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University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 A Xerox Education Company 72-22,441 JONES, Henry Paschal, 1930- JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND UNITED STATES TNVOLITMENT IN VIETNAM. The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1972 Political Science, general University Microfilms, A )G:;r<OXCompany, Ann Arbor, Michigan THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY HENRY PASCHAL JONES Norman, Oklahoma 1972 JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM APPROVED BY r DISSERTATION COMMITTEE PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received. University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company for Esther 1 1 1 ACKNOWLEDGMENT The author hereby expresses his gratitude to Professor Rufus G. Hall, Jr., of the University of Oklahoma Political Science Department. His helpful suggestions and patience in directing this dissertation are sincerely appre­ ciated. I also express my appreciation to Professor Oliver E. Benson for his help and encouragement. I Owe d special uebL uf yidLj-Luut; Lu Professor Richard C. C. Kim. I believe he will know why. And finally I express thanks to Mrs. Bendy Simms whose conscientious typing of the final manuscript lightened the burden considerably. IV TABLE OP CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION .................................... 1 Chapter I, INDOCHINA POLICY IN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION— BACKGROUND TO THE DULLES E R A ....................... 11 The Containment Policy Negotiation from Strength NbC-66— A Global Cuimui Laieat Truman-Acheson Indochina Policy II. JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND HIS WORLD . 45 What Manner of Man? Background and Qualifications Dulles and Moralism Dulles as Partisan Dulles and Communism Dulles's Strategic Concepts Massive Retaliation and Liberation Dulles and Indochina III. 1954— THE YEAR OF THE NEGATIVE DECISION .................... 105 The Effort to Avert Negotiations The Meeting with Congressional Leaders The Senate Debate The President Speaks The Decision not to Intervene Sequela IV. THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ........... 153 The "New Look" in Foreign Policy and Red China Page The Berlin Conference The Allies Disagree The Negotiations Did the Russians "Bet a Little in .Asia to Win a Lot in Europe"? Negotiations Concluded— Innocence by Disassociation V. THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY .................................. 201 Origins The Nature and Purpose of the Treaty The Alternative Fizzles VI. POST-GENEVA POLICY AND DEVELOPMENTS . 257 VII. CONCLUSIONS ........................... 268 A P o l 4 r*\r "Ra qo H o n A n 4-4 — Communist Ideology AF.'- ■ S ...................................... 288 BIBLI V H Y .................................... 297 VI JOHN FOSTER DULLES AND UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM INTRODUCTION Though much has now been written about the Vietnam War, the American scholarly community has yet to produce an explanation of its meaning that has been widely accepted. Has it been a war like any other, explainable in terms of a realistic resort to political violence in the face of a generally perceived threat to the national interest? Was the war the result of a new American militarism, stimulated by a "warrior caste," as Arthur M. Schlesinger has suggested? Has it been a Leninist-defined imperialist war? Or was American involvement in Vietnam on such a large scale the result of conceptual failures of leadership and bureaucratic 2 confusion, as Henry A. Kissinger has suggested? These questions raise the further question of what lessons for United States foreign policy can be learned from the Vietnam experience. Any lessons learned would redound Richard M. Pfeffer (ed.). No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1958), 10, ^Ibid., 11. 2 to the benefit of future policymakers, unless it is found that policymaking is essentially and inevitably an irrational process. Some scholars have found the Vietnam situation so intractable that they have concluded that no lessons can be drawn. Thus Professor Samuel P. Huntington observed that "it is conceivable that our policy-makers may best meet future crises and dilemmas if they simply blot out of their minds any recollection of this one." The danger of drawing the wrong conclusions was so great that Professor Huntington 3 thought none should be drawn at all. Each significant historical experience does have its unique aspects, and so reasoning by false analogy is an ever­ present danger. The tendency of many American policy makers to reason by false analogy— comparing the Geneva settlement of 1954 to the Munich agreement of 1938, for example— is a factor in the original decisions to go into Vietnam. But to argue that men are condemned to the vicious circle of false analogy is to argue that history holds no lessons, if not to deny the applicability of human intelligence to political affairs altogether. An interesting question is, what draws leaders away from an intelligent application of historical knowledge to a foreign policy problem? One answer to this question is that "an individual /policymaker in this case/ responds not only to the 'objective' characteristics of a situation, but also ^Ibid.. 2. 3 to the meaning the situation has for him." And more specif­ ically, "enemies are those who are defined as such, and if one acts upon this interpretation, it is more than likely that the original definition will be confirmed," The author of this hypothesis further believes that there is "an apparently universal tendency to judge the actions of others — and particularly of those defined as enemies— according to different standards from those applied to oneself."^ This may be understood as a form of ideology to which certain personality types are more subject than others. For some United States policymakers in the era of the cold war, this kind of ideology may result in no distinction being made, or only a blurred one, "between moral and political bases for evaluating the Soviet Union" and Communist activities gener­ ally.^ The broad purpose of this work is to apply this hypothesis to the manner in which a particular leader. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, approached a particu­ lar foreign policy issue, namely the emergence of Communist power in Indochina. This work is not seen by the author as a conventional example of what is known as the "decision making approach" to political inquiry. It does seek to analyze a number of related positive and negative decisions ^Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy," Journal of International Affairs, XXI, ÎI0. 1, 1967, 16-39. ^Ibid. 4 as they affected and called forth United States political and military involvement in Indochina in the 1950's. But it seeks also to examine some personality factors of one of the chief participants in these decisions, and to explore some of the ideological factors which pressed upon the minds of all of the participants. The work is also seen as a kind of case study of one of the most significant of recent United States foreign policy dramas, the final denouement of which we do not yet know. By now, many writers have tried to tell how the United States became involved in Vietnam. It is hoped that a further contribution to the understanding of that involvement is hereby made. A General Framework of Analysis In his book Foreign Policy in Perspective,^ John P. T.ovell suggests a number of "key factors in decision-making analysis." Lovell's factors are presented below with brief comment as to what extent, and where, they will be incorpor­ ated in the body of this work. It should be noted that the attempt here is to focus on the elected or appointed policy­ makers in Washington, that.is_to say on the political aspects, and not on the military aspects of United States involvement in Vietnam. Lovell's factors are: 1. Situation, External Setting and Capabilities. ^John P. Lovell, Foreign Policy in Perspective (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 227-2401 5 Mr.