American Policy Toward the Defense of Formosa and the Offshore Islands, 1954-1955
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University of Nebraska at Omaha DigitalCommons@UNO Student Work 8-1-1971 American policy toward the defense of Formosa and the offshore islands, 1954-1955 Donald H. Chang University of Nebraska at Omaha Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork Recommended Citation Chang, Donald H., "American policy toward the defense of Formosa and the offshore islands, 1954-1955" (1971). Student Work. 445. https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/445 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE DEFENSE OF FORMOSA AND THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS, 1954-1955 A Thesis Presented to the Department of History and the Faculty of the Graduate College University of Nebraska at Omaha In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts by Donald H. Chang August 1971 UMI Number: EP73083 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI EP73083 Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 Accepted for the faculty of The Graduate College of the University of Nebraska at Omaha, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts. Graduate Committee Name Departme ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Both Professors Paul L. Beck and Harl A. Dalstrom have taken time to read my manuscript and have enlightened me in many ways. Without their comments and guidance, it would have been impossible for me to present the work in its present form. To them, I wish to express my deep appreciation and profound gratitude. Donald H. Chang TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . ................... iii TABLE OF C O N T E N T S .......... iv CHAPTER I. A CONFLICT OF INTEREST . 1 II. NEW AGITATION AND EMBROILMENT........... 25 III. AMERICA IN THE MIDDLE .................... 48 IV. NATIONAL UNITY DISPLAYED: FORMOSA RESOLUTION ADOPTED AND MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY RATIFIED ........................ 82 V. CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS AND POWER ALIGNMENTS .............................. 120 VI. A WAR OF NERVES ...........................153 VII. A SURCEASE .............' ........... 182 CONCLUSION............ 212 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................ 219 CHAPTER I A CONFLICT OF INTEREST The American attitude toward the defense of Formosa and the offshore islands during the Quemoy crisis that erupted in September 1954 was intertwined with American policy toward China in general and the Nationalist Govern ment in Formosa in particular. The United States had tried to stay out of the civil conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists. Yet the sequence of events that developed in the Far East forced the United States to take a position in favor of the Nationalists on Formosa. The American policy toward Formosa, although it ran counter to the Communists, was not fully identified with the cause of the Nationalists. A review of the divergent objectives of each of the three parties involved is the first point in order. The American Attitude Formosa^ was Chinese territory before it was ceded ^"The word Formosa is used throughout this paper to indicate Formosa and the Pescadores unless otherwise speci fied. It is to be noted that the Chinese, both the Nationalists and the Communists, always use the Chinese terms, Taiwan and Penghu, to denote these islands. The tendency of the western world has been to use the term Taiwan rather than Formosa since 1960. However, in order to follow the customary usage of western literature in the 1950*s, the word Formosa is used throughout this paper. 1 2 by treaty of Shimonoseki to Japan as a result of China*s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895. During the Second World War,, the: Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, stated that Formosa' should be returned to "the Republic of China.." 2?' The. Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 3 1945, reaffirmed the Cairo; Declaration and the instrument 4^ of Japanese surrender: ' accepted the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation. After V—J day ,., General Order Number One of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur,.. Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Japan,,- provided' for the surrender of the Japanese forces in China and' Formosa to Generalissimo Chiang Kai- 5 shek. With the: assistance of the United States Navy, the Chinese forces landed on.Formosa in September 1945 and disarmed r/ 2Herbert Feis, Contest Over Japan (New York: Norton & Co., 1967) ,- Appendix: X,. p. 155. The Chinese Nationalists often stress the significance of the use of "the Republic of China" in the Cairo Declaration. To them, this terminology carries a desirable, implication that Formosa should be re turned to no other: government of China than the Government of the Republic of China,., the Nationalist Government. Ob viously, in referring to: China as "the Republic of China," the framers of the Decl'aration merely used the official title of China in use after' the revolution of 1911. 3 Ibid.. , Appendix: IX,, p . 160. ^TlE.S. Department o f State Bulletin, XIII, No. 324 (September 9, 194.5;),,. p., 3.64.. Hereafter cited as D.S.B. 5 Feis, Contest Over Japan, Appendix VI, p. 165. 3 c the Japanese troops on the island. After the Japanese were removed from Formosa, the Chinese Government took administra tive control of the area, and formally incorporated it as the thirty-fifth Province of the Republic of China on ,t 7 October 25, 1950. In Chinese eyes, Formosa was restored to China in accordance with the Cairo Declaration by virtue 8 of the fact that they had regained control of it. The end of the Second World War did not bring peace to Chipa. The struggle for national power between the Nationalist Party, which had constituted the legal govern ment of China, and the Communist Party, which had possessed an independent army, soon developed into a large scale armed conflict or, from the Nationalists' point of view, a com- 9 munist rebellion. £he China White Paper, published by the Joseph W. Ballantine, Formosa, A Problem for United States Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Insti tution, 1952), p. 57. 7 China Handbook, 1950 (New York: Rockport Press, 1951), p. 33. 8 The Chinese Nationalist Government designated October 25 as "Taiwan Restoration Day." It is interesting to note that the Chinese Communists also claimed that Octo ber 25, 1945, was the date when China regained sovereignty over Formosa. For instance, in his telegram to the United Nations General Assembly on October 10, 1954, condemning "United States aggression against Chinese territory of Taiwan," the Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai declared, "It is a fact that Taiwan was taken on October 25, 1945 by the Chinese government of that time." Important Documents Con- cerning the Question of Taiwan (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1955), p. 151. 9 A detailed study is Tang Tsou's America's Failure in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) . 4 State Department in August, 1949, indicated that the American Government would not get involved in China.^ With vast territory under their control, the Communists pro claimed the establishment of the People*s Republic of China on October 1, 1949. Meanwhile, the Nationalists had re treated from mainland China and announced that the site of the Government of the Republic of China had moved to Formosa as of December 8, 1949. At this time the United States continued to recognize the Nationalist Government on Formosa as the government of China, but anticipated the loss of Formosa to the communists soon.'*''*' The drastic change on the China scene necessitated the disclosure of American policy on what was expected to be the closing phase of a civil war. On January 5, 1950, President Truman issued a statement in which he stressed the The official title of the White Paper is United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, Far Eastern Series No. 30 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949). In his "letter of transmittal" to President Truman, Secretary Acheson said, "Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities would have changed the result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to ity" p. xvi. See also McGeorge Bundy, The Pattern of Responsibility (Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside Press, 1952), p. 191. ^ A State Department Policy Information Paper of Decem ber 23, 1949, was leaked to the press from General MacArthur*s Headquarters in Tokyo on January 3, 1950. The text was later reprinted in Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings be fore the Committee on Armed Forces and Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82 Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), Vol. 3, pp. 1667-69. 5 fact that Formosa had been surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek after V-J day and that for the past four years "the United States and the pther allied powers have 12 accepted his exercise of Chinese authority over the island." This was interpreted as meaning "the United States Govern ment regarded Formosa as Chinese territory without qualifica- 13 tion." The President then went on: The United States has ho predatory designs on Formosa or on any other Chinese territory.