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1111 2 6 China in Asian and 3 4 5 6 David S. G. Goodman 7 8 9 1011 1 2 3111 Despite the comment that China is ‘overrated as . . . a source of ideas’, 4 culture is not something that Gerry Segal explored in any depth in his 5 article on ‘Does China Matter?’. That article was of course not centrally 6 concerned with either China’s cultural interaction with the rest of the 7 world, or even the politics of that interaction, but was primarily an argu- 8 ment cautioning other governments and government agencies about the 9 need to ensure some perspective in dealing with the government of the 20111 People’s Republic of China (PRC). All the same, to that end Segal’s article 1 stated that ‘China does not . . . matter in terms of global culture.’ 2 Specifically it argued that China has had limited cultural reach not only 3 compared to ‘the dominant West’ but also in comparison to ; that 4 during the last 20 years the government of the PRC has spent more effort 5111 in resisting and controlling the domestic impact of external cultural influ- 6 ences than in attempting to create any specific external influence of its 7 own; and that China does not play as great a role for Chinese around 8 the world as does for the Indians. 9 Not all these arguments confront established orthodoxy by any means. 30111 During the last 20 years the PRC has retreated from its role as a purveyor 1 of world revolution and has devoted considerable effort to the domestic 2 management of ‘Western’ cultural manifestations. At the same time, the 3 argument about the relative strengths of Chinese and Japanese influence 4 and authority outside their borders is clearly more contested. Japan, it is 5 true, has had considerable impact in East and Southeast during the 6 twentieth century, both because of its colonial programme in the 1930s 7 and its later economic development programme. However, China has an 8 even older, and longer sustained cultural influence in the that might 9 still be said to run deep. On the surface at least, Segal’s argument about 40111 the ‘’ would seem to be even more necessarily contested. 1 It is often asserted that the Chinese outside the PRC constitute a signifi- 2 cant social, economic and even political force in their own right; and 3 moreover that there is considerable potential for these ‘Overseas Chinese’ 4111 to ally with the PRC to create a new future Chinese . 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 72

72 David S. G. Goodman 1111 In considering each of these three arguments, this chapter has two aims. 2 The first is to examine in greater detail the points being made by Segal. 3 The second is to attempt to go beyond the original position about how 4 the rest of the world should approach its engagement with the govern- 5 ment of the PRC to consider ’s wider interactions with the 6 external world. In undertaking this analysis it draws on and highlights 7 additional perspectives on China’s cultural influence. 8 Segal’s article is concerned primarily with the international politics of 9 the government of the PRC as seen from the Atlantic Community, for 1011 whom it was written. It has been absolutely the norm for Chinese govern- 1 ments during the last hundred years to equate Chinese society with the 2 Chinese , specific governments and even political parties, and this 3111 equation is reflected in Segal’s article (Fitzgerald, 1994). All the same it 4 is clearly possible to distinguish between the party-state of the PRC as a 5 source of cultural activity, and Chinese society more generally. In simi- 6 larly deconstructive mood, China’s cultural influence in and North 7 America is almost certain to be different from its influence in East and 8 , and where a significant proportion of the popu- 9 lation may be Chinese. It is important to ask ‘to whom’ China matters 20111 as a source of cultural influence, as well as to what extent. 1 Essentially this chapter highlights two crucial aspects of China’s cultural 2 politics for the future, which do not always pull in the same direction. 3 The first is the role of East and Southeast Asia in China’s worldview. 4 East and Southeast Asia are China’s principal region of influence, in 5 cultural terms no less than in economics and politics. Moreover, there is 6 a clear, if sometimes less tangible relationship between, on the one hand, 7 any PRC claims to world leadership and its role in its immediate region, 8 and, on the other, China’s claims to leadership of East and Southeast 9 Asia and the influences of Chinese culture. The second is the contradic- 30111 tion between the cultural goals of the government of the PRC and the 1 current political system’s ability to deliver progress towards those goals. 2 As in economics and politics, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wants 3 to see China acknowledged as a cultural superpower. At the same time, 4 the CCP’s role in the determination of cultural production makes this 5 extremely unlikely: there is often an inherent contradiction between narrow 6 political nationalism and the wider appreciation of Chinese culture. 7 8 China as a world culture 9 40111 Segal’s contention that China has limited influence and authority, not only 1 by comparison with Europe and Atlantic , but also in comparison 2 with Japan, seems puzzling if not downright perverse. There is of course 3 no gainsaying the universal impact of American culture, as Coca Cola, 4 McDonalds, MTV, TV soap operas and Hollywood bear more than 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 73

China in East Asian and world culture 73 1111 adequate witness. European influences are also apparent not only in the 2 widespread acceptance of democratic liberalism, nationalism and capi- 3 talism, but also in the appreciation of food and wine, and literature, 4 especially as standards of living and real disposable incomes rise. 5 All the same, in his haste to argue, Segal did not interrogate the 6 complexity of the ‘global culture’ that he criticized China for having failed 7 to engage. The description of ‘global culture’ can of course be limited to 8 an Atlantic eye’s view of the spread of the influence of the United States. 9 Alternatively, global culture might be seen in more pluralistic perspec- 1011 tives, recognizing the development of other (if less dominant) cultural 1 influences on the world as a whole. There are after all manifestations of 2 Chinese culture – traditional medicine and exercise regimes, literature and 3111 films, not to mention the variety and impact of Chinese – to be 4 found almost universally. Moreover, some cultures have greater influence 5 in some countries and on some parts of the world than others. This wider 6 appreciation of global culture would seem a particularly wise strategy in 7 this case, given that in the long term China is always more likely, not 8 least for linguistic reasons and the relatively greater ease of communica- 9 tions, to have greater impact within East and Southeast Asia. 20111 While there is no denying the twentieth-century impact of Japan on 1 East and Southeast Asia, first through its colonial expansion and then 2 later since the 1950s through the scale and extent of its economic activ- 3 ities, Chinese culture seems more certainly to be at the heart of regional 4 activities in a number of ways. or at least Confucian tradi- 5111 tions are often regarded not only as the major characteristic of China but 6 also of , and some parts of Southeast Asia – especially those 7 where Chinese migration has been considerable. Difficult as it is to iden- 8 tify and generalize about culture, where Japanese culture is usually regarded 9 as inward looking and only interested in Japan itself, not least by the 30111 Japanese themselves (Hendry, 1987) China sees itself fundamentally as a 1 world culture. 2 Segal’s comments about the lack of influence of Chinese culture certainly 3 stand in stark contrast to received wisdom. Even when acknowledging 4 the limits to the generalization, almost every other commentator since 5 Fairbank has long identified East Asia in terms of the common elements 6 of Chinese cultural heritage (Fairbank et al., 1960). Indeed, for many, 7 the apparent economic success of the early was at least in part 8 attributable to this background. In its triumphalist report of 1993, the 9 hailed the ‘economic miracle’ of an East Asian development 40111 characterized by ‘rapid growth and decreasing inequality’ (World Bank, 1 1993). While the World Bank did not explicitly mention the importance 2 of cultural factors, other commentators making similar arguments and 3 later building on the World Bank Report quite explicitly emphasized the 4111 role of Confucianism in the emergence of regional economic success (Levy 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 74

74 David S. G. Goodman 1111 Jr, 1992: 15). Although there was some variability in the Confucianism 2 identified in this way, common characteristics tended to include a stress 3 on social order and the family. 4 Imperial China was certainly the source of considerable cultural, as 5 well as political, influence throughout East Asia. It contributed elements 6 of Confucian statecraft and a popular Confucian , as well as 7 Confucian ethics in family and personal relations, to the surrounding 8 states. came to Mount Wutai in (in today’s 9 Province) from India, and moved from Shanxi to and Japan. 1011 Unsurprisingly, given the role of texts in both Confucianism and Buddhism, 1 became a common script, and as in China, being able 2 to read and write became the mark of the educated 3111 throughout the region. Trade among the countries of East Asia was at 4 times extensive, leading among other things to shared cultures in paint- 5 ings and ceramics. 6 Segal’s article does not deny these earlier Imperial cultural influences, 7 and neither is there anything in his other writings to suggest that was the 8 case. His argument in ‘Does China Matter?’ is that China no longer 9 continues to exert such influence and authority in the region. He had a 20111 constant aversion to the China exceptionalism sometimes associated with 1 academic observers of China. This was a discussion that could never be 2 resolved. Segal was talking about China as the government of the PRC: 3 while sometimes the China-experts might accept that equation, often they 4 differentiate between Chinese society and culture on the one hand and 5 any particular state or government on the other. 6 In the twentieth century it is undeniable that the influence and authority 7 of the Chinese state declined under , Republic and (perhaps more 8 variably) the PRC. However, this did not always lead those in the East 9 and Southeast Asian region to reject the influence and importance of 30111 Chinese culture. Necessarily, in the era of modern nationalism, the previous 1 and sometimes much earlier regional position of Imperial China led later 2 to both resentment and resistance. At the same time, even where polit- 3 ical contestation between states resulted, this did not lead to the total 4 rejection of Chinese culture. For example, while there has been a notice- 5 able decline in Japanese appreciation of Chinese culture during the last 6 20 years, the attraction for things Chinese remains strong, including not 7 just material culture but also religious ideas and influences. 8 Even at the level of more there would appear to be 9 little to support Segal’s contention. Every visitor to the countries of East 40111 and Southeast Asia relatively rapidly comes up against various manifes- 1 tations of Chinese culture, if only because of the apparent ubiquity of the 2 migration chains across the region that started in about 1000 AD. There 3 are Chinese communities across the whole region, including not only the 4 more obvious commercial classes of Southeast Asia, but also the substantial 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 75

China in East Asian and world culture 75 1111 and more recent Chinese communities in Japan, and to a much lesser 2 extent in Korea. 3 These communities have developed Chinese schools, Chinese 4 and Chinese shops. In many cases they have developed their own local 5 Chinese literatures, and their presence has often led to linguistic and culin- 6 ary influences. Every has a Chinese district, as do many smaller 7 towns and cities, and there are both media and even 8 social and political organizations. Of course, the degree of Chinese cultural 9 manifestation is variable. There are countries, such as Indonesia, where 1011 it is only during the last few years that open Chinese public behaviour 1 has once again become possible. 2 In contrast, manifestations of Japanese culture are considerably more 3111 limited. Despite the massive scale of Japanese investment in the countries 4 of East and Southeast Asia, there seems to be only a limited purchase for 5 Japanese culture. Certainly the of Korea and more particularly 6 bear clear influences from the era of Japanese colonialism. In 7 Taiwan’s case this remains even celebrated to some extent, reflecting the 8 extent to which many local and indigenous people in Taiwan feel (partic- 9 ularly in retrospect) that Japan brought liberation as well as conquest. 20111 Certainly, too, a number of Japanese cartoon characters, most notably 1 Hello Kitty, have become fairly widespread throughout the region, espe- 2 cially among the young. For the most part though, Japanese cultural 3 manifestations are limited and tend to be celebrated (including in China) 4 only in themselves rather than leading to a wider influence for Japan. 5111 On the other hand, Segal’s contrast of China and Japan is useful in 6 helping to understand the scope and role of Chinese culture. In a number 7 of ways, it could be argued that there is no meaningful Chinese culture, 8 or at least not in the ways that countries like Japan, currently have national 9 cultures. Since the late nineteenth century and the the 30111 Japanese state has constantly intervened to create a national conscious- 1 ness and identity, and this codification of Japanese culture was an essential 2 part of post-Second World reconstruction with the development of 3 new ‘nihonjinron’ (theories of Japaneseness) (Nakane, 1986). In contrast, 4 the concept of ‘Chinese culture’ has always been and remains one of 5 limited utility – lacking in coherence and essentially contested (Shih, 2002), 6 particularly in the last 20 years within the PRC (Guo, 2003). The expla- 7 nation of this phenomenon lies in the relative novelty of ‘China’, unresolved 8 debates over the meaning of , and last, but by no 9 means least, the size and scale of the area ruled by the Chinese state. 40111 Despite claims by the CCP and the PRC, in their constitutions and 1 other foundational statements, to present solutions to problems faced by 2 ‘the ’ and ‘China’s sovereignty’ during late Imperial China 3 as a result of ‘foreign capitalist imperialism and domestic feudalism’ (Hu, 4111 1991: 1), these are essentially ex post facto rationalizations of events. 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 76

76 David S. G. Goodman 1111 ‘China’ did not come into existence until the establishment of the Republic, 2 and the various terms for it in Modern (most notably 3 Zhongguo and Zhonghua – both referring to the ‘Central Plains’ which 4 were the location of pre-modern moral authority) are late nineteenth- 5 century neologisms. Before the establishment of the Republic, the Empire 6 was designated only by the ruling . There was no sovereign Chinese 7 state. The Empire was the world, ruled over by the – the ‘Son 8 of Heaven’ – and defined not by boundaries but by allegiance to the 9 Emperor (Shih, 2002: especially 2 ff.). 1011 Neither were there any ‘Chinese people’, let alone citizens, before the 1 twentieth century. The idea of a nation was an anathema to an Empire 2 that had prided itself on its social and cultural diversity (Hevia, 1995). 3111 The inhabitants of the Empire spoke different languages, had a variety of 4 belief systems, ate vastly different diets and cuisines, and lived different 5 life-styles. This variety should be no great surprise, given the size and 6 scale of the Empire. Although China is often implicitly compared to a 7 European nation-state, the more appropriate comparison might be with 8 Europe itself. One result is that there was a far stronger individual iden- 9 tity to native place and locality than to the Empire, which became apparent 20111 as the political system began to change at the beginning of the twentieth 1 century, and with the emergence of a strong provincialism (Levenson, 2 1967a: 158). Another result is that there was both an Imperial Culture 3 and a series of local cultures. The Imperial Culture centred on the Court 4 and the arts related to education (necessary for Imperial service): essay 5 and writing, and painting. Material and social cultures 6 (including language) were essentially localized. 7 The movement to recognize and develop a Chinese nation dates only 8 from the first decade of the twentieth century, and is usually attributed 9 to Zhang Taiyan, who sought to encourage feelings of solidarity to over- 30111 ride the ’s intense provincialism (Rankin, 1986; Wong, 1989). It 1 coincides with the first tentative attempts to create and use a standard 2 colloquial Chinese language, seen by its promoters as essential in educating 3 people and bringing them together. The nationalist project gained 4 momentum with the collapse of the Empire, the establishment of the 5 Republic, the of 1919, and the subsequent estab- 6 lishment of both the Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party. 7 In general, its success is seen in the extent to which people across the 8 various provinces now privilege China rather than their own locality 9 (Goodman, 2002) and have in the process absorbed public beliefs about 40111 the longevity of the Chinese nation, the Chinese state and the Chinese 1 people, all in only about 80 years. 2 At the same time, Chinese nationalism has achieved nowhere near the 3 unanimity of purpose achieved in Japan. From the beginning, the concep- 4 tualism of Chinese nationalism has been a domestic political issue, argued 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 77

China in East Asian and world culture 77 1111 over by political parties, groups and associations – each of whom claimed 2 to be the authentic Chinese voice, equating the fate of the Chinese nation 3 with their own fate (Fitzgerald, 1994). During the Republic there was 4 an uneasy relationship between nation and region (Gillin, 1967; Kapp, 5 1973; Fitzgerald, 1998) that still largely remains unresolved. In the era 6 of Mao-dominated politics, the PRC tried to minimize regionalism in its 7 explanation of Chinese nationalism, although, during the 1990s, consid- 8 erably more pluralism has become recognized and to a considerable 9 extent encouraged (Goodman, 2002: 853). Even more pertinently for the 1011 definition of Chinese culture, there has been an almost continuous debate 1 on the extent to which Chinese heritage should be accepted or rejected 2 in the definition of the nation, as well as about the precise content of 3111 that heritage. Paradoxically, in terms of the 1990s wider-world debate 4 about an East Asian development model, interpretations of Confucian- 5 ism have been extremely varied (Levenson, 1958; Louie, 1980) and 6 issues of its significance and meaning for Chinese nationalism and the 7 definition of Chinese culture have remained matters of intense debate in 8 the eras of Xiaoping, and (de Bary, 1991; 9 Guo, 2003: 91). 20111 The consequences of this and practice are a definition of Chinese 1 culture that is both complex and contested – not to say occasionally 2 elusive. Contemporary Chinese culture inherits both the imperial impera- 3 tive to be a world culture and the twentieth-century requirement of a 4 more specific nationalism, with the two often in tension. Equally, there 5111 is a tension between, on the one hand, a political nationalism that seeks 6 to emulate Japanese nation-building and emphasize a revolutionary break 7 with the past (and indeed often the CCP’s revolution) and, on the other, 8 a cultural nationalism that constantly refers to China’s past – if with little 9 agreement about the content of that past. In addition, there is the some- 30111 what circular attempt to define Chinese culture in terms of the practices 1 and beliefs of those who are now taken generally to be ‘Chinese’ – the 2 descendants of those whose origins can be traced back to having lived 3 under the rule of one of the imperial , regardless of their current 4 place of residence. In among all these competing influences there is also 5 the discourse of race, that seeks to define Chinese culture in terms of the 6 Chinese people and their civilizing influence (Dikotter, 1992). 7 8 The party-state and culture 9 40111 Segal’s argument about China’s cultural engagement with the world is 1 that, in the period since 1978, the government of the PRC has been more 2 concerned to limit external cultural influences coming in than with the 3 development of its own external influences outside its borders. It is certainly 4111 the case that in the post-Mao Zedong reform era the PRC ceased its 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 78

78 David S. G. Goodman 1111 attempts at the export of revolution, perfunctory though those were at 2 times. Equally it is the case that in the wake of the Tiananmen crack- 3 down of 1989, the CCP and the PRC held the Voice of America and the 4 BBC responsible for inciting the youth rebellion that had preoccupied 5 throughout May of that year. In the wake of June’s clearing of 6 Tiananmen Square, the party-state took action to attempt to limit European 7 and US media activities in the PRC. It is also the case that state author- 8 ities are anxious, and possibly over-anxious, about the impact that 9 American and European culture may have on the PRC. The early 2003 1011 request for the Rolling Stones to remove ‘Let’s Spend the Night Together’ 1 from their repertoire, or alter the words, during a planned series of concerts 2 (that eventually did not take place because of the SARS outbreak) is one 3111 trivial, yet clear and recent, example of such anxiety leading to action. 4 More serious has been the system of Internet ‘blocking’ (exclusion of 5 access to sites) introduced within the PRC since 2001 (Zittrain and 6 Edelman, 2003). 7 All the same, it would be mistaken to draw the conclusion from these 8 observations that, since the beginning of the 1990s, the PRC had either 9 withdrawn into its shell, or significantly altered its belief in the need for 20111 external cultural outreach. The development and international promotion 1 of the Chinese film industry (notwithstanding attempts at censorship), 2 Beijing’s eventually successful bid to host the Olympic Games (after an 3 initial defeat by Sydney) and the domestic promotion of the Chinese soccer 4 team’s participation in the 2002 World Cup are all major events that 5 suggest the PRC’s commitment to international cultural interaction. 6 Far from abandoning international involvement, the regime’s external 7 promotion of China has simply changed, with the replacement of an 8 agenda of international revolution by the more nationalist endeavour of 9 acceptance as a major world power; and through the PRC’s supplementing 30111 Europe and the United States as its major focus of attention with activ- 1 ities targeting its interactions with East and Southeast Asia. In particular, 2 the PRC has concentrated on the international promotion of Chinese 3 culture, although that may be no easy matter, not least because of the 4 tension between the goals of political and cultural nationalism. 5 The most recent changes in the PRC’s cultural outreach have been 6 shaped by three events: the reform programme engineered by Deng 7 Xiaoping in 1978 that resulted in significant changes in the relationship 8 between politics and culture; the end of the Socialist Bloc in the USSR 9 and ; and almost simultaneously the Tiananmen crack- 40111 down of 1989 and the various reactions abroad. Political reform in the 1 late 1970s led first to a radical change in the system of censorship (from 2 prior approval to the possibility of ex post facto condemnation) and the 3 commercialization of publishing that gradually but dramatically opened 4 up the space for representation of Chinese culture (Hendrischke, 1988; 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 79

China in East Asian and world culture 79 1111 Goodman, 2001). By the 1990s, there was essentially an open discussion 2 of the representation of Chinese culture, if confined largely to personnel 3 within the party-state (Dirlik, 1996). Central to the discussion of Chinese 4 culture has been the issue of whether national identity is to be concep- 5 tualized as a revolutionary break with Imperial China, or as a return to 6 the essential (often moral) purity of the past (which might also in some 7 senses be regarded as a break with the more recent revolutionary past) 8 (Guo, 2003: 75). 9 One of the historical ironies during the 1990s was that whilst the party- 1011 state held external media responsible for the problems that it faced during 1 May and June 1989 in Beijing, its longer-term reactions to those events 2 eventually resulted in considerably greater external cultural influences, and 3111 especially on the young, being manifested within the PRC. The difference, 4 however, was that these new external cultural influences came initially 5 from the Chinese communities of East and Southeast Asia, and then more 6 generally from that region, and were more immediately concerned with 7 popular rather than political culture. During the early 1990s 8 popular music (Canto-pop) from and pop music from Taiwan 9 flooded into the PRC. These were rapidly followed by other manifesta- 20111 tions of youth culture from around the region, including magazines, clothes 1 and music from Japan, , , , Thailand and 2 even . 3 The cause of this sea change was at least in part the situation of relative 4 isolation in international circles that the PRC found itself in following 5111 4 June 1989. Western European states and America turned their backs 6 on almost all interactions with the PRC for varying periods of 6 to 18 7 months. The USSR was in the process of removing the communist 8 monopoly, both domestically and in Eastern Europe. Faced with the 9 prospects of isolation, the PRC turned to improving its relations with 30111 the states of East and Southeast Asia. Relations with most of these 1 (with the exception of Japan) had been poor or formally non-existent for 2 some time before the 1990s because of the and those states’ 3 concerns about communism and revolution, and the PRC’s role in their 4 promotion around the region. 5 For a variety of reasons, this rapprochement would probably have even- 6 tuated sooner rather than later in any case. The PRC’s changed economic 7 outlook after 1978, as well as its abandonment of its commitment to 8 international revolution, the impact of changed PRC economic develop- 9 ment policy on international investment in East and Southeast Asia, which 40111 was rapidly being perceived as a problem by several of the states of the 1 region (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand) who felt that funds were being 2 directed away from them and towards the PRC; and the collapse of the 3 European Socialist bloc, all contributed to this development. Nonetheless, 4111 the events of 1989–1990 provided a catalyst for change in the PRC’s 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 80

80 David S. G. Goodman 1111 foreign policy that also led to formal diplomatic relations with South 2 Korea and several members of the ASEAN bloc, notably Indonesia and 3 Singapore, and improved relations with others, including Malaysia and 4 Thailand. 5 During the 1990s, trade and cultural interactions with the countries of 6 East and Southeast Asia grew so significantly that several commentators 7 started examining the porousness of the PRC’s borders and the possible 8 consequences for the development of the Chinese state (Goodman & Segal, 9 1994). Somewhat paradoxically, given the hostility that used to charac- 1011 terize attitudes in the countries of Southeast Asia towards their local 1 Chinese communities, the PRC’s appeal to the region has been based on 2 its promotion of Chinese culture, as well as on trade. The obvious explan- 3111 ation of this paradox would seem to be the PRC’s (not inaccurate) reading 4 that much entrepreneurial expertise in the rest of East and Southeast Asia 5 was in the hands of Chinese business people. 6 Tourism within the PRC from East and Southeast Asia was an obvious 7 starting point for the development of the promotion of Chinese culture, 8 for all, but particularly during the early 1990s directed at encouraging 9 Overseas Chinese to visit (and presumably invest) in their ancestral 20111 places. While tourism to the PRC from the United States and Europe 1 eventually regained its pre-1989 levels and began to grow again, the expan- 2 sion of tourism from East and Southeast Asia grew even more rapidly 3 during the 1990s. Another channel for the encouragement of Chinese 4 cultural influence in East and Southeast Asia has been the development 5 of Chinese language publications, in particular the overseas edition of 6 People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao): the CCP’s official daily. This has been 7 remarkable not only for its open circulation in Southeast Asia, which well 8 within living memory would previously have been impossible, not to say 9 dangerous, in most cases, but also because the overseas edition of the 30111 People’s Daily is printed in the full-form Chinese characters (sometimes 1 described as ‘traditional’ characters) that are still generally used to write 2 Modern Standard Chinese outside the PRC. Given the CCP’s commitment 3 to simplified Chinese characters – a potent of political national- 4 ism and the need to create a fundamental break with past practice – this 5 represents a considerable compromise to the end of extending cultural 6 influence. 7 All the same, there are clear limits to the extent to which considera- 8 tions of a wider Chinese culture might take precedence over the narrower 9 concerns of political nationalism in the PRC. A most obvious and recent 40111 example of this kind of contradiction was the award of the 2000 Nobel 1 Prize for Literature to Xingjian. Gao is primarily a dramatist and 2 was well known in the PRC during the for Wild Man and Bus- 3 stop, performed there at that time. He is also a painter and writer of 4 fiction, including Soul Mountain, which bore the prize citation. Since 1987 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 81

China in East Asian and world culture 81 1111 he has lived in Paris, and is now a French citizen, although he writes all 2 his plays and fiction in Modern Standard Chinese. While then Premier 3 Zhu Rongji congratulated Gao as a French citizen, others within the party- 4 state poured scorn on Gao’s achievement as not representative of 5 contemporary (citing other preferred writers still living 6 within the PRC) or as a politically motivated attack on the PRC (BBC 7 12 October 2000; People’s Daily: 13 October 2000). A more enlightened 8 cultural nationalism might have interpreted the award as a triumph for 9 Chinese culture. That it did not, underlines the continuing place of the 1011 CCP’s own particular politics in the determination of Chinese culture. 1 2 The PRC and the Overseas Chinese 3111 4 Segal’s argument that China does not play a significant role for Chinese 5 around the world is at first sight a remarkably off-beat, unorthodox and 6 provocative comment. Moreover, relative statements about the strength 7 of India’s connections with Indians as opposed to China’s with the Chinese 8 could really only have been made by someone living in Britain. In general, 9 migrants almost always maintain connections to their country of origin, 20111 even if for long periods they may only be emotional or psychological, 1 whether they be Chinese in Sydney or Indians, Pakistanis, Bengalis or Sri 2 Lankans in Britain. In the UK, China does not loom large in the academic, 3 let alone the public consciousness. Migrants and their descendants from 4 the Indian sub- significantly outnumber any kinds of Chinese 5111 residents. Even so, there were politically inspired disturbances of political 6 order in London’s during the late 1960s that took their cue 7 from Mao Zedong’s . On the whole, elsewhere in the 8 world where Chinese are the more numerous migrant community (of the 9 two), the links with the PRC are more in evidence, if more recently for 30111 social and economic rather than for political reasons. 1 The 1990s saw two major stimuli to thinking about international 2 networks of Chinese. The first was the sizeable out-migration of young 3 Chinese from the PRC in the aftermath of the entry of the PLA into 4 Tiananmen Square in June 1989, although not solely occasioned by that 5 event. The second was recognition of the phenomenal growth of the PRC 6 economy, fuelled by its international links, that led to considerable atten- 7 tion in both academic publications and the mass media on the varieties 8 and extent of Chinese networks around the world. 9 In the early 1990s a number of commentators beyond the borders of 40111 the PRC seized on the importance of the Chinese living elsewhere – the 1 ‘Overseas Chinese’ – as an important engine of economic growth. In a 2 contemporaneously influential article, The Economist, for example, high- 3 lighted the leading roles of the 55 million (according to its calculations) 4111 Overseas Chinese in both their countries of residence and in the more 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 82

82 David S. G. Goodman 1111 recent development of the PRC. The influence of these Overseas Chinese 2 was identified not only in East and Southeast Asia, where they were 3 (and remain) concentrated, but also in substantial numbers in the US 4 (1.8 million) Canada (0.6 million) and New Zealand (1.8 million) 5 (1 million) and Europe (0.6 million) (The Economist, 6 18 July 1992, p. 21). 7 In their own countries of residence, these Overseas Chinese were repre- 8 sented as wielding disproportionate, significant and often controlling 9 economic influence, while they were also identified as the vehicle of 1011 economic change for the coastal economies of the PRC (Baldinger, 1992; 1 Yamaguchi, 1993). The latter function was most obviously demonstrated 2 for those societies of East Asia that are predominantly Chinese – Hong 3111 Kong, Singapore and Taiwan – and where, during the late 1980s and 4 early 1990s, whole industries moved from their original base into the PRC 5 (Asia Research Centre, 1992). Elsewhere, the spotlight fell on the small 6 Chinese populations in a number of different countries in Southeast 7 Asia and their apparently much larger economic impact. In Cambodia, 8 where 5 per cent of the population were said to control 70 per cent of 9 the economy; in Indonesia where 4 per cent of the population were 20111 attributed with a 73 per cent economic control; in Malaysia where 29 1 per cent were said to control 61 per cent; in the where 2 per 2 cent were regarded as responsible for 60 per cent; and in Thailand where 3 10 per cent were held to control 81 per cent of the economy (Goodman 4 1998: 143). 5 The Economist provided perspective on the scale of influence of the 6 Overseas Chinese by aggregating data: 7 8 Overall, one conservative estimate puts the 1990 ‘GNP’ of Asia’s 51m 9 overseas Chinese, Taiwan and Hong Kong included, at $450 billion 30111 – a quarter bigger than China’s then GNP, and, per head, at about 1 80% of the level of Spain or Israel. 2 3 According to The Economist, Overseas Chinese economic success was 4 attributable to two factors. One was the ties of personal acquaintance, 5 trust and obligation said to be at the core of Chinese society. The other 6 was the high rate of savings of the Overseas Chinese: Worldwide, the 7 overseas Chinese probably hold liquid assets (not including securities) 8 worth $1.5 trillion – 2 trillion. For a rough comparison, in Japan, 9 with twice as many people, bank deposits in 1990 totalled $3 trillion 40111 (The Economist, 18 July 1992: 21). 1 Building on this kind of analysis, other commentators claimed that the 2 interactions of China and the Chinese in East and Southeast Asia had laid 3 the foundations for a new economic ‘superpower’ to rival the US, Europe 4 and Japan (Howell, 1992; Weidenbaum, 1993; East Asia Analytical Unit, 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 83

China in East Asian and world culture 83 1111 DFAT, Australia, 1995). Still other commentators went spectacularly even 2 further, to argue that ethnic Chinese identity might supersede the need 3 for states and lead to a reduced role for inter-state activity within the 4 region (Ong and Nonini, 1997: 323). In the words of one author, there 5 was every possibility that a ‘Chinese Commonwealth’ will emerge as a 6 development from a China whose ‘very definition . . . is up for grabs’ 7 (Kao, 1993). 8 These portrayals of the potential relationship between the PRC and the 9 Overseas Chinese are the essential context to Segal’s related comment in 1011 ‘Does China Matter?’. Although undoubtedly overstated and probably 1 somewhat misdirected, Segal pointed to the need for perspective and the 2 danger of reading too much into the emergence of a ‘’. Such 3111 ideas are inherently interesting and challenging, but they fundamentally 4 misunderstand the structures of Overseas Chinese transnationalism. The 5 unity of the Overseas Chinese in East and Southeast Asia is a categoric 6 construct, more a function of analysis than evident in their economic and 7 political behaviour. 8 The concepts of either a Chinese Commonwealth or Overseas Chinese 9 unity (with or without the PRC) may be useful devices for drawing atten- 20111 tion to the processes contributing to the PRC’s economic development 1 during the early 1990s, and may even have some appeal to certain kinds 2 of Chinese nationalism. It may indeed be a particularly useful rhetoric 3 for encouraging Chinese outside the PRC to invest or engage in other 4 business activities there. In 1992, for example, Yuchuan, Director of 5111 the Overseas Chinese College of University made one such 6 attempt: ‘The chances are becoming greater for the 24 million Chinese 7 who have attained citizenship in Southeast Asian nations to come to realize 8 once again their common heritage and cultural traditions, as economic 9 cooperation grows.’ (China Daily, 22 October 1992). 30111 At the same time, there are clear social, political and economic limits 1 to the notion of Greater China, which are sometimes too easily over- 2 looked by many commentators. The social limits are acute, not least since 3 there are many common (flawed) assumptions by Europeans about the 4 homogeneity of ‘the Chinese’. The essentialization of the Chinese in 5 the PRC as a single culture has, as already noted, more to do with the 6 emergence of twentieth-century nationalism than with any social homo- 7 geneity. When the various Chinese of Southeast Asia outside the PRC are 8 brought into consideration, the meaning of being Chinese in a social sense 9 becomes very broad indeed. Many of the Chinese of the region speak 40111 no Chinese language at all and are significantly assimilated in their host 1 societies, through state action and discrimination, no less than through 2 length of stay. Migrating from the Chinese mainland, during the colonial 3 era they rapidly became the business class of Southeast Asia – although 4111 it is hotly debated whether this was for cultural or structural reasons – 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 84

84 David S. G. Goodman 1111 a settled minority in each country who effectively operated as the region’s 2 domestic capitalists (Mackie, 1988). Earlier reservations from the host 3 societies were compounded during the latter half of the twentieth century 4 by political discrimination that resulted as a response to the establishment 5 of a Chinese communist party-state. 6 To cope with hostile circumstances, the Chinese of Southeast Asia 7 turned at a very early stage in their migration to more reliable particu- 8 laristic ties requiring relationships of long-term reciprocity: common place 9 of origin, shared language, family and kinship (Lever-Tracy et al., 1996). 1011 While these may be in a general way common characteristics of the Chinese 1 in the region, in practice they necessarily reflect competition and division 2 rather than any unity of action, purpose or mythical conspiracy. For 3111 each Chinese cooperation and interaction is within the security of shared 4 reference groups, rarely moving beyond those boundaries to engage others 5 described as ‘Chinese’. Such relationships with shared reference groups 6 became particularly important during the late 1980s and early 1990s, as 7 the Chinese resident in East and Southeast Asia became involved econom- 8 ically in the PRC – preferring to interact with their families’ place of 9 origin on the Chinese mainland. 20111 Even in East Asia, there is little social homogeneity about the Chinese 1 of either Taiwan or Hong Kong. Taiwan is the most obviously hetero- 2 geneous, with a major social division between ‘mainlanders’ who arrived 3 with the defeat of the Nationalist Party on the mainland of China in 1949 4 and much longer Taiwan-based communities of - and Hakka- 5 speakers. That division has been the basis of politics since the early 1990s 6 – although without an exact of support – which has certainly 7 developed different attitudes to the meaning of Chinese identity. In 8 Hong Kong, society and politics are more divided along socio-economic 9 lines, but even in that case language groups and ancestral homes in China 30111 create recognizably separate communities, which are especially active 1 in the business world. Despite, or perhaps because of, the dominance of 2 Cantonese speakers, there are organized communities of and 3 Indonesian Chinese (those who fled Indonesia during the 1960s) who 4 exercise disproportionate influence. 5 As these comments on social diversity suggest, there are clear political 6 limits to the development of a Greater China. Hong Kong became part 7 of the PRC in the middle of 1997, but Taiwan remains apart. Moreover, 8 Taiwan’s political relations are not simply a function of the PRC’s domestic 9 politics but also of its own, where significant sections of the population 40111 are unlikely to seek closer relations to a Beijing government of whatever 1 persuasion, and others are hostile principally to a communist party-state. 2 For their part, the comparative advantage of the Chinese of Southeast 3 Asia would be lost through closer association with the PRC. They gain 4 precisely because, as entrepreneurs, they are outside and separate from 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 85

China in East Asian and world culture 85 1111 the PRC. Chinese identity has clearly been important in a general way in 2 the development of relations between the Chinese of Southeast Asia and 3 the PRC, but the extent of divided loyalties can be easily overstated. To 4 quote Lee Kuan Yew, in many ways the founder of Singapore, ‘We are 5 Ethnic Chinese but our stakes are in our own countries, not where our 6 ancestors came from’ (Cragg, 1996: 17). 7 Then too, the economic scale of Greater China is often exaggerated. 8 The PRC is clearly a growing economy, if from a very low base which 9 has led to impressive rates of growth for a very long period of time, 1011 with considerable potential. All the same, during the early 1990s the 1 wealth of the Overseas Chinese was significantly overstated. The calcula- 2 tion of that wealth rested, without explicit acknowledgement, on only one 3111 part of the proposed Chinese Commonwealth, namely Taiwan, which 4 contains more than 80 per cent of the aggregate domestic product of 5 the hypothesized entity, and which is more usually (pace The Economist) 6 not recognized as Overseas Chinese territory. Take Taiwan and Hong 7 Kong out of the calculation of an Overseas Chinese Empire in the making, 8 and what remains is a small but relatively buoyant Singapore economy, 9 and a series of Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia, who speak indi- 20111 vidually for themselves rather than for the Chinese of Southeast Asia. 1 Moreover, there is remarkably little economic integration among these 2 various non-PRC constituent parts of a potential Greater China. Their 3 major point of contact is in the PRC, where there are clear limits to the 4 potential for further spectacular growth of Chinese Southeast Asian 5111 involvement. 6 7 Culture, the state and the region 8 9 The PRC would certainly appear to be more limited in its role in the 30111 determination of Chinese culture than its own self-view would sometimes 1 seem to imply. Not least, this would seem to result from discussions and 2 debate about the structure and dimensions of Chinese culture, and subse- 3 quent policy uncertainty. Moreover, the hyperbole surrounding the 4 emergence of the idea of Greater China provides adequate evidence of the 5 need for greater balance in assessing the role of the government of the 6 PRC in regional, and, by extension, world affairs. By the same token, 7 however, it also provides evidence of the impact and importance of Chinese 8 culture beyond the borders of the PRC, particularly in East and Southeast 9 Asia, and the significance of that region to the international position 40111 of the PRC. 1 The dynamics of cultural influence are such that, while the party-state 2 may be divided on the definition of Chinese culture, and may not provide 3 the only source of cultural authority, the PRC may still nonetheless both 4111 benefit from the wider appreciation of China and attempt to build on it 45111 3928P DOES CHINA-A/rev2 18/11/03 4:38 pm Page 86

86 David S. G. Goodman 1111 to other ends. This usage of Chinese culture has clearly been an important 2 part of the PRC’s strategy since the early 1990s – particularly in its deal- 3 ings with governments and entrepreneurs in East and Southeast Asia. For 4 their parts, governments and entrepreneurs have most of the time 5 responded positively to the greater interaction. Entrepreneurs have found 6 a degree of ease and possibly psychological comfort in dealing with more 7 familiar partners in the PRC. Governments have found themselves in agree- 8 ment with a PRC that, as the discussion over the emergence of ‘Asian 9 values’ demonstrated, shares a common sense of regional community in 1011 many aspects of international politics. The key issue here is not the import- 1 ance of the PRC to the societies and countries of East and Southeast Asia, 2 but the extent to which it will in the longer term come to be regarded 3111 as the regional leader, and the consequences of that interaction for the 4 PRC’s role in global politics. 5 6 7 8 9 20111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 30111 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40111 1 2 3 4 45111