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A STUDY of the UNITED STATES NAVY's MINESWEEPING EFFORTS in the KOREAN WAR by STEPHEN DWIGHT BLANTON, B.A. a THESIS in HISTORY S

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A STUDY of the UNITED STATES NAVY's MINESWEEPING EFFORTS in the KOREAN WAR by STEPHEN DWIGHT BLANTON, B.A. a THESIS in HISTORY S A STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY'S MINESWEEPING EFFORTS IN THE KOREAN WAR by STEPHEN DWIGHT BLANTON, B.A. A THESIS IN HISTORY Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS Approved Accepted August, 1993 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to take this opportunity to thank those people who have helped in the research and writing of this paper. Foremost, I want to thank Dr. James R. Reckner for his patience and aid in guiding my work. I would also like to thank Dr. Donald Walker for looking over the paper to help refine it. The aid, given to me by Dr. Edward J. Marelda, Cathy Lloyd, and everyone else at the Operational Archives of the Naval Historical Center in locating documents, was invaluable. Without the help of these people, this paper would not have been possible. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................... ii LIST OF TABLES ......................................... iv L I S T OF FIGURES . v CHAPTER I . INTRODUCTION ................................... 2 II. POST-WAR TO THE KOREAN WAR .................... 11 III.FORMING OF A NEW STRATEGY ..................... 38 IV. THE SIEGE OF WONSAN AND THE FLOATING MINE THREAT .................. 77 V. AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION ...................... 97 ENDNOTES ............................................... 105 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................... 117 APPENDICES A. UNITS ASSIGNED TO CTG 95.6 MINESWEEPING FORCE DURING THE KOREAN WAR ................... 122 B. SHIP STATISTICS ............................... 125 C. TASK ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE INCHON, WONSAN, AND CHINNAMPO SWEEPS .......... 127 D. AVAILABLE MINESWEEPERS IN THE FAR EAST ........ 129 E. MINES SWEPT ................................... 130 F. UNITED NATIONS SHIPS SUNK AND DAMAGED IN KOREAN WATERS .............................. 132 LIST OF TABLES 1 ESTIMATED INFLUENCE OF OCEANOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN MINE WARFARE. 4 2 COMPARISON OF OCEANOGRAPHIC CONDITION ON COASTS OF KOREA. 2 0 3 COMPARISON OF MINE WARFARE OPERATIONS ON COASTS OF KOREA. 22 4 NUMBER OF FLOATING MINES SIGHTED .................. 95 iv LIST OF FIGURES 1. THE SITUATION DURING THE FIRST YEARS OF THE WAR. 2 2. MODIFIED MOORED SWEEPING GEAR AND MAGNETIC SWEEPING GEAR. 2 6 3. P'OHANG-DONG SWEEP ............................... 27 4. THE MINE SITUATION IN 1950... 33 5 . KUNSAN SWEEP . 3 7 6. WONSAN APPROACHES. 42 7 . WON SAN. 56 8 . CHINNAMPO SWEEP . 59 9. CHINNAMPO APPROACHES ............................. 61 10 . CHINNAMPO. 6 5 11 . HUNGNAM . 6 7 12. EAST COAST COASTAL SWEEP FROM YANGYANG TO SUWON DAN. 7 5 13. EAST COAST COASTAL SWEEP FROM SUWON DAN TO SONGJIN AREA. 7 6 14. MINE SIGHTINGSS AND DESTRUCTION, 1950 ........... 87 15. MINES SIGHTED AND SWEPT, 1950-51 ................ 89 16. MINES SIGHTED AND SWEPT, 1951 ................... 90 17. MINE SIGHTINGS, 1951 ............................ 92 18 . MINE SIGHT INGS , 19 51 . 9 3 v CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The main problems the United States Navy faced when the Korean War began on June 25, 1950, were a lack of equipment, a lack of ships, and a lack of experienced personnel (see Figure 1) . The causes of these problems were military demobilization after World War II and the massive budgetary cutbacks drafted by Congress in the post-war years in an attempt to realize a "peace dividend." The combined effect of demobilization and fiscal constraint upon the navy's efficiency immediately became apparent when the United States entered;the Korean War. Admiral Charles K. Duncan, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) during the war, considered ludicrous the idea that the United States only needed to maintain an amphibious or mine force on one coast to maintain and develop the retained technologies and skills, yet "that is exactly what was done and we paid heavily for it."1 Minesweepers comprised an important facet of the war effort. The reduced minesweeping force became part of the United Nations Blockade and Escort Force. 2 Their job was to clear the assault beaches for amphibious landings and to sweep fire support channels so the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers could get close inshore to bombard the enemy. 3 Throughout the war the bombarding naval forces poured over 70 million pounds of high explosives onto enemy positions causing 1 SEA OF JAPAN YELLOW SEA -)60 f- (I) 4J i!3 Q:' " ~ -3~· Figure 1. THE SITUATION DURING THE FIRST YRARS OF THE WAR source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report J. 2 an estimated 57,000 casualties and a large amount of material damage. 4 It is accepted that "minable waters are considered to be those whose depth does not exceed 10 0 fathoms. " 5 In Korea this posed a tremendous problem for minesweepers as "nowhere in the Yellow Sea is the water more than 60 fathoms in depth, and within 10 miles of the shore it is less than 20 fathoms." 6 This extensive minable area and the prevailing currents around Korea created a virtual nightmare for minesweepers. The currents, which reached speeds of five knots on the west coast, tore up many mines' mooring cables and shifted other moored mines from their original positions. This created irregular minefields, which were more difficult to clear (see Table 1) . Many of the mines laid by the North Koreans and later swept by the United States Navy were of Russian origin. Some of the mines were of 1904 vintage, while the majority were from the inter-war period, laid by fishing sampans and junks. In tandem with these old moored contact mines were new ground influence mines. By mixing the two types the enemy "presented a new menace to the minesweeper. " 7 The ships found it difficult to sweep one type in the presence of another. Fortunately for the navy, the North Koreans were given very few influence mines. "There is no doubt that if the enemy had sown a large number of pressure and pressure 3 T.lBLE 1 E!.'T~TED INYLUKNCE OF OCIUNOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN li.I1iE lURFJ.RE lLI.NE LAY liiG NATUR.a.L DETECTION OF SWEE:PnG 07 lT'l'RITION ll10RED lli.NES MOORED !IJlES ~ ~ )IO<UUI Bottom Will intert~ ChAracter rlth neep~ (topography & gear where ~ok;y composition) and irregul~. Tide Great l&(ldinm ll~dilllll ran Jltditg Range llines can only l&ines are lr!inee ma.y be Can be neptj Where tide r8ll88 be lo.id at low oubject to exposed at at high tide i1 large there tide where variable low tide where but neep~ il greater IUiiiP­ ~ range is large. prensures. range ie large. ~:~ust be at ~- ot ain81 greater depth. boaoh.ing. Tidal ~ Great ~ ~ ~ Currents Will interfere Currents of high Large dip 1n YJ.oater1 'rill be with nnvfeation velocity may drag Btrong cur- carried by cur- and mo.y cause the anchors or rents mAY limit rent1. difficulties in break mooring cnbles. peeping to handline of g1.1ar. alack water. Wind U&dium Small Scali J!!!X!iUII ~ \'fill interfere Will interfere Floating ainee 'lfi th Mvigri.tion with navigation K1l dOW!J w1D4 and m.ay 06U8e and gear h&.nd- at about 2. s~ difficulty in ling. ot wind ~. handling. TABLE 1 CONTINUED JUNE UilliG NATURAL DETECTION OP' S'lfm'DG 07 l&fiCfiOI 07 Jl"l'RITION I&JORED JliNES IIOORXD J!IBS n.oum ym ll'avea Great Great Great QI!!! ~ Rough eeae Will contri- ww liait Rough aeu DetectioD br will stop bute largel;r detection by will aake rlsual n4ar and operations. to draggiDg visual, radar BWoepi.ng .anar~ and breaking and eonar dit!iaul. t O:D rlll be lUdted. o! cables. methode. True iaponible. by rough.-.. !or both ahipa and planes. Trana- llediUJI Ln parency J.!urky water will reduoe rleibility o! m.1.ne s at ahallow depths. Ice Small Medium Uedium Modi WI Will prevent visual Will illter!ere !la,y obscure ciJ:lea. detection of moored with navigation mines by aircraft. & gear handling. Source: CINCPACFLT Interim Evaluation Report 1, volume 6, 1121- 1122. magnetic combination type mines, our countermeasure capability would have been severely taxed." 8 Despite the post-war cutbacks, the United States still maintained the strongest navy in the world. Yet, even with its offensive might its amphibious force was compelled to wait outside Wonsan harbor "while a few minesweepers struggled to clear it. " 9 When the Second World War ended, the U.S. Navy had over 500 minesweepers and about 33,000 men in the Pacific mine force alone. For the Korean War, the entire American mine warfare force totalled two divisions of destroyer minesweepers, two divisions of minesweepers, and 21 smaller ships. Many of these vessels were far from the theater of conflict. Pitifully few ships were available considering that "around the embattled Korean peninsula, shallow, minable waters stretched for 11,000 miles." 10 By mid-October, without endangering any ships larger than the fishing junks and sampans used to lay the mines, "the Communists sank five U.S. and two Korean ships, damaged several more, and rocked the Pentagon" when Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, received Rear Admiral Allen E. Smith's message reporting that the navy had "lost control of the sea."11 The reason America "lost control of the sea" could be seen in the force reductions imposed on the post-war navy by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. The people's desire to demobilize brought on a vicious budget war among the 6 individual branches of the armed services in defense of their future roles. The newly independent air force claimed a strategic bombing ideal that captured the imagination of the country, thus, the navy received a disproportionately small part of an even smaller budget. The Russians, whose interest in mine warfare was deeply imbedded in their traditionally defensive approach to naval problems, capitalized on America's self-imposed mine warfare weakness by taking this opportunity to inflict as much physical damage as possible on the American fleet.
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