Quarter 2019 nd Issue 93, 2 93, Issue

and Military Justice Unity of Command of Command Unity Warrior Women Cyber Domain Cyber Tactics in the the in Tactics

JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY-THREE, 2ND QUARTER 2019 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 http://ndupress.ndu.edu

Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher VADM Frederick J. Roegge, USN, President, NDU

Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.

Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.

Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.

Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich

Assistant to Ms. Seich Jack Randolph Ostlie

Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell

Book Review Editor Frank G. Hoffman, Ph.D.

Associate Editors Patricia Strait, Ph.D., and Jack Godwin, Ph.D.

Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Advisory Committee Charles B. Cushman, Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; Col David J. Eskelund, USMC/Marine Corps War College; VADM Michael M. Gilday, USN/The Joint Staff; RADM Jeffrey A. Harley, USN/U.S. Naval War College; MG Lewis G. Irwin, USAR/Joint Forces Staff College; MG John S. Kem, USA/U.S. Army War College; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and Staff College; Brig Gen Chad T. Manske, USAF/National War College; Col William McCollough, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; LtGen Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC/The Joint Staff; LtGen Daniel J. O’Donohue, USMC/The Joint Staff; Col Evan L. Pettus, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; Brig Gen Kyle W. Robinson, USAF/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for and Resource Strategy; Brig Gen Jeremy T. Sloane, USAF/Air War College; Thomas Wingfield, J.D./College of Information and Cyberspace

Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/National War College; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/ Joint Forces Staff College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney-Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College

Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Airman runs in Air Force Marathon at Transit Center, Manas, Kyrgyzstan, September 15, 2012 (U.S. Air Force/Brett Clashman); Coastguardsman from Cutter Bertholf reunites with his wife and child after returning to homeport at Coast Guard Island in Alameda, California, October 24, 2017; Navy engineering project manager assigned to Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of dances with Djiboutians before medical clinic ribbon-cutting ceremony in Ali Oune, , January 31, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/Shawn Nickel) About the Cover In This Issue U.S. Army Soldier assigned to East Africa Response Force, deployed in support of Combined Joint Forum Task Force–Horn of Africa, helps 2 Executive Summary unload flatbed truck during mission readiness drill in Libreville, Gabon, 6 “Untapped Resources” January 17, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/ for Building Security Chris Hibben) from the Ground Up By Viva Bartkus 14 Tactical Maneuver in the Cyber Domain: Dominating the Enemy By Jennifer Leigh Phillips 21 From DOPMA to Google: Features Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Cyber as a Case Study in Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Talent Management 71 Unity of Command: . JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship Authority and Responsibility joint military and security studies journal designed to By David Blair, Jason Hughes, inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and and Thomas Mashuda over Military Justice other partners on joint and integrated operations; By Lindsay L. Rodman national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; and developments in JPME Today training and joint professional military education to 79 U.S. Africa Command and Its transform America’s military and security apparatus 32 Covert Action as an Intelligence Changing Strategic Environment to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting Subcomponent of the By William Robert Hawkins and freedom today. All published articles have been vetted through a peer-review process and cleared by the Information Instrument Brenda Jeannette Ponsford Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. By Charles Pasquale and NDU Press is the National Defense University’s Laura Johnson 87 Enhancing Unit Readiness cross-component, professional military and academic on the Southwest Border publishing house. 38 Augmenting Bloom By Cindie Blair, Juliana T. Bruns, The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the for Education in the and Scott D. Leuthner contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views Cognitive Domain of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. By Douglas E. Waters Recall and Craig R. Bullis Copyright Notice 93 Gallipoli: Lessons from the This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition of Joint Force Quarterly. Any copyrighted portions Great War on the Projection of of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted Commentary Power and Joint Forcible Entry without permission of the copyright proprietors. JFQ should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted 47 Warrior Women: 3,000 By Patrick William Naughton from or based on its content. Years in the Fight Submissions and Communications By Mary Raum JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Book Reviews research from members of the Armed Forces, 100 The Cold War and The Cold security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, 55 Military Medicine: The Gender academic specialists, and civilians from the United Gap in Trauma Training War’s Killing Fields States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration Reviewed by Walter M. Hudson to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. By Daniel P. McGarrah manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress, or write to: 102 Limiting Risk in America’s Wars Editor, Joint Force Quarterly 60 The Acquisition and Cross NDU Press Servicing Agreement: An Old Reviewed by Tom Greenwood 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) Fort Lesley J. McNair Tool for the Modern Military Washington, DC 20319 By William M. Stephens Joint Doctrine Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 104 The Insufficiency of U.S. Email: [email protected] 66 A Model for Tactical Readiness JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq Irregular Warfare Doctrine Through Strategic Opportunity 2nd Quarter, April 2019 By David A. Zelaya and Joshua Wiles By John A. Pelleriti, Michael Maloney, ISSN 1070-0692 David C. Cox, Heather J. Sullivan, J. Eric Piskura, and Montigo J. Hawkins 111 Fire for Effect: The Evolution of Joint Fires By J. Mark Berwanger 116 Joint Doctrine Update Airmen from 96th Aircraft Maintenance Unit prepare Quick Strike extended range mine for loading on to B-52 on Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, September 16, 2018, as part of exercise Valiant Shield 18 (U.S. Air Force/Zachary Bumpus)

Executive Summary

hat good is looking back? parts of society. Our view of the world General Powell’s initial vision. The Fifty years ago, one of the was far more restricted than it is today. history of JFQ’s founding has been re- W key people behind the Apollo I suspect most of our readers have a counted in this column in JFQ 85, with Moon missions was a computer scien- hard time imagining a past where such assistance from General Powell and oth- tist named Margaret Hamilton. Like boundaries existed or, more likely, why ers. Key in that recounting was the fact many young people in those days, I was some still exist even if laws removed that as Chairman, General Powell had all about becoming an astronaut and them long ago. the vision to see the need for this journal going to the Moon. While the early Now that Joint Force Quarterly has as a part of a larger effort that continues astronauts were all men, not everyone served the joint force for over a quarter today: to find ways to better integrate involved was, as proved all too well in of a century, I thought a look back might the military Services into a coherent joint the movie Hidden Figures. Until that offer a few insights about how jointness force capable of winning the Nation’s movie, I had no idea who programmed has affected the U.S. military since the wars and every other mission the military the computers that made the mission early days of the Goldwater-Nichols would be called on to accomplish. possible—and I read everything I could Department of Defense Reorganization The inaugural JFQ reflected where in the Space Race days of the 1960s. Act of 1986, when Chairman of the Joint the Joint Chiefs were on the journey to Why did I not know that story? It was Chiefs General ’s idea for jointness and their Services’ roles in that a different time—no Internet, only JFQ originated. Our first edition was effort some 7 years after the landmark three television networks, and published in the summer of 1993 after Goldwater-Nichols legislation. That issue people of color and women were often the Joint Staff and National Defense had some 13 articles and 3 book reviews, excluded from the frontlines of many University developed and executed in addition to General Powell’s remarks

2 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 and a column from my predecessor in this “to support the new naval strategy and chair, Alvin Bernstein. You can access this joint warfighting operations.” first issue online, and I think you would General Carl Mundy, the 30th com- find each article of value, some 92 issues mandant of the Marine Corps, stated the later. Here is what I saw by looking back. clear definition of jointness of that period In the first section, readers learned as he saw it, “Future military success that each Service chief had a vision for also depend on maintaining a system of his Service to follow, which reflected joint warfare that draws upon the unique his Title 10 responsibilities to organize, strengths of each service, while providing train, and equip as his predecessors had the means for effectively integrating them done—but at least with a tip of the hat to to achieve the full combat potential of the becoming part of the joint force. In 1993, Armed Forces.” The commandant would the had dissolved and the place the Marine Expeditionary Unit and “Peace Dividend” was the focus of many Marine Air Ground Task Force at the in the policy circles of governments in the center of capabilities that the Marines were West. We were just three summers after ready to provide in the integrated strategy Operation Desert Storm, but Saddam was of the Navy and the joint force. still in power. The Joint Chiefs’ views Picking up directly on the idea of reflected this new reality: Army Chief of a “cool and lively debate,” as General Cover of Joint Force Quarterly 1, Summer 1993 Staff General Gordon Sullivan summed Powell offered as JFQ’s focus in his (NDU Press) up the moment by stating, “International opening column, Air Force Chief of Staff issues require a broader appreciation of General Merrill McPeak offered that primarily on the bipolar world until the the threat—from the unitary and relatively “the Cold War was a contest of ideas demise of the Soviet Union. predictable adversary we knew in the Cold and, in the end, freedom won out.” Jeremiah remarked on the exploding War, to the diverse, ambiguous threats General McPeak, ever an iconoclast, took world population and the resulting lack that we confront today.” He accepted the this opportunity to suggest topics that of resources resulting in competition harsh reality of a reduced force in coming aspiring authors should write about in for food, water, and safe places to live. years but in spending that would keep JFQ, a unique call from among the chiefs’ Interestingly, he commented on the pace with the economy. General Sullivan articles. Unlike the other Joint Chiefs, responsibility of the world community fully supported the idea of jointness and he did not discuss any specific Air Force to deal with “genocidal crimes, such as made it clear where the Army was headed, strategy; instead he asked questions about those committed by the Khmer Rouge in “There is unmatched power in the syner- how the military did business in 1993. Cambodia. . . . The right to national sov- gistic capabilities of joint operations.” He He strongly believed in the power of ereignty ought not to be absolute in cases saw the need for joint operations to “be divesting the military of functions that of genocide any more than child abuse the norm at every level of command.” he believed would be best accomplished carried out in a private home should be Those of you with recent field experience by civilian industry. Presaging a soon-to- beyond the reach of criminal law.” will know if that has happened. convene commission that would review Additionally, Admiral Jeremiah Admiral Frank Kelso wrote about the the relationships of the Services to each saw the need to combine technologi- Navy’s shift in strategies from open ocean other, General McPeak suggested a revisit cal advancement with “organizational combat “toward joint operations from of the roles and missions and the central- adaptability,” or, as he called it, “learning the sea.” The admiral noted that “[after] ization of support in Defense agencies. curve dominance.” He defined this re- Desert Storm the Navy has taken steps to Decentralization from how the Air Force quirement as “the ability to develop the improve its ability to work in the joint operated to the logistics of the support of tactics, organizations, training programs, arena in operations, planning, procure- the Armed Forces should be examined in and warfighting doctrines to exploit new ment, and administration and to improve his view. His title “Ideas Count” could be technology effectively.” Reflecting the communications between the staff of the the unofficial motto of JFQ. rising view of warfare in the post–Desert Chief of Naval Operations and the Joint Following the Service chiefs, the sec- Storm period, the admiral suggested that Staff and between the Department of the ond Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the joint force now could operate in such a Navy and the Department of Defense.” Admiral David Jeremiah, saw a world of way that would leverage new technologies. He recognized the fiscal realities of the growing regional conflicts with the de- While the debates over this balance of end of the Cold War as well but took mise of what we seem to be headed back human and technological prowess con- the challenge to refocus the budget by into—great power competition. He saw tinue today, the admiral noted that due to moving $1.2 billion ($2 billion in 2019 the beginning of a shift away from the the world’s best military education system, dollars) in the Navy and Marine budgets Cold War experience, that is, multilateral our advantage would always be in our and bilateral security agreements based “[military] officers who, while well trained

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Eliason 3 Hospitalman Ronda Rollins stands guard at front gate of Fleet Hospital Five compound in during Operation Desert Storm, February 1, 1991 (U.S. Navy Reserve/Milton Savage) in their technical specialties, can also value of joint professional military educa- provided an outstanding precedent for calmly gaze into the eye of the tiger when tion, stating that even though “jointness Recall. It also created a precedent for it comes to problems of international must permeate the curricula of the allowing fairly junior officers, in compari- politics, grand strategy, force moderniza- intermediate and senior Service colleges, son to the others I have mentioned, to be tion and restructuring, or the complex it should not do so at the expense of published in JFQ. consequences of future technology.” I can ignoring instruction on individual Service In this edition of JFQ, our Forum attest to the strength of the continuing perspectives which remain fundamental leads off with an interesting article from debate on this point in our professional to understanding joint warfare.” Former Viva Bartkus that discusses the world military education classrooms a quarter of Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense of “right of bang,” where a business a century later. for Special Operations and Low Intensity proposition between the military and The rest of the inaugural JFQ lineup Conflict Seth Cropsey wrote about the industry led to effective execution of the was and remains impressive for the range limits of jointness as he saw the concept by-with-through concept in Honduras. of military scholars, policy experts, and as defying definition. His article deserves Looking to integrate the physical do- senior officers, including two theater another look as a compass check on our mains within the cyber domain, Jennifer commanders, former defense officials, and current joint status. In an excerpt of their Phillips provides us with the requirements research experts. Looking at the table of work from a RAND study, Rear Admiral to best advantage the joint force today. contents, the titles themselves show the James Winnefeld, USN (Ret.), and Dana Even if the military were to succeed in valuable range of ideas even in that early Johnson walked our readers through that integrating all its efforts in all domains, time. Here are some highlights. epic application of coalition airpower David Blair, Jason Hughes, and Thomas Steven Peter Rosen discussed the issue followed by a massive combined arms Mashuda help us see that recruiting, of whether Service redundancies were attack on Saddam, removing the Iraqis hiring, and retaining the right people to wasteful or value added. Robert from Kuwait. In the last article, then-Ma- work cyber is just as essential as any other Doughty, USA, then leading the History jor Richard Hooker, USA, and Second specialty but presents specific challenges Department at West Point, discussed the Christopher Coglianese

4 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 in today’s highly competitive commercial governments of Africa, William Hawkins in chief, changes in staff, and the styles information technology world. and Brenda Ponsford offer a new U.S. of the presentation, plus having added JPME Today provides two excellent Africa Command approach to helping a virtual and very successful online ver- articles from faculty members engaged our partners in the region. Closer to sion of the journal, I believe Joint Force in advancing the education proposition home, Cindie Blair, Juliana Bruns, and Quarterly continues to meet the mission in ways that meet former Secretary Scott Leuthner describe how Joint Task General Powell gave us in 1993. I am James Mattis’s challenge in the National Force North is developing innovative proud of our accomplishments and am Defense Strategy. As information con- training that enhances combat readiness equally proud of my teammates who tinues to dominate our thinking in while accomplishing missions on the U.S. work behind the scenes to make JFQ joint doctrine and warfighting, Charles Southwest border. happen. We promise you that our team Pasquale and Laura Johnson describe As we look back in Recall, returning here at the National Defense University, how covert action is used to support to the Great War of a century ago, Patrick Joint Staff, Defense Media Agency (that intelligence as a part of our national Naughton takes us deep into the Gallipoli hosts our Web site), and Government information instrument of power. While Campaign in April 1915, one which Publishing Office will continue to sup- Bloom’s Taxonomy has long been at the fought in as a young port the cool and lively debate of issues core of theories on how best to provide man, to show us how this multidomain that matter to the joint force, just as education to any group of students, operation is a valuable case study for General Powell hoped we would. All we Douglas Waters and Craig Bullis offer today’s joint planners. Rounding out this need is you to bring us the ideas to make suggestions on how to augment this issue are three outstanding book reviews that conversation continue. JFQ framework in order to help those stu- on works that use the past as a means to dents who learn in different ways than inform future operations. Joint Doctrine William T. Eliason Bloom anticipated. has an important article from the team of Editor in Chief A JFQ noted alumna, Mary Raum, John Pelleriti, Michael Maloney, David returns with an excellent review of Cox, Heather Sullivan, J. Eric Piskura, women in combat that addresses a true and Montigo Hawkins that discusses blind spot in our staff and war college problems with current irregular warfare curriculums. Her discussion is much in doctrine. Helping see the potential dis- line with my personal discoveries on the agreements after the September 2018 space program mentioned above. After release of Joint Publication 3-60, Joint a bit of a delay, Daniel McGarrah, the Targeting, J. Mark Berwanger suggests first noncommissioned officer to win the this debate falls into the definition of Secretary of Defense Essay Competition, “fires” among the Services. And, as highlights a number of issues that always, we provide you with the latest should be addressed in how we treat update of joint doctrine development. wounded women in combat. Following In future columns, I will be looking up on our recent discussion of the into other editions in that first year of by-with-through approach, William JFQ because I think those perspectives Stephens discusses the nuts and bolts of offer us a good view of how our joint how to support the approach with a sim- views have evolved and how some ple but effective tool. Recounting the remain very well in place. As one com- value of tactical operations in advancing parison to consider, that first issue had theater security cooperation plans, no women authors or issues related to David Zelaya and Joshua Wiles discuss them. This issue presents 31 authors of exercise Garuda Shield 17, where the which 8 are women. I believe we are all authors were engaged in making new made better for hearing from a range partnerships happen. of views. As General Powell said in the Leading off Features, another inaugural issue, JFQ’s “purpose is to alumna—with the unofficial record for spread the word about our team, to most viral online JFQ article—Lindsay provide for a free give-and-take of ideas Rodman, returns to help us under- among a wide range of people from stand the issues involved at the nexis of every corner of the military.” military justice, command authorities, I stand in awe of how well our in- and responsibilities, particularly in the augural issue was constructed and how area of sexual violence. Looking at durable the format seems to have been. the impact of “dark money” on the After 25 years, even with different editors

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Eliason 5 Despite presence of armed forces in Honduras, children rarely leave home, even during daytime, and gangs restrict families’ movements by imposing “invisible borders” between gang territories, 2016 (EU Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations/Antonio Aragón Renuncio)

rug cartels and gangs have made “Untapped Resources” Honduras one of the most violent D places on Earth. The success of U.S. maritime interdiction operations in the Caribbean has pushed narcotraf- for Building Security fickers to adopt strategic land transport routes through Central America, con- tributing to high levels of gang violence from the Ground Up in San Pedro Sula and instability in the Aguan Valley in northern Honduras. By Viva Bartkus The clearest indication of just how bad the Honduran security situation has become is that mothers are sending their 8-year-olds unaccompanied on We knew we were winning when gang leaders started quietly “the Beast” through Mexico for merely the chance of a better life in the United sending their sons and younger brothers to us for jobs. States. Asked by U.S. Theater Special —Command Sergeant Major Joff Celleri, USA Operations Command–South in 2014 7th Special Forces Group to develop a more comprehensive San Pedro Sula, Honduras, 2014 theater security plan, Soldiers from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) launched an unconventional partnership with Amer- Dr. Viva Bartkus is an Associate Professor of Management at the University of Notre Dame. This article would not have been possible without the extensive collaboration of Professor Emily Block, Mr. Mike ican and Honduran business leaders Nevens, and Charles Cleveland, USA (Ret.). to generate new and different options.

6 Forum / “Untapped Resources” JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Eighteen months of intense collabora- •• JP 3-20, Security Cooperation communities, which could then provide tion revealed not only striking insights •• JP 3-08, Interorganizational the glue to hold together societies when but also obstacles for the theater Cooperation the inevitable triggers of violence occur.8 security plan. Based on the experience •• JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction Under most conditions, the in Honduras and ongoing research, •• JP 3-07, Stability Department of State and U.S. Agency this article argues that, under certain •• JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian for International Development (USAID) conditions, combatant commands Assistance take the lead responsibility for economic should develop theater security plans •• JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations initiatives, with combatant commanders that seek cooperation with business •• JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil mainly rendering support. U.S. military from the onset. It further contends Authorities cooperation with USAID is extensively that by working with local, national, •• JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.3 codified.9 Under certain circumstances, and multinational businesses, the U.S. however, combatant commanders must The 2017 National Security Strategy military could access former Secretary take the lead responsibility for economic dictated that “to prevail, we must inte- of Defense ’s “untapped measures. These circumstances include grate all elements of America’s national resources beyond the U.S. Govern- when hazardous security conditions power—political, economic, and military ment”1 to create a powerful self-sus- prevent the work of civilian humanitarian . . . the United States must develop new taining force to enhance security. aid organizations. Such circumstances concepts and capabilities to protect our This article has three objectives. also rest on the support of the chief homeland, advance our prosperity, and First, it examines the implications of the of mission. To illustrate, combatant preserve peace.”4 JP 1, Doctrine for current security threats, described by commanders in and Afghanistan the Armed Forces of the United States, the 2018 National Defense Strategy as utilized special operations forces (SOF), defines instruments of national power “more complex and volatile than what Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), as diplomatic, informational, military, we have experienced in recent memory.”2 and the Commander’s Emergency and economic.5 As a matter of course, Although civilian-military cooperation is Response Program (CERP) for eco- military campaigns already enforce not a new idea, more recent joint doc- nomic reconstruction priorities. As a economic restrictions in the case of sanc- trine and the Joint Concept for Integrated consequence, as one SOF general officer tions, embargoes, and no-fly zones. Yet Campaigning (JCIC) expands the U.S. commented: civil-military cooperation can also assist military role in economic security, par- in positive objectives such as economic ticularly in areas outside of traditional With the recent approval by the Chairman development. armed conflict. Second, it argues that of the Joint Concept for Integrated The expansion of U.S. military successful execution of such an expanded Campaigning, I consider critical economic responsibility into economic security economic security role will require the efforts as an example of the new roles the initiatives rests on extensive academic U.S. military to overcome multiple U.S. military will have to play outside of and field research. Leading scholars have challenges. When practice in the field traditional armed conflict. . . . In other shown how economic growth dimin- attempts to match joint doctrine, the words, how can the U.S. military work ishes the threat of war, while poverty results are rarely effective and sustain- itself out of a job earlier and achieve real and hopelessness create the underlying able. Moreover, the urgency of theater strategic success in these human centric conditions for conflict.6 Evidence from campaigns prevents military planners conflicts that have become the norm for the cross-country analysis demonstrates from developing environment insights first part of this century? . . . We need a that societies where work is valued and from outside collaborators in the private well-built intellectual bridge between war available show higher rates of satisfaction sector. Third, it describes the USASOC and peace and business is one of the key and indicators of welfare and lower rates experience in Honduras and other ongo- spans that needs building. of violence and conflict. One of the mul- ing research to draw out lessons learned tiple ways business provides a stabilizing about who, when, where, and perhaps force is that large-scale economic activity most critically, how such unconventional Challenges: Addressing absorbs disenfranchised young men who alliances with business should be piloted Who, When, and Where may otherwise gravitate toward violence in the future. If it stimulates debate, it The question is no longer why the in the absence of other viable opportuni- will meet the author’s intent. U.S. military should take an economic ties.7 Moreover, thriving businesses and security role, but rather why it is not markets provide the opportunity for the The U.S. Military Role in executing on that role better. The first formation of networks, norms, and trust Economic Security of two obstacles to overcome is that among members of previously warring Although by no means exhaustive, the even when commanders attempt to tribes, ethnicities, and religious groups. following joint publications (JPs) imply execute against their economic security Business provides a safe haven to develop a significant economic security role for responsibilities, more often than not social capital among members of different the U.S. military: they do not achieve their long-term

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Bartkus 7 stabilizing objectives. In areas under fund such projects indefinitely; at some resettlement zones before the FARC-EP threat of conflict, USAID and other aid point their goodwill will run out. Once melts back into the jungle to narcotraf- programs rarely generate sustained eco- the funding ends, so does the associated ficking, extortion, and other criminal nomic impact; only business generates economic activity. Once the economic activities. long-term sustainable economic activity. activity ends, so does its inherent sta- Moreover, those commanders Indeed, achievement of long-term stra- bilization through the employment of who employ Security Force Assistance tegic goals of regional stability requires military-aged males. Unlike USAID Brigades (SFABs) or SOF elements the substitution of business self-interest funds to build a road or similar projects, should take the lead in reaching out to for the goodwill of USAID-funded the approach proposed here emphasizes local and international business, as they projects. business opportunities that will earn possess both the authorities and the skills. To illustrate the challenge, take the sufficient revenues and profits to generate When security concerns prevent civilian Village Stability Operations (VSOs) in self-funding operations. Once again, only nongovernmental organization (NGO) Afghanistan. VSOs embedded small business generates long-term, sustainable economic development efforts, the U.S. teams of Soldiers into strategically im- economic activity. military taking the lead in economic secu- portant villages to coordinate initiatives The second obstacle is that even rity initiatives is critical. Without doubt, to improve local governance, protect though JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and the most critical condition is the chief of communities where they live, and enable JCIC direct commanders to develop a mission’s endorsement. economic development. There is no more comprehensive understanding of the thoughtful analysis of such operations environment prior to framing the prob- Challenges: Addressing How than David Kilcullen’s regarding what lem and ultimately planning the theater In the design of integrated campaign- he christened as the “Kunar model.”10 campaign, experience in the field indi- ing, the JCIC expands the operating His insights rest on the program of road cates that, more often than not, planners environment by showing when and construction in Kunar in 2006–2008, fall short of doctrine. The pressures on where additional allies are needed across which integrated local civilian and integrated campaign planning are such the competition continuum below military leaders and coordinated over- that adding another critical element such armed conflict. It begins with a recogni- lapping initiatives in establishing good as business is unlikely to gain widespread tion that both military and nonmilitary governance, protecting local populations, adoption. This extra effort—expanding activities are essential to achieve accept- and economic development. Directly beyond traditional community devel- able political goals; military power alone engaging local communities in planning, opment methodologies to assessing is insufficient. Following through on construction, and even protection of the sustainable business opportunities and critical economic initiatives can serve to road mattered more than the road itself. building ongoing business relationships “improve,” “counter,” and “contest” The process of building the road im- in the field—will not be warranted every- competition below armed conflict. proved governance and established trust. where. The upfront investment in skills JCIC lays out a disciplined approach for That trust encouraged more cooperation and time would be too great. And thus, working with nonmilitary powers. by previously wavering populations, and it is critical that the conditions for such Yet for all its comprehensiveness, the thus ultimately improved security. an expansion of the concept of “joint” JCIC provides remarkably little direction Critics of VSOs quickly attacked be specified and circumscribed. Such an to combatant commanders on how to Kilcullen’s model as a failure. Despite incremental investment of time and per- improve understanding of the operational some $80 million in USAID funds for sonnel should only be made when “the environment such that they achieve “em- road construction and development, the juice is worth the squeeze.” pathy” with all actors in the sector or how Kunar security situation deteriorated Thus, the approach to business to harness the economic instruments of rapidly after 2008.11 What this debate from the onset of campaign planning national power. The USASOC experience missed was the question of how to make must be part of a larger enduring U.S. of working with business in Honduras the security gains sustainable beyond military commitment to the region. on the theater security plan illustrates the completion of the Kunar road or The decades-long commitment to Plan valuable lessons. The bottom line is that comparable efforts. Many observers ac- Colombia would certainly be a case in generating transformative options for knowledged the importance of ongoing point. Arguably, the greatest challenge long-term security through partnerships funding for such initiatives. However, facing the Colombia Peace Accord is with business requires sustained commit- improvements in the security situation the reincorporation of Fuerzas Armadas ment, coproduction of strategies between last only as long as the economic activity Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército business and the U.S. military, and invest- necessary for increased employment. del Pueblo (FARC-EP) ex-combatants ment in novel capabilities. Economic activities like the Kunar road into Colombian society and the economy. Self-interest drives business. As Adam construction funded by USAID are, For that, hundreds, perhaps thousands, Smith declared over 200 years ago in the by their very definition, unsustainable. of FARC-EP ex-guerrillas need jobs. It Wealth of Nations, “It is not from the American taxpayers will not continue to is a race to establish livelihoods in the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer,

8 Forum / “Untapped Resources” JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon addresses crowd after Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC leader known as Timoleón Jiménez signed peace accord, September 26, 2016 (U.S. State Department) or the baker that we expect our dinner, individuals could develop into leaders of Frontlines (BOTFL) program. Over the but from their regard to their own self-in- illicit networks. previous decade and across 30 coun- terest. We address ourselves not to their One implication from these business tries, BOTFL students and faculty had humanity but to their self-love, and never observations is that, although many worked with local companies and mul- talk to them of our own necessities, but factors contribute to understanding the tinational corporations such as General of their advantages.” Business expects operating environment, the rapid expan- Electric and Newmont Mining, interna- each individual to determine and pursue sion or widespread collapse of businesses tional humanitarian organizations such his or her own personal self-interest. in an economic sector can serve as a as Mercy Corps and World Vision, and In its most basic definition, business leading indicator of potential instability. the local Catholic Church to harness produces and sells goods and services The contention here is that opening the dynamism of business in rebuilding within an economic system of markets for the aperture to include the interest and war-torn societies before they tip back goods, labor, and capital. Motivated by perspectives of business can generate such into conflict. Although other business profit, every business requires both some insights and thus strengthen combatant schools work in developing economies, form of investment and customers who commanders’ integrated campaign Notre Dame’s Mendoza College of value its production. Besides increasing planning across the continuum of Business was chosen for its focus on and employment, business also creates webs competition. success with the business and economics of relationships with employees, bankers, of conflict, asking more of business customers, and suppliers. It provides “The Honduras Play” to build peace and prosperity. To this a legitimate avenue in society for the In 2013, USASOC launched a pilot unique partnership with USASOC, ambitious to advance—those with en- program to develop creative approaches Notre Dame faculty and BOTFL ergy, foresight, and willingness to take to security. As its initial civilian partner, alumni civilian volunteers brought risks, and launch and build businesses. If USASOC chose the University of Notre their business expertise and relation- these profitable avenues are closed, such Dame’s interdisciplinary Business on the ships from their employment at Intel,

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Bartkus 9 Marine Corps landing support specialist with Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force–Southern Command guides CH-53E Super Stallion on Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras, July 10, 2015 (U.S. Marine Corps/Abraham Lopez)

Amazon, United Airlines, Pricewater- where it immediately utilized its new identify opportunities. Commanders gave houseCoopers, private equity/venture business skills both to work with senior the joint team the freedom to identify capital firms, and the Special Olympics. high-tech executives on consulting proj- knowledge gaps and then seek expertise USASOC commanders asked the joint ects and to launch its own e-commerce to address them. To illustrate, recog- team to explore whether it was possible businesses, ultimately pitching its business nizing their own ignorance regarding to overcome the staggering differences ideas to venture capitalists. One key take- the inner workings of major Honduran in process, mindset, and even language away from this experience was that most gangs, the joint team interviewed incar- to foster military-business cooperation. Soldiers have limited experience of what cerated gang members in Los Angeles To address the Theater Special it takes to run a successful business. As prisons and the Catholic priests who are Operations Command–South objective one seasoned Silicon Valley private equity working toward rehabilitating them. The to develop unconventional options for the investor relayed after meeting with the Soldiers traveled to Los Angeles thinking theater security plan, a team of 13 Soldiers Soldiers, “Their dedication, commitment, about security threats, while the business and 8 civilians was commissioned. The and hard work immediately earned my civilians were simultaneously thinking Honduras premission preparation was respect. But their questions on business about jobs for young uneducated men. different from conventional approaches: were beyond naïve.” Without a better The interviews revealed how both pos- not only crossing traditional boundaries understanding of this major part of soci- sessed an inaccurate lens to analyze the within the U.S. Army but also consciously ety, Soldiers will not imagine the possible underlying problems. More specifically, blurring the lines between military and common ground with potential business gang members described how their civilian teammates. More specifically, partners during their toughest deploy- criminal participation involved far more Soldiers immersed themselves in intro- ments, let alone possess the language and about identity, which the Catholic priests ductory finance, accounting, operations, facility to build necessary relationships. further corroborated by identifying and marketing at Notre Dame, as well as The joint team spent real time to- tattoo removal as the highest priority international law and peace studies. The gether developing a common language for rehabilitation. And thus, the joint team then proceeded to Silicon Valley, to foster civil-military dialogue and to team uncovered critical insights into the

10 Forum / “Untapped Resources” JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 operating environment that would have and tourism industries, for example. requisition the necessary uniforms. His proved impossible for either business or Nevertheless, textiles, farming, tourism, business teammates counseled otherwise. the Soldiers independently. and Soldiers share critical common Honduras has a longstanding textile Despite the violence in San Pedro ground around security. industry with skilled tailors and seam- Sula and the Aguan Valley, local business- In San Pedro Sula, the focus was on stresses producing low-cost apparel for men and expatriate Hondurans in Miami tying together the existing, courageous the American market. Why not purchase described exciting business prospects. “points of light” in Honduran society the police uniforms from local textile However, the security risks associated to reinforce governance, security, and companies? The large-scale order would with operating in either region essentially economic initiatives. Coordinating the encourage these local businesses toward prohibited investment. As one potential efforts of leaders in vocational training, more production, with the second- and investor in San Pedro Sula put it, “Why micro-finance, civic, and religious orga- third-order effects being increased invest in a business when any extra prof- nizations not only supported the safety, employment, wage payment, and local its will just be extorted?” The region functioning, and transparency of markets consumption. presents a catch-22: Businesses could for goods, services, and lending but also In the north coast, the joint team contribute to stability and economic al- created nascent and informal community ran straight into another example of the ternatives to the illicit drug trade, but the governance structures. Solidifying the instability associated with the rapid col- region needed security in order to entice local market for labor quickly became the lapse of a region’s major industry. More investment. priority to enabling the private sector to specifically, African palm oil production What the joint team found was that hire suitable young men and giving them dominates the local economy. However, although the basic business investment a reason to invest in themselves and their in recent years, the two largest global equation balancing risk and return was communities. producers, and , have correct, the math was wrong. Through Over time, however, the joint team’s dumped their production on interna- collaborative approaches that reinforced thinking evolved regarding how to drive tional markets, thereby causing the price security, governance, infrastructure, and a wedge between communities and for African palm oil to collapse below information transparency of markets, criminals. SOF expertise was critical to what the campesinos need to feed their Soldiers and business could make the undercut the appeal of gangs and nar- families. As a consequence of domestic security cost side of the investment cotraffickers, discredit their messages to political decisions taken by governments equation variable, not fixed. As a conse- young people, expose their motives, and on the other side of the world, hundreds quence, investment opportunities could convince the rest of the population to of campesinos in northern Honduras become more attractive than business voluntarily hand over, or at minimum, were thrown out of work. Yet northern leaders currently believe. The joint team’s isolate those who intimidate them. Yet Honduras has a significant competitive insights revealed key unrealized benefits the challenges of local law enforcement advantage: the natural deep-water port for both partners. For businesses, those to protect Hondurans were deeply rooted in Trujillo. The race for the team then who contribute to enhanced security in and substantial. One junior police officer became to enable the campesinos’ tran- unstable environments would earn deci- inadvertently described the challenge: sition to new and more profitable export sive advantages and, ultimately, profits. “When both my wife and I need to go crops through tying them into the global For the U.S. military, these businesses to work, the girlfriend of the gang leader food supply chain by building relation- represented potential partners who em- living next door looks after our kids.” ships with U.S. agricultural multinational body a persistent presence and stabilizing Although such efforts were constantly companies. force. daunted by local corruption, these It is critical to stress that in this pilot To test these insights further, the capacity-building initiatives relied on program, Soldiers did not and would joint team proposed novel mission plans. investments in police training and equip- not pick individual business winners and First, it launched innovative security ment to overcome significant structural losers. They spent zero money, unlike plus business initiatives to take back one barriers. the millions of dollars spent through the barrio in San Pedro Sula in a sustainable Nevertheless, without the help of PRTs and CERP. Rather, the value of fashion from criminal gang domination. their civilian business teammates, the this initiative lay, first, in the diagnosis of Second, it leveraged agriculture and tour- Soldiers did not perceive how they could the root causes of problems; second, in ism opportunities in the north coast to multiply the impact of their security proposing solutions to test; and third, strengthen peasant farmers, campesinos, initiatives through associated business in assisting Soldiers to develop fledgling to withstand pressure from sophisticated decisions. In a relatively simple example, relationships with new local allies in narcotrafficking organizations. Indeed, the San Pedro Sula police force required business. before embarking on this unique effort, new uniforms. A team member, a senior As benefits the world of gray in which few military leaders would have predicted noncommissioned officer, immediately the joint team operated, its solutions were that Soldiers would be working along- phoned the U.S. Army’s 7th Special far from elegant. They were messy, pre- side investors in textiles, agriculture, Forces Group headquarters in to carious, and pragmatic. All depended on

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Bartkus 11 Navy engineman, attached to Coastal Riverine Squadron, discusses navigation with Honduran servicemembers during Southern Partnership Station 2014 (U.S. Navy/Rafael Martie) the trust developed with local Hondurans must also provide the security return will require no more resources or per- based on working side by side. Local and on the investment of the military’s sonnel. The approach does require a international businesses proved quite will- resources and time. Operating in unsta- shift in mindset, training, and planning. ing to “fail fast.” They experimented with ble environments presents business Conversion of common ground into alli- new initiatives, rewarded those employees with additional costs such as employee ance will require combatant commanders who identified failures quickly, and then protection, work stoppages, and extor- to open the aperture when assessing the remedied them on the ground. tion. High security costs push potential facts on the ground in order to imagine Ultimately, business demands simple business expansions into unprofitability. new possibilities, identify and approach metrics to track its performance in the Yet in Honduras, the scales needed only potential new business allies, and jointly marketplace. By analogy, the measures to be tipped modestly, through reduc- develop creative approaches to enhancing of effectiveness for this joint team and its ing security costs, to encourage those security. successors were equally straightforward: investors already contemplating new Commanders who employ SFABs reduction in violence, employment business launches to make the required and SOF should take the lead to seek of young men, and increased local investments. Except in rare circum- cooperation with business at the onset of livelihoods. stances, however, business alone cannot their campaign planning. Implementation affect the needed security for economic will require at least two phases of part- Conclusion expansion. Thus, when developing nering. First, when developing theater The USASOC experience in Honduras theater security campaigns, the U.S. security campaigns, business partners like indicates that to build security from military will find powerful and willing BOTFL bring to bear problem-solving, below, this alliance between the U.S. local allies in business in enhancing data-gathering, analysis, and creativity to military and business must tip the scales security from the ground up. identify and frame business opportunities to improve the risk-return calculation For the U.S. military, the first steps and figure out why these business oppor- associated with business investment. It toward forging such a civilian alliance tunities are not being pursued already.

12 Forum / “Untapped Resources” JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Second, once the business opportunities disconnect between the U.S. military’s to economic development and assistance, insti- tution-building, strategic communications, and are clear, attention turns to building rela- promotion, command, and mobility more. One of the keys to this effort, I believe tionships with civilian partners—such as cycles and the need for a longer term re- . . . is to find untapped resources outside of local business, NGOs, and multinational lationship with businesses on the ground. government.” corporations—that possess the required Perhaps it suffices to point out that 2 Summary of the 2018 National Defense skills and resources to pursue them. As the JCIC acknowledges this dilemma: Strategy of the United States of America: Sharp- ening the American Military’s Competitive Edge business ventures drive self-funding op- “Improvements in relationships occur (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, erations through earning revenues and over long periods of time. Therefore, 2018). profits and provide jobs for military-aged they are often undervalued when mea- 3 Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, Security men, they represent a powerful self-sus- sured on an event-by-event cost-benefit Cooperation (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, taining force to enhance security. basis.” May 23, 2017); JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, Theater security campaigns aligning Yet in the long term, the most signif- October 12, 2016); JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction security and business efforts must be icant obstacle to adopting such a novel (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September focused to be successful. Furthermore, expansion of the concept of “joint” 9, 2016); JP 3-07, Stability (Washington, DC: this approach works if (and only if) may be overcoming the U.S. military’s The Joint Staff, August 3, 2016); JP 3-29, macro-governance issues are at some bureaucratic risk-averse culture. From Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 3, 2014); JP 3-57, minimum workable level. Some rule of an external perspective as a partner who Civil-Military Operations (Washington, DC: law, currency stability, and functioning usually works at the speed of business, the The Joint Staff, September 11, 2013); JP 3-28, civic infrastructure are necessary precon- sheer number of roadblocks—what one Defense Support of Civil Authorities (Washing- ditions. Few businesses can function in general officer called the “undeciders”— ton, DC: The Joint Staff, July 31, 2013); and the middle of an insurgency or civil war. was striking. Simply getting the joint JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, August 1, 2012). Moreover, this approach requires consis- team into Honduras with some flexibility 4 Summary of the 2018 National Defense tent policy, unity of effort, and long-term of maneuver was no small achievement. Strategy of the United States of America. commitment; it takes longer than 6 The best reason for the U.S. military 5 JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the months to build a business. Similarly, to embrace this proposed creative ap- United States (Washington, DC: The Joint such theater security campaigns require proach to theater security campaigning Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, July 12, 2017). multiple rotations to make security gains and seek alliances with business is that 6 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the sustainable. Without coordination of when this works, we will not have to fight Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be innovative governance, security, and our way in to secure strategically critical Done About It (New York: Oxford University business efforts, adversaries will simply areas again and again. Working with Press, 2007). attempt to co-opt local businesses for business on integrated campaigning must 7 Jan Osburg et al., Assessing Locally Focused Stability Operations (Washington, DC: RAND, their nefarious ends. Yet all the efforts of be a focused part of a larger enduring 2014). the U.S. military toward improved gov- commitment to the region by the U.S. 8 James Coleman, Foundations of Social ernance and security will be wasted unless military. As one SOF general officer Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, businesses are created both to provide commented, “10 percent are just the bad 1990). 9 jobs to disenfranchised young men and to guys. Leave them for my 75th Ranger USAID Policy on Cooperation with Depart- ment of Defense (Washington, DC: U.S. Agency build social capital among communities. Regiment.” For the other 90 percent, all for International Development, 2015). If the conversion of mutual self-inter- but the most vile adversaries are probably 10 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: est in security into a viable alliance with reconcilable under some conditions. The Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One business had been easy, the U.S. military dignity associated with a good day’s work (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). would have already accomplished it. The in local businesses represents one of those 11 Gilles Dorronsoro, Afghanistan: The Impossible Mission (Washington, DC: Carnegie USASOC experiment in Honduras ran critical conditions. Indeed, the joint team Endowment for International Peace, 2011). into a number of obstacles. Many the charted its progress in Honduras once joint team overcame, but some proved gang leaders began to quietly send their insurmountable. More specifically, the little brothers and sons to local businesses question of legal authorities consumed for jobs, as those jobs represented a way the attention of not a small number of out of gang life. JFQ judges advocate general, although in the end they did secure the necessary au- thorities. By contrast, this novel alliance Notes did not survive the retirement of critical 1 commanders. Business leaders build their Secretary of Defense Robert Gates speech (2008), “We as a nation must devote more enterprises for the long term and expect resources to what has been called ‘soft power,’ their partners to be there. It is beyond the elements of national power beyond the the scope of this article to address the guns and steel of the military—from diplomacy

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Bartkus 13 Owltonomous, autonomous surface vehicle from Florida Atlantic University, competes during Office of Naval Research–sponsored Maritime RobotX Challenge, Honolulu, Hawaii, December 14, 2018 (U.S. Navy/John F. Williams)

the sniper, the unit is able to identify Tactical Maneuver in him. He is located in the corner apart- ment of the sixth floor of the building. The unit is not able to call in kinetic support due to the high potential for the Cyber Domain civilian casualties in the area. The Joint Terminal Attack Controller [JTAC] Dominating the Enemy makes a call for fire: “CYBER01, THIS IS L63, IMMEDIATE SUPPRESSION GRID 211432, BUILDING 2, FLOOR By Jennifer Leigh Phillips 6, SW CORNER, AUTHENTICA- TION IS TANGO UNIFORM OVER.” The response is immediate: “THIS IS s the platoon clears the alley, unidentified explosion, and Corporal CYBER01, IMMEDIATE SUPPRES- Corporal Stokely turns the corner Stokely can see there are people clustered SION, GRID 211432 BUILDING 2, A and receives sniper fire from in the windows on multiple levels of FLOOR 6, SW CORNER, OUT.” A an elevated position near a cluster of the building where the sniper fire is moment later, an image materializes high-rise apartment buildings. There originating. After several moments of on the JTAC’s Cyber ROVER screen is already chaos in the street from an attempting unsuccessfully to neutralize of a man holding a rifle, his back to the camera device. “L63, THIS IS CYBER 01, TARGET CONFIRMED, REQUEST CONFIRMATION FOR Major Jennifer Leigh Phillips, USAFR, Ph.D., is Individual Mobilization Augmentee to the Deputy Chief of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Division, 607 Air and Operations Center, U.S. Air IMMEDIATE SUPPRESSION.” “THIS Force. She is also an Assistant Professor of Education at the University of Southern California. IS L63, CONFIRMED.” The television

14 Forum / Tactical Maneuver in the Cyber Domain JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 set near the sniper explodes, sending glass conceptual thinking about the cyber do- between the cyber domain and other and shrapnel through the room. The main must move away from an obsession domains to achieve operational and explosion disrupts the sniper, allowing the with strategic-level decisions toward full tactical objectives through multidomain team to move quickly through the street, integration of cyber into combined arms maneuver. The success of distributed continuing on to their destination. for tactical and operational maneuver as a operations in the future will rely on the necessary condition for achieving national ability to achieve rapid maneuver in the Imagine the possibilities if tactical and strategic objectives. Our national cyber domain as part of sequential or teams were able to plan a raid that inte- defense mechanisms must invest in ap- simultaneous integrated movement across grated not only air and ground support propriate tactical capabilities and practical other domains. We must move away but also on-call fires in the cyber domain. education of its personnel to effectively from a static understanding of focusing In terms of achieving economy of force, maneuver in the cyber domain as part of on tools used to conduct offensive and limiting costs, and reducing physical a holistic multidomain approach. defensive operations in the cyber do- collateral damage, the opportunities are The operational and tactical initiative main toward a focus on dominating the endless. To effectively compete in future is empowered by exploiting cyber ma- enemy by seizing the initiative through war, the United States must master neuver to cripple the enemy’s cognitive combined arms multidomain maneuver the ability to maneuver through and in linkages. Time and space also present that fully integrates manipulation of the the cyber domain to seize the initiative challenges for intelligence, command and cognitive, virtual, and physical dimen- by destabilizing the enemy’s cognitive control, and logistics. Today’s linear, stra- sions of the cyber domain. According to decisionmaking capacities. Achieving tegically reactive approach to the cyber Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1, operational and tactical maneuver success domain cannot overcome the tactical and Warfighting: in the cyber domain requires advances in operational coordination requirements to U.S. military doctrine, tactics, and train- enable maneuver. To achieve the desired Success depends not so much on the efficient ing beyond current capacities. effects across the physical, virtual, and performance of procedures and techniques, The concept of tactical cyber maneu- cognitive dimensions where wars are but on understanding the specific char- ver arises from an appreciation that the fought and won, a renewed emphasis is acteristics of the enemy system. Maneuver Internet of Things (IoT) will become needed on the intersectionality between relies on speed and surprise for without ubiquitous, pervading every aspect of our the cyber domain and physical space to either we cannot concentrate strength daily lives over the next 20 to 40 years. refine joint force doctrine; operational against enemy weakness. Tempo is itself The IoT will penetrate both large urban practice; and tactics, techniques, and a weapon—often the most important. areas and the expanse of rural, virtually procedures (TTPs). Overcoming the Success by maneuver—unlike attrition—is connected regions of the world currently cognitive barriers to conceiving of this often disproportionate to the effort made. considered “unconnected.” intersectionality will require a concerted However, for exactly the same reasons, The large physical footprint that has effort to deliberately query and challenge maneuver incompetently applied carries been an advantage to U.S. military oper- biases in our own conception of the cyber with it a greater chance for catastrophic ations in the past is quickly becoming a domain through education, training, failure.2 liability. Disruptive use of force within and simulations, and exercise trials across the manipulation of the cyber domain both joint force. Three key attributes of the At the battalion level and below, tac- in close and deep battle to create surprise cyber domain compel the U.S. military tical forces must effectively induce shock and shock is achievable through tactical to sharpen its integration of cyberspace in and surprise in the enemy, and the cyber and operational cyber maneuver. Military combined arms multidomain maneuver domain may be the most effective means actions will not likely be at a time or place considerations: an interactively complex of doing so in a given particular situation. of our choosing. U.S. military forces system; the intersection of the physical, U.S. forces are currently integrating may find they can control strategic use cognitive, and virtual; and nonlinear, robotics, unmanned aerial vehicles, arti- of force in the cyber domain, but com- disproportionate strategic effects to be ficial intelligence, and other capabilities. mercial, civilian, and systemic influences achieved by appropriately integrating Combined arms maneuver already inte- will demand that tactical military entities tactical maneuver in the cyber domain grates the cyber domain throughout the function offensively in this domain. These as part of operational design through all military force, but a real understanding fielded forces will interact with the IoT phases of warfare.1 of the interaction—the hinges—between in the conduct of their duties across the the cyber domain and other domains is range of military operations. Operational Considerations limited to few specialists at this time. The When facing an enemy of techno- for Tactical Maneuver entire force needs to be better educated logical parity such as Russia or , in Cyberspace regarding the interplay between the cyber the military actor is potentially at a Maneuver. Tactical maneuver ele- domain and other domains to bring disadvantage in the cognitive, physical, ments must take advantage of virtual, about a paradigm shift in current con- and/or virtual dimensions. As a result, physical, and cognitive connections cepts of multidomain maneuver. Clearly,

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Phillips 15 Commander of 558th Flying Training Squadron, left, discusses training mission utilizing T-6 Flight Simulator with enlisted remotely piloted aircraft pilot student, Joint Base San Antonio, Texas, July 17, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Bennie J. Davis III) cyber is not a replacement for other forms need to encompass the architectural warfare and information operations with of maneuver and fire, but it is part of a support and configuration management coordination procedures to establish the complete whole in terms of our approach requirements needed to integrate new equivalent of a cyber “call for fire.”3 to conducting operations. and emerging technologies into a distrib- Fire support could be provided either Much of the technology exists today uted network environment. However, the through a cyber element embedded within commercial entities to support ideas and concepts related to maneuver within a Tactical Operations Center or mapping, overlaying, and exploiting within the cyber domain must precede through deep fires support provided cyber environments. Adapting these investment in technology tools and mate- through U.S. Cyber Command or the technologies for operational and tactical riel solutions. joint cyber center established at the joint military purposes will require a clear Fires. With the proper authorities force command (JFC). In the absence picture of maneuver in the cyber domain and command and control structure in of secure and reliable communications as both physically and temporally overlaid place, calls for fire in the cyber domain to these reachback elements, the tactical with human and physical terrain features may resemble those in other domains. unit of the future must also possess the of interest to military missions. The Destroying or activating a virtual-phys- ability to conduct its own organic fires activities described to support maneuver ical connector to achieve lethal effects support within the cyber domain to the will also apply to the fires considerations through cyber during a “troops in greatest extent possible. The ability to en- and will require extensive investment contact” by what could be called a close gage in direct tactical cyber fire mission, in doctrine and training to understand cyber support mission rather than a originating from the team rather than a the logistical and intelligence require- close air support may or may not have reachback element such as CYBER 01 ments needed to support these actions. physical effects visible to the naked eye. described in the opening vignette of this Specifically, logistical considerations will Tactics will need to meld both electronic article, would not alleviate responsibility

16 Forum / Tactical Maneuver in the Cyber Domain JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 for those disaggregated elements sup- for monitoring, communication, and inform tactical maneuver in the cyber porting that team to monitor the effects coordination in real time to support a domain. These lessons may also inform of the tactical cyber direct fire in the vir- more diverse approach in the future to the imperative for restraint in the tual dimension as previously described. command and control. conduct of tactical offensive operations Cyberspace coordination proce- Just War Considerations. Gregory in the cyber domain precisely because dures and rules of engagement (ROEs) J. Rattray has posited an interesting idea of the potential disproportionate con- established in advance are designed to related to force in the cyber domain that sequences of interactions within this mitigate cyber effects from spilling over may be worth further consideration for complex system. and creating unintended consequences its implications for military ROEs. He Understanding the Cyber Domain outside of the immediate cyber domain specifically puts forward the concept of as a Complex System. Military planning environment in which tactical maneuver microforce, wherein “the use of nonvi- is an exercise in problem-solving. When is taking place. The environment(s) olent digital attacks to achieve political presented with a military scenario or identified as viable for cyber maneuver objectives must be understood as part of challenge, the planner must design an in advance of the mission may or may a new form of warfare. . . . At issue here approach that will result in success based not coincide with the specific area of is the amount of energy unleashed by on effective and thorough framing of the operations within which the tactical unit a given weapon at the time of attack.”4 problem. Future planners must frame the is maneuvering physically. Even in a no Putting aside the discussion of whether context of tactical action in all domains, communications or degraded commu- digital attacks represent a new form of including the interactive networks and nications environment, the reachback warfare, understanding actions in the configurations of the cyber domain. cells previously identified can monitor cyber domain as a form of energy or Traditional military planning assumes for spillover effects outside of the cyber violence is useful to applying the precepts that by translating the commander’s environment, ensuring the joint task of just war theory. Perhaps the current guidance and mission to objectives and force commander and/or component concept of kinetic versus nonkinetic force tactical tasks, the planner is able to ma- commander is aware of changes in the may need to be adapted to understanding neuver and conduct operations across all cyber domain environment. force as the act of violence regardless of domains in a simultaneous or sequential Command and Control. As can how discernable the effects of that force approach. However, proper planning re- be seen from considerations discussed may be to the naked eye or sensor. As quires careful analysis of the multifaceted regarding maneuver and fires, planners demonstrated in the opening vignette, nature of the influences of these domains and operators will need to develop rendering effects through tactical maneu- on human perceptions and the environ- similar control mechanisms to Airspace ver in the cyber domain has the potential mental conditions across these domains. Control Mechanisms. However, geo- to cause unintended collateral damage to Integration of the cyber domain graphic boundaries will not be sufficient noncombatants either directly or because in tactical military planning appears to given that applications and the network of bleed over of tools intended for mili- threaten the principle of simplicity. The architecture supporting the IoT are not tary purposes on civilian networks. overdramatization of the domain in always collocated in the same city, region, Assuming the perspective that the current strategic literature and discourse or country as the device or program cyber domain should be treated as an has a tendency to cloud clear thinking that must be manipulated to support environment just like the other domains on problem-solving in this domain. maneuver and fires missions. Command helps to clarify the cyber domain con- However, while the domain is an in- and control of operations that integrate siderations in relation to jus in bello. teractively complex system, effective tactical maneuver in the cyber domain Jus in bello, as it applies to the United techniques for developing an under- is essential in mitigating unintended States military, concerns the moral and standing of the multifaceted connections consequences. philosophical Western tradition of just and layers of the cyberspace domain are Decisionmakers should examine war theory as well as the international available today. Through disciplined opportunities to expand authorities to agreements and treaties that comprise investigation of connections, or hinges, the tactical commander below the JTF international humanitarian law. among the virtual, physical, and cognitive level to conduct maneuver in the cyber dimensions of the cyberspace domain, domain for both offensive and defensive Arising Opportunities military planners can hope to achieve op- purposes. This expansion should include Integration of tactical maneuver in the portunities to achieve both simultaneity a careful analysis of the applicability of cyber domain by fielded forces focuses and depth through the cyber domain current ROEs and the Laws of Armed on achieving one’s objective through in concert with other tactical actions. Conflict to examine applications of force offensive maneuver. Rather than empha- Keeping a close eye on the greater opera- in the cyber domain. Further investiga- sizing the threat of the individual actor tional and strategic objectives is essential tion is warranted into how the military and potential disproportionate effects in all planning; integration of the cyber force can expand and logistically support achieved by the lone wolf, we should domain in planning is no exception. passive and nontraditional mechanisms seek to learn from the lone wolf to

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Phillips 17 A key component of future success in of the potential negative impact deriving planning requires that planners visualize achieving simplicity in tactical maneuver from poor planning and risk mitigation. the cognitive, physical, and virtual prop- in the cyber domain will be to move be- Morris’s intent in releasing the worm erties of the cyber domain as co-existing yond a reliance on materiel solutions and was to tally the size of the Internet at and interacting simultaneously with the to focus first on ideas and concepts such the time. However, the randomization physical domains of land, sea, air, and as presented here to evolve a shared un- measure Morris installed in the worm space. Effectively framing the problem in derstanding of the cyber domain. While to ensure it would be able to succeed in military operations will include mapping common operating pictures, computer penetrating systems resulted in a level of the hinges previously discussed between network defense, and computer network replication that effectively crashed every the cyber and other domains, identifying attack (CNA) tools will be requirements computer system it entered. As discussed, opportunities to exploit those bridges, to conduct tactical maneuver in the cyber the utilization of TTPs and control and providing for deliberate mechanisms domain, a common and comprehensive mechanisms must include risk mitigation to take advantage of those bridges for understanding of the complexity of this protocols to help to limit unintended either offensive or defensive purposes. domain in military operation is required. consequences. Specifically, disruption The case of the Stuxnet worm’s ability Integrating doctrine, organization, of a particular WiFi or WiMax network to cause physical damage to the uranium training, materiel, leadership, personnel, in a village or town in order to prevent gas centrifuge tubes at the Natanz nu- facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) citizens from tipping local authorities to clear facility in Iran is the clearest example considerations as part of a functional the location of a maneuver element could of exploiting a hinge between the virtual solutions analysis is essential as a fol- also have the unintended consequence of and physical through the cyber domain.5 low-on consideration of this initial work. disrupting medical alert systems, home Like the Morris worm, Stuxnet had a Today’s joint force is compelled to focus monitoring equipment for hospice pa- singular purpose, but designers scoped on baselining common knowledge of the tients, or other life-sustaining activities Stuxnet to specifications that attempted cyber domain as essential to equipping among the civilian population. As civil to limit effects only to those centrifuge military planners and operators with defense and civilian cyber infrastruc- tubes used at Natanz. Effective prob- the necessary background for both un- tures become more reliant on common lem-framing and careful identification derstanding the cyber environment and architecture backbones, tool and TTP de- of the connection between the virtual conducting successful tactical maneuver velopment must focus on discriminators and physical dimensions were required in this environment. and identification protocols for devices to identify the desired means for limiting While Department of Defense and networks in order to limit unin- the expansion of Iranian enrichment Information Assurance training has tended collateral damage to the greatest programs. This problem-framing effort become a standard tool for teaching extent possible. allowed designers to achieve the desired Servicemembers how to protect their Overcoming the perception that effect in the physical dimension through own activities within the cyber domain, analyzing and problem-solving within manipulation in the virtual. Additionally, there is no single-source mandatory the cyber domain is too complex without the worm initially went undetected by training that attempts to shape a extensive and specific subject matter ex- the Iranian government, and when the common vernacular or language for pertise undermines the military principle mechanical (physical) difficulties began communication across the joint force re- of unity of command. Problem-solving to emerge, the initial assumption was that garding this domain. While Intermediate by the military planning team necessarily there was a physical defect or malfunction Developmental Education introduces involves both diagnosing the problem afoot. Stuxnet thus achieved both a phys- officers to cyber domain concepts, this as well as explaining the challenge ical and cognitive effect through virtual training is too little and too late to equip clearly and concisely to senior leaders. action in the cyber domain. the tactical force for planning required at Additionally, senior leaders must be While the Stuxnet worm attack was the junior officer and junior enlisted level. well versed in the risks, assumptions, authorized based on a strategic priority, A concerted effort to peel away the “mys- and opportunities the cyber domain the planning, worm development, and tique” of the cyber domain leads directly presents. Finally, commanders must have execution required tactical focus, includ- to clarity in planning and orders writing. confidence in the risks that the force is ing extensive cyber espionage by a skilled Finally, design should also consider assuming in delegating freedom of action cadre of experts. In conducting the prob- the integration of just war principles in to the tactical level. The cyber domain lem-framing to determine how to disable relation to the cyber domain. Myriad proves to be no exception, but the com- the Natanz enrichment efforts, planners policies, legal considerations, and ROEs mander who does not understand the necessarily envisioned a path across the procedures will continue to influence the domain will prove to be inherently more virtual hinge in the cyber domain to utilization of certain tactics within the risk adverse. achieve a physical effect. In this respect, cyber domain. The 1988 release of the Exploiting the Intersection of the the cognitive interplay with the cyber Morris worm by a Cornell University Physical, Cognitive, and Virtual domain is present in both the attacker and student, Robert Morris, is an example Through the Cyber Domain. Future victim of this attack. In particular, Stuxnet

18 Forum / Tactical Maneuver in the Cyber Domain JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Army Rapid Capabilities Office and Project Manager for Electronic Warfare & Cyber teamed with 173rd Airborne Brigade, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, and other receiving units while participating in Joint Warfighting Assessment 18, Grafenwoehr, , April 2018 (U.S. Army)

informs the proper approach to tactical could maintain the offensive during tacti- overheating a phone battery to create a maneuver in the cyber domain from the cal maneuvers while limiting unintended low-yield explosion, or turning on the perspective of economy of force and mass. civilian collateral damage with further television as a distraction all become pos- The Israelis achieved economy of refinement of military doctrine, training, sibilities. The objective of neutralizing the force in the case of the Stuxnet worm and tactics. Even in the least connected enemy is achieved. through extensive intelligence prepara- countries today, the widespread use of Tactical maneuver in the cyber tion of the battlespace across all domains. cellular and WiFi technologies (and in the domain is only possible if embraced as This example also highlights the hinge absence of such technology-integrating a viable component of combined arms between the technical and human con- networks the use of devices able to con- multidomain maneuver. U.S. military siderations of the cyber domain. While nect through peer-to-peer connections current force posture and technology the cybernetic problem of identifying the such as Bluetooth) creates opportunities certainly does not permit this scenario to appropriate hinge is essentially one of sci- to seize the initiative and exploit tactical come to fruition today, but a reorienta- entific method, the intended geopolitical advantages. Where it may be unaccept- tion in doctrine and policy would allow effect and following consequences fit in able to use a high-tonnage air-dropped for the full realization of DOTMLPF-P the larger scheme of “wicked” problems.6 munition on an apartment building solutions to meet these requirements. The decision to exploit an opportunity where a combatant is firing from on a Nonlinear, Disproportionate in the cyber domain became a selected team, it may be possible to see passively Strategic Effects Achieved at the Tactical option to resolve the Israeli problem into the room where the shooter is firing Level. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint precisely because it conformed to a range from through connected devices such as Operations, states, “Commanders con- of “action-prospects” available to the televisions and phones. If the team is able duct [cyber operations] to retain freedom decisionmakers.7 to pinpoint the exact source of the hostile of maneuver in cyberspace, accomplish A team properly equipped with a fire, utilizing a hinge to initiate a physical the JFC’s objectives, deny freedom of “map” of identified hinge opportunities effect by short-circuiting the electricity, action to enemies, and enable other

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Phillips 19 operational activities.”8 However, the and governmental cyber infrastructure, and design campaigns to achieve strategic majority of military discourse remains though not formally tied to the Russian military and national objectives. A com- focused on strategic cyber or simply government, achieved clear military mon understanding of the cyber domain focusing effects in the cyber domain objectives. The CNA prevented accurate as ubiquitous in civilian and military life based on cyber-centric considerations estimations of the strength and direction is the first step for military forces to be rather than based on a true multidomain of Russian overland movements, prevent- prepared for this eventual future. JFQ maneuver approach. While leadership ing communication and queuing among and strategy to task metrics dominate observers, military elements, and senior discussions of leadership, training, policy experts. The cyber domain attack Notes planning, and kinetic operations in war- was able to prevent an effective initial 1 fare, a consistent trend concerning the response to Russian aggression due to The term phase specifically refers to the phases of an operational plan as articulated cyber domain is to compartmentalize ambiguities and a lack of information. in Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations its application because of the alleged Additionally, the attack took advantage (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 17, “uniqueness” of the domain. But all of pro-Russian sentiments of a portion of 2017), V-6. tactical tasks performed on the battle- the civilian population, lending confusion 2 Marine Corps Doctrine Publication 1, field should trace back to strategic aims. to the true nature, intent, and extent of Warfighting (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Marine Corps, June 20, Tactical and operational cyber maneuver the Russian invasion. As the campaign 1997), 38. provide the potential to achieve nonlin- moved forward, the extent, duration, and 3 Per Field Manual 6-30, Tactics, Tech- ear, disproportionate strategic effects for scope of Russian maneuver in the cyber niques, and Procedures for Observed Fire (Wash- military forces. domain would change to meet the mili- ington, DC: Headquarters Department of the To understand this vision of tactical tary needs of the Russian planners. Army, July 16, 1991), calls for fire consist of six elements sent in three separate transmissions. cyber maneuver, the phrase nonlinear, Rather than focusing on the actions While additional elements or subelements may disproportionate strategic effects should undertaken in the cyber domain, be they need to be adopted for real-time cyber support be taken in the proper context of prob- denial, deception, espionage, attack, or in a close combat situation, the practical coordi- lem-solving. The military planner seeks maneuver, the cyber domain must first nation mechanisms would remain the same. 4 to solve problems, possessed of both be visualized as an organic environment. Gregory J. Rattray, Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 20. scientific and human factors. The pur- Humans both influence and are influ- 5 For a detailed case study on the Stuxnet pose of warfare is to crush the enemy’s enced by the cyber domain, much the worm, see Chris Morton, “Stuxnet, Flame, will, denying him the desire or ability to same as they are on the land, sea, air, and and Duqu: The Olympic Games,” in A Fierce continue to fight. Human will is both space. Individuals pass through the cyber Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986–2012, ed. expressed and influenced through the domain in the same way they walk on Jason Healey (Washington, DC: Cyber Conflict Studies Association, 2013), 212–231. cyber domain. While policymakers cannot the land or sail across the sea. In a future 6 Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, ignore the importance of strategic control world, the cyber domain is ubiquitous, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” of this medium, targeting the will of the connecting humans, devices, and even Policy Sciences 4, no. 2 (1973), 155–169. individual is essentially a matter of tactical multilayered networks both passively and 7 Ibid. 8 maneuver—exploiting his weaknesses actively to one another. JP 3-0, III-9. while making our own weakness appear as strength. To do so effectively requires Maneuver in the cyber domain is not a shift in our conceptualization of the a new concept given that we as individ- cyber domain. Russia’s ability to conduct uals interact with and manipulate the tactical maneuver in the cyber domain physical, virtual, and cognitive dimen- during the 2008 Georgia crisis provides sions of the cyber domain on a daily basis. valuable insight into the utility of apply- Tactical maneuver in the cyber domain ing multidomain maneuver principles as part of a combined arms multidomain that integrate the cyber domain for future approach to military operations is a con- military operations. cept that must be further explored and Though it has been asserted that elucidated in military doctrine and tactics. Russian targeting of Georgian cyber Effective education of the force regarding infrastructure as part of its overland ma- the cyber domain is essential to grooming neuver was not conducted at the tactical future planners, operators, and leaders level, the value of seizing the initiative who are able to grapple with this domain. and achieving economy of force through The future force must be able to visu- preparatory cyberspace fires in this alize the operational and tactical hinges operation is clear. The CNA conducted between the cyber domain and other do- on a wide scale against Georgian civilian mains as they conduct problem-framing

20 Forum / Tactical Maneuver in the Cyber Domain JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Cyber warfare operators assigned to 275th Cyber Operations Squadron of 175th Cyberspace Operations Group, Maryland Air National Guard, configure threat intelligence feed for daily watch in Hunter’s Den at Warfield Air National Guard Base, Middle River, Maryland, December 2, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/J.M. Eddins, Jr.)

From DOPMA to Google Cyber as a Case Study in Talent Management

By David Blair, Jason Hughes, and Thomas Mashuda

alent management is the sine in order to produce dominant combat is the one that best leverages the deep qua non of an effective organi- capability. If the American military strengths and best mitigates the weak- T zation and, therefore, a critical cannot attract, develop, and retain the nesses of that society. This is a function determinant of military success. Within right people, producing an environment of both humans and hardware, requir- the framework of this article, talent in which these people flourish, the joint ing talent management reform and management is best understood as the force cannot expect to find success in acquisitions reform, respectively, but thinking, policy, and strategy associated competition below the threshold of as the special operations forces (SOF) with hiring, training, and retaining armed conflict, major combat oper- axiom counsels, “humans are more great people. Due to the competitive ations, or credible deterrence. This important than hardware.”1 If the mil- nature of combat, military organiza- is a moving target, as the proverbial itary is to retain its competitive edge, it tional structure and culture must be “right people” change over time due must master talent management, espe- ruthlessly functional, designed to apply to changes in society and technology. cially in relatively new enterprises such the abilities and skills of the populace Stated simply, a nation’s best military as cyberspace.

Cyber as a Case Study David Blair, USAF, is a Senior Special Operations Aviation Advisor at the Office of Surveying our present portfolio, this the Secretary of Defense. Major (P) Jason Hughes, USA, is a Medical Service Corps Officer serving as the challenge is most acute and pressing Joint Staff Surgeon’s Strategic Plans, Exercises, and Logistics Action Officer. Lieutenant Commander Thomas Mashuda, USN, is an MH-60R Pilot currently serving in the Joint and Coalition Operational in the cyber community. Since the Analysis Branch of the Joint Lessons Learned Division of the Joint Staff J7. full scope of the problem exceeds

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Blair, Hughes, and Mashuda 21 the scope of any one article, talent more than 6 months have to relearn that means that cyber does not need to management for cyber warriors is a much of the new “state of the art” when fund and manage a separate personnel manageable problem that implicates they return. This is incompatible with bureaucracy. However, the impediments many of the larger talent management the current staff and school-in-residence of the industrial-age systems still used by trends. A number of changes to the model required to advance under an up- the Services make it difficult to compete current industrial-era promotion and or-out system. This remains a persistent with the market to bring in talent and to retention systems are necessary to problem that will take major changes to retain any talent developed organically. maintain a competitive edge in cyber fix and which must be coordinated with The current structure can take advan- over the coming decades—specifically, multiple stakeholders. tage of the opportunity to follow the tailored control over standards and Running parallel to this rigid pro- USSOCOM pattern that, under Section advancement, a technical track for cyber motion structure is a monetary incentive 922 of the 2016 National Defense operators, and the possibility of a cyber system that functions as a force manage- Authorization Act, gained a responsibility auxiliary force with an alternative means ment, rather than a talent management similar to a Service Secretary for the of accession. tool. The same bonus and incentive pay Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special To outline the challenges associated templates used to retain a sufficient num- Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, with talent management in the cyber ber of pilots and Navy nuclear Sailors to which included new authorities for man- force, this article begins by describing meet billet quotas have been applied to aging SOF personnel. A similar structure those challenges and continues by cyber forces since 2010. Such Selective with similar authorities might be imag- conducting strengths, weaknesses, oppor- Reenlistment Bonuses and Assignment ined for cyber policy elements under tunities, and threat (SWOT) analyses of Incentive Pays, adopted by the Army the Office of the Secretary of Defense. the U.S. cyber status quo, the indepen- Cyber Mission Force in 2015,3 are short- However, by continuing to rely on legacy dent German “Gray Berets” cyber service sighted stop-gaps at best. They assume, industrial-age systems, the joint force model, and the Russian and Chinese possibly incorrectly, that throwing money may have to severely curtail the role of levée en masse cyber models. From the at the talent management problem will fix military cyber and rely on other options.7 SWOT analyses, the authors syntheti- it. These techniques are likely unsustain- The better road is to recalibrate our con- cally derive policy recommendations for able in the shadow of an ever-growing cepts of professional military and citizen improving cyber talent management. private tech sector and workforce shifting Soldiers around these new technologies. Ultimately, this cyber case study can toward millennials. provide a template for solving aspects of Structurally, cyber operators have Civilian Model: Flexible the larger talent management problem, achieved some degree of institutional au- Tech Sector Careers especially in highly technical domains or tonomy within the Services—U.S. Army American businesses in the industrial branches. Cyber Command, the 24th Air Force and service sector follow a model similar and its cyber mission forces,4 the U.S. to the military personnel system—the The Current Cyber Baseline Navy’s Tenth Fleet, and the U.S. Marine legislation that scripts the military per- This article assumes a general knowl- Corps Forces Cyberspace Command.5 sonnel system was based on best prac- edge about the basic principles of the Moreover, the establishment of U.S. tices from these industries in the late current military personnel system. As Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) 1970s.8 Gather thousands of applicants, a quick review of the cyber status quo, provides a warfighting platform for these select the best on paper, train them to cyber operators are subject to the same forces. USCYBERCOM is following a execute the job required, and follow the personnel system rules as the rest of model similar to U.S. Special Operations company plan for promotion. Workers the military. Of particular concern are Command (USSOCOM), with semi-in- are placed in an assembly line talent the “up-or-out” system, the system of dependent funding and acquisition management program, working their centralized promotion boards, and the authorities and a direct operational link to way up from the bottom. This works for centrally managed assignment system. the Secretary of Defense.6 However, like industrial or service companies, whose These features fit well for an indus- USSOCOM, even with these changes, product is stable and where optimiza- trial-era assembly line bureaucracy.2 the command will not have much tion often trumps innovation. The tech They are ill-suited, however, to a tech control over the personnel policies and sector, specifically Google and Micro- company, as the case study below processes of its people, which remain the soft, manages talent in a fundamentally demonstrates, and cyber is more like a province of the military departments. different way because tech-sector tech company than an assembly line. Unfortunately, as described above, it is requirements are fast-moving targets. Checking all the boxes to accom- in these policies and processes that the Google, for example, worked to build modate an industrial, centrally managed talent management problem lives, not in a system that allowed exceptional talent, system is a particular problem for cyber, a lack of institutional independence. outside of the normal metrics of degrees as the field runs at the speed of Moore’s The current structure leverages extant or certifications, to be identified and in- law, and operators out of the seat for and stable Service processes, a strength corporated into their system. This allows

22 Forum / Cyber as a Case Study in Talent Management JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Cyberspace operations specialists with Expeditionary Cyber Support Detachment, 782nd Military Intelligence Battalion (Cyber), provide support to training rotation for 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, at National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, January 13, 2019 (Steven Stover) recruiters to attract young, ambitious in today’s environment. The millennial structures to emphasize the individual. self-starters and original thinkers to keep generation and other prospective employ- Google highlights that they are an orga- up with the ferocious pace of change in ees use technology and social networks nization built by engineers for engineers; the tech sector. Competing for those far more than previous generations. this yields a structure that allows freedom people means understanding how to Attracting talent requires a social recruit- on the technical side but manages their attract them.9 One of the key aspects of ing strategy that leverages social networks career.12 the Google system is an organizational in more fluid and interactive ways.10 The Google established Project Oxygen, culture that encourages collaboration and Department of Defense (DOD) could which uses analytics to develop leaders individual projects—the company aspires similarly shift toward a more fluid recruit- who allow technical workers to thrive in to the concept of “20 percent time,” or ing and assignment system that leverages their culture. Technical experts want to the principle that employees are empow- social networks rather than financial be managed by those who understand ered to spend one-fifth of their working incentives. their skills. Project Oxygen found that time on projects of their own initiative. Recruiting exceptional talent is the leaders who empowered the team, Google demonstrates that in an informa- first step. Keeping the talent is next. eschewed micromanagement, communi- tion-age talent management system, there Younger workers want to make an impact cated with a clear vision and strategy for is a blurring of lines between recruiting, by changing the way the world lives the team, and wielded key technical skills retention, and employment of talent, and one algorithm at a time.11 They value to advise are those best equipped to man- quality of service works alongside quality this “quality of service” more than job age in a technical environment.13 of life both to attract the right people and security, which was a recruiting factor for The civilian model enjoys the strength to use them well. earlier generations. Organizations had of a flexible organizational structure, not Microsoft realized that outdated to design their culture and structure to beholden to dated personnel systems, to techniques of recruiting hurt its ability accommodate this desire. Technical com- take advantage of talent or the market. to attract the talent needed to succeed panies eschew hierarchical management The civilian sector can provide attractive

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Blair, Hughes, and Mashuda 23 (From left) Alex Rice, chief technology officer and co-founder of HackerOne, Peter Kim, Air Force chief information security officer, and Chris Lynch, director of Defense Digital Service, announce “Hack the Air Force” event at HackerOne headquarters, San Francisco, April 26, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Dan DeCook) employment packages oriented toward high-level headquarters has a hall of craft. Additionally, creativity is a hiring creative incentives rather than solely honor that retells the stories of the draw as well as a value producer, and the compensation. For instance, Google’s exemplars of the command. Doing the flexibility to pursue creative craft is a ne- commitment to 20 percent time consis- same for cyber would require a careful cessity. Finally, freedom in job placement tently receives high reviews and results navigation of security issues.) Survival in is a stronger draw than compensation. in profitable results, most notably Gmail an entrepreneurial environment is only Gaining and maintaining skill in the and Google Earth.14 Furthermore, access possible by maintaining an innovative cyber domain for the long term require to worldwide talent provides ample access spirit and the drive to solve problems. concessions from the traditional military to sources of talent not available to the A talented 12-year-old with access model, especially in the form of a “tech- military. However, the pace and volatility to limitless information can change the nical track” option and relief from the of the industry is a liability that causes world,18 and can threaten a company’s pressures of an up-or-out system. constant churn in the workforce.15 business model or bottom line. Google, Visionary leaders such as Elon Musk16 Microsoft, and similar tech companies Independent Service: provide what Simon Sinek calls the face threats from continuing digital trans- Germany’s “Gray Berets” “why,”17 attracting funding and talent formation, advanced analytics, artificial Germany’s Cyber and Information to tackle seemingly unachievable goals. intelligence, machine learning, and other Space Command, colloquially known As described above, changing the world innovations that could fundamentally as the Gray Berets,20 was established is a key attraction for tech talent. The change the talent landscape. Companies as the sixth German military service in private sector is able to leverage “lore,” that guess wrong today will find it diffi- April 2017. This three-star command openly discuss big ideas, and trumpet cult to attract a workforce needed to win joined the German army, navy, air force, past accomplishments, thereby creating in an unpredictable future.19 joint support service, and joint medical room for collaboration with other like- This analysis reveals several key prin- service.21 It was borne out of a real and minded companies or pull “free agents” ciples from the civilian sector, namely, growing concern that Germany was ill- from other sectors. (Lore as an attractor that technical cyber operators desire to equipped to fight future wars (and con- is hardly foreign to the military—every be led by those who understand their flicts short of war) in the cyber domain.

24 Forum / Cyber as a Case Study in Talent Management JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 This concern was borne out as hackers determine the effectiveness of the Gray to civilian IT, which is a more volatile targeted the Bundeswehr’s information Berets’ retention practices, but increased market than aviation. Additionally, a technology (IT) infrastructure 284,000 flexibility in cyber career options should separate cyber force is susceptible to times in the first 3 months of 2017.22 yield positive results. isolation and stovepiping, both of which This new cyber service is slated to Next, free from the archetypes of are killers of innovation. At its worst, garner 13,500 personnel from various other services, a separate cyber force this could manifest itself in an inflexible IT and intelligence specialties in the would also be able to shape its own rank cyber force incapable of integrating with existing German force.23 structure and establish the incentives and other military disciplines or government The independent service model has opportunities for advancement within instruments of national power. Service been advocated by many military leaders, it. The leadership of such a force would distinctions could also numb cyber to the most notably Admiral James Stavridis, be notionally free to establish the criteria personalities and needs of other services USN (Ret.), as a means of ensuring the it values among its members and then that it is meant to complement and operational effectiveness of U.S. cyber reinforce those criteria in its advancement support. capabilities.24 Since the German Cyber and retention systems. This would open Despite its strengths, a separate and Information Space Command is still possibilities for a flattened rank structure cyber force is not a panacea, as it does in its infancy, it is difficult to say exactly similar to parts of the American tech not inherently solve the problems of how successful a separate cyber force sector, where experience and time in talent management. While it may not will be at recruiting and retaining talent. service do not trump knowledge and be encumbered by the recruiting, re- However, one can still hypothesize on the capability. Starting off from scratch would tention, and advancement requirements strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and allow a cyber force to establish its own of the existing military services, it still threats that such a force presents. Given ground rules and, therefore, shape its must compete against the private sector, the recency of cyber military operations, own culture, blending the aforemen- which will likely still possess competitive the ambitious nature of this project com- tioned innovative solutions implemented advantages in salary and career flexibility. mends it as a model worth considering, at Google with the already granted Moreover, relaxing entry standards could and one whose advantages are apparent, USCYBERCOM specific authorities, have the unintended consequence of although in the abstract, especially given among other distinctives. significant personnel costs in the future, the popularity of propagating services and A separate cyber force is also flexible especially with regards to health care. corps in this particular historical moment. and can determine its own pace for The independent service model The strengths and opportunities adaptation. If the existing cyber rank, reveals several key principles. First, the for talent management inherent in the advancement, or incentive structure is military cannot afford to “buy” talent German model of a separate cyber force stagnant or ineffective, a new one could against the tech sector, and must instead are numerous. First, that force would be arguably be implemented much faster focus on providing meaningful missions, able to set its own standards for entry than it could within one of the conven- camaraderie, a culture of technical excel- that could greatly increase eligibility rates tional Services. This strength is crucial in lence, and unique career opportunities. within the existing talent pool. Among a domain that is ever-changing. Since “shoehorning” cyber warriors into these are standards for age, physical fit- Lastly, a separate cyber force could, in legacy careers inhibits the development ness, and level of education. The German theory, compete at an equal level with the of this requisite unique cyber identity, a cyber force has already recognized this other services for money and resources cyber force requires flexibility and some opportunity and discussed waiving that could help attract talent. Such a par- degree of autonomy in order to realize certain education qualification entry adigm shift would elevate cyber warriors’ these goals. Therefore, the military requirements.25 priorities, where they would otherwise should consider limited forms of institu- Second, an independent cyber be buried among the other competing tional free rein for cyber warriors, akin to force could standardize training for priorities of an individual service. those granted USSOCOM but specific to its members. Whereas U.S. Cyber However, there are weaknesses the demands of the cyber domain. Servicemembers receive a disparate and threats to the separate service breadth and depth of training among model. While the German Cyber and Russian and Chinese Models the Services, an autonomous cyber Information Space Command has stated Our competitors have seen in cyber a service could ensure its members have a it intends to improve the salaries and ca- field where they have some degree of common baseline. Germany has signaled reer opportunities for its servicemembers, natural advantage—namely, the field its intent to do just this by instituting it has been slow to offer specifics, and lends itself to cybernetic theories of a cyber security master’s degree at its even as a service, would be still bound to controlling human thought and process, Bunderswehr University to train up to 70 national governmental personnel laws. and these are well-trodden ground for future cyber force soldiers per year, and This is a problem in cyber, for just as the both the Soviet and Chinese states.27 subsequently create an educational incen- military pilot pool is directly linked to Additionally, cyber coarsens boundaries tive for enlistment.26 It will take time to civilian demand for pilots, cyber is linked of time and space, thereby eroding

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Blair, Hughes, and Mashuda 25 the high industrial-era walls between sensitive missions and most advanced produce athletes for the Olympic games, the civil and the military sphere. The capabilities, but a second ring of state- in which it scours the countryside for Russian model leverages the whole of owned industries provides both capacity the best and brightest, training athletes society, in several tiers, to achieve cyber and access to the global information from a young age to bring the country effects against an adversary. This begins space. A third ring of militia-guerrilla glory.37 China is working with companies in the interagency and, for historical forces allows the state to put “asks” out to cultivate “the world’s top cyber secu- reasons, the Russian cyber enterprise is on the Internet to encourage individual rity talent” by recruiting top graduates, led by the Federal Security Service, or cyber actions. While national capabilities both from China and overseas and from FSB (the successor of the KGB), which are retained by official organizations, cyber contests. Traditionally, China has performs national cyber actions, includ- these “patriotic hackers” can aid and abet placed people in targeted programs based ing propaganda and disinformation.28 national efforts through everything from on exam scores; however, it seems that The wealth of expertise is owned by defacement to identifying weaknesses and potential cyber recruits are evaluated on these national agencies, and they use entry points in systems.32 The Chinese performance and provided practical train- them in hybrid warfare, or gray zone, employed a similar concept in the wake ing to hone key cyber skills.38 approaches to national policies.29 Similar of the 2001 EP-3 Hainan Island incident, The effort of cultivating and re- to the United States, the Russian when patriot hackers conducted distrib- cruiting cyber talent feeds Unit 61398, military considered cyber more in the uted denial-of-service attacks and probes which is housed in a 12-story building realm of communications until relatively on U.S. military Internet sites.33 This and staffed by hundreds to thousands recently, and Russian military cyber outer tier is unruly and cantankerous, but of people who are trained in computer troops were mostly concerned with it is low-cost and plausibly deniable. security and computer network opera- maintaining computer connectivity and China, like Russia, has advanced tions, and proficient in English. The scale security. cyber capabilities and strategies rang- and duration of attacks against a wide In 2012 Russia created the ing from stealthy network penetration set of industries tracked to the known Foundation for Advanced Military to intellectual property theft.34 China location of Unit 61398 demonstrate Research (FAMR), a cyber-military unit has centralized its cyber force in the China’s capability and capacity to execute focused on offensive and defensive cyber 2nd Bureau, Unit 61398, under the 3rd economic, offensive, and defensive cyber operations. Like the United States and Department (SIGINT/CNO), which operations.39 Germany, the country has difficulties re- reports directly to the Chinese equivalent The strength of this model is its abil- cruiting qualified cyber warriors because of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.35 The ity to leverage the whole of interagency of the competition for more lucrative People’s Liberation Army’s cyber com- and society toward cyber objectives, civilian options. FAMR is an effort to de- mand is fully institutionalized within the which is a key enabler for hybrid warfare velop its own organic cyber capabilities in Communist Party of China (CPC) and capabilities. Concentric rings of capabil- order to expand the use of cyber to sup- able to draw on the resources of China’s ities, combined with the levée en masse port conventional military operations.30 state-owned enterprises to support its principle, allow both national forces to Until FAMR bears fruit, Russia’s operations. The CPC is the ultimate conduct precise attacks with the most current whole-of-society and outsourcing authority in mainland China; unlike in controlled tools and guerrilla forces to model creates significant risk. Hackers Western societies, in which political par- conduct deniable, unpredictable hit- learn each time they execute a mission, ties are subordinate to the government, and-run attacks. However, in order to but so do those who are attacked. the military and government in China are employ the levée en masse principle in an Outsourced hacking is hard to control, subordinate to the CPC. authoritarian country, a state must roil and Russia may find that the hacker ex- The centralization of action is a key its people into a foment in order to yield ceeds the desired endstate as the hacker factor and explains the focused targeting the patriotic hackers, often exposing the finds they can break further into the process directly related to China’s stra- government to the threat of its hackers system. No internationally recognized tegic goals, as observed by Mandiant, a getting out of control and going too far. redline exists on cyber warfare, and each leading cybersecurity firm. Organizing They also do not need to consider the au- instance may lead to unpredicted con- and directing are useless without the thorities’ problems in using such a model, sequences for the Russian government, talent to operate in cyberspace. China but untangling this would be challenging. causing kinetic or reprisal cyber warfare.31 launched a countrywide effort to find An effective cyber model should The good news is that “war is graded cyber talent, pledging to increase the extract this principle of multilayered on a curve,” and the Russians seem to number of scholarships to attract students civil-military cybersecurity partnerships. have similar problems with talent attrac- pursuing cyber security and running spe- It should also consider the value of tion and retention. But their national cial recruitment for “maverick geniuses,” collaboration with industry and “cyber cyber is formidable, and their ability to which constitutes a part of nationwide militias” where there are shared interests leverage the whole of society is extremely efforts to train cyber security talent.36 or values. However, as part of a liberal effective. Security services own the most This effort is akin to China’s efforts to democracy, the American military must

26 Forum / Cyber as a Case Study in Talent Management JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Commanding general of U.S. Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command tries hand at One World Terrain, March 2018 (U.S. Army)

consider proper authorities, control, and porary talent management systems efforts to leverage advanced technologies civil society immunities involved in the such as those used in the Silicon Valley in pursuit of a new revolution in military use of force. tech sector. The former focuses on affairs (RMA).46 An RMA is a tectonic transactional optimization tools, which shift in military operations, a rapid syn- The Policy/Strategy Mismatch means matching the right number of thesis resulting from long-term shifts in With this survey of available models faces with the right (easily categorized) society and technology. For instance, the complete, our analysis returns to the qualifications to fill all the places on the invention of rifles held the potential for cyber talent management problem and organizational chart. The latter “expects revolution, but they could not be fully identification of potential solutions. the unexpected,” embracing unique applied until nationalism allowed for Chuck Spinney, acolyte of Colonel John and self-identified talents, and hence it major changes in distributed command Boyd, once described a “Plans/Reality is a model uniquely suited to a creative and control, as manifest in the small-unit Mismatch”40 between the budgetary economy. The mismatch between the tactics used in the American Revolution. process and results of said process. creative economy and our lagging The possibilities of hardware cannot The current talent management crisis industrial-era military personnel systems be realized without evolution on the is a symptom of a policy/strategy mis- drives out many of our best people.44 In human side of the equation. For instance, match, as evinced by the Air Force pilot one particularly concerning turn, U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) is one of these shortage,41 our difficulties in attracting competitors have been able to incor- key advanced technologies changing cyber talent,42 and the myriad persistent porate many features similar to those the role of the human workforce. By difficulties induced by an up-or-out used by Silicon Valley into their systems automating simple, repetitive tasks—the system as described in Tim Kane’s book in order to optimize the same sorts of sorts of tasks that industrial systems em- Bleeding Talent.43 The root of these talents that a rigid industrial-age system brace—AI is forcing humans to refocus problems is a generational mismatch is driving out of the U.S. Defense estab- on creative tasks, where they will still between industrial-era human capital lishment writ large. outpace machines for the foreseeable management systems, the hallmark of This problem is especially pressing future. However, the traditional industri- rust-belt corporations, and contem- in light of the Third Offset Strategy45 al-era military training and recruitment

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Blair, Hughes, and Mashuda 27 system tends to focus on processes for brings the cyber talent of our society to knowledge but focus on managing and reproducing these repetitive tasks. Just as bear without endangering our freedoms, integrating the capability within the these technologies drove major structural providing a version of the Russian model larger force. This is a functional split that changes in the civil economy, they will more appropriate for a liberal democracy. is evident in many high-tech fields—for have to drive major changes in the mili- Increased Control over Standards example, the National Aeronautics and tary workforce in order to unlock the full and Advancement. No matter what sys- Space Administration hires excellent potential of a fighting force increasingly tem is ultimately adopted for cyber talent engineers, and many focus their careers composed of millennials. management, it should exert expanded on honing that craft, while others go on influence over the standards to which to run the organization. One key cultural Policy Recommendations members are held and their opportunities feature of this split is that one is not Analysis of these three models yields for advancement and retention. Perhaps clearly superior to the other, but they are three design principles toward building implemented as coordinating authority mutually reliant. This is a feature of the such a force. The mission focus of the with the Services, paralleling the expan- tech sector as well—few things will drive German model demonstrates the value sion of SOF authorities, this influence out technical talent more quickly than of flexible career tracks that focus on would address key issues previously high- a technically illiterate manager dictating craftsmanship. The Russian model lighted in the existing force structure. technical decisions to a craftsman. reveals the importance of decentraliza- First, control of standards would allow In many aspects, recurring themes tion and organizational flattening, as recruiters to open their aperture and from the tech sector and adversary their multilayered approach provides accept highly talented individuals who models parallel aspects of aviation and span and innovative tactical options. would not otherwise qualify for military surgical culture, with high levels of value Finally, the Silicon Valley model illus- service. Since cyber warriors do not need on technical mastery and collaboration, trates the imperative to trust the initia- to hump miles to charge an enemy hill, and the self-policing of performance tive of our people, as many of the most the flexibility to refocus standards (within and values.50 In a technical track model, profitable products of Google began as reason) on cyber-relevant requirements career operators would recognize the individual discretionary projects. would prevent the loss of otherwise pre- (to their mind, likely unenviable) role Building on these design principles, mier talent.47 of their peers on a management track in there are three recommendations that are Next, control over advancement instructional governance, and those peers both within the realm of the possible and boards would ensure that the right quali- would recognize the value and province within a policy-relevant timeframe. First, ties, qualifications, and skills are retained, of technical experts. Performance pays for DOD should consider supercharging the independent of Service biases, as to which technical track officers could offset these increasing institutional independence of blocks should be checked under an up- lost promotion opportunities. These our cyber forces by granting increased or-out system. Control over retention technical leaders might even enjoy special latitude over standards and advance- tools would allow for a tailored incentive privileges and opportunities, such as the ment for cyber operators. Second, system that could overcome existing standardization and evaluation roles, to realizing that cyber is a non-industrial, indiscriminate systems that seek to retain further create interdependencies. Another creativity-and-collaboration-driven, a body to operate a computer terminal advantage of a technical officer corps is and extremely perishable skillset, DOD without regard to whether that body is the idea of intrinsic authority, which is should consider a technical track for the most qualified.48 Money might not al- a requirement for mission sets that are cyber operators that focuses on elite ways be the most effective retention tool, expected to navigate complex problems technical skills but retains the broad au- but it is currently the easiest tool given with national-level consequences, which thorities of officers. This maps well onto current processes and authorities. might not have approved solutions. Silicon Valley precedents of legendary Technical Track for Cyber. The Air Given the prospect of a technical expert, senior coders who are disproportion- Force is presently considering a technical deep in an enemy’s network, running ately productive, as well as practices of track.49 Triggered by an aircrew retention a time-critical exploit, he will likely not our competitors. Finally, following the crisis, the Service is realizing that flight have time to ask for guidance for all un- principle that cyber is part of the larger skills are perishable and difficult to replace foreseen problems and will need to make 21st century’s “democratization of pro- and that many of those who hold them some command decisions in the course of duction,” the national security enterprise would prefer to continue to exercise them his action. A technical officer would have must consider coarsening some of the on a technical track rather than to pursue the broad authorities to make these calls. civil-military distinctions along the lines a management-style promotion career In another idea from the Air Force’s of the early Republic. A multitiered path. Such a path, as described below, efforts to remedy its manning crisis, “cyber auxiliary force,” which leverages would allow a branching between those virtual staff tours could allow a cyber Reserve and National Guard authorities, who wanted to pursue and maintain force member to remain in place at an and potentially revives constitutional “let- proficiency and mastery of cyber tools operational assignment, gain a Pentagon ters of marque and reprisal” authorities, and those who will maintain a functional phone number, email, and office symbol,

28 Forum / Cyber as a Case Study in Talent Management JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 and do her staff job while maintaining a basic operational currency. Any meetings that could not be done via video tele- conferencing could be attended through a temporary duty assignment. This is similar to the tech sector telecommuting model, which is wildly popular in Silicon Valley. Cyber Reserve and Auxiliary. Two fundamental options supplement our full-time cyber force: a cyber Reserve force and auxiliary cyber force that allows DOD to leverage talent when needed, while also allowing them the opportunity to continue their work in the private sector. The Reserve force model must be modified to accommodate and attract talent to support this venture. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provides the Secretary of Defense flexibility to adjust hiring and retention of cyber personnel.51 Cyber Defense Operations Command Sailors monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized This provides an avenue for DOD to activity within information systems and computer networks at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek– Fort Story, , August 4, 2010 (U.S. Navy/Joshua J. Wahl) fundamentally change the structure for key personnel in support of the cyber might count as a drill given arrange- and Georgetown professor Catherine mission. In many cases, Reservists who ments with industry. Specifically, given Lotrionte.54 Distinct from the Merchant are civilian cyber professionals could do state-sponsored attacks against American Marine–analog Reserve model, this many of the same tasks for the govern- civilian economic interests, cybersecurity model is more like raising a militia or ment under a Reserve commission, which industries or major corporations may privateering. provides the authorities with what they often find their interests aligned with Government should produce guiding need to execute their “wartime” mission. military cyber objectives. These Reservists principles for active cyber defense ver- Placing them in an Individual Ready might serve as a bridge using both sus laws and regulations that it cannot Reserve status where they are on-call Federal and corporate authorities, much enforce.55 This provides a framework to provides access to their talents without as Merchant Marine officers do, whose leverage private solutions to defend pub- competing with the private sector. This civil and military authorities are blended lic and private cyberspace deterring future model is akin to keeping a lawyer on re- and take on different flavors in war and attacks. Defensive posture operations tainer for future work, and with a flexible peacetime.52 This would require extensive would be managed by the private sector; drill days option, they could be activated ethics training and legislative clarification, however, offensive operations require a to deal with an emergent problem or but is likely a necessity against com- different model. even if they identified a problem through petitors who do not observe a “Cyber An offensive auxiliary force co-ex- their civilian work. Geneva Convention” in differentiating ists with the Reserve force, meaning a Change in the cyber world is acceler- military versus civil cyber infrastructure. Reserve officer, with DOD authorities, ated; this allows key people to maintain As a salient example, the shipping leads a team of cyber patriots to execute their skills and support the private sector industry realized that governments were offensive missions in support of our while also protecting the homeland from unable to completely secure sea lines national defense. Building a national cyber attacks through their company’s of communication against , thus defense entity similar to “Anonymous” day-to-day operations of defending demanding a private-sector security solu- allows us to focus efforts and leverage their applications and networks. Our tion. Governments initially resisted this talent in a nonattributable way while competitors attack both government effort but accepted that active defense defending our national interests, as long and private-sector entities; therefore, measures deployed by owners, along as alignment with the values of a free and skills need to be consistently maintained with insurance providers, helped deter secure society could be ensured. This to counter the current threat. A yearly attacks. The bottom line—the private is different from the Russian model, in virtual drill would allow U.S. Cyber sector filled a critical gap in protection.53 which they leverage hackers by placing Command to test and provide updates This is the idea of “letters of marque and asks in cyberspace without controlling on defense-related targets, but daily work reprisal” discussed by cybersecurity expert their actions or effects, good or bad. This

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Blair, Hughes, and Mashuda 29 nationalizes the risk and creates an ability A third spiral, adjusting for conditions, Notes to control actions against adversaries, might make use of “letters of marque and while allowing access to talent that may reprisal” and empower businesses or in- 1 See “SOF Truths,” available at

30 Forum / Cyber as a Case Study in Talent Management JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 15 James Kaplan, Naufal Khan, and Roger Studies Review, September 28, 2016, available 47 Brian Everstine, “Is Uniformity Needed Roberts, “Winning the Battle for Technology at . 2016/October%2013%202016/Is-Uniformity- ning-the-battle-for-technology-talent>. 32 Connell and Vogler, Russia’s Approach to Needed-for-All-in-Uniform.aspx>. 16 Katie Fehrenbacher, “Elon Musk’s Vision Cyber Warfare. 48 Stavridis, “Time for a U.S. Cyber Force.” Includes New Cars, Car Sharing, and Solar- 33 Jose Nazario, “Politically Motivated 49 Chris Busque, “Finding the Inside Track City Deal,” Fortune, July 21, 2016, available Denial of Service Attacks,” in The Virtual in the Race for Talent,” RAND Project Air at . 3, ed. Christian Czosseck and Kenneth Geers and Tom Philpott, “The Arguments Behind 17 Simon Sinek, “How Great Leaders (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2009), 163–181. New Tech-Track Career Paths,” Stars and Inspire Action,” video, 17.58, TEDxPuget 34 Ashton Carter, “Remarks to the Air Stripes, August 20, 2015, available at . spire_action>. available at . tions: Software of the Mind, 3rd ed. (New York: Changing the World,” T Magazine, October 35 See “APT1: Exposing One of China’s McGraw-Hill Education, 2010); and Samuel 12, 2015, available at . ant-apt1-report.pdf>. 51 U.S. House, National Defense Autho- 19 Michael Mankins, “How Leading 36 Cao Siqi, “China Launches Cyber rization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Conference Companies Build the Workforces They Need Security Talent Training Nationwide, Global Report, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., November 30, to Stay Ahead,” Harvard Business Review, Times (Beijing), September 20, 2016, available 2016, available at . org/2017/09/how-leading-companies-build- shtml>. 52 Harold C. Hutchison, “Everything You the-workforces-they-need-to-stay-ahead>. 37 David Barboza, “Chinese Gymnast En- Need to Know about the Merchant Marine,” 20 Tom O’Connor, “German Military dured Childhood Sacrifice,”New York Times, We Are The Mighty, December 10, 2017, Battles Foreign Hacking with New Cyber August 5, 2008, available at . the-merchant-marine>. es-new-cyber-division-amid-russian-hack- 38 Siqi, “China Launches Cyber Security 53 Wyatt Hoffman and Ariel (Eli) Levite, ing-claims-579573>. Talent Training Nationwide.” Private Sector Cyber Defense: Can Active Mea- 21 Andreas Maisch, “German Rolls Out 39 “APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber sures Help Stabilize Cyberspace? (Washington, New Cyber Defence Team,” Euractiv, Decem- Espionage Units.” DC: Carnegie Endowment for International ber 6, 2017, available at . Press, 1985). private-sector-cyber-defense-can-active-mea- 22 Ibid. 41 “Congress Probes Military Pilot sures-help-stabilize-cyberspace-pub-71236>. 23 Ibid. Shortage,” DOD, March 30, 2017, available 54 Catherine Lotrionte is currently Brent 24 James Stavridis, “Time for a U.S. Cyber at . croft Center for Strategy and Security; see also org/magazines/proceedings/2014-01/time- 42 Jack Moore, “In Fierce Battle for Cyber “Catherine Lotrionte,” available at . Talent, Even NSA Struggles to Keep Elites on atlanticcouncil.org/about/experts/list/cather- 25 Isabel Skierka, “Bundeswehr: Cyber Staff,” Nextgov, April 14, 2015, available at ine-lotrionte>. Security, the German Way,” ORF, available at . keep-elites-staff/110158/>. 56 Crispin Burke, “The Pentagon Should 26 Ibid. 43 Tim Kane, Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Adjust Standards for Cyber Soldiers—As It Has 27 Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why Always Done,” War on the Rocks, January 24, Control Theory and the Military,” Journal It’s Time for a Revolution (New York: Palgrave 2018, available at . 28 Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler, 45 Robert Work, “Deputy Secretary: Third 57 Jeremy A. Rabkin and Ariel Rabkin, “To Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare (Arlington, Offset Strategy Bolsters America’s Military De- Confront Cyber Threats, We Must Rethink the VA: Center for Naval Analyses, March 2017), terrence,” transcript, DOD, available at . deputy-secretary-third-offset-strategy-bol- 29 Ibid. sters-americas-military-deterrence/>. 30 Ibid. 46 N.A. Lomov, Scientific-Technical Progress 31 William Haynes, “NATO’s Cyber and the Revolution in Military Affairs (A Soviet Capabilities Are Only Defensive Without View) (Washington, DC: Headquarters Depart- Cyber ‘Red Lines,’” Georgetown Security ment of the Air Force, 1973).

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Blair, Hughes, and Mashuda 31 MC-130J Commando II from 9th Special Operations Squadron airdrops Maritime Craft Aerial Delivery System over Gulf of Mexico during training exercise, November 12, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Matthew Plew)

Covert Action as an Intelligence Subcomponent of the Information Instrument

By Charles Pasquale and Laura Johnson

overt action (CA) has long played it with military operations and the importance of understanding the tool an important role in support- military instrument of power (referring in the intelligence context. C ing and advancing U.S. national to the common, yet flawed, DIME The term intelligence itself is open to security and foreign policy objectives, typology of diplomatic, information, interpretation. One general description is but broad misunderstandings in both military, and economic instruments). of the activities and products associated concept and application frequently lead Despite obvious areas of overlap with with collecting, analyzing, producing, discussants to conflate and confuse other instruments, CA is more appro- disseminating, and using information to priately understood as a tool within the ultimately support policy objectives. It intelligence subcomponent of the infor- may also include the various Intelligence mation instrument. While some might Community (IC) organizations and a Dr. Charles Pasquale was the Central Intelligence Agency Director Representative to the National view this as a semantic distinction range of other functions. Intelligence War College from 2016–2019 and is an Adjunct without a difference, CA’s complexity, regularly plays an important role in help- Professorial Lecturer at American University. Dr. political and operational sensitivity, ing leaders to fill knowledge gaps and Laura Johnson is an Adjunct Professor with the Catholic University of America and Director of and oversight requirements increase the make better decisions, but there is much Analysis at Data Science. more to it than may be evident to a casual

32 JPME Today / Covert Action JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 observer or consumer. In addition to some exceptions) be retroactive and must the operation).10 So “covert” conceals the associated processes and institutions, specify the action(s) to be undertaken, the actor, but “clandestine” conceals intelligence is both an instrument to wield which government entities are directed to the action. There is also an unfortunate and an underlying elemental component participate, and whether any third parties tendency to use “covert” as an adjective that enables, empowers, and supports will be used.3 The second is “timely” no- to describe activities that are not specifi- other efforts with context and perspective. tification to the congressional intelligence cally “overt” (done or shown openly); It is more than just a nebulous “knowl- committees, although notification may be loosely referring to “secret” activity as edge ether” that exists in the background restricted to just a few congressional lead- “covert” only perpetuates misunder- as a mystical fount of knowledge that ers if sensitivity is required.4 Within these standing of what constitutes CA. decisionmakers can dip into for insight. components, the CA also must “support It is worth noting that, while this Intelligence—including CA—involves a identifiable [U.S.] foreign policy objec- article presents CA in a U.S. context, deliberate process of actively prioritizing tives” and be found “important to U.S. some of the general concepts may also information needs, tasking, direction, and national security.” Statute further requires apply to similar actions taken by for- evaluation that requires a cadre of profes- the President to establish a written re- eign counterparts. Other intelligence sionals who understand its structures, sponse plan for every CA in the event of services—particularly those with a com- authorities, capabilities, and limitations. its unauthorized public disclosure,5 and petent external function—are also likely it prevents any government funds from to have the tools, techniques, relation- Covert Action being expended for CA without a formal ships, and authorities to plan and execute U.S. statute defines covert action, in finding.6 The National Security Council CA without their government’s “finger- part, as one or more U.S. Government (NSC) is the highest-ranking executive prints.” However, they do not necessarily activities undertaken “to influence polit- branch component involved in support- have the same statutory definitions, ical, economic, or military conditions ing CA, although it has no authority to requirements, restrictions, or oversight. abroad, where it is intended that the conduct such operations.7 [government’s] role will not be appar- Significantly, CA-related statute spe- Intelligence and the Military ent or acknowledged publicly.”1 The cifically excludes those actions primarily in Title 50 Covert Action: House Permanent Select Committee on intended to collect intelligence or to Combined but Distinct Intelligence (HPSCI) and Senate Select conduct traditional military, diplomatic, Compounding the above, a related Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) have counterintelligence, or government law point of confusion lies with the Title sole CA congressional oversight respon- enforcement activities, among other 10/Title 50 distinction and discourse, sibility. And unlike during the Kennedy things.8 None of this is to say, however, which often inaccurately tries to and Reagan eras, CA is now developed, that operators cannot collect intelligence draw clear lines between military and authorized, and overseen within a spe- during the course of a covert action. intelligence activity; in reality, the cific formalized process. Both HPSCI and SSCI consider intel- two overlap (this does not, however, In 2017, then-Director of the Central ligence and its related activities to include constitute Title 60). Whereas Title 10 Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) Mike covert or clandestine activities affecting is exclusively related to the “Armed Pompeo publicly reaffirmed this point U.S. relations with a foreign government, Forces,” Title 50 “War and National when he stated that, despite what we may political group, party, military force, Defense” includes all intelligence activi- see in the movies, “we do not pursue co- movement, or other association.9 But ties and many military operations. vert action on a whim without approval or poor understanding of a critical distinc- Although CA was originally imple- accountability. There is a comprehensive tion between “covert” and “clandestine” mented as a Central Intelligence Agency process that starts with the President and activity—described below—blurs the line (CIA)-specific mission area, press report- consists of many levels of legal and policy and creates additional confusion for many. ing increasingly alludes to military special review and reexamination. . . . When it operations forces (SOF) conducting these comes to covert action, there is oversight Clandestine Operations operations. But while this idea is becom- and accountability every step of the way.”2 Much of the IC’s and Department of ing increasingly ingrained in common The current situation did not develop Defense’s (DOD’s) work is clandestine, perception, partly because of the afore- automatically or organically, however; it although only a relatively small portion mentioned loose use of terminology, the evolved largely in response to hard learned fits into the category of CA. “Covert” distinction is less clear cut than it might lessons, such as those associated with the activity hides the true affiliation or appear. As Andru Wall notes: Iran-Contra scandal in the 1980s. relationship of the primary person or The legal process for initiating CA organization behind the action (that [U.S.] SOF [personnel] typically work requires two key components. The is, the identity of the sponsor), but the closely with CIA personnel while conduct- first is a written “finding,” which the activity may be generally observable. ing unconventional warfare, although President of the United States must In contrast, “clandestine” activity hides the relationship tends to be informal and personally authorize. It may not (with the activity itself (that is, the existence of focused more on mutual support. . . . The

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Pasquale and Johnson 33 relationship is one of cooperation in pursuit The CIA has historically been—and the White House Situation Room, includ- of mutual objectives rather than a formal available public reporting suggests that ing the President. As the Department of superior-subordinate relationship. . . . This it remains—the leading entity for CA Defense operators would move down their is an important distinction that directly operations, even when they include U.S. checklist, we heard McRaven’s voice as each answers whether the unconventional military SOF personnel who may be operational or geographical mark or mile- warfare mission is a military operation or temporarily placed under CIA authorities, stone was hit.22 intelligence activity.11 guidance, and direction. Although statute technically allows the President to desig- It is unclear whether the U.S. This type of complex operating envi- nate any agency to conduct CA,18 doing Government originally intended to ac- ronment—involving both civilian IC and so is not necessarily feasible, and the same knowledge the bin Laden operation after military operators under similar statutory intelligence oversight requirements and the fact. Had one of the “stealth” heli- authorizations—may blur the distinctions restrictions would apply in any event. copters not crashed in the Abbottabad between types of activity, who is support- CA is a core mission area for the CIA, compound, leaving clear traces of U.S. ing, and who is leading. This is where which arguably has unique institutional involvement, it is plausible that the statutory distinctions become increasingly processes, structures, and experience to operators could have gotten in and out important. carry it out. Secrecy is difficult enough without leaving America’s “fingerprints,” Not only does the military have some to maintain in ordinary operational thereby maintaining plausible deniability. Title 50 roles, but some Title 10 authori- conditions; CA sensitivities exponentially This is a clear example of using Title 50 ties may also appear outwardly similar magnify this challenge and therefore re- CA authorities under the CIA’s direction to CA—albeit without the required quire extraordinary structural elements to and control, while using military forces Presidential finding or congressional be in place and functioning. as the action arm.23 (As a side note, read- oversight. For example, Title 10 currently The widely publicized raid that ers should not conflate Panetta’s overall allows the Secretary of Defense to expend captured and killed Osama bin Laden “direction and control” of the covert ac- up to $100 million in any fiscal year to presents a useful example of military tion with Admiral McRaven’s “command support “foreign forces, irregular forces, resources being used in an operation offi- and control” of the military forces on the groups, or individuals who are supporting cially under the direction and control of a ground and in the air.) or facilitating ongoing [U.S. SOF] opera- civilian intelligence agency and under CA The following additional examples tions to combat terrorism.”12 (Prior to authorities and congressional intelligence help to illustrate how CA had been used the 2005 National Defense Authorization committee oversight. President George in the mid-1990s and early 2000s with Act, SOF reportedly relied on CIA fund- W. Bush in 2001 reportedly had issued a varying degrees of success (or failure) ing for these operations.13) But these are finding specifically to target and kill bin against ’s regime in Iraq not covert actions, which the legislation Laden,19 and President , to create psychological conditions for specifically excludes among the provided shortly after taking office in 2009, report- regime change, insert teams to conduct authorities;14 rather, they are more consis- edly directed then–CIA Director Leon counterterrorist and counter-regime tent with traditional SOF unconventional Panetta “to make the killing or capture operations, and develop indigenous op- warfare, although some of them probably of bin Laden the top priority of our war position militia groups. But because CA would share many common character- against al-Qaeda.”20 Panetta has since details largely remain shrouded in secrecy, istics were they conducted under CA publicly stated that he officially com- this article’s authors take no position on intelligence authorities. manded the overall May 2011 bin Laden the veracity of these examples—they are Similarly, Title 10 gives the U.S. Special raid from the CIA as a Title 50 covert primarily to show how covert operations Operations Command (USSOCOM) operation, even while then–Joint Special may play out in practice and to highlight commander the responsibility and author- Operations Command commander, some potential challenges associated with ity to conduct all affairs relating to special Admiral Bill McRaven, executed opera- CA as a strategic tool. operations activities, which include “such tional-level control of the mission from other activities as may be specified by the Afghanistan.21 Nick Rasmussen, director Selected Examples from President or the Secretary of Defense.”15 of the National Counterterrorism Center, Iraq Covert Action Cases However, it explicitly does not constitute recounted 5 years after the operation: Although the U.S.-led coalition soundly authority for DOD to conduct any action defeated Iraq in the 1990–1991 Gulf that “if conducted as an intelligence activ- During the raid itself, I clearly recall the War and devastated its infrastructure ity, would require a notice to [SSCI and role that Admiral McRaven played from and army, Saddam remained a meddling HPSCI].”16 Although CA would clearly Jalalabad, Afghanistan. In addition to dictator with an apparent penchant for fall within that requirement, some critics carrying out his command and control weapons of mass destruction. President worry the criteria are actually designed to function with his team, he was piped in via George H.W. Bush was unwilling to expand DOD activities while avoiding the secure video conference to provide updates take down the Iraqi regime in the additional oversight.17 to the CIA and the assembled officials at because—as he wrote in his

34 JPME Today / Covert Action JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 memoir several years later—the human and political costs of removing Saddam would have been incalculable. Had he gone to Baghdad following the dislodg- ment of Iraq from Kuwait:

the coalition would have instantly col- lapsed. . . . [It] would have destroyed the precedent of international response to ag- gression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different — and perhaps barren — outcome.24

Instead of pushing to Baghdad, the President reportedly issued a finding that authorized the CIA to spend up to $100 million to covertly “create the condi- tions” that would lead to Iraqi regime change from within using two main lines of effort: overseeing a propaganda Celebrations in Times Square after death of Osama bin Laden, May 2, 2011 (Courtesy John campaign and creating an opposition Pesavento) movement in Iraq. Third-Party Propaganda. The CIA the University of Chicago30 and had opposition force to bring down the Iraqi reportedly contracted the Rendon Group developed significant Washington, DC, regime.34 Although he had no military (TRG)—a private strategic communica- political connections.31 TRG funded training or service, Chalabi and the INC tions and public affairs company—to Chalabi to create the conditions in Iraq created a 1,000-man militia to fight set up a propaganda office in .25 that would bring down Saddam, but, the Iraqi military, which he incorrectly TRG’s work included planting false according to author James Bamford, claimed was extremely weak, stating it stories in the foreign press about Saddam “Chalabi [himself] was a creature of was like “a leaking warehouse of gas, to highlight his atrocities and undermine American propaganda to a large degree. and all we had to do was light a match,” his legitimacy; this supposedly was easy TRG basically created his organization, according to Baer.35 In addition to the to do, as he was a frequent perpetrator the Iraqi National Congress [INC], and militia, Chalabi attempted to increase of real atrocities, and the best lies tend put Chalabi in charge.”32 the size of his own opposition alliance by to have a modicum of truth. But TRG The INC reportedly set up a print bribing non-Kurdish, Mosul-based tribal supposedly supplied misinformation to shop in the Kurdish governorate of leaders who agreed to support the INC’s unwitting British journalists, who then Salahuddin and ran a disinformation rebellion. Press reporting indicates that published it in London press stories that campaign, creating fake versions of Iraqi he may also have partnered with Iranian occasionally filtered back into the U.S. newspapers filled with stories of regime intelligence officers to conduct a separate media. Because CA statutes prohibit abuses. Robert Baer—a former CIA coordinated operation in southern Iraq.36 actions “intended to influence United officer who reportedly worked with In March 1995, Chalabi launched the States political processes, public opinion, Chalabi—compared this to “something attack, reportedly against Baer’s advance policies, or media,”26 the CIA reportedly like a spy novel . . . people were scan- warnings and recommendation to abort criticized this unintended “blowback” as- ning Iraqi intelligence documents into the operation because the plot had leaked pect and took additional steps to prevent computers, and doing disinformation and the United States would not provide domestic U.S. circulation.27 . . . [and] forgeries . . . to bring down backup if he went ahead. Iraqi forces killed Seeking a contractor to expand its Saddam.”33 But without publicly available many of Chalabi’s men, and most of the propaganda operations inside Iraq to assessments of the propaganda’s effec- rest deserted as the bribed tribal leaders sat bring down the regime,28 TRG engaged tiveness, it is unclear to what degree the out the operation and Iran withheld sup- Dr. Ahmed Chalabi, a London-based results met the desired policy outcomes. port.37 The failure ultimately ended what Iraqi exile who came from an elite Shiite Third-Party Support to Opposition remained of Chalabi’s relationship with family that fled Iraq in 1958;29 he also Forces. A second part of Chalabi’s mis- the CIA, but the Iraq Liberation Act of held a doctorate in mathematics from sion included building an indigenous 1998 called for Iraqi regime change as an

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Pasquale and Johnson 35 overt U.S. strategic objective, meaning the noted above45 also reportedly authorized behalf of the U.S. Government while con- INC’s actions no longer had to be covert; the CIA team to support an Iraqi Arab cealing its role. Similarly, the Scorpions, as DOD and the Department of State were paramilitary insurgency group—“the a symbol of Iraqi resistance, may have had then free to openly support Chalabi and Scorpions”—that was trained to con- a powerful psychological effect on those others in the INC.38 duct psychological and other operations Iraqis who saw hope for an indigenous First-Party Counterterrorism throughout Iraq. This reportedly was part uprising, even though the group was a Operations. In contrast to working wholly of the U.S. policy of regime change.46 U.S.-manufactured proxy instead of a through intermediaries, other purported Former D/CIA George Tenet wrote in function of the Iraqi people’s will. CA missions have directly involved CIA his memoir that the group was to conduct Returning to the DIME typology, paramilitary officers in the planning, sabotage and raids to destabilize Iraq it is important to remember that in preparing, and conducting operations.39 prior to the 2003 war.47 The CIA team CA, the nature of the tool used does not According to press, President George W. reportedly vetted the men for suitability supersede the information aspect. Some Bush in the days following the 9/11 at- before moving them through Turkey to CAs described above (for example, pro- tacks signed a counterterrorism (CT) CA the United States for CIA training, but paganda efforts) clearly align with the finding that empowered the CIA to create accounts differ about the Scorpions’ op- “i.” But while other examples included and deploy paramilitary teams to hunt erational capability and effectiveness—one applying negotiation skills to engage and kill designated terrorists anywhere in press report indicated that the war’s quick the Peshmerga (aligning with the “d”), the world as part of the war on terror.40 conclusion minimized the initial mission,48 using force to kill terrorists and blow up This was especially applicable to Iraq in but others refer to the group’s inherent infrastructure (aligning with the “m”), the summer of 2002, as the administra- lack of skill and capability49—leaving and wielding large sums of cash to achieve tion presumably had been considering an open question as to how planners in desired influence effects (aligning with the war with that country for its alleged com- Washington perceived the value of such a “e”), none of these existed in a vacuum. plicity with al Qaeda. The below examples specialized indigenous team.50 This is a question of fit as well as function; are partly based on one self-described each of these examples existed within the CIA CT operator’s published description Not the Same by Any framework of one or more CA findings, of his deployment to Northern Iraq in Other Name and because CA exists under congres- advance of the 2003 .41 Some may argue that CA is incompat- sional intelligence oversight and regularly In July 2002, a CIA CT team report- ible with the information instrument, relies on intelligence assets, it remains first edly entered Northern Iraq and linked which tends to reflect the soft-power and foremost tied to the “i” instrument of up with supportive Kurdish Peshmerga side of national statecraft, or that national power. CA can therefore never be fighters to find and kill terrorists.42 They “covert” simply describes a way of solely any of the others. Rather, it may be soon found roughly 1,000 members of doing things, applied to whatever useful to think of DIME instruments in Ansar al-Islam and al Qaeda encamped instrument is being used that way. But it CA operations as creating a hybrid, such in the ungoverned northern Kurdistan is not that simple, and the above statu- as “information-military” is similar to the part of Iraq along the border with Iran, tory and operational examples show “political-military” and “political-eco- where hundreds of al Qaeda had sought that the essence of CA is not whether nomic” hyphenated compound terms that safe haven after the coalition offensive in it involves pamphlets or paramilitary are commonly used in security discourse. Afghanistan.43 Although the CIA team forces, but to what extent information was eager to capture or kill the terrorists, is withheld or obfuscated about the The realities noted above have signifi- CIA headquarters reportedly did not sponsor. Each of the DIME instruments cant implications for applying the DIME provide the necessary support to proceed. can be applied overtly, clandestinely, or construct to intelligence and information, Unable to conduct the CA offensive, the covertly, but their individual character- whether overt, clandestine, or covert. team instead collected and reported on istics are secondary to information when Strategists, operators, and educators must the groups, interrogated the Peshmerga’s applied in a CA context. be vigilant not only in remembering that captives, destroyed key infrastructure in National governments overtly use CA is rooted in intelligence as a subcom- preparation for war, and built a broad public diplomacy and public affairs to ponent of the information instrument, human intelligence network throughout directly engage foreign and domestic but also in comprehending what consti- Kurdish-controlled Iraq. This resulted in populations, convey diplomatic messages tutes CA, why it is a useful instrument in a trove of raw intelligence that the team and intentions, and shape their opinions. the strategist’s toolkit, and how to weigh sent back to Washington for analysis, and But these are different from the covert the associated costs and risks. reflected the tangential intelligence col- informational activities described in the Because covert action’s functional lection that falls outside primary statutory Iraq examples because TRG and the INC mechanism is to deliberately manipu- authorities for CA.44 manipulated foreign and Iraqi percep- late information and knowledge about First-Party CA Support to Indigenous tions of Saddam’s regime through false the actors involved in an activity, it Paramilitary Forces. The same finding information to achieve an objective on falls squarely within the information

36 JPME Today / Covert Action JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 29 instrument. Moreover, because its Pub. L. No. 108-375, 118 Stat. 1811 (2004), Mayer, “The Manipulator.” available at . Regroups,” Christian Science Monitor, June nal intelligence committees, it is more 15 Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, § 15, 2004, available at . component of information. This remains 16 Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, § 31 Robert Dreyfuss, “Tinker, Banker, a distinction with a difference. JFQ 127e(a). NeoCon, Spy,” The American Prospect, October 17 Jennifer D. Kibbe, “Conducting Shadow 23, 2002, available at . Policy 5, no. 2 (January 24, 2012), 373–392, 32 “Buying the War,” Bill Moyers Journal, Notes available at . org/moyers/journal/btw/transcript1.html>. 1 Title 50, U.S. Code, War and National 18 EO 12333, “United States Intelligence 33 See Mayer, “The Manipulator.” Defense, § 3093(e). Activities,” § 1.7(a)(4). 34 “Events Leading Up to the 2003 Inva- 2 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 19 Bob Woodward, “CIA Told to Do sion of Iraq.” “Director Pompeo Delivers Remarks at CSIS,” ‘Whatever Necessary’ to Kill bin Laden,” 35 Mayer, “The Manipulator.” April 13, 2017, available at . html>. Out of the New Iraq,” Counterpunch.org, May 3 Title 50, U.S. Code, War and National 20 “President Obama on Death of Osama 20, 2004, available at . iraq/>. 5 Title 50, U.S. Code, War and National 21 “CIA Chief Panetta: Obama Made 37 Ibid. Defense, § 3093(h). ‘Gutsy’ Decision on Bin Laden Raid,” video, 38 Dreyfuss, “Tinker, Banker, NeoCon, 6 Ibid., § 3094(c). 11:28, PBS News Hour, May 3, 2011, available Spy.” 7 Executive Order (EO) 12333, “United at . Tucker and Charles S. Faddis, Operation Hotel 1981, as amended by EOs 13284 (2003), 22 Nick Rasmussen, “The Weight of One California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq 13355 (2004), and 13470 (2008). United Mission: Recounting the Death of Usama Bin (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2009)—con- States Intelligence Agencies (2008); see Laden, Five Years Later,” The White House, tains information that the CIA reviewed and especially, Section 1.2, “The National Security May 2, 2016, available at . 40 Dana Priest, “Covert CIA Program With- 9 “Permanent Select Committee on Intel- 23 For an excellent discussion of the in- stands New Furor,” Washington Post, December ligence,” Rule X, 11[j][1], in Rules of the House creased role of the military in covert action, see 30, 2005, available at . Priest sourced the lative/house-rules.pdf>. A World Transformed (New York: Knopf, information about the CIA paramilitary teams 10 Joint Counterterrorism Assessment 1998), 489. to “a dozen current and former intelligence Team, “Terminology (Covert),” in Intelligence 25 Jane Mayer, “The Manipulator,” The officials and congressional and executive branch Guide for First Responders (Washington, DC: New Yorker, June 7, 2004, available at ; see Seymour M. Hersh, fornia, 4–9, 24–27, 35–48. NCTC/documents/features_documents/Intel- “The Debate Within,” The New Yorker, March 42 Ibid., xiv, xxii. ligence_Guide_for_First_Responders.pdf>. 11, 2002, available at ; 44 Ibid., 3–24. 10–Title 50 Debate,” Harvard National see also Peter Rost, “How a Public Relations 45 Priest, “Covert CIA Program Withstands Security Journal 3 (2011), 115, available at Firm Helped Start the War,” Huffington Post, New Furor.” . ingtonpost.com/dr-peter-rost/how-a-public- the War, CIA Reportedly Trained a Team of 12 Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, § relations-fi_b_22912.html>. Iraqis to Aid U.S.,” Washington Post, August 127e(a). This expenditure requires concurrence 26 Title 50, U.S. Code, War and National 3, 2005, available at . Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Para- 28 “Events Leading Up to the 2003 47 George Tenet and Bill Harlow, At the military Operations: Issues for Congress, RS22017 Invasion of Iraq,” History Commons; Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New (Washington, DC: Congressional Research see especially “June 1992,” available at York: HarperCollins, 2007), 388–389. Service, December 6, 2006), 4, available at . jsp?timeline=complete_timeline_of_the_2003_ California, 44. 14 Title 10, U.S. Code, Armed Forces, § invasion_of_iraq&complete_timeline_of_ 49 Ibid., 36–48. 127e(f); see also Ronald W. Reagan National the_2003_invasion_of_iraq_iraq_in_the_1980s_ 50 Ibid., 33–48. Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, and_1990s=&startpos=100>.

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Pasquale and Johnson 37 Marine Corps graduate (left) of Lance Corporal Leadership and Ethics Seminar 01-18 accepts certificate of completion from course director (middle) and her instructor (right), on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, July 27, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Brendan M. Mullin)

Augmenting Bloom for Education in the Cognitive Domain

By Douglas E. Waters and Craig R. Bullis

he unclassified summary of terrorists, and other threat actors.”1 In real need for future joint professionals the 2018 National Defense describing the required lines of effort who possess sophisticated conceptual T Strategy (NDS) concludes that to realize the strategy’s objectives, the skills and judgment; judgment is critical “to succeed in the emerging security NDS states that professional military because its exercise is a key character- environment, our Department and education (PME) will have to be revi- ization of any professional.3 Joint Force will have to out-think, out- talized, with an emphasis on “intellec- Truth be told, this NDS-directed maneuver, out-partner, and out-inno- tual leadership” and “independence of renaissance of thinking and judgment vate revisionist powers, rogue regimes, action.”2 The NDS clearly emphasizes a within the joint force will require more than a reinvigorated PME system, as a systems-level analysis and approach will be required to engage the entire career Douglas E. Waters is an Assistant Professor of Department of Defense Systems in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Craig R. Bullis is a Professor life cycle of the joint professional. PME of Management at the U.S. Army War College. is only one piece of this puzzle, and it

38 JPME Today / Augmenting Bloom in the Cognitive Domain JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 does many things right. Any reform ef- Table 1. Bloom’s Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and Assessing fort should carefully focus on areas for Domain of Learning Definition and Description improvement without dismantling or degrading proven and effective practices. Creating Incorporating components of one concept with a different concept to produce a unique, integrated understanding However, there continues to be both Evaluating Making judgments (and explaining reasoning) regarding the value of the material anecdotal and published statements from senior Department of Defense (DOD) Analyzing Deconstructing complicated material into component parts so that those individual components can be assessed for relevancy leaders and others that indicate that lead- ership development systems, to include Applying Using material appropriately in a new situation PME, are failing to produce enough Understanding Comprehending material as to explain details in one’s own words strategic-minded leaders for success in Remembering Reciting previously learned information from memory the dynamic, complex emerging security 4 Source: L.W. Anderson et al., A Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and Assessing: A Revision of Bloom’s environment. Whether these senior lead- Taxonomy of Educational Objectives (New York: Pearson, Allyn & Bacon, 2001). An important caveat ers are right (and we believe there is merit is that both the May 29, 2015, CJCSI and the Army’s MCTEP include an earlier version of Bloom’s to these assertions), exploring targeted taxonomy as the reference for learning outcomes. The table used in this article reflects the more areas of reform within PME that enhance updated outcomes that have been proposed by Bloom’s colleagues. strategic thinking development is an unambiguously desirable goal, and one However, when the learning outcome is necessary to better prepare joint and aligned with the NDS line of effort. specifically relates to the cognitive domain, Army professionals to meet the cognitive Currently, both joint- and Service-level Bloom’s taxonomy and the Army training challenges of the operational environ- PME programs use Benjamin Bloom’s model need a more nuanced application. ment as characterized by the NDS. Taxonomy of Educational Objectives as This article argues that the progres- This article starts with a short discus- the primary means to differentiate learn- sive application of Bloom’s taxonomy is sion of Bloom’s taxonomy, and then both ing levels within the conceptual domain. incomplete for education in the cogni- joint and Army curricular development This existing model, proposed by Bloom tive domain. In particular, it argues that models are examined within the context over 60 years ago, significantly advanced thinking competency development must (and demands) of the cognitive domain. pedagogy by suggesting that education strive for the same learning outcome Additionally, it examines mission com- begin with simple comprehension of across all levels of PME. To differentiate mand as a prototype for how to better a topic and progress to more complex those levels, though, outcomes should achieve conceptual learning outcomes conceptual activity such as evaluation be augmented by including the context across all educational cohorts. Ultimately, and creation. As an example of this ap- in which the behavior is demonstrated. the article offers stratified systems theory proach, the Army’s program is instructive. Leaders at all levels are expected to (SST) as a complementary framework The Army Learning Model stresses the comprehend issues, analyze the situation, that can be used to meet the contextual importance of education being student- apply critical thinking skills, and create need. Implementing the article’s recom- centered, progressive, and sequential, as innovative solutions. What changes with mendations should enhance PME to well as outcome oriented.5 Progressive seniority, however, is complexity of the better align with the challenges associated and sequential instruction allows higher environmental context. Consequently, with a dynamic, uncertain future. level courses to build on the foundational PME’s role should be to prepare all material as well as on the experiences students to think at high levels, and Bloom’s Levels of Learning of the student population. Outcome- then do so within increasingly more Within military educational settings, oriented programs enable educational complex organizational contexts. This outcome-based goals are generally institutions both to add value to the will enhance leader performance at all reasonable in focusing instructors and operational employment of learned skills levels and, due to the prominence of students on the objectives of a particular as well as to assess the effectiveness of the conceptual skills at the strategic level,6 is course or lesson. Inside PME, learning instruction. To facilitate these demands, absolutely necessary to enhance strategic outcomes specify the student’s expected the Army structures its training to fol- thinking capacity in the joint force. In learning, as well as the cognitive level low a task, conditions, and standards other words, the proposed framework of learning for that course or individual framework. Moreover, Army educational introduces the requirement for sophis- lesson within the curriculum.7 Bloom’s systems use Bloom’s taxonomy of learn- ticated conceptual development early in taxonomy helps identify this cognitive ing outcomes to differentiate the various one’s career in order to better prepare level of learning using domains that learning levels associated with particular senior leaders for the complex challenges represent increasing levels of cognitive learning objectives. The appropriate appli- they face. Such a change will not be easy; complexity, depending on the desired cation of Bloom’s taxonomy can improve it will require a significant adjustment to endstate of the instruction. Bloom educational systems by focusing courses existing PME policy directed by both the first introduced his taxonomy in 1956 and lessons on the desired learning levels. Joint Staff and Services. However, change to enhance communication and com-

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Waters and Bullis 39 parison of educational outcomes.8 His demonstrably inadequate for educational Augmenting Bloom for initial framework was updated in 2000 outcomes at all levels. Strategic Thinking by L.W. Anderson and colleagues to To more clearly delineate the idea of include six levels (table 1). The value Uniqueness of the contextual consideration within the of this taxonomy within an educational Cognitive Domain conceptual domain, we refer to the system is that it can orient progressively The cognitive domain of leadership concept of strategic thinking. Previous higher levels of understanding. requirements presents a unique chal- work outlines the components of this lenge to those developing PME educa- conceptual capability to include the Joint Professional tion. The NDS, as mentioned, requires following:15 Military Education significant conceptual skills among its Critical thinking is defined as “the As currently applied, the joint curricular Servicemembers so they can operate •• use of those cognitive skills or strate- development model suggests all PME effectively in complex environments. gies that increase the probability of should be structured progressively Research highlights the unique impor- a desirable outcome. It is used to (that is, begin at Bloom’s lower levels tance of high levels of conceptual skill describe thinking that is purposeful, and advance to higher levels within the for senior leaders.11 In fact, T.O. Jacobs reasoned, and goal directed.”16 taxonomy).9 This progression typically argues that the sophisticated applica- Creative thinking is considered to be correlates to the rank or organizational tion of advanced conceptual capa- •• the use of cognitive skills to develop level of the students, and can be seen bilities—what he refers to as wisdom novel ideas, approaches, or solu- clearly when comparing learning out- (synonymous with our previous use of tions that improve outcomes and are comes between different levels of joint judgment)—is the sine qua non of stra- valued by others.17 professional military education (JPME). tegic leadership.12 Conceptual capability Systems thinking provides a concep- For some training domains, the pro- is critical at the strategic level because •• tual framework for seeing the whole gressive advancement makes sense, even context and responsibilities are mostly rather than parts, identifying inter- for higher level PME. For example, ill-defined, and emerging from an relationships rather than things, and consider the concept of joint capabilities environment that is volatile, uncertain, recognizing patterns of change over as taught in officer JPME. Appropri- complex, and ambiguous. Moreover, time.18 ately, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the character of war for today’s (and Thinking in time includes having of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) begins at tomorrow’s) leaders requires advanced •• a historical perspective—a sense of a lower outcome level, requiring basic cognitive skills at every level.13 Develop- past, present, and future as it pertains knowledge of joint structures and pro- ment of such sophisticated skills within to an issue—as well as the ability cesses. It then increases the sophistica- the officer corps cannot begin at senior to forecast future organizational tion of content and the expectation of field grade levels, but must start early in strengths and weaknesses and exter- learning outcomes through Intermedi- one’s career.14 nal threats and opportunities.19 ate-Level Education and culminates at Development of conceptual skills the Senior Service College (SSC).10 At begins at birth and extends throughout a Examining these conceptual compe- the SSCs, not only are the content areas lifetime of changing personal and profes- tencies in more detail is instructive, as it related to national strategy develop- sional context. While the PME system has quickly demonstrates the problematic na- ment, but the outcomes are also pre- some responsibility for this development, ture of a sole reliance on the progressive dominantly at the Analyze and Evaluate we suggest that solely using Bloom’s application of Bloom’s taxonomy. For ex- levels of Bloom’s taxonomy. Because categorization for the conceptual do- ample, consider creative thinking, which the outcomes identified in the CJCSI main imposes a rigid standardization is defined above as the ability to think in relate to knowledge of joint capabili- that handicaps the joint force’s human novel ways to improve outcomes. It seems ties, it seems reasonable to begin with capital development. First, it establishes obvious that this capability is required at basic remembering and increase those an expectation too low for the demands every level. In other words, it seems rea- outcomes over time to evaluation and on today’s leaders; and second, it enables sonable to expect (or ensigns) synthesis. In this way, students leverage the Services to ignore the challenges of to have knowledge of creative thinking both their previous education, as well as developing cognitive abilities among all constructs and to comprehend the value their experiences, to better demonstrate ranks. However, integration of contextual of creative thinking in the context of their the requirements to apply, analyze, and levels into conceptual learning outcomes assignments. We would also expect that eventually evaluate activities in light of would facilitate development of thinking they could understand and apply creative joint requirements. competencies through a context-relevant thinking constructs within the domain However, this progressive increase curriculum—one that leverages all of of their responsibilities. Finally, most in Bloom’s levels is unsatisfactory for Bloom’s taxonomy regardless of PME would require these younger officers to all content areas. In fact, within the level. In effect, it would reframe inquiry analyze the context for the appropriate domain of conceptual capabilities, it is about how we parse PME. use of creative thinking and evaluate

40 JPME Today / Augmenting Bloom in the Cognitive Domain JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 General Dunford speaks to students and spouses of Capstone 2018-3, a course for general and flag officers that reinforces comprehension of joint matters and national security strategy, at National Defense University in Washington, DC, May 18, 2018 (DOD/James K. McCann)

the appropriate application of this con- even as they demonstrate those capabili- but, unlike the lieutenant, do so within ceptual skill. But all of those outcomes ties within the more limited confines of the much broader context associated with are restricted to the relatively narrow their responsibilities. leadership at the strategic level. context of their responsibilities. In most Such a perspective does not assume Similar arguments can be applied cases, a “lieutenant’s world” is limited to that the same outcomes are expected to critical thinking, as “the deliberate, understanding company intent (maybe within advanced education curriculum. conscious, and appropriate application battalion at the more senior lieutenant At a Senior Service College, we expect of reflective skepticism . . . as a way to ranks) within his or her areas of influ- the same levels of Bloom’s taxonomy to improve one’s judgment”21 should be ence and responsibility. But, to be sure, inform the desired learning outcomes. expected of officers at every seniority that context is limited.20 Despite this, we The difference, however, is the context. level. The same is true of systems think- believe it is reasonable to expect a lieu- As SSCs are responsible for facilitating ing, as complexity of systems, including tenant to evaluate creative thinking and the transition from operationally focused joint, interagency, intergovernmental, create new understanding by synthesizing leaders to leaders (and leader advisors) and multinational (JIIM) linkages, both other cognitive components and technical within the strategic domain, the context inside and outside of the organization, in- skills while adapting to changing circum- expands to a different order of magni- creases at higher levels. Additionally, time stances. In fact, establishing an outcome tude. In fact, one could argue that SSC horizons at higher levels are substantially for these young officers only to compre- education should assume few externally longer than those perspectives expected hend or apply is setting expectations too constraining limits on leader discretion. at lower levels.22 All leaders should low; the current operating environment So, as in the case of the lieutenant, we analyze and evaluate the effects of their simply demands more of these junior of- would expect the SSC-graduate colonel decisions over time, but those horizons ficers. In sum, lieutenants need to operate or captain to be ready to apply, analyze, expand with the added responsibilities of at the highest levels of Bloom’s taxonomy, and even evaluate this adaptive reasoning more senior leadership.

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Waters and Bullis 41 Special operations forces from Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia participated in U.S.-led Advanced Combat Leaders Course designed to improve lethality in close quarters battle, Slovakia, November 14, 2018 (U.S. Army/Alexis K. Washburn)

JPME and the if the Services are adequately covering goals, TRADOC’s policy of task, condi- Conceptual Domain thinking competency development, then tion, and standards generally serves the We are not meeting this challenge perhaps the JPME coverage is acceptable. Army well. Specifically, the educational within our current JPME curriculum. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as a learning objective, the outcome of a Currently, joint leader development is quick discussion of the Army PME pro- class or course, “Describes exactly what guided by a set of Desired Leader Attri- gram suggests. the student is capable of performing butes, one of which directly touches on (the action/behavior), under the stated critical, creative, and strategic thinking Army Training and conditions, to the prescribed standard competency. This informs learning Doctrine Command upon lesson completion.” Examples of objective development across the JPME Educational Standards training development in the TRADOC continuum, which follows the same The U.S. Army’s Training and Doc- pamphlet specifically portray the train- progressive application of Bloom’s levels trine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet ing activity. However, the condition is seen in the joint capabilities example 350-70-14, Training and Education often categorized as either the training provided above. In fact, there are no Development in Support of the Institu- location or the accompaniment of mate- learning outcomes that directly address tional Domain, outlines educational rial required to execute the activity. critical, creative, or strategic thinking policy and directs the use of a task- Importantly, the condition normally at the precommissioning and primary condition-standard framework. This does not refer to the context in which JPME levels, with intermediate-level pamphlet correctly argues that “one of the activity is performed. While the outcomes only at the comprehend, the most important steps to designing model is a reasonable start for orienting apply, and analyze levels.23 and developing lessons is developing training activities, as already noted, it JPME instruction depends on synergy and writing learning objectives.” In is incomplete without this contextual with Service-specific PME programs, so support of developing clear learning consideration.24

42 JPME Today / Augmenting Bloom in the Cognitive Domain JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Table 2. Creative Thinking Educational Outcomes Incorporating Bloom Levels and Context Comprehend Apply Create/Synthesize Evaluate strategy; develop Comprehend policy and Creatively apply instruments of and implement organizational Strategic (SST Levels VI and VII) strategy, as well as Service and national power in national and and systems adaptation and JIIM capabilities international contexts innovation Creatively apply joint doctrine Facilitate operational Organizational Comprehend Service and joint Operational (SST Levels IV and V) and capabilities within area of adaptation via operational Level concepts and capabilities operations design and operational art Exercise tactical adaptation Creatively apply Service Comprehend creativity (operate outside of doctrinal Tactical (SST Levels I, II, and II) doctrine within area of concepts and doctrine constraints but within operations commander’s intent) Abbreviated Aspects of Bloom’s Taxonomy

Relatedly, just as in JPME, TRADOC Army’s Operating Concept, the U.S. officers should be educated to analyze requires the use of Bloom’s taxonomy Army Mission Command Training and and evaluate all of these components in the development of learning out- Education Plan FY18–20 (MCTEP) so that each one—lieutenant through comes. Most often, course developers outlines a comprehensive strategy for its general—is best prepared to make the appropriately create sequential learning development. most effective decision. As directed in objectives by employing consecutively The MCTEP correctly asserts the MCTEP, however, such instruction higher levels of Bloom’s taxonomy out- that “building competence follows a is not considered until the Command comes.25 However, the preferred method systematic approach, from mastering and General Staff College or the SSC. of sequencing should be to move from individual competencies to applying them We believe that is too late. Instead, mir- a limited contextual environment to a in increasingly complex and ambiguous roring our arguments before, we suggest more complex contextual environment, situations.” Such an outcome aligns with that higher level outcomes are included while keeping Bloom’s level of learning our argument for explicit inclusion of at junior levels, using the more narrowly constant. In other words, the action verb context in learning outcomes. However, constrained context as the distinguishing of Bloom’s model (which represents the the learning outcomes specified in ap- characteristic of the desired outcomes. desired outcome) remains the same, but pendix A of the MCTEP demand the This criticism is not aimed at the the context in which that verb is executed same progression of Bloom’s outcomes developers of the MCTEP, who did an is significantly different. This pedagogical that we criticize in the cognitive domain, impressive job outlining a detailed and option is not clear in joint or TRADOC generally beginning with comprehend for comprehensive plan to attain the Army’s guidance, but would afford greater lieutenants and progressing (sequentially) goals concerning mission command. flexibility in meeting the cognitive devel- to evaluation at the colonel level.27 MCTEP developers followed current opment needs of leaders at all levels (with Such an educational orientation Army curriculum development methodol- less institutional confusion). does not achieve the Army Mission ogy, and it is this curriculum development Command Strategic Endstate 1, which model that needs to change. Moving Beyond Discrete reads, “All Army leaders understand and It is clear that the current joint and Thinking Competencies: practice the MC philosophy.”28 Clearly, Army curriculum development models Mission Command company-grade officers practice mission are incomplete. Sole reliance on the The consideration of context is impor- command in much narrower circum- progressive application of Bloom’s tax- tant to the cognitive domain, but stances than commanders at higher onomy, even when augmented by the similar arguments can be made for other levels. While many examples emerge Army’s task, condition, and standards essential leadership responsibilities. In from the listing, we focus on one as an framework, does not provide enough fact, we suggest that the development exemplar: “Exercise disciplined initia- context to better prepare joint and Army of mission command be characterized tive.” The MCTEP suggests lieutenants leaders for the cognitive demands of in a similar way. The Army defines and captains are taught to comprehend the current and future operating envi- mission command as “the exercise of and analyze levels, with application being ronment. Because of the importance authority and direction by the com- the outcome achieved in the operational of integrating Bloom with contextual mander using mission orders to enable domain.29 Disciplined initiative is the considerations, a framework for capturing disciplined initiative within the com- essence of mission command, and, as those considerations is required. mander’s intent to empower leaders to such, officers should recognize the many Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint be agile and adaptive in the conduct of factors associated with discipline, includ- Operations, defines three levels of war- Unified Land Operations.”26 Because ing subordinate training levels, levels of fare: strategic, operational, and tactical, of its importance for the success of the trust, and complexity of the task. And all and such a framework can provide a

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Waters and Bullis 43 Table 3. The Stratified Systems Model of Organizational Leadership Task Requirements and Characteristics SST Postulated Type of Unit Supervised Time with Civil Service Systems, Resource, Horizon for Primary Correlates and Policy Scope of Work Planning Perspective Civil Representative Sphere of Military Service no. of Stratum Domain Toe Grade Influence or Unit (Political Subordinates Intelligence Appointees) (Military) Create and Unified or integrate complex Subunified JIIM + Cabinet systems; organize 100,000– VII General Command, Global 20+ years Industry + Secretary acquisition of major 500,000 or Army International resources; create Indirect Command - policy Strategic Oversee direct Systems operations of Theater Lieutenant Deputy subordinate 50,000– National and 10–20 JIIM + VI Army/ General Secretary divisions; allocate 200,000 Multinational years Industry Corps resources; interpret and apply policy Direct operation of Division, complex systems; Regional Major Major Under allocate assigned 10,000– Joint and V (Limited 5–10 years General Enabling Secretary resources; 25,000 Multinational Multinational) Command interpret and implement policy Direct operation Minor Organizational Brigadier of systems; Enabling 5,000–10,000 Sector General tailor or task Command organize resource Assistant allocations to IV 4–7 years Joint Secretary interdependent subordinate Brigade/ Colonel programs and 2,500–5,000 10–20KM Group subsystems; implement policy Lieutenant Develop and Colonel/ execute plans Battalion Sergeant and task organize subsystems; Major Principal III Direct prioritize resources; 300–1,000 4–15KM 1+ years Service Staff translate and Battalion Major implement policy Staff Level and assigned missions Supervise direct performance of subsystems; Captain/ Assistant anticipate/solve Branch/ II First Company 60–200 1.5–5KM 3+ months Principal real-time problems; Technology Sergeant shift resources; Command translate and implement policy Direct performance Platoon; Clerical of work; use System- Lieutenant; Section, and Other Less than I practical judgment 3–40 400M–3KM Specific NCOs Squad, Office 3 months to solve ongoing Technology Team Supervisor problems Sources: Adapted from Thomas O. Jacobs and Elliott Jaques, “Executive Leadership,” in Handbook of Military Psychology, ed. Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff (New York: Wiley, 1991); and Kenneth W. Lucas and Joan Markessini, Senior Leadership in a Changing World Order: Requisite Skills for U.S. Army One- and Two-Star Assignments (Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, April 1993).

44 JPME Today / Augmenting Bloom in the Cognitive Domain JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 starting point for this discussion.30 Table it also provides a ready-to-use template asset to build trust and interoperability 2 demonstrates this application for for curriculum developers to insert criti- across the Joint Forces and with allied and creative thinking using the JP 3-0 frame- cal contextual components for education partner forces.32 work and abbreviated Bloom’s taxonomy related to the cognitive domain. levels for simplicity and readability. While We recommend that the Joint Staff Ingenuity, intellectual leadership, not all encompassing, this approach and Services consider a modification from professionalism, and independence of clearly demonstrates an improved meth- the “task, condition, standard” framework action require leaders at all levels who are odology that appropriately challenges of curriculum design to one that includes requisitely skilled in handling cognitive officers at junior, intermediate, and “task, condition, standard, and context.” complexity. They must be able to identify senior levels to display appropriate levels Understandably, including this additional internal and external threats and opportu- of conceptual competence within the dimension to PME makes education nities, and interpret those signals to focus frame of the warfighting environment more complicated. However, we suggest organizational action. These leaders must they will face at their respective levels. those concerns can be moderated with also reconcile paradoxes that exist within This JP 3-0 contextual differentiation is two caveats. First, higher levels of context the complex environment and provide certainly a step in the right direction, but can be introduced with similar instruc- clear guidance both for the preparation we suggest more fidelity is required. For tion across PME levels (in accordance and conduct of military action. In other that reason, joint and Service curriculum with higher level outcomes of Bloom’s words, to shoulder the leadership chal- developers may want to consider the taxonomy) by employing increasingly lenges implicit in the NDS, leaders of all more comprehensive SST model to ori- complex case studies and faculty examples ranks must be able to contend with sig- ent contextual considerations. to represent the contextual differences. nificant conceptual demands. We believe Second, the addition of “context” is only this article advocates a targeted approach Stratified Systems Theory necessary for certain domains. This article within PME that is aligned with meeting SST uses multiple dimensions to dis- recommends that at least the cognitive these demands. tinguish leadership responsibilities by domain, as well as aspects of mission The categorization of learning level.31 This framework proposes seven command, are viable candidates for the outcomes in accordance with Bloom’s organizational strata and provides expanded perspective, but there are taxonomy makes sense for many of the comparisons of military units to politi- many technical skills in which Bloom’s educational domains that students are cally appointed DOD civilian leaders taxonomy alone provides sufficient differ- taught in PME. However, the appropri- (table 3). We summarize unique tasks entiation. Curriculum developers can use ate use of Bloom’s taxonomy depends associated with those positions as well as their tacit expertise to assist the Joint Staff on the pedagogical domain and the differentiate the organization based on and Service educational systems in identi- context in which that knowledge, skill, the representative number of subordi- fying those areas where expanded context or attribute is demonstrated. For some nates as well as the sphere of influence. is necessary. In the end, though, improv- content domains the context matters The time horizon for planning provides ing PME through such considerations less, so a progression through Bloom’s the original authors’ synopsis of the provides students the best preparation knowledge levels across the levels of PME time orientation that a leader within a for the challenges they will face in future is appropriate. However, we suggest particular stratum should consider. The operational assignments. that some domains, and in the cognitive framework also adds the “perspective” domain in particular, a similar application column to highlight the increasingly Conclusion fails to meet the needs of our population. complex functional orientation required The National Defense Strategy is clear Instead, the differentiating educational by a leader at successive levels. Such in articulating the need for a new outcome should be the context in which limiting of both time and responsibili- approach to PME: the educational domain is demonstrated. ties is functional as it reduces some of Such contextual differences better high- the uncertainty associated with a longer PME has stagnated, focused more on the light the unique differences in education term view and allows the lower level accomplishment of mandatory credit at the across JPME and Service PME educa- leader to be more focused on achieving expense of lethality and ingenuity. We will tional systems. more specified assigned tasks. emphasize intellectual leadership and mili- Teaching to the higher level out- For the context of this article, then, tary professionalism in the art and science comes earlier in one’s career, even with the benefit of the SST model is the ar- of warfighting, deepening our knowledge the more constrained context, sets the ticulation and differentiation of general of history while embracing new technology conditions for better employment of responsibilities and unique characteristics and techniques to counter competitors. those skills at the highest levels, when at each level, allowing comparison across PME will emphasize independence of ac- the context is much more unconstrained. levels to better understand the increased tion in warfighting concepts to lessen the Consequently, development of complex complexity in the world to which leaders impact of degraded/lost communications thinking skills, as well as other critical at all levels are progressing. Consequently, in combat. PME is to be used as a strategic considerations, must begin early in PME.

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Waters and Bullis 45 12 To build such appreciation for their im- Thomas O. Jacobs, Executive Leader- zation and Managerial Leadership for the 21st ship: The Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Century (Arlington, VA: Cason Hall, 1996). portance and difficulty, PME outcomes National War College, 2009). 23 CJCSI 1800.01E, Officer Professional should reflect Bloom’s higher level re- 13 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Military Education Policy, Enclosure E; A-2, quirements across all levels. JFQ Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex A-3, and Enclosure E. Endnote encompasses World (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, October paragraph. 7, 2014), 8–16, available at . of the Institutional Domain (Fort Eustis, VA: 14 As an important caveat, though, this TRADOC, March 27, 2015), 67–70. 1 Summary of the 2018 National Defense article’s focus on conceptual capability is not 25 Ibid., 62, 69. Strategy of the United States of America: Sharp- intended to reduce the importance of either 26 Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission ening the American Military’s Competitive Edge technical or interpersonal skills. Skeptics often Command (Washington, DC: Headquarters (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, argue that an excessive focus on cognitive Department of the Army, March 12, 2014), 2018), 5. ability would select highly intelligent but less 1, available at . fession,” in The Future of the Army Profession, situational comedy The Big Bang Theory, Dr. 27 U.S. Army Mission Command Training 2nd ed., ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Mat- Sheldon Cooper comes to mind). However, and Education Plan FY18–20 (Washington, thews (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2005), 3–39. this counter argument forgets that some of the DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 4 For representative examples, see Gordon great general and flag officers (for example, June 2017), v, A-1–A-6. B. Davis, Thomas C. Graves, and Christopher George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 28 U.S. Army Mission Command Strategy N. Prigge, “The Strategic Planning ‘Problem,’” Chester W. Nimitz) were men who possessed FY13–19 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Military Review (November–December 2013), remarkable skills in all three of these domains. Department of the Army, June 12, 2013), 1. 12; Heather M.K. Wolters, Anna P. Grome, and In parallel with advances the joint force is mak- 29 U.S. Army Mission Command Training Ryan M. Hinds, Exploring Strategic Thinking: ing in the development of its leaders’ technical and Education Plan FY18–20, A-2. Insights to Assess, Develop, and Retain Army and interpersonal skills, it should also focus on 30 Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations Strategic Thinkers, Research Product 2013-01 the advancement of conceptual skills. (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January (Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute 15 Douglas E. Waters, “Understanding 2017). for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February Strategic Thinking and Developing Strategic 31 Jaques, Requisite Organization; Thomas 2013), 3; and Bob Scales, Scales on War: The Leaders,” Joint Force Quarterly 63 (4th Quarter O. Jacobs and Elliott Jaques, “Executive Lead- Future of America’s Military at Risk (Annapo- 2011), 116. ership,” in Handbook of Military Psychology, ed. lis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), 187–198. 16 Diane F. Halpern, Thought & Knowledge: Reuven Gal and A. David Mangelsdorff (New 5 The Army Learning Model is referenced An Introduction to Critical Thinking, 4th ed. York: Wiley, 1991), 431–447. in several publications, including Richard J. (Mahway, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 32 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Stafford and William Mark Thornhill II, “The 2003), 6. Strategy of the United States. Army Learning Model: Changing the Way 17 Teresa M. Amabile, Creativity in Context: Sustainers Train,” Army Sustainment 44, no. 2 Update to the Social Psychology of Creativity (March–April 2012), available at . Art and Practice of the Learning Organization 6 Steven D. Clement and Donna Ayers, (New York: Doubleday, 2006), 6–7. Leadership for the 1970s: A Matrix of Organiza- 19 The concept of thinking in time was tional Leadership Dimensions, Army Leadership originally described by Neustadt and May, and Monograph Series 8 (Fort Benjamin Harrison, later classified by Jeanne Liedtka as one of the IN: Army Administrative Business Center, five elements of strategic thinking. See Richard 1976). E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in 7 Army Training and Doctrine Command Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers (TRADOC) Pamphlet 350-70-7, Army Edu- (New York: The Free Press, 1986); and Jeanne cational Processes (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, M. Liedtka, “Strategic Thinking: Can It Be January 9, 2013), 13–14. Taught?” Long Range Planning 31, no. 1 8 Benjamin S. Bloom, ed., Taxonomy of (1998), 123. Educational Objectives: The Classification of Ed- 20 One scholar argues that the responsibility ucational Goals, Handbook 1: Cognitive Domain of each level of leadership is to narrow the focus (New York: David McKay Company, 1956). and responsibilities of each lower organiza- 9 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tion, thereby allowing more junior leaders to Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01E, Officer Profes- be more narrowly oriented than those at more sional Military Education Policy (Washington, senior levels. DC: The Joint Staff, May 29, 2015). 21 Stephen J. Gerras, Thinking Critically 10 Ibid. about Critical Thinking: A Fundamental Guide 11 Executive research within the Army is for Strategic Leaders (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. reviewed in Stephen J. Zaccaro, Models and Army War College, August 2008), available at Theories of Executive Leadership: A Conceptual/ . VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Be- 22 Elliott Jaques, Requisite Organization: A havioral and Social Sciences, 1996). Total System for Effective Managerial Organi-

46 JPME Today / Augmenting Bloom in the Cognitive Domain JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Sergeant Brooke Grether, U.S. Army Reserve military police Soldier and gunnery crew truck commander with 603rd MP Company, out of Belton, Missouri, poses for portrait after finishing gunnery lane at Fort Riley, Kansas, May 18, 2018 (U.S. Army Reserve/Michel Sauret)

hree stories: blood, guts, and Warrior Women hand-to-hand combat. T Story 1: 40 AD. Four decades after the birth of Christ, the Vietnamese 3,000 Years in the Fight Tru’ng Sisters rise to lead their people after successfully thwarting a Chinese 1 By Mary Raum attempt to dominate their country. Coming from a society where both sexes work, practice law, and serve as judges, they are encouraged by their families to They fought like devils, far better than the men. study the principles of the martial arts. As resistance and freedom fighters, they — Georges Clémenceau, Mayor, capture and decapitate their Chinese 18th Arrondissement, referring to women of the Paris Commune, during ’s prisoners and reclaim 65 city fortifica- republican uprising, 1871 tions. Both sisters are experts in knife fighting and ride into the fray atop two white elephants in full battle armor, their ornately carved breastplates signaling their status as nobility. The sight of the Dr. Mary Raum is a Professor and Swanee Hunt Academic Chair in Women Peace and Security at the monolithic beasts and the two women U.S. Naval War College. wielding handheld weapons instills fear

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Raum 47 Female tank instructors of School of Infantry Professions conducted drill with Nagmachon tanks and armed hummers, January 1, 2013 ( Defense Forces/Zev Marmorstein) in their enemies and breaks their ranks. Mona Island.” He portrays the fear of ancient societies, they are allowed many While in command, Tru’ng Tac and his soldiers when they set sight upon a freedoms and protections under the law. Tru’ng Nhi school and place in positional Celtic Iceni female leader, “causing their Boudicca, the female ruler of the authority many generals, 36 of whom are limbs to be paralyzed.”2 Statesman and Iceni tribes to which these ancient docu- women. Numbers differ, but their troops, historian Cassius Dio also writes about ments refer, fights the Romans after she composed of peasants and aristocracy, the invasion with the Druids: “a terrible is captured, flogged, and beaten. The range in size of from 20,000 to 80,000 disaster occurred in Britain. Two cit- invaders tie her two daughters to wooden combatants. The Tru’ng Sisters are re- ies were sacked, eighty thousand of the stakes, and she is forced to watch as the garded as national heroines of Vietnam, Romans and their allies perished, and the legion of heavy infantry gang-rape them. with many temples, schools, and streets island was lost to Rome. Moreover, all Cassius Dio, in his description of her, dedicated to them, and there is a yearly this ruin was brought upon the Romans stated, “she is tall with flaming red hair, holiday that commemorates their deaths. by a woman, a fact which caused them terrifying to look at with a fierce gaze and Story 2: 60 AD. In 54 AD, after the greatest shame.”3 a harsh, powerful voice . . . grasp[ing] a Emperor Nero comes to power, he The point that a female commander is long spear to strike dead all those who begins to energize the flagging effort at the helm of the defense of Mona is not set eyes on her.”4 With an arrogant of his predecessor, Claudius, to control peculiar to Britons at the time; there is no tone, he added, “this woman possessed Briton by sending troops to the Welsh division between a person’s sex and his or greater intelligence than is usually found border country to subdue one of the her rise to the role of military commander. in the female sex.”5 Boudicca is excellent last strongholds against Roman rule. Celtic women hold high status in the with a sword and gifted in hand to hand Tacitus, a Roman senator and historian, ancient world for the liberties and social combat, but her trademark is her abil- pens in his Annals, Book XIV, all the positions they claim. Compared to their ity to maneuver a two-horse chariot. In known details of the campaign under the counterparts in Greek, Roman, and other acknowledgment of the brutal treatment subheading “Romans and the Druids at of her daughters by the invaders, she

48 Commentary / Warrior Women JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 rides into what is modern-day Colchester of Dahomey. Within their realm, they are military graves being upturned contain and sacks the city. Returning the ven- held in high esteem and valued as war- the bones and weapons of horsewomen geance applied to her daughters, she is riors. Two accounts exist regarding their who fought alongside men. Lying with particularly intent on killing the Roman roots. The first is that they formed some- them are arrows, swords, daggers, armor, women and impales all of them on out- time in the early 1600s, as gbeto, meaning shields, spears, and sling stones.12 size gibbets, or suspends their corpses “big hunter.” Malian society, where from trees, cutting off the upper fronts of the gbeto live, is considered progressive Women Combatants: A Global their bodies and sewing the severed frag- for the time due to their valuing educa- Review of Their Exploits ments to their mouths. Before turning tion and exchanging scholars with China, Geographically, from the North Ameri- the community into a pile of smolder- Europe, and the Middle East. Other can continent, eastward to the nations ing ash, the Iceni Queen makes a fiery histories describe the women as serving as of Asia, and across many eras, women speech in which she affirms Celtic women armed palace guards, later forming into show they are talented and ruthless as as embodiment and soul of the lands the Black Sparta combat troops of King combatants and leaders in war. There is from which they arise. Her expert tribal Gezo, in the region of modern-day Benin no question; they are physically and psy- guerrilla tactics are no match over time, in West Africa.7 Female generals oversee chologically able to thrive in battle situ- however, against the highly organized their ranks, and they serve 40 continu- ations. In the 1800s in , and outsized enemy forces, but she has a ous years as a significant part of Gezo’s Buffalo Calf Road Woman (also known definitive impact on turning the enemy military forces. as Brave Woman) of the Northern soldiers away from her people. These stories are only three of thou- Cheyenne fights with her husband at Today, the Iceni Queen is well known sands of accounts of women combatants the Battle of Little Big Horn. In 2005, throughout the . that exist in historical archives of war. It breaking a century of silence among During the reign of Queen Victoria, a has not been until the last two decades tribal elders about discussing George likeness of Boudicca and her two daugh- that such exploits are appearing as impor- Armstrong Custer, she is publicly cred- ters was commissioned and cast in bronze tant additions to the timeline of conflict. ited as the warrior who strikes the blow by the royal family and Parliament’s One of the reasons for the missing factual that knocks the cavalry commander engineer and sculptor, Thomas knowledge and understanding about these off his horse.13 Running Eagle of the Thornycroft. The statue sits on a plinth women is that their experiences have been Piegan Tribe of the Blackfoot Nation beside the Victoria Embankment next purposely written out of the chronology participates in several successful raids to Westminster Bridge and the House of of historical records.8 A 2012 opinion and war parties. In a battle with the Parliament in downtown London. This piece by Bettany Hughes, an English Flathead, she is explicitly targeted by the line from William Cowper’s Boadicea, An historian, author, and broadcaster who enemy after field intelligence confirms Ode, is inscribed on the side of the art- specializes in classical studies, asserts that there is a strong woman warrior among work, “Regions Caesar never knew, thy not only have women’s exploits been de- her people. The enemy singles her out posterity shall sway.”6 leted, but also their wisdom and insights for killing before they enter battle, club- Story 3: 17th Century. The troops about religion, codes, hadiths, texts, and bing her from behind astride her war- are a ferocious sight, advancing silently statecraft.9 Hughes discloses that women horse. Dahteste, a Choconen Apache from the African bush, barefoot, wield- may only occupy a mere 0.5 percent of warrior woman, is a successful raider ing clubs and knives. They walk through about 3,500 years of recorded history.10 and compatriot to Geronimo serving acacia, a low-growing dense plant with At Stanford University, extensive work by as a translator and mediator during the white, spiny hooked razor-sharp thorns. one of the world’s leading scholars and U.S. Cavalry negotiation for his tribe’s Each undergoes the same exhaustive drills researchers of female antiquities, Adrienne surrender. Lozen, born into the Chi- to become insensitive to fighting and Mayor, writes in The Amazons that there is henne Band, is considered a strategic impervious to pain. One methodology conclusive evidence today that many tales genius in planning and orchestrating to harden them to battle is to have all re- of women warriors thought to be fictional battles. She is so effective in her ability cruits heave bound prisoners of war into are facts.11 Support for her studies exists to predictably determine the enemy’s an angry crowd and watch unmoving, as in data derived from recent archeological movements that her nation claims she the captives are torn apart. Most lethal of digs. Fifty ancient burial mounds near the is born with shaman powers. Vittorio, the warriors are the Reapers, armed with town of Pokrovka, Russia, close to the her brother and the Chief of the Warm 3-foot-long straight razors so they can Kazakhstan border, are yielding women’s Springs band of the Tchihendeh division slice the enemy in two. An artistic render- skeletons alongside their weapons. Such of the central Apaches, talks about her ing of one of the troops shows a standing excavations are adding to the credibility of in respectful tones, stating, “She is my fighter with a musket, club, dagger, and the Greek historian Herodotus’ accounts right hand. She is a shield to her people an enemy’s severed head, blood dripping that depict numerous instances of female . . . as strong as a man, braver than to the ground. These fighting elite are fighters. At other archeological sites from most, and cunning in strategy.”14 women in the service of the African King ancient Eurasia, up to 40 percent of

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Raum 49 Students with Infantry Training Battalion—part of first ITB company to include female Marines as part of ongoing research into opening combat-related job fields to women—practice basic marksmanship techniques at Camp Geiger, North Carolina, September 26, 2013 (U.S. Marine Corps/Tyler L. Main)

The Southern Hemisphere has the female troops wearing red leather armor in their invasions of . fewest recorded examples of women and carrying shields. There are many During the Greco-Persian wars, Artemisia warriors, but there are some illustra- warrior queens among the Hausa in the I of Caria commands a contribution of tions worth noting. During the great region of Niger and Nupe, who practice five ships under the Persian King Xerxes age of maritime exploration of the early for and fight savage battles with their at the naval battle of Artemisium. As the 1500s, there are eyewitness accounts by enemies. Both groups are primarily campaign progresses, and it becomes navigators that see female warriors on Muslim. Yaa Asantewaa, queen mother of evident she will fall into Greek hands, the tributaries of the great rivers on the Ejisu in the Ashanti Empire—now part she decides to raise the colors of the South American continent. Explorer of modern-day Ghana, prepares, equips, enemy on her vessel’s mast to confuse and conquistador Francisco de Orellana and leads the War of the Golden Stool in the Greeks into thinking she is a friend. relates that during his traverse of the 1900. It is the final battle in the Anglo- In the writing of the second-century entire length of the Amazon, he encoun- Ashanti struggle with British colonialists. Macedonian author Polyaneus, Xerxes ters warrior women skilled in the use of Numerous illustrations of women acknowledges Artemisia’s excelling in bordunas. Depicted as tall, with muscular fighters exist in the history of the geo- the face of death and awards her a war physiques and well trained, the women graphic regions of south, eastern, and prize of a complete suit of Greek armor. are lethal additions to fights due to their central Europe. While many of the stories One detractor, Thessalus, a son of Greek aptitude in the use of the bow and arrow. depict land battles, there are also women physician Hippocrates, calls her cunning Other European expedition histories who show excellent aptitudes for fight- ploys those of “merely a cowardly pirate.” describe women skilled in martial arts and ing at sea. A research team from Western After the Battle of Artemisium, she re- ground combat inhabiting the Andes.15 recently uncovered remnants ceives the formal title of Grand Admiral On the continent of Africa, Dahomey of Viking shield-maidens, or skjaldmaer, and Commander in Chief of the Persian women are not the only female warriors. along with their battle swords. They Navy. In honor of her heroics, her profile Greek histories report seeing Libyan are believed to have accompanied male is imprinted on fifth-century coins.16

50 Commentary / Warrior Women JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 In the Persian Empire, during the Mary Beard, in her New York Times the patriarchy of today. Understanding sixth century BCE, women are valued best-selling book Women and Power, this historical deletion of women’s roles for their contributions as rulers, they argues that the strong patrilineal Roman is helpful to start to see that the current oversee legislative court and run official culture is what obliterated the speech gender landscape is not an accident and ministries, and they hold positions of and power of women.19 Demeaning that today’s ideas about women are military might. During the 30-year reign female populations in this period is the inextricably linked to what she terms of Cyrus the Great, Pantea Arteshbod norm. Philosophers, politicians, and “historical, cultural DNA.”27 Extensive stood out as commander of the Persian artists from the era show a common research behind Women and Power shows Immortal Army, which roles are akin to bond in their negativity toward women. that within the history of equality there today’s special operations forces. The Soldier and mercenary Xenophon is a basic rule of thumb: “in tracing the Immortals are referenced in Herodotus’ believes that “men can better endure persistence of female disempowerment, writings as a professional corps consisting physically adverse conditions. Women Beard argues that we inherited a deep of some heavy infantry at a size of up to are much more fearful, and hence more cultural preoccupation” with it and that 10,000 troops.17 Her society considers protective of possessions, while men the “more a culture oppresses women, Pantea as a sensitive and caring military are more courageous.”20 Demosthenes, or oppresses anyone, the more absorbed commander. an Athenian general during the Pelo- they become with keeping the disempow- In Asian chronologies, there are ponnesian War, sees women as having erment rather than moving beyond it.”28 more examples of female fighters than in three roles: “men keep hetaerae (mis- In 2017, the World Economic Forum any other part of the world. One of the tresses) for the sake of pleasure, female (WEF) estimated that the likelihood for most widely documented is the Japanese slaves for daily care, and wives to give global gender parity in economics and onna-bugeisha, who are part of the noble legitimate children and be guardians of civil and legislative rights would not occur warrior caste that fights alongside the households.”21 From Greek dramatist any time soon, with research showing samurai. Each intensively exercises in the Meander comes the line “a man who that reaching a modest level of equality is use of the ko-naginata, a pole weapon teaches a woman to write should know at least 170 years away.29 Not only is an blade for battering, stabbing, or hooking that he is providing poison to an asp.”22 extended timeframe involved, but reach- an opponent. All are taught tanto- Ancient Greek Hipponax disparages ing new stages of reduction in disparities jutsu, a series of knife fighting systems. women in his poetry: “There are two are also taking longer to advance. Labeled Instruction regimens focus on the use of days on which a woman is most pleas- by the WEF as the “creeping delay,” the the kaiken, an 8- to 10-inch-long dagger ing—when someone marries her and excessive lapse of time for change is a used for indoor, close quarter combat.18 when he carries out her dead body.”23 result of our human nature to automati- The onna-bugeisha’s ko-naginata is Euripides’ classical tragedies often have cally try to find selective arguments to purposefully formed to be slightly smaller women describing themselves in a nega- resist moving toward equitabilities. Loss than the o-naginata for men, to compen- tive light. From his plays come the lines and grievance theory from the field of sate for women’s differing average height “I am only a woman, a thing which the social dynamics aids in explaining why the and body strength. world hates” and “we are a curse to disproportionate interval plagues change Knowing about this history is im- man.”24 for women desiring to enter a career in portant because it demonstrates a broad Not all is negative from the period. combat arms. Reaching a majority ac- demographic and geographic represen- There are some who take a nontraditional ceptance entails a change in sociocultural, tation of women in war. It shows they line and advocate for women, but this not physical, DNA. effectively fight and lead in jungles, is not a common occurrence. Student For a shift to occur, the current deserts, steppes, at sea, and in riverine records of Plato’s teachings show he idealized and privileged spaces men and regions. They are physically and emotion- believes women should learn the crafts women hold in the military will need to ally able to compete and do well across of musical and physical training, as well undergo modification. In socio-science an expansive set of scenarios including as military preparation, and that men terms, such adjustment requires a reduc- hand-to-hand combat, camouflage, and and women should employ themselves ing of holding onto what is called “severe tracking, and in using the lethal weapons in fighting enemies the same way.25 internal grievances.”30 Grievances are systems of their times. Aristotle, Plato’s student, has an entirely defined as “real or imagined wrongs or different viewpoint, asserting that women other causes for complaint or protest to The Excommunication are naturally inferior to men, physically, the status quo.”31 Two primary grievance of Women from War spiritually, and intellectually.26 groups exist in the combat exclusion Why and how women have been deleted Beard makes a compelling argument issue. Those who support women’s rights or ostracized from taking on combat that there is a direct line between the to bear arms are defined as “liberalist,” roles is believed to be linked to the rise silencing and invisibility of women in the meaning they are open to new behavior of the patriarchal societies of Greece cultures of the ancients to the current or opinions and are willing to discard and Rome. English scholar and classicist and continuing problems with some of traditional values and replace them with

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Raum 51 new ones. Those who would prefer on women practicing law, and the culture of the 21st-century infantryman. women not be allowed this role take on Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Up until The comments also ignore the numeric a “conservativist” approach, meaning 1975, pregnancy resulted in immediate that there are over 9,000 U.S. military their preference is to hold to historical at- dismissal from the Armed Forces. One women who earned valor awards and titudes and values that women should not rare example of support from inside the combat action badges in the past two be combatants. One excellent example of military for women’s inclusion is when decades.39 Also disregarded is the cur- loss and grievance compounding change Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo rent situation of women in the Army. At and an excessive period passing before a Zumwalt writes and distributes Z-gram a Future of War Conference in Arizona new paradigm emerges is with the near #116, “Equal Rights and Opportunities in 2018, the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff, century of effort it took to achieve the for Women in the Navy,” in August of General James McConville, gave an over- women’s right to vote in the United 1972.34 Some new ideas he proposes view where he stated: States and United Kingdom.32 are the opening of all enlisted rates to women, the support of the goal of assign- We have women in every single infantry, Ideas and Their Application ing women to ships at sea, the opening armor and artillery battalion and every single From 1900–2015, examples of leg- of civil engineering and chaplaincy roles brigade combat team in the Army. . . . The islatively blocking, rescinding, and to women, and an assignment of techni- Army currently has 600 women in infantry reinvigorating the roles of women in cal qualified unrestricted line women and armor jobs. . . . Ten (now 12) women the military are numerous. It is not to restricted line billets. In follow-on have graduated from Ranger School, which until after , when the decades, women are allowed entry into is our toughest school. We have a woman women of the all-female medical units the Service academies and to fly combat commanding a company in the 82nd prove to be highly successful, that the aircraft. Many of these modifications do Airborne Division, an infantry company.40 men overseeing their activities support not occur until both bodies of the legisla- their formal entry into the forces. Most tive branch of the U.S. Government gain In 2018, the first female sapper tab of the women involved in promoting additional female officials who support was awarded, and currently, 22 women their value to the military are already the changes and branches of the Armed are serving as infantry and armor of- hardened to rejection because nearly Services approach 10 percent total female ficers. Statements spoken to the cadets in all of them have labored as suffragists population.35 Virginia, while deserving unqualified re- and suffragettes to gain voting rights.33 Two primary arguments continue to spect due to the level of highly decorated Their success in front- and rear-line plague the “women as fighters” issue: combat experience behind them, show hospital work leads to the passage of the that women are considered a distraction the “conservativist” line of the women Army Reorganization Act, which allows to unit cohesion, and women are less in combat argument, are an example of female medical professionals to attain able physically and mentally to perform a deep cultural preoccupation with the status as officers and receive a relative combat roles. As recently as September of status quo, and are a good representation rank to that of their male counterparts. 2018, James Mattis is quoted as stating of “loss and grievance” toward a scenario However, limitations are put in place in a presentation to cadets at the Virginia that no longer exists in the battle prepara- to allow only for promotion within the Military Institute (VMI) that “the jury’s tion crucible. A ban on women in combat four lowest officer ranks of lieuten- still out on women serving in combat. was rescinded 6 years before the declara- ant to major without full rights and The United States needs to decide tions made at VMI and are 4 years after privileges, or equal pay. Women will not whether females in close-quarters combat Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter an- be considered for substantial, formal are a military strength or weakness . . . nounced the decision to open all combat leadership responsibilities, and female remember our inclination is to have this jobs to women. enlisted Army Soldiers get capped at open to all. But we cannot do something Internationally, the move to delete 2 percent of total enlisted brackets. that militarily doesn’t make sense.”36 combat exclusion policies begins almost Officer slots are limited to 10 percent, The defense given for these statements is 30 years ago. By 2018, more than a and rank restrictions exist for female that there is not enough data yet on full dozen industrialized nations allow participants for 50 years. The removal female inclusion.37 In an earlier interview, women to serve in combat.41 During of these limitations does not occur until Mattis notes what infantrymen are like the late 1980s, Canada and Denmark the Vietnam War in 1967. in battle: “They are cocky; they’re ram- passed total inclusion laws for women Any changes related to the military bunctious. They’re necessarily macho. in the military. In Australia in 2011, the woman after 1967 parallel the passage And it’s the most primitive; I would military began a 5-year plan that resulted of national legislation of the Equal Pay say even evil, environment. You can’t in women serving as navy ordnance Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, even explain it.”38 There is no awareness disposal divers; as airfield and ground prohibiting discrimination, the evolution shown here of 3,000 years of women’s defense guards; and as members of the of the Equal Employment Opportunity participation in events as deadly and hor- infantry, artillery, and armored units. Commission, the lifting of the ban rific as the picture presented here of the ’s air force is now composed of

52 Commentary / Warrior Women JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 almost 9 percent female personnel, and Conclusion: Leading, Arteshbod, Artemisia, Boudicca, the several are serving as and Legislating, and Learning Tru’ng Sisters, Yaa Asantewaa, and Lozen fighter pilots. In 2018, India deployed There continues to be a preoccupation should be as well-known as their male its first all-female elite SWAT team with with keeping alive the grievance between counterparts. JFQ expertise in explosives, urban warfare, the liberalist and conservativist sociologi- and deadly martial arts. Thirty-six com- cal points of view that women cannot mandos work in counterterrorism units and should not fight. Three spheres need Notes and receive preparation by top global to be addressed to offset this problemati- 1 experts in weapons proficiencies and Krav cal state of affairs: leadership understand- Nghia M. Vo and Nguyen Ngoc Bich, The Trung Sisters Revisited (Saigon, Vietnam: Maga, which is a lethal martial arts pro- ing, legislation, and education. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, gram pioneered by Israeli special forces. Military leaders should consider learn- March 18, 2015). In field maneuvers, the commandos are ing about historical examples of female 2 Joshua J. Mark, “Tacitus on Boudicca’s proving to be highly proficient in ambush combatants to affect their own and Revolt,” Ancient History Encyclopedia, January and counter-ambush tactics, jungle, and other’s attitudes regarding the myth that 18, 2012, available at . urban operations. They can, stated an women have not been in combat. Over 3 Cassius Dio, Roman History (Cambridge: article in The Telegraph, “spring from the past 20 years, there has been a vast Harvard University Press, 1987). Changes deep sleep to action, fully armed, within improvement in the availability of such occurring in the 1960s and 1970s parallel the a minute of an alarm.”42 Israel has long information, and it should be mined. larger, two-decades-long timeframe that has had compulsory mixed gender military Including historical and modern stories become known as “second-wave feminism.” 4 Ibid. service and represents an extensive mod- in instructional scenarios and informal 5 “Boudica (Boudicca),” in Encyclopae- ern history with integrated troops. A discussions with troops will aid in shifting dia Romana, ed. James Grout, available at 2000 equality amendment to the Israeli the negative cultural DNA about women . 6 William Cowper, Boadicea: An Ode (1782), [] is equal to the arms need to write or tell their stories so Eighteenth-Century Poetry Archive, February rd right of men.” The 33 Caracal Combat that the abysmal 0.5 percent of their writ- 2019, available at . whose sexes appear the same, is now 70 can increase. 7 Stanley B. Alpern, Amazons of Black percent female. Members were actively In the world of politics, legislators Sparta: The Women Warriors of Dahomey (New York: New York University Press, 2011). Also engaged in Al Aqsa Intifada, the Gaza who support gender-related military eq- see Frederick Forbes, Dahomey and the Daho- Withdrawal, and the Israel-Lebanon War. uitabilities or work with lawmakers who mans: Being the Journals of Two Missions to the Recruits use M16A1 and M4A1 assault are opposed to transformation also need King of Dahomey, and Residence at His Capital, rifles, grenade launchers, light antitank to become and remain knowledgable in the Year 1849 to 1850 (London: Longman, weapon rockets, light and heavy machine about why and how past societies dis- Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1851). 8 Mary Beard et al., “‘Big Books by Blokes guns, and automatic grenade launchers. empower female populations. The more about Battles’: Why Is History Still Written One female member in the battalion examples available in their repertoires of Mainly by Men?” , February 6, served as commander of a sniper platoon. successful and failed scenarios, the abler 2016. Chloe Angyal, “Men Write History, but In general, earlier societies that ac- the policymakers become in their ability Women Live It, HUFF Post Opinion, March cepted female warriors did not plague to fend off the “creeping delays” that 28, 2018, available at . inclusion, nor did they impede their repeating past errors. Educators in war Helen Lewis, “From Cynisca to the Pages of talents. Instead, the military ensured colleges and military Service schools who the TLS, If We Write Women Out of History, women could succeed as warriors. Those develop curricula and lectures for security We Only Get Half the Story,” New Statesman developing weapons for women built sector professionals would benefit their America, November 10, 2015. Alison Flood, “Popular History Writing Remains a Male Pre- hardware for success and did not burden student populations through formally serve, Publishing Study Finds,” The Guardian, them with the idea that they should instigating study units that discuss social January 11, 2016. “fight like a man.” Training scenarios aspects and historical examples of women 9 Maya Salam, “In Her Words: Where were put in place that worked to their in war. Demographics in war college and Women Rule the Headlines,” New York Times, strengths. Operationally, women were Service school classrooms have changed January 4, 2019, available at . could excel. Only in recent generations mixed gendered the military becomes 10 Bettany Hughes, “Why Were Women have women been excluded by using an in the field, the more it is essential for Written Out of History?” excuse that they do not match, precisely, those being schooled in professional blog, February 29, 2016, available at . strength of a male contemporary. awareness about women and war. Pantea

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Raum 53 11 Adrienne Mayor, The Amazons: Lives and 22 James C. Thompson, “What Athenian list-alphabetically/z/list-z-grams/z-gram-116. Legends of Warrior Women Across the Ancient Men Said about Women,” Women in the An- html>. World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, cient World blog, July 2010, available at . See also Andromache, speaking cal Review E 84, no. 1 (July 2011). Data now the Female Viking Warrior Was Written Out of in Euripides, Andromache, ca. 428–425 BCE. show that once 10 percent of a population is History,” The Guardian, September 15, 2017; 23 Ibid. committed to an idea, it is inevitable that it will Michael Greshko, “Famous Viking Warrior Was 24 Ibid. See also Phaedra, speaking in Eurip- eventually become the prevailing opinion of the a Woman, DNA Shows,” National Geographic, ides, Hippolytus, 428 BCE. entire group. The key is to remain committed. September 12, 2017, available at ; Antiquity: An Online Resource for the Study of video, 0:42, September 26, 2018, available Simon Worrall, “Amazon Warriors Did Women in the Ancient World, November 27, at . . 37 Ibid. news/2014/10/141029-amazons-scythians- 26 Aristotle, The History of Animals, ed. 38 Ibid. hunger-games-herodotus-ice-princess-tattoo- Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton Univer- 39 Richard Sisk, “Women in Combat: cannabis/>; and Jeannine Davis-Kimball, sity Press, 1984). Stars, Combat Action Badges and Casualties,” “Warrior Women of Eurasia,” Archeology 50, 27 Kate Tuttle, “Tracing the Roots of Military.com, August 31, 2015, available at no. 1 (January–February 1997), available at Misogyny to Ancient Greece and Rome with . 28, 2017, available at . 13 Martin J. Kidston, “Northern Cheyenne books/jacketcopy/la-ca-jc-women-and-power- 40 Matthew Cox, “Twelve Female Soldiers Break Vow of Silence,” Helena Independent 20171228-story.html>; see also Beard, Women Have Now Graduated Army Ranger School, Record, June 28, 2005. and Power. Military.com, April 9, 2018, available at . net/history-famous-people/lozen-intelligent- 2017), available at ; WEF_GGGR_2017.pdf>. Gretel C. Kovach, “Wide Range of Policies for Carolyn Niethammer, Daughters of the Earth: 30 Gerry Larsson et al., “Daily Uplifts and Women in Combat Jobs,” San Diego Union The Lives and Legends of American Indian Coping as a Buffer Against Everyday Hassles: Tribune, February 14, 2015. Women (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977); Relationship with Stress Reactions over Time 42 Saptarshi Ray, “New All-Female SWAT and James Axtell, ed., The Indian People of in Military Personnel,” Scandinavian Psycholo- Team to Protect Indian Prime Minister after Eastern America: A Documentary History of gist 4, no. 13 (2017), available at . (London), August 11, 2018. 1981). See also Peter Aleshire, Warrior Woman: 31 Ibid. See also The Global Gender Gap The Story of Lozen, Apache Warrior and Shaman Report 2017. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015). 32 Emmeline Sylvia Pankhurst, My Own 15 Buddy Levy, River of Darkness: Francisco Story (London: Eveleigh Nash, 1914). Helen Orellana’s Legendary Voyage of Death and Dis- Pankhurst, Deeds, Not Words: The Story of covery Down the Amazon (New York: Bantam, Women’s Rights, Then and Now (London: Scep- 2011). ter, 2018). Emmeline Sylvia Pankhurst, The 16 See Polyaenus, Stratagems, 8.53.5; Suffragette Movement: An Intimate Account of also see Jone Johnson Lewis, “Biography of Persons and Ideals (London: Longman, 1931). Artemisia I, Warrior Queen of Halicarnassus,” Elizabeth Crawford, The Women’s Suffrage ThoughtCo, February 14, 2019, available Movement: A Reference Guide 1866–1928 (Lon- at . ing paper, Mary Raum, “Suffragism, Women 17 Herodotus, “The Battle of Thermopy- in Military Nursing and Medicine,” in From lae,” in The Histories, 7.22, available at . believed in peaceful campaigning, whereas the 18 Steven Turnbull, Samurai Women 1184– suffragettes believed in direct action (violence 1877, Warrior, book 151 (Oxford, United and militancy). The suffragists were nation- Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2010). ally organized; the suffragettes were a smaller 19 Mary Beard, Women and Power: A Mani- organization with 2,000 members at its peak in festo (New York: Liveright, 2017). 1914. The suffragists allowed men to join their 20 Stewart Irvin Oost, “Xenophon’s Atti- efforts; the suffragettes did not. tude Toward Women,” The Classical World 71, 34 Admiral E.R. Zumwalt, Jr., “Equal Rights no. 4 (1977), 225–236. and Opportunities for Women,” Z-gram #116, 21 Complete Works of Demosthenes, Delphi August 7, 1972, Naval History and Heritage Ancient Classics Book 56 (Hastings, East Sus- Command, available at

54 Commentary / Warrior Women JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Marine recruit Maria Daume, Platoon 4001, Papa Company, 4th Recruit Training Battalion, drags simulated casualty on combat training course during Crucible, January 5, 2017, Parris Island, (U.S. Marine Corps/Greg Thomas)

Military Medicine The Gender Gap in Trauma Training

By Daniel P. McGarrah

he combination of civil-military batants are positioned in the battlespace operations, humanitarian due to joint operations with nongovern- T duties, and combat operations mental organizations (NGOs), private results in women working in hazard- voluntary organizations, and various ous environments and the necessity of partner-nation personnel operating female-specific trauma training. The in regions of the world frequented by Sergeant First Class Daniel P. McGarrah, USA, 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) the U.S. military. Women have moved is the Senior Enlisted Medical Advisor for 4th Psychological Operations Group, Fort Bragg, North declares, “The Servicemen and women from support roles to operational ones, Carolina. He wrote this essay while a student at who defend our nation will have the making them more susceptible to the College of International Security Affairs. It equipment, the resources, and the combat trauma and injuries and increas- won the Strategic Research Paper category of the 2018 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff funding they need to secure our home- ing the likelihood of U.S. military per- Strategic Essay Competition. land.”1 Currently, more female noncom- sonnel treating female civilian casualties.

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 McGarrah 55 Physiological indications and sociocul- touch the opposite sex. These five con- the higher casualty rates of men in com- tural concerns for female-specific training siderations make up just a portion of the bat. Nevertheless, the traditional male are two critical areas resulting from the physiological and sociocultural issues fac- model leads to a misperception of where increase of women working in harm’s ing the DOD medical community and its and how to perform particular lifesaving way. The need for nonmedical personnel need to update its trauma curriculum. medical interventions such as a cricothy- to understand both areas is imperative for Studies show that the effects of roidotomy (procedure to open an airway) increasing the survivability of women in hypothermia can differ in men and or needle thoracostomy (an incision in the physical trauma situations because most women, contributing to complications chest wall using a needle, commonly used preventable mortalities occur prior to a such as the lethal triad.5 These three to treat a collapsed lung). Currently, the casualty arriving at a hospital.2 The surviv- life-threatening issues are vital to manag- training dialogue does not describe the ability aspect goes beyond the training and ing a trauma casualty as they can lead to differences in both sexes, for example the into the core values that are the founda- irreversible shock and ultimately death. instruction to find the Adam’s apple as a tion of the Armed Forces. The Chairman Medical personnel within U.S. Special reference point for a cricothyroidotomy. of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that Operations Command (USSOCOM) This body part is primarily a landmark the integration of women into previously reviewed research involving athletes and for men due to the larger larynx that restricted occupations will occur while the effects of hypothermia. These person- men develop during puberty and is typi- unit readiness, cohesion, and morale are nel listed this topic as a potential pitfall cally impossible to see on a woman due preserved.3 This statement clarifies that during combat operations because the to the higher amount of subcutaneous the military must revise its trauma man- study showed women having twice the fat. A 2014 mixed-gender case study of agement protocols to maintain a successful rate of hypothermia injuries than men.6 cricothyroidotomy procedures examined National Security Strategy. The medical personnel conducting the the failure rate of locating the cricothy- research stated: roid membrane by palpation rather than Physiological Indications ultrasound in a hospital setting.8 The find- The physiological indications for Sex differences in thermoregulatory re- ings indicate that it is significantly more female-specific training are not new sponses during cold exposure are influenced challenging to perform this procedure challenges for the Department of by interactions among total body fat con- on women (a failure rate of 29/36, or 81 Defense (DOD). The inclusion of phys- tent, subcutaneous fat thickness, amount percent) than men (11/36, or 31 per- iological differences and demands are of muscle mass, and surface area-to-mass cent).9 In contrast to the hospital setting, in the Army’s executive order regard- ratio. . . . In females and males of equiva- Servicemembers rely on the Adam’s apple ing gender integration. This executive lent subcutaneous fat thickness, females as a landmark to find the cricothyroid order states: typically have a greater surface area, but membrane, which leaves them unpre- smaller total body mass and smaller muscle pared to perform a cricothyroidotomy on Both the Army and Marine Corps stud- mass (thus, lower total body heat content) women under battlefield conditions. ies found that women participating in than males and lose heat at a faster rate. The next male-specific phrase is to ground combat training sustained injuries Women’s thermogenic response to cold “follow the nipple line” while perform- at higher rates than men, particularly in exposure also appears less able to generate ing a needle thoracostomy. The training occupational fields requiring load-bearing. metabolic heat than males of similar body verbiage in this procedure not only shows These studies also revealed concrete ways composition due to less total muscle mass.7 disregard to the implications for women to help mitigate this injury rate and the but overweight men as well. There is impact on individuals and the teams in Current military trauma training does no emphasis on the problem of what which they operate. The sustainability of not identify this deficit toward women to do with female breast tissue in any our combat readiness and our obligation to in courses like Tactical Combat Casualty of the TCCC training slides. The need the welfare of the force means these findings Care (TCCC) or other medical training for this discussion should not require must be addressed in the implementation programs for nonmedical personnel. lengthy training, merely a reference to of the full integration of women in the Thus, if female Servicemembers de- specific considerations when dealing with Armed Forces.4 velop hypothermia twice as fast as male patients who do not meet the example Servicemembers, they require a higher of a fighting-age male. Imagine the ad- However, the Army did not have priority in terms of triage to prevent un- ditional chaos and stress of combat while any conclusive data requiring the need toward consequences of hypothermia. conducting a procedure for the first for female-specific trauma training in Moreover, the differences in anatomy time on a female casualty; it is then the this executive order. Nevertheless, there and physiology between both sexes can striking differences between both sexes are known differences in the effects of lead to complications when perform- become apparent. The Committee of traumatic injuries for each sex, includ- ing emergency medical treatments. The Tactical Combat Casualty Care officially ing hypothermia, landmarks, verbiage, standard example used by DOD medical updated curriculum in August 2018 to training models, and the reluctance to training is a fighting-aged man, due to reflect evidence-based changes regarding

56 Commentary / The Gender Gap in Trauma Training JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Sailor cuts pants off training dummy to check for further injuries during week-long tactical combat casualty care course at U.S. Naval Hospital, Okinawa, , January 13, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Kelly M. Agee) site selection, needle bore size, and presents a more significant concern. If need for proactive planning that stresses confirmation of an effective procedure.10 they are worried about removing cloth- cultural inclusivity and overcomes sensi- The committee is reviewing what further ing from what is essentially a plastic doll, tive gender issues or stigmas. updates will be implemented regarding then how are they going to perform—in As a TCCC instructor, I facilitated female anatomical differences, which will combat—with a living, breathing, and numerous training simulations that in- ensure that first responders are knowl- potentially dying woman? Additionally, a cluded professional actors and actresses edgeable when treating female casualties USSOCOM medical survey conducted role-playing as female patients to provide with traumatic thoracic injuries. recently listed 36 characteristics each realistic training for the students. In these Unfortunately, overlooking female special operations forces (SOF) medical trauma scenarios, instructors were able to mannequins and the effects of medical professional would want in a nonliv- identify the cultural and medical obstacles role-players is a topic that continues ing model for training.11 The two least that nonmedical personnel may face and after years of inattention. Recently, the desired characteristics were race and were able to assist in desensitizing stu- Medical Simulation Training Center gender. In the past, when fewer women dents to gender challenges. on Fort Bragg tested the use of female were working within the SOF com- When Servicemembers began the mannequins with mixed results from munity, the small number of female training with a live female role-player, the the Servicemembers performing trauma casualties did not necessitate male- or dynamics of the medical scenario in play scenarios. Some of the Servicemembers female-specific training, nor was it drastically altered a standard response, were still reluctant to cut off the clothes cost-effective. As the needs and goals of at least the first time. The reason for this from a plastic mannequin, which DOD shift, grow, and develop, there is a change is varied, but a constant theme

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 McGarrah 57 A disconcerting problem documented in recent years is a lack of initiative to treat women in life-threatening medical situa- tions. One study involving nearly 20,000 cases nationwide showed a male-female issue with the lack of CPR application; the alarming results found that women were less likely to survive than men when CPR was necessary. The Associated Press reported, “Females are less likely than males to get CPR from a bystander and more likely to die . . . and researchers think the reluctance to touch a woman’s chest might be one reason.”13 Another factor found in this study is the lack of anatomically correct female mannequins on which to practice chest compressions.14 These cases directly correlate to the lack of female-specific training models and examples accounted for in TCCC training protocols. By discussing the cause and effect aspect of this topic and ensuring that training is professional, DOD could Hospital corpsman, right, gives instruction to Sailor during field training exercise portion of Tactical help decrease the number of female Combat Casualty Care training, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, May 31, 2013 (U.S. Navy/Sean Furey) Servicemember fatalities. At first glance, male-female integra- is that men react poorly when a woman Sociocultural Concerns tion into trauma training appears equal is screaming or sobbing during training. The sociological and cultural concerns and does not require changes to trauma Surprisingly, the students’ voices and their for female-specific training include education; however, with closer analysis, actions become erratic and illogical at misperceptions, obstacles, and variables it becomes evident that men and women times. When asked how they felt when the concerning women and the require- are not the same in a battlefield trauma female role-player was crying or scream- ment to remove clothing in traumatic situation. If women believe that the ing, “Don’t let me die!” the answer from situations. These issues involve touch- military does not meet their medical most students was “My mind went blank” ing women and completing the task needs, then a reduction in the number of or “I was in panic mode and didn’t know of making a female patient “trauma women entering the military is a reason- how to get her voice out of my head.” naked.” The oversexualization of the able response. This problem is vital to These reactions were notably worse for female body is best confronted and female recruitment and retention—there individuals with sisters or daughters. understood in training to prevent need- is a need for women to fill positions During follow-on scenarios, the stu- less female fatalities due to inaction. within the military due to a reduction in dents reacted much better and without Currently, there are cultural and societal the eligible population in America. The nearly as many problems because of norms that inhibit trauma training—for cause for this is that DOD “estimates their exposure in the first scenario. As instance, sexual harassment. Resolving that 71 percent of the roughly 34 mil- with other simulations, exposure helped the reluctance of both medical and non- lion 17- to 24-year-olds in the United automate appropriate responses. The use medical Servicemembers to treat female States today would fail to qualify based of professional medical role-players is not casualties and follow mandated proto- on the current enlistment criteria be- currently a requirement for TCCC but is cols that include the removal of cloth- cause of physical or mental health issues, a valuable tool for training. As such, live ing is not an easy task. In contrast, the low educational scores, or major criminal role-players should be available in con- civilian medical community has training convictions.”15 The whole issue dimin- junction with mannequins to “inoculate” protocols set up for these situations ishes the operational effectiveness of Servicemembers so that the first time they to protect both the patient and the Servicemembers within DOD and affects treat a female casualty, it is not in actual medical provider; however, the public NSS objectives. combat. In the end, this is a simple and sector still struggles to treat women, Cultural and religious biases are inexpensive fix to encourage nonmedical as shown in a recent cardiopulmonary those that many in DOD would rather personnel to understand what to expect resuscitation (CPR) report from the not deal with to prevent the appear- and how to respond to a female casualty. American Heart Association.12 ance of discrimination or prejudice in a

58 Commentary / The Gender Gap in Trauma Training JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 “politically correct” environment. The Recommendations ment of a casualty’s blood to clot properly. Aci- dosis is the excessive amount of acid in bodily cultural aspect under scrutiny here is The following recommendations iden- fluids or tissues. when a man wants to protect a wounded tify some options for the problems 6 Thomas A. Cappaert et al., “National woman; this chivalrous maxim drove uncovered. First, update trauma train- Athletic Trainers Association Position State- the Israeli army’s decision to remove ing and the DOD-approved TCCC ment: Environmental Cold Injuries,” Journal women from frontline units. The author guidelines to include female-specific of Athletic Training 43, no. 6 (November/ December 2008). of a report on female service in the guidance for casualties. Second, review 7 Ibid. Israel Defense Forces (IDF) comments research studies provided and commit 8 M. Campbell et al., “The Accuracy of that the “Army has promised to allow to further investigations in order to Locating the Cricothyroid Membrane by Palpi- soldiers to avoid conduct that violates examine any potential pitfalls in current tation: An Intergender Study,” BMC Anesthesi- their religious beliefs, even if such con- medical training. Third, incorporate live ology 14, no. 108 (2014). 9 Ibid. duct is considered normal among the female role-players and female manne- 10 National Association of Emergency mainstream of Israeli society. Examples quins in the trauma training curriculum. Medical Technicians, “TCCC-MP Guidelines of such behavior include being alone Finally, ensure that women continue to and Curriculum,” August 1, 2018, available at in a room with a woman or seeing a be given the opportunities for survival . 11 Greg Horn et al., “Manikin Human- example plays into concerns among U.S. this article. Doing so is essential to our Patient Simulator Training,” Journal of Special Servicemembers who are Orthodox Jews national strategy. Operations Medicine 17, no. 2 (Summer 2017), or members of other religions with simi- 89–95. lar laws regarding these customs.17 The current policy in the Department 12 “Women Are Less Likely to Receive CPR On one hand, female-specific of Defense is that women will integrate Because of Boobs: Study,” New York Post, No- vember 13, 2017, available at . their morality or religion by seeing female-specific physiological/sociological 13 Ibid. a woman not fully clothed. On the differences and concerns. DOD policy 14 Ibid. other hand, many medical profession- should support training, medical treat- 15 John Spencer, “The Military’s Real Prob- lem: Fewer Americans Are Joining,” Politico, als have stated that religion will not be ment, and research to ensure women December 15, 2015, available at . of battle a soldier would complete the it clear that women will serve in combat 16 Idit S. Gittleman, “Female Service in trauma procedures without hesitation. arms, so women’s survivability should be the IDF: The Challenge of an ‘Integrated’ Army,” Lawfare blog, March 5, 2018, available Unfortunately, what happens when this equal to that of men. JFQ at . to do in environments where the female 17 Ibid. body is not to be viewed unclothed and Notes 18 Ibid. would potentially cause operational 1 concerns. And, as stated in the IDF National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White report, “Evaluating the IDF’s fitness is House, 2017), available at . the technical knowledge required.”18 2 Brian J. Eastridge et al., “Death on the Currently, within the U.S. military, Battlefield (2001–2011): Implications for the Future of Combat Casualty Care,” Journal of religious concerns are accepted and the Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 73 (December segregation of the sexes is not yet a con- 1, 2012). cern. Nevertheless, the need for military 3 HDQA Execution Order 097-16 to the leaders to ensure that this situation is ad- U.S. Army Implementation Plan 2016-01 dressed is evident with the turmoil seen (Army Gender Integration) (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2016), in the IDF and the problems it is facing 2, available at . to show that women are not valuable to 4 Ibid., 3. 5 the mission, but to illustrate the need The lethal triad consists of hypothermia, acidosis, and coagulopathy. Hypothermia is to have better research for the variables merely being colder than one’s average resting when it comes to trauma training. temperature, which usually averages to 98.6°F, but can fluctuate. Coagulopathy is the impair-

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 McGarrah 59 Marines with 1st Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division, and Airmen with 9th Air Support Operations Squadron, 3rd Security Force Assistance Brigade, conduct call-for-fire training during exercise Comanche Run at Fort Hood, Texas, February 26, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Sahara A. Zepeda)

The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement An Old Tool for the Modern Military

By William M. Stephens

Relatively small but wise investments in African security institutions today offer disproportionate benefits to Africa, Europe, and the United States in the future, creating mutual opportunities and reducing the risks of destabilization, radicalization, and persistent conflict.

—Statement of General David M. Rodrigues, USA, Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 8, 2016

n a recent issue of Joint Force support partners by working with Quarterly, and Eero multinational, regional, and local I Keravuori presented the by-with- forces.1 The goal of this approach is through (BWT) operational approach to maximize the effectiveness of a Lieutenant Colonel William M. Stephens, USA, is a Staff Judge Advocate at the Defense Language to multiple areas of operations and mutual goal, such as regional stabi- Institute Foreign Language Center. illustrated how the United States can lization. By working by, with, and

60 Commentary / Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 through regional partner forces, the ACSA process is relatively easy in theory, paid within 30 days of the transactions, U.S. military can help others build fulfilling an ACSA order and handing that this “debt” is tracked, and the customer their own defense and/or governmen- item to another unit requires a significant will carry the debt. This is key, especially tal organizations but not necessarily amount of knowledge, skill, and coordi- in dealing with less well-funded allies in through direct engagement in combat. nation. The first step is to identify a need, the developing areas of world. As the This article expands on this concept and there must be a recognition that this debt is tracked, it may be paid by future and illustrates how the use of a simple need can be fulfilled by another partner operations, including any other type of exchange of supplies and materials by organization. After the need is identified operations. For example, if the United joint forces or by individual Service and it is determined that this need can States provided equipment in January components via Acquisition and Cross be met, the recipient customer places a 2018 during exercises to a host country, Servicing Agreement (ACSA) transac- written order giving a full description that same country may repay that debt by tions may assist in fulfilling General of the goods or services required on a providing airlift services to U.S. personnel Votel’s vision and promote sustainable standardized order form. When the order in support of a multinational operation in regional defense institutions. It also is placed, the form of payment must be September. expands on how forces can increase decided, along with the value of the item their logistics interoperability and provided on a Standard Agreement Form Applications be strategic in their BWT approach.2 3381. There are many other small staffing ACSA transactions are utilized pri- This article next illustrates that ACSA steps by the J4, resource manager, and marily during “wartime, combined transactions could be tailored as an legal section, but in general, after entry, exercises, training, deployments, effective tool for U.S. Army train-and- the United States uses the ACSA Global contingency operations, humanitarian assist units, multidomain task forces, Automated Tracking and Reporting or foreign disaster relief operations, or multinational forces and allow these System to track orders, the completion certain peace operations under the to build partner capacity and increase of those orders, and if payment has been UN [United Nations] Charter, or for access to support for other countries’ made for those orders.6 unforeseen or exigent circumstances.”9 forces. Lastly, this article explores and Payment for the requested goods or The authorization to use an ACSA in advocates for an expansion of the use services may be accomplished in three more innovative ways is allowed in the and oversight of the simple, underuti- ways, but each of these means is not controlling Directive 2010.9.10 This lized ACSA. necessarily mutually exclusive. The first expansive language is critical, as the method is direct payment—one orga- global nature of conflict means that Background nization pays the appropriate amount there will be greater opportunities An ACSA is an international agree- of money for the item received. If it is to partner with multinational or UN ment between the United States and a direct payment, one nation is billed forces to achieve an objective. Terror- another country/entity that can assist and the other should pay the value of ist groups, such as Boko Haram and in the acquisition of needed supplies the good received within 30 days. The the so-called Islamic State, do not or material in order to support living second means is through replacement- limit themselves to a specific region, as conditions or mission accomplishment.3 in-kind (RIK). RIK payment allows the porous borders facilitate regional influ- Acquisition is defined in Department receiving party to replace LSSS that it ence spanning multiple countries. As a of Defense Directive 2010.9, Acquisi- receives with the LSSS “of an identi- result, any successful mission/solution tion and Cross-Servicing Agreements, as cal, or substantially identical, nature.”7 to counter these groups should focus “obtaining logistics support, supplies, Under the RIK payment, if a nation on regional stability versus specific or services under an acquisition agree- receives food, it may repay the debt by country stability. ment.”4 Logistics support, supplies, providing an equal amount of the same This article does not propose that the or services (LSSS) may be reciprocally type and kind of food. The last available use of a simple exchange of supplies and paid for by the receiving/requesting means of payment is through an equal materials between respective defense de- country.5 value exchange (EVE), which allows partments is the ultimate fix to promote When a transport ship sails into payment by the receiving party by paying sustainable defense institutions or that it harbor, for instance, it is easy to forget the providing country with another type is a solution for rapid resupplying a fast- how much work it took to create that of supplies or services (or other LSSS) moving strike force. Instead, it proposes picturesque scene. The challenges associ- “of an equal value to those received.”8 that ACSA transactions can be a multi- ated with the trip (including the years Under the EVE payment method, if the functional tool used for several purposes; of training and experience to give the receiving country receives fuel, it may it encompasses the spectrum of opera- crew the requisite knowledge and skills provide security services equal to the tions currently taking place, and it is also to sail) and the backbreaking work of the amount of the value of the fuel. Neither a flexible tool that can be a force multi- longshoremen loading the supplies are RIK nor EVE repayment systems require plier for planned future operations or new underappreciated. Similarly, although the immediate repayment. If they are not Army units. By expanding this program,

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Stephens 61 Sailor assigned to USS Curtis Wilbur receives food from Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force helicopter air crewman for Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement logistics exchange during Keen Sword 19, Philippine Sea, October 31, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Emily Cooper) it will be especially useful as a tool that become even more prevalent and exten- The ACSA program could be tailored can be used as part of the Army’s future sively used by troops on the ground. Two as a force multiplier to fit each SFAB in fighting and winning wars. specific units that would benefit from respective area of operation and tailored The application of the BWT opera- the application of the ACSA program to each different partnered conventional tional approach is effective in working in Army operations are the Security force.17 Each partner will have different with and equipping partner nations in Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) and needs at different times. As the goal is order to build their capacities. The use Multidomain Task Force (MDTF). to provide each country with the tools of the ACSA is also consistent with the Security Force Assistance Brigades. to contain and defeat terrorists in its future vision of Army logistics to build The Army is developing and will stand respective location, the proper equipment partner capacity. As Edward Dorman up six SFABs that will train, advise, and must be provided in combination with and Christopher Townsend adeptly assist partner conventional forces.14 The training and assistance.18 As indicated, note in their article in a recent issue of genesis of this authority is the 2015 the first step to any ACSA transaction is JFQ, one nation or service cannot and National Security Strategy, which man- identifying a need. The SFAB could assist should not be the sole source of support dates that the United States train and the partner nation with identifying the in an operation.11 Instead, each part- equip local partners as well as provide equipment or services needed as well as ner, including the host-nation partner, operational support to confront terrorist by listening to the troops on the ground. should equally provide the capabilities of groups in their own country—in es- The SFAB could then train host-nation support to the joint coalition of forces sence, providing each country with the units and build partner capacity by re- interdependently.12 In future conflicts tools to contain and defeat terrorists in quiring repayment through RIK or EVE. and operations, Soldiers will be perform- its respective location.15 SFAB members While payment by monetary exchange ing their regular role of maintaining the should be extensively trained on ACSA, may be easier for both countries, it does logistics tail rather than contracting for as it will be an useful method of provid- not increase logistical support training or all the basic support or services.13 This ing the right tools, at the right time, to capacity.19 By requiring RIK or EVE pay- means that ACSA programs should partner forces.16 ment, the SFAB could help the partner’s

62 Commentary / Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 logistics and transportation sections/unit just in one battlefield domain but must being encumbered by a long logistics or fill the repayment orders and increase the also be able to exploit opportunities and capabilities tail. institutional muscle memory for working vulnerabilities that may rapidly appear For example, MDTF forces, inte- through their own acquisition and logis- and disappear in separate domains.22 grated with local or multinational forces, tics systems. Instead of an attacking conventional in cooperation with the government of One example of how the ACSA pro- force marching to assault an objective, Niger could engage an element of Boko cess could assist the SFAB unit members the new units will be rapidly assaulting Haram on the border of Chad with air, on the ground is by the simple exchange an objective via several domains either cyber, satellite, and joint ground forces. of equipment for billeting. A ground before, during, after—or a combination The Boko Haram elements might flee the force commander may provide a host na- of all. This rapid deployment force must area and cross the border into Chad to tion with limited surveillance/detection be able to nest within local elements in regroup and broadcast a request for as- equipment in return for billeting and order to conduct insertions and actions sistance to fighters in the area. Presuming security for the SFAB team, which would where necessary and be able to operate there was legal and operational desire train the host-nation forces on how to and conduct multidomain battle across and authority, the United States could use the equipment. In this example, the time.23 These units must be able to oper- switch host-nation partners from Niger United States would obtain the equal ate quickly in order to penetrate areas to Chad and then use the latter’s supplies value exchange of the equipment by quickly and avoid being targeted by to restock. U.S. and Chadian forces could being billeted and fed by the host nation conventional or antiaccess/area-denial rapidly continue the operation utilizing while also benefiting from the increased systems.24 This means each unit must the cyber, satellite, and ground capabili- security of a well-trained host-nation have the exact equipment and capability ties to engage the Boko Haram elements security team. As another example, an at the exact moment when necessary. in all domains.27 ACSA transaction may be entered with This equipment may be utilized in the In this example, if U.S. forces could a multinational partner that is also in assault or it may be used as sustainment not reasonably use commercial resources the same area of operations to provide during an approach. In either case, the due to the rapid speed of the operation, fuel and security for a series of ground units must be able to obtain equipment the geographic distance from a logistics convoys, if the partner will provide air and exercise those capabilities in as short hub, or the austere environment, they transportation, billeting, and security as time as possible. Previously, even if a could rapidly complete the requisite for U.S. troops in that partner’s existing requester attempted to obtain gear from ACSA paperwork and move to complete compound. prepositioned stocks, it could take days or the mission. The Department of Defense In either of these examples, care must weeks from the time of the request to the (DOD) could repay the government of be given that the exchange is actually time the order is filled and on the way to Chad by any means allowable without equal and the reciprocal exchange must the requestor. Even though requests can having to engage in negotiations dur- be a fair trade in that the training is high now be completed in approximately 96 ing an ongoing mission or cease the quality, the billeting and security is ad- hours,25 utilization of an ACSA exchange operation because it did not have enough equate, and the fuel is of the proper type. would enable U.S. and partner forces to supplies. Repayment of equipment or In both of these examples, presuming all obtain the necessary stocks or capabilities services used in the mission could be of the trades are equal, the SFAB troops much faster. completed later by an equal value ex- working shoulder to shoulder with the MDTF elements should work by, change of items or services such as in a partner forces not only could provide ma- with, and through multinational partners planned humanitarian relief operation in terial or support directly to that partner or host-nation elements for maximum another part of the country at a much force but also would be the direct benefi- effectiveness.26 They must use all the later time. ciary of the exchange. Each transaction, available resources in order to engage while small in context, builds trust as well the objective rapidly, safely, and lethally, Challenges as institutional capabilities and assists in including working with other govern- Although the logistics and support accomplishing the strategic long-term mental organizations. One way to assist exchange may be an effective tool to goals of the SFABs. these troops in moving quickly through build capacity and institutions, the Multidomain Task Force. The ACSA ground terrain and working across do- knowledge of this tool and ensuring process could also be a force multiplier mains and time is to work with partner that it is used properly present chal- for the newly created MDTF. This unit forces, including multinational or coali- lenges. The knowledge of this tool concept is developing new tactics for the tion forces and utilization of reciprocal should be incorporated into training lightning pace and greater lethality of exchanges via ACSA transactions. These with U.S. forces, and there must be an future conflicts.20 The small units in the transactions would allow the MDTF increase of strategic messaging to the force must be able to move quickly, live units to partner with multinational task partner nations regarding this tool. and operate in austere conditions, and be force elements to engage and defeat the Second, there must be increased over- lethal.21 These new units will not operate enemy through greater lethality without sight and training of this tool to ensure

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Stephens 63 USS Mount Whitney, moored under northern lights in Trondheim, Norway, November 4, 2018, during multilateral exercise Trident Juncture 18 (U.S. Navy/James R. Turner) that it does not become a perpetual audience may be other leaders across of an area versus partner nations has “gift” of supplies but remains an equi- subregional areas, which may lead come into focus recently as seen by the table exchange between equal partners. to an increase in “demand” for the controversy in the North Atlantic Treaty While the United States cannot use same ACSA transactions by a different Organization even after 2014, when ACSA transactions to increase its country or regional partner seeking members assured the United States inventory or use them when the item greater U.S. presence, mutual coopera- that they would increase their respec- can be obtained from U.S. commercial tion agreements, or even mutual aid tive contributions to 2 percent of their sources, neither should the requesting agreements.30 For example, if a nation’s gross domestic product.31 This attention organization be permitted to use the leadership sees DOD as a valuable part- highlights the struggle to ensure equality generosity of the ACSA program to ner that can provide valuable logistics of payment of blood and among be a routine and continual supplier of resources during a crisis situation, it may partner nations and ensures that one goods and services. be willing to allow basing in a strategic nation does not become the perpetual According to open sources, the location. This could provide the United gift giver without reciprocity. The ACSA United States is a party to ACSA agree- States with even more opportunities to program theoretically negates potential ments with only 19 African nations, create long-term relationships and es- disparity, as each country is to contribute including some in the areas of regional tablish a long-term presence, potentially an equal value exchange of goods and concern, such as Mali, Niger, and even building a greater network of part- services or pay the cash value of the item/ Chad.28 An ACSA transaction success- ner nations, which would only lead to a services. Theoretically, for every dollar fully completed provides a strategic greater capacity to engage in missions of spent to support a partner force, that dol- opportunity to broadcast a verifiable a greater effect but smaller scale and at a lar must be recaptured. truthful message to a target audience lower cost. Reality does not necessarily match that may shape the tactical as well as The issue of costs and the disparity theory, however, as seen by an inspector strategic environment.29 This target of U.S. contributions to the defense general’s report that was critical of the

64 Commentary / Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 16 U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) and thrive in future volatile, uncertain, Cox, “Army Chief: Advise-and-Assist Units.” use of the ACSA program in current complex, and ambiguous environments 17 Ibid. 32 operations. The report indicates that and will increase our ability to support 18 National Security Strategy. “USAFRICOM did not effectively units across a greater reach of the globe 19 Ibid. manage the ACSA orders it executed through agreements with our regional 20 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “New Army and was not required to oversee ACSA partners.34 By doing so, we can simul- Unit to Test Tactics: Meet the Multi-Domain Task Force,” Breaking Defense, March 21, orders executed by its Subordinate taneously build partner capacity and 2017, available at . command did not include all the essen- for them. JFQ 21 Ibid. 22 tial data when processing the orders and Ibid. 23 David G. Perkins, “Multi-Domain Battle: did not track implementation properly Joint Combined Arms Concept for the 21st or obtain proper assurances that the Notes Century,” Association of the United States logistics support was executed properly Army, November 14, 2016, available at . according to the DOD Instruction. As nd proach,” Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2 Quarter 24 Freedberg, “New Army Unit to Test seen by the report, there will need to 2018), 40. Tactics.” 2 be significant training and oversight Edward F. Dorman III and Christopher 25 Sisk, “Army Goes Back to Basics on Sup- to ensure that the partner forces repay Townsend, “Laying the Foundation for a Stra- ply, Maintenance.” tegic By-With-Through Approach,” Joint Force 26 Freedberg, “New Army Unit to Test the debts owed to the United States. nd Quarterly 89 (2 Quarter 2018), 69, 73. Tactics.” Without this additional training, over- 3 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 27 The situation is completely hypothetical sight, and monitoring, the United States for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSD[AS]), and not based on any scenario, real or fictitious. could give so much well-meaning sup- “Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreements,” The author also understands that this scenario port that a less wealthy country would available at . does not take into account the legal and opera- 4 not be able to repay that debt, and the Department of Defense (DOD) Directive tional authorities or the complexities of each 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross Service Agree- trade balance would always be in deficit country’s relationship and does not reflect the ments (Washington, DC: DOD, September 30, current state of operations in that area. against the United States. 2016). 28 Dave Hecht, “U.S. Africa Command 5 Ibid., § E2.1.1. Hosts First Ever Signing of Acquisition Cross 6 Conclusion For a great legal article on the process Service Agreement,” U.S. Africa Command, The United States is increasing the as well as how to obtain an ACSA, see Ryan September 19, 2014, available at . 7 ments to accomplish mutual objectives. DOD Directive 2010.9, § E2.1.14. 29 James G. Stavridis, “Strategic Commu- 8 The rise in nonstate actors instigating Ibid., § E2.1.6. nication and National Security,” Joint Force 9 regional conflict spanning multiple OUSD(AS), “Acquisition and Cross- Quarterly 46 (3rd Quarter 2007), 5. Service Agreements.” 30 Ibid. countries means that any successful 10 Ibid. 31 Ivana Kottasova, “How NATO Is mission/solution to counter these 11 Dorman and Townsend, “Laying the Funded and Who Pays What,” CNN, March groups must focus on regional stability, Foundation for a Strategic By-With-Through 20, 2017, available at . building by working by, with, and 13 Richard Sisk, “Army Goes Back to 32 through local and multinational Department of Defense Office of Inspec- Basics on Supply, Maintenance,” Military.com, tor General, “U.S. Africa Command’s Man- partners as well as by building partner November 2, 2017, available at . 21, 2017, available at . resources available to be a leaner, faster, available at . College: Military Education in a Democracy 15 taposition of goals is to leverage the National Security Strategy (Washing- (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002), ton, DC: The White House, February 2015); 6. resources of our partners and utilize Matthew Cox, “Army Chief: Train and Advise some of the tools already available, such Troops ‘Are Not Special Forces,’” Military.com, as the Acquisition and Cross Service October 9, 2017, available at .

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Stephens 65 Indonesian armed forces soldiers and Borzoi Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division (1-27 Wolfhounds), participate in live fire exercise during Garuda Shield, in Cibenda, Indonesia, September 27, 2017 (U.S. Army National Guard/Matthew A. Foster)

A Model for Tactical Readiness Through Strategic Opportunity

By David A. Zelaya and Joshua Wiles

heater security cooperation pro- tion among tactical units is that readi- to the Soldier. First Battalion, 27th grams (TSCPs) provide a unique ness often takes a back seat to strategic Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat T opportunity to simultaneously objectives. What follows is a model for Team, 25th Infantry Division (1-27 generate U.S. force readiness and tactical unit integration into the strate- Infantry), used tactical strategy to meet improve strategic interoperability with gic planning process that yields better both national and strategic require- partner nations; however, the percep- outcomes for units at echelon. It is a ments while furthering unit readiness simple model developed from our expe- during GS17 with the Indonesian army rience in Exercise Garuda Shield 17 (Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Captain David A. Zelaya, USA, is Company (GS17). The model emphasizes placing Darat [TNI-AD]). Commander of B Company, 1st Battalion, 27th tactical leaders at strategic points While the battalion did achieve its Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, of friction to communicate tactical overall training objectives, it was not 25th Infantry Division (1-27 Infantry), on Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. Major Joshua Wiles, USA, is requirements up the chain of command without friction. We can now provide Operations Officer at 1-27 Infantry. and receive strategic messages down feedback into our missteps and successes.

66 Commentary / Tactical Readiness Through Strategic Opportunity JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 What follows is a road map that outlines Figure Model for Balancing Tactical and Strategic Requirements how we would have done things if we

had another chance. We outline our Step 1: Place Leaders in Step 2: Understand Step 3: Communicate Step 4: Communicate situation, describe the model, and focus Positions of Friction Resources Training Requirements Up Strategic Themes Down Receive initial mission Battalion planners identify Battalion S3/O Communicate on some of the key friction points we resources available to communicate tactical training strategic themes and Identify logistics and tactical units requirements to strategic and messages to tactical encountered along the way. maneuver planners to partner-nation planners units in easy-to-under- attend planning conferences Compare available resources with tactical Fill initial manning to achieve stand products. Battalion commander training requirements training requirements. The Situation and Model attends Concept Development Workshop and Establish key relationships 1-27 Infantry’s experience was unique provides his intent. with strategic and partner-nation planners. in that it was the highest degree of interoperability yet achieved with Indo- nesia. GS17 is an annual preplanned

exercise that has historically focused on Execution Preliminary Concept Initial Logistics Final disaster relief and nonlethal civil support Planning Meeting Developments Workshop Planning Conference Planning Conference Planning Conference operations; however, in recent years the exercise has shifted toward a more kinetic theme. 1-27 Infantry had three primary goals going into the exercise: Maximize interoperability at the •• the key factor. The closer that planner events. Additionally, face-to-face coordi- highest and lowest echelon possible is to the executing unit, the better he nation with the partner nation became between U.S. and Indonesian forces. will be able to communicate and negoti- crucial, as it controls the key resources of Leverage strategic resources to •• ate that unit’s readiness requirements. land and time. 1-27 Infantry successfully conduct a Company Combined Arms Regardless of who is in the position, established this vital relationship with the Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX). however, he must be empowered with a TNI-AD early and leveraged it through- Train at echelon and achieve the •• clear understanding of his commander’s out the planning process to ensure that required complexity to conduct intent and training requirements to be training objectives remained relatively a Battalion Fires Coordination successful. The commander’s intent stable regardless of changes to the strate- Exercise simultaneously with the must include the minimum requirements gic and political environment. Company CALFEX. that define success for the training unit. GS17 included B Company of 1-27 These minimum requirements are often Strategic Planners Infantry and A Company of 303 Infantry communicated as key training gates on a Home station training often includes (TNI-AD) training side by side, mutually tactical unit’s training progression. a complex environment of competing supported by indirect fires, snipers, and Once a leader is identified and em- units and limited resources. Tacti- both U.S. and TNI-AD aviation. The powered, he must be placed in the best cal units tasked with a TSCP have a battalion headquarters was a combined position to advocate for his unit. The unique opportunity to leverage strategic command post with staff representation regularly held planning conferences are resources for gains in readiness. Steps from the United States and Indonesia. the best venue to establish face-to-face two and three in our model are the The partnered task force operated under relationships with all parties. The interac- tactical unit’s opportunity to shape the auspices of a United Nations mandate tions among tactical planners, strategic the planning process to achieve its for training purposes. combatant command planners, and the ends. Units should maximize focus on To achieve its training objectives, partner nation are critical for setting the two lines of effort that define success 1-27 Infantry utilized a four-step tactical conditions for success, both strategically with clearly outlined standards. We integration model outlined in the figure. and tactically. SCC exercise planners specifically used Objective T (OBJ-T) As with most things, the most important generally viewed their mission through a standards as our baseline when deter- step is the first one. Units must identify lens based on senior leader directives and mining our minimum requirements in and empower the correct tactical exer- guidance. These planners were often not accordance with guidance provided to cise planner to communicate readiness fully aware of our distinct readiness re- us by brigade leadership. The OBJ-T requirements to strategic decisionmakers quirements; therefore, it was key to select standard outlined minimum personnel (specifically, the Service component com- a tactical unit–level representative armed requirements and training objectives mand [SCC]) and subsequently place with the unit commander’s readiness that defined success. that planner at positions of friction in intent to advocate for integration of those TSCP personnel requirements were order to communicate the tactical unit’s objectives into the TSCP exercise. In our the first key components for consider- interests. When identifying the right lead- particular case, we sent the battalion’s ation. We found ourselves balancing two ers for the job, we found that echelon was assistant operations officer to all planning areas: force-cap and leader presence.

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Zelaya and Wiles 67 Indonesian soldiers and Borzoi Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division (1-27 Wolfhounds), conduct live fire exercise during Garuda Shield, in Cibenda, Indonesia, September 27, 2017 (U.S. Army National Guard/Matthew A. Foster)

The OBJ-T Leaders Guide outlines exceeded the initial force-cap of 150 The second focus area relating to minimum personnel requirements for personnel and had to be adjusted upward readiness is unit training objectives. 1-27 any given training event. Eighty percent with SCC planners. Due to successful Infantry was able to increase readiness of the unit’s authorized Soldiers must negotiations, 1-27 Infantry was able to through disciplined commitment dur- be present for training, and 85 percent secure the required personnel slots that ing the planning process. As mentioned, of key leaders must be present. Tactical- led to a successful mission. The battalion battalion representation at the logistics level planners must consider minimum dual-hatted enablers as observer-con- planning conference directly influenced requirements to achieve desired readi- trollers and safeties, achieving significant training success. The battalion armed key ness; this includes number of Soldiers efficiencies. leaders with the minimum readiness tasks being trained, external evaluators, and Filling key leader slots to achieve required to achieve success. These tasks enablers. We recommend, at a minimum, OBJ-T requirements became a particular were based on training gates required a battalion-level headquarters element to point of friction due to the constant to achieve future readiness milestones. mission command the broader exercise change of personnel before, during, In this case, the battalion executed a in order to give the training audience and after the exercise. To maintain the company CALFEX and battalion fire the flexibility to focus on what is most readiness gains secured from a TSCP, it is coordination exercise in preparation for a important: training. Planners must keep critical to lock key leaders into positions. battalion live-fire set to occur later in the in mind, however, every seat assigned to We achieved success by maintaining focus year. staff or an enabler is a seat taken from the on the minimum required personnel and primary training audience. using that standard as the basis for all ne- Partner Nation 1-27 Infantry brought one light gotiations. We also influenced the process Despite language and technological infantry company, a scout/sniper team, a throughout a 6-month planning period barriers, communicating require- battalion fire support element, battalion by injecting battalion-level planners early ments to our partners was relatively medical team with provider, and the and maintaining that presence through- straightforward once we established a battalion main command post to GS17. out execution. sense of trust at the lowest level. That The required support personnel quickly said, we focused most of our effort

68 Commentary / Tactical Readiness Through Strategic Opportunity JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Indonesian armed forces and Hawaii Army National Guard participate in command post exercise during Garuda Shield, in Cibenda, Indonesia, September 25, 2017 (U.S. Army National Guard/Thomas A. Foster) on communicating our live-fire train- successfully, achieving interoperability Below are a few planning consider- ing requirements and accepted risk on via the TVB was a more precarious ations that we should have emphasized our interoperability training objective. proposition. in steps 2 and 3 of our tactical integra- The outcome was a considerable gap The TNI-AD preferred face-to-face tion model that would have allowed us in emphasis by both parties during integration to maintain a shared network. to maximize interoperability during the execution. Furthermore, the language barrier be- training exercises: Testing interoperability via a tacti- tween forces incurred unforeseen costs. During the initial planning confer- cal voice bridge (TVB) was an objective The use of a TVB in this context re- •• ence, SCC planners should have identified as critical to operations in the quired translation on both sides of every provided tactical units with an Pacific. TVBs allow for shared com- transmission. The TVB also forced the interoperability assessment in accor- munication between two partner forces TNI-AD to apply new combat power to dance with Army Regulation 34-1, without the need to reduce commu- manning partnered radios. Multinational Force Interoperability. nication security or equipment. TVBs Despite some initial complications, Based off the assessment of the part- are not new or uncommon in modern the TVB still proved to be a powerful ner-nation’s capabilities, planners at operations; however, GS17 was the first tool to reduce friction between units. echelon (including the tactical level) time the technology was employed be- During situations where shared com- should bring interoperability training tween American and Indonesian forces. munications were necessary for safety, objectives to the table. Those train- Traditionally, TVBs are used between the TVB and our architecture worked as ing objectives should be outlined and partnered nations with similar command designed. Specifically, during two real- agreed to by the partner countries. and control architecture and a shared world medical evacuations and indirect Both partners need to understand language. We established our TVB with fires coordination, the TNI-AD seized and strive toward the same goals a partnered force with significantly dif- the opportunity provided by shared com- throughout the exercise. ferent communications architecture and munications. They manned the TVB, Tactical planners for partnered forces which also spoke a significantly different maintained the network on their radios, •• should align communication capa- language. While the TVB was established and sent critical reports.

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Zelaya and Wiles 69 bility, staff manning, and structure •• The Embassy attaché generates a as closely as possible. If not, the summary of the exercise’s recent mission command architecture across history that is then given to the stra- all warfighting functions should be tegic effects cell at the SCC. outlined, agreed to, and rehearsed •• The SCC then outlines its com- during the initial phase of the mander’s intent for the exercise, exercise with a specific emphasis on including desired interoperability medical lines of communication. training objectives by echelon. •• When overcoming a language •• Division-level planners reconcile barrier, the following should be the commander’s intent with their considered by all parties: maintain own training objectives, themes, and a robust interpreter capability and messages. balance the depth of integration •• All three inputs are finally given to against the risk of overcomplicating the training unit in either a one-page lines of communication. Specifically, document or a leader smart card. planners must understand that the At endstate, Soldiers conducting higher the echelon of integration face-to-face interaction and training with between nations, the lower the com- partner nations understand the context plexity of interoperability. New from NDU Press of their operation and can communicate Communicating Strategic with partners in a productive manner—all Chairman Xi Remakes Themes Down of which further enables a quality exercise and successful accomplishment of readi- the PLA During our time training with the Assessing Chinese Military ness objectives. TNI-AD, we found them to be moti- Reforms vated, professional, and competent. TSCPs should be viewed as readiness Edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Arthur They were our peers and desired to be S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew opportunities, not burdens. They provide treated as such. Over time and within N.D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow opportunity for increased resources, recent conflicts, U.S. forces have oper- unique experiences, as well as deployment ated with a mentor/mentee mindset in China’s current military reforms and training readiness. Influencing the relation to other armies. Our tactical are unprecedented in their ambi- process early and continuously directly tion and in the scale and scope of exercise scenario was originally built correlate to a unit’s ability reach readiness the organizational changes. Vir- at home station using a host-nation levels outlined in their commander’s in- tually every part of the People’s framework common in current U.S. tent for the exercise. Planners successfully Liberation Army (PLA) now Army decisive-action training scenarios. enable increased capability and readiness reports to different leaders, has The idea of a host nation subtly implies generation by understanding manning had its mission and responsibilities that the nation doing the hosting needs changed, has lost or gained subor- requirements and the commander’s de- our help managing their internal affairs. dinate units, or has undergone a sired training objectives to be successful. The TNI-AD were quite aware of the major internal reorganization. Exercise planners and their partner-nation context of the exercise and wanted The contributors review the equivalents are the key audience to influ- to make sure that the training sce- drivers and strategic context under- ence and ensure success. 1-27 Infantry nario reflected our countries working pinning the reform effort, explore gained capability and readiness through the various dimensions of PLA together under a United Nations diligent planning and the hard work of its efforts to build a force capable of resolution. Soldiers. We utilized a tactical integration conducting joint operations, con- Subtle strategic distinctions like the model to increase interoperability in the sider the implications for the PLA one above are just as critical at the tacti- Pacific and do our part within the greater services, and examine Xi Jinping’s cal level as at the strategic. The final step team. It is our humble desire that future role in driving the reforms through in our tactical integration model focuses and using them to strengthen con- units participating in TSCP missions will on the idea that strategic themes, mes- trol over the military. The chapters apply our lessons learned. JFQ sages, and pitfalls need to be understood chronicle successes and outstanding problems in the reform effort, and by tactical leaders who are conducting consider what the net effect will face-to-face engagements with foreign be as the PLA strives to become partners. The following is a possible a “world-class” military by mid- solution to the strategic communications century, if not much sooner. issues we experienced during our exercise:

70 Commentary / Tactical Readiness Through Strategic Opportunity JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Reserve Soldiers from 418th Military Police Detachment (Detention Camp Liaison), headquartered in Orlando, Florida, receive tour of U.S. Naval Consolidated Brig in Charleston, South Carolina, March 5, 2018 (U.S. Army Reserve/Michel Sauret)

Many important changes will come out Unity of Command of this legislation, including sentencing reform, a reformed appellate process, and changes to jury composition. Authority and Responsibility Perhaps the most important outcome of all of these reforms is not what has changed, but what has remained the over Military Justice same: the role of the commander in the military justice process. By Lindsay L. Rodman The military places commanders at the center of all disciplinary decisions related to their troops. Commanders he military justice system has sweeping reforms in 30 years, the result have the authority to direct investiga- been undergoing constant of a comprehensive 2-year Department tions and then to determine what forum T change for the past decade, as a of Defense (DOD) review, were passed is appropriate for the adjudication of seemingly endless stream of legislation by Congress in late 2016 and imple- misconduct. For lower level misconduct, continues to modify the procedures mented via executive order on March 1, the commander can choose to impose ad- through which we achieve justice and 2018.1 These changes went into effect ministrative punishment, that is, anything accountability. This period of flux, on January 1, 2019, bringing with from a reprimand to nonjudicial punish- however, is coming to an end. The most them the modern era of military justice. ment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).2 For more serious misconduct, it is the Major Lindsay L. Rodman, USMCR, is a Judge Advocate for the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. The author commander who determines whether a thanks Lieutenant Colonel Iain Pedden, USMC, for his leadership and inspiration for this article. court-martial is appropriate, and if so,

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Rodman 71 Servicemembers review Manual for Court Martial in legal office of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, deployed in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, maritime security operations, and theater security cooperation efforts, Arabian Gulf, August 11, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Joshua Murray) whether a summary, special, or general are accountable for what happens in victim rehabilitation, the commander is court-martial is warranted.3 their units—that is, whether their troops uniquely positioned to ensure that the Commanders have always been at the are following orders and maintaining system is effective holistically, as well as in center of the military justice process. That discipline—then they must have the con- its component parts. role has been under attack over the past comitant authority and responsibility to This article explains more thoroughly decade by legislators who believe that the address disciplinary infractions. Similarly, what many military justice practitioners system would be more just if decisions if commanders are accountable for the have taken for granted for some time: were taken away from commanders. Very well-being of their troops, then they must the importance of retaining authority of few other countries with similar civilian have the authority and responsibility to the commander over the military justice justice systems continue to maintain take care of them, which includes things process. First, the article examines the as central of a role for commanders in like enabling access to health care and re- commander’s role over military justice justice matters. Many onlookers have sponding to the needs of victims of crimes. as a historical matter and as established therefore understandably asked why com- Commanders’ oversight of the military in the law. Then it discusses the com- manders must stay at the center of the justice process is not only an imperative mander’s role as a doctrinal imperative. U.S. military justice system. The answer from an accountability perspective, but it Finally, it addresses some of the practicali- is simple: it would be inconsistent with is also actually what is best for all stake- ties associated with the commander’s role our doctrine, and the needs of our glob- holders in the military justice process: the and major counterarguments. ally deployable military, to organize our accused, the victim, and those who seek justice system in any other way. justice. Commanders have the ability to A Matter of History and Law There are many reasons for com- take a systems-based approach to protect Although military court-martial pro- manders to retain authority over the the rights of both victims and those ac- ceedings now look similar in most ways military justice process, but primarily cused of crimes. Rather than disaggregate to Federal civilian criminal proceed- the question of accountability must be the various services and processes that go ings, their history is quite different. paired with responsibility. If commanders into investigations, courts-martial, and Courts-martial have evolved over time

72 Features / Authority and Responsibility over Military Justice JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 to look like civilian courts, as expecta- Before the consolidation of disparate broader set of statutes that creates the tions from Congress and the American justice systems into one UCMJ, military framework for the establishment of good people about due process, the rights of courts-martial looked much more like order and discipline within military units. accused and victims, and consistency of administrative separation boards than The modern UCMJ codifies important outcomes have driven reforms to the today’s courts-martial.10 Each Service had tools other than the court-martial for system. Nevertheless, their origins are its own system with its own rules. The commanders to use to maintain the instructive, as they highlight the fun- common thread was the commander’s security and discipline of their troops, damental differences between the two authority to appoint a person or board including the authority to arrest or systems and their purposes. to make a swift determination of guilt or restrain13 and the authority to impose The modern-day military justice innocence, and an appropriate sentence, nonjudicial punishment.14 system derives primarily from the estab- for any accusation of criminal activity The role of the military commander lishment in 1950 of the UCMJ, which against a Servicemember under his or controlling all aspects of discipline for was a codification and professionalization her purview. At the time, there was no the Servicemember is one that has been of the U.S. Army’s Articles of War. These expectation that courts-martial should reinforced many times over the course articles had evolved over the course of have the same protections or processes of U.S. history. Starting with the Bill of the Army’s history, starting in 1775, as civilian criminal courts. Quite the Rights, the Fifth Amendment right to a and had their roots in British law and opposite—the military context dictated grand jury applies “except in cases arising tradition.4 Although the original scope that the process had to be battlefield- or in the land or naval forces, or in the mi- of military jurisdiction was meant to be -appropriate and accommodate litia,” indicating that even the Founding narrow and only apply to military of- the exigencies of war. Fathers acknowledged the importance fenses, commanders in practice would use Even after 1950, courts-martial did of an expedient military justice system disciplinary proceedings even for civilian not use judges. Instead, “law officers” outside the normal civilian criminal pro- offenses because of their impact on the who were trained judge advocates were cess. The history of expanded military discipline of the unit.5 In 1863, Congress appointed as nonvoting members to jurisdiction summarized above is indica- “expressly authorized courts-martial advise the court-martial (a panel of tive of this need. The resulting modern to try various civil crimes, regardless Servicemembers) about the law as they day UCMJ states in its preamble, “The of whether the circumstances of their reached their decisions.11 The com- purpose of military law is to promote commission prejudiced good order and mander was responsible for selecting the justice, to assist in maintaining good discipline,”6 thus codifying what had law officer and the panel.12 There were order and discipline in the armed forces, become practice out of necessity in the no “standing courts,” that is, judges and to promote efficiency and effectiveness in preceding 88 years. Another similar a system of courts standing by waiting for the military establishment, and thereby expansion occurred in 1916, when court- cases to come to them. Instead, a court- to strengthen the national security of martial jurisdiction was again extended to martial would be convened, as necessary, the United States.” Additionally, a long all civilian crimes, in peacetime as well as by the commander to address misconduct line of Supreme Court cases, culminat- during a time of war.7 ad hoc. ing in the clarification of law in Solorio While the historical trend was toward Today’s system still preserves the v. United States,15 upholds Congress’s giving commanders more authority over same roles for the commander, with some establishment of jurisdiction over U.S. their Servicemembers, by the end of World modern-day tweaks. Only a subset of Servicemembers for all cases, simply War II there was also a call for military the panel is actually selected to serve in as a result of their service in uniform, justice reform. During the 4 years of U.S. its current role, which is akin to that of a understanding the need for the military involvement in World War II, there were jury. And although military judges have to retain control over the discipline of its roughly 2 million court-martial proceed- replaced the law officers, thus fundamen- Servicemembers. ings.8 Many of the outcomes in those cases tally changing the look and feel of the In international law, the doctrine of appeared arbitrary or haphazard, leading court-martial, there are still no standing command responsibility creates liability to public pressure on Congress to use its courts. Courts-martial are convened only for commanders for the war crimes of constitutional authority “to make Rules when they are needed. A commanding their subordinates.16 Commanders can be for the Government and Regulation of officer still must determine that alleged found guilty at court-martial solely be- the land and naval Forces” to create a fair misconduct should be appropriately cause they were the superior at the time, system of justice.9 The effort to achieve a adjudicated through a criminal court if one of their subordinates commits a balance between the need for commanders proceeding, and only then, through war crime.17 Command responsibility to have expanded jurisdiction over their his or her “convening order” is a judge is good law, and came up as recently members and the need for a system that appointed. as 2015, when onlookers clamored for treats the accused fairly and in accordance Although the UCMJ is often thought greater accountability for leadership after with American values of fairness and jus- of as the collection of laws that govern the mistaken bombing of a hospital in tice resulted in the 1950 UCMJ. courts-martial, it is actually a much Kunduz, Afghanistan. Although U.S.

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Rodman 73 Airman with 455th Air Expeditionary Wing Legal Office Superintendent (left) looks over Manual for Courts-Martial guide with Airman NCO-in-Charge of General Law, at Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan, March 17, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Nicholas Rau) commanders are rarely brought before to be responsible and accountable for to accomplish missions, they may not courts-martial on command respon- disciplinary matters, which is due in absolve themselves of the responsibility sibility charges,18 this notion—that part to their legal obligations under the for the attainment of these missions.”22 “Commanders are legally responsible UCMJ. However, closer examination Commanders’ inherent authority and for their decisions and for the actions, of the Services’ command and control responsibility for the attainment of the accomplishments, and failures of their (C2) doctrine reveals the importance missions below them make them likewise subordinates”19—is a basic principle of of keeping disciplinary decisions within inherently responsible for the deeds, and the international laws of war. the command. C2 doctrine requires misdeeds, of their troops. In the Marine commanders to have complete dis- Corps, responsibility and accountability A Matter of Doctrine ciplinary authority, as this authority are described as corollaries of authority: Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication derives from fundamental principles of “Responsibility, or accountability for (MCDP) 6, Command and Control, command in general. results, is a natural corollary of authority. states simply, “No single activity in war The interaction of responsibility and Where there is authority, there must be is more important than command and accountability is essential to understand- responsibility in like measure. Conversely, control.”20 The doctrinal definition of ing command authority. As explained where individuals have responsibility for command used by all the Services is in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces achieving results, they must also have found in Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, of the United States, “Inherent in com- the authority to initiate the necessary Department of Defense Dictionary of mand is the authority that a military actions.”23 Military and Associated Terms, and commander lawfully exercises over The Navy uses nearly identical lan- it “includes responsibility for health, subordinates including authority to guage in its doctrinal publication on welfare, morale, and discipline of assign missions and accountability for command and control, and Navy culture assigned personnel.”21 Current doctrine their successful completion. Although additionally takes accountability and in all Services expects commanders commanders may delegate authority responsibly even more seriously than the

74 Features / Authority and Responsibility over Military Justice JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 other Services.24 Famously, in the Navy, mission control, unity of effort, decen- although they are not necessarily part of commanders are routinely relieved of tralized decisionmaking and execution, the same command structure.”35 command for failures in their unit, regard- initiative of subordinates, and implicit As stated, UCMJ authority is a re- less of their proximity to the failure itself.25 communication and understanding. quirement for troops to be administrative Authority and responsibility have These five elements are addressed in each control to a unit, meaning that unity of long been intertwined concepts, and it of the Services’ doctrine, using slightly command and unity of effort should be is not surprising to see the Services’ doc- different verbiage, but with similar senti- the same for disciplinary matters. Because trines recognize their interdependence. ments. Each of the Services’ treatments disciplinary matters can be complex, it is In doctrine they are used nearly inter- of these elements of effective command important that unity of command exists changeably. This is important because reveals the importance of retaining dis- for these matters. Typically, the notion of the American public has an expectation ciplinary authority with the role of the unity of command stands for the notion that commanders must be accountable commander. that one person cannot and should not for any bad behavior, including criminal- Mission control “takes the form of have more than one chain of command. ity, within their units. Accountability for feedback—the continuous flow of in- For disciplinary matters, this means that misbehavior in the unit must be paired formation about the unfolding situation delegating disciplinary decisions outside with the authority to address it.26 Failure returning to the commander—which of the chain of command would contra- to hold commanders properly account- allows the commander to adjust and vene the doctrine of unity of command. able is therefore not best addressed by the modify command action as needed.”31 The last three of the Navy’s five removal of authority. Even when com- This iterative process is a quintessential characteristics of command and control manders delegate their authority, as stated part of warfighting. Only the commander (decentralized decisionmaking and in JP 1, “they may not absolve themselves has the ability to determine the needs of execution, initiative of subordinates, of the responsibility for the attainment of the unit and the resultant means through and implicit communication and under- these missions.”27 The Air Force includes which a disciplinary issue must be standing) all derive from the trust that this language, nearly verbatim, in its own handled. Although disciplinary matters commanders must place in their subordi- C2 doctrine.28 are incredibly important, they are not the nates. The idea of disciplined initiative by The Army Doctrine Publication primary mission of the Armed Forces; the subordinates is also foundational to the (ADP) 6, Mission Command, on com- primary mission is warfighting. Army’s notion of mission command. In mand approaches the subject slightly One attribute essential to effective the Army, it is the role of the commander differently than the Navy and Marine warfighting is speed: “speed over time is “to enable disciplined initiative within the Corps, distinguishing between the art tempo—the consistent ability to oper- commander’s intent to empower agile of command and the science of control, ate quickly.”32 In the Navy, “To use his and adaptive leaders” in the employment stating, the “art of command lies in command and control process at peak of land operations.36 As stated in ADP discriminating between mistakes to under- effectiveness, the naval commander must 6, the “exercise of mission command is write as teaching points from those that gather and use information better and based on mutual trust, shared under- are unacceptable in a military leader.”29 faster than his adversary.”33 Different standing, and purpose.”37 The ultimate Part of the essence of command, to the Services have different mnemonics for trust from commanders will result from Army, is in making the tough decisions understanding decisionmaking and speed their own knowledge that they hold the about military justice and discipline within or tempo.34 Regardless of which model authority and responsibility over the the unit. In fact, in the Air Force, the is employed, the decisionmaker must trustworthiness of their troops. minimum requirements for a commander have all pertinent information, and then MCDP 6 states that C2 effectiveness to have sufficient administrative control must make decisions quickly, in order to can only be measured in relation to the of a unit to go forward are the following: maintain an advantage over an adversary. enemy.38 In matters of discipline, that “responsibility for UCMJ actions, protec- Especially in a battlefield scenario, the means commanders must be held re- tion of assigned forces and assets, lodging, commander must be able to autono- sponsible and accountable for outcomes dining, and force reporting”30—in other mously make decisions. in their units—their enemy is criminal- words, as a matter of doctrine, but one Unity of effort is the Navy’s second ity, bad behavior, and victimization. As cannot have effective C2 if one does not characteristic that comprises command discussed, that responsibility is not best have UCMJ disciplinary authority. and control. JP 1 provides the following: achieved by diminished authority (that is, Command and control includes a “Unity of command means all forces op- less C2 altogether), but rather through number of concepts that are integral to erate under a single commander with the better accountability measures and effective warfighting and a professional requisite authority to direct all forces em- improved leadership (better and more military. Navy Doctrinal Publication 6, ployed in pursuit of a common purpose. effective C2). Command and Control, breaks command Unity of effort, however, requires coordi- down into its component parts succinctly, nation and cooperation among all forces addressing five characteristics in turn: toward a commonly recognized objective,

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Rodman 75 Practical Concerns National Defense Authorization Act of altering the commander’s role would not In 2013, the Secretary of Defense 2013. DOD made many witnesses and help address actual problems. established the Military Justice Review resources available to the RSP, which did Most of the recent proposed legisla- Group (MJRG) to perform the largest laudable and thorough investigations. tion that would remove the commander’s review of the military justice system Advocacy organizations that felt strongly disciplinary authority would place that since 1980.39 MJRG efforts resulted in about removing the commander’s discre- authority in the hands of uniformed the Military Justice Act, which passed tionary authority in the military justice lawyers, either assigned to the command the House and Senate in December process also provided extensive testimony or assigned to a separate legal unit. 2016 and which represents the largest and other materials for consideration. However, some have hinted that serious set of reforms of the UCMJ since its At the end of the day, the RSP was not crimes could be removed from the com- enactment.40 The MJRG states at the persuaded that it made sense to modify mander’s authority altogether, which is outset of its report, which was released the commander’s central role in the deci- the practice in some other countries.44 in December 2015, that “the neces- sion process, despite its departure from For the U.S. military, these proposals sity for justice and the requirement for civilian norms. The RSP, which was ex- would not lead to a more effective mili- discipline are inseparable.”41 In other clusively focused on sexual assault crimes, tary or more just outcomes. words, the achievement of military concluded as follows, addressing many There are many reasons that other discipline is not, and should not be, at counterarguments along the way: countries have modified the com- odds with the achievement of justice. It mander’s role regarding military justice. is therefore the role of the commander Evidence considered by the [RSP] does The primary reason is lack of capacity to maintain the discipline of the unit not support a conclusion that removing and professional capability in their court- and to achieve justice when misconduct authority to convene courts-martial from martial systems. Smaller militaries cannot arises; both roles are intertwined and senior commanders will improve the qual- achieve a critical mass of experienced and complementary. ity of investigations and prosecutions or professional litigators to competently The MJRG also considered one of increase conviction rates in these cases. try complex cases. Lawyers need years the most often cited reasons that the Senior commanders vested with convening of trying a variety of cases to become commander’s central role in the military authority do not face an inherent conflict well-prepared for higher stakes cases. In justice process should be maintained: of interest when they convene courts-mar- other countries, justice is better served by the ability to be globally engaged and tial for sexual assault offenses allegedly letting civilian authorities handle those deployed. The MJRG, which did not committed by members of their command. cases. This is a problem that the U.S. substantially revise the commander’s As with leaders of all organizations, military has addressed by working hard disciplinary decisionmaking authority, commanders often must make decisions over the past decade to better profes- stated, “In the military, there is a unique that may negatively impact individual sionalize and train its litigators, including need to conduct trials in deployed members of the organization when those a requirement that complex cases be tried environments during ongoing combat decisions are in the best interest of the or- by specially qualified prosecutors. operations around the world, as well ganization. Further, civilian jurisdictions There is no country in the world that as in other nations where American face underreporting challenges that are is engaged globally to the same extent as Servicemembers are stationed.”42 similar to the military, and it is not clear the U.S. military. The United States has Commanders must be able to address the criminal justice response in civilian the thorniest missions, in some of the misconduct in any deployed environ- jurisdictions, where prosecutorial decisions most remote parts of the planet. In those ment; our military does not have the are supervised by elected or appointed law- environments, disciplinary decisions, like luxury of outsourcing these kinds of yers, is more effective.43 most decisions, can have life-or-death decisions in expeditionary and combat consequences. As discussed, there is environments. Nevertheless, there are The RSP was appointed in the con- a doctrinal imperative associated with good reasons that commanders are best text of annual efforts to legislate change retaining disciplinary authority in the poised to execute disciplinary decision- in the military justice process in order to commander. There is also a pragmatic making at home as well. help address the problem of sexual as- utility to ensuring that commanders have Aside from the MJRG, which was sault in the military. Many of the changes control over the discipline of their units established within DOD, a number of that resulted from passed legislation have and do not have to refer to other officers, outside groups have studied the com- helped address problems in the military other lawyers, or other units to make swift mander’s role in the military justice justice process or problems with how determinations that best meet the needs process recently. The most noteworthy the military was handling sexual assault of the mission. Countries that do not find of these was the Response Systems generally. Proposals to remove the com- themselves fighting in similar environ- to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes Panel mander from the military justice process ments consistently may not prioritize these (RSP), a Federal Advisory Committee have not passed, likely due to conclusions mission effectiveness considerations to the Act commission established in the like those of the RSP and MJRG that same extent as the United States.

76 Features / Authority and Responsibility over Military Justice JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 National Guard Trial Defense Service and 167th Judge Advocate General’s Corps section culminated yearlong training exercise, August 7–8, 2018, at Calhoun County Courthouse, Anniston, Alabama, with mock trial, going through entire legal process that Uniformed Code of Military Justice would require (U.S. Army National Guard/Katherine Dowd)

It is worth noting, however, that White House and Congress, and consul- ensuring, first, that the rate of sexual as- justice is not compromised by retaining tation with advocacy organizations. The sault decreases (that is, fewer victims are the commander’s authority over military military has vastly improved its ability created), and, second, that victims are justice. The commander is in the best to support victims in the past few years, well supported if a sexual assault should position, from the perspective of all including the advent of the victims’ legal occur. A commander who is powerless stakeholders in the criminal process, to counsel and efforts to incorporate new over the justice process is also powerless oversee military justice. Commanders methods into the victim support pro- to ensure that a victim’s needs and input have no incentive to condone crimi- cesses, such as counseling and workplace are taken into consideration. nality or harbor those who commit support.45 There is a need for culture misconduct. Lack of discipline is toxic change within the military to address sex- There is a saying in the military that to mission accomplishment. At the same ual assault. But removing the commander 10 percent of troops take up 90 percent of time, commanders want justice for their from disciplinary decisions is not the way the commander’s time. Some advocates, troops and have an incentive to ensure to achieve culture change. As the RSP and even the occasional commander, that proceedings are fair. Commanders stated, “Historically, commanders have have argued that removing the authority do not have an incentive to railroad inno- proved essential in leading organizational over discipline from commanders would cent Servicemembers; they have a strong responses during periods of military cul- free them up to concentrate on other incentive to take care of their troops. For tural transition, as the Services have relied matters. The desire to move away from victims of crimes, this means providing on them to set and enforce standards and commanders controlling these decisions additional resources to help with recov- effect change among subordinates under reflects a misunderstanding of the history, ery, both mental and physical. their command.”46 doctrine, and underlying policy justifica- Especially with respect to sexual as- Especially in the area of victims’ needs tions for the current system. Maintaining sault cases, the military has developed in and rights, it is imperative that com- the well-being of the unit is commanders’ many areas, with the help of some leg- manders stay involved. Commanders will responsibility, and as such they must retain islation, pressure from leadership in the be, and should be, held accountable for the concomitant authority.

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Rodman 77 Legislation that would further dis- dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/ is-sen-gillibrand-right-on-how-to-address- sac_2012/01-2_crimLaw_miljsystem.auth- sexual-assault-in-the-military/rep-loretta-san- tance commanders from their command checkdam.pdf>. chez-commanders-must-be-held-accountable- responsibility will degrade discipline, de- 9 U.S. Const., art. I, § 8. military-culture-must-change>. crease effectiveness, and impair command 10 Uniform Code of Military Justice 27 JP 1, V-1. response to victim needs and enforce- (UCMJ), Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 28 Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) ment of victim rights. Future legislative, 108 (now 10 U.S. Code §§ 801–940 (1970). 6-0, Command and Control (Washington, DC: Hereinafter, 1950 UCMJ. Headquarters Department of the Air Force, executive, and regulatory efforts should 11 Article 26, 1950 UCMJ. The 1950 ver- June 1, 2007, Incorporating Change 1, July adopt a harmonized approach to the cod- sion of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 28, 2011), 5. ification of principles consistent with both is available at . 30 AFDD 6, 39. mental principle of unity of command. 12 Article 25–26, 1950 UCMJ. 31 MCDP 6, 40. 13 10 U.S. Code § 809, Art. 9, “Imposition 32 MCDP 1, 40. The reforms made to the military justice of Restraint.” 33 NDP 6-0, 4. system in this last round of litigation are 14 10 U.S. Code § 815, Art. 15. 34 In the Marine Corps, for example, it is truly transformative. They promise to 15 Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, Colonel John Boyd’s Observe-Orient-Decide- professionalize the military justice system, 444 (1987). Solorio reversed O’Callahan v. Act Loop. See MCDP 1, 40n18. bringing it further in line with civilian Parker, which for a brief time limited jurisdic- 35 JP 1, V-1. tion in the military to only Service-connected 36 ADP 6, 1. The notion of disciplined practice without sacrificing the pivotal cases. Solorio describes O’Callahan as ahistori- initiative reappears on page 4. role of the commander. JFQ cal and misunderstanding a long tradition of 37 ADP 6, 2. jurisdiction over Servicemembers by military 38 JP 1, 38. commanders. 39 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Notes 16 Victor Hansen, “What’s Good for the “Comprehensive Review of the Uniform Goose Is Good for the Gander: Lessons from Code of Military Justice,” October 18, 2013, 1 Military Justice Act of 2016 is Divi- Abu Ghraib; Time for the United States to available at . 40 Reform,” of the National Defense Authori- ity Towards Its Own,” Gonzaga Law Review Ibid. 41 zation Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Public Law 42, no. 3 (2006–2007), 335–414, available Military Justice Review Group, Report No. 114-328, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., January at . UCMJ Recommendations (Washington, DC: 17 gov/Portals/99/Documents/FY17NDAA. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). Department of Defense, December 22, 2015), 18 pdf?ver=2016-12-30-100457-077>; Execu- The last such trial was the United States 16, available at . 42 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States [C.M.A. 1971]), which precipitated out of the Ibid., 19. 43 (Washington, DC: The White House, March 1, My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War. Response Systems to Adult Sexual As- 19 2018), is available at . 2012), 6. Panel (Arlington, VA: RSP, May 2014), annex 20 2 10 U.S. Code § 815, Art. 15, “Command- Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication B: “Report of the Role of the Commander ing Officer’s Non-Judicial Punishment.” (MCDP) 1, Warfighting (Washington, DC: Subcommittee,” 5, available at . 44 at . ated Terms (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, slaughter, and abduction cannot be tried at 5 Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Justice Under Fire: November 8, 2010, as Amended Through court-martial, according to section 70 of the A Study of Military Law (New York: Charter- February 15, 2016), 101. National Defence Act. In Australia, the mili- 22 house, 1974); William Winthrop, Military Law JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of tary justice system is used “when the offence and Precedents (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern- the United States (Washington, DC: The Joint substantially affects the maintenance and ability ment Printing Office, 1920); see alsoSolorio v. Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorporating Change to enforce Service discipline in the [Australian United States, 483 U.S. 435, 444 (1987). 1, July 12, 2017). Defence Force]. Otherwise, criminal offences 23 6 Robert D. Duke and Howard S. Vogel, MCDP 6, Command and Control or other illegal conduct are referred to civil “The Constitution and the Standing Army: (Washington, DC: Headquarters United States authorities, such as the police.” See Australian Another Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdic- Marine Corps, October 4, 1996), 39. Government Department of Defence, “Military 24 tion,” Vanderbilt Law Review 12, no. 2 (March Navy Doctrinal Publication (NDP) 6, Justice System,” available at . 45 7 Horbaly, “Court-Martial Jurisdiction,” DC: Headquarters Department of the Navy, 10 U.S. Code, § 1044e, “Special Victims’ 69n8. May 19, 1995), 8. Counsel for Victims of Sex-Related Offenses.” 25 46 8 Department of Law, U.S. Military Acad- Ibid., 7. RSP, annex B, 2. 26 emy at West Point, “Overview of Criminal Loretta Sanchez, “Hold Commanders Law and the Military Justice System,” n.d., 3, Responsible for Sexual Assaults,” U.S. News available at

78 Features / Authority and Responsibility over Military Justice JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 U.S. Africa Command partner from Gabon participating in Africa Endeavor 2017 sits in on briefing during weeklong event in Lilongwe, , August 21, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Dominique Shelton)

U.S. Africa Command and Its Changing Strategic Environment

By William Robert Hawkins and Brenda Jeannette Ponsford

n March 6, 2018, General that “On any given day, up to 7,200 “U.S. Africa Command, with partners, Thomas D. Waldhauser, USMC, U.S. uniformed personnel, Department strengthens security forces, counters O commander of U.S. Africa of Defense civilians, and contractors transnational threats, and conducts Command (USAFRICOM), testified are in Africa representing all services, crisis response in order to advance before the U.S. House Armed Services career fields, and specialties, protecting U.S. national interests and promote Committee.1 He hailed the decade of our national security and working tire- regional security, stability, and prosper- work his organization had done since it lessly to tackle the many challenges on ity.” In his lengthy prepared statement, was established in 2008. He reported the African continent.” He continued, however, he did not mention how the nature of American interests have changed over the years. These changes, William Robert Hawkins is a former economics professor who taught at universities in , primarily related to trade with the con- North Carolina, and Virginia before spending 20 years in Washington, DC, integrating international tinent, have greatly reduced American trade issues into a broader national security context. Brenda Jeannette Ponsford is the Dean of the Walker School of Business at Mercyhurst University in Erie, Pennsylvania, and specializes in ties to Africa and call into question international business. how much money and personnel are

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Hawkins and Ponsford 79 allocated to USAFRICOM given the promoting China-Africa relations, deep- this imbalance was oil. The 2008 financial many challenges the United States ening cooperation in all areas, building crisis and resulting recession brought is facing in other theaters where the a China-Africa community with a shared imports and the deficit down for a few stakes are higher. future, and jointly building the Belt and years, but by 2011 imports were back up Two weeks later, the chairman of Road as well as global and regional is- to $74.3 billion, generating a deficit of the House Armed Services Committee, sues of concern to all sides.”5 The Belt $53.2 billion. The U.S. trade deficits in Representative Mac Thornberry (R-TX), and Road Initiative (BRI) is Beijing’s goods with the four largest African sup- took a 7-day trip through East Africa. bid for global control of infrastructure, pliers of oil in 2011 were $28.9 billion He stopped in Djibouti, , Kenya, resources, and markets. President Xi with Nigeria; $12.1 billion with Angola; , and Ethiopia, meeting with U.S. pledged $60 billion in development $3.1 billion with Chad; and $439 mil- commanders and troops and local African funds to the continent.6 The summit lion with the Democratic Republic of the political and military leaders. In his return supposedly resolved to “firmly safeguard Congo (DRC). According to the U.S. press release, he tried to carry strategic the open global economy and multilateral Trade Representative (USTR), Nigeria concerns from other regions into Africa trading system, [and] oppose trade pro- was only the 44th largest market for U.S. to justify increased American efforts tectionism and unilateralism.” Preventing exports; Angola ranked 69th, and the there. In particular, he noted, “I saw foreign nations from taking actions to DRC was 136th on the list. Exports to evidence of China stretching its influence control (protect) their own economic Chad were so low the USTR did not across the region. Anyone who believes destiny will ensure Chinese industrial bother to rank them.8 African states that China is only concerned about the dominance in trade and investment. This prefer to import goods from Europe or Indo-Pacific region is ignoring the clear is the renewed doctrine of “free trade im- China rather than from America. evidence in Africa and elsewhere.”2 perialism” practiced by the British Empire By 2017, the goods deficit with Africa Thornberry’s reference to China is two centuries ago and which the Chinese had dropped to $10.8 billion. This was at the center of trending events on the learned about from the other end. due entirely to a reduction in imports, continent. China’s President Xi Jinping That the People’s Republic of China from $93 billion in 2011 to $24.9 billion visited Africa during his first overseas (PRC) sees itself in competition with in 2017. U.S. goods exports to Africa had trip after being reelected in March 2018, the West in Africa has prompted many actually decreased over these years, down just like he did in 2013 after he was American foreign policy experts to argue from $32.9 in 2011 to $14.1 in 2017. first elected as president. Indeed, he has that the United States should do more in The cause for the change can be seen visited the continent four times in the Africa to counter the spread of Beijing’s more succinctly regarding the three larg- last 5 years. As the state-run China Daily political influence and control of the est oil suppliers of 2011; by 2015 imports reported upon President Xi’s return from continent’s resources. Part of this argu- from Nigeria, Angola, and Chad had his most recent trip to Senegal, Rwanda, ment rests on an exaggerated view of dropped a total of $44.6 billion. Thanks , and Mauritius in July U.S. material interests in the region, both to the rapid increase in domestic oil pro- 2018, “China and Africa have formed a now and in the future. What is real is duction in the United States because of community of shared interests featuring the need to prevent China from using its fracking and offshore wells, America no win-win cooperation.”3 In addition: increasing economic ties to gain political longer needs African oil. influence, thus mobilizing the continent Appropriately, General Waldhauser’s China remains committed to helping to increase Beijing’s clout in world affairs. testimony was much more about im- Africa clear its development bottlenecks At the 17th Annual Sub-Saharan Africa proving conditions in Africa than in in infrastructure, capital, and talents Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum linking events there with U.S. economic while helping African countries explore a last July, Deputy Secretary of State John interests. He told the House commit- development mechanism and path that suit Sullivan made the usual claims: “Africa is tee, “Our first strategic theme is that their own conditions. . . . Sino-African co- the major market of the future,” and “the U.S. Africa Command activities directly operation has also provided Africa with an United States, as the largest economy support U.S. diplomatic and develop- alternative to Western development philoso- in the world, sees boundless opportuni- ment efforts in Africa. Working with phy and path, and has had a positive effect ties for Africa.”7 Yet, rhetoric aside, few our interagency partners—primarily the on African people’s ideas, development material interests exist that can undergird Department of State and U.S. Agency for philosophy, and perception of the world.4 USAFRICOM. International Development (USAID)—is In 2008, when U.S. Africa Command a core tenet of our strategic approach in In early September, the Beijing was stood up under General William E. Africa.”9 He continued: Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Ward, USA, the United States was run- Cooperation (FOCAC) attracted leaders ning a $65.7 billion trade deficit with African nations—their people, their increas- from all 53 African nations. According Sub-Saharan Africa, importing roughly ing appetite for democratic principles, their to state-run Chinese media, “Leaders four times as much as its domestic pro- growing economic impact and potential exchanged views on such issues as ducers were exporting. The main cause of in global markets—remain an enduring

80 Features / U.S. Africa Command JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 interest for the United States. U.S. Africa However, no estimate was given as leadership role in the global economy, it Command supports our African partners to how much American producers might is imperative that it dedicate significant in building the capability and the capacity benefit from the initiative. Instead, most attention to making inroads in frontier to develop local solutions to radicalization, of the detail was about using “trade markets. . . . U.S. companies are pres- destabilization, and persistent conflict. By as aid” to boost the EAC economies. ently at risk in Africa.” But where does making targeted investments and main- The White House stated, “In its initial the risk come from? The Chamber taining strong partnerships, we can set the phase, Trade Africa aims to double warned, “Last year China surpassed the basic security conditions needed for good intra-regional trade in the EAC [and] in- United States and assumed America’s governance and development to take root. crease EAC exports to the United States long-running status as Africa’s single Africa, our allies, the United States, and the by 40 percent.” Another priority was largest trading partner.” Since then, world stand to benefit from a secure, stable, “Exploration of a U.S.-EAC Investment China has taken a much more aggres- and prosperous Africa.10 Treaty to contribute to a more attractive sive policy toward expanding its trade investment environment.” This would with Africa with a keen eye to boosting The Marine commander thus rep- lead to the export of U.S. capital rather exports to cover what is still a large resented the same approach that has than goods to the continent, expanding import flow of oil and minerals. long characterized U.S. policy—the African production rather than American Though couched in commercial development of Africa for the Africans, production. terms, the Chamber’s letter presented the with Americans playing a benevolent role Speaking at the U.S.-Africa concept of strategic competition between rather than a self-interested “imperialist” Business Forum on August 5, 2014, the United States and China, which fore- role. The mission statement of the State in Washington, President Obama pro- shadowed the National Defense Strategy Department’s Bureau of African Affairs claimed, “I’m proud that American (NDS) drawn up by the Trump admin- takes the same tone, making no mention exports to Africa have grown to record istration.17 The NDS identified “Great of advancing any explicit American mate- levels, supporting jobs in Africa and the Power” competition with Russia and rial interest.11 United States, including a quarter of a China as the major challenges facing the million good American jobs.”14 But this United States, superseding the primacy The Failure of Trade Expansion situation would not last. of counterterrorism, which had domi- On July 1, 2013, President Barack Exports to Tanzania and nated thinking since 2001. This change Obama announced a new Trade Africa peaked in 2013, and those to Kenya—the in strategic focus affects USAFRICOM initiative. According to the White largest trade partner—peaked in 2014, directly and in a major way. Its security House fact sheet, the program “seeks and were down 72 percent by 2017. cooperation programs have concentrated to increase internal and regional trade Only in Rwanda were exports higher in on combating terrorism and insurgency. within Africa, and expand trade and eco- 2016 than in 2013. For the EAC as a While these threats remain, the command nomic ties between Africa, the United whole, U.S. exports in 2016 were less must now raise its sights to recognize a States, and other global markets.”12 Its than a third of what there were in 2013 Chinese presence that is far more perva- focus was the East Africa Community when Trade Africa was launched and less sive and influential. One of the strategic (EAC) comprising Burundi, Kenya, than half what they had been in 2005. approaches the NDS sets is to “Counter Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The Even in the aggregate peak year of 2013, coercion and subversion”: accompanying description of the EAC fit total exports amounted to just over $1.2 an export-oriented policy: billion, hardly a significant amount in the In competition short of armed conflict, larger context of U.S. world trade and its revisionist powers and rogue regimes are The EAC is an economic success story, and national deficit.15 using corruption, predatory economic represents a market with significant op- practices, propaganda, political subversion, portunity for U.S. exports and investment. The Nature of the proxies, and the threat or use of military The five states of the EAC, with a popula- U.S.-China Rivalry force to change facts on the ground. Some tion of more than 130 million people, The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, in are particularly adept at exploiting their have increasingly stable and pro-business league with its affiliated chambers in economic relationships with many of our regulations. They are home to promising Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, security partners. We will support U.S. local enterprises that are forming creative Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia, sent interagency approaches and work by, with, partnerships with multinational compa- a letter to Capitol Hill in 2011 stating and through our allies and partners to nies. And EAC countries are benefiting that economic engagement “represents secure our interests and counteract this from the emergence of an educated, global- an overwhelmingly positive tool of soft coercion.18 ized middle class . . . and the region’s GDP power on the continent. This goodwill [gross domestic product] has risen to is felt on a daily basis by U.S. companies This should apply to China and more than $80 billion—quadrupling in on the ground.”16 It argued, “If the Africa. The ability of Beijing to subvert only 10 years.13 United States is to continue to play a the integrity of local governments and

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Hawkins and Ponsford 81 President Xi Jinping addresses Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Business Summit, April 12, 2015, in Sandton, Johannesburg (Elmond Jiyane, Government Communication and Information System) even change their diplomatic orienta- Counter-Violent Extremist Organization it can make the case that its role is vital tion away from the West far exceeds the personnel operating in U.S. Africa in the larger global context. However, menace of radical groups that do not Command to support priorities outlined since the aim of staying competitive have the resources of a major power in the National Defense Strategy. Over with China in Africa is more a political behind them. Unfortunately, the NDS the next several years, the realignment than a military operation, it need not does not mention Africa in this context. projects a reduction of less than 10 per- be abandoned in the name of force In its list of regions where the United cent of the 7,200 military forces serving optimization. States is concerned about maintaining in Africa Command.”19 The press release a favorable balance of power, Africa is also stated that “Optimization preserves China’s Strategy the only region not on the list. Later, a the majority of U.S. security cooperation In 2009, the Congressional Research section is devoted to the continent, but partnerships and programs in Africa.”20 Service reported that its priority is to “Support relationships While the campaign against Islamic to address significant terrorist threats in terrorist groups and insurgents such as China’s foreign aid is difficult to quantify. Africa.” While mention is also made of Boko Haram, the so-called Islamic State, The PRC government does not release stopping human trafficking, transnational al Shabaab, and al Qaeda needs to con- or explain Chinese foreign aid statistics criminal activity, and illegal arms trade, tinue, consideration must be given to and much of PRC foreign aid does not the Chinese threat is not explicitly cited. the potential for China to back its own appear to be accounted for in the scholarly A final mission in the Africa section of the proxies to pressure or even overthrow literature on foreign aid. . . . China is NDS, however, is to “limit the malign governments that will not grant the a relatively small source of global aid. influence of non-African powers,” which concessions Beijing wants to advance its However, when China’s concessional loans should certainly apply to China as a “revi- interests. Given that USAFRICOM is and state-sponsored or subsidized overseas sionist power.” already under-resourced for the coun- investments are included, the PRC becomes On November 15, 2018, the terterror mission, it will be difficult to a major source of foreign assistance.21 Pentagon announced a “realignment of expand its range in this direction unless

82 Features / U.S. Africa Command JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 According to then PRC President Hu development. With different features and any more. You just need to have competi- Jintao, speaking at the 5th FOCAC held advantages, our economies are cut out for tive goods for sale.”28 Chinese goods sell July 2012 in Beijing, the Chinese govern- each other. China has mature, applicable at prices that are only a fraction of what ment had built more than 100 schools, technologies and equipments and relatively comparable goods cost from Europe or 30 hospitals, 30 anti-malaria centers, and abundant capital. Africa, on its side, America. Nor are they all low-end items. 20 agricultural demonstration projects boasts great strengths in market size, labor The proportion of machinery and elec- in Africa.22 Beijing has also successfully cost, and resources. Our cooperation is tronic products accounts for more than rolled out $15 billion in preferential lend- constructive in nature as it expands shared half of China’s exports to Africa. America ing, trained close to 40,000 Africans in interests and leads to win-win results. It no longer makes inexpensive consumer various sectors, and provided more than is cooperation between brothers that fosters goods, having conceded that market to 20,000 scholarships to students from common development by leveraging our China. Chinese telecom giants Huawei African countries to study in China. respective strengths.24 and ZTE are pushing Western firms out In addition to becoming Africa’s larg- of new networks, providing less expensive est trading partner, its loans have made Within the pattern of importing oil service in over 30 Sub-Saharan African China Africa’s largest financier, ahead and minerals from Africa and paying for countries.29 China is also expanding the of the World Bank and International them with manufactured goods, China- export of automobiles to Sub-Saharan Monetary Fund (though as a legacy of Africa trade continues to expand. In Africa. French journalists Serge Michel their imperial pasts, the United Kingdom, 2013, total trade topped $200 billion, and Michel Beuret argue that “Cheap India, and France still hold larger shares nearly the equal of the trade carried on goods can be an even more habit-forming of direct foreign investment in the with Africa by the United States and drug in poor countries than they are in continent). Hu stated the move was European Union (EU) combined. And rich ones.”30 Yet this can slow local growth designed to stop “the big bullying the by 2015, China-Africa trade neared $300 not only in manufacturing but also in the small, the strong domineering over the billion, with Beijing setting $400 billion formation of a business class, as Chinese weak and the rich oppressing the poor,” as its goal by 2020.25 merchants handle the distribution and a thinly disguised slap at America and Yet it is loans to African states that sale of Chinese goods often down to the Europe. The loans will go toward sup- present the greatest threat to their stability retail level so as to extract every Yuan from porting infrastructure, manufacturing, and independence. China holds at least their exports. Indeed, many Chinese are and the development of small businesses. 14 percent of the continent’s sovereign moving to Africa not only to start small However, the general practice of Chinese debt, having lent more than $100 bil- businesses but also to become farmers. state-owned banks is to finance Chinese lion to governments and state enterprises firms in building the roads, ports, facto- since 2000, according to the Brookings Pushback Against ries, mines, wells, power plants, and shops Institution, and the Belt and Road blitz Chinese Imperialism that will be counted as African growth. has just started. “We’re seeing countries There is, however, pushback in Africa In Beijing, economics is tied to at 50 percent, 100 percent, and in one against a trade pattern that suppresses broader strategy. The final FOCAC docu- case 200 percent of GDP debt, based on local industrial development, com- ment proclaimed, “We believe that the concessionary loans from China,” stated pounds national debts, and often brings development of the new type of strategic U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Donald in Chinese workers rather than provide partnership between China, the largest Yamamoto, when he was the acting more skilled jobs to Africans. Chinese developing country, and Africa, the larg- Assistant Secretary of State for African af- interest in African agriculture is also est group of developing countries, is of fairs.26 Rwanda, Angola, Zambia, Kenya, strong, setting off concern about food great significance for the peace, stability, and the DRC have started to ask questions security on the continent as the Chinese and development of the world and serves about the debt burden that has come buy up farm land and export harvests. the fundamental and strategic interests of from partnering with China. Concerns As the Economist has reported: both sides.”23 The phrase balance of power over what Beijing might demand if debts was also used. go bad have increased since Sri Lanka Africans are increasingly suspicious of At the 2014 FOCAC, however, Vice was coerced into turning over its port of Chinese firms, worrying about unfair deals Foreign Minister Zhang Ming had talked Hambantota (built by a Chinese state- and environmental damage. Opposition about “South-South cooperation” in owned firm) and 15,000 acres of land to is fueled by Africa’s thriving civil society, terms of the same division of labor within China for a lease of 99 years—a financial which demands more transparency and an the international economy that character- transaction with a strategic yield.27 accounting for human rights. This can be ized past patterns of imperialism: David Zweig, a professor at the an unfamiliar challenge for authoritarian Hong Kong University of Science and China, whose foreign policy is heavily based China-Africa cooperation offers a model Technology, has stated, “In the past, if on state-to-state relations, with little appre- of mutual complementarity. China and a state wanted to expand, it had to take ciation of the gulf between African rulers Africa are both at a critical stage of territory. You don’t need to grab colonies and their people.31

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Hawkins and Ponsford 83 themselves and will never allow any exter- nal forces to interfere in China’s internal affairs . . . nor does it use social system or ideology as a yardstick to determine what kind of relations it should have with other countries. China respects the right of the people of other countries to independently choose their own social system and path of development, and does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs.35

The BRI is expanding Beijing’s circle of friends as the project is delivering sig- nificant benefits in the short term.36 Most of those benefits, however, are intended for China in the long term, where the program is spearheaded by firms that are either state owned or closely tied to the Communist regime. President Xi Djiboutian army commander of elite military force Rapid Intervention Battalion listens during course signed numerous BRI agreements during graduation, taught by U.S. Soldiers with 1-26 Infantry Battalion, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st his recent African trip. And as Beijing’s Airborne, at training location near Djibouti, March 7, 2019 (U.S. Air Force/Shawn Nickel) media reported, the FOCAC summit in Beijing’s push to imbed its own in- by a Kenya-based journalist blaming September 2018 was “expected to align terests in the assistance offered to others African leaders for keeping their people Africa’s natural resources, population often backfires. On January 26, Le Monde poor by balking at Chinese extractive dividends and market potential with Afrique reported that the Chinese govern- resource development projects. He China’s investment, equipment and tech- ment’s gift of a $200 million headquarters concluded, “Clearly, the actual battle in nology.”37 Another restatement of the building and computer network for the Africa is not between external players. imperialist model. African Union in Addis Ababa contained It is between Africa’s leadership and its a back door that could allow the trans- people.”33 This lays the groundwork for Expanded Mission fer of African Union files to servers in changing these leaders in favor of those While U.S. economic interests in Africa Shanghai.32 Beijing has denied this charge, more willing to partner with Beijing for are waning, China’s interests will but feels the heat from critics. These the good of the people. continue to expand. Analysts believe dangers will only increase. As part of the The targets of the op-ed were that by 2020, nearly 65 percent of the BRI, China is developing a “digital Silk democratic governments responding oil consumed in China will have to Road” of fiber optic networks across the to public concern about Chinese influ- be imported. China’s oil dependency developing world, including Africa. These ence: “It is time for Africa to stop aping reached 45 percent in 2006 and 52 projects will undoubtedly include overt the democratic systems championed by percent in 2014. It became the world’s mechanisms for censorship and covert Western powers.”34 Though the Chinese largest oil importer in 2015, passing means of surveillance and data collection. do business all across the continent, the United States, whose imports were USAFRICOM needs to develop ways they feel more comfortable dealing falling. In addition to fueling continued to assist local governments to safeguard with authoritarian regimes. Indeed, economic growth, Chinese demand is themselves from the threats emanating one of their selling points is that, un- being reinforced by a rapidly growing from Chinese-provided cyber infrastruc- like the United States and EU, they do private auto market and the govern- tures. This new capability will not be not push democracy and human rights ment’s policy of using low global oil cheap in either money or personnel, but on host governments. Indeed, these prices to fill (and expand) its strategic the Trump administration is making cyber values run contrary to the principles that petroleum reserve. Domestic oil pro- security a high priority. The case must underlie China’s own Leninist regime. duction in China is also declining as the be made for Africa to receive its proper Beijing made this connection explicit in country lags behind the technological share of these new resources in light of the its 2011 white paper China’s Peaceful progress made in the United States. Chinese effort on the continent. Development. In its foreign policy section, Chinese strategists are looking at ways Global Times, a media outlet of the the official document states: to control its import dependence, from Chinese Communist Party, has struck developing more protected oil resources back at those claiming Beijing is engaged The Chinese people adhere to the social in Central Asia that can be delivered in imperialism. In 2014, it ran an op-ed system and path of development chosen by by pipeline to meeting the demands of

84 Features / U.S. Africa Command JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 the world’s largest automobile market national governments that want the based on the Noncommissioned Officer with electric cars.38 Yet there seems to confidence to constrain Chinese ambi- Leadership Center of Excellence at Fort be little chance for oil imports to be tions and guard their own freedoms. That Bliss, Texas. First offered in 2014, it has brought down, and thus no way China’s USAFRICOM represents a whole-of-gov- produced over 240 African sergeants campaign to expand exports to pay for ernment approach, with personnel from major, both male and female, from African oil can slacken. more than 10 U.S. Government depart- 18 African countries. Its July 2018 China’s heavy investment in Africa ments and agencies, including the State graduating class included 45 noncom- and dependence on its oil and other Department and USAID, gives it the missioned officers from Botswana, resources make it vulnerable. Political depth and scope to partner with a multi- Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, volatility and pushback against Beijing’s tude of local authorities. USAFRICOM Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and greed, exploitation, and explicit rejection can serve as a coordinated reinforcement .42 This kind of training is an of human rights will raise the political to Ambassadors and Embassy staffs important element in the human infra- price of its investments and risk draw- from multiple departments. This will structure of national independence. ing in substantial security forces.39 A require improved cooperation between China is also involved in Malawi, but report released in August by EXX Africa the Department of Defense and State. in ways that present a stark contrast to Business Risk Intelligence found that Bureaucratic rivalry must lessen in the face American efforts. It has invested in the of a growing common adversary playing country’s economic development, but to China is actively positioning itself as a for very high stakes. its own benefit. Research by Theodora C. major supplier of arms to the African While Africa needs economic in- Thindwa, a lecturer at Mzuzu University’s continent. Beyond the commercial vestment and foreign development Centre for Security Studies in Malawi, objective of increasing sales of Chinese assistance, its leaders must be able to found “no relationship between invest- manufactured weapons and military channel growth to benefit their own ment levels and employment created. This equipment, China . . . seeks to control people and resist becoming victims of a suggests the importation of Chinese labor a greater share of the weapons trade in new imperialism. The United States may into Malawi, which leads to economic Africa in order to protect its extensive not be able to confront China economi- losses for the Malawian workforce.”43 infrastructure investments on the conti- cally in Africa, but its military and other China has provided help in some fields nent. On the back of the One Belt, One public agencies can compete with China such as medicine, leading Thindwa to Road initiative, China has made massive in influence across the continent by pre- conclude, “China comes out as both a investments in East Africa, including senting itself as a genuine friend of local neo-colonialist in some areas and as a de- railway lines, hydropower dams, and new authorities in their desire to maintain na- velopment actor in other areas.” This kind port projects in countries such as Kenya, tional independence and to root out the of tension is common across the conti- Sudan, and Ethiopia. Central to this corruption Chinese money will breed. nent. The small African states cannot stand strategy is China’s military logistics base This is nation-building at the institu- alone against China (“a force to reckon in Djibouti.40 tional level. While the American message with in the 21st century,” as Thindwa calls in aid and training programs has long it). USAFRICOM can, however, provide According to the Stockholm emphasized democracy and human rights enhanced capabilities and foster coalitions International Peace Research Institute, (values the rejection of which Beijing to strengthen their hands. China exported more military equipment tries to sell as an advantage in dealing to Africa in the 2012–2016 period than with Africa), it must also build a sense Even if Beijing is able to safeguard its the United States and France combined, of national consciousness and higher material interests on the continent, it can though less than Russia, which is the loyalty that can recognize and resist the still be prevented from expanding its po- largest provider of weapons to the con- pressures to abandon the common good litical clout. And it must move its coveted tinent.41 American policy has been to to the benefit of foreign interests. A supplies of energy and other resources discourage African states from spending professionalism based on “honor, duty, from Africa through waters currently scarce resources on weapons when there country” over avarice. controlled by the U.S. and Indian navies, are so many more important development The strong ties that USAFRICOM reinforced by other allies being pulled into goals. However, when African govern- has made with African militaries based on alignment to contain China’s ambitions. ments choose to improve their military facing common insurgent and An asymmetrical strategy that supports capabilities, the United States should make threats can be broadened to face another local opposition to Beijing’s imperialism a stronger effort to be the source of any truly existential danger. One example of and authoritarianism while controlling desired equipment and the training that USAFRICOM’s success in developing the commercial/logistical sea routes that goes with it. This is a critical field of politi- professionalism in the ranks of Africa’s link China and Africa is a cost-effective cal competition with China and Russia. armed forces is in Malawi, where it has approach that puts USAFRICOM at the USAFRICOM is well positioned partnered with the Malawi Defense Force center of the action as America’s lead ele- to provide political support to African Sergeants Major course. This course is ment on the continent. JFQ

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Hawkins and Ponsford 85 16 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, “Multi 30 Michel and Beuret, China Safari, 115. Notes Industry Letter Regarding Opportunities for 31 “One Among Many,” The Economist, Jan- Growth in Africa,” October 17, 2011, available uary 15, 2015, available at . among-many>. ment Before the U.S. House Armed Service 17 Summary of the 2018 National Defense 32 Joan Tilouine and Ghalia Kadiri, “A Committee (HASC), March 6, 2018, available Strategy of the United States: Sharpening the Addis-Abeba, le siège de l’Union africaine at . 2018), available at . les-chinois_5247521_3212.html>. available at . zation,” DOD press release, November 15, jing), September 3, 2014, available at . ters Shared Future,” China Daily (Beijing), News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/ 34 Ibid. July 26, 2018, available at . ment,” PRC, Information Office of the State fa31031a351e90293.html>. 20 Ibid. Council, available at . 5 An Baiije, “Belt, Road Aligns with African Aid Activities in Africa, America, and 36 “World Needs More Globalization, Not Nations,” China Daily (Beijing), September Southeast Asia, R40361 (Washington, DC: Less,” Global Times (Beijing), January 20, 5, 2018, available at . 14f38999a.html>. ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=1423>. 37 “Goals Set for Upcoming Forum on Chi- 6 Lina Benabdallah and Winslow Robert- 22 Speech by President Hu Jintao at the na-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit,” Xin- son, “Xi Jinping Pledged $60 Billion for Africa: Opening Ceremony of the 5th Ministerial Con- hua, June 17, 2018, available at . washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/ 23 “Beijing Declaration—Toward an Even 38 “Petroleum stockpiling is of great wp/2018/09/17/xi-jinping-pledged-60-bil- Stronger China-Africa Community with a significance to the country because a strategic lion-for-africa-where-will-the-money-go/?utm_ Shared Future,” People’s Republic of China petroleum pool would assure China’s energy se- term=.2f3bcf8f54be>. (PRC), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September curity,” quoted in Niu Li, “Wisdom of China’s 7 John J. Sullivan, “Remarks at the 5, 2018, available at . 3, 2017, available at . 2018, available at . South Cooperation, Complementarity, Equality, Increase Its Military Presence in Africa,” 8 “2012 National Trade Estimates Report and Real Results,” PRC, Ministry of Foreign CNBC, June 27, 2018, available at . gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-publi- shtml>. 40 EXX Africa, “The Secret Chinese Arms cations/2012-1>. 25 “China-Africa Trade Approaches $300 Trade in the Horn of Africa,” EXX Africa Busi- 9 Waldhauser, “National Security Challeng- Billion in 2015,” China Daily (Beijing), ness Risk Intelligence, August 2018. es and U.S. Military Activities in Africa.” November 10, 2015, available at . holm International Peace Research Institute, sion,” Department of State, available at . Finds Itself in China’s Debt,” Wall Street Jour- sites/default/files/Trends-in-international- 12 “Fact Sheet: Trade Africa,” The White nal, July 25, 2018, available at . House, July 1, 2013, available at . Partnerships Through NCO Development,” office/2013/07/01/fact-sheet-trade-africa>. 27 Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri U.S. Africa Command, September 24, 2018, 13 Ibid. Lanka to Cough Up a Port,” New York Times, available at . Hotel, Washington, DC, August 5, 2014. The Beuret, China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing’s 43 Theodora C. Thindwa, “China-Malawi forum was part of a larger summit that brought Expansion in Africa (New York: Nation Books, Relations: An Analysis of Trade Patterns and some 50 African leaders to the U.S. capital. 2009), 115. Development Implications,” African-East 15 “U.S. Trade in Goods by Country,” U.S. 29 David E. Brown, Hidden Dragon, Asian Affairs, no. 4 (2014), available at Bureau of the Census, available at . Africa is Underestimated and Africa’s Potential view/146>. Data are given for the period 1997–2016 and Underappreciated (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Stud- includes regions as well as individual countries. ies Institute, September 2012), 33.

86 Features / U.S. Africa Command JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Marines assigned to Engineer Company, Marine Wing Support Squadron 272, Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, use excavator to preserve road being constructed near U.S./Mexico border, March 18, 2013 (U.S. Marine Corps/Manuel Estrada)

Enhancing Unit Readiness on the Southwest Border

By Cindie Blair, Juliana T. Bruns, and Scott D. Leuthner

ood, realistic training can often planning training for operational units (LEAs) enables units to meet many of be illusive. External factors such that provide engineering or intelligence, their wartime mission essential tasks G as urban growth, pollution, com- surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) (MET), operate against a thinking petition for frequencies and airspace, and capabilities, commanders from all Ser- and adaptive adversary, and improve protected habitats continually challenge vices should consider supporting coun- interoperability with the joint force and the Department of Defense (DOD) in terdrug (CD) missions on the Southwest interagency community. Such training carrying out realistic training at instal- border through Joint Task Force North also contributes to protecting the home- lations.1 However, a small Southwestern (JTF-N) as a readiness enhancer. Sup- land by supporting CD/counter–trans- task force has a unique solution to keep porting JTF-N-funded CD missions national organized crime (CD/CTOC) units training like they fight. When with Federal law enforcement agencies activities. In many instances, examples of this training opportunity are currently being demonstrated. Criminal activity along the Southwest Lieutenant Colonel Cindie Blair, USMC, is the Staff Judge Advocate for Joint Task Force North. Major Juliana T. Bruns, USAF, is a Tactical Data Link Program Manager at the Defense Information Systems border poses a significant national secu- Agency. Major Scott D. Leuthner, USA, is a Special Forces Officer at Special Operations Command–Pacific. rity threat for the United States.2 JTF-N

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Blair, Bruns, and Leuthner 87 missions combine realistic unit training ISR capabilities contribute the primary assist LEAs in protecting U.S. borders with the goal of protecting the homeland support for Southwest border missions, from drug traffickers and transnational that benefits units, LEAs, and the Nation. which include ground and aerial radar organized crime threats. Unit commanders are often unaware that systems, unmanned aircraft systems JTF-N pays for their support, or they may (UAS), foreign intelligence, ground Training Benefits underestimate just how much these CD reconnaissance, and other support Units conducting counterdrug missions missions enhance deployment readiness providing detection and monitoring derive many benefits from providing by providing training in a real environ- (D&M).12 Additionally, JTF-N facilitates CD/CTOC support to LEA. First, ment similar to overseas contingency engineer missions to construct roads, in recognition of the U.S. military’s operations (OCO) locations. fences, or lighting.13 emphasis on realistic training, sup- Once a unit agrees to provide support, porting units conduct missions on the Mission, Processes, JTF-N facilitates funding, transportation, Southwest border in a diverse environ- and Authorities mission planning, and execution between ment with terrain and climate similar to Located at Fort Bliss, Texas, JTF-N the unit and the supported agency.14 that in current OCO locations.20 Com- is a U.S. Northern Command JTF-N also coordinates with the appli- parable to the U.S. (USNORTHCOM) element that cable state National Guard CD program (USCENTCOM) theater of operations is under the operational control of coordinator to synchronize all military and parts of Northern Africa, the South- U.S. Army North3 and has an annual LEA support across the border.15 While west border between the United States counternarcotics budget of about $8 the sourcing cell tries to identify all target and Mexico (US/MX) covers almost million.4 As a task force without allo- units, JTF-N always encourages com- 2,000 miles with limited visibility, cated or apportioned forces and only manders to contact the cell directly for tough mountainous terrain, some major about 160 assigned personnel, JTF-N more information or to volunteer for mis- population centers, and large swaths of relies solely on volunteer units from all sions on the Southwest border. Statutory uninhabited desert, providing a robust Services to complete its missions.5 Each authorities permit DOD units to lawfully training environment for all units.21 The of these missions lasts 60–179 days, support LEA by conducting CD/CTOC Southwest border’s climate also provides but the majority generally span 2 to 4 missions, and the JTF-N staff obtains all a year-around training opportunity for months.6 Supporting LEAs since 1989, proper approvals.16 those hindered by inclement weather at JTF-N’s area of responsibility includes Federal statutes and Office of the their home station, especially UAS units the entire continental United States Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy pro- from the cold and windy U.S. northern including Puerto Rico and the Virgin vide DOD authority and guidance to states such as Alaska, Washington, and Islands; however, most missions occur coordinate DOD support to LEA on the New York.22 along the four Southwest border states Southwest border.17 JTF-N relies on 10 Second, units operate against a of Arizona, California, New Mexico, U.S. Code § 284 and its subsections for thinking and adaptive adversary when tar- and Texas, covering more than 660,000 most missions, which permit, but are not geting drug traffickers on the Southwest square miles.7 Its mission is to support limited to: border. Criminal organizations use the LEAs and facilitate DOD training varied terrain and vast desert along the transportation support through conducting CD/CTOC opera- •• US/MX border to traffic drugs, humans, CD-related LEA training tions in order to protect the homeland •• and weapons; launder money; and con- detection and monitoring of air, sea, and increase DOD unit readiness.8 •• duct other associated illegal activities.23 and surface traffic Policy permits JTF-N to support The Southwest border is the main entry engineering support for building Federal LEAs from the Department •• point for all major illicit drugs into the roads, fences, and lighting of Homeland Security, Department of United States.24 Such training provides aerial and ground reconnaissance Justice, and the High Intensity Drug •• units conducting D&M and reconnais- (including ground sensor platoons Trafficking Area.9 Once an appropriate sance missions the opportunity to use, [GSP] and tunnel detection) LEA official requests CD support, JTF-N test, and adjust sensors, optimize tactics, linguist or intelligence analyst provides military operational units and a •• techniques, and procedures, and employ support comprehensive intelligence threat assess- lessons learned in a real-world environ- communications and network ment for the requested mission.10 •• ment with immediate feedback.25 These support.18 JTF-N’s sourcing cell then finds lessons provide valuable input for future supporting DOD units by attend- All JTF-N missions comply with the missions or contingency operations. ing resource, training, and planning Posse Comitatus Act and intelligence When conducting D&M missions, conferences, and reaching out to units oversight rules.19 Not only do these aircrews and operators may monitor, deliberately identified as having the missions provide DOD units with invalu- continuously track, and report to LEAs organic resources to successfully provide able training opportunities that improve certain targets within 25 miles of the U.S. Southwest border support.11 Units with interagency interoperability, but they also border.26 These missions rely on trained

88 Features / Enhancing Unit Readiness on the Southwest Border JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 operators who use sophisticated aircraft to accumulate crew mission ready hours space limitations on military bases, DOD sensors in a real-world environment to and conduct formal training instruction.33 engineer units rarely have opportunities locate vehicles, ultralight or unmanned Engineer missions provide units with to perform horizontal construction proj- aircraft, backpackers, all-terrain vehicles, technical construction operations and ects prior to deploying to a contingency boats, horses, and any other method traf- management training in a complex and or stability operation.42 Units that support fickers use to transport illegal drugs across challenging environment.34 Engineer sup- LEAs through JTF-N gain invaluable the border.27 Some units also use sensors port is inclusive from survey and design training from construction projects on the combined with intelligence training to through final construction and enables Southwest border that include training on provide LEAs with a pattern analysis units to exercise all operational planning rental equipment equivalent to the unit’s through processing, exploitation, and process steps including mobilization, own organic assets.43 dissemination, identifying named areas of deployment, employment, sustainment, Additionally, many Army UAS units interest where traffickers may create new and redeployment.35 Participating units fail to achieve required annual flight techniques or routes to move their drugs. report successfully training on 90 percent training due to external factors, such as In essence, training mirrors, with great or more of their individual and collective weather or competition with other units accuracy, how these units operate during MET objectives per mission, averaging a to train in the same, limited military contingency or stability operations. total of 12 units and 429 Servicemembers airspace.44 JTF-N not only offers ad- For units conducting mounted and trained per year.36 ditional military airspace for training dismounted reconnaissance, the challenge Ground tactical units also proficiently but also expands the area to make the of facing a thinking, adaptive adversary train MET objectives tied to functions in National Airspace System (NAS) avail- is often difficult to replicate outside of the find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and able to all Services’ UAS units.45 Unlike OCO areas, yet it is commonplace along disseminate (F3EAD) model. Volunteer manned aircraft, DOD UAS have not the Southwest border.28 One Marine tactical units, including Marine Corps historically operated in the NAS. The Corps reconnaissance company com- GSPs and reconnaissance forces and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) mander highlighted his appreciation for Army scouts, regularly conduct find must first issue a Certificate of Waiver the JTF-N-funded training, emphasizing and fix operations using reconnaissance or Authorization (COA) to DOD.46 A the relevance of the terrain and adaptive expertise to locate drug traffickers and COA allows DOD UAS to fly precoor- adversary in his final report.29 transnational organized criminals and dinated flight routes from the NAS into In another recent example, an adver- provide LEA with geolocation and target DOD special use airspace where, cur- sary spotter compromised a U.S. Marine description for interdiction purposes.37 rently, DOD conducts the vast majority Corps GSP while the latter emplaced radio Similar to planned combat missions, of UAS training.47 In fiscal year 2019, repeaters. When conducting sensor main- units submit a thorough concept plan fol- JTF-N coordinated over 70,000 square tenance and repositioning 5 days later, the lowed by a detailed mission confirmation miles of airspace with the FAA for UAS platoon realized that someone tampered brief to JTF-N.38 In addition to normal units to conduct training while support- with the wiring to one of the repeaters. operational planning, the volunteer forces ing LEAs along the south Texas border.48 Ten days after the compromise, the same may include other training opportunities This number will only increase as JTF-N platoon noticed a sensor pulled from the directly before or after a CD/CTOC works closely with the FAA to secure ground with a severed wire.30 This real-life mission, such as a live-fire range that also even more COAs for military UAS oper- adversarial reaction to detection opera- contributes to MET training.39 The unit’s ating in the NAS.49 tions affected the mission and evoked a plan must include details for a medical This benefits UAS units not only problem-solving response that was better evacuation, communications, logistical because flying in Class A airspace requires experienced in the JTF-N permissive envi- support, contingency battle drills, risk instrument flight rule certification (IFR), ronment than in a combat situation. mitigation, and rules for the use of force, which the 2nd Battalion, 13th Aviation Third, JTF-N missions train units to among others.40 This detailed planning Regiment, UAS training center in Fort complete essential wartime tasks. Mission alone provides training for key related Huachuca is only now training Army essential tasks are collective tasks evalu- collective tasks prior to deployment. UAS operators to support JTF-N mis- ated and assessed by commanders at all Throughout one ground reconnaissance sions, but because it also provides a echelons through bottom-up feedback mission, Marines conducted 21 days of better training area when compared obtained primarily with training and persistent reconnaissance from multiple to the smaller, more restricted military evaluation outlines.31 From October observation points, enabling them to airspace.50 While the Air Force already 2014 to August 2018, 12 air assets sup- certify of 3 out of 7 mission essential tasks IFR certifies its operators, it still requires ported LEAs through JTF-N by flying and 12 out of 37 key collective tasks.41 a COA from the FAA to fly in the NAS.51 6,944 CD missions.32 During this period, Besides enabling units to complete JTF-N continues to coordinate COAs for pilots and operators flew 30,000 flying wartime essential tasks, JTF-N missions any LEAs supporting unit, consistently or training hours, enabling units to meet also expand training opportunities. Due adding more flight corridors for UAS various MET objectives and for aircrews to high costs, environmental hurdles, and operators around the country.52

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Blair, Bruns, and Leuthner 89 Soldier with 541st Engineer Company, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force 7, moves concertina wire over stake on practice barricade at Naval Air Facility El Centro in California, December 4, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Asia J. Sorenson)

DOD and the Services in general BVLOS operations, the Services do not Protecting the Homeland further benefit from UAS operators fund units for a Ku satellite frequency.58 Through Interoperability obtaining IFR certification because it However, JTF-N will pay for dedicated Counterdrug missions on the South- provides an advantage when fighting ir- Ku satellite frequencies to increase train- west border in support of Customs regular warfare inside a legitimate state ing benefits.59 Funding is yet another perk and Border Patrol (CBP) benefit or nation’s owned airspace.53 Training at JTF-N provides to supporting units. DOD through training and improve or above flight level 180 (that is, sea level In an era when military components interoperability with the interagency up to flight level 600) in a noncongested are competing for scarce resources, community, which aids in protecting airspace with robust terrain allows the JTF-N provides much-needed funding the Nation’s borders. This is especially military to increase its proficiency and to units for training and LEA support important in light of the recent deploy- closely aligns UAS operators to their on the Southwest border, thereby saving ment of 5,200 Title 10 forces to the manned counterpart.54 The increased the unit’s own operation and mainte- Southwest border.62 These troops are integration of manned and unmanned nance funds for other purposes. While moving into JTF-N’s area of operation assets enables greater expansion of UAV not permitted to pay for operational to reinforce the ports of entry and assist applications and utility to further assist in tempo items like flight hours, fuel, CBP officers in securing the border, homeland security.55 maintenance, and spare parts, JTF-N ensuring officer safety as migrants In addition to benefiting from a can pay for equipment and personnel approach the United States seeking new IFR certification, a larger airspace transportation, lodging, per diem, rental asylum.63 This is the second deployment provides UAS operators the opportunity cars, and more.60 In fact, the only costs of military troops to the Southwest to train in beyond visual line of sight incurred by volunteer units generally border in the past 6 months and the (BVLOS) operations. UAS operators relate to equipment purchases and refit opportunity to coordinate with LEAs conduct BVLOS flights out of their visual and maintenance of their organic assets. through JTF-N missions prior to such a range, which enables a drone to cover Additionally, the supported LEA pro- deployment is invaluable.64 far greater distances.56 Flying BVLOS vides engineering units with all necessary Those units conducting D&M or operations requires a satellite Ku fre- construction materials, while JTF-N reconnaissance missions on the border quency band.57 Because current training funds the unit’s transportation, travel, report its observations to the inter- procedures do not require proficiency in per diem, and equipment rental costs.61 agency community, which assists LEAs

90 Features / Enhancing Unit Readiness on the Southwest Border JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 in both apprehending and deterring Engineer projects provide protection OSD policy requires that all JTF-N drug traffickers, stopping illegal drugs to the homeland in a different manner. missions provide DOD training and from entering the United States, and When completed, these roads provide readiness opportunities to volunteer units countering other transnational organized increased mobility of restrictive terrain, conducting CD missions. This is not only crime activities. From October 2014 enabling LEAs to decrease response time a policy requirement, but also a part of to August 2018, air D&M support in interdicting CD/CTOC threats along JTF-N’s mission statement and vision. directly contributed to LEA detain- the Southwest border.75 Currently, in While training benefits are easy to articu- ing 46 narcotic traffickers and 14,206 one of the U.S. CBP sectors, volunteer late in operational planning documents, undocumented aliens.65 Additionally, engineer units from all different Services JTF-N seeks innovative approaches to DOD support enabled our LEA partners and locations are alternating missions to increase the scope and variety of training to seize 280,788 pounds of marijuana, complete close to 3 miles of all-weather opportunities for the joint force, such as 5,271 pounds of cocaine, 2.1 pounds road.76 Upon completion, the road will the aforementioned initiative to fly UAS of methamphetamine, and 29.2 pounds provide 55 miles of unimpeded lateral in the NAS. JTF-N sourcing and planning of other drugs.66 Joint surveillance and movement for this sector, improving teams are always looking at new ways target attack radar system (JSTARS) CBP’s ability to secure the border.77 to integrate forces and missions, layer D&M missions also provide a good Similar engineer projects in the Rio coverage, and enable interagency and example of our interagency support Grande Station contributed to disrupting joint force training to units that otherwise benefiting the Nation. Using a moving drug trafficker infiltration routes, deny- may not have such an opportunity. With target indicator that looks for suspicious ing vegetation concealment, causing a engineers, UAS, and GSP units raving movement in named areas of interest, 190 percent increase in apprehensions about the real-world training experience the JSTARS crew coordinates with and a 74 percent increase in turn-backs.78 that Southwest border missions present, it interagency partners to maximize cross- This project also increased visibility along is clear that commanders who fail to take cueing opportunities with other paired the Rio Grande River and will reduce advantage of such opportunities are miss- assets to locate drug traffickers.67 In one CBP’s interdiction response time by 75 ing a phenomenal money-saving readiness instance, a JSTARS crew identified three percent.79 In the Nogales Station, CBP enhancer for their units. JFQ tracks of interest on a mission.68 The reported a 90 percent reduction in DTO crew provided real-time coordination interdiction time (from 30 minutes to with 11 separate departments across 2 minutes) and an almost 50 percent Notes the interagency community.69 LEA and decrease in the number of individuals who 1 DOD cross-cued the tracks with positive have gotten away in due part to DOD’s Government Accountability Office 80 (GAO), Military Training: DOD Approach to results, culminating in the apprehension completed engineer projects. Managing Encroachment on Training Ranges of three Dominican Republic nationals, Yuma Sector also reported benefits Still Evolving, GAO-03-621T (Washington, a 25–30-foot boat, 151.6 kilograms of from JTF-N-sponsored engineer proj- DC: GAO, 2003), available at . 2 Similarly, ground reconnaissance increase in detection capability and an “National Southwest Border Counter- narcotics Strategy,” Office of National Drug units coordinate with interagency increased wide-area response speed from Control Policy, May 2016. partners and provide benefits by commu- 5 miles per hour to 30, resulting in a 3 Joint Task Force North (JTF-N), “Pro- nicating sensor and personal observations 75 percent reduction in interdiction re- tecting the Homeland,” trifold, October 2017, to LEAs for drug interdiction purposes.71 sponse time thanks to DOD engineers.81 available at . 4 “Joint Task Force North Information prohibits Title 10 military personnel expand and even improve with increased Brief,” PowerPoint slides, December 22, 2015, from directly participating in police func- volunteer DOD participation. slide 12. tions on U.S. soil, Active-duty units do Unit personnel from all Services feel 5 Ibid. not accompany LEAs on interdictions.72 a sense of pride and accomplishment 6 Matthew Fath, “Information Paper: Sourc- However, ground tactical units directly when they contribute to protecting the ing Assistance Request,” February 21, 2018. 7 See “Joint Task Force North—History,” coordinate with interagency partners homeland by providing ISR or engineer- available at . relevant information DOD provides.73 authority. Personnel learn to commu- 8 Ibid. For example, a U.S. cavalry scout squad- nicate with the interagency community 9 Paul Wolfowitz, Department Support to ron conducting a reconnaissance mission during the planning and execution Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies (Wash- ington, DC: Department of Defense [DOD], provided actionable information to phases of all missions and provide im- October 2, 2003); JTF-N, “Protecting the LEAs that enabled them to interdict 275 mediate, mutually reinforcing benefits to Homeland.” While JTF-N can also provide pounds of narcotics and apprehend 72 their own units and to the agencies with limited support to State, tribal, and foreign law undocumented aliens.74 whom they collaborate. enforcement agencies (LEAs), the majority of JTF-N missions support Federal LEAs.

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Blair, Bruns, and Leuthner 91 10 Ibid. 34 Witwer, “Joint Task Force North J37— 60 GAO, DOD Counterdrug Activities: 11 “Joint Task Force North Proposed Policy Sourcing Cell Brief,” slide 3. Reported Costs do not Reflect Extent of DOD’s Changes,” PowerPoint slides, April 16, 2018, 35 Ibid. Support, GAO/NSIAD-98-231 (Washington, notes on slide 11. 36 Ibid. DC: GAO, 1998), 3, 10, available at . Operating 13 Ibid. ties.” and support costs are not included in DOD’s 14 Ibid.; see Joint Task Force North Web 38 “JTF-N ROS/CONPLAN GS7178-13 counterdrug budget because they pertain to site, available at ; (26JUN17),” 1–4; and U.S. Marine Corps 1st the existing force structure that supports the JTF-N, “Protecting the Homeland.” Reconnaissance Battalion, “Joint Task Force national defense mission and would be incurred 15 JTF-N, “Protecting the Homeland.” North Mission Command Brief for Operation regardless of the type of operation conducted. 16 “Section 284, Support to Counterdrug Persistent Vision,” PowerPoint slides, March “As such, they are not true counterdrug costs,” Activities and Activities to Counter Trans- 8, 2018. according to the DOD Coordinator for Drug national Organized Crime,” Code of Federal 39 South Texas Regional Support Team, Enforcement Policy and Support; and Manage- Regulations (CFR) Title 10 (2018), available at “4th Ground Sensor Platoon Live-Fire Range,” ment Controls Over National Drug Control Pro- . PowerPoint slide, July 28, 2017. gram Funds Managed through the DOD Central 17 Ibid.; Wolfowitz, Department Support to 40 Ibid. Transfer Account, DOD Inspector General Audit Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies. 41 Moore, “Operation Persistent Vision.” Report No. D-2000-145 (Arlington, VA: DOD 18 “Section 284, Support to Counterdrug 42 Jose Cambreros, “JTF-N Mission Brief— Office of Inspector General, 2000), 10–11, Activities and Activities to Counter Transna- Mission Number: ES 10928-18,” PowerPoint available at ; 19 Fath, “Information Paper.” 43 Witwer, “Joint Task Force North J37— GAO, DOD Counterdrug Activities, 2–3. 20 U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Sourcing Cell Brief.” 61 Adams, “JTFN DOD Training Capabili- Enhancing Realistic Training White Paper: 44 Ibid.; Ryan, “Research for Paper” email. ties.” Delivering Training Capabilities for Operations 45 Moore, “Operation Persistent Vision;” 62 Barbara Starr and Ryan Browne, “Pen- in a Complex World (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Ryan, “Research for Paper” email. tagon to Send 5,000 Troops to Border as Mi- U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, January 46 “Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS): grants Inch Closer,” CNN, available at . border-troops-migrants/index.html>. ternarcotics Strategy”; Rich Witwer, “Joint 47 Ibid. 63 Ibid. Task Force North J37—Sourcing Cell Brief,” 48 Ryan, “Research for Paper” email. Typi- 64 John L. Mone and Paul J. Weber, “Op- PowerPoint slides, last updated July 21, 2014, cal military restricted airspace training blocks eration Guardian Shield on U.S.-Mexican Bor- slide 18. are less than 10,000 square miles of airspace. der,” FOX26, available at ; however, this previous deploy- las D. Ryan, USA, JTF-N J35 Aviation Plans 50 Ibid. ment involved Title 32 forces, not Title 10. officer, on October 19, 2018, with the subject, 51 Ibid. 65 Rovayo, “Charts.” “Research for Paper.” 52 Ryan, “Research for Paper” email. 66 Ibid. 23 “National Southwest Border Counternar- 53 Therese Jones, International Commercial 67 Joint Task Force North Information cotics Strategy.” Drone Regulation and Drone Delivery Services Brief,” PowerPoint slides, December 26, 2017, 24 Ibid. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), available slide 1. 25 “JTF-N CONPLAN 2-13th UAS at . 69 Ibid. 26 “Section 284, Support to Counterdrug 54 This information is derived from an email 70 Ibid. Activities and Activities to Counter Transna- sent to our research group from CW4 Adam 71 South Texas Regional Support Team, tional Organized Crime.” Morton, Battalion Standardization officer for “JTF-North Support to CD/CTOC—USMC 27 “JTF-N CONPLAN 2-13th UAS 2-13th Aviation Regiment, on October 3, 2018, Ground Sensor Operations,” PowerPoint slide, UV9983-18 (26JUN17),” 1–4. with the subject “Air Info.” January 16, 2018. 28 Michael Adams, “JTFN DOD Train- 55 Andrew Lacher et al., “Airspace Integra- 72 Fath, “Information Paper.” ing Capabilities,” video, 1:53, August 5, tion Alternatives for Unmanned Aircraft,” 73 U.S. Army, 6-1 Calvary, “Coyote Over 2016, available at . available at . Sourcing Cell Brief,” slide 3. Vision: Ground Reconnaissance,” PowerPoint 56 Allison Ferguson, “Opening the Skies 76 Rich Witwer, “Joint Task Force North slide, May 8, 2018. to Beyond Visual Line of Sight Drone Op- Readiness Generation Brief,” PowerPoint 30 “Ground Sensor Platoon—Deming, NM: erations,” PrecisionHawk, 2018, available at slides, January 20, 2017, slide 7. DTO Counter-measures/GSP Disruption of . 78 Witwer, “Joint Task Force North J37— 31 “OBJ-T and Joint Task Force North 57 Ryan, “Research for Paper” email. Sourcing Cell Brief,” slide 3. Turn-backs Information Brief,” PowerPoint slides, October 58 This information is derived from an email describe when people who are about to illegally 31, 2018, slides 1 and 12. sent to our research group from CW4 Adam cross the border into the United States return 32 This information is derived from an email Morton, Battalion Standardization Officer for to Mexico after seeing Customs and Border sent to our research group from Guillermo Ro- 2-13th Aviation Regiment, on October 23, Patrol respond to the area. vayo, Operational Law Attorney for JTF-N, on 2018, with the subject, “Questions.” 79 Ibid., slide 3. October 12, 2018, with the subject “Charts.” 59 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 81 Ibid.

92 Features / Enhancing Unit Readiness on the Southwest Border JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 New Zealand landing troops at Gaba Tepe, Gallipoli (Anzac Cove), April 25, 1915 (Archives New Zealand)

Gallipoli Lessons from the Great War on the Projection of Power and Joint Forcible Entry

By Patrick William Naughton

s the 100th anniversary of the the gaps among the different domains Empire’s capital of Constantinople end of World War I passes, it were clear. The (now Istanbul) had three objectives: A is worthwhile to reflect on the executed in the Dardanelles Strait in force the empire’s surrender, open a lessons that the conflict can teach April 1915 was one of the few events route behind the German lines, and the joint force. Most remember the in the war that incorporated land, bolster ailing ally Russia, who could war as being primarily fought by land sea, subsurface, air, and multinational not face the Ottomans and Germans forces; jointness did occur, though operations at all levels of war that on its own. Once the naval attack was today can be recognized as a true joint stymied by effective shore-to-ship artil- operation. The attempt by the allied lery firing from hardened forts and the nations in February and March of 1915 mining of the strait, the allies planned Major Patrick William Naughton, USA, is an Army Interagency Fellow in the Veterans’ Employment to execute a naval assault through the to conduct amphibious landings, allow- and Training Service at the Department of Labor. Dardanelles to threaten the Ottoman ing the army to seize the fortifications

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Naughton 93 and silence the enemy guns so the navy numerous considerations when planning The commission concluded that techni- could pass safely to Constantinople. this type of operation. As one of the first cal matters for campaign planners were This plan, recognized today as a true joint forcible entries in the modern “guided wholly by the views laid before joint forcible entry, involved coordina- era, the events in the Dardanelles in April them by the Secretary of State for War tion among all domains, as well as the 1915 provide a historical case study for and the First Lord of the Admiralty.”7 synchronization among numerous mul- modern military professionals to study in Finally, the commission found that at tinational participants, including troops order to supplement this doctrinal guid- the end of each planning meeting of the from Australia, Ceylon, England, France, ance. Gallipoli presents several lessons still Dardanelles War Council, many “left India, , Nepal, New Zealand, applicable today when examining poten- without having any very clear idea of Newfoundland, Russia, Senegal, Syria, tial future large-scale combat operations what had or had not been decided.”8 along with Jewish Palestinian refugees. within the MDO concept. Starting at the strategic level, these The Gallipoli Campaign offers the joint two prevailing characters, often at odds force five main lessons when examining Unity of Command with each other, resulted in a divided possible forcible entry operations within Unity of command is a core principle of unity of command from the commence- the multidomain operational (MDO) joint operations and is defined as the ment of operations. The effects of this concept: “operation of all forces under a single quickly trickled down to the operational responsible commander who has the and tactical levels. The commission unity of command •• requisite authority to direct and employ found that Sir Ian Hamilton, appointed coordination of joint fires •• those forces in pursuit of a common as the overall ground commander of the multiple dilemmas •• purpose.” The common purpose is the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force for logistics and consolidation gains •• achievement of unified action, which the Dardanelles, was perplexed by the health service support concept. •• is enabled by the unison of all military command structure. The final report con- 4 Joint Forcible Entry efforts directed by a singular leader. cluded that Hamilton appeared to have Due to the complexity of joint forcible regarded Kitchener as the commander According to a recent National Mili- entry operations and the coordination in chief rather than Secretary of State for tary Strategy of the United States, the required among the different services War, bypassing the established military “U.S. military stands ready to project across all domains, to include multina- chain of command to take all guidance power to deny an adversary’s objec- tional participants, joint doctrine recog- directly from him.9 When later questioned tives and decisively defeat any actor nizes that achieving unity of command on his actions, Hamilton stated that every that threatens the U.S. homeland, our is vital for success.5 decision he made was overshadowed and national interests, or our allies and part- After the evacuation of allied critiqued by Kitchener.10 ners.”1 Looking at large-scale combat forces from Gallipoli, the Dardanelles The Dardanelles Commission report operations within the MDO concept, Commission was formed by order of the highlighted three issues with Hamilton’s oriented against a peer competitor, British government to determine the leadership and plan. First, his invasion the end-point of the projection of that origin, inception, and conduct of opera- concept allowed for zero flexibility and power will culminate with joint forcible tions. In 1917, the commission issued its hinged on unrealistic expectations. Once entry, which joint doctrine defines as first report, which determined that the Hamilton had his plan approved, it al- operations to “seize and hold lodge- entire operation lacked unity of effort lowed for no deviation at the tactical ments against armed opposition.” A from the top down. The report stated, level. The commission concluded that lodgement is defined as a “designated “It is impossible to read all the evidence, the invasion plan “entered into so much area in a hostile or potentially hostile or to study the voluminous papers which detail as to what was to be done if all operational area . . . that affords con- have been submitted to us, without being went well that they left little margin for tinuous landing of troops and materiel struck with the atmosphere of vague- the unexpected.” It further claimed that while providing maneuver space for ness and want of precision which seems the rigidity of the plan and its reliance subsequent operations.”2 to have characterised the proceedings on assumed success was responsible for Forcible entry will most likely occur of the War Council.”6 This council was the damping of the initiative of the com- in the seize the initiative and dominate dominated by the overbearing personali- manders at the direct level, preventing phases of the joint combat operational ties of Secretary of State for War Lord them from exploiting what successes were model. As such, it becomes crucial in al- Herbert Kitchener and First Lord of the achieved.11 Second, he had no reserves lowing the joint force to progress toward Admiralty Winston Churchill, neither of available to exploit opportunities or rein- controlling the operational environment, whom were experts in naval or amphibi- force forces stymied at the landing points. achieving strategic military and political ous warfare. The commission found that Third, his entire army staff was located objectives, and setting the conditions the specialists present were hesitant to on the HMS Queen Elizabeth, a dread- to advance to subsequent phases of the express their opinions or voice dissent nought-class battleship commanded by operation.3 Joint doctrine introduces due to the personalities of these two men. the and also tasked with fire

94 Recall / Gallipoli JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 support for the landing. Consequently, assault forces are building combat shells used. Lastly, the belief fell short while the ship gave Hamilton mobility, it power in the operational area from that the untested tactic of coordinated meant he had limited direct communica- nothing as quickly as possible.” It rec- fires, aided by aerial observation, would tion and span of control over his dispersed ognizes that forces will normally have make up for the inability to spot the forts landing forces.12 minimal to no artillery fire support ini- by direct line of sight. The seaplanes “did Since the initial Dardanelles operation tially available. To assist with this, doc- not fulfill expectations, as the engine was a naval endeavor, critics would later trine declares that “Fires from aircraft power was deficient, and there was much claim that though Hamilton was ap- (manned and unmanned) and/or naval difficulty experienced in rising from the pointed as the commander for the entire platforms (surface/subsurface) take on water when there was any sea.”21 operation, he was always treated as an added importance to compensate for Though joint fire support efforts auxiliary of the Royal Navy and a minor the lack of artillery.”17 Planners for the failed to suppress the Turkish forts during nuisance to be tolerated until the navy operation did identify the importance of the landing, they did aid in halting coun- could again assume control.13 This was fires in supporting the Gallipoli landing terattacks, allowing the landing parties reinforced by the insistence of Churchill forces. to gain a foothold. It would also set the on the importance of the navy, in con- War Council planners understood tone and shape of the battlefield for the trast to Kitchener, to any who would that the Dardanelles Strait was protected rest of the campaign. German General listen. The commission also noticed this by numerous hardened forts hidden Liman von Sanders, commander of all division, which was propagated by both among the hills, invisible from direct line Ottoman forces on the Dardanelles, later dominant senior leaders. To alleviate this, of sight. These positions contained heavy commented on the effectiveness of allied it suggested that a specially equipped and Turkish guns, thwarting any attempt to fire support, stating, “the artillery effect dedicated unarmed vessel with adequate force the strait or land troops. However, of the hostile constituted a signaling capabilities that could house as Churchill later stated during the com- support of extraordinary power for the both staffs from the navy and army to- mission’s investigation, “This war had landing of the army.”22 Sanders also gether would have allowed for a more brought many surprises. We had seen noted the synchronization that land- and effective unity of command and span of fortresses reputed throughout Europe sea-based artillery quickly achieved after control during the landings.14 to be impregnable collapsing after a few the initial landings. He claimed, “the roar When asked in an unguarded mo- days’ attack by field armies without a of the guns on the coasts of the peninsula ment about the campaign difficulties, regular siege.”18 Events on land at the never ceased day or night. When the land Hamilton, ever the loyal subordinate, Western Front had demonstrated that batteries ceased firing, the ships’ guns stated, “Lord Kitchener is a great genius, previously impenetrable forts could be began, and vice versa.”23 but like every great genius he has blind easily destroyed by howitzers. To mitigate Gallipoli validates the concept of co- spots.”15 For modern military profession- the concern over the inability to spot ordinated joint fires and their importance als, the Gallipoli campaign demonstrates the forts directly from the ships, it was during joint forcible entry attempts. As the dangers of how division at the political decided, in a first for modern warfare, discussed, Kitchener and Churchill domi- and strategic levels can affect operations to use seaplanes and air balloons, which nated the planning process; both had at the operational and tactical levels of planners believed could act as spotters for little understanding of joint coordinated war. It also reflects what can occur when indirect fire.19 fires between ships and shore, aided by domineering leaders refuse to utilize the Despite the evidence demonstrated aerial spotting. Rather than allowing “understand, visualize, describe, direct, on land at the Western Front, one of subject matter experts to inform the War lead, and assess” operations process the first attempts at joint fire support Council on each service’s capabilities, loop.16 Lastly, Gallipoli graphically il- for the landings in the Dardanelles was these two men pressured everyone to lustrates the importance of undertaking disastrous. As noted by the commission, continue with the plan. The result was a whole-of-government approach aimed they overlooked the fact that “Guns as split: joint fires failed to suppress the at achieving unified action through unity mounted on board ships cannot be given Turkish forts during the invasion and of effort guided by unity of command. sufficient elevation to obtain high-angle subsequent 8-month campaign but were If the message coming from the strategic fire similar to howitzers.”20 The success effective in allowing landing forces to level is divisive or heavily dictatorial, it is of howitzers on land against hardened gain a foothold and later shaped the na- extremely challenging for a commander positions was later found to be due to ture of the peninsula conflict. to nest the efforts of joint, interagency, in- the high-angle entry of the shells, which The overall operational objective of tergovernmental, and multinational forces exploded within the forts bypassing outer the entire campaign was to silence the aligned against a singular objective. walls, hills, and other obstacles. Ship-to- Turkish forts in order to allow the navy shore fire during the landings had little to pass to threaten Constantinople, which Joint Fires effect on Turkish forts and entrenched was never achieved. Due to the infancy of Joint doctrine understands that “In positions due to the angle of fire and the joint fires and the suppression of subject forcible entry operations, the initial armor-piercing instead of high-explosive matter experts during the planning phase,

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Naughton 95 the concept was never fully developed to land at other points as well,” thus points, seeking to drive them back into and leveraged to its full effect. A core les- setting the stage for the first joint and the sea. In response, Hamilton, revert- son for joint planners is evident: during multinational forcible entry operation in ing to what military leaders of the time planning, all key fire experts from each the modern era.27 knew best, informed his men, “You have service and nation participating must In the early morning of April 25, got through the difficult business, now establish capabilities, communication, 1915, after a brief but intense naval you have only to dig, dig, dig, until you and employment prior to execution in bombardment, the 29th British Division are safe.”31 In testimony to the effective- order to leverage the full effect of joint conducted a deliberate amphibious attack ness of joint fires and how it shaped the fire support. on five beaches (labeled S, V, W, X, Y) in battlefield, Sanders ordered his men to the Cape Helles region on the European establish their trenches as close as possible Multiple Dilemmas side of the Dardanelles, with an endstate to the allies to negate any fires arrayed Joint doctrine acknowledges that forc- of overwhelming Ottoman forces and against them.32 Once dug in, fires from ible entry may include a combination of seizing key high ground. Simultaneously, the ships had little effect, since they could amphibious and air assault operations. the Australia and New Zealand Army only fire in depth and not linearly along It champions presenting the enemy with Corps (ANZAC) conducted a deliberate a trench line. Soon the fronts solidified multiple dilemmas that create “threats attack with no preparatory fires at beach and assumed the character seen in other that exceed the enemy’s capability to Z, with the intent of cutting the Cape theaters of World War I. respond.” The overall goal is to create Helles peninsula in two and isolating and The entire Gallipoli campaign is often a “coordinated attack that overwhelms fixing the Ottoman army on the Cape. called a failure, with distinct critique the enemy before they have time In conjunction with these landings, a being leveled against the initial landings to react” and to facilitate follow-on feint was conducted at the Gulf of Xeros and their lost opportunities. However, operations.24 Hamilton received much by the Royal Navy, and the French con- considering that Hamilton had almost condemnation for his decision to land ducted a demonstration followed by a no knowledge of the enemy situation, his force at multiple points. Numerous raid on the Asiatic side at Kum Kale.28 poor maps, no deterrence options, and critics claimed he should have landed in Against all odds, the allies established faced an entrenched enemy who both one place, using a strategy of deterrence a foothold and limited lodgement at outnumbered and expected him, the mixed with surprise. However, despite each entry point. They did so by pre- initial entries achieved their objective of attempts at secrecy, the Ottomans knew senting Ottoman forces with multiple establishing lodgements for subsequent well in advance that Hamilton’s force dilemmas to react to. Sanders later wrote operations. Hamilton accomplished this was coming and had ample preparation about his experience early on April 25 by presenting the enemy with multiple time. To counter this, Hamilton pre- and the rapid succession of reports on dilemmas to react to. The various deliber- sented his enemy with multiple dilem- enemy landings that bombarded his ate attacks—feint, demonstration, and mas in order to confuse and overwhelm headquarters: “From the many pale raid—when combined, presented the their ability to react. faces among the officers reporting in Ottomans with a situation they struggled Once it was realized that the navy the early morning it became apparent to comprehend, which prevented them alone could not force the straits and that although a hostile landing had been from immediately marshaling their over- threaten Constantinople, Hamilton expected with certainty, a landing at so whelming combat power to counter. Had concluded that to effectively “force many places surprised many and filled the allies landed on one or two beaches, the passage of the Dardanelles, the them with apprehension.”29 Sanders and the Ottomans would have easily repelled cooperation of the whole military force his subordinate commanders struggled them. The effectiveness of presenting an will be necessary.”25 Due to the ter- to develop a common operational adversary with multiple dilemmas to off- rain, entrenched enemy, and lack of picture and response to the landings. set advantages is a valid lesson for today’s surprise, rather than putting all of his Eventually, effective individual leadership joint force. troops ashore in one landing area via a exercised at the direct level halted the tiered force flow, Hamilton decided to allied advances. The most famous ex- Logistics and land his entire force at once at differ- ample was Ottoman Lieutenant Colonel Consolidation of Gains ent locations.26 He acknowledged his Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s (later the first Joint doctrine recognizes that a joint plan “involved difficulties for which no president of Turkey) order to his men: “I forcible entry’s main objective is to precedent was forthcoming in military don’t order you to attack, I order you to seize and hold a lodgement as a base for history.” Hamilton lacked an accurate die. In the time which passes until we die subsequent operations. This foothold is intelligence estimate of enemy forces other troops and commanders can take meant to receive large follow-on forces or even maps that reflected the terrain. our places.”30 and the logistics to support them.33 From this he decided it was necessary Sanders, following Ataturk’s example, Army doctrine has recently introduced “not only to land simultaneously at as threw successive wave after wave of coun- the concept of the consolidation of many points as possible, but to threaten terattacks against all the allied landing gains—activities to ensure that any tem-

96 Recall / Gallipoli JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Allied soldiers dug in at Chocolate Hill, Suvla Bay, Gallipoli, August 6, 1915 (National Army Museum/Trooper O. Ward)

porary operational success is enduring writing, “The men were exhausted . . . the Hamilton was unable to resupply his and to set the conditions for the joint small amount of transport available did forces quickly enough, which resulted force to exploit it.34 In a forcible entry not suffice to maintain the supply of mu- in them culminating soon after landing. context, these consolidation activities nitions, and cartridges were running short His immediate response was to solidify primarily deal with defending the lodge- despite all efforts to push them up from the lines, consolidate his gains, and ment, landing and building combat the landing places.”37 allow his logistics support to sort itself. power, and the logistics to support it. The commission faulted the extended By then, however, the Ottomans had Hamilton set about doing exactly that; lines of communication and poor pack- recovered from the multiple dilemmas his first dispatch stated that all time ing of supplies as being behind the failed presented and effectively halted further immediately after the landing “was sustainment plan. Material packed in advances. A slug-fest ensued over the consequently spent in straightening the Alexandria, , was repacked for next 8 months, as the allies attempted to line, and in consolidating and strength- the invasion on the staging islands of break the deadlock, move up the penin- ening the positions gained.”35 Lemnos and Mudros.38 While this is a sula, and seize key terrain that had been Though the initial landings were a suc- common practice, the supplies were not expected to fall on the first day of the cess, the attempts to move inland failed. combat loaded or prioritized by need. landings. Hamilton excluded his logistics One of the main reasons for this was the Consequently, the force was unable to officers in preplanning events, with di- inability to consolidate gains and build lo- access supplies needed to consolidate its sastrous consequences. Had they known gistics nodes to support follow-on forces. gains in the lodgements. Though the the scheme of maneuver, they could One witness later described the scenes logistics officers were later criticized, the have better prepacked the ships to sup- on the beaches and how they “reminded commission found they were not at fault. port it. A valuable lesson exists for joint one irresistibly of a gigantic shipwreck.”36 The real reason for the stowage failure force planners considering future forcible The commission report found many faults “was the absence of knowledge of the entries: include all joint functions during with the sustainment activities during and operations for which the embarkation planning activities. immediately after the landings. Hamilton was required, and that the embarkation himself acknowledged how logistics ham- officers at the ports of loading were not pered his ability to move off the beaches, to blame.”39

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Naughton 97 Health Service Support Concept as had been intended, and they could not HSS plan’s conformance to the tactical During large-scale combat operations, a be left on the beaches, which were under plan, which today is recognized as the valid health service support (HSS) plan shell fire.”44 Consequently, the wounded most basic element for providing effec- will prevent a force from culminating. were immediately loaded on any ship of tive HSS.50 Since medical planners never This was understood in World War I, as opportunity, without triage, to transport initially understood the tactical plan, noted in a British field manual from the them to the hospital ships, which then they prepared no contingencies. The era that is still applicable today within removed that asset to transport more Australian official history concluded that the MDO concept: “The presence of fighting men ashore. in Hamilton’s staff planning, “Whatever a number of sick and wounded proves Like the sustainment preparation, suffering, disillusionment, and loss was an encumbrance to a Commander, and the reason why the HSS plan was found caused by the absence of medical arrange- since his mobility will be handicapped lacking was medical authorities’ exclusion ments was due to this obsession . . . that by being compelled to carry a number during planning activities. The commis- the presence of the ‘operations’ branch of unfit men, every effort is made sion was highly critical of Hamilton, who was in some way more important than to remove them to the lines of com- did not inform his surgeon general of that of the ‘administrative’ branch [which munication with all despatch.”40 The the possible risks on the beaches. This included medical].”51 As with sustain- HSS plan for the landings was simple: resulted in inaccurate casualty estimates ment, joint planners must understand the as the lodgements were secured and and a misunderstanding of how to sup- importance of including medical treat- the force advanced, casualty clearing port the landings with medical assets.45 ment throughout all planning activities; stations, ambulance units, and field As the lines solidified, the force health furthermore, joint medical planners must hospitals would be established. Evacu- protection (FHP) plan was also found to aggressively advocate for their function ation would occur via the ambulances be wanting. Dysentery, typhoid, diarrhea, and resist marginalization. Failure to do so through the clearing stations, to the gangrene, and later frostbite—all easily will have disastrous consequences for the field hospitals, and then via barges to preventable—devastated the ranks.46 joint force in any forcible entry attempt. hospital ships, just as in other theaters.41 The official history of the war pub- The plan hinged on immediate success lished by the Australian government Conclusion on the beaches. issued a charge that no medical military Until only recently, Gallipoli was a As discussed, the rigidity of planner ever wants to hear. It claimed the synonym for a military debacle at all Hamilton’s scheme of maneuver pre- men lost their faith in their leaders mainly levels of war. The Dardanelles Com- ordained that all objectives would be due to the lapse in medical coverage for mission’s final report did acknowledge accomplished as planned. Medical au- both the HSS and FHP plans.47 In their that though none of the campaign’s thorities were told that the Turks would defence, medical support was always an objectives were reached, it succeeded be quickly driven off the beach and room afterthought in Hamilton’s mind and the in diverting forces that would have made for hospitals ashore. However, as surgeons general were never kept fully otherwise been used to face Russia, the Dardanelles commission highlighted, informed of operational plans. In addi- it influenced the Balkan States either this “presupposed success, but better tion, expectation management, always the to remain neutral or delayed them in provision ought to have been made for bane of medical authorities, was present joining the Central Powers, and also the contingency of failure.”42 Medical at Gallipoli. One surgeon later wrote in occupied a large part of the Ottoman planners did account for a slight lapse in frustration, “If you are going to expect forces that could have been used else- coverage as troops landed and moved to have at a place like ANZAC all the ar- where.52 The report also concluded that inland, but they did not factor in that this rangements one expects at St. Thomas’s the operation could have succeeded might take days rather than hours or that Hospital, you will not get them, and I had it been treated as the main effort adequate space for hospital units would cannot understand anyone expecting rather than as support to the events on not become available.43 them.”48 Finally, planners also had no his- the Western Front.53 When examined “Hardly any advance was made after torical precedence to draw from; as noted through the prism of trench warfare the landing, and it was found impossible by the ANZAC Surgeon General Neville that dominated military thought in to carry out the evacuation as intended” Howse: “We were in the unfortunate other theaters of World War I, as stated began the commission’s description of position of having no history to guide by renowned historian Alan Moore- the actual execution of the HSS plan. us of a previous landing on such a large head, “the Gallipoli campaign was no It continued, “it therefore became scale in modern times, so that we could longer a blunder or a reckless gamble; necessary that all casualties should be get no idea of what medical arrangements it was the most imaginative conception evacuated by seas as soon as possible. should have been made.”49 of the war, and its potentialities were The casualties began at the very outset of Five of the six principles of joint health almost beyond reckoning.”54 the landing, and many of them occurred services—proximity, flexibility, mobility, As Hamilton and numerous others in the boat before the men had disem- continuity, and control—were present stated in their testimony to the commis- barked. It was impossible to sort the cases at Gallipoli. What was missing was the sion, this was the greatest amphibious

98 Recall / Gallipoli JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 operation ever undertaken in the annals (London: Edward Arnold, 1920), 144. Notes 32 Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, 71. of warfare up to that point that attempted 33 JP 3-18, I-1. to synchronize ground, sea, subsurface, 1 The National Military Strategy of the 34 ADRP 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: air, and multinational forces. As such, United States (Washington, DC: The Joint Headquarters Department of the Army, 2017), they had zero historical precedence to Staff, 2015), 7. 3-7. 2 draw from and were learning as they Joint Publication (JP) 3-18, Joint Forcible 35 Hamilton, “Dispatch to the Secretary of Entry Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint War,” 107. went. Churchill himself later conceded, Staff, 2018), I-1. 36 Ashmead-Bartlett, The Uncensored Dar- “To land a large army in the face of a 3 JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, danelles, 57. long-warned and carefully prepared DC: The Joint Staff, 2017), V-7–V-10. 37 Hamilton, “Dispatch to the Secretary of defence by brave troops and modern 4 Ibid., I-9, GL-16. War,” 106. 5 weapons was to attempt what had never JP 3-18, II-1. 38 The Final Report of the Dardanelles Com- 6 Dardanelles Commission, First Report mission, 16. yet been dared and what might well (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 39 Ibid., 17. 55 prove impossible.” 1917), 21. 40 G.R.N. Collins, Military Organization The negative memory of the at- 7 Ibid., 10. and Administration (London: Huge Rees, tempted joint forcible entry at Gallipoli 8 Ibid., 21. Ltd., 1918), 272. 9 41 influenced military thought in the inter- The Final Report of the Dardanelles The Final Report of the Dardanelles Com- Commission, Part II (London: His Majesty’s mission, 70–71. war years. As written in the doctrine of Stationery Office, 1919), 88. 42 Mackenzie, Supplementary Report, 95. the time, by the 1920s it was believed 10 Thomas Mackenzie, Supplementary 43 The Final Report of the Dardanelles Com- that, due to events in the Dardanelles and Report: The Final Report of the Dardanelles mission, 72. the high death tolls caused by technology, Commission, Part II (London: His Majesty’s 44 Ibid., 73. “Descents upon a hostile coast, if op- Stationery Office, 1919), 93. 45 Ibid., 90. 11 C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, History of the 46 Ibid., 76. posed, have a very small chance of success, Great War, Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol. 47 C.E.W. Bean, Official History of Austra- particularly in modern times. It is true I (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1935), lia in the War of 1914–1918, Vol. I: The Story of that the landing may be made, but getting 251–252. ANZAC from the Outbreak of War to the End of away from the coast is the difficulty.”56 12 Ibid. the First Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign, May 13 Interestingly enough, in the interwar E. Ashmead-Bartlett, The Uncensored 4, 1915 (Sydney: Angus & Roberton, Ltd., Dardanelles (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1941), 563. years, as the Marine Corps worked to 1920), 94. 48 The Final Report of the Dardanelles Com- reinvent itself and become experts at 14 Aspinall-Oglander, History of the Great mission, 76. amphibious operations, the Gallipoli War, 254. 49 Ibid., 80. Campaign was studied profusely, becom- 15 Compton Mackenzie, Gallipoli Memories 50 JP 4-02, Joint Health Services (Washing- ing the main catalyst behind the creation (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, ton, DC: The Joint Staff, 2018), I-1. Inc., 1930), 45. 51 Bean, Official History of Australia in the of the Marine’s first doctrine on the 16 Army Doctrine Reference Publication War of 1914–1918, 569. subject, the Tentative Landing Operations (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process (Wash- 52 Dardanelles Commission, First Report, 39. Manual.57 The concepts introduced in ington, DC: Headquarters Department of the 53 The Final Report of the Dardanelles Com- this manual went on to influence World Army, 2012), 1-2. mission, 86. 17 54 War II operations, including the largest JP 3-18, IV-15. Alan Moorehead, Gallipoli (New York: 18 Dardanelles Commission, First Report, 24. HarperCollins, 1956), 357. joint forcible entry operation to date—the 19 Ibid. 55 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, landings at Normandy. 20 Ibid., 25. 1915 (London: Thornton Butterworth Lim- Overall, events from World War I are 21 Ibid. ited, 1923), 314. often remembered for the careless loss of 22 Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey 56 William K. Naylor, Principles of Strategy life on an industrial scale, which leaders (Uckfield, East Essex: The Naval and Military with Historical Illustrations (Fort Leavenworth, Press, Ltd., 1927), 71. KS: General Service Schools, 1921), 335. on all sides were unable to fully com- 23 Ibid., 78. 57 Kenneth J. Clifford, Progress and Purpose: prehend or prevent. However, the war 24 JP 3-0, VIII-14. A Developmental History of the United States still offers modern military professionals 25 The Final Report of the Dardanelles Com- Marine Corps, 1900–1970 (Washington, DC: several lessons—earned through the mas- mission, 13. Headquarters Department of the Navy, 1972), 26 sive expenditure of blood and treasure of Ian Hamilton, “Dispatch to the Secretary 47, 139. of War, 20 May 1915,” The Final Report of the an entire generation—that can be applied Dardanelles Commission, Part II (London: His today. Fortunately, unlike our World War Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1919), 97. I predecessors, modern day joint planners 27 Ibid. have numerous historical forcible entry 28 Ibid., 100. 29 examples to learn from, which should not Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, 63. 30 Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish JFQ be wasted. Republic: A Case Study in National Develop- ment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 22. 31 Ian Hamilton, Gallipoli Diary, Vol. I

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Naughton 99 he Cold War is now suddenly rise to “revolutions, new states, economic back in vogue, since we are sup- dislocation, and destruction on a scale T posedly entering an era of great that nobody . . . would have thought pos- power competition. China looms as the sible.” World War II’s outcome finalized greatest security challenge according the global order’s de-Europeanization. to the latest National Defense Strategy. Seen this way, as part of a huge geopo- China and Russia are considered revi- litical economic and political reordering, sionist powers, disturbers of the existing we can therefore also see that the Cold international order. Therefore, there War did not exclusively, or even primar- is an understandable impulse to look ily, define the planet and its inhabitants. back, beyond the war on terror of the Westad’s perspective shows that the U.S.- 21st century’s first decades, beyond the USSR Cold War dynamic can be seen as dubious “End of History,” the info-tech part of a larger historical process that was boom of the 1990s, past the hubristic concurrent with the years of superpower and all-so-brief “Unipolar Moment,” standoff. Indeed, much of what strikes to the last great power struggle itself. us as uniquely part of today’s newest It is ancient history to many now, but novus ordo seclorum—its multipolarity, its the decades-spanning Cold War, with nationalism, its identity obsession—was all its ideological clash between the com- underway during the Cold War. This very munist and free worlds, certainly seems multiplicity continuously defied super- The Cold War: A World History germane today. It was, at certain times, power attempts at taming and reducing it. By Odd Arne Westad a potentially existential conflict that As Westad writes, “Time and again, grand Basic Books, 2017 would turn the world into cinders. It schemes for modernization, alliances, or 720 pp. $40.00 was, at other times, a tense conflict that transnational movements stumbled at the ISBN: 978-0465054930 many thought would never end. first hurdle laid by nationalism or other Two recently published sweeping forms of identity politics.” surveys tell the Cold War’s story. Odd This reconfiguration of the Cold War Arne Westad’s massive The Cold War: as more than a bipolar ideological strug- A World History broadens the temporal gle is also emphasized in Paul Thomas perspective. Instead of the standard Chamberlin’s hefty The Cold War’s 1945 to 1991 bracketing, he opens up Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long Peace. a panoramic 100-year-long view. The The author’s perspective is equally global, Cold War did not start following ap- and to some degree revisionist (hence the parent Soviet (or, depending on your title, a respectful riposte to Professor John perspective, American) encroachments Lewis Gaddis’s book) in challenging the into an opposing sphere of influence. notion that the Cold War was a time of The capitalist West and the communist bipolar placidity. As he capably sets forth, Soviet Union had been in conflict from not only was the Cold War not bipolar, the USSR’s very founding in 1917. it also was not in the least sense cold. Indeed, Westad goes back even further Fourteen million people were killed in than that. The Cold War era was born what he calls “catastrophic waves of vio- of larger 19th-century socioeconomic lence” that crashed on a huge geographic transformations. Economic unravelings, arc from northeast to southwest Asia. such as the global crisis of the 1890s, What really mattered in emerging na- consequently loosened communists from tions throughout the world, and especially socialists, turning the former into radical in this killing arc, was not some proletarian revolutionaries. Anti-colonialist stirrings revolution, but a workable model to jump- The Cold War’s Killing Fields: in turn-of-the-century national parties start a new country into modernity. In Rethinking the Long Peace and congresses from Indonesia to South all its cruelty, destruction, and waste, the By Paul Thomas Chamberlin Africa also contributed. These events sub- Soviet model for development—a com- HarperCollins, 2018 sequently brought forth leaders and mass bination of state planning, collectivized 640 pp. $29.99 movements, paving the way for ultimate agriculture, and nationalized industry— ISBN: 978-0062367204 independence. Europe’s 1914–1945 seemed to offer the fastest path. immolation, as Westad terms it, the According to both authors, time and Reviewed by Walter M. Hudson “thirty-year European civil war,” gave again the superpowers misread particular

100 Book Reviews JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 yearnings. In so doing, bipolarity not only an industrialized one, and its revolution of “a new breed of radicals driven by did not keep the peace, but it also pro- was not led by the proletariat. And in religious and ethnic politics [that] seized longed or otherwise escalated struggles just a few years after communist China’s the vanguard . . . this next generation of into long-drawn-out conflicts fueled by founding, China broke decisively with the fighters rejected both Washington and superpower arms and money. Westad USSR and pursued a separate geopolitical Moscow’s influence.” A prime example states, “Over and over again, events that trajectory. Even among major powers, the was Lebanon, the apparent “model of were in origin local and specific metamor- Cold War ceased being a bipolar struggle. a functioning, multisectarian republic” phosed into manifestations for a global Westad points out that the mid-1950s that exploded into violence and anarchy. struggle.” For Westad, the Cold War’s Sino-Soviet split ended the notion of the Beirut’s Battle of the Hotels, during “universalist heart” drove America to USSR and China as “brother states” for which Phalangist, Muslim, and pan-Arab stake massive amounts of blood and trea- good. Any notion that the world was sim- secularist gunmen shot it out from atop sure in places that, only a few years earlier, ply bipolar should have been discarded. luxury resort high-rises, augured this era. had meant nothing. In American eyes, Few policymakers understood this. Meanwhile, Marxist globalist pretentions communism became the exemplar trans- Westad notes that President Richard were dashed as neighboring communist national threat that often demanded total, Nixon, for all his many faults, was one nations fought each other tooth and claw. whole-of-government approaches on a of the few who did. Nixon, in Westad’s Cambodia launched attacks into Vietnam scale that would dwarf anything today. book, is a very strange hero of the very in 1977, just 2 years after absolute com- Chamberlin writes that sometimes strange Cold War (juxtapose this with munist victory in both countries, and America did not even understand that Chamberlin’s villainous take). It was Vietnam responded with its own inva- success, in terms of stopping communism, Nixon, who in Westad’s words, “[b]ecause sion. By the following year, Pol Pot was was staring it in the face—for example, he fundamentally distrusted his own peo- calling for Vietnam’s “wholesale destruc- the brutal obliteration of the Indonesian ple, forced U.S. foreign policy onto a track tion.” And, of course, nothing was more Communist Party in the mid-1960s where, for the first time during the Cold astonishing than the Iranian Revolution. that all but secured much of Southern war, it dealt with others on the assumption All in all, neither book is perfect. In Asia from communism and that served that U.S. global hegemony would not last Chamberlin’s account in particular, there as a “harbinger for the collapse of the forever.” Nixon, in his rejection both of is a whiff of agit-history, of revisionist Communist movement in the Third American exceptionalism and democratic historical thinking that, at times, makes World.” Yet at the same time, the United globalism, was thus able to grasp China’s American policymakers and their policies States plunged ever deeper in the Vietnam singularity, a concept far more important sound venal, and/or downright sinister in morass to stop a model of communism than “linkage.” China could be separated ways that strike this reviewer as unfair. And already on its way to being discredited in and dealt with as its own entity, not as part Westad concludes with a sort of would-be the same region. Of course, the Soviets of a larger global pattern. idealist paean that the previous 600 pages- misread the world as well. According to Nixon’s breakthrough occurred in the plus of his global history undermine. Westad, the fundamental contradiction of 1970s, the Cold War’s strangest decade. Nonetheless, both books’ distinctive vir- the seeming pan-Marxist offensive dur- Experts assumed the superpowers were tues strongly outweigh their flaws. ing the Cold War was that communism becoming, in Westad’s words, a “perma- So, in the end, what lessons can we premised itself on a classless, nationless nent duopoly, in which the United States derive, explicit or implicit, from these world of proletarians and peasants—but and the Soviet Union shared responsibil- Cold War histories? We know that the “problem was that for many ordinary ity for limiting regional conflict, making the Cold War demanded a clear and people . . . a strong nation-state was what sure that nuclear weapons did not pro- long-term strategy at the highest level. they wished for most.” liferate, and avoiding restlessness within Strategies, often due to their temporal China gets rich treatment in both their own ranks.” But this overstated su- and contextual construction, as well books. The communist victory in China perpower influence and importance. The as the demands for parsimony, have to was, Chamberlin notes, of momentous ground was in fact shifting tectonically whittle down complex situations. The consequence. Its triumph there, with fully during the 1970s. Conflicts broke out Cold War strategies adopted by the 20 percent of the world’s population, that escaped the taut Cold War logic. The United States may not have been done seemingly made the world look all of a India- War in 1971 had little to with ill will or bad intentions. At times, sudden “Red.” In America, the shock do with superpower ideological struggle; they may have been theoretically sound was enormous (imagine if all of Saudi the stakes were not in the slightest over and coherent. But they often simplified Arabia, Egypt, or Turkey fell completely whether a communist party would pre- and assumed away too much. Given the under al Qaeda, and one gets a small vail. Rather, as Chamberlin notes, the stakes, the temptation was constantly to sense of the dismay). It astonished the war indicated the rise of “ethno-religious seek connection when there was, in fact, Soviets precisely because what happened politics of violence in the Third World.” particularity or separation. Events seemed went completely against communist doc- This new wave of conflict defied linked, though often such events were trine—China was a peasant nation, not superpower labeling. Chamberlin writes not, and nations and peoples acted with

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Book Reviews 101 unique motivations. This pattern-seeking n Limiting Risk in America’s Wars, when combined with sophisticated intel- compulsion in turn prompted and itself Phillip Meilinger boldly argues ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance fed what David Halberstam termed the I against conducting prolonged wars (ISR) networks and highly trained special “crisis psychology” of the Cold War: of annihilation with large conventional operations forces (SOF), the author be- threats were everywhere and increasing, U.S. ground forces. This strategy has lieves this triad now renders large ground and thus they became existential. Instead, proved too costly and seldom achieves formations (similar to those employed in what we can learn from each book is that, the political goals for which recent Afghanistan and Iraq) irrelevant. In his often during the Cold War, the parts campaigns have been fought, he view, the latter are unwieldy, easy to target, were greater than the whole. Nations and argues. Instead, Meilinger, a retired often misconstrued as occupation forces, peoples worked out their own destinies, Air Force pilot, favors the indirect and responsible for a preponderance of regardless of, and sometimes in defiance approach espoused most prominently civilian casualties. Citing 2006–2007 sta- of, superpower goals. Perhaps the biggest after World War I by British military tistics from Afghanistan, Meilinger writes: lesson, as simple as it may be, is to be thinkers Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart and aware, not of connection and pattern, but Major General J.F.C. Fuller. Building Nearly 95 percent of the 35 airstrikes of exceptionalism and singularity. JFQ on their ideas, the author contends resulting in collateral damage involved U.S. strategy would be better served troops-in-contact—those instances when if our forces undertook second-front the rigorous safeguards taken at the air Colonel Walter M. Hudson, USA, is an Assistant operations, which he defines as a “grand operations center to carefully vet targets to Professor and Deputy Chair of the National Security and Economic Policy Department in strategic maneuver involving a major avoid such mistakes were bypassed. Given the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National military force that strikes the enemy that there were some 5,342 airstrikes flown Security and Resource Strategy at the National unexpectedly somewhere other than by Coalition air forces that dropped “major Defense University. the main theater of action (the source munitions” during those 2 years, the num- of the enemy’s strength).” Such opera- ber causing collateral damage was a mere tions could help divert opposing forces, 0.65 percent of the total. attack critical vulnerabilities, reinforce allies, develop asymmetric advantages, He further asserts that this percentage and be decisively exploited. In short, could have been lower if there had been second-front operations could enable fewer situations where troops-in-contact military forces to avoid prolonged and needed in-extremis close air support. inconclusive conflicts and more rapidly Unfortunately, he offers scant evidence achieve stated war aims at lower risk. that SOF troops-in-contact were more The foregoing summary of the au- adept at accurately guiding air-delivered thor’s analysis may strike some readers as munitions on to enemy targets than gen- strategically valuable. It may be in some eral purpose forces. Nor does he examine contexts, but it is deceptively simple (per- the implications of greater risk for SOF haps even facile) when one ponders just units in different operational contexts. how difficult it is to open up second-front The author does a nice job balancing operations against nonstate actors whose his discussion of warfighting theory with foot soldiers wear no uniforms, defend no historical vignettes that highlight both sovereign territory, and rely on illicit trans- successful and unsuccessful indirect ap- national networks to fund their operations. proaches and second-front operations. Moreover, few readers are likely to argue The successful campaigns he discusses are that deception and surprise—key tenets of the French and Indian wars in America the indirect approach—are less important (1754–1763), Wellington in Spain today than they were in Sun Tzu’s day. (1809–1812), the Arab Revolt (1916– But, as U.S. Navy SEALs learned in 1992 1918), and Operation Torch in North Limiting Risk in America’s Wars: when they came ashore in Somalia under Africa (1942). The failed campaigns he Airpower, Asymmetrics, and the glare of TV cameras, the prolifera- analyzes are the Sicilian Expedition dur- a New Strategic Paradigm tion of information technology makes ing the Peloponnesian War (415–413 achieving and maintaining surprise on the BCE), Imjin War (1592–1598), By Phillip S. Meilinger modern battlefield extraordinarily difficult. Napoleon Bonaparte in Egypt (1798– Naval Institute Press, 2017 The most controversial theme of this 1799), Gallipoli (1915), and Norway 304 pp. $39.95 book, however, is that advanced precision (1940). Not surprisingly, he dedicates ISBN: 978-1682472507 munitions have now elevated airpower a separate chapter, titled “Descent into Reviewed by Tom Greenwood to be America’s most decisive arm. And

102 Book Reviews JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Disaster,” to the so-called endless wars in quantitative analysis of U.S. air missile what the author’s theory of victory is for Afghanistan and Iraq. defense requirements is beyond the scope employing airpower—beyond minimizing The author’s succinct and pithy of this review, transforming fixed air military and civilian casualties—which is a campaign summaries are quite good; bases—both overseas and at home—to recurring theme in the book. Historically, however, no mention of modern arma- successfully survive a long-range enemy airpower has been less than decisive. ments and airpower in some of the cruise missile attack portends to be a While the World War II Bombing Survey vignettes makes their relevance suspect, if Sisyphean task. As T.X. Hammes has acknowledged the significant impact of not disconcerting, given his overarching noted in Joint Force Quarterly 81 (2nd strategic bombing campaigns in both theme about the efficacy of airpower. Quarter 2016): theaters, it did not determine they were Why did some of the armies and fleets decisive. Historians, including Geoffrey in the case studies do better than others? An opponent does not have to fight modern Wheatcroft (New York Review of Books, Meilinger argues it was not simply that fighters or bombers in the air. Instead, he 2018) most recently, conclude that the these forces pursued an indirect approach can send hundreds or even thousands of operational and strategic effects of air- and fought on multiple fronts. Rather, small UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] power have been hyped since Kitty Hawk. they did so while displaying a high degree after each aircraft at its home station. Airpower’s utility has garnered positive of strategic, operational, and tactical fi- Support aircraft, such as tankers . . . are reviews in contemporary conflict (the two nesse by being consistently more proficient even more difficult to protect. Even if air- conventional Gulf Wars) as its precision than their adversaries in devising a logical craft are protected by shelters, radars, fuel capabilities have improved. Yet even with and achievable strategic plan; conducting systems, and ammunition dumps will still complete mastery of the air over Iraq, an accurate net assessment; providing be highly vulnerable. Afghanistan, and other ongoing cam- sound leadership; obtaining timely and ac- paigns, airpower has not yet proved that it curate intelligence; fostering a friendly and Third, distributing combat power can deliver decisive effects. sympathetic population; fielding properly across a theater may be a prerequisite These reservations notwithstanding, sized forces; developing specialized doc- for joint forces to survive and effectively Phillip Meilinger has written a thought- trine, tactics, and weapons; and exercising operate inside the enemy’s weapons ful and provocative book that warrants command of both the sea and air. engagement rings. If so, then credible close attention from JFQ’s readership. However, a central question left land forces will continue to play a vital The changing character of war suggests it unanswered by the book is whether role in executing a number of critical mis- may be worthwhile to use this book as a Meilinger’s proposed triad (airpower, sions (for example, deterring, deceiving, springboard for once again reexamining ISR, and SOF) will be able to withstand protecting, raiding, reinforcing, clearing, airpower’s potential contribution to multi- rigorous historical scrutiny and meet attacking, holding, and evacuating, to domain operations in the 21st century. JFQ our future needs. In the era of great name just a few). While SOF can perform power competition, can this concept some of these missions, they are ill-suited be ultimately validated as the Defense for others and generally lack sufficient Colonel Tom Greenwood, USMC (Ret.), was an Infantryman, with subsequent assignments at Department’s warfighting concept for organic combat power needed to defeat the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy use against high-end peer competitors? even modestly sized enemy formations. and National Security Council. There are good reasons to be skeptical. While large U.S. conventional ground First, in a degraded and contested future forces bivouacked inside static forward op- operating environment, sophisticated ISR erating bases may be a recipe for stalemate systems may prove increasingly unreliable, (if not defeat), it is an exaggeration to thereby impeding joint force target identi- argue that conventional land forces have fication and kill chain processes so essential no operational utility in a high-end war. to sustaining high-tempo operations. The Ongoing efforts by the Army and Marine inability to locate enemy mobile targets Corps to equip conventional forces with could result in reduced U.S. and allied air long-range precision surface fires could target engagement and sortie generation defend strategic chokepoints and free rates, rendering second-front operations up maritime or aerospace forces to com- more problematic. More recent campaigns mence second-front operations that the have enjoyed unusual freedom of action author so strongly advocates. For this given the adversary’s inability to compete reason, readers should not be quick to dis- in the air domain. miss the important role conventional land Second, the increasing range and forces will continue to play on the modern lethality of threat missile systems will battlefield within a joint context. require highly capable and robust U.S. Fourth, assuming air installations can and allied air defense units. While a be adequately protected, it is not clear

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Book Reviews 103 Special forces from Gulf Cooperation Council nation attempt to hook boarding ladder onto U.S. Army vessel “Corinth” during visit, board, search, and seizure training in Arabian Gulf during exercise Eagle Resolve, March 17, 2015 (U.S. Air Force/Kathryn L. Lozier)

The Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine

By John A. Pelleriti, Michael Maloney, David C. Cox, Heather J. Sullivan, J. Eric Piskura, and Montigo J. Hawkins

s the United States enters a new to disrupt and degrade the Nation mation, cyber, drug, economic, and era of near-peer competition, over time. China and Russia, Iran and unconventional warfare, to avoid and A current irregular warfare (IW) North Korea, and violent extremist offset U.S. conventional military advan- doctrine is insufficient to counter organizations (VEOs) have been using tages. While aware of threats, U.S. adversary irregular strategies intended irregular methods, including infor- strategists struggle to define them, as evidenced by the frequent use of non- doctrinal, poorly defined terms such as hybrid, gray zone, nontraditional, Colonel John A. Pelleriti, ARNG, is G3 Deputy Chief of Staff Operations for the Florida National Guard. unconstrained, and asymmetric warfare. Colonel Michael Maloney, USAF, is Commander of the 932 Operations Group at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. Lieutenant Colonel David C. Cox, USMC, is Commanding Officer of Intelligence Support The doctrinal terms irregular warfare Battalion, Marine Corps Support Facility, in New Orleans, Louisiana. Lieutenant Colonel Heather J. and unconventional warfare (UW) Sullivan, USAF, is Commander of the 349th Force Support Squadron at Travis Air Force Base, California. provide a common point of departure Lieutenant Commander J. Eric Piskura, USN, is Assistant Operations Officer, Naval Supply Systems Command Fleet Logistics Center, in Norfolk, Virginia. Major Montigo J. Hawkins, USA, is a Logistics for the discussion, but are incomplete, Officer at U.S. Transportation Command. generally not well understood, and

104 Joint Doctrine / Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 often misused. To be successful in this area.”4 UW is currently only conducted of armed conflict by expanding coercion new era of irregular competition, U.S. by SOF, primarily Army Special Forces, to new fronts, violating principles of planners must reassess and update IW- who are specially organized, trained, and sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and related terms, concepts, and authorities equipped to conduct UW by U.S. Special deliberately blurring the lines between required to counter irregular threat Operations Command.5 While UW is civil and military goals.”9 The NDS also strategies. focused on coercing, disrupting, or over- acknowledges adversarial use of threat Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the throwing hostile governments, it adds the strategies, short of open warfare, to Armed Forces of the United States, defines complex requirement of working with achieve its goals that include informa- IW as “a violent struggle among state and or through an insurgency or resistance tion warfare, ambiguous or denied nonstate actors for legitimacy and influ- movement to achieve UW objectives. proxy operations, and subversion.10 ence over the relevant population(s).”1 Recent UW examples include U.S. SOF Both documents make a clear case that This definition evolved largely out of support to the Northern Alliance in the most senior U.S. leaders understand post-9/11 counterinsurgency (COIN) Afghanistan and anti–Islamic State forces the irregular nature of the threats the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and in Syria. Adversary definitions of UW Nation is facing. is focused on influencing the relevant often differ from the U.S. definition and Threatened use of unrestricted war- population to defeat insurgencies. While include a much broader scope of non- fare, not to be confused with IW or UW, appropriate for COIN environments, traditional warfare activities. These are is not new. For years, U.S. military and current IW doctrine is not focused on discussed in more detail later, but, suffice professional debate has examined and countering strategic irregular threats it to say, the current U.S. definition is incorporated elements of unrestricted intended to undermine the United States too narrow to counter the broad range war, albeit under a variety of models and over time. Traditional, or conventional, of irregular strategies being employed by names. Recognition of recent success- warfare also falls short. Traditional America’s adversaries. ful employment of unrestricted warfare warfare consists of major force-on-force against the United States is starting to operations and is characterized as “a The Use of Unrestricted emerge in military and political dialogue violent struggle for domination between Warfare and the national strategic documents nation-states or coalitions and alliances of National strategic documents clearly outlined. At a time when many aspects of nation-states.”2 While traditional warfare outline the irregular threats posed the conventional U.S. military are at their covers nation-state level competition, by China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, peak, primary competitors are freely em- it is insufficient to counter most state- and VEOs. U.S. strategists previ- ploying unrestricted warfare to counter sponsored irregular threats. The risk of ously referred to this group as “4+1” U.S. strength. escalation with China, Russia, Iran, or and more recently as “2+2+1.” The As early as the 1980s, the Chinese North Korea—all current or potential nu- National Security Strategy makes a began the process of modernizing their clear powers—is too high for traditional clear case that the 2+2+1 are actively conventional force structure, power warfare to be a viable strategic option in competing against the United States, projection capability, and doctrine. The most cases. This is why the indirect ap- its allies, and partners.6 The document unprecedented success of the U.S.-led proach is so attractive to U.S. adversaries states, “many actors have become coalition in the Gulf War provided the and why they have become highly skilled skilled at operating below the thresh- Chinese with a template for future war at operating below the level of traditional old of military conflict—challenging through recognition that technological conflict and are careful not to provoke the United States, our allies, and our dominance gave the United States and its one.3 While conventional capabilities may partners with hostile actions cloaked allies unparalleled information that could certainly be leveraged in nontraditional in deniability.”7 It further details how exploit an opposing force.11 Recognizing warfare, major combat operations against adversaries are disrupting and degrading the difficulty and expense of trying to near-peer competitors is seldom a feasible sources of American strength utilizing match the U.S. conventional military in strategic option. transnational criminal organizations, the near term, the Chinese focused on UW, a related concept to IW, is cyberspace, and economic warfare.8 The overcoming the conventional advantages often misused and generally not well key takeaway is not that they are com- that contributed to military dominance. understood outside of the special opera- peting with the United States, but how Unrestricted warfare doctrine was a tions forces (SOF) community. UW is they are competing. U.S. adversaries are by-product of this quest, ultimately not merely the opposite of conventional not interested in a conventional fight, introduced to the public in February warfare, but is defined as “activities to but prefer to attack indirectly so as not 1999 when two Chinese PLA Air Force enable a resistance movement or insur- to provoke conventional conflict. The , Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, gency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow National Defense Strategy adds, “Both published the book Unrestricted a government or occupying power revisionist powers and rogue regimes Warfare.12 by operating with an underground, are competing across all dimensions of Unrestricted Warfare hypothesized auxiliary, or guerrilla force in a denied power. They have increased efforts short that modern warfare would no longer

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Pelleriti et al. 105 Soldiers assigned to 7th Special Forces Group conduct urban warfare training during Emerald Warrior 17 at Hurlburt Field, Florida, March 7, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Barry Loo) conform to the Clausewitzian principles would be a mixture of covert and overt, military means. Because Iran lacks the of using armed forces “to compel [the] licit and illicit activities. “Combatants” size, influence, and resources of China, enemy to do our will,”13 but had instead would be representative of the popula- their application of unrestricted warfare transformed into a layered and inter- tion: civilians, businessmen, politicians, may be more aggressive. Lacking the minable campaign “using all means, servicemembers, entrepreneurs, criminals, same options as China, and operating including armed force or non-armed and terrorists, all constantly shifting in a vastly different regional environ- force, military and non-military, and le- between roles. Conventional military ment, Iran’s employment of unrestricted thal and non-lethal means to compel the battles would be secondary in nature and warfare comes in the form of support for enemy to accept one’s interests.”14 Such complementary to other efforts, if they terrorism and subversion through surro- campaigns would integrate information occurred at all.17 The ultimate goal would gates. Through its Islamic Revolutionary and resources across multiple domains be to diminish the United States and its Guard Corps, Iran supports numerous simultaneously, creating a “battlefield of allies, creating conflict without crossing regional terrorist and militia groups, battlefields” in order to reduce an op- thresholds that would result in open, including Hamas, Hizballah, Palestinian ponent’s superiority on one battlefield by conventional combat. Islamic Jihad, the Taliban, and Iraqi forcing the opponent to deal with many Iran employs unrestricted warfare Shia groups.19 The success of Iranian battlefields concurrently.15 The result for many of the same historical and unrestricted warfare strategy can be seen would be the fading distinction between practical reasons as China. As outlined in the current conflicts in Lebanon, Iraq, soldiers and civilians because war would in his paper, “Unrestricted Warfare in Syria, and Yemen, all battlefields where be everywhere—battlefields would be Chinese and Iranian Foreign Policies,” conventional forces support the layered “virtually infinite.”16 Traditional operat- Canadian Lieutenant Colonel M.R. and simultaneous application of influence ing domains (land, sea, air, space, cyber) Perreault outlines the similarities in how by other means. would expand in every direction, includ- both nations see themselves and the Russia also subscribes to unre- ing politics, economics, trade, culture, world—threatened by the West and driv- stricted warfare strategy, dubbed “New legal, information, infrastructure, and ing toward regional supremacy.18 As a Generation Warfare” by Russian general even the national psyche. result, China and Iran both seek to offset Valery Gerasimov in February 2013.20 Qiao and Wang suggest that most un- U.S. power and influence, but neither are Gerasimov described the evolution of restricted warfare activities would occur capable of achieving their desired results Russian hybrid warfare whereby future prior to any formal declaration of war and through application of conventional conflict will be defined by the “tendency

106 Joint Doctrine / Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 toward blurring the lines between the North Korea is the most recent coun- “There is a remarkable correlation states of war and peace.”21 Conflict try to adopt and employ unrestricted to [China’s] historical experience of will focus on a series of “asymmetrical warfare. Through media manipulation, the opium wars in the mid-1800s, in operations using a host of [strategic] intelligence infiltration, sabotage, espio- which foreign nations fostered Chinese capabilities to ‘nullification of an enemy’s nage, cyber hacking, and military threats, addiction, leading to the takeover of advantages in armed conflict.’”22 Like North Korea has been able to protect their assets. This episode was led by the Chinese unrestricted warfare model, its ruling regime while simultaneously the British, with German, French, the Russian version simultaneously links developing its nuclear and conventional Dutch, American, Russian and Japanese limited, targeted military operations to warfighting capabilities. Its application of support—just the nations where the layers of “information operations, cyber unrestricted warfare has successfully frus- new wave of synthetics has struck.”31 warfare, legal warfare, economic war, and trated U.S.-led sanctions and U.S.–South U.S. adversaries understand that drug any other activities that are directly linked Korean military might. Although their addicts cannot serve in the military. to the designated strategic outcome.”23 capabilities are more limited than China, They also pay fewer taxes and eventually These layers are constantly evaluated and Russia, or Iran, all of these regimes sup- become an economic drain on society. modified to achieve the desired effect of port North Korean efforts as part of their China is not alone in using drugs as a “shifting stable and thriving state[s] into a own unrestricted warfare campaigns. The weapon. Joseph Douglass stated, “While web of chaos, humanitarian upheaval and political tension and chaos caused by the the dubious distinction of initiating large- outright civil war, making it susceptible North Korean strategy increases U.S. scale political war with drugs goes to the to foreign intervention.”24 In his article, costs in national treasure and political Chinese, it is the Soviets who have made “Conventional and Unconventional in attention. Similar to support to North trafficking the effective political warfare Military Actions,” Romanian lieutenant Korea, several specific irregular tactics are and intelligence weapon it has become.”32 general Teodor Frunzeti characterizes un- utilized by multiple adversaries and wor- Douglass further outlined how both the conventional war as a “political struggle thy of further analysis. Chinese and Russians effectively utilized with non-political and non-military the drug trade throughout the Cold means, putting into practice . . . political, Drug Warfare War to undermine the United States economic, psychological, propaganda, A growing body of scholarly work economically, socially, and militarily to military measures against a state to desta- points to the deliberate use of illicit great effect. Qiao and Wang define drug bilize its political power.”25 narcotics by 2+2+1 as both a chemical warfare as “obtaining sudden and huge Russia’s successful operations in weapon and funding strategy. Utiliza- profits by spreading disaster in other Ukraine and Georgia are representative of tion of illicit narcotics in this manner is countries.”33 This distinction highlights the new model. Russia succeeded in dele- not a new concept. The Western powers that the illicit drug trade is more than just gitimizing the Ukraine government and leveraged the opium trade extensively a profit-making business but also a form its North Atlantic Treaty Organization during the 19th-century Opium Wars of warfare used to threaten the security of supporters, while also seizing large areas both to exploit China economically and other nations. The USASOC white paper of Ukrainian territory by employing a to degrade its population and military asserts that drug warfare is one piece blend of SOF, proxy forces, corporate power.28 As early as the 1940s, Mao of a wide spectrum of warfare tied to a entities, civilians, intelligence agents, po- Zedong realized the potential of using broader Chinese military strategy meant litical agitators, media, and transnational drugs as a weapon and mounted a coor- to destabilize an adversary.34 criminal elements. As stated in the U.S. dinated drug warfare campaign against Jihadists have also adopted the tactic Army Special Operations Command the West, officially targeting “Japan, the to target American and Western youth (USASOC) white paper “Counter- United States military forces in the Far and use the immense profits to finance Unconventional Warfare,” “Funded by East, neighboring countries throughout terrorist activities.35 Both Hizballah and the Kremlin and operating with differing the Far East, and the United States al Qaeda have issued fatwas encourag- degrees of deniability or even acknowl- mainland.”29 Currently, the Drug ing the use of drug warfare as part of edgement, the Russian government uses Enforcement Administration assesses their overall strategies against the West.36 ‘little green men’ for classic [unconven- that the vast majority of the most This tactic is literally a “two for one” for tional warfare] objectives . . . causing dangerous illicit drugs (for example, VEOs as they use drugs to undermine chaos and disrupting civil order.”26 The fentanyl and other synthetic opioids) are target populations while simultaneously speed and effectiveness of employing imported from China through direct reaping enormous illicit profits to fund multiple “battlefields” simultaneously mail or smuggled through Canada and other nefarious activities. In 2016 alone, took the United States and its allies by Mexico.30 Long-time analysts Ralph over 63,000 Americans were killed by surprise.27 Russia’s conventional forces Little and Paul Pilliod describe how drug overdose37 at a cost of over $500 played a supporting, nondecisive role, Islamic extremists and China are delib- billion to the U.S. economy.38 The num- demonstrating Russia’s commitment to erately using drug warfare to weaken bers are staggering, and when viewed unrestricted warfare as a strategic tool. Western target populations. They state, through an irregular strategic lens, a

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Pelleriti et al. 107 brilliant strategy—intended to poison no strings attached. Unlike the United paigns in history and serve as a prelude a target population while degrading States, China does not demand free and of future battles. military capabilities and bankrupting the fair elections, human rights vetting, or Open source media reports are replete economy—comes into focus. anti-corruption measures in return for with examples of the nefarious use of the economic aid. Lack of quid pro quo cyber domain by adversaries other than Economic Warfare is enticing for developing nations that Russia. These include China’s theft of The economy is arguably the most merely wish to gain new infrastructure F-35 Joint Strike Fighter plans to create important of the four instruments of or aid with no expectation of repayment. its J-31 aircraft, Iranian hackers charged national power and a key target of China’s Belt and Road Initiative—a with attacks on U.S. banks and infra- near-peer adversaries’ indirect attacks. massive infrastructure effort to develop structure, and a North Korean release of As mentioned, both China and Russia a Eurasian land bridge from China to damaging emails from the Sony enter- include the concept of economic Russia, Central Asia, Indochina, and tainment company.46 As acknowledged warfare as part of their unconstrained India, coupled with a maritime Silk Road by then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of warfare doctrines. Historically, eco- from China through Singapore to the Staff General Martin Dempsey in 2015, nomic warfare encompassed sanctions, Mediterranean—is a prime example. The cyber is “the only major field of warfare trade embargoes, blockades, and United States has little influence and less in which the United States doesn’t quarantines, as well as competition for control over these geographic areas that have an advantage over its foes.”47 markets and raw materials.39 The pos- have significant economic impact in the Commanders of every U.S. combatant session or denial of natural resources, United States and globally. The competi- command have echoed this sentiment. sources of production, and wealth tion for raw materials and markets will Information and cyber are not only key have served as root causes of warfare provide enormous potential for conflict in enablers for conventional forces and throughout history. A prime example the years to come.42 operations but also important weapons in is Japan’s reaction to U.S. trade and the unconstrained warfare arsenal. oil embargoes in the late 1930s, which Cyber Warfare Japan perceived as an act of war and Information and cyber also represent Reassessing Doctrine precipitated the attack on Pearl Harbor. significant irregular challenges, as the The United States is clearly engaged in Modern economic warfare, however, world has grown increasingly dependent a nontraditional conflict but possesses is not merely about trade embargoes, on information and communication limited irregular doctrine and strategies sanctions, and commerce. The modern technology. Regimes have adapted to compete and win. Reassessing current economic warfare environment includes their information and cyber doctrine to doctrine presents several options. First, cyber theft of trade secrets, currency overcome historical U.S. technological we must expand the current definition and market manipulation, globalization, advantages. The Russian cyber attack on of IW to include all nontraditional forms and interconnectivity on a scale not seen Estonia in 2007, for instance, served as a of warfare. While the current defini- to date. Economic warfare is merging significant warning regarding adversary tion focuses narrowly on influencing a with cyber war to make the notion of intent and capabilities. It was the “first relevant population in a COIN environ- embargoes enforced by ships of the line cyber-attack in history that affected a ment, an expanded IW definition should seem quaint. Regarding China, Harold country nation-wide,” according to include identifying and countering near- Furchtgott-Roth stated, “competition Helen Popp, counselor for cyber issues peer competitors’ irregular tactics, which and property rights are blurred and at the Estonian embassy in Washington, are characterized by a conventionally diminished.”40 He also references the DC.43 During what came to be known weaker opponent using irregular means coming fight over 5G cellular technology as a distributed denial-of-service attack, to degrade, disrupt, and eventually and the U.S. response to Chinese at- Estonians could not access online defeat a conventionally stronger foe—a tempts at dominance in 5G highlighting media, government Web sites, or bank fundamental premise of irregular warfare property rights and intellectual property accounts.44 The coordinated hybrid going back to the beginning of warfare theft as key components of economic attack on Georgia just a year after the itself.48 U.S. IW doctrine must evolve warfare.41 New economic flashpoints are Estonia attack was another example of from its current post-9/11, COIN focus also emerging in Africa, as China seeks Russia’s threat to U.S. allies.45 Even to one that encompasses a broader spec- control over raw materials and rare earth more concerning, the jury is literally still trum of irregular threats. elements (REEs). In 2010, China con- out on claims that Russian state-backed A second option is to broaden the trolled over 90 percent of African REE hackers leveraged information and cyber definition of UW with an expanded mining, forming, manufacturing, and warfare to influence the U.S. Presiden- emphasis on near-peer competition. refining, essentially creating a monopoly tial election in 2016. If true, a state’s As mentioned, the current definition on these key resources. China is also ability to directly influence the outcome requires working with or through an expanding its influence in developing re- of a U.S. election could represent one of insurgency, resistance movement, under- gions through economic investment with the most effective irregular warfare cam- ground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force, all

108 Joint Doctrine / Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 SEALs conduct military field operations during exercise Trident 18-4 at Hurlburt Field, Florida, July 11, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Corban Lundborg)

of which do not always apply to near-peer A third option is to leave the current In addition to doctrine, the authori- irregular conflict. UW has not always definitions of IW and UW intact and ties required to operationalize doctrine been as narrowly focused as it is today. develop an entirely new doctrinal concept are a critical component in developing an UW definitions from the Cold War era to cover near-peer sponsored irregular operational approach. Homeland defense emphasized guerrilla warfare and resis- threats (for example, hybrid, asymmetric, and homeland security authorities are tance movements, but also included the unconstrained, or nontraditional warfare). especially relevant to the discussion of concepts of political, psychological, and The new concept should be inclusive of all irregular attacks employed against the economic warfare, as well as sabotage and irregular methods, as well as conventional homeland. Homeland defense is focused subversion supported and directed by an force and interagency capabilities to be on defending against state-sponsored at- external force.49 The Army UW definition fully effective. Counter-Unconventional tacks, while homeland security is focused from 1969 states, “UW consists of mili- Warfare states, “To prove successful, on preventing criminal and terrorist tary, political, psychological, or economic counter-UW must be strategic in con- acts.53 Without question, interagency co- actions of covert, clandestine, or overt ception and scope. It therefore must operation is important for both; DOD is nature within areas under the actual or encompass the whole-of-government the lead for homeland defense, while the potential control or influence of a force while employing the full range of syn- Department of Homeland Security is the or state whose interests and objectives are chronized IW functions in order to defeat lead for homeland security. Historically, inimical to those of the United States.”50 an adversary’s unconventional warfare homeland defense has focused on defend- UW doctrine continued to include the activities.”52 None of the current doctrinal ing the air and maritime approaches from concepts of sabotage and subversion into options, traditional warfare, IW, or UW air and missile attack, as these were the the 1990s, and did not lose doctrinal ties fully addresses state-sponsored irregular primary military threats to the homeland. to political, psychological, and economic threats and strategies. Whichever doctrinal Under the new paradigm, however, warfare until well into the COIN era in route is chosen, the key is to understand enemies use indirect tactics to easily Iraq and Afghanistan.51 Expanded UW that the United States is engaged in a dif- bypass conventional air and maritime doctrine should be less tied to working ferent type of war, probably not the one defenses. Policymakers have a difficult with and through insurgencies and resis- the Department of Defense (DOD) is time discerning what constitutes a state- tance movements and more focused on best prepared to fight. Updated doctrine sponsored irregular attack, possibly using the broader aspects of state-versus-state and authorities are required to compete transnational criminal organizations, irregular conflict. and win. cyber hackers, or other third parties as

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Pelleriti et al. 109 33 surrogates versus a criminal or terrorist American Military’s Competitive Edge (Wash- Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, ington, DC: Department of Defense, January 55. act. The distinction is extremely signifi- 2018), 2. 34 USASOC, Counter-Unconventional War- cant, however, when discussing homeland 10 Ibid., 3. fare White Paper, 3. defense versus homeland security au- 11 Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from 35 Little and Pilliod, Drug Warfare, 2. thorities. Under a new homeland defense the Gulf Wars” in Chinese Lessons from Other 36 Ibid., 5. framework, DOD could become the Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, 37 Holly Hedegaard, Margaret Warner, and and Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Arialdi M. Miniño, Drug Overdose Deaths in the supported instead of supporting agency Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 159. United States, 1999–2016, NCHS Data Brief to counter state- or VEO-sponsored ir- 12 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unre- No. 294 (Washington, DC: Department of regular attacks. Almost without saying, stricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy Health and Human Services, December 2017), interagency cooperation and coordina- America (Venice, CA: Shadow Lawn Press, available at . 13 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and 38 President’s Council of Economic Advi- IW strategy, but DOD roles and au- ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princ- sors, The Underestimated Cost of the Opioid thorities could and should be significantly eton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 75. Crisis (Washington, DC: The Executive Office expanded to counter indirect attacks. 14 Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, ix. of the President, November 2017), 1. 15 Tony Balasevicius, “Looking for Little 39 James P. O’Leary, “Economic Warfare These may seem like extreme, even Green Men: Understanding Russia’s Employ- and Strategic Economics,” Comparative Strat- ment of Hybrid Warfare,” Canadian Military egy 5, no. 2 (1985), 179–206. radical, ideas to some, but history has Journal 17, no. 3 (Summer 2017), 20–22. 40 Harold Furchtgott-Roth, “5G, Economic proved that to survive and thrive, na- 16 Qiao and Wang, Unrestricted Warfare, Warfare and How to Win,” Forbes, February 5, tions must understand and fight the wars 31. 2018, available at . in Chinese and Iranian Foreign Policies: Is the 41 Ibid. gets a vote, and it is not currently in Phoenix Walking into the Red Dragon’s Foot- 42 Government Accountability Office 2+2+1’s best interest to challenge the steps?” Canadian Forces College, 2015, 8–18. (GAO), Rare Earth Metals in the Defense Supply United States in traditional combat. A 19 “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Chain, GAO-10-617 (Washington, DC: GAO, much more pragmatic approach is to (IRGC),” Counter Extremism Project, avail- April 1, 2010), 18–29. disrupt, degrade, sabotage, and subvert able at . mark Attack on Estonia, Is the World Better the Nation over time using irregular 20 Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Prepared for Cyber Threats?” Foreign Policy, strategies. The evidence outlined herein Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” April 27, 2017, available at . prepared-for-cyber-threats/>. 21 Ibid. 44 Ibid. fight it is in and develop the doctrine and 22 Ibid. 45 Ibid. authorities required to compete and win. 23 Balasevicius, “Looking for Little Green 46 Paul D. Shinkman, “America Is Losing America’s future as a free and prosperous Men,” 23. the Cyber War,” U.S. News and World Report, nation may very well depend on it. JFQ 24 Sergey G. Chekinov and Sergey A. September 29, 2016, available at . Notes 25 Teodor Frunzeti, “Conventional and 47 Ibid. Unconventional in Military Actions,” Strategic 48 Field Manual 3-05.130, Army Special 1 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Impact, no. 4 (2012), 6–13. Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, 26 U.S. Army Special Operations Command (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorpo- (USASOC), Counter-Unconventional Warfare of the Army, September 2008), 1-1. rating Change 1, July 12, 2017), I-6. White Paper (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC, Sep- 49 Ibid., J-2. 2 Ibid., X. tember 26, 2014), 4. 50 Ibid. 3 National Security Strategy of the United 27 Ibid. 51 Ibid. States of America (Washington, DC: The White 28 Ralph Little and Paul Pilliod, Drug 52 USASOC, Counter-Unconventional War- House, December 2017), 3. Warfare: The Confluence of Jihadist and China fare White Paper, 9. 4 JP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare (Jacksonville: North Florida High Intensity 53 JP 3-27, Homeland Defense (Washington, (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, September Drug Trafficking Areas Assessment 2017-1, DC: The Joint Staff, July 29, 2013), I-2. 15, 2015), vii. August 2017), 9. 5 JP 3-05, Special Operations (Washington, 29 Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., Red Cocaine: The DC: The Joint Staff, July 16, 2014), X. Drugging of America and the West (London: 6 National Security Strategy of the United Edward Harle, Ltd., 1999), 11. States of America, 25. 30 National Drug Threat Assessment 2017 7 Ibid., 3. (Washington, DC: U.S. Drug Enforcement 8 Ibid., 12. Administration, October 2017), 65. 9 Summary of the National Defense Strategy 31 Little and Pilliod, Drug Warfare, 9. of the United States of America: Sharpening the 32 Douglass, Red Cocaine, 15.

110 Joint Doctrine / Insufficiency of U.S. Irregular Warfare Doctrine JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Iraqi security forces and coalition partners, including U.S. Army Soldiers with 3rd Cavalry Regiment, provided fire support to assist Syrian Democratic Forces as they continued military offensive to rid so-called Islamic State from Syria, June 8, 2018 (U.S. Army/Anthony Zendejas IV)

Fire for Effect The Evolution of Joint Fires

By J. Mark Berwanger

n September 28, 2018, Joint documents is commendable, there will fully realized. For some time, adversaries Publication (JP) 3-60, Joint Tar- be many who will claim joint doctrine have been honing their ability to influ- O geting, was revised and signed falls short in providing the joint force ence the United States, using their full by the Director of Joint Force Develop- with the necessary fires- and targeting- range of traditional and nontraditional ment, and JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, related doctrine to properly integrate military capabilities. The United States, is in the final stages of its revision, ten- and synchronize all capabilities needed however, continues to struggle with how tatively scheduled to be signed in the to accomplish the commander’s intent. to properly incorporate the totality of its fall of 2019. While the level of effort The next step in the evolution of fires own offensive capabilities. The daily news put into the revision of both of these should involve a cultural change and cycle is driven by the desired effects of expanded understanding of the concept, U.S. adversaries operating below the level including all offensive capabilities used of armed conflict, but until change in to influence an adversary, regardless of U.S. military culture and perception takes Commander J. Mark Berwanger, USN, is a Joint Doctrine Analyst in the Joint Doctrine Analysis the originating weapon system, thereby place, the joint force’s complications asso- Division, Joint Force Development, Joint Staff J7. allowing the targeting process to be ciated with integrating and synchronizing

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Berwanger 111 Scout snipers with 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment, Marine Air-Ground Task Force-6, provide long-distance fire support while conducting the Air Assault Course during Integrated Training Exercise 2-19 aboard Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, California, February 9, 2019 (U.S. Marine Corps/Victor A. Mancilla) the full complement of capabilities will re- some of them (kinetic and nonkinetic) detail-based process. In order for infor- main. Currently, there is no consensus on are not. Some of these terms are used mation to be updated/added to joint how to fully describe and fully encompass correctly (in accordance with doctrine), doctrine, it must be shown to be extant the magnitude of military capabilities that and some of them are not. For example, in the joint force. The opposite of extant can be brought to bear in a coordinated the phrase nonlethal weapon is often practice would be a concept, until it is effort to accomplish a mission. used to describe any weapon that creates proved and accepted (see Joint Concept Joint doctrine is considered the stan- a nonlethal effect. However, nonlethal Integration and Development System). dardized foundation for military leaders weapon is defined in joint doctrine as a Also, there must be consensus among the and planners to use when employing “weapon, device, or munition that is ex- key voting members of the joint doctrine the joint force. It is the “fundamental plicitly designed and primarily employed development community before informa- principles and overarching guidance for to incapacitate personnel or materiel tion can be added or changed. Examples the employment of the Armed Forces immediately, while minimizing fatalities, of voting members include combatant of the United States. This represents the permanent injury to personnel, and un- commands and the individual Services. evolution in our warfighting guidance desired damage to property in the target This is the simple answer to why kinetic and military theory that forms the core of area or environment” (that is, beanbag is not found anywhere in joint doctrine; joint warfighting doctrine and establishes guns or tear gas).2 currently, there is no consensus among the framework for our forces’ ability to Many terms are not defined in doc- the community regarding the definition fight as a joint team.”1 Throughout the trine purposely because the dictionary of kinetic and how it should be used in operating joint force, terms like kinetic definition is sufficient. The reason behind joint doctrine, even though the term and nonkinetic or lethal and nonlethal the appearance or absence of certain is widely used across the joint force. are used. Some of these terms (lethal “contentious” terms in joint doctrine is Ultimately, this does not prevent the joint and nonlethal) are found in doctrine and that doctrine development is a deliberate, force from using the term anyway.

112 Joint Doctrine / Evolution of Joint Fires JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 It is noteworthy to mention that in commander a range of flexible options. •• add discussion on the integration of the preface of any joint publication there The selection, availability, scalability, and space operations in joint targeting in is a statement under “Application” that effectiveness of capabilities and activities appendix C states, “The guidance in this publication provide the joint force commander the •• modify the name of Phase 6 of is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will means to engage targets throughout the the JTC from “Assessment” to be followed except when, in the judg- operational environment.5 “Combat Assessment” and replace ment of the commander, exceptional the phrase targeting assessment with circumstances dictate otherwise.” While These passages from joint doctrine combat assessment throughout the the term kinetic is commonly used across have not changed appreciably over past publication. most combatant commands, the use of revisions, and the joint force continues to JP 3-60 does a reasonable job of such a term does come with associated identify the need for doctrinal clarity with being agnostic when it comes to deter- risk. When there is a lack of joint force issues of integration and synchronization mining which specific fires capability consensus concerning a term, and there- of capabilities. or solution should be used to achieve fore not resident within joint doctrine, Despite the limitations discussed, the desired effect on the target. This there is the potential the term could be there have been many improvements to is a vitally important part of the JTC. used dissimilarly, which could potentially targeting doctrine. The recent changes to The process begins with Phase 1, carry serious implications. JP 3-60: “Commander’s Objectives, Targeting During the revision process, a com- clarify roles and responsibilities of Guidance, and Intent” and it is only in mon response within the joint fires •• components and joint force com- Phase 4, “Commander’s Decision and community was that clear doctrine is mander staffs during the joint target- Force Assignment,” just prior to employ- needed regarding how to integrate non- ing cycle (JTC) ment, that a decision is made as to which traditional capabilities with other more update and clarify the joint target- specific capability will be used to achieve traditional ones. Theoretically, this is •• ing coordination board’s roles and the desired effects on the target. Ideally, already answered in JP 3-60, which states responsibilities this is only done after every available that targeting is “the process of selecting update and clarify the joint fires capability has been considered for the and prioritizing targets and match- •• element’s targeting roles and intended target. This process is similar to ing the appropriate response to them, responsibilities the way that defense acquisition programs considering operational requirements update and clarify the joint fires are run. and capabilities.”3 The targeting process •• targeting working group’s roles and To get the best possible solution, in requires a continuous analytic process responsibilities. any advance problem-solving method, to identify, develop, and affect targets to add discussion on coordination the process should not begin with a meet the commander’s objectives and •• between components when one preconceived notion of what the answer provides planners with access to detailed component, supported or support- will be. Instead, regarding an acquisition information on the targets, supported by ing, engages time-sensitive targets program, a capability gap is identified the nominating component’s analytical within another component’s area of first, and a deep understanding of the reasoning that links the targets with the operations requirements is established. Then the desired effects. Targeting helps integrate update the target development dis- process looks to develop a product that and synchronize fires among the other •• cussion consistent with changes to will satisfy that gap, instead of designing joint functions (command and control, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a new piece of gear and then looking for intelligence, movement and maneuver, Instruction 3370.01B, Target Devel- a military problem to apply it toward.6 protection, sustainment, and informa- opment Standards The JTC was designed to work much the tion).4 Additionally, JP 3-60 states: •• consolidate and clarify the discussion same way. of cognitive, control, and informa- The commander’s objectives are The employment of capabilities and other tion characteristics understood first. A target is identified activities that create nonlethal effects such add discussion clarifying the relation- that if manipulated or influenced could as key leader engagement, civil-military •• ship between target lists and the create the effects that will achieve the operations, and military information no-strike list commander’s intent. Then the target- support operations can help address these add new discussion on nonlethal ing process attempts to match the best concerns. Nonlethal effects, including •• effects estimates capabilities with that specific target. use of information-related capabilities add new discussion for joint force Yet it is still currently difficult (nearly (IRCs), can also influence adversary de- •• maritime component targeting in impossible) for joint force planners to cisionmakers’ choice of actions, local public appendix C, “Component Targeting integrate their IRC capabilities with opinion, and indirectly affect domestic and Processes” other, more traditional capabilities international support of the adversary. earlier in the targeting process. All too Nonlethal effects provide the joint force

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Berwanger 113 Using Dazzler nonlethal weapon and blank rounds, Embarked Security Team on board USNS Rainier, along with Sailors on board Coastal Riverine Squadron Three’s Riverine Command Boats, defend from simulated attack as Rainer departs to support ships for RIMPAC 2016, Joint Base Pearl Harbor- Hickam, Hawaii, July 24, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Martin Wright) often, the IRC and traditional targeting earlier in the targeting cycle and consider •• Joint fires: Fires delivered during the working groups are held separately and all capabilities as possible “fires” provid- employment of forces from two or only joined or integrated at the decision ers. Only after all capabilities have been more components in coordinated board level. Examples of these separate considered should a force allocation rec- action to produce desired effects in working groups include the information ommendation be made to the joint force support of a common objective. See operations working group, which is often commander. also fires.9 separate from the joint targeting work- Arguably, the issue resides in the •• Scheme of fires: The detailed, ing group. In many instances, planners fires culture and what has traditionally logical sequence of targets and fire come to these working groups having been considered fires. Furthermore, ac- support events to find and engage already identified the capability to use cording to JP 3-09, “Joint targeting is targets to support the commander’s against a proposed target and the desired a fundamental task of the fires function objectives.10 effect. The remaining tasks are to receive that encompasses many disciplines and •• Joint fires observer: A trained Ser- commander approval and synchronize requires participation from all joint force vicemember who can request, adjust, the effort. While this process works, staff elements and components. The pur- and control surface-to-surface fires, it is inherently flawed and contrary to pose of joint targeting is to integrate and provide targeting information in the genesis behind the targeting cycle. synchronize joint fires into joint opera- support of Type 2 and 3 close air Since warfighters are creatures of habit, tions by utilizing available capabilities to support terminal attack control, and they inherently fall back on what comes create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect perform autonomous terminal guid- naturally. Cyber warriors will naturally on a target.”7 Other key definitions are ance operations.11 look for cyber targets having already provided to fully understand the back- •• Munitions: Munitions are used to decided that a cyber weapon should be ground of the issue: create desired effects on targets. The used­—similar to the way bomber pilots joint force commander may issue Fires: The use of weapon systems or will look for targets that they believe •• guidance on the use or restricted other actions to create specific lethal would best be serviced by a bomber. use of unique weapons or certain or nonlethal effects on a target.8 Instead, all warriors should integrate munitions types (for example, cluster

114 Joint Doctrine / Evolution of Joint Fires JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 munitions or mines) and may pri- oritize the allocation or use of joint operations area–wide systems like the Tomahawk missile or the Army Tactical Missile System for specific purposes.12 •• Munition: A complete device charged with explosives; propellants; pyrotechnics; initiating composition; or chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material for use in opera- tions including demolitions.13 Culturally, the joint force understands what has traditionally been considered fires and how to apply the JTC to tra- ditional fires. At first glance it appears that the definition of fires supports the solution-neutral approach to targeting Barbados servicemember shoots nonlethal rounds with M32 grenade launcher during exercise as discussed. Nevertheless, once the first Tradewinds 2016, at Twickenham Park Gallery Range, , June 24, 2016 (U.S. Marine Corps/ layer of fires is peeled back, the current Justin T. Updegraff) understanding of the joint function is that an effect could be achieved, and to tweet) as munition and something like a rooted in what is traditionally consid- what extent, is necessary. The specifics blog as a weapon system, but this is the ered a weapon and weapon system. As on how the effect is achieved may remain needed change in military thinking and described in doctrine, the joint force “en- protected while still allowing the process doctrine that is required to bring the gages” targets by “employing” weapon to run its course. joint force in line with the Chairman’s systems, which “deliver” munitions. In previous conflicts, it may have been focus and strategy. Munitions are traditionally described by possible to focus mainly on traditional The Joint Concept for Integrated their type (for example, cluster munitions capabilities and targeting while sprinkling Campaigning, which is gaining so much or mines)14 and defined in doctrine as “a on IRCs as an afterthought. However, attention and popularity, agrees that complete device charged with explosives; this is not the world of warfare anymore, the Department of Defense is already propellants; pyrotechnics; etc.”15 This and arguably never was. Adversaries have being outpaced by adversaries who are definition resonates through the tradi- been using information as a weapon currently capable of integrating all of tional thought process on how conflicts for quite some time and their prowess their offensive capabilities. According to are fought, and why many planner-level is only increasing. The increased focus the concept, “adversaries will continue working groups are separated and stove- placed on information-related capabili- to creatively combine conventional and piped. Traditional weapons systems (a ties is evident from the creation of the nonconventional methods to achieve rifle) employ munitions (bullets) to create newest joint function, information; objectives by operating below a thresh- an effect (deceased enemy combatants). U.S. Cyber Command’s activation as a old that would invoke a direct military With this in mind, it should come combatant command; the creation of response from the United States while as no surprise that traditional capabili- a separate Space Force; as well as the retaining the capability to engage in ties work through traditional working focus of “competition short of armed more conventional armed conflict.”16 groups and boards, while nontraditional conflict” found in the Joint Concept for The concept also places a large emphasis IRCs work through their own working Integrated Campaigning (and the subject on integrating and synchronizing joint groups and boards, and the two try to of the forthcoming Joint Doctrine Note, force capabilities and activities. One of deconflict from each other after most “Competition Continuum”). Among the “interrelated elements” compris- of the force allocation decisions have many national defense documents, the ing the central idea behind integrated been made, instead of synchronizing and amount of attention and focus all the campaigning is “Employ the Integrated integrating early—the way the targeting other nontraditional capabilities are cur- Force and Secure Gains.” Under this cycle is designed to function. Admittedly, rently receiving is paramount. The speed element is the required capability to there are other barriers to bringing all of information is only increasing, and the “synchronize joint force and foreign the capabilities together in one room, effects of nontraditional capabilities are partner activities in an integrated cam- namely classification issues. But this issue felt globally. It is difficult for a traditional paign construct.”17 The concept goes is easily overcome; in order to conduct military planner to consider something on to state, “The factors of integrated the targeting process, only the knowledge like a social media post (for instance, a campaign design allow for an informed

JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 Joint Doctrine 115 application of joint force capabilities and strengthen the alignment of the instruments of national power. The Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision factors work in conjunction with exist- (to be signed within 6 months) ing methodologies to assist the joint JP 1-0, Joint Personnel force in achieving U.S. policy aims.”18 JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence Throughout all the strategic-level documents, the same conclusion can be JP 3-(number not yet assigned), Information found—all capabilities need to be inte- JP 3-05, Special Operations grated in order to achieve the optimal JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support desired effects. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations Until the definition, utilization, and JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations cultural understanding of “fires” is up- JP 4-09, Distribution Operations dated to include all offensive capabilities, regardless of the weapon system they JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support originate from, the integration and syn- JP 6-0, Joint Communications System chronization problem will remain. The JTC is designed to provide the optimal solutions, but stovepiping capabilities JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) prevents the process from being fully JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States realized. Instead of trying to achieve JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations consensus on a specific term like kinetic, JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, the joint doctrine development com- Radiological, and Nuclear Environments munity and the joint force should focus on the primary warfighting function that JP 3-28, Defense Support to Civil Authorities is responsible for delivering the effects JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance necessary to achieve the commander’s JP 3-72, Nuclear Operations objectives. Without doing so, the same complications of synchronization and JP 4-0, Joint Logistics integrations will be manifested repeat- JP 4-04, Contingency Basing edly and will continue to be brought up JP 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning during joint exercise after action reports as well as feedback received during joint fires-related publications revisions. The capabilities are extant and efforts are 7 JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support (Washington, by compartmented ideologies. Then joint ongoing to use the JTC the way it was DC: The Joint Staff, December 12, 2014). force commanders will truly know what it 8 designed. The missing piece now is the Ibid. means to “fire for effect.” JFQ 9 Ibid. formalization of the idea that all capabili- 10 Ibid. ties need to be considered. To do this, all 11 JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support (Washing- offensive capabilities should be considered ton, DC: The Joint Staff, November 25, 2014). Notes 12 under the fires function and thereby As described in JP 3-09. 13 JP 3-42, Joint Explosive Ordnance equally considered during the targeting 1 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Disposal (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, process. Similar to a concept developing Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, September 9, 2016). into the next major military acquisition DC: The Joint Staff, March 25, 2013, Incorpo- 14 JP 3-09. rating Change 1, July 12, 2017). 15 JP 3-42. program, the solution cannot already be 2 JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authori- 16 Joint Concept for Integrated Cam- assumed. Incorporating the integration ties (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October and synchronization of all offensive capa- paigning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 29, 2018). March 16, 2018), available at . solution to achieve the desired effects, 5 Ibid., II-17. 17 Ibid. enhancing how fires are understood at the 6 Defense Acquisition Guidebook (Fort 18 Ibid. fundamental level. It will refocus the joint Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition University, warfighting community and open the 2017), available at .

116 Joint Doctrine JFQ 93, 2nd Quarter 2019 call for entries for the 2019 Secretary of Defense and 2019 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions

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