uruguayan exiles, especially those living in Argentina prior to the 1976 military coup, followed a similar path denouncing the Bordaberry regime’s human rights abuses. They established key contacts within the US Congress, collaborated with numerous international human rights organizations, presented their testimonies in front of various international organisms, including the UN, OAS, and ILO, actively participated with their Chilean, Brazilian and Bolivian counterparts in the Russell Tribunal II, and staged public demonstrations to condemn the crimes of the regime. Although much smaller than the Chilean and Uruguayan exile communities, the Bolivian and Paraguayan exiles also joined the peaceful resistance to the Banzer and Stroessner dictatorships and tapped into the global human rights movement to pressure these regimes.

Until 1976 a large number of exiles and political refugees stayed in Argentina. However, after the death of President Juan Perón on 1 July 1974, the country’s security situation deteriorated further, which compromised the safety of many leftist South American exiles. From 1974, the newly established parapolice/paramilitary Triple-A and its coordinated work with other groups linked to the Argentine security forces made these political refugees a high priority target. These far-right terrorist groups operated with impunity and direct support from high ranking officials of the Isabel Perón administration.

363

The groups linked to the Triple-A considered the presence of these leftist exiles from Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile and Paraguay as a potential threat to Argentina. They therefore conducted violent operations against them. These actions were carried out unilaterally or in conjunction with Argentine and other South American intelligence services seeking to save Argentina from the red menace.

The exiles’ ability to deliver their message globally isolated the regimes and eroded their international legitimacy. The numerous solidarity campaigns around the world and the global human right movement allowed the exiles to voice their grievances across Europe and in the United States. Their testimonies in front of Congressional hearings and other international organisms, along with the solidarity campaigns in numerous countries revealed and documented the regimes’ violent and repressive natures. These activities also led to reductions in financial assistance and cuts to military aid, and to the termination of training programs such as the USAID-OPS.

The South American anticommunist dictators, especially Pinochet, Bordaberry, Banzer and Stroessner, believed that they had made an important contribution to the Cold War effort. They claimed responsibility for containing and eradicating the threat posed by Marxism in the region. In private, Presidents Nixon and Ford, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger backed the regimes and undermined the Congressional hearings dealing with the issue of human rights violations in Latin America. However, this private support was not enough. As signatories of the Rio Pact and loyal partners in the Inter-American defence system led by the US, these regimes expected public recognition and support from their key ally to counter their critics. Instead, the US Congress repeatedly questioned their methods, condemned their disregard for the human rights of their citizens, and demanded that the Nixon and Ford administrations cut financial aid and avoid public support for these regimes.

Initially, these dictatorships resorted to different strategies to address the problems generated by the exiles’ campaigns. Primarily, they sought to boost their diplomatic credentials and image at home and abroad. For instance,

364

throughout 1974-1975, the Chilean junta launched a number of public relations campaigns in an attempt to restore its international credibility and improve its image, especially in the US. It also organized a ‘good will trip’ for its navy flag ship Esmeralda, which turned into a PR nightmare and further embarrassed the Pinochet government and the Chilean Navy. In addition, the junta’s intelligence apparatus stepped up the monitoring of the exile community across Europe. The Uruguayan security forces, on the other hand, increased their coercive activities in Argentina against political refugees, and the exile community in general. It also set out to disrupt the contacts between the latter and the US Congress by targeting prominent figures of the peaceful resistance and suspending their Uruguayan passports. To gain much needed local support, General Banzer played the nationalistic card opening a line of dialogue with Pinochet to solve the territorial disputes between Bolivia and Chile. The Stroessner regime, on the other hand, relied on a large network of spies and collaborators to infiltrate and control the exile community in Argentina. Without exception, all the regimes interpreted these political developments from a narrow Cold War perspective. They deliberately linked the South American exiles to an international Marxist plot to undermine their credibility.

Although the armed forces maintained an overwhelming military superiority over their opponents, the latter’s change of tactics presented numerous challenges for these dictatorships. The fight shifted away from the domestic urban or rural battlefields where the military forces had operated comfortably. The opposition moved to an international theatre where diplomacy, politics and wide information distribution became powerful and effective tools to undermine the legitimacy of these regimes. The new theatre bogged down and embarrassed these dictatorships. They struggled to adapt and respond effectively to their opponents outside an armed combat environment where they had the clear advantage. While the regimes attempted to use diplomacy and public relations individually to neutralize the bad international publicity generated by the solidarity campaigns, they failed. Therefore, these military governments joined their neighbouring counterparts to launch a

365

multilateral response. They formalized the Cóndor alliance to target the exile community and attempt to intimidate them and disrupt their ties with the transnational human rights networks. However, the regimes needed a motive that would allow them to initiate such an endeavour. They, therefore, exaggerated the threat posed by the JCR to justify their military response to their opponents, especially exiles campaigning against the regime.

The Cóndor plan, however, must not be interpreted as a desperate response by a group of rogue intelligence agencies. Such a view oversimplifies the complex environment in which this alliance came into existence, and pins the responsibility on a reduced number of actors. The transnationalisation of state terrorism beyond the Southern Cone of Latin America would not have been possible without some degree of support from non-military elements. The international isolation generated by the solidarity campaigns conducted by the exiles and their supporters pushed these military governments to set aside differences and cooperate with each other. That isolation also led these regimes to develop ties with like-minded anticommunist figures and groups across Latin America and the rest of the world.

Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s the global anticommunist movement experienced a number of major transformations. The most prominent anticommunist fora in Asia and Europe had united forces to establish the World Anticommunist League (WACL). The myriad groups and organizations that came under the latter’s umbrella responded bitterly to the politics of détente of the US government and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the widespread international campaigns against the South American anticommunist governments prompted the most radical elements of the Latin American Right (RLAR) into action. In the early 1970s, the latter joined the WACL and established the Latin American Anticommunist Confederation (CAL) as the WACL’s branch for the continent. From its creation, the CAL dedicated its entire infrastructure to cooperate with the military regimes, and became one of their most vocal advocates.

366

With that support, these global anticommunist fora and, especially the RLAR, made an important contribution to the radicalisation of military repression in South America. The internal documents, resolutions, and plans established at their various gatherings reveal that these groups supported violent repression and urged these regimes to target specific Latin American social sectors and groups. The RLAR’s activities in support of the anticommunist regimes in South America helped create the necessary environment where repression and state terrorism reached unprecedented levels. In other words, the violence and impunity of the crimes committed under the Cóndor banner did not happen only because of the fear inflicted by the armed forces and other thugs upon a paralysed and submissive population. There were also sectors of society (small as they might have been) closely associated with the RLAR that called, supported and actively participated in the hunt for alleged communists.

Nixon and Kissinger’s opening to Communist China, the sporadic negotiations with Cuba, and their engagement with the Soviet Union during the negotiation of the Helsinki Accord, generated a great deal of animosity and fear in the anticommunist world. The politics of détente drew the WACL, and particularly its Latin American branch, closer to the Latin American dictators. The US and Latin American armies also did their part to bolster multilateral cooperation between them in the successive meetings that took place in October and November 1975. However, these anticommunist fora had actively worked towards the consolidation of regional cooperation since 1972. These calls had intensified in 1974 at the WACL and CAL’s congresses and materialised the following year.

The CAL lobbied the US government to discontinue negotiations with Cuba, organized campaigns to support anticommunist dictatorships in Latin America, and worked to establish an anticommunist media network that would produce favourable publicity for the regimes. The forum also worked actively to eliminate the ‘red clergy’ from the Catholic Church. CAL chapters developed methods to purge alleged communists from trade unions and educational centres,

367

created black lists of Marxist militants and delivered them to the security forces. The CAL, through its Paraguayan chapter, arranged training in unconventional warfare for Latin American military personnel, government officials and civilians at the Taiwanese academy. The resolutions adopted at the various CAL conferences and congresses throughout 1972-1975 urged the military governments to step up repression against specific sectors of society, such as peasants, workers, and students. Prominent anticommunist far-right organizations associated with the CAL and WACL, such as Alpha 66, other Cuban anti-Castro organizations in Miami, and European fascist groups carried out terrorist operations on behalf of South American military governments. All these factors confirm that by the mid-seventies the RLAR and its global anticommunist partners had adopted a more proactive role. As the Australian League of Rights claimed, the “1975 World Anti-Communist League Congress paved the way for a major counter-offensive against the red advance”.5

The regimes, therefore, came together due to endogenous and exogenous factors that had little to do with the JCR or the threat posed by armed struggle. Several authors have confirmed that the US helped to put the regimes’ repressive infrastructure together. However, the formalization of the Cóndor alliance cannot be attributed to the US government’ geopolitical strategies for the continent alone. The regimes and, more importantly, their supporters share a great deal of responsibility. The civilian partners linked to the CAL and WACL and their anticommunist counteroffensive created the conditions that allowed Cóndor to fly high and far beyond South America to the US and Europe murdering opponents so as to shock the exiles and disrupt the solidarity campaigns. The kind of State terrorism implemented by these regimes at home sought to instil fear in the local population. The Cóndor plan was an attempt to use this tactic internationally, hoping that what worked at home could be made to work globally.

5 Australian League of Rights (A.L.O.R.), (1975), "World Anti-Communist League Conference prepares for Counter-Offensive against Red advance", Intelligence Survey, 25(6): 1-8, p. 8.

368

Primary sources

Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios Latinoamericanos-Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios Uruguayos (CEIL-CEIU), Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, Universidad de la República Uruguay

Carta al Comité Central (CC), “Denuncia contra Cuba”, 14 de Marzo 1975, in Colección David Cámpora, box: MLN-T Exterior, folder: Balances e Informes 1975 (1).

“Carta de Regis Debray al ELN de Bolivia”, file ELN Bolivia, in folder MLN-T Documentos Organizaciones Políticas (1).

“Cuba 1974”, in Colección David Cámpora, box: MLN-T Exterior, folder: Balances e Informes 1974 (1).

Documento de la Colonia Perdurit 2, Marzo, 1975, in Colección David Cámpora, box: MLN-T Exterior, folder: Balances e Informes 1975 (1).

“Documento de los Renunciantes”, 28/11/1974, in Colección David Cámpora, box: MLN-T Exterior, folder: Balances e Informes 1974 (2).

Mensaje Inti Peredo, “Volveremos a las montañas”, Julio 1968, file ELN Bolivia in folder MLN-T, Documentos Organizaciones Políticas (1).

Mensaje de Inti, Septiembre de 1969, file ELN Bolivia, in folder MLN-T Documentos Organizaciones Políticas (1).

Peredo, C., “Carta al MLN-Tupamaros”, file ELN Bolivia, in folder MLN-T Documentos Organizaciones Políticas (1).

--, “Conclusiones sobre la experiencia de Teoponte”, Diciembre 1970, file ELN Bolivia, in folder MLN-T Documentos Organizaciones Políticas (1).

369

CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD

Associated Press, “Many OAS nations ready to welcome Cuba”, Christian Science Monitor, 29 May 1974, in CIA “News, Views and Issues”, No. 7, 31 May 1974, available at CIA-RDP77-00432R000100330006-5, released 08/08/2001, [accessed 28/04/2009].

Binder David, “For Cuba, the O.A.S. is almost beside the point”, New York Times, 13 October 1972, available at CIA-RDP88-01315R000400130003-4, released 11/11/2006, [accessed 24/04/2009].

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “The status of Cuban subversion in Latin America”, No. 0545/75, 2 May 1975, available at CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070044-5, released 14/09/2000, [accessed 25/04/2009].

Centre for National Security Studies, “William Colby testimony before US Congress”, 13 September 1974, available at CIA-RDP88-01315R000200010008-7, released 17/05/2002, [accessed 04/05/2009].

CIA, “General Pinochet interviewed in human rights violations-Doc also mentions- Santi”, 11 March 1974, approved for release 27/09/1989, online, available at CREST/FOIA online http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_00000402 56.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2010].

--, “Latin America’s changing foreign relations”, Intelligence Memorandum, C145, No. 0783/75, Confidential, 29 December 1975, available at CIA- RDP86T00608R000300060028-4, released 17/05/2002, [accessed 10/03/2010].

--, “Quito: not just another conference”, Intelligence Memorandum, Secret, No. 1143/74, 4 November 1974, C. 120, available at CIA-RDP85T00353R000100110002-2, released 07/05/2002, [accessed 23/04/2009].

CIA-Directorate of Operations, “Army arrest/execution of MIR leader Vonschowen, Carabinero concerns of HR abuse”, Information Report [not finally evaluated intelligence], No. 2692-15-4, 31 January 1974, approved for release 11/06/1999,

370

available at CREST/FOIA online http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_00003450 55.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2010].

-- “Death of Miguel Enríquez, head of MIR”, Intelligence Information Cable, Information Report [not finally evaluated intelligence], 2974-316-4, 25 October 1974, approved for release 11/06/1999, available at CREST/FOIA online http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_00003450 97.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2010].

--, “Off Mil count of prisoners under detention as of 31 December 73”, Information Report [not finally evaluated intelligence], No. 2623-200-2, 11 January 1974, approved for release 11/06/1999, available at CREST/FOIA online, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_00003450 49.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2010]

--, “Attempts to locate General Secretary of the Socialist Party Altamirano & other Leftists”, Information Report [not finally evaluated intelligence], No. 2893-107-3, 20 August 1974, approved for release 11/06/1999, available at CREST/FOIA online http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_00003450 87.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2010].

CIA-Staff Notes, “Latin American Trends”, Secret, No. 0509/75, 14 May 1975, available at CIA- RDP79T00865A000900340002-5, released 08/08/2001, [accessed 29/04/2009].

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Latin American Trends”, Secret, No. 0529/75, C. No. 121, 1 October 1975, available at CIA-RDP79T00865A001900010002-0, released 08/08/2001, [accessed 24/04/2009].

-- “Latin American Trends – Staff Notes”, C 145, Secret, No. 0537/75, November 26, 1975, available at CIA-RDP86T00608R000300120052-0, released 17/05/2002, [accessed 04/05/2009].

-- “Latin American Trends”, Secret, December 17 1975, available at CIA- RDP79T00865A002300400002-2, released 04/09/2002, [accessed 24/04/2009].

371

CIA, “Aspects of the situation in Chile”, Secret, No. 1030/74, March 21, 1974, available at CIA-RDP85T00353R000100030005-8, released 07/05/2002, [accessed 29/04/2009].

--, “Chile: prisoner release program underway”, Latin American Trends, Secret, 25 September 1974, approved for release 11/06/1999, available at CREST/FOIA online http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_00003439 85.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2010].

--“Bolivia: Banzer and the politics of instability”, Intelligence Memorandum, No. 1035/74, May 28, 1974, available at: CIA-RDP85T00353R000100050009-2, released 09/05/2002, [accessed 24/04/2009].

-- “Weekly Review special report: Brazil’s changing foreign policy”, Secret, 23 August 1974, No. 636, available at CIA-RDP85T00875R001500070004-1, released 25/09/1999, [accessed 24/04/2009].

CIA: Directorate of Intelligence, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Secret, No. 50, 22 July 1970, available at CIA- RDP79T00975A016700100001-5, released 11/06/2003, [accessed 29/04/2009].

-- “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Secret, 16 July 1971, No. 041, available at CIA- RDP79T000975A019500080001-7, released 19/05/2003, [accessed 26/04/2009].

--, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 268, 17 July 1971, available at CIA- RDP79T00975A022300090001-4, released 25/06/2003, [accessed 29/04/2009].

--, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Secret, No. 42, 22 July 1971, available at CIA- RDP79T00975A019600020001-2, released 18/03/2004, [accessed 29/04/2009].

-- “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Secret, No. 042, 4 December 1971, available at CIA- RDP79T00975A020600070001-5, released 21/08/2003, [accessed 29/04/2009].

--, “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, 28 February 1972, C 197, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A021300040002-9, released 21/05/2003, [accessed 27/04/2009].

-- “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Secret, 31 October 1972, No. 41, available at CIA- RDP79T00975A023100030001-1, released 22/10/2003, [accessed 27/04/2009].

372

-- “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Secret, No. 40, 15 June 1973, available at CIA- RDP79T00975A024700130001-3, released 27/08/2003, [accessed 29/04/2009].

-- “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 21 July 1973, available at CIA- RDP79T00975A024900060001-9, released 01/06/2005, [accessed 04/05/2009].

-- “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C-264, 30 August 1973, available at CIA- RDP79T00975A025100130001-8, released 08/07/2003, [accessed 29/04/2009].

-- “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 13 September 1973, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A0252000100001-0, released 20/01/2003, [accessed 04/05/2009].

-- “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 14 September 1973, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A0252000110001-9, released 15/01/2004, [accessed 04/05/2009].

-- “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 15 September 1973, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A025200120001-8, released 15/01/2004, [accessed 04/05/2009].

-- “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, C 204, 17 September 1973, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A025200130001-7, released 15/01/2004, [accessed 04/05/2009].

-- “Central Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, 19 January 1974, C 289, available at CIA- RDP79T00975A026000120001-9, released 08/07/2004, [accessed 27/04/2009].

CIA: Office of National Estimates, “Argentina: Perón returns”, Secret, Memorandum, 2 August 1973, available at CIA- RDP85T00875R2000120042-7, released 08/02/2007, [accessed 29/04/2009].

Goosdell James Nelson, “Cuba-US hijacking accord near”, The Christian Science Monitor, 8 December 1972, available at CIA-RDP77-0043R000100030001-3, released 07/08/2001, [accessed 26/04/2009].

National Intelligence Office-NIO/Chief, Central America Caribbean Branch, “The limits of Cuban subversion in Latin America”, Memorandum, 28 August 1974, available at CIA-RDP79B01737A0021100110001-6, released 04/03/2001, [accessed 24/04/2009].

United States Intelligence Board (USIB), “National Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, No. 631, 29 June 1974, available at CIA-RDP79T00975A026700010020-3, released 01/06/2005, [accessed 29/04/2009].

373

-- “National Intelligence Bulletin”, Top Secret, No. 6662, 24 July 1974, available at CIA- RDP79T00975A027900010040-8, released 14/06/2007, [accessed 29/04/2009].

Sec. State WASHDC to AMEMBASSY Santiago, “Senate resolution on aid to Chile”, Telegram, 04 October 1973, available at CIA-RDP75B00380R000600170031-8, released 30/08/2001, [accessed 04/05/2009].

Wise David, “Covert operations abroad: an overview”, 9/12/74, available at CIA-RDP88- 01315R000200030007-6, released 17/05/2002, [accessed 04/05/2009].

Documents Uruguayan Foreign Relations Ministry’s Archive, Montevideo, Uruguay

Ambassador Roberto González Casal to Minister Juan Carlos Blanco, Memorandum No. C-877/75, 6 November 1975, in Folder 6 “CEA Conferencia de Ejércitos Americanos en Montevideo 21/10/75”, Box 33: “Uruguayan Embassy in Santiago, Chile.”

Departamento de Integración Económica, “Declaración conjunta formulada por los señores Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de Uruguay y Bolivia, Doctor Juan Carlos Blanco y General Alberto Guzmán Soriano, Respectivamente”, Documento Informativo No. 2, Montevideo, Marzo de 1975, in Folder 24 “Uruguay-Bolivia”, Box 32: “Embajada de Uruguay en Chile”.

-- “Declaración conjunta de los Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de la República del Uruguay y de la República de Bolivia, Doctor Juan Carlos Blanco y General Alberto Guzmán Soriano, respectivamente, formulada en la Paz, el 10 de Agosto de 1974”, Documento Informativo No. 2.1. Montevideo, Marzo 1975, in Folder 24 “Uruguay- Bolivia”, Box 32: “Embajada de Uruguay en Chile”.

Diplomacia para URUBAIRES, Telex Cifrado Abril 4, 1975, in Box 2: 9-21, File H12-4 1975, [accessed 20/09/2012].

Secretario Agustín Ortega para Director General, Coronel (PAM) Walther Machado, Telex, URUBAIRES, Abril 3/1975, H12-4, in Box 2:9-21, File 1-1975: Confidenciales Telexes recibidos 1975, [accessed 20/09/2012].

374

URUBAIRES, “Zelmar Michelini”, Abril 23, 1975, in Box 2: 9-21, File H12-4 1975, [accessed 20/09/2012].

Villaverde, J. C., “Ejércitos-Principal Diurno”, Document L17, in Folder 6 “CEA Conferencia de Ejércitos Americanos en Montevideo, 21/10/75”, Box 33: “Uruguayan Embassy in Santiago, Chile”.

--, “Ejércitos-Principal Nocturno”, Document L202, in Folder 6 “CEA Conferencia de Ejércitos Americanos en Montevideo, 21/10/75”, Box 33: “Uruguayan Embassy in Santiago, Chile”.

--, Document L203, in Folder 6 “CEA Conferencia de Ejércitos Americanos en Montevideo, 21/10/75”, Box 33: “Uruguayan Embassy in Santiago, Chile”.

Documents National Archives (NARA) College Park, Maryland

AID-OPS, “Termination phase-out study public safety project – Bolivia”, Washington DC, May 1974, in RG 286: Records of the AID 1961- Office of Public Safety/Office of the Director/Programs Surveys and Evaluations 1959-1974 (Argentina-Ceylon)/Box 1 (NND 9053511; Bolivia File).

Frank Ortiz to AID/W, “Public Safety Report March 1973”, Airgram 13 April 1973, Message A-32, in Record 286/Records of the Agency for International Development 1961- (NND 911800), Office of public safety/office of the director/ General Records 1957-74/ 8-G Venezuela Uruguay Box 4; File Uruguay Monthly Reports July 1972-April 1974.

--, “Public Safety Report June 1973”, Airgram 20 July 1973, Message A-67, in Office of Public Safety/office of the director/ General Records 1957-74/ 8-G Venezuela Uruguay Box 4; File Uruguay Monthly Reports July 1972-April 1974.

Charles Adair to State Department, “Political platform of the ‘Frente Amplio’, AIRGRAM 23 March 1971, Montevideo, in RG 286: Records of the AID 1961- Office of Public Safety/Latin American Branch/Country file Uruguay 1956-1974 Box 109 (NND 937601); File IPS – 2 General Information/Uruguay.

375

USAID-OPS Montevideo to AID/W, “Public Safety Report October 1971”, AIRGRAM 17 November 1971, Montevideo, A-155, in RG 286: Records of the AID 1961- Office of Public Safety/Latin American Branch/Country file Uruguay IPS 2-1 to IPS 2-3 1964 to 1974 Box 110 (NND 937601); File IPS 2-2 /Monthly Reports/Uruguay 1968-1971.

-- “Public Safety Report February 1972”, AIRGRAM 14 March 1972, Montevideo, A-25, in RG 286: Records of the AID 1961- Office of Public Safety/Latin American Branch/Country file Uruguay IPS 2-1 to IPS 2-3 1964 to 1974 Box 110 (NND 937601), File IPS 2-2 /Monthly Reports/Uruguay 1972.

-- “Public Safety Report March 1972”, AIRGRAM 14 April 1972, Montevideo, A-35, in RG 286: Records of the AID 1961- Office of Public Safety/Latin American Branch/Country file Uruguay IPS 2-1 to IPS 2-3 1964 to 1974 Box 110 (NND 937601); File IPS 2-2 /Monthly Reports/Uruguay 1972.

Documents National Security Archive (NSA), (George Washington University, Washington DC)

Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box III, Tucumán File.

Directiva del Comandante General del Ejército Nro. 404/75 (Lucha contra la subversion), in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box II.

File “6/15/06” FOIA “Desarrollo de la lucha contra el terrorismo”, in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box II.

Harry W. Shlaudeman – to – The Secretary of State, “ARA Monthly Report (July): The ‘Third World War’ and South America’, Unclassified, Department of State, Washington DC, 3 August 1976, [Argentina Project: S200000044- Box 4859-80D177].

Interview with Gen Ricardo Flouret in May 1985, in Argentina Dirty War Collection- Gugliota Donation – Box III, Tucumán File.

Interview with Mario Lucio Rodríguez, Secretary General of the sugar workers union in San José [after 1980], in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box III, Tucumán File.

376

Lt. Col. Ramírez (chief of intelligence destacamento), “Intelligence Report” [no date], in Argentina Dirty War Collection-Gugliota Donation – Box II.

US Ambassador Lodge to State Department, “Uruguayan Situation”, Secret Telegram 27/08/1971, Buenos Aires, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB71/doc4.pdf , in National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 71, [accessed 27/03/20109].

FOIA Documents Chile Declassification Project

Anonymous to FBI, “Ignacio Novo Sampol”, report, 1979/07/16, Collection FBI Chile Declassification Project Tranche II, online, available at http://foia.state.gov/Search/results.aspx?searchText=ignacio+Novo+Sampol&beginDate= 19790716&endDate=19790716&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumb er=, [accessed 13/12/2013].

Documents State Department Wikileaks

US Embassy Brasilia to US Embassy Santiago, “Visit to Chile of Brazilian Anti- Communist”, Telegram 3 September 1975, Confidential, online available at The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975BRASIL07678_b.html, [accessed 31/07/2013].

US Embassy in Santiago to Secretary State Washington DC, “Visit to Chile of Brazilian Anti-Communist”, Telegram 27 August 1975, limited official use, online, available at The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975SANTIA05854_b.html, [accessed 01/08/2013].

Documents Centro de Información y Archivo (CDYA) Paraguay

Capitulo Brasileño de la WACL, “Proposición del capítulo Brasileño de la Liga Mundial Anticomunista al VII Congreso de la misma en Washington, D.C.”, 1974, Washington D.C., R108-F1433.

377

Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Estatutos: disposiciones relativas a los miembros”, México, 29 de Agosto 1972, R108F1551-1565.

Confederación Anti-Comunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Leyes fundamentales de la CAL: carta de principios”, México, 29 de Agosto 1972, R108-F1543-1550.

--, “Primer documento básico para delegados al Tercer Congreso de la CAL”, Guadalajara, México, 1973, R108F1760-1762.

“Congreso Coordinador CAL”, R108F1463.

Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana (CAL), “Programa y agenda para la reunión del Consejo Coordinador de la Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamericana (CAL), del 10 al 12 de Julio de 1974”, Guadalajara, México, R108F1720-1731.

--, “Secretaría contra la subversión en universidades y escuelas”, 1974, R108F1459-1460.

--, “Secretaría contra la subversión del clero rojo”, 1974, R108F1448.

--, “Síntesis de acuerdos para los miembros del Consejo Coordinador”, 1974, R108F1447.

Federación Mexicana Anticomunista (FEMACO), “Proyecto para fundar una ‘Agencia de Comunicación Internacional (ACI)”, Guadalajara, México, 1973, R108F1720-1726.

Pastor Coronel to Gral Francisco Britez, Letter (no date), Asunción, Paraguay, Doc. No. 0246F0370, in Box documentos recuperados, File Dpto. VII.

Raimundo Guerrero, “FEMACO, sujeta a la aprobación del VII Congreso de la WACL en Washington DC las siguientes resoluciones”, Guadalajara, México, 2 de Marzo de 1974, R108-F1406.

Raimundo Guerrero-Liga Mundial Anticomunista (WACL), “Re: Elecciones parlamentarias en Chile”, Memorandum, 21 de Febrero 1973, R198-F2587.

WACL, Circular No. 10, Marzo 19, 1973, Series 1972-1973, R198-F2591.

WACL, Circular No. 12, 5 de Octubre 1973, RE: letter Nixon-Pinochet, R198-F2595.

World Anticommunist League (WACL), “Viaje del presidente de WACL a US”, circular 011/75 PWA, Sao Paulo, Septiembre 1975, R198-F2616.

378

Bibliography

(1973), "Cuba-United States: Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offenses", The American Journal of International Law, 67(3): 619-620. (1974), "Helsinki consultations text of the Conference Communique", The American Journal of International Law, 68(1): 181-193. (1975), Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe - Final Act. Helsinki, Finland Hellenic Resources Network HR-Net, online, available at http://www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html, [accessed 20/10/2011]. (1976), "Latin America", The Military Balance, 76(1): 62-69. (1976), Los Comunistas si creen en el Comunismo, El Nacionalista (órgano oficial del Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano-MNC), New Jersey, Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano. (2005), Raúl Sendic: Tupamaro 1925-1989, [DVD], Director Figueroa, A., Montevideo, Buen Cine Producciones. (2007), My enemy's enemy, dir. MacDonald, K., Belgium, The Weinsteing Company: 87 Mins [DVD]. (2009), Acusado. Miguel Sofía, empresario periodístico, es uno de los acusados: pidieron cuatro procesamientos por crimenes de "Escuadron de La Muerte", 17 Abril, La República, Montevideo, 4Pixels, online, available at http://www.lr21.com.uy/politica/360501-pidieron-cuatro-procesamientos-por-crimenes- de-escuadron-de-la-muerte, [accessed 10/10/2009]. (2010), Nixon pidió a Pacheco que mataran a Sendic si Mitirone era ejecutado, La República, Montevideo 4pixels, online, available at http://www.larepublica.com.uy/politica/420170-nixon-pidio-a-pacheco-que-mataran-a- sendic-si-mitrione-era-ejecutado, [accessed 1/09/2010]. (2013), Argentine dictatorship human rights case involving Mercedes Benz reaches US Supreme Court, MercoPress, 15/05/2013, Montevideo, South Atlantic News Agency, online, available at http://en.mercopress.com/2013/10/15/argentine-dictatorship-human- rights-case-involving-mercedes-benz-reaches-us-supreme-court, [accessed 19/10/2013]. (2013), "Kissinger and Chile: the declassified record", Kornbluh, P. editor, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing No. 437, online, available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB437/, [accessed 26/122013] (2013), ¿Qué dice la carta de Amodio Pérez?, La República, Montevideo, 4Pixels, online, available at http://www.lr21.com.uy/politica/1097881-que-dice-la-carta-de-amodio- Pérez, [accessed, 4/05/2013]. (2013), William D. Rogers, Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia, online, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_D._Rogers, [accessed 21/09/2011].

379

Agee, P., (1975), Inside the Company: C.I.A. diary, Harmonsworth, England, Penguin Books. Aguilar, L., (1968), Marxism in Latin America, New York, Alfred-A-Knopf. Aldrighi, C., (2001), La Izquierda armada: ideología, ética e identidad en el M.L.N.- Tupamaros, Montevideo, Ediciones Trilce. --, (2007), La intervención de Estados Unidos en Uruguay (1965-1973): el caso Mitrione, Montevideo, Trilce. --, (2009), Memorias de la insurgencia: historias de vida y militancia en el M.L.N.- Tupamaros 1965-1975, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental. Alexander, R., (1969), Communism in Latin America, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press. --, (1982), Bolivia: past, present and future of its politics, New York, Praeger. Alianza Estudiantil Prometeo (A.E.P), (2004), "El Legado de Hitler", online, available at http://www.legado-de-hitler.blogspot.com/ 2011, [accessed 02/09/2011]. Alpha 66, (2005), "Our History: Cuban freedom fighters in quest of the liberation of our homeland ", online, available at http://www.walterlippmann.com/docs549.html, [accessed 03/11/2011]. Amnesty International, (1974), Annual Report 1973/74, London, Amnesty International. --, (1975), Annual Report 1974/75, London, Amnesty International. Anderson, S. and J. L. Anderson, (1986), Inside the League: the shocking expose of how terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American death squads have infiltrated the World Anti- Communist League, New York, Dodd Mead. Aparicio, F., R. García and M. Terra, (2013), Espionaje y política: Guerra Fría, inteligencia policial y anticomunismo en el Sur de América Latina 1947-1961, Montevideo, Ediciones B. Arboleya J., (2000), The Cuban counterrevolution, Ohio, Centre for International Studies Ohio University. Arce, L., (2004), The inferno: a story of terror and survival in Chile, Wisconsin, The University of Wisconsin Press. Archive, T. N. S., (2006), "On 30th anniversary of Argentine coup new declassified details on repression and U.S. support for military dictatorship", online, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB185/index.htm#19760326, [accessed 23/07/2011]. Arismendi, R, (1962), Problemas de una revolución continental, Montevideo, Pueblos Unidos. --, (1967), América Latina: campo de lucha o base de agresión, Montevideo, Comisión Nacional de Propaganda del Partido Comunista.

380

--, (1968), Conversación con los jóvenes: algunos temas en debate acerca de nuestra revolución, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Comisión de Propaganda del Partido Comunista. --, (1969), Insurgencia juvenil, Montevideo, Ediciones Pueblos Unidos. Assmann, H., (1971), Teoponte: una experiencia guerrillera, Oruro, Bolivia, CEDI. Australian League of Rights (A.L.O.R.), (1975), "Special report on World Anti- Communist League Conference", On Target, 11(27), online, available at http://www.alor.org/Volume11/Vol11No27.htm, [accessed on 24/10/2011]. --, (1975), "The bell tolls in Asia", Intelligence Survey, 25(4): 1-8. --, (1975), "World Anti-Communist League Conference prepares for Counter-Offensive against Red advance", Intelligence Survey, 25(6): 1-8. --, (1975), "The Helsinki surrender", On Target, 11(28), online, available at: http://www.alor.org/Volume11/Vol11No28.htm#1a, [accessed 03/11/2011]. Baird, J., (2007), After the coup: the trade union delegation to Chile, in (2007), Vintage reds: more stories of rank and file organising, Sydney, roughreds.com, online, available at http://roughreds.com/twopdf/baird.pdf, [accessed 20/09/2013]. Bandeira, L. A. M., (2006), "Brazil as a regional Power and its relations with the United States", Latin American Perspectives, 33(3): 12-27. Bardach, A. L., (2002), Cuba confidential: love and vengeance in Miami and Havana, New York, Random House. Bareirosaguier, R., (1988), "The Stroessner era in Paraguay ", Historia, (496): 72-82. Bayefsky, A. F., L. Alexeyeva, M. M. Kampelman, M. Tabory, J. J. Maresca and A. H. Henkin, (1990), "Human Rights: the Helsinki process", Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 84(March 28-31): 113-130. Bayley, M. A., (2007), Un pueblo en lucha contra el fascismo: Frente Amplio - uno solo dentro y fuera de Uruguay en la resistencia a la dictadura, Montevideo, Ediciones Cauce. Bellant, R., (1991), Old Nazis, the New Right, and the Republican Party, Boston, Ma, South End Press. Benítez, M., (2004), “El Escuadrón”, Montevideo, CX36 Radio Centenario, online, available at http://www.radio36.com.uy/entrevistas/2004/07/310704_dcumento_9.htm, [accessed 20/07/2008]. Berger, M., (1983), Historia de la logia Masónica P-2, Buenos Aires, El Cid Editor- Fundación para la Democracia en Argentina. Bienfait, H. F. and W. E. A. v. Beek, (2001), "Right and Left as political categories. An exercise in "Not-so-Primitive" classification", Anthropos, 96(1): 169-178. Blixen, S., (1988), Treinta años de lucha popular: conversaciones con Gorriarán Merlo Montevideo Editorial Contrapunto. --, (1998), Operación Cóndor: del Archivo del Terror y el asesinato de Letelier al caso Berríos, Barcelona, Virus Editorial.

381

--, (2005), Sendic, Montevideo, Ediciones Trilce. Boccia Paz, A., (1997), La década inconclusa: historia real de la O.P.M., Asunción, El Lector. Bologna, M., (2004), Los Verdugos Latinoamericanos-Las Fuerzas Armadas: de la Contrainsurgencia a la globalización, Civilización o Barbarie: Encuentro internacional “Desafíos y problemas del mundo contemporáneo”, Serpa, Portugal, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina. Bonilla, H., (1979), "La dimensión internacional de la Guerra del Pacífico", Desarrollo Económico, 19(73): 79-92. Broquetas, M., (2012), "Los frentes del anticomunismo: las derechas en el Uruguay de los tempranos sesenta", Contemporáñea: Historia y problemas del siglo XX, año 3, Vol. 3, (Dossier: Los caminos del autoritarismo en la segunda mitad del siglo XX en la América Latina). Bullentini, A., (2013), Los ex gerentes procesados, Página 12, 22 Mayo 2013, Buenos Aires, online, available at http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-220551-2013-05- 22.html, [accessed 24/05/2013]. Byrne, M., P. Kornbluh and National Security Archive (U.S.), (1990), The Iran-Contra affair--the making of a scandal, 1983-1988, Washington, D.C., National Security Archive and Chadwyck-Healey. C.M.C., (1942), "Latin America and the War II", Bulletin of International News, 19(14): 597-605. Caillabet, C., (2008), "14 de abril de 1972: una fecha de plomo", online, available at http://memoriaviva5.blogspot.com/2008/08/14-de-abril-de-1972.html, [accessed 21/09/2009]. Calloni, S., (1999), Los años del lobo: Operación Cóndor, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Continente: Peña Lillo. --, (2001), Operación Cóndor: pacto criminal, México, La Jornada. Calvert, P., (1989), "Argentina: the primacy of Geopolitics", The World Today, 45(2): 33-36. Camacho, F., (2006), "Los asilados de las Embajadas de Europa Occidental en Chile tras el golpe militar y sus consecuencias diplomáticas: el caso de Suecia", Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe/European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, (81): 21-41. Campos, J. H., 2nd, (2005), The state, terrorism, and national security discourse: forging the state in a time of terror, in the face of fear, Ph.D., University of Hawaii. Cardozo Prieto, M, (2011), "Era otro mundo, ¿o no? ", Amerika, (5), online, available at http://amerika.revues.org/2736#quotation, [accessed 21/09/2012]. Carmona, E., (2010), "Teoponte, la otra guerrilla guevarista en Bolivia", online, available at: http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=39799, [accessed 9/11/2010].

382

Carranza, M. E., (1978), Fuerzas armadas y estado de excepción en América Latina, México, Siglo Veintiuno Editores. Cartagena, J. T., (2010), A 40 años de la guerrilla de Teoponte, Los Tiempos.com, Bolivia, Editorial Canales, online, available at http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/nacional/20100718/a-40-anos-de-la- guerrilla-de-teoponte_80984_153516.html, [accessed, 28/11/2010]. Castañeda, J., (1994), Utopia unarmed: the Latin American Left after the Cold War, New York, Vintage Books. --, (1998), Compañero: life and death of Che Guevara, New York, Vintage. Catholic Church, Archdiocese of São Paulo (Brazil) and J. Dassin, (1986), Torture in Brazil: a report, New York, Vintage Books. Cavallo Castro, A., M. Salazar Salvo and O. Sépulveda Pacheco, (1990), La historia oculta el régimen Militar: Chile 1973-1988, Santiago de Chile, Editorial Antártica. C.E.I.L.-C.E.I.U., "Cronología ampliada", [unpublished], Montevideo, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias-UDELAR. Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (C.E.L.S.), (2007), "C.E.L.S. Juicios: crimenes del terrorismo de estado-weblogs de las causas", online, available at http://www.cels.org.ar/wpblogs/ingles, [accessed 16/08/2011]. Centro de Estudios Miguel Enríquez, (2009), Fuentes Alarcón, Jorge Isaac, Archivo Chile: historia político social-movimento popular, Santiago, Chile, CEME, online, available at http://www.archivochile.com/Memorial/caidos_mir/F/fuentes_alarcon_jorge.pdf, [accessed, 17/01/2010]. Child, J., (1979), "Geopolitical thinking in Latin America", Latin American Research Review, 14(2): 89-111. --, (1983), "The American Southern Cone: geopolitics and conflict", Proceedings of the conference of Latin Americanist Geographers, 9: 200-213. Clarridge, D. R. and D. Diehl, (1997), A spy for all seasons: my life in the CIA, New York, Scribner. Cmiel, K., (1999), "The emergence of human rights politics in the United States", The Journal of American History, 86(3): 1231-1250. Coady, C. A. J., (2004), "Terrorism and innocence", The Journal of Ethics, 8(1): 37-58. Coatsworth, J., A. Fishlow, R. Kaufman, M. Muse, R. Rennie, R. Roett, T. Skidmore, P. Sigmund, C. Smith, A. Stepan and N. Truitt, (2004), Kenneth Maxwell: letter to the editor, Foreign Affairs, 83(2): 187. Coggiola, O., (1986), El Trotskismo en la Argentina (1960-1985), Buenos Aires, Biblioteca Política Argentina. Colectivo Taller de Reflexión, (1991), Informe Rettig y Fuerzas Armadas, Santiago, Chile, PAS, Taller de Reflexión.

383

Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos, (1999), Nunca más en Chile: síntesis corregida y actualizada del informe Rettig, Santiago de Chile, LOM Ediciones: Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos-Fundación Ideas. Comisión de Verdad y Justicia (C. D. V. Y. J), (2008), Informe final: síntesis y caracterización del régimen, Asunción, Editora J. C. Medina, Vol 1, part II. --, (2008), Informe Final: las principales violaciones de derechos humanos, Asunción, Editora J.C. Medina, Vol. 2. -- (2008), Informe Final: las responsabilidades en las violaciones de derechos humanos, Asunción, Paraguay, Editorial J.C. Medina, Vol 6. Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, C., P. Berryman and University of Notre Dame-Centre for Civil and Human Rights, (1993), Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, Notre Dame, Published in Cooperation with the Center for Civil and Human Rights, Notre Dame Law School, by the University of Notre Dame Press. Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas (C.O.N.A.D.E.P), (1984), Nunca Más, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Editorial E.U.D.E.B.A, online, available at http://www.desaparecidos.org/arg/conadep/nuncamas/indice.html, [accessed 19/07/2011]. Conaghan, C. M., J. M. Malloy and L. A. Abugattas, (1990), "Business and the "boys": the politics of neoliberalism in the Central Andes", Latin American Research Review, 25(2): 3-30. Corbell, C., (1972), "Military institutional development and sociopolitical change: the Bolivian case", Journal of International Studies and World Affairs, 14(4): 339-435. Cores, H., (2002), Memorias de la resistencia, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental. Correa, R. and E. Subercaseaux, (1990), Ego Zum: Pinochet, Santiago, Chile, Zig Zag S.A. Craviotto, W., (2005), Testimonios de una época: la verdadera historia jamás contada, Montevideo, Zonalibro. Da Rosa, J. E., (1983), "Economics, politics, and hydroelectric power: the Paraná river basin", Latin American Research Review, 18(3): 77-107. Daniel, J., (1976), "The Peronist Left, 1955-1977", Journal of Latin American Studies, 8(2): 273-296. Davis, W. C., (1995), Warnings from the far south: democracy versus dictatorship in Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile, Westport, Connecticut, Praeger. De Santis, D., (1998), A vencer o morir: P.R.T-E.R.P docuemtnos Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, Universidad de Buenos Aires. --, (2000), A vencer o morir: P.R.T-E.R.P. documentos, Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, Vol. 2. --, (2009), Entre Tupas y Perros: un debate con Eleuterio Fernández Huidobro y Luis Mattini sobre Tupamaros y el P.R.T-E.R.P., Buenos Aires, Ediciones RyR.

384

Delgado, Á., (2004), El ejército de Dios: nuevas revelaciones sobre la extrema derecha en México, México, D.F., Plaza & Janes. Department of the Army, (1962), F.M: 33-5 Psychological Warfare, Washington DC, USG Printing Office. Derechos, H. R., (2008), "S.O.A. students and instructors from Uruguay 1949 - 1996", online, available at http://www.derechos.org/soa/uy4996.html, [accessed 15/08/2008]. Deutschmann, D., (2008), Che: a memoir by Fidel Castro, Melbourne, Ocean press. Di Fonzo, L., (1983), St. Peter's Banker, New York, Mainstream Publishing Company (Edimburgh) Ltd. Dinges, J., (2000), "The dubious document (brief article)", Columbia Journalism Review, 38(5): 10. --, (2004), The Condor years: how Pinochet and his allies brought terrorism to three continents, New York, New Press. Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (D.I.N.A.), (1975), Primera reunión de trabajo de inteligencia nacional Santiago, Chile, D.I.N.A. Dos Santos, T., (1980), Imperialismo y dependencia, México, Ediciones Era. Douglas, A., (2005), "Italy's Black Prince: terror war against the Nation-State", Executive Intelligence Review, 32(5), online, available at http://www.larouchepub.com/other/2005/3205_italy_black_prince.html, [accessed on 15/10/2013]. Douglas, M. and S. Abruzzese, (2007), William D. Rogers is dead at 80; planned U.S. policy in Latin America, The New York Times, New York, The New York Times Company, online, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/30/us/30rogers.html?_r=0, [accessed 22/10/2014]. Dutrénit Bielous, S., (1998), "La diáspora uruguaya y la historia nacional." Cuadernos de Marcha, XII(136). Dutrénit Bielous, S. (2006). El Uruguay del exilio: gente, circunstancias, escenarios. Montevideo, Trilce. Dutrénit Bielous, S., and G. Rodríguez de Ita, (2000), Tras la memoria: el asilo diplomático en tiempos de la Operación Cóndor, México, Instituto de Investigaciones Dr José María Luis Mora & Instituto de Cultura de la Ciudad de México-Gobierno del Distrito Federal. El mostrador, (2013), "Documentos secretos revelan que Brasil financió al régimen de Pinochet", online, available at http://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2013/03/05/documentos-secretos-revelan-que- brasil-financio-al-regimen-de-pinochet/, [accessed, 07/03/2013]. F. A. S. Intelligence Resource Program (IRP), (1998), "National Intelligence Directorate (D.I.N.A.) - National Information Centre (C.N.I.)", online, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/chile/dina.htm, [accessed 04/07/2010].

385

Fascell, D. B., (1979), "The Helsinki Accord: a case study", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 442(1): 69-76. Ferreira, R. G., (2010), Guatemala y la Guerra Fría en América Latina (1947-1977), Guatemala, Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, Centro de Estudios Urbanos y Regionales. Flores, J. R. and M. Loyola, (2000), Por un rojo amanecer: hacia una historia de los comunistas chilenos, Magyar ISBN Iroda, Orszagos Szechenyi Konyvtar. Friedmann, J., (2007), New research taints image of Desert Fox Rommel, Spiegel Online International, Germany, Spiegelnet Gmbh, online, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,484510,00.html, [accessed 23/5/2012]. Fuentes, F., (2009), "Bolivia, Paraguay settle 74-year border dispute", online, available at http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/41551, [accessed on 6/02/2013]. García, M. C., (1998), "Hardliners v. "Dialogueros": Cuban exile political groups and United States-Cuba policy", Journal of American Ethnic History, 17(4): 3-28. García Naranjo, F., (1996), Historias derrotadas: opción y obstinación de la guerrilla chilena (1965-1988), Morelia, Michoacán de Ocampo, México, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, Departamento de Historia Latinoamericana. Garzón, A., (2007), "La Junta Coordinadora Revolucionaria y la Operación Cóndor", online, available at www.cedema.org/uploads/4778_1_junta_de_coordinacion_rev.pdf, [accessed 3/08/2010]. Gilio, M. E., (1972), The Tupamaros guerrillas, New York, Ballantine Books. González Bermejo, E., (1985), Las manos en el fuego, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental. González Janzen, I., (1986), La Triple-A, Buenos Aires, Editorial Contrapunto. González Menció, A., (2011), "Principales aspectos sobre las agresiones biológicas de los Estados Unidos contra Cuba", online, available at http://www.monografias.com/trabajos88/aspectos-agresiones-biologicas-estados-unidos- cuba/aspectos-agresiones-biologicas-estados-unidos-cuba.shtml, [accessed 8/03/2012]. Gordim da Silveira, H., (2009), "Brazilian military vision of the Chaco War: projection, geopolitics and international rivalry in South America", Antíteses, 2(4): 649-667. Haines, H., (1984), "Black radicalization and the funding of Civil Rights: 1957-1970", Social Problems, 32(1): 31-43. Hanratty, D. and S. Meditz., (1988), "Paraguay: a country study", online, available at http://countrystudies.us/paraguay/, [accessed 18/02/2010]. Harmer, T., (2011), Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.

386

Harmer, T. (2012), "Brazil's Cold War in the Southern Cone, 1970–1975", Cold War History, 12(4): 659-681. Helms, J., (1975), "Internationalists preparing the world for war or Communism: address by Senator Jesse Helms at W.A.C.L. Conference on April 25", Intellgence Survey, 25(6): 1-8. Hevia Cosculluela, M., (1988), Pasaporte 11333: ocho años con La C.I.A., Montevideo, Tupac Amaru Editorial-TAE. Huidobro, F., (1987), Historia de los Tupamaros, Vol 2, Montevideo, Editorial MZ ltda. --, (1988), Historia de los Tupamaros, Vol 1, Montevideo, TAE. --, (1988), Historia de los Tupamaros, Vol 3, Montevideo, TAE. --, (2004), En la nuca: historia de los Tupamaros, Montevideo, Banda Oriental. Huntington, S. P., (1957), The soldier and the state: the theory and politics of civil- military relations, Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. --, (1962), Changing patterns of military politics, New York, Free Press of Glencoe. Institute for Policy Studies (I.P.S.), (1990), "World Anti-Communist League-W.A.C.L.", online, available at http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org/articles/display/World_Anti- Communist_League#P10587_2120949, [accessed 08/04/2011]. Inter-American Defence Board (I.A.D.B.), (2012), "Galería de Presidentes", online, avaliable at https://sites.google.com/a/jid.org/iadb/el-consejo-de-delegados/biografia-del- presidente/galeria-de-presidentes, [accessed 23/06/2012]. Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America, (1978), Violations of human rights in Uruguay (1972-1976), Toronto, Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America. International Documentation ( I. D. O. C.), (1974), Chile under military rule: a dossier of documents and analyses compiled by the staff of I.D.O.C., New York, IDOC. Israel, S., (2002), El enigma Trabal, Montevideo, Uruguay, Ediciones Trilce. Jaunarena, M., (1978), Uruguay vencerá: discursos, entrevistas y artículos de Zelmar Michelini, Barcelona, Editorial Laia. Jerman, W., (Editor), (1975), Repression in Latin America: a report on the first session of the Second Russell Tribunal-Rome, April 1974, Nottingham, Bertrand Russel Foundation & Spokesman Books. Jones, A., (2007), "'Sindicalistas Australianos': a case study of international trade unionism", Labour History, 93(November): 197-212. Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, (1976), Las Fuerzas Armadas al pueblo oriental, Montevideo, República Oriental del Uruguay, Junta de Comandantes en Jefe, Vols. 1-2. Keen, B. and K. Haynes, (2004), A History of Latin America, New York, Houghton Mifflin.

387

Keys, B., (2010), "Congress, Kissinger, and the origins of human rights diplomacy", Diplomatic History, 34(5): 823-851. Komisar, L., (1999), Kissinger Declassified, The Progressive, online, available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Kissinger/KissingerDeclassified.html, [accessed 1/03/2013]. Kornbluh, P., (2004), The Pinochet file: a declassified dossier on atrocity and accountability, New York, New Press. Kraushaar, W., (2008), "Chile Si, Junta No!" Political protests at the 1974 FIFA World Cup, Mittelweg 36, Germany, Eurozine.com, online, available at: http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-08-07-kraushaar2-en.html, [accessed 17/09/2012]. Krüger, H. and J. Marshall, (1980), The great heroin coup: drugs, intelligence & international fascism, Boston, MA, South End Press. Kurtz, M., (1999), "Chile's Neo-Liberal revolution: incremental decisions and structural transformation, 1973-89", Journal of Latin American Studies, 31(2): 399-427. Labrouse, A., (1973), The Tupamaros: urban guerrillas in Uruguay, Victoria, Australia, Penguin Books. Landau, S., (1988), The dangerous doctrine: national security and U.S. foreign policy, London, Westview. Lara, J., (1972), Guerrillero Inti Peredo, México, Editorial Diogenes S.A. Larraquy, M., (2007), López Rega: el Peronismo y la Triple A, Buenos Aires, Punto de Lectura. --, (2010), De Perón a Montoneros: historia de la violencia política en la Argentina. Marcados a fuego I I (1945-1973), Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Aguilar, Alfaguara, Altea, Taurus. Larraquy, M. and R. Caballero, (2000), Galimberti: de Perón a Susana, de Montoneros a la CIA, Buenos Aires, Grupo Editorial Norma. --, (2002), Galimberti: crónica negra de la historia reciente de Argentina, Madrid, Aguilar. Latin American Review of Books, (1974), Generals and Tupamaros: the Struggle for power in Uruguay 1969-1973, London, Latin American Review of Books Ltd. Lauderback, D. M. (2004). The United States Army School of the Americas: mission and policy during the Cold War Ph.D., The University of Texas at Austin. League for the 5th International, (1991), "Cuba: the final domino?", online, available at http://www.fifthinternational.org/content/cuba%E2%80%94-final-domino, [accessed 09/08/2010]. Lee Christman, C., (1969), "The Chaco War: a tentative bibliography of its diplomacy", The Americas, 26(1): 54-65.

388

Lessa, A., (2003), La revolución imposible: los Tupamaros y el fracaso de la vía armada en el Uruguay del siglo XX, Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo. --, (2005), Estado de Guerra: de la gestación del Golpe del 73 a la caída de Bordaberry. Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo. Lewis, P. H., (1980), Paraguay under Stroessner, North Carolina, The University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill. --, (1982), Socialism, Liberalism, and Dictatorship in Paraguay, California, Praeger. --, (2002), Guerrillas and generals: the "Dirty War" in Argentina, Westport, Connecticut, Praege. López, F., (2007), The emergence and radicalization of the Unión de Trabajadores Azucareros de Artigas (U.T.A.A.): origins of the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional- Tupamaros (M.L.N.-T.), Honours Degree, University of New South Wales UNSW. Loveman, B., (1999), For la Patria: politics and the armed forces in Latin America, Wilmington, Del., SR Books. Loveman, M., (1998), "High-risk collective action: defending human rights in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina", American Journal of Sociology, 104(2): 477-525. Lowy, M., E. Sader and S. Gorman, (1985), "The militarization of the State in Latin America", Latin American Perspectives, 12(4): 7-40. MacEóin, G., (1975), Chile: the struggle for dignity, London, Coventure. Maestre Alfonso, J., (1978), El Libro rojo del presidente Pinochet y C.I.A., Madrid, Akal. Maira, L., (1981), "Nota preliminar sobre la influencia (creciente) del pensamiento de la nueva derecha norteamericana en América Latina", Revista Mexicana de Sociología, 43(Número extraordinario): 1923-1943. Malloy, J. M. and E. Gamarra, (1988), Revolution and reaction: Bolivia, 1964-1985, New Brunswick, Transaction Books. Mara, F. O., (1998), "From dictatorship to democracy: the US and regime change in Paraguay, 1954-1994", Bulletin of Latin American Research, 17(1): 59-79. Markarian, V., (2004), "De la lógica revolucionaria a las razones humanitarias: la izquierda uruguaya en el exilio y las redes transnacionales de derechos humanos (1972- 1976)", Cuadernos del CLAEH, (89): 1-25. --, (2005), Left in transformation: Uruguayan exiles and the Latin American human rights networks, 1967-1984, New York, Routlege. --, (2006), "From a revolutionary logic to humanitarian reasons: Uruguayan leftists in exile and human rights transnational networks", Cuadernos del CLAEH, 1, online, available at http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0797- 60622006000100002&lng=en&nrm=iso, [accessed 17/12/2012]. --, (2006), Idos y recién llegados: la izquierda Uruguaya en el exilio y redes transnationales de derechos humanos, 1967-1984, Montevideo, Correo del

389

Maestro/Ediciones La Vasija-Centro de Estudios Interdisciplinarios Uruguayo, Universidad de la República. --, (2007), "Uruguayan exiles and human rights: from transnational activism to transitional politics, 1981-1984", Anuario de Estudios Americanos, 64(1): 111-140. Marlene Martínez, Á., (2006), La experiencia política de los militantes del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (M.I.R): motivaciones, práctica partidaria y división de la militancia. Chile (1973-1988), Licenciatura en Historia, Universidad de Chile, online, available at http://www.cybertesis.cl/tesis/uchile/2006/Martínez_m2/html/index- frames.html, [accessed 12/10/2009]. Márquez, N., (2004), La otra parte de la verdad: la respuesta a los que han ocultado y deformado la verdad histórica sobre la década del '70 y el terrorismo, Buenos Aires, N. Márquez. --, (2006). La mentira oficial : el setentismo como política de Estado. Buenos Aires, [s.n.]. --, (2008). El Vietnam argentino : la guerrilla marxista en Tucumán. Buenos Aires, N. Márquez. Martorell, F., (1999), Operación Cóndor, el vuelo de la muerte: la coordinación represiva en el Cono Sur, Santiago de Chile, Lom Ediciones. Maryorga, R. A. and S. Gorman, (1978), "National-Popular state, state capitalism and military dictatorship in Bolivia: 1952-1975", Latin American Perspectives, 5(2): 89-119. Maxwell K., (2003), "Other 9/11: the United States and Chile, 1973", Foreign Affairs, 82: 147-151. --, (2004), "The case of the missing letter in Foreign Affairs: Kissinger, Pinochet and Operation Condor", The David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies Working Papers on Latin America, 04/05(3): 1-31. McSherry, P., (1999), "Cross-border terrorism: Operation Condor.(Report on Chile: Twilight of the General: Chile After the Arrest of Pinochet)", NACLA Report on the Americas, 32(6): 34-35. --, (1999), "Operation Condor: clandestine Inter-American System", Social Justice, 26(4): 144-174. --, (2000), "Preserving hegemony: National Security Doctrine in the Post-Cold War era", NACLA Report on the Americas, 34(3): 26-34. --, (2001), "Operation Condor: new pieces of the puzzle", NACLA Report on the Americas, 34(6): 1-2. --, (2002), "Tracking the origins of a State Terror network: Operation Condor", Latin American Perspectives, 29(1): 38-60. --, (2005), Predatory states: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin America, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

390

--, (2007), "Death squads as parallel forces: Uruguay, Operation Condor and the United States", Journal of Third World Studies, 24(1): 13-52. McSherry, P. and M. R. Molina, (1999), "Introduction to 'Shadows of State Terrorism: impunity in Latin America'", Social Justice, 26(4): 1-12. McSherry, P., M. Slatman, E. Serra Padrós, A. Simoes Fernández, C. Silverira Bauer, J. C. Fernández, S. Visconti and U. Rodríguez Díaz, (2012), Dossier: Coordinaciones represivas en el Cono Sur de América Latina (1964-1991), Taller segúna época. Revista de sociedad, cultura y política en América Latina, Buenos Aires, 1(1): 1-302. Memoria Viva, (1985), "Declaración Jurada: Andrés Antonio Valenzuela Morales", online, available at www.memoriaviva.com/culpables/agentes/valenzue.htm, [accessed 23/09/2010]. Méndez E, J., (2006), The human right to truth: lessons learned from Latin American experiences with truth telling, in Borer, T. A., (2006), Telling the truths: truth telling and peace building in post-conflict societies, Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press. --, (2007), El derecho humano a la verdad: lecciones de las experiencias Latinoamericanas de relato de la verdad, Historizar el Pasado Vivo, online, available at http://www.historizarelpasadovivo.cl/es_resultado_textos.php?categoria=Verdad%2C+ju sticia%2C+memoria&titulo=El+derecho+humano+a+la+Verdad.+Lecciones+de+las+exp eriencias+latinoamericanas+de+relato+de+la+verdad#acapite, [accessed on 20/01/2012]. Méndez Méndez, J. L., (2006), Bajo las alas del Cóndor, La Habana, Editorial Capitán San Luis. Mendoza, D. H. D. and A. M. Vara, (2006), "Political storms, financial uncertainties, and dreams of “big science:” the construction of a heavy ion accelerator in Argentina", Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 36(2): 343-364. Merenson, S., (2003), Ser Peludo: una etnografía histórica de tránsitos y pasajes en la construcción de un sujeto social (Bella Unión, República Oriental del Uruguay, Montevideo, Departamento de Antropología Social: Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, Universidad de la República. --, (2004), ""Peludos", "caramelos" y "sucedidos". La importación del campo y los trabajadores rurales en la construcción de un pasado para la militancia tupamara Montevideana", Lucha Armada, 1(1): 1-25. --, (2005), Apuntes sobre la jerarquía "peludo", "pequeño productor", "gringo" en la frontera uruguaya-argentina-brasilera". Tránsitos, pasajes y representaciones, VI Reunión de Antropología del MERCOSUR, Montevideo. Meyssan, T., (2007), "La Liga Anticomunista Mundial, Internacional del crimen", online, avaliable at http://www.kaosenlared.net/noticia/liga-anticomunista-mundial- internacional-crimen, [accessed 15/02/2011]. Miranda, C. R., (1990), The Stroessner era: authoritarian rule in Paraguay, San Francisco, Westview Press.

391

Moneta, J. C., (1979), "La política exterior del Peronismo: 1973-1976", Foro Internacional, 20(2): 220-276. Montenegro Martín, G. A., (1994), Thesis for Masters Degree: "The Australian Solidarity Campaign with Chile 1973-1990", Master, University of New South Wales. Morales, J. A. and J. D. Sachs, "Bolivia's economic crisis", in Sachs J. D., (1989), Developing country debt and the world economy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp. 57-79. Morelli, L., (2004), En alta y clara voz, Montevideo, I. Rosgal. Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (M. I. R.), (1976), MIR: dos años en la lucha de la resistencia popular del pueblo Chileno 1973-1975, Madrid, ZERO S.A. Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T), (2003), Actas Tupamaras, Argentina, Cucaña Ediciones. New York Times, (1971), The Pentagon papers, Boston, Boston: Beacon Press. Nickson, A., (1982), "The Itaipú hydro-electric project: the Paraguayan perspective", Bulletin of Latin American Research, 2(1): 1-20. --, (1988), "Tyranny and longevity: Stroessner's Paraguay", Third World Quarterly, 10(1): 237-259. --, (1989), "The overthrow of the Stroessner regime: re-establishing the Status Quo", Bulletin of Latin American Research, 8(2): 185-209. Nilson, C. M., (1998), Operación Cóndor: terrorismo de Estado en el Cono Sur, Buenos Aires, Ediciones Lohlé Lumen. Nohlen, D. and M. F. B, (1981), "Cooperación y conflicto en la Cuenca del Plata", Estudios Internacionales, 14(55): 412-443. O'Donnell, G., (1988), Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina 1966-1973, in comparative perspective, Berkeley, University of California Press. Oberg, J., (1975), "Third world armament: domestic arms production in Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina and India 1950-75", Instant Research on Peace and Violence, 5(4): 222-239. Ojeda, A. E., (2008), The trauma of psychological torture, Westport, Connecticut., Praeger. Operation, (2001), The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military, Oxford Reference Online, Oxford University Press, online, available at http://www.oxfordreference.com.wwwproxy0.library.unsw.edu.au/view/10.1093/acref/97 80199891580.001.0001/acref-9780199891580-e-5763?rskey=xHZwNc&result=2, [accessed 28/07/2008]. Operation Plan, (2001). The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military. Oxford Reference Online, Oxford University Press, online, available at http://www.oxfordreference.com.wwwproxy0.library.unsw.edu.au/view/10.1093/acref/97

392

80199891580.001.0001/acref-9780199891580-e-5783?rskey=St5I7G&result=1, [accessed 28/07/2008]. Osorio, C. and M. Enamoneta, (2007), Rendition in the Southern Cone: Operation Condor documents revealed from Paraguayan “Archive of Terror”, online, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB239d/index.htm, [accessed 17/01/2012]. Oxford English Dictionary, (2013), "exile, n.1", Oxford University Press, online, available at http://www.oed.com.wwwproxy0.library.unsw.edu.au/view/Entry/66231?isAdvanced=fal se&result=1&rskey=wsca41&, [accessed 14/03/2013]. Oxtoby, K. L, (2004), Smoke and mirrors: the Dirty War and Argentine military professionalism, Master of Arts, University of Calgary. Painter, J., (2002), Obituary: General Hugo Banzer Suarez; Bolivian dictator who took up democracy, The Independent, London, in SOA Watch, online, available at http://www.soaw.org/about-the-soawhinsec/13-soawhinsec-graduates/1732, [accessed, 10/01/2010]. Pastore, M., (2010), La utopía revolucionaria de los años '60, Buenos Aires, Ediciones del Signo. Payne, D., (1990), "A Latin last hurrah", Society Abroad, 27(2): 47-52. Peredo, I., (1971 ), Mi campaña con el Che, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Edibol. Pérez, C., (2003), "Historia del M.I.R: si quieren guerra, guerra trendrán", Estudios Públicos, 91(Invierno): 5-44. --, (2004), "Años de disparos y tortura (1973-1975): los últimos días de Miguel Enríquez", Estudios Públicos, 96(primavera): 355-382. Petras, J. and M. Morris, (1975), The United States and the overthrow of the Allende government, New York, Monthly Review of Press. Petroni, C., (2012), "Todos los Peronismos, el Peronismo (La Triple A: el terrorismo de estado Peronista - Capitulo de Contextualización del Libro)", Izquierda Punto Info, online, available at http://www.izquierda.info/libros/CAPITULO1.pdf, [accessed 21/10/2012]. --, (2012), "Los Crimenes de la CNU/Triple A", Izquierda Punto Info, online, available at http://www.izquierda.info/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=12212, [accessed 17/11/2012. Pinay, M., (1962), Complot contra la Iglesia, México, Ediciones de la Identidad- Ediciones "Mundo Libre", online, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/24754883/Maurice-Pinay-Complot-Contra-La-Iglesia, [accessed on 6/09/2011]. Piñeiro, M. B., (2006), Che Guevara and the Latin American revolution, Melbourne-New York, Ocean Press. Pinochet, A., (1978), Geopolítica de Chile, México, CID Editor.

393

Pion-Berlin, D., (1988), "The National Security Doctrine, military threat perception, and the 'Dirty War' in Argentina", Comparative Political Studies, 21(3): 382-407. Poder Judicial de la Nación, (2004), Causa No. 13.445/99 "Videla, Jorge Rafael y Otros s/Privación Ilegal de la Libertad Personal y Otros", Juzgado Nacional en lo Criminal y Correccional Federal 7, Buenos Aires, Poder Judicial Nacional, online, available at http://www.cels.org.ar/common/documentos/procesamientos_septiembre.doc, [accessed 29/10/2010]. Pozzi, P., (2001), Por las sendas Argentinas: el P.R.T-E.R.P - la guerrilla Marxista. Buenos Aires, Eudeba: Universidad de Buenos Aires. Prado Salmón, G., (1990), The defeat of Che Guevara: military response to guerilla challenge in Bolivia, New York, Praeger. Presidencia de la República Oriental del Uruguay, (2011), Actualización de la investigación histórica sobre detenidos desaparecidos, Uruguay, Presidencia de la República, online, available at http://www.presidencia.gub.uy/wps/wcm/connect/presidencia/portalpresidencia/comunica cion/informes/investigacion-historica-sobre-detenidos-desaparecidos, [accessed 19/04/2012 Rabe, S., (2012), The killing zone: the United States wages Cold War in Latin America, New York, Oxford University Press. Ramonet, I., Ed. (2007), Fidel Castro: my life, Victoria, Australia, Allen Lane-Penguin Books. Rayner, M., (2010), Solidaridad!, Australia, Radio National, aired 31/01/2010, online, available at http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/hindsight/solidaridad/3108534, [accessed 28/03/2013]. Reboratti, C. E., (1983), "El encanto de la oscuridad: notas acerca de la geopolítica en la Argentina", Desarrollo Económico, 23(89): 137-144. Redick, J. R., (1975), "Regional nuclear arms control in Latin America", International Organization, 29(2): 415-445. Research Department Amnesty International, (1972), Paraguay in the seventies: a background paper, London, Amnesty International. Resende-Santos, J., (2002), "The origins of security cooperation in the Southern Cone", Latin American Politics and Society, 44(4): 89-126. Rey Tristan, E., (2006), A la vuelta de la esquina: la Izquierda revoluicionaria Uruguaya. Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo. Rico, Á., (2005), 15 días que estremecieron al Uruguay: golpe de estado y huelga general: 27 de junio-11 de julio de 1973, Montevideo, Uruguay, Editorial Fin de Siglo. --, (2008), Investigación histórica sobre la dictadura y el terrorismo de estado en el Uruguay, Montevideo, Universidad de la República Oriental del Uruguay.

394

Rico, Á., J. P. Barrán and G. Gaetano, (2007), Investigación histórica sobre detenidos desaparecidos: contexto represivo, coordinación regional, centros de reclusión y testimonios, Montevideo, Dirección Nacional de Impresiones y Publicaciones Oficiales. Rico, Á., L. Senatore, L. Maggio, B. Rico, S. Fossati, M. Bengochea and R. Miguel (1989), La resistencia a la dictadura 1973-1975, Montevideo, Editorial Problemas. Robertson Q.C., G., (2002), Crimes against humanity: the struggle for global justice, London, Penguin Books. Rock, D., (1987), Argentina 1516-1987: from Spanish colonization to Alfonsín, [2nd edition], Berkeley - Los Angeles, University of California Press. Rodríguez, G. O., (2010), De Ñakaguazú a Teoponte: la guerrilla guevarista en Bolivia, Los Tiempos.com, Bolivia, Editorial Canales, online, available at http://www.lostiempos.com/oh/actualidad/actualidad/20100725/de-nakaguazu-a- teoponte-la-guerrilla-guevarista-en_81654_154911.html, [accessed 21/11/2010]. Rodríguez, R., (2006), La patota de la O.C.O.A. robó y trajo al Uruguay 7 millones de dólares en 1976, La República, Montevideo, 4pixels, online, available at http://www.larepublica.com.uy/politica/212555-todos-los-crimenes-de-automotores- orletti-no-estan-amparados-en-la-ley-de-caducidad, [accessed 12/10/2011]. Rogers, W. D., (2004), Fleeing the Chilean coup [comments], Foreign Affairs, 83(1): 160-175. Rojas, C., (1988), Recuerdos de una mirista, Montevideo, Uruguay, Deltaller. Rosencof, M., (2003), La rebelión de los Cañeros, Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo. Rosencof, M. and F. Huidobro, (1987), Memorias del calabozo, Montevideo, TAE. Rostow, W. W., (1960), The stages of economic growth: a non-commuinst manifesto, Cambridge, University Press. Ruffner, K. C., (2007), "C.I.A's support to the Nazi war criminal investigations: a persistent emotional issue", Centre For the Study of Intelligence-CSI, online, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi- studies/studies/97unclass/naziwar.html, [accessed 28/07/2013]. Ruiz, M. and R. Sanseviero, (2012), Las rehenas: historia oculta de once presas de la dictadura, Montevideo, Fin de Siglo. Russell, D., (2000), C.I.A./Syndicate, Drug War: covert money, power & policy, online, available at http://www.drugwar.com/ciasyndicate.shtm, [accessed 9/11/2012. Saleam, J., (2005), The Right-Wing underground in Sydney 1973-1977 (With emphasis on the Special Branch FIles), Sydney, Radical Nationalism in Australia (R.A.D.N.A.T.),online, available at home.alphalink.com.au/~radnat/underground.html, [accessed 18/10/2011]. San José State University-Department of Economics, The Park Chung Hee regime in South Korea, online, available http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/park.htm, [accessed 19/04/2011].

395

Sánchez Ortiz, J. J., (2010), "Sociedades secretas en México y su poder oculto en la política", online, available at www.sociedades-secretas-en-mexico-y-su-poder-oculto-en- la-politica-a32790, [accessed 29/07/2012]. Sandoval Rodríguez, I., (1987), El proyecto político militar 1971-1982: el estado de la seguridad nacional en Bolivia, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, Universidad Boliviana Gabrial Rene Moreno. Santillana, R., (1999), "Miguel Enríquez y la J.C.R.", Online, available at www.archivochile.com/America_latina/JCR/JCR_de/jcrde0005.pdf, [accessed 20/08/2010]. Schoultz, L., (1987), National Security and United States policy toward Latin America, New Jersey, Princeton University Press. Scott, C. M., (2008), The Central Intelligence Agency: a documentary History, Wesport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press. Scott, P. D., (1972), The war conspiracy; the secret road to the second Indochina war, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill. --, (1977), Crime and cover-up: the CIA, the Mafia, and the Dallas-Watergate connection, Berkeley, California, Westworks. --., (2003), Drugs, oil, and war: the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia, and Indochina, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. --, (2010), American war machine: deep politics, the CIA's global drug connection, and the road to Afghanistan, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Serbin, K., (2005), "Behind Pinochet's reign of terror: torture chamber", Christian Century, 122(1): 28-34. Sergeyev, F., (1981), Chile: C.I.A. big business, Moscow, Progress Publishers. Servetto, A., (2008), "Memorias de intolerancia política: las victimas de la Triple-A (Alianza Anticomunista Argetnina)", Anti-Tesis, 1(2): 439-454. Servicio Paz y Justicia Uruguay, (1989), Uruguay nunca más: informe sobre la violación de derechos humanos (1972-1985), Montevideo, S.E.R.P.A.J. Sharif, R., (1977), "Latin America and the Arab-Israeli conflict", Journal of Palestine Studies, 7(1): 98-122. Shayne, J. D., (2009), They used to call us witches: Chilean exiles, culture, and feminism, Lanham, Lexington Books. Simkin, J., "John K. Singlaub", Spartacus Educational, online, available at http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKsinglaub.htm, [accessed 06/05/2011]. --, "Ray Steiner Cline", Spartacus Educational, online, available at http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKclineR.htm , [accessed on 16/04/2011]. Simon, H., (2003), "The response of the moderate wing of the Civil Rights Movement to the War in Vietnam", The Historical Journal, 46(3): 669-701.

396

Slack, K., (1996), "Operation Condor and human rights: a report from Paraguay's Archive of Terror", Human Rights Quarterly, 18(2): 492-506. Slatman, M., (2009), Una doctrina militar contrarrevolucionaria para la Nación Argentina: análisis de la discursividad oficial del ejército Argentino durante la Guerra Fría (1957-1976), VIII Reunión de Antropología del Mercosur: Diversidad y Poder en América Latina, Buenos Aires Universidad Nacional de San Martin-UNSAM. --, (2010), "Para un balance necesario: la relación entre la emergencia de la Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria y el Operativo Cóndor, Cono Sur, 1974-1978", Testimonios 2: 78-100. --, (2010), Revisando una hipotesis: las relaciones entre la emergencia de la Junta de Coordinación Revolucionaria y la estructuración de la Operación Cóndor (1972-1978), IX Encuentro Nacional y III Congreso Internacional de Historia Oral de la República Argentina: "Los usos de la Memoria Oral y la Historia Oral", Argentina, Asociación de Historia Oral del Norte Argentino-AHONA. Smith, B. H., (1979), "Churches and human rights in Latin America: recent trends in the subcontinent", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 21(1): 89-127. Solingen, E., (1993), "Macropolitical consensus and lateral autonomy in industrial policy: the nuclear sector in Brazil and Argentina", International Organization, 47(2): 263-298. Sondrol, P. C., (1991), "Totalitarian and authoritarian dictators-a comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner", Journal of Latin American Studies, 23(3): 599-620. --, (1992), "The emerging new politics of liberalizing Paraguay - Sustained civil-military control without democracy", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 34(2): 127-163. Spectator2006, (2007), "La O.N.U y los Tecos de la U.A.G.", Un Informe de la O.N.U. Sobre los Tecos, online, available at http://informe- onu.blogspot.com/2007_04_01_archive.html 2011, [accessed 7/09/2011]. Stepan, A. C., (1971), The military in politics: changing patterns in Brazil, Princeton, Princeton University Press. Stuart, C., (1984), Stefano Delle Chiaie, London, Anarchy Magazine: Refract Publications. Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, (1978), Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Washington D.C, US House of Representatives, online, available at http://www.allentwood.com/articles/conclufraser.html, [accessed 20/04/2011]. Summerfield, D., (1991), "The psychosocial effects of conflict in the Third World", Development in Practice, 1(3): 159-173. Sznajder, M., (2007), "Differential institutional dynamics: a comparative analysis of the Chilean and Uruguayan political diasporas", Revista de Ciencia Política, 27(1): 46-66. Sznajder, M. and L. Roniger, (2007), "Political exile in Latin America", Latin American Perspectives, 34(4): 7-30.

397

Tapia Valdes, J., (1980), El Terrorismo de Estado: la Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional en el Cono Sur, México, Editorial Nueva Imágen. Terra Noticias, (2010), "Ex Tupamaro cuestiona a quienes se llaman progresistas", TELAM, 16/09, online, available at http://noticias.terra.com.ar/internacionales/ex- tupamaro-cuestiona-a-quienes-se-llaman- progresistas,1a2cde059ea1b210VgnVCM3000009af154d0RCRD.html, [accessed 22/7/2013]. The Communist International (1919-1943), Marxist Internet Archive, online, available at https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/index.htm, [accessed, 8/01/2014]. Tomás Ramírez Torres, (1976), La compleja moral Puritana del ciudadano Norteamericano, El Nacionalista (organo oficial del Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano), New Jersey, Movimiento Nacionalista Cubano. Tongil Group, (2008), "Affiliated companies", online, available at http://www.tongilgroup.org/eng/02_sub/2c_sub00.php, [accessed 23/01/2013]. Trinquier, R., (1961), La Guerre moderne, Paris. --, (1964), Modern warfare: a French view of counterinsurgency, Pall Mall P. --, (1976), Les maquis d'Indochine, 1952-1954, Paris, Editions Albatros. --, (1978), Le temps perdu, Paris, Albin Michel. --, (1980), La guerre, Paris, Albin Michel. --, (1984), Le premier bataillon de berets rouges: Indochine 1947-1949, Paris, Plon. Tróccoli, J. N., (1996), La ira de Leviatán: del método de la furia a la búsqueda de la paz, Montevideo, Innomedia. -- (1997), La hora del depredador: una historia del Uruguay de los años perdidos, Montevideo, Editorial Fin de Siglo. Trotsky, L., (1932), "In defence of october: a speech delivered in Copenhagen, Denmark in November 1932", online, available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1932/11/oct.htm, last updated 4/3/2007, [accessed 17/10/2010]. Tucker, J. B., (1984), "Gene wars", Foreign Policy, (57) (winter): 58-79. U. S. Government, (1950), N.S.C.-68: United Sates objective and programs for National Security (7 April, 1950), (N.S.C.), Washington D.C., online, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm, part I, [accessed 19/12/2011]. U.S. Senate Select Committee, (1975), Covert action in Chile 1963-1973: staff report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Report), Washington D.C, US Senate, online, available at http://www.archives.gov/declassification/iscap/pdf/2010-009-doc17.pdf, [accessed 03/07/2011].

398

United States Government, (1947), National Security Act of 1947, Act of July 26, 1947 (As Amended), U. S. S. Council, Washington, D.C., USG, online, available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/nsaact1947.pdf, section 101, [accessed 17/01/2011]. Uribe, A., (1975), The black book of American intervention in Chile, Boston, Beacon Press Boston. Valente, R., (2009), Célula anticomunista atuou no Brasil durante a ditadura, Folha de São Paulo, 15 November, São Paulo, Brasil, Empresa Folha da Manha Ltda., online; available at http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/fsp/brasil/fc1511200911.htm, [accessed 20/10/2011]. Varas, F., (1979), Gustavo Leigh, el general disidente, Santiago, Editorial Aconcagua. Verdugo, P., (1989), Caso Arellano: los zarpazos del puma, Santiago, CESOC. Vicens, L., (1983), Loperreguismo y Justicialismo, Buenos Aires, El Cid Editor- Fundación para la democracia en Argentina. Weigert Reimann, E. and F. Sánchez Rivas, (1976), Las fuerzas armadas de Chile: un caso de penetración imperialista, Havana, Editorial Ciencias Sociales. Weiner, T., (2008), Legacy of ashes: the history of the C.I.A., London, Penguin. Welsh, I., (2009), "Guerrilla warfare: the way of the weak", online, available at http://www.ianwelsh.net/guerrilla-warfare/, [accessed 24/09/ 2010]. Wikipedia, (2013), "List of Cuba-US aircraft hijackings ", online, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Cuba%E2%80%93United_States_aircraft_hijacking s, [accessed 9/03/2011] Wilkinson, M. D., (1992), "The Chile solidarity campaign and British government policy towards Chile, 1973-1990", Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe / European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, (52): 57-74. Wilson, F., (1986), El exilio y la lucha, Montevideo, Ediciones de la Banda Oriental Wingfield, D. D., (1968), The Inter-American Defence College: an assessment of its activities, Ph.D, University of Maryland. Winn, P., (2004), Victims of the Chilean miracle: workers and neoliberalism in the Pinochet era, 1972-2002, London, Duke University Press. Wright, T. C., (2007), State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and international human rights, New York, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Wright, T. C. and R. O. Zúñiga, (2007), "Chilean political exile", Latin American Perspectives, 34(4): 31-49. Zoglin, K., (2001), "Paraguay's Archive of Terror: international cooperation and Operation Condor", The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review, 32(1): 57-82.

399