Japanese Pan-Asianism and the Philippines from the Late 19Th Century to the End of World War II Brill’S Japanese Studies Library

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Japanese Pan-Asianism and the Philippines from the Late 19th Century to the End of World War II Brill’s Japanese Studies Library

Edited by

Joshua Mostow (Managing Editor) Caroline Rose Kate Wildman Nakai

VOLUME 53

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/bjsl Japanese Pan-Asianism and the Philippines from the Late 19th Century to the End of World War II

Going to the Philippines is Like Coming Home?

By Sven Matthiessen

LEIDEN | BOSTON Cover illustration: Matsui Iwane entering Nanking on 17 December 1937. Source: China Incident Photograph Album Volume 2 (Shina Jihen shashin zenshū. Vol. 2), published in 1938 by Asahi Shimbun. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Matthiessen, Sven, author. Japanese pan-Asianism and the Philippines from the late 19th century to the end of World War II : going to the Philippines is like coming home? / by Sven Matthiessen. pages cm. — (Brill’s Japanese studies library ; volume 53) Includes bibliographical references and index. Summary: “Examines the development of Japanese Pan-Asianism and the perception of the Philippines within this ideology. Due to the archipelago’s previous colonization by Spain and the US, the Philippines was a special case among the Japanese occupied territories during the war. Matthiessen convincingly proves that the widespread pro-Americanism among the Philippine population made it impossible for Japanese administrators to implement a pan-Asianist ideology that centred on a return to Asian values”— Provided by publisher. ISBN 978-90-04-30553-3 (hardback : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-90-04-30572-4 (e-book) 1. Japan—Relations—Philippines. 2. Philippines—Relations—Japan. 3. Japan—Foreign relations— 1868-1912. 4. Japan—Foreign relations—1912–1945. 5. Regionalism—Asia—History. 6. Philippines— Civilization—American influences. I. Title. DS849.P5M38 2016 303.48’252059909041—dc23 2015030449

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This book is printed on acid-free paper. Contents

List of Illustrations vii

1 Introduction 1

2 Diverging Views Melting into One—The Perception of the Philippines in Japanese Pan-Asianist and Nationalist/Imperialist Thought, 1886–1931 16 Conclusion 41

3 Traditionalists vs. Realists—‘Exoteric’ and ‘Esoteric’ Pan-Asianism and the Inclusion of the Philippines in an East Asian Bloc 42 ‘Going to the Philippines is Like Coming Home’: The Perception of the Philippines in “Exoteric” Pan-Asianism 45 The ‘Esoteric’ Stream: Pan-Asianism and Geopolitics 63 Conclusion 75

4 The Occupation of the Philippines 78 The Japanese Military and Its Plans to Administer the Philippines 79 The Perception of the GEACPS within the Japanese Navy at the Outbreak of the Pacific War 80 Plans of the Japanese Army towards Philippine Administration at the Outbreak of the Pacific War 86 The Appointment of the Military Administration 91 The Research Commission on the Philippines 97 Conclusion 107 The Execution of Japanese Occupation Policy in the Philippines 109 Propaganda Measures Taken by the Military Administration 114 Japanese Economic Policy during the Occupation 124 The KALIBAPI-Party 132 The Second Philippine Republic and Reactions to Japanese Claims of “Liberation” 139 Reform of the Education System under the Japanese Occupation 147 Religion, the Spanish Legacy and Treatment of the “Overseas Chinese” during the Japanese Occupation 155 Pan-Asianism and the Soldier in the Field 163 The Kempeitai in the Philippines 174 Conclusion 181 vi contents

5 The Filipino Perspective 184 Filipino Revolutionaries and Japanese Pan-Asianism 184 Filipino Pan-Asianists 188 The Department of Information and Philippine Asianists 199 Filipino Response to Pan-Asianism and the Japanese Rule 210 The Jones Law and first Steps towards Independence 213 The Philippine Commonwealth 216 Conclusion 221

6 Summary and Conclusion 223

Bibliography 229 English Sources 229 Japanese Sources 238 Index 242 List of Illustrations

1 Matsuoka Yōsuke 2 2 Carlos P. Romulo statue UN Avenue 3 3 Portrait of Kuga Katsunan 19 4 Miyazaki Tōten in his early 30s 26 5 Statue of Mariano Ponce in Barangay Bagong Nayon, Baliuag, Bulacan 27 6 Matsui Iwane entering Nanking on 17 December 1937 46 7 President Quezon in November 1942 92 8 Jorge B. Vargas and General Homma 96 9 Tōjō (front) and his cabinet 111 10 Lieutenant General Tanaka Shizuichi 137 11 Officers and men of the Cooper’s Unit, Southern Mindoro Guerrilla Force, Bolo Area, 6th Military District based in San Jose, Mindoro 180

Chapter 1 Introduction

Three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, on 10 December 1941, the Japanese military forces started the invasion of the Philippine main island of Luzon. This day marked the beginning of the Japanese occupation of the Philippine islands, which would last for almost three years. This book analyzes the role of the Philippines in Japanese prewar and wartime planning, discussions among intellectuals and politicians in Japan and the Philippines on the future relations between the two nations, especially regarding the integration of the Philippines in a Japanese-led bloc, and visions of future Philippine independence. Before the war against the US emerged as an issue of geostrategic planning, the archipelago had been home to the largest Japanese community in Southeast Asia since the early 20th century. In the late 1930s, about 25000 Japanese lived in the Philippines, most of them in the Davao community in the southern island of Mindanao where they engaged in the cultivation of abaca (Manila hemp).1 In planning for the war against the US, the Imperial government began to show greater interest in the Philippine islands. The American military bases in the archipelago posed a direct threat to the Japanese main islands and therefore the Philippines was strategically of great importance.2 Another legitimization given for the invasion of the Philippines and, more generally, for Japan’s southward expansion, was the liberation of the peoples of Southeast Asia from Western oppression and their unification in a self-sustaining economic bloc, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GEACPS, Daitōa Kyōeiken). The philosophy underlying the GEACPS was Pan- Asianism (Han Ajiashugi), an ideology that propagated the liberation and unity of all Asian peoples that was also applied to the Philippines. In the eyes of Japanese Pan-Asianists, the creation of the GEACPS functioned as a final step in the process of Asian emancipation from Western hegemony. Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946) introduced the concept to the public on 1 August 1941 when he proclaimed the necessity of a self-sustaining sphere of stability in East Asia.

1 Ken’ichi Gotō, Tensions of Empire. Japan and Southeast Asia in the Colonial and Postcolonial World (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), p. 89. 2 Kageyama Tomoji, Hiripin no zenbō—beikoku kyokutō shinshutsu no kyoten (Tokyo: Aikoku Shinbunsha Shuppanbu, 1941), pp. 15–16.

ILLUSTRATION 1 Matsuoka Yōsuke. Source: Ningen Matsuoka zenbō.

While this sphere should include, amongst other areas, the Philippine islands,3 the archipelago differed in many ways from other countries of the region by the time of the Japanese invasion and was not an obvious choice for an inclusion into an ‘Oriental bloc.’ The country’s history as a Spanish colony from the mid-16th century until 1898 and as an American dominion since 1898 had produced a society subject to Ibero-American influences different from the British, Dutch and French colonial experiences of other Southeast Asian countries. As part of the Spanish legacy, the great majority of the populace was Catholic, and most Filipinos respected the Americans as teachers rather than considering them occupiers. After the war, nationalist historiographers such as Renato Constantino (1919–1999) harshly criticized the positive attitude of the Filipino majority towards the Americans. Constantino highlighted the American use of education as their key to winning the “hearts and minds” of the Filipinos:

The education of the Filipino under American sovereignty was an instrument of colonial policy. The Filipino has to be educated a good colonial.

3 Eizawa Kōji, Daitōa Kyōeiken no shisō (Tokyo: Kōdansha Gendai Shinsho, 1995), p. 14. Introduction 3

ILLUSTRATION 2 Carlos P. Romulo statue UN Avenue. Source: Photo by Ramon F. Velasquez.

Young minds had to be shaped to conform to American ideas. Indigenous Filipino ideals were slowly eroded in order to remove the last vestiges of resistance. Education served to attract the people to the new masters and at the same time to dilute their nationalism which had just succeeded in overthrowing a foreign power. The introduction of the American educational system was a means of defeating a triumphant nationalism.4

Constantino emphasized that the Filipinos were not allowed to take charge of the Ministry of Education until the inauguration of the “Philippine Commonwealth” in 1935. According to Constantino, those Filipinos who finally did take charge of domestic affairs from 1935 onwards were ‘a new generation of Filipino-American’ who were ‘thinking and acting like little Americans.’ Despite the positive effects of this American-imposed education, like alphabetization, the Philippines was still the ‘handmaiden of their colonial policy.’5 Carlos P.

4 Renato Constantino, “The Miseducation of the Filipino,” in The Filipinos in the Philippines and Other Essays, ed. Renato Constantino (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1966), pp. 39–65. 5 Ibid. 4 Chapter 1

Romulo (1899–1985) was a long-time Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the postwar Philippines and was from 1949 to 1950 the first Asian to serve as President of the United Nations General Assembly. During the war, Romulo was in the United States as Resident Commissioner in the American House of Representatives. Unlike Constantino, Romulo took a completely pro-American stance:

The Filipino is the product of three influences: the basic Malayan, the Spanish, and the American. Unlike Japan, which kept itself isolated until Admiral Perry opened its doors, the Philippines kept open house to the world. The Filipino is the cosmopolite of the Orient, and the Japanese is an alien to him as to the American or to the Spaniard. The Filipino would not be a worthy pupil of Americanism if he did not know that his independence and self-respect spring from what he learned from America. This explains why out of all conquered countries the Philippines alone sprang without question to the aid of its conqueror. Without propaganda or flag-waving it fought—and is still fighting—for America.6

Even though Constantino and Romulo disagree on how to assess the American impact on the Filipino people, they share the notion of a positive attitude of the Philippine population towards the US at the time of the Japanese invasion. Nationalist historians like Constantino and Teodoro Agoncillo, as well as pro- American politicians like Romulo and Japanese historians like Gotō Ken’ichi come to the same conclusion regarding the overall positive attitude of the Filipinos towards American rule in the islands. Therefore, Japan, while seeking to act as a liberator of the Asian continent, found itself confronted with an environment where the people it intended to liberate did not feel suppressed. Contrary to Indonesia and Burma where the Japanese were initially welcomed as liberators from Western oppression, in the Philippines pan-Asianist ideas like ‘Asia for the Asians’ seemed strange to many Filipinos as they saw themselves not so much as Asians but rather as belonging to ‘the West.’ The Japanese thus faced the difficult task of implementing the ideology of Pan-Asianism in arguably the most Western-orientated society of the region.7 Filipinos mostly

6 Carlos P. Romulo, I saw the Fall of the Philippines (Sydney: Harrap, 1943), p. 35. 7 Ken’ichi Gotō, “Cooperation, Submission, and Resistance of Indigenous Elites of Southeast Asia in the Wartime Empire” in The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945, ed. Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 274–301. Introduction 5 ignored Japanese propaganda and the Japanese found themselves confronted with more hostility than in any other country in Southeast Asia.8 The strong and positive relationship between the Philippine population and the Americans made it difficult for the Japanese invaders to win over the Filipinos for their pan-Asian slogan of ‘Asia for the Asians.’ In disseminating the idea of a GEACPS, Japan sought to unify Asia and free the continent from Western oppression. According to Japanese pan-Asianist ideologues, Japan as the most developed country of the region had to take the leadership in this struggle for Asian independence.9 This New Order (shin chitsujo) for East Asia was one of the official Japanese objectives in the war. The geographer Noguchi Hōichirō, who wrote Volume 2 of the “Ethnic Nation Series” (Minzoku sōsho) in 1943, titled “The Nations of the GEACPS” (Daitōa Kyōeiken no kokumin), pointed out that Pan-Asianism was

the obligation of Japan as the leader of the GEACPS and a method of self defense. This must not be the method of capitalist imperialist exploitation and extortion of the various ethnic groups of Asia that Europe and America have employed in the past; rather it is a league devoted to the co-existence and co-prosperity of all the ethnic nations of Greater East Asia.10

The idea of unifying Asia under Japanese leadership had emerged in Japan as early as the beginning of the Meiji period (1868–1912). Pan-Asianist movements called for the unification of the ‘Asian race’ (propagating ‘One Asia’) under Japanese leadership. Due to the obvious differences of culture, language and politics, most advocates of Pan-Asianism (Han Ajiashugi) in Meiji Japan only referred to the unification of the Eastern part of Asia.11 From February 1941, the Supreme Command of the Japanese Imperial Army conducted specific research on how to administer occupied territories. These plans considered the independence of Burma and the Philippines within the

8 Satoshi Nakano, “Appeasement and Coercion,” in The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction, ed. Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo T. José (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), pp. 21–58. 9 See for example Kageyama, Hiripin no zenbō, p. 10 and Nishimura Shinji, Daitōa Kyōeiken (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1942), pp. 275ff. 10 Noguchi Hōichiro, Daitōa Kyōeiken no minzoku, vol.2 of Minzoku sōsho, ed. Maehara Mitsuo, Noguchi Hoichirō, Kobayashi Hajime (Tokyo: Rokumeikan, 1943). 11 Christopher W.A. Szpilman, “The Dream of One Asia: Ōkawa Shūmei and Japanese pan- Asianism,” in The Japanese Empire in East Asia and its Postwar Legacy, ed. Harald Fuess (Munich: Iudicium-Verlag, 1998), pp. 49–63. 6 Chapter 1 framework of the GEACPS.12 This independence meant that Filipinos would run the Philippine government; however, the Philippines would become part of an economic bloc where it was no longer dependent on trade with America but subject to Japanese domination. This domination, the Pan-Asianists justified, represented Japan taking the burden of liberating suppressed East Asian countries.13 However, throughout the actual occupation of the Philippines the Japanese administrators failed to win Filipinos over to the cause of the GEACPS. From the beginning of the occupation, the vast majority of the Philippine population considered the Japanese army an oppressive, rather than a liberating force. The overall positive attitude towards the Americans among the Philippine population, along with the American promise of independence, made it almost an impossible mission for the Japanese Military Administration (JMA) to convince the Filipinos that their country would benefit more by being part of the GEACPS. It also cannot be doubted that the Japanese army repeatedly mis- treated Filipinos and ignored Philippine culture. In this book I will argue that the Philippines on one hand exemplifies the failure of the Pan-Asianist concept of the GEACPS, while on the other hand the archipelago was an exceptional case among the Japanese-occupied territories during World War II due to its Americanized society. In what follows, I will analyze how the Philippines was perceived in Japanese pan-Asianist thought from the late 19th century until the Pacific War and how the Japanese tried to implement the pan-Asianist idea of the GEACPS in a country where the majority of the population identified themselves with the Western hemisphere instead of with the Orient. The study highlights the development and diversification of Japanese Pan-Asianism from the second half of the 19th century until the Pacific War with regard to the role of Southeast Asia and the Philippines. With respect to the occupation period, the main focus will be on an investigation of the actual influence of pan-Asianist ideology on the Military Administration and the so-called Second Philippine Republic that was inaugurated in October of 1943. As we will see, the Japanese Pan-Asianists called for an adaptation of Pan-Asianism to Philippine circumstances. These voices also warned against ignoring the cultural and historical specifics of the archipelago. The most prominent advocate of this faction was arguably Rōyama Masamichi (1895–1980), who was also one of the most prominent figures in the field of political science in Japan both before and after World War II.

12 Arima Manabu, Nihon no rekishi, dai 23 (Teikoku no shōwa) (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2002), pp. 287–88. 13 Kageyama, Hiripin no zenbō, pp. 269–70. Introduction 7

As a leading member of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai (Shōwa Research Association), he was one of the main political advisers to Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945). He also led the Philippine Research Commission in 1943. This study will examine his critical stance towards the integration of Southeast Asia into the GEACPS and his influence on the planning of occupation policy in the Philippines in comparison with fundamentalist Pan-Asianists, who were far more optimistic about the smooth integration of the Philippines into the sphere. This book also looks at reactions among Filipino scholars and politicians to Japanese claims of liberating the islands from the Western colonial yoke. It will introduce Filippino Pan-Asianists like Pio Duran (1900–1961) and Benigno Ramos (1893–1945), who published articles in the Japanese pan-Asianist journal Dai-Ajiashugi (Greater Asianism) and showed a highly positive attitude towards the concept of the GEACPS. In connection with Philippine collaboration during the occupation period, the role of Philippine Asianism is to date a rather unexplored field.

Prominent scholars such as Gotō Ken’ichi and Mark R. Peattie consider the Japanese expansion into the South Seas as an operation solely conducted to satisfy Nippon’s needs for raw materials and human resources. Hence, for such scholars, the pan-Asianist argument of liberating the region was a mere façade and Japanese occupation policies in the region only had incidental side effects on postwar liberation movements in Southeast Asia. In the current state of research, this “façade theory” represents the most prominent viewpoint in studies of the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. There is a vast amount of English language literature on the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. This literature tells the story of the Japanese rule in the islands from a Filipino perspective and describes Pan-Asianism and the establishment of the GEACPS as a means of justification for Japanese imperialism. Arguably, the most prominent Philippine book in this respect is Teodoro A. Agoncillo’s (1912–1985) The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941–1945 (1965). Agoncillo, as a Filipino eyewitness of the Japanese occupation, described in detail the daily life of the Filipinos under Japanese rule and the hardships the population endured. His book is of the utmost importance for the examination of the occupation period; however, he did not refer to any Japanese materials. Agoncillo in this book as well as in his Filipino Nationalism, 1872–1970 (1974) argued the ineffectiveness of Japanese propaganda and administration in winning over the local population. On the contrary, the policies of the Japanese military fuelled resistance, and inspired most guerrillas to fight 8 Chapter 1 for the return of the Americans. A smaller group (namely the Hukbahalap) fought for complete independence. Their common ground was strong opposition to Japanese rule, which fostered the emergence of Filipino nationalism.14 Like Agoncillo’s book, A.V.H. Hartendorp’s (1893–1964) two-volume work, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines (1967), provides a picture of the occupation from a detailed eyewitness account of personal experiences during Japanese rule in the Philippines. Hartendorp, who was a confidant of president Manuel Quezon (1878–1944) before the war, was interned at Santo Tomas Camp for most of the occupation. He provided a very subjective narrative of events, since he wrote the larger part of the book during his internment in the form of a diary (this represents a significant difference between his and Agoncillo’s book). Hartendorp himself admitted that his work was anything but impartial, and more an account of daily life in the internment camp than one of Japanese rule in the Philippines. Therefore, his extensive work is highly informative regarding the treatment of POWs and foreign nationals by the Japanese during occupation, but contains only limited information on the implementation of Pan-Asianism in Philippine politics and society. Probably the most profound book covering a wide range of topics related to the occupation whilst making use of Japanese materials is The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction, edited by Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo T. José (1999). This publication contains contributions from the editors as well as from various Japanese scholars. The volume provides insights into the Japanese administration of the archipelago in different regions, Japanese attempts to win over the Filipinos, resistance, collaboration and religious matters. Overall, the contributors conclude that all Japanese efforts to include the Philippines into the GEACPS failed due to a lack of planning and infrastructure and that occupation eventually delayed Philippine national development. Military interests clearly shaped the Japanese administration of the islands, thus making it impossible to win the Philippine population over to the idea of a ‘New Philippines’ within a ‘New Order’ for Southeast Asia. All ideological approaches simply had to take a back seat to the sheer war needs of the Imperial Army. According to Nakano Satoshi, Tokyo even gave up its official agenda of creating a ‘New Philippines’ and instead pursued a course of ‘appeasement and coercion’ in order to convince Filipinos not to resist Japanese rule.15

14 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, Filipino Nationalism, 1872–1970 (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1974), p. 35. 15 Satoshi Nakano, “Appeasement and Coercion,” in The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction, ed. Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo T. José (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), p. 58. Introduction 9

This meant nothing less than abandoning the ideal of the GEACPS and acting simply as a colonial overlord. Filipinos needed no longer to be convinced of the idea of the GEACPS, but instead were given the chance to maintain their living standard by not resisting Japanese rule. Overall, the contributors to this volume did not believe that the Japanese occupation strengthened Philippine independence movements; on the contrary, it made the islands even more dependent on the United States than it had been before the war. For Ikehata Setsuho, Japanese atrocities and cruelties during the occupation tightened the bond between Filipinos and Americans and made the population long for the return of their former rulers. Hence, the historical view that the Japanese occupation contributed to the future liberation of Southeast Asia would not hold true for the Philippines.16 Angelito L. Santos, too, in Under Japanese Rule (1992), edited by Renato Constantino, concludes that the Japanese occupation was overall a setback for Filipino culture and history. According to Santos, Japanese occupation policy solely followed war interests and was by no means designed to benefit Filipinos as the advocates of the GEACPS had promised. It only brought some ‘incidental and mixed blessings,’ such as the revival of traditional Filipino culture in the area of Manila.17 Even though this ‘façade theory’ is the most prominent in the literature on the Japanese southward expansion, there are also other views. Two kinds of ‘Liberation Theories’ can be found in the literature on the Japanese southward expansion: the first claims that no other nation contributed more to the liberation of Asia than Japan, but that its militarists sabotaged the good intentions of the government. The army’s primary policy of securing resources thus made the liberated nations look like Japanese dominions. As naive as this might sound, even within the US State Department there were voices who, although probably not believing in the sincerity of Japanese pan- Asianist ideals, did not blame the entire Japanese political elite for the expansion of the Empire. Following this point of view, the militarists who had taken over power in Japan in 1941 held responsibility for Japan’s failed administrative policy in the occupied territories. The historian Hugh Borton (1902–1995), who worked for the State Department as an advisor, claimed that the imperialists had manipulated and betrayed the emperor and the emperor system.

16 Setsuho Ikehata, “The Japanese Occupation Period in Philippine History,” in The Philippines under Japan, pp. 19–20. 17 Angelito L. Santos, “Gleanings from a Cruel War,” in Under Japanese Rule. Memories and Reflections, ed. Renato Constantino (Quezon City: Foundation for Nationalist Studies, Inc., 1992), pp. 5–63. 10 Chapter 1

Thus, the emperor was not responsible for militaristic aggression. Borton even considered Konoe Fumimaro, who had largely sympathised with pan-Asianist ideas while being Prime Minister, a potential postwar leader of Japan.18 The second kind of ‘Liberation Theory’ states that the West had to change its attitude toward Asian peoples after the war because Japan made its Asian neighbours conscious of their common Asian heritage. Discrimination against the ‘yellow race’ in the US and Britain legitimized Japanese imperialism in the eyes of many Asians, so after the war, the West was forced to treat the Asians as equals in order to limit the conditions that had made early Japanese suc- cesses possible.19 Indeed, there was a change of attitude. When the United States started re-conquering its former colonies, it was eager to avoid the impression of re-invading them. Thus, in 1944 it changed the name of the “Committee on Colonial Problems” (established in 1943) to the “Committee on Colonial and Trusteeship Problems.” A return to the old status quo was no longer possible.20 The landslide victories of the Japanese army at the beginning of the war had a ‘strong and immediate psychological effect on colonial peoples in Asia’ and destroyed the image of invincibility of the Great Western Powers.21 As Eri Hotta puts it, the Japanese occupation period evoked awareness among the native populations of belonging to Asia, even though ‘not in the manner that Japan’s cultural policies and training programs had originally intended.’22 A third theory can be found in the writings of Robert S. Ward, Akira Iriye and Hatano Sumio. This theory claims that from 1943 onwards, a positive outcome for Japan had become more and more questionable. Therefore, it was Tokyo’s tactic to project the political struggle in Asia beyond the issue of the war. By granting independence to former Western colonies such as Burma and the Philippines, Japan could play the role of a martyr as it took the burden of leading the Asian peoples in their struggle for emancipation from Western domination at the cost of waging a hopeless war.23

18 Akira Iriye, The Japanese–American War, 1941–1945 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 151. 19 Gerald Horne, Race War: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on the British Empire (New York: New York University Press, 2004), p. 415. 20 Iriye, The Japanese–American War, p. 188. 21 Mark Philip Bradley, “Decolonization, the Global South and the Cold War, 1919–1962,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Volume One: Origins, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 464–85. 22 Eri Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War 1931–1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 219. 23 Hatano Sumio, Taiheiyō sensō to Ajia gaikō (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1996), p. 209. See also Iriye, The Japanese – American War, p. 164. Introduction 11

Thus, there are four main approaches to the interpretation of Japanese motives for the southward expansion and its occupation policy:

1. Japan fought the war solely out of imperialistic motives and the creation of a GEACPS was merely a façade. Japanese occupation policy followed the military needs for the war and was not underpinned by any valid ideological agenda. 2. The Japanese army that always opposed southward expansion never embraced the idea of the GEACPS, thus refusing to implement an occupation policy according to pan-Asianist ideals in the occupied territories. 3. Japan did indeed fight the war for the liberation of Southeast Asia, but the army failed to implement a proper administrative policy in the occupied territories. The militarists were not willing, or were not able, to put the ideals of Pan-Asianism into action. Japan nevertheless contributed largely to the strengthening and emergence of independence movements in the regions it had occupied during the war. 4. Tokyo soon realized that it was heading towards defeat and was more eager to prepare the Japanese case for the postwar era than creating either a sphere of influence, or a Co-Prosperity Sphere that would embody an Asian bloc as a counterpart to the West. Hence, from 1943 onwards, Japanese occupation policy did not follow any pan-Asianist or imperialistic motives. It was merely a strategy for the future survival of the Japanese Empire as a defeated state.

Eri Hotta summarizes the Japanese efforts in the occupied territories in the following way:

While devising policies based on their imperative to win the war, as well as on their often misguided presuppositions about the people they ruled, Japanese rulers rigorously sought to incorporate the population into the life of their empire. As unwanted as this attention was, the Japanese policies ended up introducing the population of Southeast Asia to a new modus vivendi outside the past colonial context: their world now belonged to Southeast Asian, Asian, and indeed international contexts.24

24 Hotta, Pan-Asianism and Japan’s War, p. 219. 12 Chapter 1

In this book, I will show that indeed the Japanese rulers in the Philippines failed to understand the Filipinos while at the same time taking great efforts to win them over for the concept of the GEACPS. However, challenging Hotta’s conclusion, I will also argue that the Japanese occupation did not instigate any change of attitude among the Filipinos towards their place in the world. It was rather the Philippines’ degree of Westernization/ Americanization that prevented Japanese Pan-Asianism from establishing roots in the archipelago. Therefore, the Wilsonian approach towards governing the Philippines had created an environment in which it became impossible to implement an ideology promoting the concept of the GEACPS. Another purpose of this book is to demonstrate the development of Japanese Pan-Asianism from the late 19th century to the Pacific War. I will highlight the role the Philippines played in Japanese pan-Asianist thought before the war, and what role Japanese Pan-Asianists envisioned for the archipelago within the GEACPS. In this context, it will be important to look at how Pan-Asianism influenced the Military Administration and the administration of the Second Philippine Republic. With regard to the Philippine side, Philippine Asianism and its impact on Philippine society will be analyzed. Another aspect will be how Philippine Asianism interacted with its Japanese counterpart and if this Philippine Pan-Asianism was not in the first place a means to achieve national independence. Due to the focus on development and application of Japanese Pan-Asianism the main materials used in this study are primary sources from Japan, including books and journal articles written by Japanese Pan-Asianists. To highlight the varying perceptions of Southeast Asia in Japanese pan-Asianist thought, the journal Dai-Ajiashugi (Greater Asianism) published by the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai (Greater Asia Society), and publications by the political scientist Rōyama Masamichi, will play a crucial role. Regarding the occupation period, amongst other sources, original documents such as the Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration will be examined. Another subject of investigation is military sources like the Nanpō sakusen ni okeru senryōchi gyōsei tochi yoko-an [Proposals for the Governance of Occupied Territories in the Southern Area of Operations], compiled by the Fourteenth Army Headquarters. In addition, the study is based on various materials from the ‘Garcia Collection’, a comprehensive collection of Japanese and Filipino sources on the occupation period held at the library of Sophia University in Tokyo. Through examination and comparison of Japanese, Philippine and Western materials, the book will provide an analysis of the perception of the Philippines in Japanese pan-Asianist thought and the impact of Pan-Asianism on Japanese occupation policy in the archipelago. Introduction 13

The structure of this book is as follows: subsequent to this first introduc- tory chapter, chapter two, entitled “Diverging Views—the Perception of the Philippines in Japanese pan-Asianist and Imperialist Thought, 1886–1931,” examines the development of Pan-Asianism in Japan from the early Meiji era until the Second Sino-Japanese War. The chapter shows how the perception of Southeast Asia in this ideology changed over the years. Whereas Japanese imperialists during the early Meiji period (1868–1912) already considered the Philippines a possible lebensraum for Japanese settlers, their contemporary pan-Asianist counterparts envisioned the establishment of an East Asian bloc consisting of Japan, China and Korea. This chapter highlights the development of Japanese Pan-Asianism from an idea based on solidarity with China to an ideology that justified Japanese expansionism. Furthermore, it stresses the differences of Pan-Asianism and nationalism regarding Japanese foreign policy and explains how these two ideologies became one between the Russo- Japanese War (1904–1905) and the Manchurian Incident (1931). The third chapter “Traditionalists vs. Realists—‘Exoteric’ and ‘Esoteric’ Pan- Asianism and the Inclusion of the Philippines in an East Asian Bloc” traces the varying positions towards the integration of the South Seas into a ‘Greater East Asian Body’ within the pan-Asianist community from the early 1930s until the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. The differences between these two factions mainly highlight the examples of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai (Greater Asia Society) and one of the leading figures within the Shōwa Kenkyūkai (Shōwa Research Association), Rōyama Masamichi. Both organizations functioned as a brain trust for the Japanese government, but whilst the former was very positive towards the possibility of convincing the people of Southeast Asia of the idea of a Japan-led Greater Asia, Rōyama emphasized the cultural differences between Japan and this region as well as the difficulties that these differences would bring about. The fourth chapter on the planning and execution of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines answers the question as to whether there was a concrete design for the administration of the islands following pan-Asianist ideals, and how far the military followed this governmental outline. As early as 1936, the Japanese Navy Headquarters included southern areas in its general principles of national policy. The Headquarters considered Japanese expansion into that region beneficial for the native people’s welfare as it would foster co-existence and co-prosperity in that area.25 In 1939, the Navy National Policy

25 Joyce C. Lebra, “Army and Navy Position Papers,” trans. Joyce C. Lebra, in Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II. Selected Readings and Documents (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press), 1975, p. 60. 14 Chapter 1

Research Committee emphasised again the importance of the Southern areas and listed future points of consideration. Besides strengthening economic ties with the region and minimizing Western influence in the South Seas, Japan should take ‘an appropriate attitude out of good will for Philippine independence.’ The committee also referred to the necessity of introducing Japan to its southern neighbours and strongly advocated cultural exchange. Even though the committee was not explicitly calling for the invasion and occupation of the Philippines and other southern regions, it strongly recommended the strengthening of political, cultural and diplomatic ties with the area. The goals envisaged by the committee were identical to those of contemporary pan-Asianist theorists and the architects of the GEACPS. Therefore, it can be concluded that the Japanese government did not develop the plan for the occupation of the Philippines immediately before the actual invasion. The examination of the report of the Research Commission in the Philippines from 1943 demon- strates how Japanese scholars such as Rōyama Masamichi assessed the impact of the American administration on the archipelago and suggested that Japan should deal with Philippine circumstances when building a ‘New Philippines’. This chapter shows that the Japanese government’s occupation plan for the Philippines was not limited to military campaign but included the realization of a pan-Asianist policy in the islands. This meant announcing an independent Philippines while also restructuring the Philippine state so that it would fit into the framework of the GEACPS. The second section of the chapter focuses on how the Japanese ruled the Philippines. It contextualizes the broad political developments from 1941 to 1944 with the plans of the military and the government discussed in the preceding chapter. The most important political achievement during Japanese rule was arguably the inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic on 14 October 1943. This chapter traces Japanese efforts to govern the islands through the old Filipino elites and the envisioned administrative and educational reforms that were believed would foster the ‘re-Orientalisation’ of the islands. Furthermore, the chapter highlights how the Japanese ran the Philippines, focusing on interactions between Japanese and Filipinos. Filipino authors of the postwar era strongly emphasized the brutality of the Japanese occupation forces and described the massive suffering of the Philippine population during the years of occupation. Indeed, the constant humiliation of the Filipino people by the Japanese military made it impossible for the new government of the Second Philippine Republic to convince the population of the idea of a ‘New Philippines’ within the GEACPS. The fifth chapter deals with Philippine Pan-Asianism in connection with the US American rule and the impact of Pan-Asianism on Philippine resistance Introduction 15 movements. Its focus lies on revolutionaries, such as Artemio Ricarte (1866– 1945) who fought alongside the Americans against the Spaniards but then became a leader of the Philippine uprising against the new American rulers. Ricarte was exiled first to Shanghai and then to Japan, where he found assistance by the famous Pan-Asianist Gotō Shimpei (1857–1929). Ricarte advocated the ‘formation of an Oriental Union’ and was a crucial figure among Filipino nationalists. Another strong proponent of Pan-Asianism and a Philippine re-orientation towards Oriental tradition and values was the lawyer Pio Duran (1900–1961), who supported the idea of a Monroe Doctrine for Asia with Japan taking the lead role in maintaining peace in the region. On the other hand, parts of the Philippine intelligentsia took an active part in intellectual exchange programmes with Japan in the 1930s. Since the US had scheduled Philippine independence for 1946, many Philippine intellectuals bemoaned the Westernization of their country and called for a return to its Oriental roots, and therefore considered Japan as a role model and teacher. However, by the time the Japanese invaded the Philippines, they were confronted with a very hostile environment due to the strong ties between the Filipinos and their former American overlords. This made it extremely difficult for Japan to establish a popular base on which the new, ‘Orientalised’ Philippines could be built. However, within the population the Ganap-Party led by Benigno Ramos did gain some influence. This party was extremely anti-American and supported Japanese rule. Many of its members joined the Yoin or ‘United Japan’ movement, which carried out various duties for the new rulers, and in 1944, many became so called MAKAPILIs (a group that gave military aid to Japan). On the other hand, various guerrilla movements emerged to cooperate with the USAFFE (US Army Forces Far East). This chapter points out the lack of a popular base for Pan-Asianism in the Philippines despite the existence of pan- Asianist and pro-Japanese organizations in the archipelago. The final chapter summarizes the results in the form of a short conclusion. Chapter 2 Diverging Views Melting into One—The Perception of the Philippines in Japanese Pan-Asianist and Nationalist/Imperialist Thought, 1886–1931

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the development of Japanese Pan- Asianism from the concept of a Sino-centric bloc to the GEACPS, along with the perception of the Philippines in both pan-Asianist and imperialist thought, from the Meiji era (1868–1912) to the Manchurian Incident (1931). It was during this time that Japan emerged from being a developing country to become the strongest economic and military power in the Far East. Yano Tōru in his standard work Nanshin no keifu (The Genealogy of Proceeding South) that was first published in 1975 describes three phases of Japan’s concern with Southeast Asia. The first phase was ‘a period of a very primitive economic system charac- terized by the mean mischief of the Japanese approach’ at the beginning of the Meiji era when mostly Japanese prostitutes came to Southeast Asia and Japan benefited from this economic system. In the second phase, starting during the first decade of the 20th century and peaking at the beginning of the Taishō era around 1912, Japan began to take interest in the trade with rubber and Manila hemp. At that time the prostitutes were replaced by businesspersons, when all over the Dutch East Indies Japanese shops (Indonesian: Toke Jepang) opened and trade with the South Seas intensified. Yano calls the ‘Southward Doctrine’ (Nanshin-ron) of the Taishō era ‘pragmatic = utilitarian.’ The third phase of Japan’s relations with Southeast Asia, which eventually led to the concept of the GEACPS in 1941, began, according to Yano, in 1931, when southward advance became the national policy of Japan at the ‘Five Ministers Meeting’ on 4 August. The Japanese objectives in Southeast Asia were clearly defined at that meeting: Japan’s aim was to foster ethnic and economic development in the South Seas and thereby extend its own influence. At the same time, provocation of other countries should be avoided.1 The ‘Objectives of the Empire’s Diplomacy’, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the same 4 August, stated that southward advance was “an important aspect for world trade” and that the region was ‘indispensable for the empire’s agriculture and national defense.’2 The Philippines, the Dutch Indies and Java were explicitly included

1 Yano Tōru, Nanshin no keifu (Tokyo: Chūo Koronsha, 2009), p. 108. 2 Quoted in ibid., p. 108.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��6 | doi ��.��63/9789004305724_003 Diverging Views Melting Into One 17 in this region.3 The question is now as to whether Nanshin-ron was merely a symptom of Japanese imperialism or also connected to pan-Asianist thought. There is no precise definition of Japanese Pan-Asianism. As will be shown in the following chapters, Pan-Asianism underwent changes and there were various forms of Pan-Asianism in Japan. Even the term ‘Asia’ itself was introduced into East Asia rather late. In the course of the increasing Western presence in the region in the mid-19th century, the term emerged in intellectual discourse in Japan and China to define a common cultural sphere opposed to the intrud- ing West. The various groups and associations that spread in Japan at that time to promote Pan-Asianism had, despite their differences, the common goal of overcoming the nation-state and unifying Asia.4 These key points remained unchanged throughout the history of pan-Asianist thought until the end of the Pacific War. Kimitada Miwa attributes two origins to Japanese Pan-Asianism. One was a ‘sense of a shared destiny’ amongst Asiatic peoples in the face of Western encroachment, and the other was ‘the awakening of Japanese nationalism as such in the minds of the Japanese’ when Japan had to respond to the threat imposed by the Western powers, doing so by adopting Western-style politics. Following Kimitada, “this type of Pan-Asianism presented itself in history as an expansive overseas version of Japan’s modern nationalism.”5 Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Meiji Restoration that marked the birth of modern Japan in 1868, pan-Asianist and imperialist views differed remarkably. The perception of the Philippines is one good example of the diverging views of imperialists and Pan-Asianists in Meiji Japan and the gradual melting together of these two ideologies into a ‘nationalistic Pan-Asianism that served as window dressing for Japan’s military aggression.’6 The distinction between Japanese nationalists and imperialists is not easy as many nationalists considered colonisation a legitimate tool to maintain Japanese security. Following the definition of the Oxford Dictionaries, imperialism is ‘a policy of extending a country’s power

3 Ibid., p. 108. 4 Sven Saaler & Christopher W.A. Szpilman, ‘Introduction,’ in Pan-Asianism. A Documentary History, vol. 1, ed. Sven Saaler & Christopher W.A. Szpilman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), pp. 1–41. 5 Miwa Kimitada, Japanese Policies and Concepts for a Regional Order in Asia, 1938–1940, Series A-46 of Research Papers, ed. Institute of International Relations for Advanced Studies on Peace and Development in Asia (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1983). 6 Christopher W.A. Sziplman, ‘Between Pan-Asianism and Nationalism. Mitsukawa Kametarō and his campaign to reform Japan and liberate Asia,’ in Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, ed. Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 85–99. 18 Chapter 2 and influence through colonisation, use of military force, or other means.’7 In this sense, the Japanese nationalists who aimed to extend Japanese influence in Southeast Asia by colonisation (even though by peaceful means) can also be labelled imperialists. Japanese nationalists took a keen interest in the South Seas (Nan’yō)8 and thus by connection the Philippines. By the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, they considered southward expansion as the only possible response to the threat that the Western powers had imposed upon Japan. To the journalist, political scientist and politician Fukumoto Nichinan (1857–1921), colonisation of the Philippines was a measure to secure Japan’s independence by avoid- ing contact with the Great Powers. Fukumoto came to the Philippines in 1889, together with the author of the book Dai Nihon shōgyōshi (The History of Commerce of Greater Japan), Suganuma Teifu (1865–1889). Only a few months prior to their arrival in the Philippines, the Japanese consulate had opened in November 1888. By 1889 there were only four Japanese residing in Manila: the Consul Yatabe Umekichi (1857–1903), one Japanese clerk, Suganuma and Fukumoto. Suganuma died after three months in the Philippines and according to Yano Tōru, during the war the theory was constructed that Suganuma was the first Japanese to establish himself in the Philippines:

Regarding Suganuma’s case, through writings that went beyond explain- ing the Southward Doctrine the wrong impression became established that he was somehow or other the supreme commander of the Japanese proceeding south as his grave was at the foreigner’s cemetery in the Manila suburb of San Pedro de Macati (until Shōwa 13).9

In fact, the first Japanese immigrant to the Philippines was presumably Tagawa Miritarō from Kyushu. He was the son of a ship builder from Nagasaki and deserted from a Dutch ship in the harbour of Iloilo on Panay Island in central Philippines in 1882.10 Fukumoto Nichinan wrote about the activities of

7 Oxford Dictionaries, Definition of Imperialism in English, assessed February 11, 2014, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/imperialism. 8 In my definition of “ ‘South Seas’ or ‘Nan’yō’ ” I follow the general application of the term that became popular in Japan during the 1930s, confined to the South Pacific, the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. A narrower definition of the term refers only to the islands of Micronesia. See Mark R. Peattie, “ ‘The Nan’yō: Japan in the South Pacific, 1885–1945,’ ” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 172–210. 9 Yano, Nanshin no keifu, p. 21. 10 Ibid., pp. 21–22. Diverging Views Melting Into One 19

ILLUSTRATION 3 Portrait of Kuga Katsunan. Source: Katsunan bunroku.

Suganuma in the Philippines and it is more than likely that he contributed to his mystification. Fukumoto and the nationalist Kuga Katsunan (1857–1907) co-founded the nationalist newspaper Nihon (Japan) in 1889, which was critical towards the policy of the Meiji administration and warned of an ongoing Westernization of Japan. In the context of the decline of the Spanish Empire, Fukumoto considered it likely that another Western power would take the Spaniards’ place, and that this would ultimately threaten Japan.11 Fukumoto did not advocate a military invasion of the archipelago but argued for taking over the islands by way of Japanese settlements and trade. In 1889 he published his book Firipin guntō ni okeru Nihonjin (The Japanese in the Philippine Archipelago), providing an account of the Philippines as a Spanish colony and describing perspectives for a Japanese colonisation of the islands. Even though Fukumoto showed great respect for former Bakufu leaders such as Harada Nobutane (1560–1598), Date

11 Setsuho Ikehata, “ ‘Japan and the Philippines, 1885–1905. Mutual Images and Interests,’ ” in Philippines-Japan Relations, ed. Ikehata Setsuho and Lydia N. Yu-José (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003), pp. 19–46. 20 Chapter 2

Masamune (1567–1636) and Matsukara Shigemasa (1574–1630) who pursued an expansionist policy by the sword, and in the case of Matsukara even planned a military invasion of Luzon, he advocated rapprochement by peaceful means:

After a long period of three centuries in which the friendly relations with this archipelago had ceased indeed, in the year of 1888, respectively Meiji 21, our Japanese government restored the old friendship. It placed a consul in Manila, Luzon, eagerly encourages trade from now on and thus there is a chance that we will see a climax in the relationship between the two countries that will someday go beyond the situation as it was three centuries ago. In general, the people who carry the hopes of today’s Japanese people criticize ancient men as Harada, Date and Matsukara for choosing invasion; nevertheless, with steadfastness and bravery these men went to territories unknown, with their eyes they saw the great strength of Spain that triumphantly went for its cause. I from now on put above all faith in the promising youth of the present Japanese for peaceful and by no means fearful Haradas, Dates and Matsukaras to emerge one by one.12

In 1891, two years after Fukumoto, Hattori Tōru (?–1908) published his book Nan’yō saku (South Seas Policy). Hattori undertook excursions to the South Seas where he collected plants and studied the vegetation. In 1908, as a journalist for the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun, he once more went on a trip to the Nan’yō but died on board his boat during the passage from Hong Kong to Java. Hattori, along with Shiga Shigetaka (1862–1927), was one of the first ‘embedded’ nationalist writers to take part in the naval training cruises of the Japanese navy during the Meiji era. As a journalist, he functioned as a messenger for the navy in its effort to bring the importance of the South Seas to the consciousness of the Japanese public.13 Like Fukumoto, Hattori argued for close trade relations between the South Seas and Japan. He argued for a strong relationship between the Asian continent and the ‘islands of the South’ because of the Pacific Ocean, which he believed was the reason for the region’s name Oceania.14 Regarding the Philippines, Hattori was almost euphoric about the resources available in the islands and praised the infrastructure, such as the harbours of Manila and Iloilo.15 Hattori saw great potential in various Philippine industries like hemp

12 Fukumoto Nichinan, Firipin guntō ni okeru Nihonjin (Tokyo: Hakubunsha, 1889), pp. 113–14. 13 J. Charles Schencking, ‘ “The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed Consciousness of a South Seas Destiny, 1872–1921,” in Modern Asian Studies 33:4 (1999), pp. 769–96. 14 Hattori Tōru, Nan’yō saku (Tokyo: Muraoka Genma, 1891), p. 10. 15 Ibid., p. 14. Diverging Views Melting Into One 21 and sugar production, as well as in the textile industry, and stressed the ancient ties between Japan and the Philippines as well as the efforts of the Meiji government to enhance the relationship:

By the way, in ancient times 3000 Japanese established a Japanese city in the centre of Luzon, a mountain away from the capital Manila and in the year before last year our government built a consulate in Manila and sent a consul for the first time.16

Fukumoto and Hattori were typical Japanese nationalists/imperialists who took a strong stance towards the expansion of Japanese influence in Southeast Asia. However, they merely advocated closer economic ties with the region and its colonisation, not the establishment of an empire. Throughout the early Meiji period, various organizations emerged which focused on the explora- tion of Southeast Asia. These organizations emphasized a Japanese mission civilisatrice in the underdeveloped Nan’yō. Therein, these organizations cleary showed the trademarks of imperialism. One of them, the Tōhō Kyōkai (Eastern Society), saw it as Japan’s obligation to lead the less developed countries of the region by extending its own influence.17 One of this organization’s most prominent members was Tanaka Suiichirō (1873–1923). He studied in England and Germany from 1905 to 1907 and established the Department of History at Keio University in 1910. He not only taught Western history but also gave lectures in Japanese and Oriental history as well as in political science. During his studies under German exchange professors at the Department of Literature of Keio Gijuku University, Tanaka published one of his most renowned books, Tōhō kinseishi (Modern History of the Far East) in 1902. In his account of the American invasion of the Philippine archipelago, he emphasized the strategic importance of the Philippines for the American advance into the Far East that would turn the United States into the dominant power of the region:

Almost parallel to the insurrection of the Hawaiian Islands, America launched a new invasion in the Philippine archipelago. Whereas Hawaii’s overall territory does not exceed that of our Shikoku, the Philippine Islands, with an overall territory of 296,182 square kilometers is as big as our main island [Honshū], Shikoku and Kyūshū together. Furthermore,

16 Ibid., p. 16. 17 Josefa M. Saniel, Japan and the Philippines, 1868–1898 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1962), p. 77. 22 Chapter 2

because this territory is close to the Asian continent, its invasion means America is becoming the strongest power in the Far East.18

Tanaka wrote of the proximity of the Philippines to the Asian continent, indi- cating that he did not consider the archipelago to be a part of Asia itself. He widely referred to independence movements in the Philippines19 but did not come up with a Japanese mission to help the Filipinos in their struggle for liberation. Fukumoto, Hattori and Tanaka were all concerned about Japan’s own security in connection with the Philippines. Fukumoto and Hattori feared that after the end of the Spanish colonial period in the archipelago another Western power would take control of the islands and thereby threaten Japan. When Tanaka wrote his book, the Philippines was under American rule, and he considered the archipelago to be a stepping-stone for an American advance into the Far East. This fear of the Philippines functioning as a basis for American domination in Southeast Asia also became an important aspect of later pan-Asianist writings in the Taishō era (1912–1926)20 and the Shōwa era (1926–1989).21 Furthermore, Fukumoto, Hattori and Tanaka emphasized the ancient, friendly relationship between Japan and the Philippines, but they did not come up with a particular vision for liberation of the islands from Western domination. Early Meiji Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru’s (1836–1915) vision of establishing a ‘European style empire on the edge of Asia’22 showed the willingness of the Meiji oligarchy to learn from the West, but to later also be able to challenge it. Inoue’s vision represented imperialist thought in Japan at the end of the 19th century. Many nationalists aimed to preserve Japan’s own national integrity through the adoption of Western-style imperialism; thereby becoming Western-style imperialists themselves. Hence, the Meiji oligarchy either

18 Tanaka Suiichirō, Tōhō kinseishi (Tokyo: Tōhōkyōkai, 1902), p. 576. 19 Ibid., pp. 576ff. 20 See for example Kodera Kenkichi, Dai-Ajiashugi-ron (Tokyo: Takara Bunkan, 1916). Kodera’s vision of the Philippine role in Greater Asia will be discussed later in this chapter. 21 In the wake of the Pacific War, the strategic importance of the Philippines was emphasised in literally every publication on the establishment of Greater Asia and the GEACPS. Kageyama Tomoji put the threat the Philippines imposed as an American stronghold even in the title of his book Hiripin no zenbō—Beikoku kyokutō shinshutsu no kyoten (All about the Philippines—the Basis for the American Advance in the Far East) (Tokyo: Aikoku Shinbunsha Shuppanbu, 1941). 22 Marius B. Jansen, “Japanese Imperialism: Late Meiji Perspectives,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 64. Diverging Views Melting Into One 23 ignored or neglected the ‘Asian identity’ of Japan.23 In 1886, Japanese imperialists established the Nanyō Kyōkai (South Seas Society), which developed detailed plans for Japanese settlers to colonise the Philippines. These plans involved Japanese settlers winning over the native chiefs on three islands of the archipelago, then starting to cultivate land and engaging in local industries. Branch offices of the Nanyō Kyōkai were to observe these activities. The first objective of the organization was to find a solution to the problem of a surplus population in Japan.24 Other organizations like the Tōkyō Chigaku Kyōkai (Tokyo Geographic Society), the Tōkyō Keizaigaku Kōykai (Tokyo Society for Economic Science) and the Shokumin Kyōkai (Colonial Society) were also mainly concerned with Japanese economic interests, and the issue of a cultural and racial kinship with the Filipinos did not play any role in their agendas. The establishment of these various organizations coincided with a clash between the Japanese army and navy. While both factions agreed on the necessity of expansionism to secure Japan’s survival as a sovereign state, the army advocated for an advance into the north (Hokushin-ron, ‘Northward Doctrine’) and the navy for southward expansion (Nanshin-ron, ‘Southward Doctrine’). As Lydia N. Yu-José explains, Pan-Asianism later became the ‘ideological counterpart’ of this latter doctrine.25 Advocates of Nanshin-ron considered the South Seas as the future sphere of Japanese interest and were eager to establish cultural, ethnic and historical links with this region. Ikehata Setsuho concluded from her studies of popular magazines advocating Nanshin-ron such as Nihonjin ([The] Japanese), Tōhō Kyōkai hōkoku (Report of the Eastern Society) and Shokumin Kyōkai hōkoku (Report of the Colonial Society) that there had been the ‘assumption that Japan would come to possess the Philippines one day.’26 If, as Professor Yu-José claims, the Pan-Asianism of the late 1930s was the ideological equivalent to the expansionist Southward Doctrine proposed by the Japanese navy, this would mean that it merely functioned as a justification for waging war in Southeast Asia and was merely a disguised form of nationalism. The following chapters of this book will show whether this was the case.

23 Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835–901) in his 1885 first published newspaper article Datsu-A-Ron (“Essay on Leaving Asia”) attributed the colonisation of China and Korea to both countries’ lack of civilization. Only Westernization could bring about civilization and thus spare Japan the fate of its neighbouring countries. 24 Saniel, Japan and the Philippines, pp. 82–83. 25 Lydia N. Yu–José, “World War II and the Japanese in the prewar Philippines,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 27:1 (1996), pp. 74–81. 26 Setsuho Ikehata, “Japan and the Philippines,” pp. 19–46. 24 Chapter 2

Despite the huge interest of the nationalists/imperialists in the South Seas and the Philippines, early Pan-Asianists in Meiji Japan were rather indifferent towards this region. They focused on the commonalities of ‘script and culture’ (dōbun dōshu) within the Sino-centric world system of which Japan had been a part for centuries.27 Parallel to the aforementioned nationalist/imperialist organizations, various Asianists joined to form the first pan-Asianist groups. Early organizations like the Kō-A-Kai (Society for Raising Asia) and the Ajia Kyōkai (Asia Association) put an emphasis on solidarity between Asian countries and refused to interfere in China’s affairs. Later organizations such as the Tōa Dōbunkai (East Asia Common Culture Association), Kokuryūkai (Armur Society) and the Kokumin Dōmeikai (National Alliance Association) advocated the establishment of a cooperative body consisting of Japan, China and Korea under Japan’s leadership.28 Early Pan-Asianism in Japan stood in opposition to the Realpolitik conducted by the ruling Meiji government. Even though members of the Meiji oligarchy sympathized with pan-Asianist ideals, there was a consensus that Japan had to modernize before it could challenge the Great Western Powers. The early Pan-Asianists, in contrast, were convinced that instead of “Leaving Asia” (datsu-A) Japan needed to “Return to Asia” (Ajia kaiki) and become aware of its Oriental roots if it wanted to withstand Western encroachment.29 One of the pioneers of Japanese Pan-Asianism, Okakura Kakuzō or Okakura Tenshin (1862–1913), bemoaned Japan’s departure from Asia and claimed the continent for Japan to be ‘the true source of our inspirations’30 despite everything Japan had learned from the West. However, Okakura’s vision of Asia was confined to Japan, China, Korea and India. Thus, the slogan ‘Asia is one’31 used by Okakura at the very beginning of his 1904 published standard work Ideals of the East and later a trademark of Pan-Asianism, was clearly focused on the unity of the Chinese Confucian hemisphere and the Buddhist, Indian subcontinent. Okakura published his works in English and they were not translated into

27 Sven Saaler, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History. Overcoming the Nation, Creating a Region, Forging an Empire,” in Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, ed. Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 1–18. 28 Morifumi Kuroki, “The Asianism of the Kōa-kai and the Ajia Kyōkai,” in Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, trans. Alistair Swale, ed. Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 34–51. 29 Saaler, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History,” pp. 1–18. 30 Okakura Kakuzō, The Awakening of Japan (London: John Murray, 1905), p. 6. 31 Okakura Kakuzō, Ideals of the East. The Spirit of Japanese Art (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications Inc., 2005), p. 1. Diverging Views Melting Into One 25

Japanese until the 1930s. Hence, he did not find a large readership in Japan with his books on Asianism in the first place. Nevertheless, Japanese militarists later utilized his thoughts to justify Japanese expansionism in the Pacific War. Matsuzawa Tetsunari argues that Okakura’s evaluation of the Meiji Restoration caught the attention of the Japanese imperialists. Three streams of thought of the late Edo period, the resistance against kangaku32 (also challenging the kogaku33 school of Neo-Confucianism), the Wang Yang-ming school34 of Neo- Confucianism and kokugaku,35 had finally joined in one single stream—“the great waterfall of patriotic ardour”. Therefore, the restoration of imperial rule could be achieved.36 Matsuzwa, however, correctly points out that the patriotism described by Okakura was that of the warrior elite:

Speaking of “patriotic ardour”, the historical truth is that at the core of Tenshin’s vision were in quality and quantity the warrior class and not the whole of the nation.37

The impact of Okakaura Tenshin on the development of Japanese Pan- Asianism as a political ideology should not be overestimated. His slogan ‘Asia is one’ and his appraisal of the Meiji Restoration as a patriotic effort earned him posthumous fame among those ideologues who equaled Greater Asia with Greater Japan in the 1930s. Nevertheless, Okakura’s main concern during his lifetime was the arts, not politics. The above-mentioned pan-Asianist groups focused on the unification of the Sino-centric core of Asia. Whereas Okakura’s Pan-Asianism was a rather romantic idea based on solidarity and equality, groups such as the Kokuryūkai clearly emphasized the necessity of Japanese leadership in the creation of a Sino- Japanese bloc. However, one early Pan-Asianist took interest in the Philippine islands and tried to support the independence movement. Miyazaki Tōten (1870–1922) was born in Kumamoto Prefecture and studied at Tokyō Senmon Gakkō (the institution preceding today’s Waseda University).

32 kangaku = Chinese Learning. 33 kogaku = Neo-Confucianist school that aimed to revive the original thought of the Chinese sages Confucius and Mencius. 34 Wang Yang-ming school = Neo-Confucianist school that emphasized the individual and self-knowledge. Therein it opposed the kogaku school. 35 kokugaku = National study. Focus on the Japanese classics instead of the Chinese texts. 36 Matsuzawa Tetsunari, Ajiashugi to fashizumu: tenno teikokuron hihan (Tokyo: Renga shoboshinsha, 1979), p. 26. 37 Ibid., p. 27. 26 Chapter 2

ILLUSTRATION 4 Miyazaki Tōten in his early 30s. Source: Sanjūsan no yume.

In 1897, he became friends with the Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925) and supported Sun’s struggle to topple the Qing government in China. Sun was a friend and supporter of the Philippine revolutionary Mariano Ponce (1863–1918), who visited Japan in 1898, officially representing the First Philippine Republic that was declared after the end of Spanish rule in the same year. During this time, Ponce met Miyazaki, whom literary scientist Yamaguchi Kōsaku (1926–1993) has described as a ‘so-called rōnin in the continent (tairiku rōnin)’ and a “patriot (shishi) who actively supported Sun Yat-sen’s Chinese Revolution.”38 Miyazaki strongly sympathized with the Philippine independence movement and was eager to support Ponce’s cause. In 1899, Miyazaki tried to send arms and ammunition to Philippine independence forces on the ship Nunobiki-Maru but this old yacht sank shortly after its departure.39 In his autobiography My Thirty-Three Years’ Dream (Sanjūsan nen no yume) first published in 1902, Miyazaki recalled his first meeting with Ponce and how he became sympathetic with the Philippine cause. Like his contemporary

38 Yamaguchi Kōsaku, “Miyazaki Tōten no Ajiashugi: tairiku rōnin no ichirui kata,” Momoyama gakuin daigaku kiyō 1:2 (1963), pp. 59–119. 39 Peter B. High, Umeya Shokichi: The Revolutionist as Impressario. http://www.lang.nagoya- u.ac.jp/proj/socho/mirai/mirai-index.html. (Accessed 10 June 2010). Diverging Views Melting Into One 27

ILLUSTRATION 5 Statue of Mariano Ponce in Barangay Bagong Nayon, Baliuag, Bulacan. Source: Photo by Judge floro.

Asianists, Miyazaki was initially concerned with Chinese affairs but soon developed a sense of solidarity for Philippine resistance against the United States. His sense of solidarity developed when Ponce told him how America had betrayed his country. Ponce appealed to Miyazaki as a fellow Asian (‘Oh, my friend from a chivalrous Asian country’)40 and thus succeeded in winning his support:

Although my aspirations centred on China, I also made friends with men from the Philippines while I was in Hong Kong. When I think about it, it seems fickle to me, but I couldn’t help it. [. . .] I was full of sympathy. How could I listen to much of this without trying to help?41

40 Tōten Miyazaki, My Thirty-Three Years’ Dream, trans. Etō Shinkichi and Marius B. Jansen (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 142. 41 Ibid., pp. 141–42. 28 Chapter 2

Miyazaki mentioned how enthusiastic Sun Yat-sen had been in giving aid to the Filipinos and how he shared Sun’s enthusiasm.42 However, the Nunobiki- Maru affair also highlighted the reasons for his failure as a politician. Unlike his pan-Asianist comrades, for example, Uchida Ryōhei, Miyazaki lacked every sense of pragmatism and spent all his money on his efforts regardless of the prospects of success. Christopher W.A. Szpilman summarizes Miyazaki’s character in the following way:

Like a true samurai, he disdained materialism, money, and moneymak- ing. Asianism was a dream in which he tried to find solace from the daunting realities of modern Japanese life.43

According to a pamphlet published in 1998 by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports of the Republic of the Philippines, Ponce received wide support from another Japanese sympathizer, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Justice in the first Japanese party cabinet, Nakamura Yaroku (1854–1929). Nakamura met Ponce in Hong Kong in 1899 on his return from a trip to Siam (now Thailand). Just like Miyazaki, Nakamura feared the ongoing colonisation of the Asian continent by the Western powers and showed great sympathy for the Philippine independence struggle. Nakamura made use of his political influence in Japan to convince the government to sell him five million bullets for Mosel rifles. Nakamura was even willing to take full responsibility for any consequences of this affair, and recruited volunteers for the crew of the Nunobiki-Maru. Even after the sinking of this ship, Nakamura made a second attempt to buy ammunition for Philippine rebels, and indeed purchased another two and a half million bullets from the Japanese army. However, some of the survivors of the Nunobiki-Maru disaster did not keep quiet about the purpose of the cargo, and this led to a diplomatic dispute between Japan and the US, which led to the embargo of the second sale of arms and ammunition. Political friends of Nakamura were able to disguise the affair by convincing the Americans that only useless junk ammunition from the Sino-Japanese War had been onboard the sunken ship. Nevertheless, in the end, Nakamura’s political career suffered due to his support for the Philippine revolutionaries, as his position was not in line with official Japanese government policy at that

42 Ibid., p. 174. 43 Christopher W.A. Szpilman, “Miyazaki Tōten’s Pan-Asianism, 1915–1919,” in Pan-Asianism. A Documentary History, vol. 1, ed. Sven Saaler & Christopher W.A. Szpilman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), pp. 133–39. Diverging Views Melting Into One 29 time.44 Both Miyazaki Tōten and Nakamura Yaroku seemed to have taken an interest in the Philippine struggle for independence rather spontaneously. According to Matsuzawa Tetsunari, Miyazaki considered Asia synonymous with the suppression of countries and peoples. China, but also countries like Siam and the Philippines, were examples of such suppression. By supporting regional activists, Miyazaki aimed to help these countries in their struggle for freedom and independence. His goal was the implementation of ‘cosmopoli- tanism’, a ‘brotherhood of man’ in a world that was ‘one house’.45 Miyazaki was, like his contemporary Pan-Asianists, mainly concerned with the creation of a Sino-centric bloc, and was driven by a strong sense of solidarity with the Chinese Republican revolution. However, the creation of an ‘Asian Union’ had to be only the first step towards the liberation of all humankind.46 Kodera Kenkichi took up this idea some twenty years later, but advocated Japanese hegemony in the region to achieve this purpose (as we will see later in this book). Miyazaki Tōten’s Asianism was closely related to his concept of ‘revolution’. As Matsuzawa Tetsunari puts it, for Miyazaki the individual had to be the initiator of any change in society. However,

the insecurity of life based on private landownership let his ideas of an independent, self-sufficient individual collapse and degrade.47

Only the abandonment of the system of private landownership could ‘liquidate the insecurity of the lives of the people’, turn them into ‘independent, self- supporting good citizens = free and independent subjects’ and create an ‘ideal, autonomous society.’48 Thus, Miyazaki considered revolution a necessity, but following Matzuzawa’s interpretation, despite his emphasis of the individual, revolution to Miyazaki meant solidarity with countries like ‘Siam, China and the Philippines’:

In a word, through truly thorough investigation and recognition of the character of suppression of the individual it was considered possible to

44 National Historical Institute, “The Truth of the Nunobiki-Maru Affair. In Memory of those who devoted their Lives to the Independence of the Philippines,” in The Nunobiki-Maru Affair (Pamphlet), ed. Republic of the Philippines. Department of Education, Culture and Sports (Manila: National Historical Institute, 1998), pp. 3–14. 45 Matsuzawa, Ajiashugi to fashizumu, p. 100. 46 Ibid., p. 101. 47 Ibid., p. 118. 48 Ibid., p. 119. 30 Chapter 2

develop the sentiment for the suppression of others and to sympathize and interact. Miyazaki Tōten did not express these issues systematically and logically—this is his insufficiency—but one could say that they rum- bled within his body and he expressed them instinctively.49

Overall, Miyazaki was a representative of the ‘first generation’ of Japanese Pan- Asianists that lacked the aspiration for Japanese domination of the continent. He aimed neither at Japanese domination of China nor of the Philippines, but saw the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in China and support for Philippine resistance against American colonisation as a first step towards global freedom and justice. In this regard, he differed from many of his fellow Pan-Asianists who also defined China as the starting point for Asian and worldwide liberation but only in connection with Japanese leadership. Even though Miyazaki felt very close to the Kokuryūkai leader Uchida Ryōhei (1873–1937), whom he called a ‘real comrade,’50 he did not share the latter’s expansionist views. His support for the Philippine independence movement was very unusual for Japanese Pan-Asianism around the turn of the century, and the Philippines had not been part of Miyazaki’s Asianism from the beginning. It was representatives of the First Philippine Republic like Ponce and Emilio Aguinaldo (1869– 1964) who had convinced him that the Philippines was a cause worth fighting for. Unlike Uchida, and other so-called tairiku rōnin, Miyazaki’s Asian interests ranked higher than Japanese nationalistic interests did, and he clearly separated his Asianism from the agendas of the Kokuryūkai and the Tōa Dōbunkai.51 Nevertheless, the latter organizations’ Pan-Asianism gained more and more prominence throughout the final years of the Meiji era. Uchida Ryōhei, who founded the Kokuryūkai in 1901, was one of the most prominent and radical activists propagating a Japanese expansionist national policy and Japanese leadership in Asia under the banner of Pan-Asianism. In his Nihon no sandai kyūmu (Japan’s Three Urgent Issues) (1912), Uchida outlined a national policy emphasizing the necessity for Japan to prepare for an ‘international war’ militarily and economically.52 To Uchida, Germany was the most powerful country to emerge in the lead up to World War I and he praised its rapid development and vitality.53 Overall, according to Uchida,

49 Ibid., p. 119. 50 Miyazaki, My Thirty-Three Years’ Dream, p. 178. 51 Cemil Aydin, Anti-Westernism in Asia. Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York: Colombia University Press, 2007), p. 57. 52 Uchida Ryōhei, Nihon no sandai kyūmu (Tokyo: Kokuryūkai honbu, 1912), p. 179. 53 Ibid., p. 186. Diverging Views Melting Into One 31

Japan would need to prepare for a confrontation with the Western Powers in a decisive conflict:

The five Great Powers of England, Russia, Germany, France and America dominate world policy and engage in the Asian continent and the Pacific. How is our Empire to fight each of these powers? We will have to simultaneously prepare militarily and economically, participate in world policy and finally will prevail. What is world policy? It is the lessons learned from our imperial ancestors; namely, a foreseeing, universal plan for the whole world. That is the fundamental national policy of the Empire.54

The ‘foreseeing, universal plan for the whole world’ is a reference to the core principle of Pan-Asianism, hakkō ichiu (the whole world under one roof). This principle also became the leitmotiv for overcoming the old world order and establishing a new one (shin chitsujo). This idea of a New World Order finally led to the concept of the GEACPS.55 In 1914, in his Seihei shigi (Personal View on Government Abuse), Uchida once more clarified Japan’s obligation to unify the whole world according to this principle:

The Great Empire indeed is awarded with the great task of protecting the cosmos (rikugō) containing the whole world (hakkō) [. . .]56

In this volume, he criticized the ruling government and proposed Japanese intervention into foreign states’ affairs. Uchida concluded that a passive stance would lead to Japan’s decline as an influential power in the Far East:

If we look at ourselves, today there are no more than only the methods of passivism and activism from which we can choose. In the case of passivism, the Empire gives up Manchuria and Mongolia, gives up Korea and returns Karafuto to Russia and Taiwan to China [. . .]. Will it be possible to preserve a long-term peace in the Pacific if the advocates of passivism are apt to leave Chinese affairs to the Chinese? Again, I must absolutely say that I do not believe so.57

54 Ibid. 55 Eizawa, Daitōa Kyōeiken no shisō, p. 88. 56 Uchida Ryōhei, Seihei shigi (Tokyo: Kokuryūkai, 1914), p. 3. 57 Ibid., pp. 48–49. 32 Chapter 2

Already one year earlier, Uchida had justified Japanese expansion in Manchuria and Mongolia in his memorial Shina-kan (My View on China). He described his fear that Japan could be damaged from chaos in China, a country that was lacking the prerequisites for the formation of a modern nation-state. Japanese intervention in China was thus an inevitable act of self-defense.58 While nationalists/imperialists like Tanaka and Hattori considered expansion into Southeast Asia and especially the Philippines a matter of national interest for Japan, Pan-Asianist Uchida favoured Japanese domination of the Sino-centric core of Asia to secure the Empire’s hegemony on the continent. Uchida was an advocate of Hokushin-ron (Northward Doctrine), as he clearly saw the key to Japan’s future lying in the expansion towards China and Central Asia. Uchida’s comrade Miyazaki showed sympathy for the Philippine independence movement and tried to support it. However, his Asianism was anchored in the principle of Asian solidarity. It was not based on the idea of liberating the continent by means of Japanese domination. Even though Pan-Asianists like Uchida were concerned primarily with Japanese interests and thus could be called nationalists, they pursued the idea of a New Order for Asia and the whole world that would bring liberation from Western oppression. Therein, Japanese leadership in Asia was not only for the benefit of Japan but for China and Korea as well. Uchida, and his comrades from the Kokuryūkai were eager to demonstrate their disgust for Western-style imperialism, and favoured a re-orientation towards Oriental values over adoption of Western customs. In terms of planned Japanese expansionism, there was a clear distinction between the aims of Pan-Asianists and nationalists/ imperialists in Meiji Japan: the former proposed the creation of a Sino-centric bloc under Japanese leadership to withstand Western encroachment; the latter called for expansion to the South, pursuing a Western-style, imperialist policy. However, the fact that more and more pan-Asianist organizations emphasised Japanese superiority instead of solidarity among Asian peoples made the ideology increasingly attractive to nationalists. In particular, the idea of creating a ‘Greater Asia’ that emerged during the Taishō era (1912–1926) encouraged an increasing number of nationalists/imperialists to join pan-Asianist societies. In 1916, Lower House member Kodera Kenkichi (1877–1949) published his Dai-Ajiashugi-ron (Treatise on Greater Asianism). This was the first major work with the word ‘Asianism’ in the title.59 Kodera went beyond the idea of a Japanese-Chinese-Korean entity even though he considered close cooperation

58 Miwa, Japanese Policies and Concepts. 59 Sven Saaler, “The Construction of Regionalism in Modern Japan: Kodera Kenkichi and his ‘Treatise on Greater Asianism’ (1916),” in Modern Asian Studies 41:6 (2007), pp. 1261–94. Diverging Views Melting Into One 33 between Japan and China the precondition for a new Asia under Japanese leadership. The creation of a Sino-centric bloc was, however, only the first stage on the way to unifying the entire ‘yellow race’:

Yes, our Japan is pressed by inner and outer circumstances and without falling into the vortex of imperialism it is [Japan’s] most important mission with respect to the question of China, in connection with car- rying responsibility that peace must be preserved, to rescue [East Asia] from the oppression of the white race. Naturally, she acts as the leading and guiding power of the yellow race to maintain the territorial integrity of China, a people that truly is a nation with a rich culture. By the interdependence between the same script and race along with trust and cooperation, we withstand the world’s current thought and establish a great new Asian civilization, aggrandize it little by little, revive the entire yellow race under this doctrine and gain politically complete freedom and independence. After all, it must be the ultimate goal to unify all yellow people in the world and thus the key conclusion of our so-called Greater Asianism is that Asia is the Asia for the Asians [. . .]60

Even though Uchida Ryōhei and other early Pan-Asianists shared the vision of a world unity starting with a Sino-Japanese bloc, Kodera introduced the outline for the establishment of Greater Asia. Kodera’s vision of ‘one Asia’ went beyond a Sino-centric bloc and encompassed the whole of Asia (including the South Seas) as the final stage of Greater Asianism. Thus, his magnum opus was a blueprint for future pan-Asianist writings of the Shōwa era, when Pan-Asianism finally became the official doctrine of Japanese foreign policy.61 Regarding the Philippines, Kodera described the islands as being at the mercy of the Great Western Powers. Similar to Uchida Ryōhei’s concerns about German expansionism in Southeast Asia, Kodera claimed in his account of Germany’s reaction towards the outcome of the first Sino-Japanese War that it took an interest in leasing rather than occupying the Philippines to gain influence in the Far East. However, the high price of 1680000 Reichsmark made the German Empire abandon the plan. America was not pleased by the idea of the Philippines ‘falling into the hands of Germany’. America came to buy the Philippines itself, whereas Germany leased Jiaozhou Bay and Palau in the Pacific, thereby giving the ‘political struggle in the Far East a new development.’62 Kodera, just

60 Kodera Kenkichi, Dai-Ajiashugi-ron (Tokyo: Takara Bunkan, 1916), p. 13. 61 See for example Nishimura Shinji, Daitōa Kyōeiken (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1942). 62 Kodera, Dai-Ajiashugi-ron, p. 176. 34 Chapter 2 like the nationalists of the early Meiji era and later Asianists of the 1930s and 1940s, emphasized the strategic importance of the Philippines when he concluded that the possession of Hawai’i and the Philippines enabled America to ‘send big warships into the Far East,’ thus inhibiting Chinese trade and making Japan suffer a ‘high degree of damage.’63 Kodera was convinced that the fate of the Far East would be in the hands of Japan, Britain, America and Russia with Japan being the future hegemonic power in the region. In the event of war, Kodera considered the Philippines a stepping-stone for the American advance in the Pacific:

Germany is losing her grounds in the Far East and in the future, the struggle for power must take place between the four countries of Japan, England, America and Russia. Furthermore, at present, Russia’s real influence is extremely weak and one cannot say that the American and Anglo- Saxon tradition of anti-militarism will not be sacrificed under pressure. Additionally, our motherland is located on the East Coast [of the Pacific] and even though the Philippines is on the West Coast, America is advancing and whether or not she will take the risk to wage war is the question. England holds the Suez Canal but in a situation where she works out a national defence policy that now takes measures towards a gradual independence of Australia; one cannot say that England has sufficient power in the Far East. Thus, only Japan can freely make fast progress in the Far East.64

Kodera wrote his treatise during the transition period between the end of the Meiji period (1868–1912) and the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931–1945).65 Throughout this era of the so-called ‘Taishō Democracy’ (1912–1931), Japan actively engaged in internationalism. At the same time, pan-Asianist thought became increasingly popular. It was during this time that nationalist/imperialist and pan-Asianist views ultimately melted into one. Even Uchida Ryōhei’s Kokuryūkai expanded its idea of Asian unity to the concept of a ‘Greater Asia,’ which went beyond the old Sino-centric core and included the South Seas. The volume Ajia taikan (Asian Overview), published

63 Ibid., p. 205. 64 Ibid., p. 397. 65 The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War is sometimes considered to coincide with the “Marco Polo Bridge Incident” of 1937. Since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria on 19 September 1931 led to constant fighting between Chinese troops and the Japanese Kwantung Army on Chinese soil, however, I indicate this date as the starting point of the war. Diverging Views Melting Into One 35 by the organization in 1918, contained chapters on, amongst others, countries of the Middle East, such as Persia and Oman, Russian-occupied Central Asia, India and Southeast Asian territories such as French-Indochina and the Philippines. The chapter on the Philippine archipelago provided a brief overview of Philippine history, topography, ethnic groups and local customs.66 Even though this volume contained no suggestions for a future colonisation of the islands, it is obvious that the Philippines was now part of the Kokuryūkai’s vision of Asia. Even though Pan-Asianism still focused on Japanese domination of China, Korea and Mongolia, Pan-Asianists increasingly considered the South Seas strategically and economically important during the Taishō era. Furthermore, the idea of a Japanese mission in Asia that went beyond militaristic interests found its way into imperialist thought of the time, and nationalists/imperialists started to emphasize Japan’s obligation to lead Asia in its struggle for freedom. In Dai-Nihonshugi (Greater Japonism) (1918), the author Kamiizumi Tokuya (1865–1946) linked the idea of a Greater Japan to the concept of Greater Asianism. Kamiizumi was a graduate of the Naval Academy and fought in 1904 in Manchuria and a year later in the Russo-Japanese War. After his successful career in the Japanese navy, where he achieved the rank of a vice-admiral, Kamiizumi became a committed advocate for Greater Japonism. However, unlike nationalists/imperialists who solely called for Japanese expansionism to withstand the Great Western Powers, Kamiizumi came up with a vision of Japan leading the suppressed ‘yellow race’ towards freedom. Greater Japonism and Greater Asianism had an identical meaning to Kamiizumi. In his view, the foundation of Japan’s superiority over other nations lay in its unique kokutai (national polity). The Imperial bloodline over thousands of years turned the Imperial household and its subjects into one family, moulding the national polity or national body called kokutai. According to Kamiizumi, this national polity was ‘unparalleled in the world.’67 Kamiizumi claimed that contemporary Japanese scholars on the history of the East (Tōyōshi) had concluded that the absence of such a national polity as kokutai was responsible for the decline of China to a point where it could no longer be called a state but a merely a civilization. This development automatically put Japan into a position of leadership within the East.68 According to Kamiizumi, another point that made Japan

66 Kokuryūkai, Ajia taikan (Tokyo: Kokuryūkai Shuppanbu, 1918), pp. 342–45. 67 Kamiizumi Tokuya, Dai-Nihonshugi (Tokyo: Kōbundō shōten, 1918), p. 21. 68 J. Victor Koschmann, “Asianism’s Ambivalent Legacy,” in Network Power. Japan and Asia, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 83–110. 36 Chapter 2 different from other countries was that the vast majority of its population belonged to the same race and thus must certainly ‘have identical goals and ideals.’69 This uniqueness of the Japanese people was crucial for its mission in Asia. Just like many of his contemporary Japanese nationalists, Kamiizumi was mainly concerned with the surplus population of his country. Kamiizumi saw it as necessary for Japan to expand its territory to solve this problem; however, as opposed to Tanaka and Hattori, he called for Japanese settlements in Siberia and Central Asia.70 Kamiizumi was eager to make it clear that Japan should not act as an imperialistic power but as a cultivator, making Asia a prosperous continent:

Whatsoever, these regions are places where the natives reside in an Asian savage land and as an Asian country; our first mission must be to take the lead in the cultivation of Asia, to make it emit the radiant brightness of ancient times and the recovery of this civilization.71

Kamiizumi pointed out that Japan’s policy was different from that of other Great Powers because of the concept of Greater Asianism:

I am not concluding that the question of our country’s population is like other powers’ common question of territorial expansion. One result of the accomplishment of the mission of Greater Japonism is people feeling joy by being able to cultivate Asia. The Greater Asianism I am explain- ing about indeed shows this. As I repeatedly say, its very reason is originally that the peoples of the world do not close that territory or fight each other because of a yellow, white, copper or black skin colour. They should rather open that door along with the nations and let a civilized world emerge without restrictions to equal opportunities, truly a cause that promotes happiness of humankind.72

Kamiizumi was a nationalist and imperialist advocating Greater Japonism, but he also used the same arguments as contemporary Pan-Asianists like Uchida Ryōhei. Even though imperialists had proposed Japanese expansion to cultivate ‘backward’ areas in the past,73 Kamiizumi explicitly spoke of Greater Asianism

69 Kamiizumi, Dai-Nihonshugi, p. 175. 70 Ibid., p. 180. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Saniel, Japan and the Philippines, p. 73. Diverging Views Melting Into One 37 as the ideal behind this expansion. Greater Japonism and Greater Asianism to him were the same thing, as only Japanese expansion would serve the purpose of all of Asia. Kamiizumi considered it Japan’s obligation to lead Asian peoples towards the cultivation of their continent, and Japanese settlements in what he considered ‘underdeveloped regions’ were a means to this end. Even though Kamiizumi came from a naval background, he was not an advocate of Nanshin- ron but called for Japanese engagement in continental Asia. In this regard, he resembled the early pan-Asianist organizations. He did not explicitly call for military actions in China or Siberia but it is obvious that the peaceful cultivation of wide swathes of land in this region by the Japanese would be impossible. However, unlike earlier nationalists/imperialists propagating Greater Japan, he legitimized Japanese expansionism by declaring Greater Japonism a mission for the sake of Asia. Kamiizumi’s vision of Greater Japonism was a mixture of imperialist and pan-Asianist views of the Meiji and Taishō eras and exemplified the amalgamation of these two ideologies. The same was true for Pan-Asianist Gotō Shinpei (1857–1929), who is still very popular in Japan today. Gotō served in the Japanese colonial administration in Taiwan as the head of civilian affairs after Japan had acquired the island from China. Later he became director of the South Manchuria Railway (1906) and eventually Japanese Home Minister (1916 and again 1923) and Foreign Minister (1918). Like Kamiizumi, Gotō firmly believed that Japanese expansionism was a tool for the emancipation of the entire Asian continent. In his 1921 volume Nihon shokumin seisaku ippan (One Part of Japan’s Colonial Policy), Gotō praised Greater Asianism as the ideology that would return the Asian continent to the Asian people:

The Asian continent is the Asian continent of the Asians and Asians must supervise political affairs within Asia [. . .]; this is what is called Greater Asianism and it is indeed the eternal, divine right of the people of the Asian continent.74

Like Kamiizumi, Gotō was also convinced that Japanese geopolitical hegemony on the continent was the way to achieve the ideal of an autonomous Greater Asia for the Asians. Furthermore, his administrative work in Taiwan and his approach to ‘scientific colonialism’ based on his education as a medical doctor turned the island into a ‘model colony’75 for Japan. Gotō’s idea of

74 Gotō Shinpei, Nihon shokumin seisaku ippan (Tokyo: Takushoku Shinpōsha, 1921), p. 127. 75 M. Lo Ming-cheng, “Confronting Contradictions and Negotiating Identities: Taiwanese Doctors’ Anticolonialism in the 1920s,” in Globalizations and Social Movements. Culture, 38 Chapter 2

Greater Asianism was quite similar to the Greater Japonism of Kamiizumi; the establishment of Greater Japan would eventually lead to the establishment of Greater East Asia. A third example of this symbiosis of ultra-nationalism and Pan-Asianism was the journalist and political activist Mitsukawa Kametarō (1888–1936). Christopher W.A. Szpilman described Mitsukawa’s Asianism as reflecting ‘the shift from universalistic or regional Pan-Asianism to a nationalistic Pan- Asianism that served as window-dressing for Japan’s military aggression.’76 In 1921, Mitsukawa published his book Ubawaretaru Ajia (The stolen Asia), which included a large section on the South Seas.77 Mitsukawa quoted the historian Kawashima Motojirō (1877–1922), who claimed that archaeological traces would prove the existence of Japanese trade relations with Southeast Asia from the early Tokugawa era (1603–1868). In addition, there had been ‘free Japanese colonies’ all over the region, including in Manila on the Philippine island Luzon. The settlers defended these colonies in ‘cases of emergency’ against foreign enemies such as the Portuguese, Dutch, and the English, as well as aboriginal chieftains.78 Mitsukawa’s vision of a Greater East Asia obviously included the Nan’yō, and he considered this region subject to Western exploitation similar to that experienced by China. Just like Kamiizumi and Gotō, Mitsukawa was both a nationalist/imperialist and a Pan-Asianist who linked the establishment of ‘Greater Japan’ inseparably to the concept of ‘Greater Asia.’ After a journey through various right-wing organizations, he eventually took part in the founding of the Greater Asia Society (Dai-Ajia Kōykai). This organization has been referred to by Christopher W.A. Szpilman as ‘radical Pan-Asianist’ in its purpose: it sought to liberate all oppressed nations worldwide based on a close cooperation between Japan, China and Korea under the leadership of the Japanese Imperial Throne.79 Following J. Victor Koschmann, this ‘Japonist’ (Nihon-shugisha) vision of Asia was related to the

exoteric form of Asianism [that] emphasized the harmonious, more or less natural continuity from family, to village, to Volk/nation, to Greater

Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere, ed. John A. Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy and Mayer N. Zald (Michigan: The University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 210–39. 76 Christopher W.A. Sziplman, “Between Pan-Asianism and Nationalism,” pp. 85–99. 77 Mitsukawa Kametarō, Ubawaretaru Ajia (Tokyo: Kōbundo, 1921), pp. 118–69. 78 Ibid., p. 120. 79 Szpilman, “Between Pan-Asianism and Nationalism,” pp. 85–99. Diverging Views Melting Into One 39

Asian community based on racial and cultural affinities between Chinese and Japanese, of the sort captured by the slogan dōbun dōshu (same culture, same race or same script, same race).80

Kamiizumi, with his emphasis on kokutai and advocacy for Japanese expansion in China and continental Asia, was a typical representative of a ‘Japonist’ who adopted ‘exoteric’ Asianism. The same was true for Gotō Shinpei and Mitsukawa Kametarō. The philosopher and critic Osamu Kuno (1910–1999) described two concurring ideologies in Meiji Japan: one an ‘exoteric’ and the other an ‘esoteric’ stream of thought. In the ‘exoteric’ canon, the emperor was an absolute monarch with unlimited authority. The ‘esoteric’ canon represented a school of thought where advisory organs executed the power of the state on the emperor’s behalf. According to J. Victor Koschmann, the coexistence of these two different conceptions eventually ‘brought that [Meiji] system down in the mid-1930s’ and led to two different perceptions of Asianism in Japan, i.e. ‘esoteric Asianism’ and ‘exoteric Asianism.’81 In the following chapters, I will examine whether Koschmann’s application of Kuno’s terminology to Japanese Pan-Asianism works with regard to the implementation of the ideology in the Philippines. Osamu Kuno described the Meiji state as a system in which a small, elitist group of intellectuals exercised its rule over the masses on behalf of the emperor. According to Kuno, there were two interpretations of the emperor’s authority: one an ‘exoteric’ ideology (kenkyō) ‘for public consumption,’ and one an ‘esoteric’ (mikkyō) ideology—an ‘elitist belief in a more restricted definition of imperial power.’ The ‘exoteric’ ideology functioned to strengthen public belief in the unrestricted authority of the Imperial Throne, while the government elite treated the emperor as a constitutional monarch and ran the state in a de facto maner, based on the ‘esoteric’ ideology. This ‘esoteric,’ ‘tactical understanding’ (mōshiawase) was only introduced to a small elite of university students and members of the higher levels of the civil service. In elementary and secondary schools, pupils were taught the ‘exoteric’ ideology. Thus, a small elite which believed in the ‘esoteric’ ideology ruled over the great majority of the population which had been educated according to the ‘exoteric’ ideology. However, the Japanese military was not in line with the ‘esoteric’ view and initiated the ‘Movement to Clarify the National Polity’ through the Ministry of Education. This campaign raised awareness among the population of the policies conducted by the ruling elite. This movement, according to Kuno, sowed the seeds of ultranationalism in Japan and eventually destroyed the Meiji

80 Koschmann, “Asianism’s Ambivalent Legacy,” pp. 83–110. 81 Ibid. 40 Chapter 2 system after the death of the two integrative figures Emperor Meiji and Itō Hirobumi.82 J. Victor Koschmann argues that this rift in Japanese society also showed in the emergence of two different types of Pan-Asianism: there was one ‘traditionalist’ faction that stuck to the old system and a ‘progressive’ or ‘rationalist’ faction that advocated adaptation of the system according to circumstances. In the case of the emperor system, ‘progressive’ meant weakening the emperor’s actual power in favour of strengthening constitutional institutions, as is the case in many constitutional monarchies in Europe. In regards to Pan-Asianism, this meant adapting the ideology to the circumstances of the region in which it was to be implemented. ‘Exoteric’ Pan-Asianism appealed to the Japanese public to raise awareness of a Japanese mission to liberate Asia and create an Asian union. On the other hand, a small group of intellectuals who were concerned with political realism advocated ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianism. Following Osamu Kuno, the ‘exoteric’ stream of thought and emperor worship in the Meiji era became a mere façade to keep the Japanese public quiet and make sure that the ruling class would stay in power. Historians and social scientists of the time had to ‘compromise their intellectual honesty’ to provide a scientific justification for the unconditional worship of the emperor.83 Was that also true for the advocates of ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianism in the context of the academic sphere in the 1930s? In regards to the Philippines and Japanese Pan- Asianism, how did the respective factions respond to that country becoming part of Greater Asia and the GEACPS? The above-mentioned Dai-Ajia Kyōkai (Greater Asia Association) represented the ‘exoteric’, more ‘traditionalist’ stream of Asianism whereas the Shōwa Kenkyūkai (Shōwa Research Association), associated with Rōyama Masamichi (1885–1980), propagated the esoteric ideology that was more progressive.84 The ‘exoteric’ Dai-Ajia Kyōkai intended to create a popular base for Pan-Asianism amongst the Japanese public, while the ‘esoteric’ Shōwa Kenkyūkai rather addressed the world public as well as political decision makers in Japan and was mainly concerned with ‘rational’ policymaking.85 By the mid-1930s, it had become apparent that these two factions showed different attitudes towards

82 Osamu Kuno, “The Meiji State, Minponshugi, and Ultranationalism,” trans. Kazuya Satō, in Authority and the Individual in Japan: Citizen Protest in Historical Perspective, ed. J. Victor Koschmann (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1978), pp. 60–80. 83 Ibid. 84 Koschmann, “Asianism’s Ambivalent Legacy,” pp. 83–110. 85 Cemil Aydin, “Japan’s Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931– 1945,” Japan Focus: An Asia Pacific E-Journal (March 2008). http://japanfocus.org/-Cemil- Aydin/2695, (accessed 29 November 2011). Diverging Views Melting Into One 41 the realization of the GEACPS. In the following chapters, I will introduce the ‘exoteric’ and ‘esoteric’ concepts of Greater Asia and the envisaged role of the Philippines in these respective canons.

Conclusion

At the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, opposition against the national policy of the government emerged in Japan. This opposition firmly criticized the adoption of Western behaviour and culture in the course of Japan’s mod- ernization. Unlike the ruling Meiji oligarchs, the opposition leaders saw the answer to Western encroachment not in copying the enemy but by propagating a re-orientation towards original (and ‘superior’) Asian values, and the creation of an Asian bloc. In its early stages, this rather romantic Pan-Asianism was focused on the Sino-centric sphere of China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan. On the other hand, Japanese nationalists/imperialists, especially in the navy, advocated a southward expansion (Nanshin-ron) to secure Japan’s political and economic independence. However, these nationalists/imperialists legitimated their agenda solely according to Japanese national interests and not with reference to the concept of cooperation between Japan and other Asian societies. Nationalists embraced imperialism while Asianists condemned it. For Pan- Asianists throughout the Meiji period the idea of Japanese leadership within an Asian bloc became increasingly prominent, as they believed that only Japan would be economically and militarily capable of leading Asia towards unification and freedom. Throughout the Taishō era and early Shōwa period, the concept of a Greater East Asian Cooperative Body (GEACB) developed, and this was no longer limited to the Sino-centric area. Finally, nationalist/imperialist concepts of southward expansion and the pan-Asianist idea of a GEACB melted into one and legitimized Japanese expansionism under the slogan of ‘Liberating Asia’ as the antipode to imperialism, which was associated with an aggressive and oppressive Western policy. At the same time two different streams of Pan-Asianism evolved: the ‘exoteric’ stream and the ‘esoteric’ stream. This contradiction within the pan-Asianist community largely centered on the question of the Nan’yō, and the Philippines in particular, becoming part of Greater Asia. This is what we shall explore in the next chapter. Chapter 3 Traditionalists vs. Realists—‘Exoteric’ and ‘Esoteric’ Pan-Asianism and the Inclusion of the Philippines in an East Asian Bloc

The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how ‘exoteric’ and ‘esoteric’ Pan- Asianists viewed the Philippines in connection with Greater Asia. Even though Pan-Asianists in the Taishō era (1912–1926) began to envisage a unification of Asia that went beyond the Sino-centric core, they did not come up with concrete plans for the inclusion of the South Seas (Nan’yō) into a Greater East Asian community. It is obvious that advocates of Pan-Asianism or Greater Asianism such as Kodera Kenkichi and Uchida Ryōhei first emphasized the commonalities between Japan, China and Korea (dōbun dōshu, ‘One Script, One Race’) as the basis for their ideology and were vague when it came to the question of Southeast Asia in connection with the concept of Greater Asia. Nevertheless, Pan-Asianism changed from an ideology based on Asian solidarity and the principle of equality among the Asian peoples to an idea of a Japanese mission to take leadership in the liberation of Asia. In this respect, it provided a justification for Japanese expansionism even in Southeast Asia that went beyond the old nationalists’ argument of merely securing Japan’s own sovereignty. This shift within the ideology turned the attention of many Pan-Asianists towards the Nan’yō and the Philippines. At the same time liberal forces inside and outside the Japanese government were eager to emphasize that Japan had no desire to invade the Philippines in the event of America granting independence to the archipelago. In 1920, Matsunami Niichirō (1868– 1945), who was a worldwide renowned authority in maritime law, visited the islands on an invitation from the University of the Philippines. He came as the first visiting professor from Tokyo Imperial University. By that time, many in the Philippines expected their country’s independence to be close at hand and therefore were looking for possible role models for the future Philippine political system.1 After his return to Japan, Matsunami published the volume Firipin to Nihon (The Philippines and Japan), which featured the key points he had made in his lectures in the Philippines. Matsunami represented the liberal political thought of the time—one that favoured the integration of Japan into the world community during the so-called Taishō Democracy. Matsunami

1 Yu-José, Japan views the Philippines, p. 73.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��6 | doi ��.��63/9789004305724_004 Traditionalists vs. Realists 43 published his book Firipin to Nihon in 1921, the same year Japan signed the Versailles Peace Treaty as one of the five victorious powers of World War I. In his book, he pointed out that Japan took no interest in interfering with politics in the Philippines regardless of whether the islands became independent or remained under American administration:

This, however, does not mean that Japan had any intention to interfere in any way with the independence question of another country. On the contrary, Japan is engrossed by her efforts to defend her own territory, and it is altogether foreign to her policy to impose upon other countries or meddle in affairs that are not her own. Considered in this light, it does not matter much to our country, whether the Philippines is to be independent or continues to remain under the control of the United States.2

Matsunami was aware of the fact that parts of American public opinion had become suspicious about Japanese ambitions regarding the Philippines but he also quoted ‘fairer’ assessments of the Japanese policy towards Philippine independence. The Philippine intelligentsia and the ‘discerning’ people in America would say that ‘our Japan has no territorial aspirations towards the Philippines.’3 The interesting thing about Matsunami is that like the nationalists/imperialists and contemporary Pan-Asianists, he recognized the strategic military importance of the Philippine islands. The proximity of the Philippines to Japanese-controlled Taiwan could, according to Matsunami, become an immi- nent threat to Japanese security because if

America constructed a naval station in the Philippines large enough to accommodate the one million and a half tons of the Atlantic and the Pacific fleets of the United States Navy, Japan would feel anxious.4

Apart from this possibility, which Matsunami did not consider likely to hap- pen, he did not consider the Philippines suitable for Japanese colonisation. He was convinced that the Filipinos’ lack of understanding of Japanese polity (i.e., the kokutai and the role of the emperor) as well as their desire for independence would make it impossible for Japan to administer the islands. Furthermore, Matsunami considered the importance of the Christian faith

2 Matsunami Niichirō, Firipin to Nihon (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1921), p. 249. 3 Ibid., p. 42. 4 Ibid., p. 250. 44 Chapter 3 in Philippine society as an obstacle to the Philippine population recognizing non-Christian overlords such as the Japanese.5 As will be shown later in this chapter, he shared exactly the same concerns as the advocates of ‘esoteric’ Asianism when it came to the integration of the South Seas into the Greater East Asian Community and the GEACPS. Japan was able to extend its influence in China in the course of World War I. Thus, it was only natural that Japanese politics focused on the preservation of this influence instead of undertaking any adventures in Southeast Asia and provoking the United States. Instead, Matsunami’s arguments clearly show that Japan tried to persuade the other victorious powers that it had no intentions of making any kind of southward advance, especially not one which included the Philippines after the archipelago would have gained its independence. Because of the Washington Naval Conference held in November 1921, Japan accepted American and British hegemony in the South Seas6 and a confrontation with the US over the Philippines was not a promising prospect. Japan retained a passive stance in Southeast Asia throughout the 1920s and acted only as a mandate power in Micronesia. However, the phase of internationalism in Japanese policy ended with the Manchurian Incident on 18 September 1931. The establishment of Manchukuo took place the following year. In 1933, Japan announced its withdrawal from the League of Nations and the question of a new South Seas policy emerged. This new situation induced Japanese Pan- Asianists to define a ‘Japanese destiny’ in Southeast Asia and turn their attention towards the Nan’yō.7 In the following chapter, the different views within the pan-Asianist community in the 1930s on extending Japanese influence to the South Seas and making the region a part of a Japanese-led GEACPS will be analyzed. In doing so, I will look at examples such as the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai (Greater East Asia Association) and the Shōwa Kenkyūkai (Shōwa Research Association). According to Kimitada Miwa, the former organization

stood for an ‘Asian confederation’ with the overtone of the ‘same race and the same species,’a sense of cultural and racial affinity. In contrast, the [Asianism of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai] incorporated the more ‘scientific’ concept of an ‘East Asian Cooperative Body.’8

5 Yu-José, Japan views the Philippines, p. 74. 6 Mark R. Peattie, “The Nan‘yō: Japan in the South Pacific, 1885–1945,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 172–210. 7 Ibid. 8 Kimitada, Japanese Policies and Concepts. Traditionalists vs. Realists 45

Hence, these two organizations exemplified the distinction between ‘exoteric’ and ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianism in their differing approaches towards the establishment of the GEACPS as well as in their perception of Southeast Asia. Even though both organizations functioned as a brain trust for Konoe Fumimaro who, from 1937 onwards, served as Japanese Prime Minister for three terms, their respective memberships barely overlapped. Their commonalities were limited to the aspiration to gain political influence through the rising political star Konoe.9 While the Dai Ajia Kyōkai’s members in general came from the Imperial Way Faction (Kōdōha) of the Japanese military, the Shōwa Kenkyūkai was associated with the Control Faction (Tōseiha) within the Imperial Army.10 The Imperial Way Faction aimed for a radical reform of the Japanese state (the so-called Shōwa Restoration) and wanted to restore the absolute power of the monarch by eliminating the power of big business conglomerates (zaibatsu) and the bureaucracy. The Control Faction, on the other hand, found it necessary to seek cooperation amongst these institutions to prepare the country for a future war against the Western powers. The perception of the Philippines in Japanese pan-Asianist thought reflects these two approaches: the ‘exoteric,’ Kōdōha-faction, considered the ideology applicable to the Philippines without making any concessions to cultural specifics: the ‘esoteric,’ Tōseiha-faction, advocated a more careful implementation of Pan-Asianism in the archipelago. The different perceptions of the Philippines in these two streams of thought reflected the divergent views on the establishment of the GEACPS. Even though both factions supported the idea of the sphere, the ‘esoteric’ realists were sceptical about the conditions for doing so in the Nan’yō. The GEACPS was the final version of the East Asian Cooperative Body and its creation the ultimate goal of Japanese foreign policy. The following sections introduce the largest and most influential organization of each faction: the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai representing the ‘exoteric’ canon and the Shōwa Kenkyūkai representing ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianism.

‘Going to the Philippines is Like Coming Home’: The Perception of the Philippines in “Exoteric” Pan-Asianism

The Dai-Ajia Kyōkai (Greater Asia Society) typically represented the ‘exoteric’ stream of Japanese Pan-Asianism. Many of its members, such as the aforementioned Mitsukawa Kametarō, were both ardent nationalists and advocates of

9 Ibid. 10 Koschmann, “Asianism’s ambivalent Legacy,” pp. 83–110. 46 Chapter 3

Greater Asia. They intended to establish this Greater Asia by the creation of a ‘Greater Japan.’ The Dai-Ajia Kyōkai had emerged from the Han Ajia Gakkai (Pan-Asia Study Society), which had been established in April 1932. This organization distinguished itself from other pan-Asianist groups by extending its vision of Asia to South and Southeast Asia. Mitsukawa was already member of this organization and was then became one of the founding members of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai, together with, amongst others, Konoe and Army General Matsui Iwane (1878–1948). Matsui, too, had been a member of the Han Ajia Gakkai and convinced the other members to establish a new organization aim- ing at the initiation of a pan-Asianist popular movement.11 This new organization was founded as the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai on 1 March 1933 and Matsui served as its first president from 1933 to 1945. He was executed as a war criminal in 1948 due to his role as commander of the Japanese

ILLUSTRATION 6 Matsui Iwane entering Nanking on 17 December 1937. Source: China Incident Photograph Album Volume 2 (Shina Jihen shashin zenshū. Vol. 2), published in 1938 by Asahi Shimbun.

11 Torsten Weber, “The Greater Asia Association and Matsui Iwane, 1933,” in Pan-Asianism. A Documentary History, vol. 2, ed. Sven Saaler & Christopher W.A. Szpilman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), pp. 137–47. Traditionalists vs. Realists 47

Expeditionary Force that committed the Nanjing Massacre in December 1937. From his days at the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, Matsui was a devoted Asianist and advocate of close Sino-Japanese cooperation. This he considered the precondition for an Asian revival leading to a Greater Asian alliance. He sympathised with Chinese revolutionaries such as Sun Yat-sen and Hu Hanmin (1879–1936).12 Even though one of Matsui’s classmates at the military academy was Araki Sadao (1877–1966), who later became one of the Kōdōha leaders, Matsui himself belonged to the Tōseiha because he believed Japan had to extend its influence in China instead of waging war against the Soviet Union.13 Thus, Matsui belonged to the ‘esoteric’ Control Faction of the Japanese military but was also a founding member and future leader of the most prominent ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist organization, the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai. Matsui’s alignment with the Control Faction, however, emerged solely from his belief in the necessity of establishing strong ties with China on the way to unification of the Asian continent. His conviction in Japan’s destiny to lead Asia towards liberation from Western oppression identifies him as an ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianist. The founding words of the Dai Ajia Kyōkai emphasized Japan’s obligation to lead Asia towards its renaissance:

Yes, and then it is the duty of the Japanese Empire to carry the heavy responsibility on her shoulders to rebuild Asia and change the (world) order. [. . .] It is time that Imperial Japan suitably expands the worldwide historical significance of the Russo-Japanese War and concentrates all her cultural, political, economic and organizational power and she must plan to take one further step in the rebuilding and unification of Asia. [. . .] The formation of a ‘Greater Asian Union’ is today’s historical task of the Japanese people.14

After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Matsui wrote in his diary in December of that year about the purpose of the war and its impli- cations for the Asian continent. He expected the war to become a ‘Greater East Asian War’ and suggested that Japanese war aims included the immediate independence of those Southeast Asian countries which were under Western colonial rule:

12 Tanaka Masaaki, ed., Matsui Iwane no jinchū nikki (Tokyo: Fuyō Shobō, 1985), p. 260. 13 T.V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 79. 14 Tanaka Masaaki, ed., Matsui Iwane, pp. 261–62. 48 Chapter 3

Thus, the China Incident suddenly turned into a war against America and England = rushing towards a Greater East Asian War. [. . .] The Greater East Asian War starts, the Empire occupies Southern Asia and our government will stimulate the awakening of every people to the idea of independence and unity of all the peoples of all countries in entire Asia with an open and calm mind, following its past China policy. It is crucial for the government that it quickly guarantees independence to both the Philippines and Burma. Furthermore, along with supporting preparation for independence of Indonesia and Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) to implement the Greater East Asia pact and explain this to the Asian peoples in detail along with the sacred purpose of the Greater East Asian War. Moreover, it is crucial that corresponding to our government’s policy we volunteer for the Greater Japan Alliance to Raise Asia (Dai- Nihon Kō-A Dōmei), the Headquarters for Raising Asia (Kō-A Sōhonbu) and the Greater Japan Association for Raising Asia (Dai-Nihon Kō-A-kai). We must in general develop the movement [towards Greater Asia] inside and outside in a lively way and nicely foster the belief of cooperation towards independence and revival of each Asian state and each Asian people.15

Matsui typically represented the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianism that resembled the Japonism of Kamiizumi Tokuya or Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944), who had called for domestic reforms leading to a ‘family state’ under the leadership of the emperor.16 The realization of Greater Japan would in Matsui’s understanding ultimately lead to the establishment of Greater Asia and independence of the colonies under Western rule in Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines. Matsui wrote of the necessity to communicate the ‘sacred’ purpose of the war and the good intentions of the Japanese Empire to the Asian peoples. He seemed convinced that these peoples would appreciate a Japanese invasion as an act of liberation if they were provided with sufficient information on the Japanese mission. Various other articles published in the monthly magazine of the Dai-Ajia Kōykai, Dai-Ajiashugi (Greater Asianism), founded in 1933, also reflected this growing interest in the South Seas. In this journal, members of the organization and other Japanese and non-Japanese Pan-Asianists (including the Philippine revolutionary Benigno Ramos and lawyer Pio Duran) published articles on the political situation in Asia. It also included a news section about

15 Ibid., pp. 276–77. 16 Koschmann, “Asianism’s Ambivalent Legacy,” pp. 83–110. Traditionalists vs. Realists 49 developments in the various parts of the region. In the first year of its publication the Philippines was not mentioned in the journal; however, starting from January 1934 there were articles on the archipelago almost every month, and the Philippines was frequently featured in the section ‘Southeast Asia News’ (Tōnan Ajia jōhō). Nonami Shizuo wrote the first article on the Philippines, published in the February issue in 1934, on the question of Philippine independence. The independence issue is a recurrent theme throughout the 1930s in Dai-Ajiashugi. One year before, Nonami published his book Tōnan Ajia sho- koku (The Countries of Southeast Asia) that was one of the first works featur- ing the term Tōnan (Southeast Asia).17 In his article for Dai-Ajiashugi, Nonami referred to the Hare-Hawes Cutting Act that was passed by the US Congress on 17 January 1933 and which guaranteed independence for the Philippines after a period of ten years. The Cutting Act also guaranteed America various economic and military rights in the islands after the official independence of the Philippines. The analysis of this Act led Nonami to the conclusion that the future independent Philippines could become a role model for US–Japanese cooperation in the Pacific area. Nonami described the Pacific as the ‘axle of the world political situation’ and urged his fellow compatriots not only to look towards Manchuria and Mongolia but also to realize the importance of the Philippine independence question with regard to Japanese-American relations. According to Nonami, it was a chance that only occurred ‘once in a thou- sand years’ to tighten the relationship with America and play a leading role in the upcoming ‘Pacific age’ together with the United States.18 Nonami did not seek confrontation with the United States over domination of the Pacific region but proposed cooperation and a kind of dual hegemony of America and Japan in Southeast Asia. This approach to peaceful cooperation is quite surpris- ing, given the fact that Nonami published the article during a time of extreme tension between Japan and the League of Nations over Japan’s presence in Southeast Asia (eventually leading to the Empire’s departure from that body). The withdrawal from the League worsened American-Japanese relations and gave greater credence to voices calling for a Japanese southward expansion.19 In September 1934, the pan-Asianist professor Imamura Chūsuke (1899– 1954) published the article “Firipin dokuritsu to Dai-Ajiashugi” (Philippine

17 Shimizu Hajime, “Southeast Asia as a Regional Concept in Modern Japan,” in Locating Southeast Ajia: Geographies of Knowledge and Politics of Space, ed. Paul H. Kratoska, Remco Raben and Henk Schulte Nordholt (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005), pp. 82–112. 18 Nonami Shizuo, “Firipin dokuritsu mondai no suii,” Dai-Ajiashugi 2:2 (1934), pp. 54–58. 19 Peattie, “The Nan’yō,” pp. 172–210. 50 Chapter 3

Independence and Greater Asianism) in the same journal. Imamura was head and founder of the Department of Colonial Economics at Nihon University. Imamura bemoaned the fact that despite the geographical proximity between the two countries, the Japanese people knew little about the Philippines. They failed to accept Philippine culture and believed they had nothing to learn from the Filipinos. Other reasons included the location of the Philippines (i.e., away from European sea routes), lack of economic value for Japan, the closed door policy of the white race towards Japan and the “evil practice of isolation” (Sakoku no heifū) that had survived in Japan from the Tokugawa era until the Shōwa period. Thus, the ideology of Greater Asianism had to win over the Japanese people for the case of Philippine independence:

This is today’s new problem—the topic of independence and the Philippines—and the problem of how to introduce it to the Japanese. Furthermore, Greater Asianism has become of much more importance to deepen cooperation among Japanese people today as before for the construction of Manchuria, as self-awareness towards the outside world increases.20

From February 1934 on, Imamura gave lectures all over the Philippines while calling himself a special correspondent of the “Nagoya Shimbun.” He emphasized that his activities were in accord with the General Staff Headquarters and that he was a close friend of the commander, General Matsui, who asked him to establish the Philippine branch of the Greater Asia Society.21 Imamura was convinced that it was Japan’s obligation to help the Filipinos win independence following the spirit of Greater Asianism. This was the case because Japan had a ‘fateful connection geographically, ethnically and historically’ with the islands. There was ‘no other way’ but to support Philippine independence, otherwise the archipelago would become subject to Western indoctrination like Siam.22 Imamura was sure that the Philippine independence movements would eventually prefer Japanese Asianism to Western domination and support the idea of the Philippines becoming part of a Japanese-led regional bloc. His emphasis on historical, geographical and even ethnic ties with fellow

20 Imamura Chūsuke, “Firipin dokuritsu mondai to Dai-Ajiashugi,” Dai-Ajiashugi 2:9 (1934), pp. 46–51. 21 Matsuura Masatake, Daitōa Sensō wa naze okita no ka: Han-Ajiashugi no seiji keizaishi (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigakushuppankai, 2010), p. 303. 22 Imamura Chūsuke, “Firipin dokuritsu mondai to Dai-Ajiashugi,” pp. 46–51. Traditionalists vs. Realists 51

Asian peoples along with his demand for domestic reforms in Japan was typical of the ‘exoteric’ stream of Japanese Asianism. The question of independence for the Philippines in connection with Greater Asianism remained a key issue in articles published in Dai-Ajiashugi throughout the 1930s. In June 1935, political scientist and former Lower House member Hayashi Kiroku (1872–1950) wrote about the historical dimension of the Philippine referendum on a new constitution, one that he considered also a referendum on the question of the islands’ independence. Hayashi was a prominent figure in Japanese politics from the early 20th century until his death. He engaged in various political organizations, took part in the Paris Peace Conference in 1918 and served as a counsellor of the Department of Foreign Affairs. From 1923 to 1933, Hayashi served as the dean of Keio University, and after the war, he remained the leader of the pan-Asianist Tōa Dōbunkai (Common Culture Association). In his article for Dai-Ajiashugi, Hayashi referred to the Tydings-McDuffie Act, approved on 24 March 1934 and granting the Philippines independence after a period of twelve years. During a transitional period of ten years, the US would maintain military forces in the archipelago and keep its naval bases for two further years after official independence. It also envisioned the possible status of neutrality of the Philippines after independence.23 The Tydings-McDuffie Act was the successor of the Hare-Hawes Cutting Act that had failed to pass the Philippine senate one year before. Hayashi’s article for Dai-Ajiashugi was composed of three paragraphs: the first dealt with the history of the Philippines as a Spanish and American colony, and its constant struggle for independence. Hayashi congratulated the Filipinos for eventually becoming independent but also pointed out that this was not a ‘complete independence,’ since America would continue to hold special rights in the Philippines even after the end of the ten-year transitional period of the Commonwealth. In the second paragraph, he stressed how dis- satisfied many Filipinos were with the limited degree of independence the Americans had offered them, and suggested that there was strong opposition to the maintainance of naval bases in the archipelago. In the final paragraph, Hayashi first emphasized that Japan had no desire to wage war against America in the Pacific and that it had no territorial ambitions in the Philippines, especially now that the latter was to become independent:

23 Lydia N. Yu-José, “Philippine, American and Japanese Relations as seen through the Issue of Neutralization,” in Philippines-Japan Relations, ed. Ikehata Setsuho and Lydia N. Yu-José (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003), pp. 47–80. 52 Chapter 3

Considering the Philippines, among the Americans there are people who are apt to claim that Japan has territorial ambitions in the Philippines, argue that they see the danger of a collision of interest between Japan and America in connection with Philippine independence and go so far to call Japanese evil. Such a discussion threatens the friendship between the countries of Japan and America. However, because this time this independence became more and more a certainty, one can wipe away that absurd fear. Japan must of course absolutely respect Philippine independence and as a friendly nation, Japan cooperates with the Philippines and has to push forward the maintenance of peace in entire East Asia. Thus, from now on the Philippines will be an important factor for the necessity of preserving peace in the Far East.24

Hayashi was attempting a balancing act by praising the upcoming Philippine independence while downplaying possible Japanese ambitions in the islands on one hand, and criticizing the shortcomings of this independence on the other. Like Nonami Shizuo in his article two years earlier, Hayashi seemed convinced that Japan could not create Greater Asia by militaristic means and war with the US. Nevertheless, he emphasized the long-lasting exploitation and suppression of East Asia by the Great Western Powers. According to Hayashi, the Russo-Japanese War was the turning point in the history of East Asia as it was ‘especially the sacred, original challenge to expel the unjust power of the white man from Asia.’ The ‘complete independence of the Philippines” was in Hayashi’s view another stepping-stone towards the retreat of the white man from Asia and an “historical inevitability’ (rekishiteki hitsuzen) that would massively influence all other Asian peoples.25 However, Hayashi spoke of ‘complete independence’ (kanzen naru dokuritsu) and he identified the independence granted within the framework of the Philippine Commonwealth as ‘not complete’ in the second paragraph of his article. To Hayashi, only a full retreat of the Americans from the Philippines and the Western Powers from the Asian continent meant freedom and self-determination for the Filipinos and all Asian peoples. The emphasis on the importance of the Japanese victory in the war with Russia and the independence of Manchuria acted as milestones on the way to the liberation of Asia, clearly showing that Hayashi considered it Japan’s obligation to take the lead in this development. In the same issue of Dai-Ajiashugi, Masaki Kichiemon published an article on the Philippine independence issue with a largely similar content to that

24 Hayashi Kiroku, “Firipin dokuritsu no igi,” Dai-Ajiashugi 3:6 (1935), pp. 33–35. 25 Ibid. Traditionalists vs. Realists 53 of Hayashi. However, Kichiemon placed more emphasis on the Japanese role in aiding the Philippines militarily and economically. Masaki was a member of the board of directors of the Ota Development Corporation in Mindanao and served as president of the Davao Japanese Club from 1933 to 1935. He was also the full-time secretary of the Nan’yō Kyōkai’s (South Seas Association) Davao branch.26 Just as Hayashi had done, Masaki stressed the shortcomings of the independence granted by the grace of America, but he also admitted that most Filipinos felt relieved about reaching independence peacefully. Politically, Masaki considered the Philippines well prepared for independence after 37 years of American rule, but it needed help for its national defence and economy. He was convinced that it was up to Japan to provide the Philippines with assistance and guidance in the respective fields. Masaki conceded that there were suspicions in the Philippines towards Japanese imperialist intentions to cede the islands but he was convinced that soon most Filipinos would come to see Japan’s true, peaceful intentions:

Because the Philippines does not possess the power for her own national defense, she has a nervous fear about her neighbours. Around the time of the Shanghai Incident27 the public opinion in Manila was like a Japanese attack would be nearby but the number of people who call upon Japanese-Philippine friendship increases gradually and because Japanese tourists come in great numbers our country now shows much more interest in the Philippines, support her economically and guide her. For the purpose of co-existence, co-prosperity, and peace in the Far East we must more and more deepen our friendship with the Philippines and cooperate with her.28

Masaki mentioned the principle of co-existence and co-prosperity (kyōzon kōyei) that later would become one of the cornerstones of the GEACPS.29 He shared Hayashi’s optimism about the development of a positive attitude of

26 Yu-José, Japan views the Philippines, p. 87. 27 The Shanghai Incident or January 28 Incident took place on 28 January 1932 when the Japanese military faked a Chinese assault on Japanese monks to justify military action in China. The following battle between Japanese and Chinese troops lasted about six weeks until the League of Nations forced both parties into a cease-fire. Japan was allowed to maintain a military presence in the city whereas the Chinese were only permitted a small police force. 28 Masaki Kichiemon, “Firipin dokuritsu mondai no kōsatsu,” Dai-Ajiashugi 3:6 (1935), pp. 36–37. 29 Eizawa, Daitōa Kyōeiken, p. 14. 54 Chapter 3 the Filipinos towards the Japanese. He also considered Philippine independence an important milestone on the road to the liberation of East Asia. The motives of Nonami Shizuo, Imamura Chūsuke, Hayashi Kiroku and Masaki Kichiemon were by no means imperialistic. They professed no desire for a Japanese invasion of the Philippines but strongly supported the idea of Japan fostering Japanese-Philippine relations and gaining political and economic influence in the archipelago. While Nonami envisioned Japanese- American cooperation in the Philippines and Southeast Asia, the other three shared the vision of a Greater East Asia free of American and Western influence under Japanese leadership. They legitimized Japan’s leading role due to its economic and militaristic superiority compared to all other Asian nations. This made it possible for Japan to liberate the continent from foreign domination. None of the above-mentioned contributors considered war with the United States desirable and they all made it clear that fears of a Japanese invasion of the Philippines were not justified. During the early years of the Dai- Ajia Kyōkai it became apparent that the advocates of ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianism who published in Dai-Ajiashugi considered the Philippines a part of Greater East Asia. A strong proponent of regional integration was the Waseda professor Sugimori Kōjirō (1881–1968). As early as the early 1920s, Sugimori had divided the world into the three entities of Greater America, Greater Europe and Greater Asia, the latter consisting of Japan, China, Siberia and parts of Southern Asia.30 Sugimori opposed trends towards nationalism and considered the nation-state as a passing phase on the route towards an international world society. The next step following the nation-state was regionalism, which meant for Asia the construction of Greater Asia under Japanese leadership.31 In 1936, Sugimori paid a visit to the Philippines where he lectured on various topics. After his return to Japan, he published several articles on the political situation in the Philippines, Thailand and China, suggesting how Japan should respond to these.32 In an article for Dai-Ajiashugi that was published in May 1937, Sugimori described the Philippines, Siam (now Thailand) and China as countries that had ‘a good opportunity’ to become ‘modern states’ (kindai kokka). Sugimori considered the societal and political conditions as sufficient in these countries, but believed their underdeveloped economies to be a major

30 Dick Stegewerns, “Forgotten Leaders of the Interwar Debate on Regional Integration. Introducing Sugimori Kōjirō,” in Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, ed. Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 101–14. 31 Ibid. 32 Yu-José, Japan views the Philippines, p. 153. Traditionalists vs. Realists 55 obstacle. Thus, industrialization was necessary, just as it had been for Japan in the course of the Meiji Restoration after 1868. Regarding the Philippines, he praised the NEPA movement (National Economic Protectionism Association) as a ‘peoples’ movement’ for Philippine industrialization since it did not receive any financial support from the state and as a ‘movement for economic nationalism’ (keizaiteki kokumin shugi). Nevertheless, he bemoaned the strong dependence of the Philippine economy on the United States even after the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Economic dependence in Sugimori’s view automatically led to colonisation:

It is needless to explain that a people, nation or society that cannot develop its resources by itself and that cannot complete production until the finished product, in the modern world beckons its own colonisation. In addition, it is an obvious inevitability that those who depend economically or industrially on someone else provoke the same situation politically. Furthermore, I do not need to explain explicitly here that under the political rule of someone else it is a complete human and cultural suffering.33

Finally, Sugimori posed the question of what Japan was supposed to do regarding the Philippines. He stressed the variety of resources the Philippines possessed and said that it was Japan’s obligation to provide aid to the Filipinos in cultivating them. Japan should foster Philippine industrialization:

Japan herself furthermore always has to show the will to push forward [in the Philippines] towards a highly developed industry and only needs to constantly implement this will.34

The American tariff policy in the Philippines, which privileged a minority of manufacturers whilst ignoring the desires of consumers, was in the view of Sugimori a contradiction of ‘the moral principles of the founding of a nation.’ Therefore, he considered a shift of morals necessary in both ‘ethnic nationalism’ (minzokushugi) and ‘popular nationalism’ (kokuminshugi)35

33 Sugimori Kōjirō, “Hi, Sen, Shi nado wo ikkansuru ugoki to waga kokusaku,” Dai-Ajiashugi 5:5 (1937), pp. 2–4. 34 Ibid. 35 Dick Stegewerns, “The Dilemma of Nationalism and Internationalism in Modern Japan: National Interest, Asian Brotherhood, International Cooperation or World Citizenship?” in Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan. Autonomy, Asian 56 Chapter 3 in the present world.36 Sugimori was convinced that most Filipinos favoured complete independence from the United States and would welcome Japanese aid in the building of a new nation. Sugimori was primarily interested in economic cooperation between Japan and the Philippines and showed a keen interest in Philippine raw materials such as cotton and gold. He suggested that a strong economy was a precondition for the establishment of a sovereign state. Without Japanese support, the Philippines would remain dependent on the US or become subject to colonisation. From May 1938 onwards, it was mainly Hayashi Naoki who continued to publish articles on the Philippines in Dai-Ajiashugi, acting as a kind of foreign correspondent for the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai in Manila. The independence issue remained the most prominent topic. Hayashi was doubtful about Philippine president Quezon’s true desire for complete independence for his country, and Hayashi quoted several American newspapers which had reported that Quezon would prefer the Philippines to remain under American leadership. Hayashi also mentioned the ‘great challenge’ that Quezon had to face while leaders such as the former president of the First Philippine Republic, Emilio Aguinaldo, harshly criticized him for allowing the US to maintain its naval bases in the Philippines even after the end of the Commonwealth, thus ‘abandoning the ideal of independence.’37 Hayashi also took a critical stance towards Quezon in the Ramos Affair. Benigno Ramos (1893–1945) was a long-time fighter for Philippine independence and had been a comrade of Quezon in the Nacionalista Party in the late 1920s. He alienated Quezon in the 1930s and accused him of remaining too closely tied to America and not being a true advocate of complete Philippine independence. Ramos’ Sakdal Movement and the Sakdal Party established in 1933, but later turning into the Ganap Party, proposed radical economic and political reforms in the Philippines, as well as ‘immediate and total independence’ from the United States.38 After a failed coup in 1935, Ramos went into exile in Japan from whence he returned in 1938 on the German ship Gneisenau.

Brotherhood, or World Citizenship? ed. Dick Stegewerns (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), pp. 3–16. Stegewerns translates minzokushugi as “ethnic nationalism”, the right of self-determination of an ethnic group in contrast to the often used and misleading translation “racism”. Following Stegewerns, kokuminshugi means “popular nationalism” where the nation/the people “are favoured over the claims of the state”. 36 Sugimori, “Hi, Sen, Shi,” pp. 2–4. 37 Hayashi Naoki, “Saikin no Hitō dokuritsu mondai,” Dai Ajiashugi 6:5 (1938), pp. 34–40. 38 Motoe Terami-Wada, “The Filipino Volunteer Armies,” in The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction, ed. Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo Trota José (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), pp. 59–98. Traditionalists vs. Realists 57

The Philippine police arrested Ramos on his return but he was soon released from prison. In his November 1938 article for Dai-Ajiashugi titled ‘Ramosu no kikoku to Sakudaru-tō’ (Ramos’ Return Home and the Sakdal Party), Hayashi showed great sympathy for Ramos’ will to reconcile and work together with Quezon for an independent Philippines and a ‘policy of social justice’ (shakai seigi seisaku). At the same time, Hayashi criticized Quezon for not preventing Ramos’ detention on his arrival in Manila and for being unclear about his willingness to accept Ramos’ offer of ‘mutual understanding’ (ryōkai) and future cooperation. Hayashi also praised Ramos as an advocate for close Japanese- Philippine relations who refused to consider any Japanese intentions to invade the Philippines. He quoted from Ramos’ speech to his fellow party members at the Rizal Monument on 29 August 1938:

Because Japan will respect our independence, there is no need to worry. Even after independence, Japan will not invade the Philippine Islands as she recognizes the Philippines’ power of self-administration. In the cases where Japan invaded foreign territories, the respective governments needed protection by the Japanese nation. However, this will not occur in the Philippines because she will preserve her inner order [. . .]. During the four years I have spent in Japan, it never came to my ears that any Japanese revealed the Japanese intention to invade the Philippines. [. . .] Japan invaded China because in the present her own existence is under threat.39

Hayashi used Ramos as the chief witness for both the peaceful Japanese policy towards the Philippines and for the Japanese invasion in China as a matter of national security. He obviously mistrusted Philippine president Quezon’s proximity to the US and saw in Ramos a better advocate for Philippine independence within Greater Asianism. If Hayashi represented mainstream thought within the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai by the end of 1938, it is obvious that there was an interest in the Philippine independence issue in connection with the future influence of both Japan and the United States in the archipelago. The ongoing emphasis on the Japanese disinterest to invade the islands still showed anxiety about provoking America by Japanese ambitions in the Philippines. Nevertheless, Hayashi considered Japan an ally of Ramos and praised him and his Sakdalistas as supporters of the Japanese cause for an ‘Orient for the

39 Hayashi Naoki, “Ramosu no kikoku to sakudaru-tō,” Dai-Ajiashugi 6:11 (1938), pp. 40–43. 58 Chapter 3

Orientals’ and the ‘revival of Greater Asia’: “In this respect, the present return home of Sakdalista president Ramos is a blessing.”40 A few months later, in an article on the restructuring of the Philippine executive, Hayashi had to admit that the political influence of Ramos and his newly founded Ganap Party was on the decline and that Quezon’s National Party held all political power in the Philippines.41 Despite the mistrust he showed towards Quezon, he possibly realized that there would be no alternative Filipino leader in the near future; Hayashi also stressed affiliations between Quezon and Japan. He wrote an article in November 1939 on the president’s 16 moral principles for Philippine education and linked these to the Japanese bushidō (‘way of the warrior’). On his 60th birthday on 19 August 1938, Quezon delivered a speech in front of professors and students at a conference for moral ethics in education. This conference took place at Santo Tomas University in Manila. In his address, he emphasized the importance of morals in education and listed 16 principles as cornerstones of a civil code for the Philippines. This Code of Citizenship and Ethics became the Presidential Executive Order No. 217 on 19 August 1939 and covered the responsibility of each citizen towards the Philippine state and its people.42 Hayashi described these 16 principles as ‘President Quenzon’s bushidō’ in which he was ‘lamenting the degradation of Philippine national character and calling for a mental renaissance. For this purpose, he said he was to use bushidō.’43 Despite bushidō being a moral code designed to explain Japanese chivalry as ‘Precepts of Knighthood,’44 Quezon indeed took inspiration from it when he created his code of ethics for the Philippines. Quezon was eager to strengthen both the Philippine government and his own position as a president. To him, bushidō was a reason for the strong position of (the state in) Japan. Quezon expressed sympathy for totalitarian regimes, such as those of Hitler and Mussolini, but had to be careful not to offend his American allies. Thus, to Quezon, bushidō did not function as a political agenda but as a moral code, and one which seemed suitable to him in the Philippines to support the development of an original Philippine national identity and enhance the authority

40 Ibid. 41 Hayashi Naoki, “Hitō seifu shunōbu no kaizō to sono seiji keizai seisaku,” Dai-Ajiashugi 7:6 (1939), pp. 36–39. 42 Hayashi Naoki, “Hitō no tokusei kyōiku to Nihon bushidō,” Dai-Ajiashugi 7:11 (1939), pp. 39–43. 43 Ibid. 44 Inazō Nitobe, Bushido, the Soul of Japan (Hyderabad: Project Gutenberg EBook, 2004), accessed 3 June 2011, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/12096/12096-h/12096-h.htm. Traditionalists vs. Realists 59 of the Philippine government.45 Quezon’s emphasis on honour, respect for the sovereign, patriotism and commemoration of national heroes resembled Inazō Nitobe’s (1862–1933) definition of bushidō. Hayashi, in his review on Quezon’s address, stressed the president’s emphasis on the moral decline of the Filipino people as the long years of Spanish and American rule in the archipelago had misled the Filipinos in many ways.46 The Pan-Asianists of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai certainly welcomed Quezon’s turn towards bushidō and his criticism of the Western influence on the Filipino people, as they could take it as an invitation for Japan to engage in the ‘Re-Orientalisation’ of the Philippines. Despite still being critical towards Quezon’s attitude regarding the independence issue, Hayashi was convinced that the president had succumbed to the political realities and would stick to the plan of Philippine independence for 1946. Even more, the president’s sympathy for bushidō seems to have assured Hayashi that Quezon would lead the Philippines into a Japan-led Greater Asian Union:

When looking at Mr. Quezon’s attitude, he now shows nothing but sympathy (rikai) for Japan and since his visit to Japan last year, he knows the true meaning of our national power. After all, he can see that we are Oriental peoples and as Oriental peoples, we finally have to understand that we must plan co-existence and co-prosperity (kyōzon kōyei). Therefore, he can see that he needs to push forward the already determined policy for independence, adopt our bushidō, plan a mental renaissance and bind close ties with Japan; this will not be difficult at all under the great leadership of Mr. Quezon. As a second Thailand the Philippines will look up to us as the leaders of the Orient and one must say that the day when [the Philippines] plays a part in the establishment of permanent peace is not far at all. One has to say that she must be truly delighted to be one great hope (ichidai kōmyō) on the way to a Greater Asian Union (Dai-Ajia danketsu) for the purpose of Greater Asianism.47

By November 1939, Hayashi seemed to be enthusiastic about the prospect of the Philippines becoming a part of a Japanese-dominated Greater Asia. To him, Quezon’s positive remarks on Japan and his obvious sympathy for bushidō completely outweighed the president’s long-term pro-American attitude. No matter how far-fetched Hayashi’s conclusion be that Quezon would from then

45 Grant K. Goodman, “Philippine Bushido,” in Nitobe Inazō: Japan’s Bridge across the Pacific, ed. John F. Howes (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 119–32. 46 Hayashi, “Hitō no tokusei kyōiku,” pp. 39–43. 47 Ibid. 60 Chapter 3 on lead the Philippines according to Greater Asianist principles, they were to some degree typical of the ‘exoteric’ stream of Pan-Asianism. Hayashi assumed that Quezon had finally become aware of Japan’s good intentions and realized how beneficial it would be for his country to become part of a Japanese-led Greater Asia. Greater Asianism was thus a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy to him: eventually the world would have to see the benevolence of the Japanese Empire in leading the Asian peoples towards their liberation. Hayashi’s conviction that President Quezon would alienate himself from the Americans grew even stronger by autumn of 1940. Quezon’s affection for totalitarianism made Hayashi believe that there was a shift in Philippine policy towards a more authoritarian form of governance. In his article “Hitō no seijiteki dōkō” (The Political Trend in the Philippines) from the October 1940 issue of Dai-Ajiashugi, he analyzed Quezon’s attitude towards the elimination of political parties in favour of single-party rule in the Philippines. Hayashi pointed out that Quezon attempted to deny his affection for single-party leadership because he might have come ‘under negative influence’ (i.e. American influence) but that his real beliefs were that a wide range of political parties would harm the political development of the Philippines. He could not make his real intentions public, however:

In fact, the Philippines is indeed already a country close to totalitarianism and it is obvious that Quezon and the other heads of the government in their inner thoughts approve totalitarianism as valid instead of democracy. Quezon does not officially advocate totalitarianism and one can think that he does not want the people to know about it for the time being. Quite right, whether the people splendidly understand this principle is highly questionable, and indeed well informed ranks are in general critical towards this and announce the opposite.48

Hayashi then claimed that the shift towards totalitarianism in Philippine policy had already begun. The decline of the Diet’s political power in favour of a stronger position of the president showed:

Especially in the recent times of emergency, power was transferred to the president himself. Even within the parliament opposition emerged and there were people calling this a violation of the constitution but according to the opinion of the judges of the Supreme Court, this was not a violation of the constitution. [. . .] The president appoints the majority

48 Hayashi Naoki, “Hitō no seijiteki dōkō,” Dai-Ajiashugi 8:10 (1940), pp. 30–33. Traditionalists vs. Realists 61

of the government officials. The army is completely under the control of the president.49

Referring to a public speech Quezon had delivered at the Law Department of the University of the Philippines, Hayashi quoted the president as welcoming ‘such kind of dictatorship that recognizes a certain degree of freedom of deeds and thoughts’ and that the shift of power from the Diet to the president was permitted by the constitution. Quezon’s statement that the Philippines had to adapt a form of governance that was suitable to its national character was to Hayashi ‘the firing of an arrow back at the advocates of so-called democracy.’50 Hayashi was convinced that this new emerging Philippine democracy would be largely different from the American model. It is obvious that he inter- preted Quezon’s attitude towards democracy, like the latter’s sympathy for Japanese bushidō, as a chance to win the Filipino government over to the idea of Greater Asia. The article on trends in Philippine politics was the last article by Hayashi Naoki and the last article in Dai-Ajiashugi dealing with president Quezon before the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in December 1941. The articles on the Philippines published in Dai-Ajiashugi show the growing sympathy of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai throughout the 1930s for the cause of Philippine independence along with increasing resentment against the United States. At the outbreak of the Pacific War, the organization seemed convinced that Filipinos would appreciate membership in a Japanese-led regional bloc. The majority of the Philippine population would seek complete independence from the US and only Japan could provide them with that. Typically for the ‘exoteric’ or ‘traditionalist’ stream in Japanese Pan-Asianism, the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai emphasized the common Asian identity of the Japanese and the Filipinos. The organization considered cultural differences between Japan and the Philippines to be a result of foreign, especially American, rule that would vanish as soon as the Philippines became part of Greater Asia. When the concept of the GEACPS became the official agenda of Japanese foreign policy in 1941, advocates of ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianism turned even more eagerly to prove cultural, historical and even racial commonalities between the Japanese and the Filipinos. The historian and anthropologist Nishimura Shinji (1879–1943), who was not a member of any pan-Asianist organization, referred in his book Daitōa Kyōeiken (The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere) to the Philippines as ‘a branch in the great Japanese tree’ and thus ‘topographically inseparably connected

49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 62 Chapter 3 with Japan.’51 Nishimura published his work in 1942, after the outbreak of the war in the Pacific. He added an extra volume in which he emphasized Japan’s leading role in the establishment of the GEACPS.52 In Nishimura’s opinion, the inclusion of Southeast Asia into the sphere could easily become a reality due to topographical and ethnic factors. Access to the sea, and the industries such as shipping and ship-building in Nishimura’s point of view naturally connected the regions of the GEACPS with each other. Since Japan was the most developed country in these industries, it was also the natural leader in the sphere.53 Ethnically, according to Nishimura, there were obvious similarities between the Japanese people and the people of East Siberia, Manchuria, China, Indochina and the islands of the South Seas, as cephalic indices and body height showed.54 Nishimura aimed to prove a racial kinship between the Japanese and the Filipinos through the example of the Tagalu and Visaya peoples who had landed in Japan during the Asuka period (552–646).55 Overall, he believed in the feasibility of integrating the Philippines into a Japanese- dominated Co-Prosperity Sphere and argued that, for Japan, ‘going to the Philippines is like coming home.’56 Overall, the common feature of the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists was their emphasis on a family-like identity of the Japanese people that could be expanded to the whole of Asia. This means that the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists took the slogan dōbun dōshu, which had originally applied to a close Sino-Japanese affiliation, and extended it to all parts of Asia, including Southeast Asia. In order to do this, they attempted to prove racial and ethnic similarities between the Japanese and the peoples of these regions. ‘Exoteric’ Pan-Asianism developed from a stream of thought that advocated the restoration of the absolute power of the Tennō and the complete abandonment of Western influences on Japanese state and society. Therefore, the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists called for domestic reforms to make the Japanese people become aware of their historical task of building a ‘New Asia.’

51 Nishimura, Daitōa Kyōeiken, p. 254. 52 Ibid., p. 274. 53 Ibid., p. 54. 54 Ibid., p. 57. 55 Ibid., pp. 60–61. 56 Ibid., p. 264. Traditionalists vs. Realists 63

The ‘Esoteric’ Stream: Pan-Asianism and Geopolitics

The other stream of thought in Japanese Pan-Asianism took a much more critical stance towards the integration of the South Seas into Greater Asia. Like the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai, the Shōwa Kenkyūkai functioned as a brains trust for the government of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro (1891–1945) from the late 1930s. Like the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai that was home to political scientists, philoso- phers, politicians and military officers, the Shōwa Kenkyūkai also contributed ‘philosophical, cultural as well as social-scientific’ ideas to Asianism and was politically affiliated with the ‘Control faction’ (tōseiha). According to J. Victor Koschmann,

the SRA’s contribution to Asianism should be understood as a reform- orientated alternative to the exoteric views of the status of the emperor and of Japan’s ‘manifest destiny’ in Asia that were gaining ground within the Japanese establishment.57

Advocates of the ‘esoteric’ stream of Pan-Asianism followed a less romantic but rather scientific approach to the creation of ‘Greater Asia’ and they did not call for a ‘Shōwa Restoration’ like their ‘exoteric’ counterparts. Unlike the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai, the Shōwa Kenkyūkai hardly addressed the Japanese public and published no journal like Dai-Ajiashugi. The organization consisted of intellectuals from different academic fields as well as representatives from the military and the economic sphere. The admission of business leaders showed the willingness of the Shōwa Research Association to involve the new elites of Japanese society in the process of political reforms in Japan instead of simply disempowering them, as the ‘exoteric’ faction proposed. The Shōwa Kenkyūkai brought together intellectuals from opposite political extremes: it harboured leftists like Ozaki Hotsumi (1901–1944) and rightists like Yabe Teiji (1902–1967). What these intellectuals had in common was their desire to establish the GEACPS. However, unlike the Asianists of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai, the members of the Shōwa Research Association took into account regional specifics and showed skepticism towards the inclusion of the Nan’yō. Below, I will introduce two Shōwa Kenkyūkai members and their perception of the Philippines in the GEACPS: Rōyama Masamichi (1895–1980) and Yabe Teiji. Yabe came up with a concrete model of the sphere that showed few commonalities with the original idea of ‘Asian solidarity’ and instead appointed the role of semi- autonomous vassal states to countries such as the Philippines and Burma.

57 Koschmann, “Asianism’s Ambivalent Legacy,” pp. 83–110. 64 Chapter 3

Rōyama was arguably the most important member of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai for the Philippines, as he visited the country as head of the “Research Commission in the Philippines” in 1943 and suggested administrative and political reforms to the Japanese Military Administration. Rōyama Masamichi was one of the most prominent figures in the field of political science in Japan before and after World War II. Rōyama graduated in 1920 from Tokyo Imperial University where he had studied Political Science at the Faculty of Law with a focus on English socialism. He became assistant professor at his alma mater in 1922 and professor in 1928. Rōyama became close to Prince Konoe and accompanied him as a special envoy to the US in 1934. Rōyama criticized the Japanese military in the course of the February 26 Incident (Ni-Ni-Roku Jiken), when a group of 1483 soldiers had attempted a coup to launch a “Shōwa Restoration” and remove government officials that they considered to be corrupt and responsible for the social decline of rural Japan. Rōyama developed an idea of a ‘constitutional dictatorship’ (rikken dokusai). He served as a member of the Diet, and the government appointed him to lead the “Research Commission in the Philippines” in 1943. After the war, Rōyama resigned from his position as a member of the Lower House and acted as president and editor of the journal Chūō Kōron and as president of the Women’s University in Ocha no Mizu. From 1951, he was chair of the Democratic Socialist Alliance (Minshu Shakaishugi Renmei) and supported the right wing, i.e. more moderate part, of the Socialist Party (Shakaitō) of Japan. Throughout the 1960s, he remained a prominent advisor and ideologue of the party and affirmed the American-Japanese Security Treaty. Up until his death in 1980, Rōyama remained a prominent figure in political and public discourse in Japan. On the establishment of the GEACPS in the late 1930s and early 1940s, Rōyama played an active role in winning over intellectuals and public opinion for the purpose of the establishment of an East Asian Community and the GEACPS. On the other hand, he was also aware of the difficulties this project would bring. According to J. Victor Koschmann, Rōyama’s position belonged to ‘the rationalist extreme of Pan-Asianism,’58 thus separating him from the above-mentioned ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists. In his 1938 essay Tōa kyōdōtai no riron (Theory of the East Asian Cooperative Body), Rōyama referenced the China Incident of 7 July 1937, which triggered the Second Sino-Japanese War. He emphasized the necessity to clarify the

58 J. Victor Koschmann, “Constructing Destiny. Rōyama Masamichi and Asian Regionalism in Wartime Japan,” in Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, ed. Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 185–99. Traditionalists vs. Realists 65

Japanese mission in Asia to the people of China, who were still reluctant about Japan’s approach to launching an ‘awakening of the Orient’ (Tōyō no kakusei) and completely misunderstood the significance of this ‘holy war’ (seisen) which, according to Rōyama, was not fought for materialistic purposes. In Rōyama’s point of view, the ‘world historical significance’ of the Japanese mission had not found its way through to the peoples of the Orient yet.59 Rōyama pointed out that even though ‘the belief of hakkō ichiu existed already during the founding days of Japan,’ European influence had taken over Japanese society and culture throughout the Meiji era. The Pan- Asianists opposed this development. However, according to Rōyama, this Pan-Asianism of people like Okakura Kakuzō and Sun Yat-sen did not gain a large audience in many regions of the Orient; rather, it remained limited to a small group of intellectuals and lacked any ‘substantial, systematical content.’ In Rōyama’s point of view, the ‘awakening of the Orient’ meant with respect to the West, that

the Orient awakes globally as the Orient. Thus, at the same time the world has to recognize the Orient as the Orient. Therefore, there must never be the general thought that Europe is the world and that European culture is world culture.60

Rōyama stressed the necessity of the formation of an Oriental bloc but at the same time, he strongly rejected the existence of a historical Asian unity:

However, from the dawn of history until today the Orient has not been aware of any political unity of course and not even of any cultural unity.61

Unlike the West, where Christianity had provided a religious unity since the Middle Ages, Confucianism and Buddhism shaped religious beliefs in the Orient. Even though both were originally ‘Oriental,’ they did not ‘incarnate an Oriental unity.’ Nevertheless, Rōyama was convinced that ‘finally the autumn of an ‘awakening of the Orient’ has come’ and that the Orient would find its place as ‘part of the world system (sekai taisei),’ unaffected by the League of Nations, which had been created and dominated by the Western powers. Rōyama concluded that ‘an Oriental awakening and an Oriental unity resulting from such a concrete world historical progress are now not a simple myth

59 Rōyama Masamichi, “Tōa kyōdōtai no riron,” Kaizō 20:4 (1938), pp. 6–27. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 66 Chapter 3 of the 20th century.’ Instead, there were various movements within Japanese society that believed in these cases that were not myths, rather something that could provide a ‘definite historical, sociological foundation (ittei no rekishiteki shakaiteki jiban)’ and ‘definite, practical and systematical content (ittei no gijutsuteki seidoteki naiyō).’ These were exactly the attributes that had been lacking, in Rōyama’s point of view, from early Japanese Pan-Asianism. He was convinced that after the China Incident the time was ripe for ‘Japanese awakening,’ which would trigger an ‘Oriental awakening.’ Even though he shared his belief with the earlier Japonists of the ‘exoteric’ faction that the fate of Japan and the fate of Asia were inseparably interwined, he did not consider Asian unity natural but something that he wanted to achieve by political means. According to Rōyama, ‘the shape of a new unified culture and thought of the Orient does not appear immediately’ because the region had to overcome Western-imposed nationalism first. Before a ‘new ideology of the Orient’ could emerge, it was necessary to create an ‘idea of East Asia’ (Tōa shisō). Rōyama justified the Japanese expansion in the continent with the fulfillment of a ‘common regional destiny’ (chiikiteki unmei kyōdōtai) and was convinced that the Orient needed to ‘overcome the tragedy caused by the misleading nationalism (Minzokushugi)’ using an ‘ideological weapon’ (shisōteki buki). Rōyama’s abandonment of the nation-state and the concept of regionalism resembled the afore-mentioned ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianist Sugimori Kōjirō, as he also shared the goal of creating an East Asian Community under Japanese leadership with the Pan-Asianists of the ‘culturalist’ faction. However, Rōyama considered this a political project and not a self-fulfilling prophecy:

However, this is not a simple intuitive ideal or poetic illusion and to be a theory it must be something creatively progressive (sōzōtekina shinpotekina mono) that has certain experiential substance and logical structure.62

Three years later, Rōyama examined the perspectives of the GEACPS from a geopolitical point of view in his contribution to the volume Taiheiyō mondai no sai kentō (A Reconsideration of the Pacific Problem) entitled “Daitōa kōiki ken ron: chiseigakuteki kōsatsu” (On the Greater East Asia: A Geopolitical Point of View). Again, he described the necessity for an ‘awakening’ (Kakusei) of the Oriental peoples and an awareness of cooperation within the envisaged GEACPS. Rōyama called this ‘geopolitically speaking, Japan’s matter and mission.’ Nevertheless, it was also a Japanese obligation to awaken these peoples

62 Ibid. Traditionalists vs. Realists 67 by force if they themselves did not develop an awareness of their Oriental identity. In the case of Korea, Rōyama emphasized the ‘ancient ties’ between the peninsula and Japan but at the same time he praised ‘the Great Saigō,’ Saigō Takamori (1828–1877), for his strong stance towards an annexation of Korea after the latter had failed to accept the policy of the Meiji administration. Chastisement (yōchō) of peoples reluctant to accept or recognize the well- intended Japanese policy was an appropriate means for Rōyama on the road to realization of the GEACPS:

We punish those adjacent peoples who do not understand our real intentions [. . .]. There is this very relation of being the same Oriental peoples; however, there is no choice but awakening those peoples who are completely lacking self-awareness.63

Rōyama proposed the implementation of an Oriental self-awareness by force if the peoples of the sphere were reluctant to cooperate. In this way, he was more straightforward than the ‘exoteric’ faction, who regarded the cooperation of fellow Oriental peoples as something that would come naturally. Rōyama referred to the different scientific methods exercised by advocates of the GEACPS as they examined the economy of the envisaged region. He distinguished three approaches; one was to look separately at each country (a method also applied by the League of Nations and the Western powers) which Rōyama called ‘an extremely planar, mechanical survey.’ The second method he described as an approach to look at certain aspects of each country in the sphere with regard to its colonial character. Rōyama praised this method as ‘a three-dimensional, world-political view and an appropriate method.’ He himself, however, favoured a third approach based on the division of the GEACPS into two spheres: the Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere (ECPS, Tōhō Kyōeiken) consisting of Japan, Manchukuo and China (“the Yen-bloc”) and the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere (SCPS, Nanpō Kyōeiken) consisting of the Philippines, India, Malaya, Thailand and the Dutch East Indies. Rōyama wrote of the need to provide a ‘two-staged examination’ (nidan no kenkyū) of the sphere. The first stage was an examination of the ECPS and the second stage an examination of the SCPS. Finally, he wanted to analyze the mutual relations of these two regional blocs. Rōyama then described the economic situation within the so- called ‘Yen-bloc,’ stating that 50 per cent of Japan’s exports went into that very region, with Manchukuo being the biggest receiver. The import volume was

63 Rōyama Masamichi, “Daitōa kōiki ken ron: chiseigakuteki kōsatsu,” in Taiheiyō mondai no sai kentō, ed. Taiheiyō Kyōkai (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1941), pp. 3–57. 68 Chapter 3 only half of the export volume and the ECPS could not yet provide those goods mostly needed by Japan. The ECPS needed to import 74 per cent of these goods from other regions, especially from America. In contrast, Japan maintained a balanced export-import rate with the SCPS but this region still conducted a great deal of its own trade with the Western powers, predominantly America and England. Rōyama quoted data from the year 1938 showing that by then only 6.4 per cent of the whole export volume of the Philippines, India, Thailand, Dutch East Indies, the Straits Settlements (including Singapore and parts of what is today Malaysia) and British-ruled Burma went to Japan. The import rates showed a similar figure, with 8.5 per cent of the SCPS’s overall imports coming from Japan. According to this data only 10 per cent of the region’s trade volume consisted of trade with Japan. Rōyama saw the concept of the GEACPS in the context of other ‘wide spheres’ (kōiki) in the world and compared the plan for the establishment of the GEACPS to existing pan-movements in Europe and America. He especially praised Germany’s advance into the Balkan region, quoting the German political economist and statistician Ernst Wagemann (1884–1956) from his book Der neue Balkan. Altes Land-Junge Wirtschaft (The new Balkan. Old Country-Young Economy).64 According to Wagemann, since in 1938 40 per cent of the Balkan region’s overall trade volume consisted of trade with Greater Germany, the latter’s economic predominance in the region was apparent. Rōyama concluded that Germany’s rival powers, England, America and France were unable to compete with Germany, hence the latter’s ‘relative weight’ increased. Regarding the GEACPS, Rōyama claimed that Japan made comparable progress only within the ECPS, especially in ‘organic economic relations’ (yūkiteki keizai kankei) with Manchukuo. Nevertheless, he conceded that in the SCPS, where only 10 per cent of the trade volume consisted of trade with Japan, ‘much energy’ (tadai seiryoku) would be necessary in the future to achieve the same results as in the ECPS. Pursuing the argument of Wagemann, the German Balkan policy was not only for the benefit of the German economy but also for the economy of the entire Balkan region. A Balkan-style economic bloc, however, could only develop if Japan could win solidarity with the native population. Rōyama considered this plan for an ‘entire prosperity’ (zentai ga sakaeru) to give a new meaning (atarashiki igi) to the economy, and saw the aspect of solidarity with the natives as a ‘highly important point’ (kiwamete daijina pointo).65 For Rōyama, Wagemann’s outline of the German Balkan policy functioned as an

64 See Ernst Wagemann, Der neue Balkan. Altes Land-Junge Wirtschaft (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1939). 65 Rōyama, “Daitōa kiki ken ron,” pp. 3–57. Traditionalists vs. Realists 69 example for the future Japanese role within the GEACPS. Japan had to adopt a policy to ‘enhance the whole Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Economic Sphere (Daitōa Kyōei Keizaiken),’ as the colonial character of the other member countries would slow the economic development. However, Japan itself would benefit from the increasing productivity and buying power within the sphere. Japan had to make the greatest efforts of all the countries involved but in return, it could take advantage of the overall prosperity within the sphere. In this way, Japan also had a chance to win solidarity with the other peoples. According to Rōyama, it was necessary to ‘establish a Japanese national policy’ and a ‘new Japan’ in connection with the GEACPS that unified these two objectives of making the entire sphere prosper, thus winning over the native peoples of the various regions. Again, following German scholarship,66 Rōyama was eager to emphasize the necessity of establishing a new international law as well as conducting further cultural and sociological studies, especially on the southern regions, since knowledge in the respective fields was still scarce in Japan.67 In Daitōa Kyōeiken, the ‘culturalist’ Nishimura Shinji criticized the economic dependence of Southeast Asia on the Western powers as well; however, since he was convinced the native peoples of the GEACPS would automatically come to appreciate the Japanese policy for its benevolence he did not mention any need for further investigations on the specific conditions of each region. Nishimura asked if it was possible to integrate all the various regions of the sphere, ranging from the ‘Soviet-occupied coastal provinces in the North to the Dutch East Indies in the South,’68 economically into one bloc. His answer was quite simple: mutual understanding was the key to mutual economic aid and growing prosperity for all member countries of the sphere. The countries had to abandon ‘liberal’ ( jiyūshugiteki) and ‘egoistic’ (rikoshugiteki) trade and eventually, a fair distribution of goods within the sphere would be simply a matter of the good will of the peoples.69 Nishimura, arguing from an ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist point of view, had no intention to divide the GEACPS into Eastern and Southern spheres, but argued that the ethnic, racial and historical bonds would make economic cooperation natural.

66 Rōyama quotes the German political theorist and law professor Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), who called for the establishment of a new international law that was applicable to the circumstances after Germany’s expansion. 67 Rōyama, “Daitōa kōiki ken ron,” pp. 3–57. 68 Nishimura, Daitōa Kyōeiken, p. 67. 69 Ibid., p. 72. 70 Chapter 3

Rōyama, on the other hand, expressed even more criticism of the practicability of the GEACPS in his major work Tōa to sekai. Shin chitsujo e no riron (East Asia and the World. A Theory towards a New Order), published in 1941. In this publication, Rōyama criticized the Japanese government for its impre- cise definition of the geographical outline of the sphere:

Nevertheless; however, considering the determination of this area, one cannot avoid the impression that the explanations on the substance of the sphere are extremely abstract and vague.70

Rōyama repeated his demand for intense research on the sphere by private scholars to ‘evaluate to what extent the determination of its limits and its content is relatively possible.’ In this respect, Rōyama praised the positive influence of German and English private scholars and research institutions on public discourse in their home countries. Rōyama stressed that the government was unable to ‘fulfil the function of a scholarship culture’ and that the concept of the GEACPS needed scientific examination.71 In “Daitōa kōiki ken ron” Rōyama divided the sphere into the two main parts of the EACPS and the SCPS, but in Tōa to sekai he stressed this division further. He described the whole body of the envisaged GEACPS as consisting of three regions: the ‘Eurasian continental region’ (Yūrashia tairikuteki chiiki), the ‘continental peninsula region’ (tairikuteki hantō chiiki) and the ‘region of the islands in the Southwest Pacific’ (seinan taiheiyō tōsho chiiki).72 Rōyama was sceptical about the fulfilment of the geopolitical preconditions for the creation of the GEACPS in these three regions. Geopolitics he defined following Karl Haushofer (1869–1946), as a

science that aims to understand the political organism (seijiteki seikat- sutai) in a natural living space (shizenteki seikatsu chiiki) by the restrictions set by its geographical shackles (chiriteki kisoku) and historical dynamics (rekishiteki undō).73

Regarding the core region (or first region) of the sphere, consisting of Japan, China and Manchukuo, Rōyama considered the present situation difficult. Although there was a possibility to concede a geopolitical connection between

70 Rōyama Masamichi, Tōa to sekai. Shin chitsujo e no riron (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1941), p. 362. 71 Ibid., p. 363. 72 Ibid., p. 370. 73 Ibid., p. 366. Traditionalists vs. Realists 71

Japan and the coastal regions of China, the Chinese hinterland (ouchi) had ‘close geographical-political connections with the Soviet Union, as well as military-geographical connections.’ Transport routes between China and the continental peninsulas of India, Thailand, Burma and Malaya were also insufficient due to the incomplete Chinese railway and road transport infrastructure. Thus, Japan had to ‘overcome many obstacles’ in establishing co-prosperity in the ‘Eastern region’ (Tōhō chiiki) and the geopolitical consideration of this part of the sphere showed ‘great complexity.’74 However, Rōyama’s main concern was the practicability of including the islands of the South Pacific around the Dutch East Indies, the ‘so-called Nan’yō,’ into a ‘geographic order’ (chiikiteki chitsujo) following geopolitical principles. Even though this region had, to some extent, relations with the ‘second region’ of the continental peninsulas, there were only minimal economic relations with the ‘first region’ (Japan, China, Manchukuo) and a ‘unified regional order’ (tōitsuteki chiikichitsujo) did not yet exist. According to the principles of geopolitics it was also necessary to compare the ‘historical dynamics’ (rekishiteki undō) of the various regions with those of Japan. Western colonisation had shaped the historical dynamics in the sphere outside Japan, and the Orient, as a product of Western politics:

Up to the present, the history of these regions has been composed (kōseisuru) by the Western countries and it is no exaggeration to say that it almost cannot be thought of as these regions’ history without these historical dynamics. Even today, America’s and England’s cognizance (nin- shiki) of the Orient is a result of the balance of power in Western Europe. The Orient does not decide the fate of the Orient. There is a high degree of non-independence of the Orient determined by the fate of Western Europe.75

The colonial character of the various regions was, for Rōyama, one of the main impediments on the way to the creation of the GEACPS. It was obvious that Western imperialism had left its mark on many Asian societies. Therefore, the ‘practical possibility’ ( jissenteki kanōsei) of implementing the idea of the sphere would be a difficult issue. Rōyama defined three historical dynamics for the region of the GEACPS. The first was the movement from ancient, smallest communities to the nation-state (minzoku kokka); the second was the ‘imperialist colonisation movement on land and sea’ of the Western European

74 Ibid., p. 371. 75 Ibid., p. 376. 72 Chapter 3 countries; the third was the movement towards self-determination of the colonies with the aim of liberation from colonisation.76 For the successful establishment of the GEACPS, Rōyama declared a fourth historical dynamic that would be necessary to describe a movement towards the ‘formation of a Greater Regional Bloc (Daichiiki Kyōdōtai Keisei).’ Without this fourth historical dynamic, the accomplishment of the project of the GEACPS would be impossible.77 Regarding the Philippines, there had been independence movements since the years of Spanish colonisation, but their impact had been weak- ened throughout the period of American rule, especially during the Philippine Commonwealth. Furthermore, apart from a few pro-Japanese Asianists, such as Pio Duran, there was no popular support for Philippine membership of a Japanese-led regional bloc. Following Rōyama’s reasoning, it would be necessary to evoke a desire to become part of the GEACPS in the Philippines that would create a dynamic movement among the Filipino people. According to the geopolitical view of Rōyama Masamichi, liberation movements in colonies needed to transform into movements for the establishment of the GEACPS. This would mean that all peoples within the envisaged sphere needed to be convinced that being part of the GEACPS would be more beneficial to them than being an independent nation-state. Regarding the lack of such a fourth historical dynamic, Rōyama was highly critical towards the existing preconditions for the integration of the South Seas into the sphere. The whole project of the sphere, in Rōyama’s point of view, was ‘not at all an easy task but an extremely difficult project with many obstacles’ and, he concluded, ‘to date the preconditions for the establishment of the GEACPS is not sufficient.’78 The ‘exoteric’ faction within the Japanese pan-Asianist community, such as the members of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai and Nishimura Shinji, saw in the GEACPS a tool to end the Western dominance in Asia. In this respect, there was no difference to the ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianists like Rōyama. However, whilst the ‘culturalists’ were convinced that the project would find approval among all Asian peoples immediately after its implementation, Rōyama considered the sphere a political project under construction that needed careful cultivation. The establishment of the GEACPS to him was a dynamic process that, by the year of 1941, had not even begun. Another prominent example of an ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianist was the political scientist and professor of law at Tokyo Imperial University, Yabe Teiji. Yabe,

76 Ibid., p. 373. 77 Ibid., p. 378. 78 Ibid., p. 378. Traditionalists vs. Realists 73 like Rōyama, was a member of the Shōwa Research Association and an advisor to the Navy Ministry, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Greater Asia and the Cabinet. Like Rōyama, he also remained an influential figure in Japanese politics and science after the war. In October 1945, following the Japanese surrender, he took part in the drafting of a revised constitution for the Japanese Empire. Furthermore, as professor at Tokyo University, he functioned as an advisor for Nakasone Yasuhiro (born 1918), who in 1982 became Japan’s 45th Prime Minister. Later Yabe also served as Dean of Takoshoku University. While working for the Shōwa Kenkyūkai, Yabe was one of those radical right-wing intellectuals who proposed disempowerment of the Japanese Diet and the establishment of a single-party-leadership like in Nazi Germany. This national party should promote Pan-Asianism and the concept of an East Asian bloc.79 In his function as an advisor to the Navy Ministry, Yabe took part in working out a design for the GEACPS. Yabe was one of several intellectuals who advised the ministry within the Navy Ministry’s Research Commission (Kaigunshō no Kenkyūkai), which was headed by Takagi Sōkichi (1893–1979) from 1937 to 1942. With the same Takagi, Yabe later came to work on the revision of the Japanese constitution after the Empire’s defeat. On 1 September 1942, the Research Commission issued its Treatise on the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Daitōa Kyōeiken-ron). Yabe was one of three influential intellectuals in the Commission (the other two being the law professor Matsushita Masatoshi and philosopher Kōyama Iwao, both of whom I will discuss in the following chapter) who each drafted their own ideas about the sphere, with a focus on the survival of Japanese identity within the framework of the sphere. Yabe discussed the GEACPS in connection with the rise and fall of the Roman and British empires and other pre-existing connections of states (kokka ketsugō) to determine Japan’s role in the future structure of the sphere. Yabe distinguished different connections: 1) annexations (heigō); 2) colonies; 3) protectorates (hogokoku) and mandates (inin); 4) federations, as in ancient and contemporary China; 5) commonwealths of independent states; 6) alliances (dōmei) or unions (rengō) and federations (renmei).80 He concluded that none of these models applied to the GEACPS as they were all based on a ‘mechanical equality’ (kikaiteki byōdō) that possessed connotations of ‘conquest’ (seifuku) and ‘exploitation’ (sakushu). Instead of a union based on ‘mechanical equality’ Yabe advocated an ‘organic, differentiated relationship’ (yūkiteki satō kankei) between the members of the GEACPS. In Yabe’s opinion, the League of Nations

79 Mimura, Planning for Empire, p. 147. 80 Totsuka Junko, “Kaigunshō no ‘Daitōa Kyōeiken-ron’-‘Kokka no seizan’ gainen wo megutte,” Nihonshi no Hōhō 1:3 (2005), pp. 81–97. 74 Chapter 3 aimed at the ‘mechanical equality’ of each country and each people, and this misconception had led to chaos and brought the world to the verge of another global war. This old system of ‘mechanical equality’ needed to be eliminated and replaced by a ‘system of a cooperative body’ (kyōdō taisei), in line with the historical development of the respective regions and the geographical situation. Within this ‘Greater Regional Unit’ (Dai chiiki tan’i), the strong and the weak nations would cooperate under the ‘moral leadership’ (dōgiteki shidō) of the nation that ‘possessed the real ability.’ Under this leadership, each country should use its own abilities to contribute to the prosperity of the entire sphere according to the principle of co-existence and co-prosperity (kyōzon Kyōei).81 Yabe considered Japan the natural leading power within the sphere, and was eager to stress the need for the Empire to distinguish itself from other member countries. Whereas the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists like Nishimura Shinji placed an emphasis on racial similarities between the Japanese and fellow Asian peoples, Yabe clearly opposed assimilation between the Empire and those countries it had to lead. According to Yabe, the Roman Empire ceased to exist as the ongoing mixing of nationalities within the realm of the Empire made the Romans lose their own identity. On the other hand, Yabe warned of the establishment of a British-style empire based on a conqueror-conquered relationship between Japan and the sphere. In such an empire, the leading power could preserve its own identity but the other countries could not develop a sense of identification with the concept of the GEACPS. Hence, Japan had to learn from the failures of the Roman and British empires. ‘Transcending as mere rulers’ like the British would automatically evoke opposition from native peoples, so Japan had to ‘extend Greater Asia’ following the Roman example. It also

must not allow herself to embed and disappear therein. Japan has to constantly preserve her individuality (kosei) and must continuously be the source of life and morals.82

The countries of the sphere needed to recognize Japanese leadership for their own well-being and come to consider Japan’s glory (kōei) as the glory of the nations of Greater Asia. In terms of the concrete political structure of the GEACPS, Yabe introduced a five-tier model. Japan as the leading country was the first tier. The second tier consisted of ‘territories outside the sphere,’ such as French Indochina and Timor. The third tier featured ‘independent countries’ like Thailand,

81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. Traditionalists vs. Realists 75

China and Manchukuo. The fourth tier consisted of ‘independent protectorates’ (Dokuritsu hogokoku) such as Burma, the Philippines and Siam. The fifth tier was reserved for territories directly controlled by Japan (chokkatsu ryō), although these were not clearly identified in the model. Similar to Rōyama, Yabe emphasized the differences between the various peoples within the sphere and even wrote of a ‘fear that Japan will be extinguished if we allow the mixing of blood (konketsu) with the South (Nanpō).’83 Even though Yabe was in principal an advocate of the creation of the GEACPS (as Rōyama was), he was not only concerned about the possibility to integrate the South Seas into the sphere but also about the possible dangers for Japan if close contact with these regions was allowed.

Conclusion

By the outbreak of the Pacific War, Pan-Asianism had become Japanese foreign policy and the moral justification for Japanese expansion into the South Seas. The establishment of the GEACPS was the manifestation of the Japanese pan- Asianist vision for a New Order in the Far East and in the world. However, there was a discourse within the pan-Asianist community on how the goal of the GEACPS could be achieved, mainly concerning the integration of the Nan’yō into this sphere under Japanese leadership. One ‘exoteric’ or “culturalist faction” argued for a simple application of the same principles underlying the old concept of an East Asian Community consisting of Japan, China, Korea and Manchukuo, to the South Seas since these regions also had natural geographic and ethnic ties with Japan. Therein, the peoples of these regions (such as Filipinos) would automatically come to appreciate participation in a Japanese-led regional system that aimed to emancipate and liberate the colonised people from their Western overlords. The ‘exoteric’ faction’s Pan-Asianism centred on the principle of dōbun dōshu, which the ‘exoteric’ Asianists extended from the Sino-centric core of Asia to the edges of the continent. This ‘culturalist’ faction was ‘exoteric’ in its appeal to the Japanese public, whom it wanted to convince of the idea of an East Asian Community. The other ‘esoteric’ or ‘realist faction,’ represented by the likes of Rōyama Masamichi and the Shōwa Research Association, was far more critical towards an integration of Southeast Asia into the sphere. Even though they advocated hakkō ichiu as the ultimate goal of Japanese foreign policy (like the culturalists

83 Ibid. 76 Chapter 3 did), they were also aware of the cultural and historical specifics, which made an integration of the region into the sphere difficult. Therefore, this group of intellectuals did not find the principle of dōbun dōshu applicable to the Nan’yō. Following geopolitical principles, Rōyama was convinced that the realization of the GEACPS was impossible without people’s movements in the various regions which supported becoming part of the sphere. By the outbreak of the Pacific War, Rōyama stated that such a movement did not exist yet as a ‘historical dynamic,’ and that the ties between the core region of the sphere (Japan, Manchukuo and China) and the Southeast Asian countries (among them the Philippines) were not strong enough to meet the preconditions for the establishment of the GEACPS. Whereas Rōyama was mainly concerned with the difficulties of integrating the South Seas into the sphere, his colleague from the Shōwa Kenkyūkai, Yabe Teiji, who also was a member of the Navy Research Commission, warned of the possible danger for Japan if it allowed close contact between its own people and the people of other parts of the sphere, mainly the south. Despite advocating the establishment of the GEACPS, he emphasized differences between the various peoples, rather than their commonalities, and feared a loss of Japan’s own identity if the sphere became a multi-cultural entity like the Roman Empire. Just like Rōyama, Yabe did not share the culturalist idea of one Asian unity under Japanese leadership. The common feature of the ‘esoteric’ Asianists was their rejection of dōbun dōshu as a core principle for the establishment of the GEACPS. The group was ‘esoteric’ in not address- ing the Japanese public but solely attempting to gain influence amongst political decision makers. Both pan-Asianist factions advocated the establishment of the GEACPS, but they disagreed on its outline. In his address before the Imperial Diet on 21 January 1941, Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke pointed out that

the aim of Japan’s foreign policy is that of enabling all nations of the world each to take its own proper place, in accordance with the spirit of the Hakko Ichiu, the very ideal which inspired the foundation of our Empire.84

Matsuoka spoke of the creation of ‘a sphere of co-prosperity throughout Greater East Asia East Asia with Japan, Manchukuo and China as its pivotal point.’85

84 Yōsuke Matsuoka, “Address by the Foreign Minister of Japan, Yosuke Matsuoka, delivered before the 76th session of the Imperial Diet, 21 January 1941,” in Pan-Asianism. A Documentary History, vol. 2, ed. Sven Saaler & Christopher W.A. Szpilman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), pp. 225–27. 85 Ibid. Traditionalists vs. Realists 77

The concept of first establishing a Sino-centric union as a starting point for the creation of an Asian union followed the tradition of earlier Pan-Asianists like Kodera Kenkichi. The GEACPS was clearly thus a product of Japanese Pan- Asianism. Takeuchi Yoshimi (1910–1977) wrote after the war that

the idea of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” during the Second World War in a sense marked the inevitable outcome of Asianism. In another sense, however, it represented the departure from Asianism, or rather a deviation from it.86

Takeuchi described the GEACPS as a form of Asianism as it officially centred on the pan-Asian principle of solidarity among Asian peoples. However, eventually it was an empty slogan, a ‘pseudo-idea’ without any substance. According to Takeuchi, the bureaucrats ‘simply spread the cloak of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere over everything.’87 In that sense, it resembled the ‘exoteric’ view of the state in Meiji Japan that Osamu Kuno had described as an ideology without real content used by a small, elitist group to manipulate the masses. Indeed, the kind of GEACPS envisioned by ‘esoteric’ Asianists like Yabe Teiji differed remarkably from the ‘exoteric’ concepts of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai or Nishimura Shinji that were introduced to the Japanese public. In the history of Japanese imperialism, the Philippines had played a major role in the so-called Southward Doctrine as a possible colony that could solve the population surplus problem in Japan. Japanese Pan-Asianists, who were very eager not to be associated with any kind of imperialism, largely ignored the Philippines until the mid-1930s. Thereafter, it was the ‘exoteric,’ traditionalist stream of Pan-Asianism that advocated making the Philippines part of Greater Asia (and later the GEACPS) while the ‘esoteric,’ realist faction argued against doing so. Which of these two pan-Asianist canons (if either) had the stronger impact on occupation policy, and what was the Filipino reaction? This is what I shall examine in the chapters on the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Another question will be if the ‘esoteric’ faction used the ‘exoteric’ ideology to access the Philippine population in the same way that the ruling elite in Meiji Japan had manipulated the Japanese public.

86 Yoshimi Takeuchi, “Nihon no Ajiashugi” (Japan’s Asianism), trans. Christian Uhl, in Pan- Asianism. A Documentary History, vol. 2, ed. Sven Saaler & Christopher W.A. Szpilman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), pp. 322–26. 87 Ibid. chapter 4 The Occupation of the Philippines

The purpose of this chapter is to show how the Japanese military planned for the administration of the Philippines and how they executed these plans. A special focus lies on the impact of pan-Asianist ideas on the outline and realization of the Japanese administration in the Philippines. By the end of the 1930s, parallel to the increasing sympathy of Japanese Pan- Asianists for Philippine independence, the Japanese military showed growing interest in fostering ties with the archipelago and supporting the idea of an independent Philippines.1 At the same time, the idealistic, pan-Asianist worldview became the national policy of the Japanese Empire. The policy of ‘Leaving Asia’ (Datsu-A) was eventually replaced by the official doctrine of ‘Returning to Asia’ (Ajia kaiki). Two proclamations, Konoe’s on “The New Order in East Asia” (Tōa shin chitsujo) in 1938 and Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke’s on “The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” (Daitōa Kyōeiken) exemplified this policy shift in 1940. As Miwa Kimitada puts it, the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai influenced the former proclamation whereas the scientific approach of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai shaped Matsuoka’s vision of the GEACPS.2 Even though Konoe’s first influence was the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai when it came to the New Order, he was also amenable to the geopolitical ideas of Rōyama Masamichi and the Shōwa Kenkyūkai.3 Obviously, both streams in Japanese Pan-Asianism had had an impact on the Japanese government by the outbreak of the Pacific War. Therefore, we will have to see which school of thought was predominant in the administration of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. One idea was to utilize Quezon and respect the sovereignty of the Philippine Commonwealth government: this was promoted by Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori (1882–1950), who wanted to minimize the degree of aggression in the Philippines and aimed at peace negotiations with the US as soon as possible. Tōgō’s point of view was shared by other members of the government and was popular among the military. The General Staff Headquarters planned to end hostilities in the Philippines fast. There even existed rumours about a secret plan presented by the Navy on 7 January 1942 to declare the Philippines

1 Lebra, “Army and Navy Position Papers,” p. 60. 2 Miwa, Japanese Policies and Concepts. 3 David Atkinson and Klaus Dodds, Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 84.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��6 | doi ��.��63/9789004305724_005 The Occupation Of The Philippines 79 independent. Although the content of this plan is unknown, the General Staff Headquarters in general intended to support the Quezon government, implement a Military Administration only for the shortest possible time and then turn the Philippines into a republic.4 The position of Tōgō and the General Staff Headquarters resembled both the hopes of the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai that Quezon would cooperate with the Japanese, and their fears (expressed especially during the first half of the 1930s) of waging war against the US. It is the purpose of this chapter to illuminate how the 14th Army that was tasked with the establishment of a military government planned the administration of the islands and how far it followed pan-Asianist ideals of one kind or the other. Furthermore, I will investigate to what extent the government in Tokyo was trying to realize Pan-Asianism in the Philippines. We will see which pan-Asianist thinkers were influential when it came to the establishment of the “Second Philippine Republic” as part of the GEACPS. Did the reservations of the ‘esoteric’ stream play a role or did the occupation policy follow the assumption that the integration of the Philippines into the sphere would take place naturally? Finally, we will look at the question of whether, in the Philippine case, Pan-Asianism indeed served as a ‘window dressing’ for Japanese expansionist ambitions or if there was a serious attempt to administer the archipelago along pan-Asianist lines.

The Japanese Military and Its Plans to Administer the Philippines

In the late 1930s, when war with the United States became more and more likely, the strategic importance of the Philippines that had been emphasized by both nationalists/imperialists and Pan-Asianists throughout the Meiji and the Taishō eras increasingly forced the Japanese military to turn its focus towards the islands. When Foreign Minister Matsuoka in August 1940, for the first time, officially used the term ‘GEACPS,’ the southern regions of the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina were supposed to be a part of that sphere. Matsuoka left it unclear whether he intended to incorporate the Philippines into the sphere or not. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the archipelago’s northern and southern neighbours made it apparent that he considered the Philippines a part of the sphere.5 However, the army and navy had different definitions for Japan’s war aims following the outbreak of the Pacific War. The spokesman of

4 Hatano, Taiheiyō sensō, p. 22. 5 Yu-José, Japan views the Philippines, p. 156. 80 chapter 4 the army, Satō Kenryō (1895–1975), pointed out that along with the principle of ‘Self-existence and Self-defense’ ( jizon jiei) it had to be the objective of the Japanese Empire to establish the GEACPS and a New Order for Greater East Asia. Navy commander Fujii Shigeta (1860–1945) wanted to limit Japanese war aims to the realization of Jizon Jiei. Records of meetings of the Imperial Council (Gozen Kaigi) reflect Fujii’s attitude until the meeting of 6 September 1941, when Japan eventually decided to wage war against America, England and the Netherlands. The establishment of the New Order had finally become an official war objective.6

The Perception of the GEACPS within the Japanese Navy at the Outbreak of the Pacific War To understand the role of Pan-Asianism in connection with the occupation of the Philippines it is crucial to look at the perception of the GEACPS within the Japanese military, i.e. the army and the navy. In the Navy Research Commission (Kaigunsho no Kenkyūkai) Japanese intellectuals worked out a Treatise on the GEACPS (Daitōa Kyōeiken-ron) that would define Japan’s role as the leading power within the sphere and its interaction with other member countries. Besides Yabe Teiji, who was very cautious about the preservation of Japan’s own identity and opposed cultural and ethnic interaction between the Empire and other countries of the sphere, two other prominent scholars actively participated in the drafting of an outline for the GEACPS in the Navy Research Commission. These were Matsushita Masatoshi (1901–1986) and Kōyama Iwao (1905–1993). Matsushita was an expert on international law who had studied this subject in America following his graduation from Rikkyō University (St Paul’s University) in Tokyo. After his return from the United States, he became professor at his old alma mater. During the war, he worked for the Navy Ministry, and the Foreign Ministry, and served as president of the Association for Japanese Foreign Policy (Nihon Gaisei Kōykai). At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Matsushita served as Tōjō Hideki’s (1884–1948) lawyer and remained a popular scholar in postwar Japan when he became president of Rikkyō University after a purge of public officials. In the following years, he engaged in the peace movement, especially opposing the production and proliferation of atomic weapons, and became a member of the House of Councillors for the Democratic Socialist Party (Minshatō). Like Yabe Teiji, Matsushita’s main concern was the preservation of Japan’s originality and individuality (kosei) in a GEACPS that should not form a state but, rather, function as a ‘union of fellow independent countries.’ Matsushita defined the GEACPS

6 Hatano, Taiheiyō sensō, p. 8. The Occupation Of The Philippines 81 as ‘the pre-destined union (unmeiteki ketsugō) that aims at the co-existence and co-prosperity (kyōzon kyōei) of the Greater East Asia.’7 Within the union, Japan was the chosen country due to its unique kokutai (national polity), which needed to be preserved under all circumstances, and which could be used to ‘enlighten the world’s mankind.’ Matsushita wanted to proclaim the Japanese ‘Imperial Way’ (ōdō) all over the world and the creation of the GEACPS was a means to this end as it guaranteed the ‘survival’ (seizon) of the Japanese state.8 Matsushita had been to the Philippines prior to the war as a students’ adviser in the Fourth Philippines-Japan Student Conference in 1941. To him, the Philippines was ‘a jewel yet to be polished, but she cannot polish herself. Japan has to show her how, for she does not know her potentialities.’9 Matsushita also showed a great deal of racial discrimination towards Filipinos by describing them as physically malnourished compared to the Japanese, and conceded an intellectual inferiority amongst the Filipinos due to their strict adherence to the democratic and liberal principles, as well as their hedonistic affection for luxury, a trait which he believed they had imported from the West.10 In Matsushita’s vision of the GEACPS, member countries could only exist at the mercy of the leading country: Japan. Thus, the degree of independence offered to member countries eventually turned them into vassal states of the Japanese Empire. In Matsushita’s model there was no distinction between the various countries of the sphere, as they would all become kinds of pseudo- independent protectorates—the role that Yabe Teiji had envisaged in his model of the GEACPS for the Philippines. In addition, just like Yabe, Matsushita found it crucial to preserve Japan’s own identity, believing that without doing so, it could not fulfill its role as ‘enlightening’ power in the world. He wanted all peoples within the sphere to be subordinate to the Japanese Imperial Way. Unlike ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists like, for example, Nishimura Shinji, he did not attempt to demonstrate racial, cultural or historical similarities between Filipinos and the Japanese. Still, it would prove difficult to allocate Matsushita to the ‘esoteric’ faction of Rōyama and Yabe as he neither made any distinction between the various regions of the sphere in terms of a classification (as Yabe did), nor did he show any criticism towards the practicability of integrating Southeast Asia into the GEACPS. Overall, Matsushita’s argument aimed

7 Totsuka, “Kaigunshō no ‘Daitōa Kyōeiken-ron’,” pp. 81–97. 8 Ibid. 9 Lydia N. Yu, “Japanese Attitudes towards the Philippines: 1900s to the 1940s,” PhD. diss., Sophia University, 1988. 10 Yu-José, Japan views the Philippines, pp. 151–52. 82 chapter 4 at the single purpose of providing a legal justification for Japanese expansion by claiming it was necessary to secure the Empire’s ‘right to life.’ The co-existence and co-prosperity (kyōzon kyōei) of the other countries incorporated in the sphere would be a mere by-product of this expansionism; Matsushita’s sphere was nothing but Greater Japan and therein he resembled the Japonists of the Taishō era like Kamiizumi Tokuya. In particular, Matsushita’s emphasis of the ‘Imperial Way’ and his resemblance to the ‘Japonists’ affiliated him with the ‘exoteric’ stream of Pan-Asianism.11 The third prominent intellectual who worked on the Daitōa Kyōeiken-ron for the Navy Research Commission was Kōyama Iwao (1905–1993). Kōyama studied philosophy at Kyoto Imperial University and lectured at Kyūsei Daisan Kōtō Gakkō, the predecessor of today’s Kyoto University. In 1938, he became assistant professor at Kyoto Imperial University and in March 1945 professor at the same institution. He retired from that post after Japan’s defeat in World War II. After the war, the American administrators banned Kōyama from public office for some time before he later became professor at Kanagawa University. After professorships at Nihon University and Tōkai University, Kōyama became president of Akita Keizaihōka University (today’s North Asia University). He spent his final years at Tamagawa University, where he was mainly concerned with philosophical anthropology and pedagogy. Kōyama attended three symposiums that took place on 16 November 1941, 4 March 1942 and 14 November 1942. At these symposiums, he engaged in discussions with three of his associates from Kyoto Imperial University, the phi- losophers Kōsaka Masaaki (1900–1969) and Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990) as well as Suzuki Shigetaka (1907–1988), who was an expert on Western mediaeval history. The monthly journal Chūo Kōron published the minutes of these discussions. At the same time, Kōyama participated in the Navy Research Commission and drafted his treatise on the GEACPS. At the first symposium, entitled “Sekaishiteki tachiba to Nihon” (The World-Historical Situation and Japan), which was held three weeks prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the discussion focused on the predominance of European and American culture, and explored how Japan could respond to this. Kōyama argued that Germany had defeated France in 1940 due to a ‘shortage of moral energy’ amongst the French, which was caused by discord between politics and culture. Referring to the German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886), Kōyama concluded that it was this ‘moral energy’ (moralische Energie) or ‘moral vitality’ (dōgiteki seimeiryoku) that eventually drove world history. Kōyama wanted Japanese youth to possess a ‘fresh moral vitality,’ a ‘healthy sense of morality’ and ‘moral

11 Koschmann, “Asianism’s Ambivalent Legacy,” pp. 83–110. The Occupation Of The Philippines 83 energy’ so it would be prepared for the coming challenges.12 At the second symposium in which Kōyama participated, entitled “Tōa kōyeiken no rinrisei to rekishisei” (Ethical and Historical Character of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”), Kōyama pointed out the necessity for close Sino-Japanese cooperation. He also justified Japan’s China policy as an act of ‘world historical dimension’ that was sadly misunderstood by large parts of the Chinese public sphere as imperialistic aggression. According to Kōyama, Japan’s intervention had prevented the partition of China. The Chinese misconception of Japan’s intentions was the ‘tragedy of the Orient’ as it made cooperation between the two countries complicated.13 Kōyama framed a basic idea for a national policy for the Greater East Asia (Daitōa minzoku seisaku). This basic idea was that the peoples of Greater Asia return to their own characteristic selves while uniting in a Greater East Asian body (Daitōa zentai) that transcended themselves. Therein, the nation state would lose its importance and a new concept of regionalism would emerge in which the different cultures would complement each other, thus mutually compensating their imperfections. In this newly established regional body, the peoples would need to appreciate the characteristic values of other peoples and it would be necessary to ‘recognize the superior points of others.’ Like Matsushita, Kōyama considered kokutai to be the core of the Japanese self and ‘the source of moral vitality’. Japanese history convinced him that Japan was ‘the country that is overflowing with moral vitality.’ However, he did not abandon Western culture in general; on the contrary, the adoption of aspects of Western modernity had enabled Japan to take the position as a leading power in East Asia. Japan was a non-Western country but, at the same time, it was part of the modern, Western-centered world. The preservation of its unique kokutai enabled Japan to prevent the decline of its moral vitality and create a new world order through the establishment of the GEACPS. Unlike Yabe and Matsushita, Kōyama emphasized the positive impact that foreign cultures could have on Japan, as long as Japan preserved its kokutai. The specific character of each people within the sphere had its own value and contributed to the entry of a new stage in world history.14 At the third symposium that took place on 14 November 1942, about six weeks after the Navy Research Commission had published its Daitōa Kyōeiken-ron, Kōyama declared the establishment of the GEACPS to be the primary goal of the Greater Asian War. There would be no termination of the war until the achievement of this

12 Fujita Chikamasa, “Sekaishiteki tachiba to Nihon,” eshare.stut.edu.tw/EshareFile/2010_ 5/2010_5_25174510.doc, (accessed 2 March 2011). 13 Ibid. 14 Totsuka, “Kaigunshō no ‘Daitōa Kyōeiken-ron’,” pp. 81–97. 84 chapter 4 very goal. Kōyama was convinced that America itself would eventually come to appreciate the Japanese concept of a new order embodied in the GEACPS as it aimed at the creation of a ‘Wide American Continental Sphere’ (Bei-shū kōikuken) that resembled the Japanese concept. The American acceptance of the Japanese idea of a new world order would mean a total victory for Japan in a war that had ‘world-historical significance,’ and which would mark a turning point in history. To Kōyama, this Greater Asia War marked the end of the epoch of the nation state as it was an ‘all-out war’ (sōryoku sen) that was ‘not only an all-out war of the state but an all-out war of the co-prosperity sphere.’ This war could only come into existence if Japan would systematically make use of the resources available within the sphere.15 In his emphasis on overcoming the nation-state, Kōyama held a position quite similar to that of Rōyama Masamichi. In addition, his recognition of the diversity of cultures within the GEACPS resembled Rōyama’s point of view; Kōyama was far more optimistic about the differences between the various regions of the sphere benefitting the development of every country that was involved. Unlike Yabe and Matsushita, he did not aim to expel all foreign influences from Japanese culture nor did he want to apply the Japanese Imperial Way worldwide. Kōyama seemed convinced that the Japanese concept of regionalism would eventually prevail and he showed no concerns about the cultural differences between the member countries hindering the process of the GEACPS’s establishment. Hence, Kōyama belonged to the ‘exoteric’ faction of Japanese Pan-Asianism. The question now would be which of these intellectuals had the strongest impact on the navy’s vision of the GEACPS and what this meant for the Philippines. The chief of the Navy Ministry’s Research Commission, Takagi Sōkichi (1893–1979), was a close aide of Konoe and shared the latter’s attitude about war against the United States. He aimed at a ‘universal’ co-prosperity sphere that did not only serve Japan’s nationalistic purposes, and requested the cooperation of Kōyama. However, Takagi had to give up his post in June 1942 due to his ongoing opposition to war with the US. He later became Chief of Staff at Maizuru Naval Station.16 The resignation of Takagi might have contributed to a marginalization of Kōyama’s impact on the actual outline of Japan’s relations with other member countries of the GEACPS in the Research Commission’s Daitōa Kyōeiken-ron. Eventually, Kōyama’s idea of a mutual cultural exchange between the leading power Japan and the other regions did not find its way into the navy document.17 The treatise demanded the ‘complete

15 Fujita, Sekaishiteki tachiba to Nihon. 16 Totsuka, “Kaigunshō no ‘Daitōa Kyōeiken-ron’,” pp. 81–97. 17 Ibid. The Occupation Of The Philippines 85 abandonment of the idea of a democratic international order’ that included the ‘peoples’ right of self-determination and peoples’ individualism’. The liberation of the Asian peoples would only be possible if they ‘all positively played their part in the establishment of the GEACPS based on the self-awareness that they were liberating themselves.’ Thus, the liberation of the Asian peoples was ‘not a centrifugal division (enshinteki bunretsu) but a centripetal synthesis (kyūshinteki tōgō).’ Only the leading power, Japan, could be awarded independence and self-government.18 The treatise followed the ideas of Matsushita and Yabe, who had placed a strong emphasis on Japan’s role as the leading power and had opposed foreign influence on Japanese culture that would endan- ger the Empire’s identity. In Yabe’s model of the GEACPS the envisaged status for the Philippines was that of an ‘independent protectorate’ and Matsushita wanted the member countries to adopt the Japanese ‘Imperial Way,’ regardless of the historical or cultural specifics of the respective regions. Both scholars considered the cultural identities of the other member countries dangerous for Japan. This put countries like the Philippines in an inferior position, as they did not belong to the realm that shared the same script and culture (dōbun dōshu). Overall, the outline of the navy for the realization of the GEACPS did not hold very promising prospects for the Philippines: the archipelago would be heavily dependent on Japan, and the Empire would only approve a Philippine administration that would unconditionally accept the role of being a Japanese puppet government. The treatise did not reflect the optimistic or naive approach of the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists who believed in cultural and eth- nical affinities between Japan and the Philippines (or cultural exchanges like those proposed by Kōyama) that would make integration of the archipelago in the sphere much simpler. The document showed a rather pragmatic approach adopted by the navy to grant member countries of the sphere a degree of independence that would serve the Empire’s own purposes. According to Hatano Sumio, this outline was ‘nothing that responded to the requests of the people and the independent movements.’19 The Japanese army and navy sent personnel to the Philippines prior to the invasion in order to prepare the Japanese landings. In addition, many Japanese who resided in the Philippines engaged in preparatory measures.20 Even though the Navy Research Commission worked out a treatise that outlined the structure and purpose of the GEACPS, the army was concerned with the administration of the ‘liberated’ countries.

18 Hatano, Taiheiyō sensō, p. 58. 19 Ibid. 20 Yu-José, Japan views the Philippines, pp. 157–58. 86 chapter 4

Plans of the Japanese Army towards Philippine Administration at the Outbreak of the Pacific War As early as 31 March 1941, the First Department Research Section of the Army General Staff issued an outline for Japanese administrative policy in occupied territories in the event that it came to a war with the USA. This policy was entitled Nanpō sakusen ni okeru senryōchi gyōsei tochi yoko-an (Proposals for the Governance of Occupied Territories in the Southern Area of Operations). The section Tai-Bei sakusen ni tomonau Hitō shori hōsaku-an (Proposed Measures with Commentary Dealing with the Philippine Islands in the Event of War with the United States) detailed how the army would act with regard to the Philippine government, the Philippine economy and the Filipino people. Unlike, for example, the Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, the “Proposed Measures” were for internal use only, thus reflecting the real intentions of the Army General Staff in the Philippines. The General Staff formulated three basic objectives considering the operations in the Philippines: first, the Imperial Army would focus on the destruction of the American military bases and pay less attention to the acquisition of resources. Secondly, the Army Special Command would make every effort to win the trust of the Philippine government, even if it ‘stood on the side of the enemy.’ Along with the destruction of the American military power in the islands, the army would make ‘plans to enforce a gradual self-liquidation’ of the government if it did not give up its resistance. Finally, the army would have to confine itself to military measures and refrain from directly engaging in political matters, apart from providing the Philippine government with assistance in the establishment of a ‘new economic system.’21 The approach to win over the Philippine government resembled the aspirations of Dai-Ajia Kyōkai’s Hayashi Naoki, who had shown growing conviction towards the end of the 1930s and early 1940s that the Quezon government could be turned against America and that it would come to appreciate Japan’s Pan-Asianist policy.22 Nishimura Shinji was even convinced that the USA would take back its promise of independence for the Philippines because of the archipelago’s crucial role as an American stronghold for the domination of the entire Pacific area. Nishimura expected the Filipinos to resist the Americans ‘by the sword’ in this case and by then the time would be right for a Japanese-Filipino union.23 The Japanese army demonstrated this ‘exoteric’

21 Sanbō Honbu Dai-Ichi-bu Kenkyūhan, “Tai-Bei sakusen ni tomonau Hitō shori hōsaku-an,” in Nanpō sakusen ni okeru senryōchi gyōsei tochi yoko-an, Tokyo: 31 March 1941. 22 See for example Hayashi, “Hitō no tokusei kyōiku,” pp. 39–43. 23 Nishimura, Daitōa Kyōeiken, pp. 270–71. The Occupation Of The Philippines 87 pan-Asianist approach in its planning for governance of the Philippines after a Japanese invasion. Indeed, the report of the First Department Research Section came with a list of steps necessary to make the Philippine government sympathize with the Japanese cause. Under all circumstances, the Japanese Empire would guarantee Philippine territorial sovereignty and independence. In addition, Japan would provide aid in the fields of national defense and the economy. The respect for Philippine sovereignty was a central aspect of the paper:

The Imperial Government respects the sovereignty of the Philippine government and apart from matters that are inevitable as immediate neces- sities upon the conduct of military operations; the operating army will not put this sovereignty at risk and furthermore guarantee the safety of the Filipino people’s resources for life [. . .].24

If the Imperial Army would cause any material damage, the Imperial Govern- ment was even ‘entrusted with the obligation of reparations.’ Furthermore, the army would force neither the Philippine government nor the Filipino people into any anti-American war operations. The assumption of the Research Section was that as soon as the American main forces were destroyed all resistance by the Philippine government and the population would automatically vanish. In the unlikely case that this strategy did not lead to immediate success and the Philippine government still resisted Japanese efforts, the operating forces would not ‘enact suppression by arms’ but occupy the ‘strategic loca- tions’ of gold and copper production. The goal was to remove the resistance slowly and carefully in order to establish a new government. In both scenarios (either winning over or removing the present Philippine government), the former anti-American resistance leader Artemio Ricarte and Manuel Roxas (1892–1948), the then government’s secretary of financial affairs, would serve as surrogates for the president. The report did not clearly define their respective roles. Overall, the First Department Research Section of the Army General Staff was very optimistic about the Philippine government not resisting the Empire. In this ‘supposed case,’ Japan would respect Philippine sovereignty, and refrain from interfering in administrative matters as much as possible. In addition, the army commander would seek cooperation with the government in administrative matters. Only in the event that the Philippine government showed an ‘inimical character’ would a military government become

24 Sanbō Honbu Dai-Ichi-bu Kenkyūhan, “Tai-Bei sakusen”. 88 chapter 4 necessary in the archipelago.25 The section of the report entitled “Steps towards the Philippine Government” (Hitō seifu taisaku) reflected much the same optimism that the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists had displayed, and a belief that both the Philippine government and people would soon come to realize the benefits of the Japanese invasion and give up their support for the US. In this regard, the first option of the army after landing in the Philippines would be not to give the impression of an occupying army but to gain the trust of the Filipinos. Nakano Satoshi describes this approach as an ‘appeasement’ policy that pursued the goal

to try and persuade the Filipino people that they should clear their past of material and psychological dependency on the United States and seek active cooperation in bringing the so-called Greater East Asian War to a victorious conclusion.26

In terms of industry and trade, the army area commander was to provide the Philippine government with guidance and support in order to establish ‘a new Philippine economic system.’ The Japanese Empire should invest in the production of iron, copper, hemp and gold and should actively engage in the exploitation of the gold and copper mines of the archipelago. At the same time, the production of sugar and tobacco needed to be restricted, as these were overproduced goods within the GEACPS.27 This meant the streamlining of the Philippine economy to the needs of the GEACPS and to those of Japan. Even though the report of the research section did not mention it, the focus on the production of gold and copper was obviously connected to Japanese war needs. The “Printed Instructions regarding proposed Measures with Commentary dealing with the Philippine Islands in the Event of War with the United States” (Tai-Bei sakusen ni tomonau Hitō shori hōsaku-an setsumeisho), which was also part of the “Proposals for the Governance of Occupied Territories in the Southern Area of Operations”, defined the plans for the integration of the Philippines into the GEACPS more precisely. Interestingly, the report pointed out that from the economic point of view the Philippines would not have much to offer for the sphere and Japan because of its strong dependence on the US:

25 Ibid. 26 Nakano, “Appeasement and Coercion,” pp. 21–58. 27 Sanbō Honbu Dai-Ichi-bu Kenkyūhan, “Tai-Bei sakusen”. The Occupation Of The Philippines 89

Therefore, if one looks at it [adding the Philippines to the GEACPS] from the point of supply and demand, against adding the Philippines to our economic sphere stands the extremely low acquisition of war resources and [. . .] the Philippine self-existence is still based now on trade relations with America [. . .].28

Philippine resources like sugar, copra, palm tree oil and tobacco would be difficult to digest within the sphere and the archipelago lacked materials that would be of value for the market of the GEACPS. Thus, exploitation of Philippine resources would not provide a justification for an invasion of the country, and would only be a by-product of a victory over American forces:

Only along with the enforcement of military operations that are determined by our ultimate goal of the ruination of the American Army’s bases of operations in the Philippines, we undertake the acquisition of resources. It is our main point to define the doctrine that there is no combat for resources.29

The Army General Staff concluded that due to the Philippines’ dependence on the US it would be necessary for Japan after the war to support the islands economically. The position of the Philippine government towards the outcome of the war needed careful examination as to how the government would resist the Japanese because of the long years of American leadership in the archipelago. The report nevertheless reflected the strong conviction of the army that defeating American forces in the archipelago would remove any hostile attitude from both the Philippine government and the population. Even though anti-Japanese resistance might continue after the destruction of the American bases in the islands, it would be only a matter of time until these hostilities would cease. The operating forces should even refrain from ‘con- straining’ Philippine resistance as this power was ‘not enduring’ anyway. It was the first option to win over the Philippine government for the purpose of the Philippines becoming part of the GEACPS,

28 Sanbō Honbu Dai-Ichi-bu Kenkyūhan, “Tai-Bei sakusen ni tomonau Hitō shori hōsaku-an setsumeisho,” in Nanpō sakusen ni okeru senryōchi gyōsei tochi yoko-an, Tokyo: 31 March 1941. 29 Ibid. 90 chapter 4

where it is impossible to look on the starvation of one nation that already generally prepared the system of an independent country and along with the beginning of operations, it is natural that we must apply a policy where we do not make the government stand on the enemy side.30

Hence, the Research Section of the Army General Staff took into account the status of the Philippines as a country on its way to independence. However, it also emphasized that the Empire would step in as a kind of nurturing power for the Philippines and substitute for America in this respect. In the case of subordination to the Japanese Empire, the Philippine government would stay in office as a ‘full autonomous administration’ and the Japanese army would interfere in administrative matters only, ‘for the purposes of assistance and leadership that are necessary to add the Philippines to the controlled economic environment of the area of operations.’31 The report listed numerous measures concerning the outline of Philippine governance. Japan should gain control over the Philippine economy by providing assistance with goods necessary for life, such as oil and flour. This would pay off for the Empire in the end despite all efforts that were necessary. It was clear that Japan could not gain much economically in the Philippines and only the enforcement of gold and copper production could contribute to the Japanese war effort. In addition, shipping companies needed to be run as government enterprises under Japanese control. The integration of the Philippines into the sphere would be a long-term process, as the GEACPS would have to fill the role the US had played in Philippine economy in the past. This resulted in the necessity of a plan made ‘on the assumption of one universal South,’ i.e. the full integration of the archipelago would have to take place after the conclusion of the war. Regarding the administration of the islands after a Japanese invasion, the “printed instructions” render more precisely the role of Manuel Roxas as a possible successor to president Quezon in a post-invasion Philippines. Whereas Artemio Ricarte was a ‘respected senior of president Quezon,’ Roxas would be the ‘the optimum person in charge that we can at present wish for as head of the resisting power against Quezon.’ The assumption of the General Staff was that Roxas only pretended to respect Quezon, while in fact opposing him.32 Apparently, the Army General Staff worked out a two- tier strategy: either Quezon would give up his pro-Americanism and cooperate

30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. The Occupation Of The Philippines 91 with the Japanese forces, or his own confidant Roxas (or the figurehead of anti- American resistance in the Philippines, Artemio Ricarte) would replace him.

The Appointment of the Military Administration The appointment of the Military Administration in the Philippines began three months prior to the official capitulation of the American troops in Corregidor on 6 May 1942. However, the initial plan of winning over President Quezon as head of a Philippine administration under Japanese guidance failed. Quezon decided to accompany General Douglas MacArthur (1880– 1964) first to Corregidor and eventually to Australia, despite his dissatisfaction with the American defence policy in the Philippines. In a letter that he wrote to MacArthur on 28 January 1942, Quezon expressed both his loyalty to the US as well as his disappointment in the general:

We decided to fight by your side and we have done the best we could and we are still doing as much as could be expected from us under the circumstances. But how long are we going to be left alone? Has it already been decided in Washington that the Philippine front is of no importance as far as the result of the war is concerned and that, therefore, we can expect no help here in the future, or at least before the power of resistance is exhausted? If so, I want to know, because I have my own responsibility to my fellow citizens whom, as President of the Commonwealth, I have led into a complete war effort. [. . .] It seems that Washington does not fully realize our situation or the feelings, which the apparent neglect of our safety and welfare has engendered in the hearts of the people here [. . .].33

Following the proposed measures of the Army General Staff, Quezon’s refusal to participate in a Philippine government under Japanese occupation would automatically put Manuel Roxas in the position of the designated head of the Philippine administration. However, Jorge B. Vargas (1890–1980) became chairperson of the newly founded Commonwealth State Council on 23 January 1942. Soon afterwards, the Japanese re-baptized this the State Council Executive Commission, which they officially inaugurated on 26 January.34 On 2 February, the 14th Army Headquarters, under the command of General Homma

33 Gregorio F. Zaide and Sonia M. Zaide, Documentary Sources of Philippine History, vol. 11 (Manila: National Book Store, 1990), pp. 514–15. 34 Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, pp. 53–54. 92 chapter 4

ILLUSTRATION 7 President Quezon in November 1942. Source: Farm Security Administration—Office of War Information Photograph Collection, Library of Congress, Reproduction Number: LC-USW33-019075-C.

Masaharu (1887–1946), issued the “Third Briefing of Military Government Status (30 January to 10 February)” that defined exactly the envisaged structure of the Philippine administration under Japanese rule. The administrative structure that the army intended to implement in the Philippines was as follows:

1. Establishment of all Parts of an Administrative Structure for the Philippines Regarding all parts of the administrative structure, according to the first order from 23 January concerning the Military Administration, the existing structure will be unified and constituted as follows on 30 January.

Administrative Secretary/Director – Budget Bureau – Appointment Bureau for Civil Officials (all kinds of examination committees) – Executive Office of the Administrative Director (including an office that issues an official daily gazette, kanpō) – Supply Bureau (bureau for the purchase of supplies/provisions) The Occupation Of The Philippines 93

– Print Bureau – All Facilities of Government Management Domestic Affairs Section – Bureau for Domestic Affairs (office concerned with the 30 districts that form Greater Manila and all other specially organized areas) – Bureau of the Military Police – Bureau for Religion – Bureau for Statistics Finance Section – Bureau for the National Treasury – Taxation Bureau – Finance Bureau (Including banks and insurance) – Insurance Bureau for Government Officials – Bureau for special Intakes (Office concerned with charity expenses acquired through legal gambling) Section of the Administration of Justice – Justice Bureau – Prison Bureau – Appellate Court – Court of First Instance for each Region – Bureau of the Public Prosecutor for each Region – Local Court in each District – Committee for the Code of Law Section of Agriculture – Bureau for Agricultural Administration (Including domestic cultivation and rural infrastructure) – Bureau for Farm Animal Husbandry – Land Bureau – Bureau for Forestries and Fisheries – Science Bureau – Bureau for Commerce and Industry – Mining Industry Bureau – Weather Bureau Section of Education and Welfare – Bureau for Public Schools – Bureau for Private Schools – Bureau for Physical Education – Bureau for Hygiene (Including Quarantine Office) – Welfare Bureau (Including Labour Office) 94 chapter 4

– University of the Philippines – National Library – Various Research Groups (chōsakai) of the Country – Philippine General Hospital Section of Civil and Transportation – Civil Bureau – Communication Bureau – Transportation Bureau – Bureau for Public Utilities – Bureau for the Water Supply of the Capital Premium Court – Supreme Court (daishinin)35

Furthermore, the Military Administration intended to establish a Council (sangakai) as an ‘advisory organ for a smooth Philippine administration.’ The quorum of this council was 12 persons, with the chairperson being appointed by the command of the Greater Japanese Army. The army selected Jorge B. Vargas for this position.36 A very crucial aspect was the appointment of directors (shidōkan) and counsellors (hosakan) to each administrative section. The directors were ‘subordinates of the heads of the Military Government’s sections’ and their job was to ‘provide administrative supervisory guidance (gyōseijō no kantoku shidō).’ The councellors were subordinate to the directors. The ‘supervisory guidance’ of the directors and councilors should ensure that the orders and instructions of the army commander (gunshireikan) and the heads of the military administration sections (gunseibuchō) were ‘thoroughly’ followed.37 As these directors and advisors were all Japanese, it was obvious that even though Vargas was the formal chairperson of the Executive Commission, the administrative body would be entirely under Japanese control. The Spanish priest and eyewitness of the Japanese occupation, Juan Labrador, came to the following judgment concerning the Executive Commission:

Everybody knows this is a puppet government. Behind it is an invisible government, which actually rules and governs. [. . .] All of us know that neither Vargas nor anyone of his subordinate officials can lift a finger

35 Dai Jūyon Gun Shireibu, “Gunsei jisshi gaikyō hōkoku, dai san gō, ichigatsu sanjū nichi shi ni gatsu tōka,” Rikuamitsu Dainikki, vol. 7, 1942, pp. 407–11. 36 Ibid., pp. 412–13. 37 Ibid., pp. 415–16. The Occupation Of The Philippines 95

without the permission of the ‘shadows’. Well-informed persons have assured me that Vargas is always accompanied by a Japanese officer in his house, in the office and in the streets. Even in going to church, he is accompanied in the car by an officer who remains at the door of the church where he is within view.38

Eventually, the belief of the ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist faction that the Philippine government would change sides after the Japanese invasion was not fulfilled. Hence, the Japanese installed a military government, just as the “Proposed Measures” of the Army General Staff from March 1941 had suggested. Nevertheless, the Japanese kept seeking cooperation from the old Philippine Commonwealth elites; besides Vargas, Lieutenant General Maeda Masami (1892–1953), Homma’s Chief of Staff, contacted other high-ranking representatives of the Commonwealth. The Japanese believed that the old elites could help with the disarmament of the remaining Filipino forces and the re-institution of law and order as well as with promoting the acceptance of the Japanese directors and councilors within the administration.39 Thirty-two officials of the Philippine Commonwealth, headed by Vargas, responded to Homma in a letter in which they assured him of their willingness to cooperate and contribute to the establishment of an administration in line with the plans of the 14th Army Headquarters:

We beg to inform Your Excellency that, in compliance with your advice, and having in mind the great ideals, the freedom and the happiness of our country, we are ready to obey to the best of our ability and within the means at our disposal the orders issued by the Imperial Japanese Forces for the maintenance of peace and order and the promotion of the well- being of our people under the Japanese Military Administration. Consequently, we have constituted ourselves into a provisional Council of State and we are immediately proceeding to draft our Articles of Organization in line with Your Excellency’s advice.40

Even though the ‘exoteric’ approach to win over the entire Quezon government had failed, to the Japanese the integration of the Philippines into the GEACPS with the help of the old elites remained a focal point in the planning of the

38 Labrador, A Diary of the Japanese Occupation, p. 54. 39 Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, pp. 53–54. 40 Zaide and Zaide, Documentary Sources of Philippine History, vol. 11, p. 511. 96 chapter 4

ILLUSTRATION 8 Jorge B. Vargas and General Homma. Source: Public Domain.

Philippine administration. Colonel Utsunomiya Naokata, who was Deputy Chief of Staff and director of the General Affairs Department in the Japanese Military Administration, emphasized the importance of the Commonwealth elites for a smooth administration of the islands. Completely aware that the majority of the Filipinos did not consider the Americans as enemies at all, he found it crucial not to offend the pro-American Filipino elites by the execution of a policy that would mean complete discontinuity of Commonwealth rule.41 Nakano Satoshi defines the outline of the Japanese occupation policy as an attempt to ‘appease’ Filipinos and slowly make them give up their pro- American attitude. Philippine historians Renato and Letizia R. Constantino leave no room for doubt in their comment on the outline of the Japanese administration: the GEACPS was overall nothing but a façade for the Japanese desire to exploit the Philippines according to their own war needs:

A spurious anti-colonial posture with vague promises of prosperity and projection of an Asian identity under the auspices of a very real and per-

41 Nakano, “Appeasement and Coercion,” pp. 21–58. The Occupation Of The Philippines 97

vasive Japanese military control of national life and exploitation of the country’s resources for the invaders’ war needs.42

Nevertheless, the Empire continued its efforts to gather information on the archipelago even after the inauguration of the Military Administration.

The Research Commission on the Philippines As early as January 1942, General Tōjō announced the Japanese intention to grant independence to the Philippines. Therefore, by the end of the year the “Research Commission on the Philippines” (Hitō Chōsa Iinkai) had been founded to assist the Japanese Military Administration and provide Japan with information on the history, culture and society of the archipelago.43 Numerous prominent Japanese scholars joined this commission, among them the Tokyo Imperial University professor Oshima Masanori (1880–1947), who would conduct research in the fields of education and religion and advise the Military Administration on such matters.44 Oshima had been to the Philippines in 1934 as a delegate of the “Society for International Cultural Relations” (Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai) with the purpose of investigating the perspectives of future Japanese-Philippine cultural relations. His visit initialized a series of professorial exchanges between Japan and the Philippines in the 1930s.45 The most prominent figure within the Research Commission, however, was its head Rōyama Masamichi. Rōyama, who harboured a very critical attitude towards the integration of Southeast Asia into the GEACPS as the most popular representative of the ‘esoteric’ canon within Japanese Pan-Asianism before the war, was in the Research Commission mainly concerned with research in the fields of politics and administration. He worked closely with his colleague Takeuchi Tatsuji (1904–?) who examined and analyzed Philippine history under Spanish and American rule. Takeuchi had received his higher education in the US from 1921 to 1931, when receiving his PhD in political science from the University of Chicago. After his return to Japan, he had joined Kansai Gakuin University near his hometown of Kobe, where he also served after the war as professor for Political Science and International Relations, as well as Dean of the School of Law. After his membership in the Research Commission on the Philippines,

42 Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, pp. 52–53. 43 Midori Kawashima, “Japanese Administrative Policy towards the Moros in Lanao,” in The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction, ed. Ikehata Setsuho & Ricardo Trota José (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), pp. 99–125. 44 Yu-José, Japan views the Philippines, pp. 144–45. 45 Grant K. Goodman, “Philippine-Japanese Professorial Exchanges in the 1930s,” pp. 229–40. 98 chapter 4

Takeuchi joined the staff of Ogawa Gōtaro (1876–1945), the Supreme Civil Advisor to the Burmese government from 1944 to 1945. Besides his teaching activities in Japan after the war, he also taught at various American universities, including Columbia and Hawaii. Takeuchi was responsible for the English translation of the second section of the Research Commission’s report on politics and administration. In his foreword to the English translation, he claimed in 1967 that the Japanese Military Administration exerted no pressure on the Commission and that the latter did not feel like serving any ‘particular political purpose.’46 Nevertheless, it was the Research Commission’s obligation to investigate the preconditions in the Philippines for integration into the GEACPS. The report that the Commission authored came up with numerous suggestions for future Japanese policy in the archipelago. Takeuchi Tatsuji closely analyzed Spanish rule in the Philippines and described the islands as being ‘under the constant dominance of the church’ during the long years of the Spanish occupation. Despite his criticism of the influence of the Catholic Church, Takeuchi conceded that Catholicism laid the groundwork for a Philippine national character as it worked as a unifying feature among the various Philippine ethnic groups. The strong interference of the clergy in the colonial administration, however, launched a ‘growing demand for recognition of human rights.’ In contrast, constant corruption within the clergy and among Spanish officials created a sentiment in the Philippine populace that privilege and abuse was something ‘natural and unavoidable.’ Therein, Takeuchi blamed Spanish rule for the Filipinos’ susceptibility to corruption and violation of the law—behaviour that was still present in the Philippines when Japan invaded the islands.47 In his account of American rule in the archipelago, Takeuchi compared the American administration with Spanish governance and gauged its impact on the Filipino people. In his analysis, Takeuchi figured out four fields of infiltration under American rule. These included the protection of individual rights, self-government, educational policy as well as health and public improvements. The impact of the European enlightenment, along with the example

46 Tatsuji Takeuchi, “Translator’s Introduction,” in The Philippine Polity: A Japanese View. Rōyama Masamichi and Takeuchi Tatsuji, trans. Tatsuji Takeuchi, ed. Theodore Friend (Yale: Monograph Series No. 12, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1967), pp. XXI–XXIV. 47 Tatsuji Takeuchi, “Survey of the Spanish Rule in the Philippines,” in The Philippine Polity: A Japanese View. Rōyama Masamichi and Takeuchi Tatsuji, trans. Tatsuji Takeuchi, ed. Theodore Friend (Yale: Monograph Series No. 12, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1967), pp. 1–27. The Occupation Of The Philippines 99 of the Mexican Revolution, had changed the attitude of the Filipino people and made them overcome the anger that they had developed during the long years of Spanish oppression. According to Takeuchi, it was effective and only natural for Americans to respond positively to the Filipino demands for the recognition of individual rights out of an awareness of their own history as colonial subjects of the British Crown. Therefore, Takeuchi concluded that there was no alternative to granting Filipinos far more self-determination than they had experienced under the Spanish. Instead of administering the Philippines from the central to the local level, the Americans removed the friars from their posts as government officials in the municipalities and strengthened the power of local government. This weakening of the Catholic Church’s influence also took place in the field of education, where a ‘system of general, non-religious, primary education’ was established. Takeuchi described education as a ‘formula of assimilation’ that was applied by the Americans to turn the Philippines into a country where the population would appreciate being part of an American-led hemisphere. The proliferation of the English language accelerated this process as it gave the different ethnic groups a common language. Takeuchi expressed appreciation for American achievements in education; the same was true for improvements in health and hygiene during American rule, which differed drastically from the colonial period under Spain. He conceded that the Americans had been able to gain the respect of their Filipino subjects with their administrative policies, but believed they had also enhanced the dependence of the archipelago on the US ‘psychologically and materially.’ Overall, Takeuchi considered the American efforts to improve Philippine education, health, hygiene and infrastructure as the implementation of the ‘American mode of social living’ and therefore as an attempt to Americanize the islands. Takeuchi formulated several points of criticism of American rule that centered on these four fields of American infiltration. One ‘defect in the American type of administration’ lay in its failure to allow Filipinos to develop a sense of duty towards state and society, as they were only concerned with the assertion of their civil rights. American-imposed education made many high potential youths leave their rural districts to seek employment in the urban centres, which caused a ‘defi- ciency in rural leadership.’ Most of all, the American education policy did not help to

develop or enhance a sentiment of nationality among the Filipino masses, to inspire them to become conscious of being Orientals, or otherwise to emphasize and nurture a sense of pride in being Asiatic. 100 chapter 4

Despite English functioning as a unifying feature among the peoples of the different Philippine islands, Takeuchi bemoaned the estrangement of the Filipino people from their cultural identity as Asians as they communicated in a Western language and adhered to American-imposed ideals. He also criticized the technological progress that American rule had brought about as this had only benefited people living in the metropolitan areas. While the urban centres and the export industry prospered, this contributed to the ongoing decline of the farming industry. Furthermore, American rule had failed to produce a ‘healthy middle class’ in the Philippines that could function as the backbone of the society. The new political elite in the Philippines, which consisted of the so-called ‘lawyer-politicians’ and who had replaced the Catholic priests in the local governments, were continuously obliged to obtain concessions from the Americans with regard to the question of complete Philippine independence. Takeuchi concluded that the new type of Filipino politician came from the legal profession, as the single role of this politician was to act as a peoples’ advocate in front of the American sovereign. Takeuchi criticized Philippine independence movements as ‘politically naïve and strategically unsound’ in their attempt to prepare for the complete independence of the islands. While granting the Philippines an extended amount of sovereignty, the Americans increased the degree of economic dependence of the archipelago on the US. Takeuchi concluded that it was part of America’s overall world policy to turn the Philippines into a country that economically depended on the US but also felt politically and culturally close to America.48 Despite Takeuchi’s critique of American rule in the Philippines, he was obviously aware of the positive effects that the US administration had had on the islands in comparison to the years under Spanish colonial rule. He also knew about the massive impact that American rule had on cultural life in the Philippines and the Westernization that the years of American administration had brought about. This awareness made him cautious about the kind of administrative policy that Japan should apply in the Philippines. Takeuchi clearly advocated a ‘Re-Orientalisation’ of the Philippines by criticizing the estrangement from their original culture that the islands had experienced during American rule. Even though he left concrete suggestions for Japanese occupation policy in the archipelago to his superior, Rōyama Masamichi, Takeuchi’s

48 Tatsuji Takeuchi, “Characteristics of American Rule in the Philippines,” in The Philippine Polity: A Japanese View. Rōyama Masamichi and Takeuchi Tatsuji, trans. Tatsuji Takeuchi, ed. Theodore Friend (Yale: Monograph Series No. 12, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1967), pp. 28–81. The Occupation Of The Philippines 101 analysis of Spanish and American rule in the Philippines reflected his ‘esoteric’ pan-Asianist views. As the occupation of the islands had already begun it was too late for Takeuchi to raise doubts, as Rōyama had done prior to the war, about the chances of integrating the Philippines into the GEACPS. However, his detailed examination, especially of the American administration’s impact on the islands, shows that Takeuchi knew that winning Filipinos over to the cause of the GEACPS would not be the self-fulfilling prophecy that the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists had predicted. Rōyama Masamichi himself was clearer in making suggestions for Japanese administrative policy in the Philippines in his analysis of the Philippine Commonwealth and the prospects for Philippine independence. Rōyama did not only describe the political structure of the Commonwealth, but also Filipino reactions to the administrative reforms that the Americans had carried out from 1935. He concluded that despite the American efforts to provide the Filipinos with public education, still ‘an overwhelming majority of the people do no thinking.’49 Rōyama conceded a strong propensitiy amongst the Philippine population for rumour and propaganda, and argued that this had contributed to their inability to formulate their own political will. In his account of political movements in the Philippines during the Commonwealth regime, Rōyama referred to the Sakdalista movement of Benigno Ramos as the white hope of the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai for a short time, as a Japan-friendly political alternative to President Quezon in the late 1930s.50 He believed that the Sakdalistas correctly recognized the problem of economic dependence on the US that had hindered the re-organization of a Philippine state. However, in Rōyama’s view, the movement lacked both structure as well as organization and thus could not ‘develop into a political party on a national scale.’ Even though Rōyama showed some appreciation for American education policy, he criticized the fact that the illiteracy rate was still at so high a level that it caused political indifference among the populace and hindered the ‘formation of a healthy public opinion in the Islands.’ Besides re-organization of the Philippine economy, Rōyama suggested as counter-measures against the political state of underdevelopment the extension of public education

49 Masamichi Rōyama, “Government and Politics under the Commonwealth Regime,” in The Philippine Polity: A Japanese View. Rōyama Masamichi and Takeuchi Tatsuji, trans. Tatsuji Takeuchi, ed. Theodore Friend (Yale: Monograph Series No. 12, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1967), pp. 82–130. 50 See again Hayashi, “Ramosu no kikoku to sakudaru-tō,” pp. 40–43. 102 chapter 4 and ‘organized training to cultivate and develop elements which can be the mainstay of the country.’ According to Rōyama, young Filipino intellectuals were obliged to take these measures but since the country was already under Japanese rule when he filed his report, he obviously considered it Japan’s duty to support these efforts. Rōyama, who had pointed at the cultural specifics of the various Southeast Asian regions before the war, paid special attention to the role of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, whose present political power he found difficult to gauge. The church needed to ‘modify its general attitude and policy’ and cooperate with the new administration of an independent Philippines.51 In this regard, he also demanded cooperation between the Catholic Church and the Japanese authorities as long as they were present in the islands, and Catholic acceptance of the Philippines being part of an Asiatic regional bloc. In the report of the Research Commission’s section on the “Formation of an Independent State,” Rōyama again defined the common experience of the Filipino resistance against Spanish rule as an important factor for the development of a common sense of nationhood, and claimed that the impact of the Mexican Revolution in 1910 had increased this even further.52 Filipino historian Teodoro Agoncillo, in his analysis of Filipino nationalism, comes to a similar conclusion regarding the impact of Spanish rule on the development of a sense of nationhood in the Philippines. According to Agoncillo, until the second half of the 19th century, every uprising against the Spaniards failed due to the lack of ‘unity and ideology’ in the archipelago with all its different ethnic groups.53 The foundation of the Katipunan (Association) Movement in 1892 by Andrés Bonifacio (1863–1897) was a response to the unwillingness of the Spaniards to approve political reforms, which laid the groundwork for the Philippine Revolution even though the Filipino elites largely ignored it.54 Rōyama concluded that after the Philippine Revolution the Americans were left with the single option to grant the Filipinos more and more sovereignty rights throughout the following decades in the form of constitutional power. This changed the Filipino campaign for independence into a ‘constitutional proce-

51 Rōyama, “Government and Politics under the Commonwealth Regime,” pp. 82–130. 52 Masamichi Rōyama, “Formation of an Independent State,” in The Philippine Polity: A Japanese View. Rōyama Masamichi and Takeuchi Tatsuji, trans. Tatsuji Takeuchi, ed. Theodore Friend (Yale: Monograph Series No. 12, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1967), pp. 131–53. 53 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, Filipino Nationalism, 1872–1970 (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1974), p. 4. 54 Ibid., pp. 11ff. The Occupation Of The Philippines 103 dure’ that would ultimately lead to an independent Philippine state. The only condition set by the US was that of a ‘stable government.’ Rōyama asserted that Filipino nationalism was born under Spanish rule while it achieved ‘internal independence’ under the Americans. Japanese rule in the Philippines thus marked the ‘third, and probably final, stage’ in the Philippines’ struggle for independence:

[Nationalism] will, at this stage under the leadership of Japan, possess for the first time a guarantee for its external security as a member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and thus be able to develop as an active factor in the formation of a truly independent state. Therefore the moral principle of hakko i-u, allowing each nation to enjoy its own proper position in the family of nations, constitutes the last essential for Philippine independence.55

Indeed, the Americans approved the foundation of nationalistic parties that propagated the goal of complete independence from the US. The most prominent party, the Nacionalista Party, won the elections for the National Assembly in 1907. While Rōyama claimed that the Americans had no choice but to allow this development, Agoncillo concludes that the Americans had an overall different approach to colonial policy compared to the European powers. It was, in particular, Governor General Francis Burton Harrison (1873–1957), who had actively supported the ‘Filipinization’ of the administration between 1910 and 1921. He strongly sympathized with the idea of complete Philippine independence at the earliest possible date. According to Agoncillo, the achievements regarding Philippine autonomy that had been made under a Democratic presidency in Washington could not be taken away again later by a Republican administration, and thus paved the way towards Philippine independence.56 In Rōyama’s point of view, the Philippines never possessed its own principles of government and always had to import these from the outside. In general, Filipinos accepted foreign principles, as long as these were adopted voluntarily. This principle needed to combine unity and freedom as well as duties and rights; only then would it constitute a ‘principle of moral justice’ that was ‘at the root of an Oriental political philosophy.’ Rōyama tried to prove that this original Oriental philosophy was not foreign to the Philippines by stressing the example of the Philippine national hero’s José Rizal’s (1861–1896) “Philosophy

55 Rōyama, “Formation of an Independent State,” pp. 131–53. 56 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, Filipino Nationalism, 1872–1970 (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 26ff. 104 chapter 4 of Redemption.” According to Rōyama, this was not an imitation of Western philosophy but ‘a synthesis between Christian culture and Oriental idealism.’57 Apparently, Rōyama used a similar approach to that of the ‘exoteric’ pan- Asianist faction by attempting to demonstrate an historic affinity between Philippine culture and the core principle of the GEACPS. Rōyama had been more than critical towards the prospect of an integration of Southeast Asia into the sphere because of the huge cultural differences between this region and Japan. However, due to the fact that occupation of the Philippines was already in progress, he was obviously willing to look for points of similarity rather than differences. With his assertion from 1941 that the preconditions for an inclusion of the Southeast Asian region into the GEACPS did not yet exist, Rōyama seems to have revised his opinion for the Philippines two years later. On the other hand, he had no real choice but to look for similarities, as the archipelago was already under Japanese occupation and there was no alternative to granting it independence within the framework of the GEACPS if Japan did not want to lose its credibility as liberator. Therefore, Rōyama drew up suggestions regarding the political character of the Philippines as a member of the sphere. As a state form, Rōyama proposed a ‘national republic’ that would fit the Philippine national character. This should not be ‘based on the principle of individualism or democracy.’ Instead, it would be necessary to extend inherent Oriental traditions such as ‘family spirit’ and ‘filial piety’ into a principle that could bind the entire nation together. The head of state needed to be legitimized not only by public elections; he should also be selected ‘based on a truly Oriental principle of justice.’ Rōyama described Quezon’s presidential rule during the Philippine Commonwealth as a ‘personal dictatorship’ that should be avoided, but at the same time he called for a strong president who would be advised by a Council of State composed of experienced and respected persons. Regarding the legislature, Rōyama wanted this to function as a ‘popular representative organ’ to serve the purpose of unifying the nation. He named the KALIBAPI a ‘national service organization’ and believed that its spirit would ‘permeate the legislature.’ In the following chapter, I will discuss the role and structure of the KALIBAPI as a political party, as well as its attempts to realize pan-Asianist ideas in the Philippines. From government officials who traditionally enjoyed large privileges in the Philippines, Rōyama expected the will to sacrifice these for the sake of the nation. Rōyama conceded that the domination of Philippine society by lawyers and politicians had led to the marginalization of scholars, entrepreneurs and other groups. Therefore, the

57 Rōyama, “Formation of an Independent State,” pp. 131–53. The Occupation Of The Philippines 105

Philippines still had ‘to pass the stage Japan had reached at the time of the restoration period.’ An independent Philippines needed a ruling class that could form the ‘backbone of the society,’ and the absence of such a class so far drove Rōyama to the conclusion that Philippine society was ‘too weak to support an independent state.’58 This conclusion resembled, to a certain extent, Rōyama’s assertion about the conditions in Southeast Asia regarding integration into the GEACPS. Despite his positive assessments regarding the Oriental traditions in the Philippines that would allow for the implementation of Oriental political principles, Rōyama did not consider the Philippines ripe for independence by 1943. Therefore, he suggested a complete reform of the Commonwealth state:

– Reform of the legislature: As the Commonwealth legislation served only the interests of legislators (i.e. the lawyer-politicians), a ‘Board of Legislative Affairs’ under cabinet responsibility had to be established. This would examine all bills. The legislature should no longer regulate the organization of administrative departments. – Regarding the executive, the president should determine the internal organization of the government’s executive branch under the advice of the Council of State. – Reorganization of the police system: A clear distinction had to be made between the police and the army. – In the case of the economy, it was crucial in Rōyama’s view to put the economy under control during the war and therefore it was necessary to establish an ‘Economic General Staff.’ The KALIBAPI should work as ‘an organ for mass mobilization and propaganda’ to gain the support of the people. This was an important condition if such a ‘controlled economy’ was to work. – The Philippine civil service needed a ‘new morale’ and motivation among its officials so they could gain respect and promotion through their own mer- its and capabilities. Rōyama emphasized the importance of a sense of duty towards the state among government officials (something that he believed was lacking in the Philippine administration at the time).

Furthermore, Rōyama also made suggestions for the future foreign policy of the independent Philippines. As a country that had constantly been under the control of a foreign power, the Philippines lacked a vision of an original foreign policy. Rōyama distinguished three schools of thought among Filipinos regarding foreign relations:

58 Ibid. 106 chapter 4

1. Quezon and most of his colleagues in the Commonwealth government assumed that European influence in East Asia would continue and therefore aimed to secure Philippine independence by ‘international law arrangements’ with Western countries. 2. A minority group around people like Pio Duran advocated a close alliance with Japan based on an Asian Monroe Doctrine. 3. A third school pursued the ‘theory of cultural regionalism’ in the course of the various independence movements all over Asia and demanded that the Philippines seek emancipation from the West. This school of thought was based on the ‘Asia is One’ theory of Okakura Kakuzō, and propagated by José P. Laurel (1891–1959) and Maximo M. Kalaw (1891– 1955). This third school of thought was, of course, close to the second as they both centred on pan-Asianist ideas.

However, according to Rōyama, by the outbreak of the war in 1941 the majority of Filipinos favoured an ‘opportunist neutrality policy.’ Nevertheless, Rōyama claimed that there had been a change of attitude two years later when public opinion had shifted towards the former minority opinion. Rōyama emphasized that this had not happened due to pressure exerted by Japan. It was, rather, an ‘ideological transformation’ that had been accelerated by the advocates of the second and third school of thought.59 Whether this change of public opinion really took place, and what the Filipino attitude towards Japanese Pan-Asianism and the concept of the GEACPS was like at the beginning of and throughout the period of Japanese rule will be the subjects of investigation in the fifth chapter of this book. Rōyama underlined the necessity to make clear to the Filipinos that the construction of the GEACPS was an act of emancipation that had to go along with the war. At the same time, Filipinos needed to realize that the American approach towards the self-determination of nations neglected a framework of duties and therefore lacked the principle of ‘moral justice’ that was at the root of the ‘New World Order’ envisaged by Japan:

The foundations for an independent Philippine state will have been laid when the people recognize and accept, corresponding to individual rights and duty to the state, the importance of formulating a programme, organizing for duty, and cooperating toward the building of a regional order of co-prosperity and co-existence in Eastern Asia.

59 Ibid. The Occupation Of The Philippines 107

The Philippines had to become aware of its own ‘positive mission’ and its ‘special character’ due to its geography and culture. Following Rōyama, the principle of the state was unequal to the principle of nationality, as the Philippine national identity resulted from its role as part of a bigger unit, i.e. a ‘larger regional order,’ which was of course the GEACPS. Thus, it was the obligation of the new Filipino leaders to make this doctrine popular among the Filipino people. In this way, Rōyama also considered it to be of the utmost importance that the Filipinos understood the difference between the Japanese-imposed economic policy and the colonial policies of the past, as they were certainly sensitive towards the exploitation of their resources. Therefore, Rōyama demanded a new international law that was ‘applicable to the coming regional order, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.’ Concluding the report’s section on administrative reform of the Philippines, Rōyama once more emphasized the difficulties that the integration of the Philippines into the sphere would bring about:

We shall be content to point out, in this connection, that the psychological and political obstacles to be overcome are not to be ignored or underestimated and that no effort should be spared in eliminating such impediments as speedily as possible.60

This statement shows that Rōyama was still critical about the implementation of Pan-Asianism in the Philippines upon the completion of his research in the archipelago in 1943. If Takeuchi can be believed and there had been indeed no political pressure put on the Research Commission by the Japanese government, Rōyama’s analysis reflects both his belief in the creation of a new regional order and his concerns about the historical and cultural specifics of a country like the Philippines, concerns he had expressed already prior to the war.

Conclusion The Japanese Navy’s planning of the GEACPS involved a discourse among the participating scholars in the Navy Research Commission. The faction of Yabe Teiji and Matsushita Masatoshi finally prevailed and the treatise published by the commission highlighted a stance in which a strong position would be assumed by Japan as the leading power in a Japanese-dominated regional bloc. Yabe Teiji envisioned for the Philippines the role of a semi-independent protectorate and strongly opposed the ‘exoteric’ approach to define a common

60 Ibid. 108 chapter 4

Oriental identity based on cultural or even racial affinities. Overall, the navy’s outline for the creation of the GEACPS was very pragmatic and followed Japanese war aims. In its focus on Japanese nationalistic interests, it resembled the Southward Doctrine (Nanshin-ron) that the Japanese navy had pursued since the early Meiji era. On the other hand, the Japanese army put a strong emphasis on winning over the present Philippine government, as can be seen in the report of the First Department Research Section. The “Proposed Measures with Commentary Dealing with the Philippine Islands in the Event of War with the United States” reflect the hopes of the Pan-Asianists of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai who were convinced that the Philippine government, as well as the Filipino people, would soon come to realize the substantial benefits that the Japanese policy had to offer. In this regard, the army’s planning stages for the Philippine occupation followed an overall ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist school of thought. Osamu Kuno described the Japanese military during the Meiji era as the only group ‘at the top of the power structure’ that supported the ‘exoteric’ ideology of unconditional emperor worship.61 Applying Kuno’s terminology to Japanese Pan-Asianism regarding the Philippines, the army maintained its tradition of clinging to the traditionalist ideology. The army advocated an occupation policy that would convince the Filipinos of the benefits of the GEACPS. The ‘exoteric’ approach would be the guidelines for the Japanese administrative policy in the Philippines and not simply be used as a façade to win over the masses. By the time of the invasion, it became apparent that the greater part of the Quezon administration, and President Quezon himself, would not change sides and cooperate with the Japanese as the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists had predicted. Nevertheless, the army continued with its plans to rule the Philippines through the old Commonwealth elites. The fact that the Japanese government in Tokyo sent a Research Commission to the Philippines more than one year after the actual invasion took place shows that the overall planning of the administration policy followed a very strict timetable. Despite cultural and educational exchanges between Japan and the Philippines prior to the war and the research that had been conducted by Japanese scholars on the archipelago, there seems to have been an awareness within the Imperial Government that the Philippine case needed further examination, especially in regard to the implementation of pan-Asianist ideas. Assuming that Tokyo considered the possible difficulties in convincing the Western-orientated Filipinos of the concept of the GEACPS, a logical consequence seems to be that the ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianist Rōyama Masamichi was sent to the Philippines. Rōyama had emphasized the obstacles to the establishment of the sphere imposed by cultural and historic

61 Kuno, “The Meiji State,” pp. 60–80. The Occupation Of The Philippines 109 specifics in Southeast Asia before the Pacific War broke out. His suggestions for a policy that would smooth the integration of the Philippines into the GEACPS demonstrate his conviction that Japanese Pan-Asianism needed to adapt to Philippine circumstances. The report of the Research Commission reflects, to some degree, Rōyama’s caveats; at the same time, it provided a blueprint for the realization of Japanese ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianism in the Philippines. In what form and to what extent did the Japanese administrators put this outline into action? The following sub-chapter will examine this question.

The Execution of Japanese Occupation Policy in the Philippines

This section will focus on how, and to what extent, the Japanese implemented pan-Asianist ideas and the concept of the GEACPS in the Philippines. After Manila had been declared an open city on 25 December 1941, the people in Manila and across the entire island of Luzon faced the Japanese invaders. The Philippines was to become a part of the GEACPS, as Japan had propagated. After the American retreat from Manila, there was looting throughout the city. The police were left to watch this plundering in silence, as they had handed over their firearms beforehand. Indeed, some police officers even joined the looting.62 On 2 January, Japanese troops eventually entered Manila. In his diary, the Spanish priest Juan Labrador remembered the event and how the Japanese restored peace in the city:

The Japanese have entered Manila, but not a single Japanese soldier can yet be seen in the streets, and the looting has become still more rampant. [. . .] Very few really know anything about the entry of the Japanese forces. It is said that some officials have occupied the most important offices. In the afternoon, motorized troops moved through Rizal Avenue and Taft Avenue. There were few of them and they had not fired a shot. Later in the afternoon, the Japanese officer ordered the police to patrol the streets with fixed bayonets to put a stop to the lootings. The occupation of Manila could not have been more peaceful. The people are keeping to their homes, with total indifference to the occupiers. Only a number of Japanese, released the day before from their concentration, greeted the incoming forces with “Banzai’s” which were barely heard except by their victorious countrymen.63

62 Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Oscar M. Alfonso, History of the Filipino People (Quezon City: Malaya Books), 1967, pp. 465–66. 63 Labrador, A Diary of the Japanese Occupation, pp. 40–41. 110 chapter 4

On the island of Cebu, south of Luzon, the picture was different. Cebu City did not surrender to the Japanese and thus the Japanese heavily bombarded the city. An eyewitness to the Japanese attack was Paul Lindholm, an American citizen who worked with his wife at Silliman University in Dumaguete. They fled to the Northern Cebu community of Guihulngan prior to the Japanese invasion of Manila. From there Lindholm watched the bombings of Cebu City:

We had expected such. It was in keeping with the announcement of the invaders the day they occupied Manila, January 2, 1942: offering resistance [. . .] leads the whole native land to ashes.64

On 21 January 1942, Tōjō Hideki who had succeeded Konoe Fumimaro in October of the previous year as Japanese Prime Minister, gave a “Statement on Japan’s Attitude towards the Peoples of Greater East Asia”. In this statement, Tōjō clarified the strategy and purpose of the “Greater East Asia War.” The main objective for waging the war was the creation of the GEACPS. Therefore, Japan had to secure all necessary resources for the war against the Western powers. Independence for the countries of the GEACPS would be a side effect, but not the main purpose of the war:

The cardinal point in the War of Greater East Asia, which our Empire is now prosecuting (sic), is to secure strategic bases in Greater East Asia and to bring the regions with important resources under Japan’s control, thereby augmenting our fighting strength, and in close cooperation with Germany and Italy, to extend increasingly vigorous operations and to fight through until the United States and the British Empire are brought to their knees. [. . .] Japan is now vigorously proceeding with the great task of establishing the sphere of common prosperity of Greater East Asia, while prosecuting military operations on a gigantic and far-flung scale, devoting the total strength of the nation. The basic policy of establishing the Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere has its origin in the great spirit which guided the foundation of our Empire, its aim being to enable each country and people in Greater East Asia to have its proper place and demonstrate its real character, thereby securing co-existence and co-prosperity based on ethical principles with Japan serving as its nucleus.65

64 Paul R. Lindholm, Shadows from the Rising Sun (Quezon-City: New Day Publishing, 1978), p. 18. 65 Hideki Tōjō, “The Premier’s Statement on Japan’s Attitude towards the Peoples of Greater East Asia. January 21, 1942,” in The Statements and Policy of the Imperial Japanese The Occupation Of The Philippines 111

ILLUSTRATION 9 Tōjō ( front) and his cabinet. Source: Public Domain.

Tōjō emphasized both the necessity to acquire resources in the occupied territories and the need to integrate these territories into the GEACPS. Japan would have to be the leading power in the sphere and its architects expected the Japanese people to devote all their strength to the purpose of establishing it. Tōjō also stressed what a great task the establishment of the sphere would be, as it incorporated different cultures and ethnic groups. According to Tōjō, all the regions that were to become part of the GEACPS shared the common experience of being suppressed in their cultural development by the Western powers. Tōjō also came up with an outline regarding the respective regions’ degree of independence within this ‘new world order’:

It is the intention of the Government that in this construction, the areas that are absolutely essential for the defence of Greater East Asia, will be controlled and dealt with by Japan itself, while regarding other regions, appropriate measures be taken as the war situation develops in accordance with the tradition, culture and other circumstances of each people.66

This idea resembled the model of the GEACPS that had been introduced by Yabe Teiji when he was a member of the Naval Research Commission in 1942.

Government regarding the present War of Greater East Asia, printed and published by G.C. Farde (Bangkok: The Bangkok Times Press, 1942), pp. 5–14. 66 Ibid. 112 chapter 4

Areas that were ‘absolutely essential for the defence of Greater East Asia’ were obviously those regions that could contribute most to the Japanese war effort. The official justification given for this war was the liberation of East Asia. Tōjō’s hint about taking into account the cultural specifics of the different areas suggests that he found it necessary to adapt the concept of the sphere to regional circumstances, i.e. to modify Japanese Pan-Asianism. The countries Tōjō intended to put under direct Japanese rule were Hong Kong and Malaya because these were the places mostly used by the British, ‘as bases for disrupt- ing the peace of East Asia.’ The Philippines and Burma should become independent as soon as their people had come to understand Japan’s motives for waging war:

As regards the Philippines, if the people of those islands will hereafter understand the real intentions of Japan and offer to co-operate with us as one of the partners for the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere, Japan will gladly enable them to enjoy the honour of independence. As for Burma, what Japan contemplates is not different from that relating to the Philippines.67

Tōjō Hideki envisioned for the Philippines not the role of a semi-sovereign protectorate as Yabe had, but that of an independent nation within the GEACPS after a transition period under a military administration. Referring to Tōjō’s speech, General Homma Masaharu, as the Japanese forces’ Commander-in-Chief in the Philippines, emphasized in front of a group of members of the newly founded Executive Commission the importance of emancipating the islands from the economic dependence on the US:

As our Prime Minister declared, our purpose in waging the current war is to crush the Anglo-American power in the Greater East Asia, because East Asia does not exist for Anglo-Saxons but for the East Asiatic peoples. Therefore, as to the Philippine Islands, the war was meant to establish the Philippines for the Filipinos as a member of the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, making a clean sweep of all the exploitations, outrages, insults and degenerations caused by the Americans during the last forty years.68

67 Ibid. 68 Masaharu Homma, “The full Text of the Speech given by the Chief of Staff of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines (At the Banquet given in Honor of Filipino Leaders in its Central Administrative Organization),” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military The Occupation Of The Philippines 113

Furthermore, Homma raised some examples of the bad influence that he believed American rule had imposed on the Filipino mentality.

For instance, it seems to us that the people of this country have long been taught by Americans to put too much importance on the material side and physical comfort of life. [. . .] The course which the Philippines should follow in the future will be the course to escape from her former position as a captive of the capitalism and imperialism of the United States, to liquidate the unnatural culture borrowed from a far away country and the industrial organization as a colony of a foreign power, to return to the original features of an oriental (Sic.) people shaking off van- ity and the dependent mentality, to reform the national life into simplic- ity and to reorganize industries which will make possible the cooperation of this country with its neighbours. We believe that a nation which indulges in pretty dresses, nice food, physical enjoyment and expensive fashions can never succeed in establishing a strong nation.69

Takeuchi and Rōyama repeated this criticism in the report of the Research Commission one year later.70 In his contribution to the Ethnic Nation Series (Minzoku sōsho) in 1943 Noguchi Hōichiro also harshly criticized the Philippine degree of Westernization and even conceded the absence of nationhood in the Philippines:

After all, from the perspectives of people, language, religion and thought the Philippines lacks the elements of a unified nation-state. The national character of the Philippines also shows the immoralities of vainglory, idleness, superstition, indecisiveness, self-interest and slander. This is very strictly speaking, but it is true because, in the end the degree of culture is low. The Philippines is subject to a climate of sweltering heat, and has been for many years a European and American colony or became half a colony. National self-esteem has vanished and she fell into the trap of following foreign countries in a worship of the powerful.71

Administration, vol. 2, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), pp. iii–vii. 69 Ibid. 70 Takeuchi, “Characteristics of American Rule in the Philippines,” pp. 21–81. 71 Noguchi, Daitōa Kyōeiken no minzoku. 114 chapter 4

Thus, Homma was in line with the assessments of many Japanese Pan-Asianists of his time who were concerned with the Philippines in connection with the concept of the GEACPS. Nevertheless, he expressed his conviction that the Philippines could overcome its deficiancies and become a worthy member of the sphere, if only the Filipinos would cooperate with Japan. The official addresses of Tōjō and Homma reflected both the ‘exoteric’ conviction that the Philippines could be quickly integrated into the GEACPS as well as the ‘esoteric’ awareness of obstacles imposed by cultural differences between Japan and the archipelago. At a dinner party at which Vargas and other members of the Executive Commission were present, Homma summed up his expectations in one sentence of his speech on the Emperor’s birthday on 29 April 1942:

It is my fervent wish that the Officials and Public in the Philippines will further renew their determination on this auspicious occasion, and manifest actual results of collaboration, based on the principle of co-existence, and mutual benefit, with Japan as the centripetal power.72

The Japanese military had clearly adopted the concept of a GEACPS with Japan as the leading power. It was obvious that propaganda was needed in order to convince Filipinos to give up resistance and go back to their daily routines. The restoration of law and order, along with propagation of the concept of the GEACPS, were the main tasks of the Japanese Military Administration in the early stages of the occupation.

Propaganda Measures Taken by the Military Administration In light of Japan’s experiences in societies such as Korea and Taiwan, the Department of the Military decided to establish a ‘special training group’ in 1938 that would work out plans to win over native populations in occupied territories. In 1939, an independent section within this group was founded. It concerned itself exclusively with the so-called ‘Southern Area’ consisting of Singapore, Malaya, Burma and the Philippines. As Motoe Terami-Wada explains, by this time the Japanese military ‘had begun to realize the importance of cultural maneuvering there.’73 These preparations went along with

72 Masaharu Homma, “Address of His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces, at the Dinner Party held in Felicitation of the Imperial Birthday, on April 29th, 1942,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 3, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), p. v. 73 Motoe Terami-Wada, “The Japanese Propaganda Corps in the Philippines,” Philippine Studies 38:3 (1990), pp. 279–300. The Occupation Of The Philippines 115 the planning of the First Department Research Section of the Army General Staff that I discussed in the previous chapter as the Japanese administrators soon transferred the ‘special training group’ from the Bureau of Military Affairs of the Military Department to the General Staff Office. For each of the four countries listed above, Tokyo recruited 150 men to conduct propaganda work in those areas. These groups consisted of intellectuals such as writers, painters, journalists and clerics. Their main duties were to convince the native populations of the good intentions of the Japanese army and to make enemy soldiers surrender. The drafting of these civilians into the Japanese army was possible due to the National Mobilization Law of 1938 that put large parts of the economy and the private sector under military control as well as enabling strict censorship of the media.74 In the Philippines, Lieutenant-Colonel Katsuya Tomishige headed the Propaganda Corps. He was a novice in the field of propaganda and left the design of activities to corps members. The Propaganda Corps landed along with the 14th Army on 22 December 1941. Up to 8 December, only the officers were aware of the destination of the mission. The army left the intellectuals that it had drafted into the corps unclear about their future field of operations until the day of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Corps members were briefed quickly on Philippine culture and customs with the help of small booklets, and were then asked to design leaflets that could explain the purpose of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in connection with the establishment of Greater Asia.75 Nakano Satoshi describes the purpose of the Propaganda Corps as ‘creating and maintaining relations of passive collaboration between the occupiers and occupied at the point of occupation in local Philippine society.’76 The Propaganda Corps itself was composed of three groups: writers, painters and interpreters. The leaflets the corps produced asked Filipinos to take up their daily routines again, to not resist the Japanese army and make USAFFE soldiers surrender. The following is an example for a leaflet that the corps distributed in Cebu on 4 July 1942:

The American influences have been completely driven from the East Asia as a result of the complete surrender of USAFFE and of the annihilation of the American Naval Forces. New Government of the Philippines was organized in Manila sometime ago and is constructing successfully a new

74 Motoe Terami-Wada, “The Cultural Front in the Philippines, 1942–1945: Japanese Propaganda and Filipino Resistance in Mass Media,” Master’s Thesis, University of the Philippines, 1984. 75 Terami-Wada, “The Japanese Propaganda Corps in the Philippines,” pp. 279–300. 76 Nakano, “Appeasement and Coercion,” pp. 21–58. 116 chapter 4

Philippines for the Filipinos under the guidance and direction of the Imperial Japanese Forces. Since hundreds of years ago, Japan has had very friendly relations with Philippines. The Imperial Japanese Forces are the most righteous Forces in the world; they are not as all devils as propagated by USAFFE, and they will never maltreat or harm law-abiding Filipino citizens. Convince Filipino Officers and enlisted-men to surrender their arms if you find them hiding. Any person who protects these Officers or enlisted-men will be severely punished according to the Imperial Japanese Military Law.77

In fact, the distribution of such leaflets showed some success as many Filipinos went back to their normal lives. In the early stages of the occupation, the population warmly welcomed the Propaganda Corps and there was a high demand for information materials among the Filipinos. The activities of the Propaganda Corps were in accordance with the outline set out by the Army General Staff to win over the population and convince the Filipinos of the idea of Greater Asia and the Philippines becoming part of the GEACPS. Therefore, newspaper companies, broadcasting companies and movie theatres had to re-open as soon as possible to re-create an ‘atmosphere of normality’ and serve Japanese propaganda purposes, as the Japanese administrators considered the Filipinos as a people who strongly believed the mass media. For the entertainment of the people, the Japanese even allowed American movies to be exhibited, although these had to undergo strict censorship; the same was true for Filipino movies and stage plays. The Japanese authorities also closely monitored the personal backgrounds of theatre owners and prohibited the production of new movies. Nevertheless, both the Manila Defense Headquarters and the Military Police (kempeitai) opposed the policy of the Army General Staff because of security concerns and their disapproval at the showing of American movies. Entertainment groups sought performance permission from the office of the Propaganda Corps, and often the Japanese administration utilized the revues of such groups for propaganda purposes as well.78 Back in Japan, not all military officials were convinced that the Philippines was developed enough to appreciate ‘sophisticated’ Japanese culture. Fuwa Suketoshi, the head of the Theatre and Film Section within the Information Bureau, considered the culture of most countries in the GEACPS retarded in the sense that the people would not be able to comprehend certain ‘aesthetically excellent’ Japanese movies

77 Lindholm, Shadows from the Rsing Sun, pp. 28–29. 78 Terami-Wada, “The Japanese Propaganda Corps in the Philippines,” pp. 279–300. The Occupation Of The Philippines 117 that consequently should not be shown in these regions.79 Fuwa wanted to strengthen traditional Japanese theatre and use it as a tool for the preservation of good morals in Japanese society.80 According to Tsumura Hideo (1907–1985), one of the most famous Japanese film critics of his time, who wrote mostly for the Asahi Shimbun, ‘all of the southern peoples, those of Burma, Malaya and Indonesia, and even the Philippines, remain in a very low condition of intellectual achievement.’81 Statements like this resemble the attitude of Yabe Teiji, who had warned about cultural interaction between Japan and the peoples of Southeast Asia. Obviously, the Information Bureau intended to utilize theatres and films first at home in Japan to propagate the concept of Pan-Asianism and Orientalism, as they considered the population in Southeast Asia too culturally underdeveloped to understand the content of these movies and stage plays. In the Philippines, only some Spanish fascist propaganda movies that had previously been banned under the American rule were exhibited.82 However, the main purpose of live theater and movies was the entertainment of the people. Until 1944, the Japanese allowed the showing of American movies in the Philippines.83 The Propaganda Corps meanwhile distributed ‘armistice tickets,’ or ‘surrender tickets’ that would allow Filipino soldiers to lay down their arms and avoid internment. And at the end of February 1942, a second group of Japanese civilians landed in the Philippines to join the propaganda activities. The most prominent of these new arrivals were Paul Yoshigorō Taguchi (1902–1978), the Archbishop of Osaka, and philosopher Miki Kiyoshi (1897–1945), who had been head of the Shōwa Research Association’s cultural section since 1937. In August of the same year, Tokyo decided on a name change for the Propaganda Corps and re-baptized it the “Army Department of Information” (Gun Hōdōbu).84 The cultural section or Cultural Problems Research Group under Miki Kiyoshi had originally been set up to develop a new ideological foundation for Japan’s China policy.85 Miki, a graduate of Kyoto Imperial University who had been

79 Peter B. High, The Imperial Screen: Japanese Film Culture in the Fifteen Year’s War, 1931–1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), p. 361. 80 James R. Brandon, Kabuki’s Forgotten War: 1931–1945 (Manoa: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), p. 136. 81 High, The Imperial Screen, p. 361. 82 Florentino Rodao, “Spanish Falange in the Philippines, 1936–1945,” Philippine Studies 43:1 (1994), pp. 3–27. 83 Brandon, Kabuki’s forgotten War, p. 194. 84 Terami-Wada,“The Cultural Front in the Philippines”. 85 Janis Mimura, Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 130. 118 chapter 4 denied an academic career due to his non-conformist lifestyle, was one of the most prominent philosophical writers in Japan at this time. As one of the leading intellectuals in his home country, he was obliged to establish a ‘cultural and philosophic foundation’ for the Shōwa Kenkyūkai, on which the brain trust’s proposed outline for Japanese foreign policy could be based. His participation in the Shōwa Kenkyūkai marked a turning point in Miki’s life as he had opposed the involvement of intellectuals in the field of political decision making up to that point.86 In the following year, Miki wrote an account of his experiences in the Philippines and concluded that the Filipinos possessed an ‘Oriental character’ (Tōyōteki seikaku). According to Miki, the ‘ideal of the foundation of the Japanese state’ was the ‘spirit of hakkō ichiu,’ and this was exercised in the ‘ideal of the family.’ The important role of the family in Philippine society proved to Miki that the ‘Oriental character’ had survived in the Philippines throughout the centuries of Western rule, and that the ‘family spirit’ was the core of the idea of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Just like his colleague Rōyama Masamichi in the Shōwa Kenkyūkai, Miki also criticized Western influences on Philippine society:

Thus, it is clear what the establishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere means for the Filipino people. What is now necessary for them is that they free themselves from the parasite mentality that can be seen in their family system up to now and understand the establishment of the new Philippines as something where they have to rely on their own power. Furthermore, if we look at their family system from the social point of view, [the establishment of the new Philippines is] something that eliminates the point of individualism (kojinshugi) that has been there. In addition, for the development of the family called the Philippines and for the peace of the family called the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, it awakens a spirit of self-sacrifice. It is understood that Japan has to combine parental authority and affection as well as an older brother’s guidance and support.87

Miki’s approach strongly resembled the views expressed by his fellow Shōwa Kenkyūkai member, Rōyama Masamichi, as well as those of General Homma, who had also criticized the absence of a sense of duty towards state and society

86 Lewis E. Harrington, “Miki Kiyoshi and the Shōwa Kenkyūkai: The Failure of World History,” Positions 17:1 (2009), pp. 43–72. 87 Miki Kiyoshi, Hyōron (3), vol. 15 of Zenshū, ed. Hirosumi Jirō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1967). The Occupation Of The Philippines 119 among the Filipino people. By driving out Western influences such as individualism and liberalism and implementing the idea of membership in the Asian family of nations within the framework of the GEACPS in the Philippines, Filipinos would come to realize their cultural roots as Orientals again. Lewis E. Harrington concludes that Miki was, by the time of his joining the Shōwa Kenkyūkai, an active supporter of Japanese expansionism as he ‘was firmly on the side of renovating and hence strengthening the effectivity of the imperialist Japanese state.’88 The “Cultural Problems Research Group” that Miki led within the Shōwa Kenkyūkai included amongst others, the afore-mentioned Yabe Teiji, who indeed advocated a form of Pan-Asianism that would most of all serve Japanese nationalistic interests. However, contrary to Yabe, Miki did not come up with a concrete political outline for the GEACPS that would assign to the Philippines the role of, for example, a semi-sovereign protectorate. He also did not oppose racial mixing between Japanese and peoples from the other regions of the sphere. Miki considered the cultural standard in the Philippines to be relatively high, an assessment that he shared with members of the Philippine Research Commission whom he had met just before his departure from the Philippines in December 1942.89 Miki Kiyoshi’s Pan-Asianism belonged to the ‘esoteric’ faction. The fact that he was drafted into the Propaganda Corps in the Philippines in 1942 and that the Research Commission the government sent to the archipelago about eight months later was headed by Rōyama Masamichi (who, like Miki, was a leading member of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai) indicate that the government in Tokyo shared some of these individuals’ reservations about the Philippines becoming a part of the GEACPS. On 31 July 1942, one day before he had to resign from his post as Commander-in-Chief of Japanese forces in the Philippines, General Homma gave an address to the Filipino people in which he once more outlined the purpose of the sphere and sketched his expectations of the Filipinos. This was the last time that Homma addressed the Filipino people and thus can be regarded as his legacy and testa- ment as commanding officer in the islands. According to Homma,

the ideal of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere is to establish, under the spirit of universal brotherhood, a firm and enduring structure by consolidating Asia for the Asians, and to create a permanent and lasting sphere of happiness and well-being for the peoples within the great area having geographical affinity. The process to realize this ideal is none

88 Harrington, “Miki Kiyoshi and the Shōwa Kenkyūkai”, pp. 43–72. 89 Yu-José, Japan views the Philippines, p. 167. 120 chapter 4

other than by the related peoples uniting themselves under the leadership of Japan, and by solidifying the bond of union, marching forward along the road of economic and political progress as a unit of peoples directly concerned with their own well-being and holding to a common ideal. The great aspiration of Japan since the founding of the Empire has been ‘To make the Universe a Home.’90 The aim is to see every people and every nation acquire their rightful positions under the sun. It is my firm conviction that the reconstruction of East Asia with closer relations among its peoples, with Japan as their spiritual support, will bring about not only the realization of the state of mutual well-being and prosperity, but also the establishment of an enduring peace among mankind.91

There were three cornerstones to Homma’s design for the GEACPS: ‘geographical affinity,’ hakkō ichiu and Japanese leadership. He emphasized that the Anglo-American powers had not only suppressed the peoples of East Asia but had also threatened the Japanese Empire’s very existence, and had forced Japan into the Pacific War. Even though the Filipinos had fought alongside American troops, the Japanese did not consider them enemies; instead, they saw them as misled victims of constant Western influence over the past decades. Just like Rōyama Masamichi, who argued that a ‘historical dynamic’ among the people was needed for the establishment of the GEACPS in respective member countries,92 Homma was convinced that without the Filipinos understanding the meaning of the sphere, the Philippines would inevitably fall back into a state of dependency on the US and could never become a sovereign state. In this respect, the Filipino people had to become aware of the contributions they would have to make towards the establishment of the GEACPS and be ready to make sacrifices just as the Japanese, or the German and Italian peoples in Europe, had done. As a first step in the creation of a ‘new Philippines,’ a ‘spiritual foundation’ was needed, as was a re-orientation of the Filipinos towards their Oriental roots:

90 “To make the Universe a Home” is another possible translation for hakkō ichiu. 91 Masaharu Homma, “Address to the Filipino People,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 6, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), pp. xv–xxi. 92 Rōyama, Tōa to sekai, p. 378. The Occupation Of The Philippines 121

What is a spiritual foundation? It comes of your return to the original racial characteristics, to the pure Filipino traditions, after ridding the masque of Occidental culture.93

Homma blamed Spanish and American rule for the estrangement of the Filipino people from their original culture and made the Americans responsible for the decline of morals in the Philippines:

As a result, the Oriental traditions of humanity and morals were effaced. The Filipino people turned to follow an easy-going life, consuming more than producing, and were led to hedonism and extravagance, conscious only of today, and oblivious of the morrow. Their sound racial characteristics were lost and they became the bold imitators of the American way of life which is devoid of introspection.94

In the report of the Research Commission, Rōyama concluded that the Filipinos had to become aware of their ‘positive mission’ towards building the GEACPS and needed to develop a sense of duty towards state and society that would function as a foundation for an independent Philippines.95 General Homma’s conclusion one year earlier had been very similar to that of Rōyama. He was also convinced that public support for the idea of the sphere within the Philippine population was necessary. Therefore, he appealed to the Filipinos to give up their pro-Americanism and remember their Oriental origins:

Arouse yourselves! I challenge particularly the younger generation who are destined to shoulder the responsibilities of the new Philippines. [. . .] Why should you follow the dictates of Europe and America with an inferiority complex? The time has come to assert yourselves as an Oriental people and to gain for yourselves, in company with other kindred races having geographical affinity, your proper place in the universal order of things. The times strongly call for a great spiritual revolution.96

Homma’s appeal reflects his awareness of the obstacles the Japanese had to overcome in their efforts to integrate the Philippines into the GEACPS. Just

93 Homma, “Address to the Filipino People,” pp. xv–xxi. 94 Ibid. 95 Rōyama, “Formation of an Independent State,” pp. 131–53. 96 Homma, “Address to the Filipino People,” pp. xv–xxi. 122 chapter 4 like the ‘esoteric’ pan-Asianist faction centred around Rōyama Masamichi, Homma knew that the Filipinos would not easily turn against the Americans and thus intended to evoke a movement supporting the concept of the sphere, especially among Filipino youth. The Propaganda Corps in the Philippines was one attempt to launch such a movement, or to generate a ‘historic dynamic,’ as Rōyama Masamichi called it. To the Filipino historian and poet Teodoro A. Agoncillo (1912–1985) all Japanese propaganda efforts were simple attempts to hide the Empire’s imperialist ambitions in the Philippines and General Homma had no credibility among the Filipinos. According to Agoncillo, the Filipinos ‘considered any attempt to persuade them to fathom their Oriental moorings as blasphemy’ and ‘a great majority of the people considered him [Homma], along with the other military officers, as barbarous and inhuman.’97 The Propaganda Corps not only incorporated famous Japanese intellectuals like Miki, but also utilized Filipino veterans and Sakdalistas for ‘Goodwill Missions.’ The corps approached, for example, General Artemio Ricarte and asked him to join these missions, but due to his poor health, he sent one of his granddaughters to speak in his stead. Nevertheless, Ricarte himself later made numerous speeches to support the Japanese in their efforts to win over his fellow citizens. The overall tenor of the addresses given during these ‘Goodwill Missions’ was that the Philippines could achieve true independence only under Japanese leadership and that people should resume their daily routines, as they had nothing to fear from the Japanese. The former president of the First Philippine Republic, Emilio Aguinaldo, also contributed to Japanese propaganda efforts by calling on Filipino soldiers to surrender to Japan through a radio broadcast. Aguinaldo also wrote letters to the Filipino guerilla chiefs to convince them that it was their duty to surrender to the Japanese. In a letter from 27 October 1942, he wrote:

You already know that in the present war between America and Japan it is not America but our country that is suffering from its dire consequences; and inasmuch as General Wainwright had already ordered the surrender of all troops, inasmuch as you belong to this disciplined army, it is imperative that you would also surrender yourselves to the Imperial Japanese Forces.98

97 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941–1945, vol. 1 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1965), p. 337. 98 Pedro M. Giminez, Under the Shadows of the Kempi (Manila: A. Navarez Publishing House, 1945), p. 54. The Occupation Of The Philippines 123

Tomas Confesor (1891–1951) was a public school teacher from Cabatuan, Iloilo, who had lived and studied in the US from 1910 to 1915. When the war broke out, he refused to surrender and began the life of a guerilla. Confesor survived the war and became, amongst others, Secretary of the Interior in the postwar Philippines. In a personal letter to Confesor Agiunaldo emphasized that Japan would grant the Philippines independence within the GEACPS and that it would be in vain to hope for a return of the Americans:

The Japanese have never considered the Filipinos as enemies; they have liberated the Filipino prisoners of war; they have put into our hands the internal government of our country; and they have officially announced to the world thru Premier Tozyo that if we cooperate in the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the Philippines would be for the Filipinos and we would be granted our independence with honor. We can no longer expect anything from North America. [. . .] Why should it matter to us if the independence comes from Tokyo instead of from Washington?99

The approach of the Propaganda Corps to explain the purpose of the GEACPS to the common people was, in general, quite simple, as sometimes the skin colour was referred to as a source of unity among Japanese and Filipinos, in opposition to the ‘white-skinned’ Americans.100 This suggestion of racial kinship between the Japanese and the Filipinos resembled the ‘exoteric’ pan- Asianist stream of thought. However, the idea behind the creation of the Propaganda Corps centred on the ‘esoteric’ assumption that it would take some efforts to overcome many cultural differences and convince the Filipinos of the concept of the GEACPS. The success of these propaganda efforts was rather moderate. Wachi Takaji (1893–1978), Director-General of the Military Administration, emphasized at a graduation ceremony for officers at the Central Constabulary Academy on 15 April 1942 that he was very pleased with the development of the Philippines as it was

rapidly undergoing metamorphosis from its empty shell of Occidentalism to a new and glorious rebirth as one of the leading Oriental nations, a proud member of the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater Asia under Japanese leadership.

99 Ibid., p. 56. 100 Terami-Wada, “The Japanese Propaganda Corps in the Philippines,” pp. 279–300. 124 chapter 4

However, despite the existence of those Filipinos who understood and appreciated Japan’s ‘real motives,’ there were still

remnants of misguided people who are blind to the fact that their acts of depredations and pillage are hurting no one but their own blood and kin, and that far from being patriots and heroes, their continued existence is a definite obstacle to the early attainment of Philippine Independence.101

In a way, Wachi’s address reflected the wishful thinking of the ‘exoteric’ Pan- Asianists that the Filipino people would come to appreciate Japanese policy. At the same time, he had to admit that a significant part of the population were still resisting the Japanese.

Japanese Economic Policy during the Occupation While the Propaganda Corps attempted to convince Filipinos of the good intentions of Japanese policy, the issue of the exploitation of Philippine resources also soon arose. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the First Department Research Section of the Army General Staff demanded the exploitation and cultivation of certain Philippine resources in March 1941.102 In an address before the Lower House of the Diet from 28 March 1942, Prime Minister Tōjō described the Philippines along with other areas as being ‘in the process of becoming bases for the sphere of new construction as peace and order are being restored, as they are making great strides towards rehabilitation.’ He also emphasized the necessity of utilizing resources in occupied territories to secure the autarky of the Japanese Empire and thereby the success of the ongoing war for the establishment of Greater East Asia:

By virtue of the magnificent victories of the Imperial Forces since the opening of the War of Greater East Asia, all the important resources for national defence in the regions of the South, such as oil, rubber, tin and others, have come into our hands, and the independent and self-sufficing position of our national economy has been further strengthened due, also, to our previous efforts. [. . .] In view of the absolute importance to

101 Takaji Wachi, “Instructions from His Excellency, the Director-General, at the Fourth Graduation Exercises for Officers, Central Constabulary Academy, April 15, 1943,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 11, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), pp. v–vi. 102 Sanbō Honbu Dai-Ichi-bu Kenkyūhan, “Tai-Bei sakusen”. The Occupation Of The Philippines 125

the prosecution of the total war of assuring the stability of our people’s livelihood, especially food supplies, the Government expects to leave no stone unturned in utilizing the resources of the whole of Greater East Asia, taking into consideration at the same time the economic requirements of the various peoples inhabiting this region.103

Ikehata Setsuho defines the exploitation of the Philippine mines as the primary reason for the Japanese occupation of the archipelago even though the mining industry was only poorly developed by the time of the Japanese invasion.104 The ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianist Nishimura Shinji came to the same conclusion in his assessment of the Philippine economy in 1942 when he described sugar, tobacco and hemp as the most important export goods, and the mining industry as ‘completely underdeveloped.’ Nevertheless, he mentioned the existence of coal, chrome, manganese and iron ore mines.105 The Japanese army planned for the exploitation of at least some of these resources from the beginning, even though it had declared the acquisition of resources a less important goal than the destruction of American military bases:

The goods that the Empire expects from the Philippines are iron, copper and hemp. Along with the largest possible production increase of these goods, we are examining the gold mines in Masbati Island, Mindanao Island, Surigao and Baguio on Luzon Island as well as the copper ore of Baguio and Panay Island. We acquire the mining rights for the promising mines from the Philippine government and if it becomes necessary we engage in the cultivation by the use of funds under the control of the area army, this support will be directly provided.106

In fact, by 1940, the Philippines was the number six producer in the world chrome-mining industry, and number ten in the manganese-mining industry, with a great deal of manganese ore being exported to Japan. The US was the

103 Hideki Tōjō, “The Premier’s Address before the Lower House of the Diet on the Progress of the War and on Economic Problems of the Greater East Asia,” in The Statements and Policy of the Imperial Japanese Government regarding the present War of Greater East Asia, printed and published by G.C. Farde (Bangkok: The Bangkok Times Press, 1942), pp. 35–53. 104 Setsuho Ikehata, “Mining Industry Development and Local Anti-Japanese Resistance,” in The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction, ed. Ikehata Setsuho & Ricardo Trota José (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), pp. 127–70. 105 Nishimura, Daitōa Kyōeiken, p. 71. 106 Sanbō Honbu Dai-Ichi-bu Kenkyūhan, “Tai-Bei sakusen”. 126 chapter 4 main customer for Philippine chrome. In the field of copper production, the Philippines was the leading country in Southeast Asia, with Japan its biggest customer.107 Thus, besides the military strategic importance of the islands, Japan had a crucial economic interest in the Philippines as the country produced some of the materials Japan needed for its armament production. Therefore, businesses related to the manufacturing of metals and minerals reopened as soon as possible after the Japanese invasion. A notification issued by General Homma on 5 January 1942 exemplifies the priority the Japanese administration gave to this sector:

All persons connected with the Business and profession listed below are urged to return immediately to their occupations and to make their rep- resentations to the Headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines (Location: Former Army and Navy Club). [. . .] (3) Dealers in and manufacturers of petroleum products (gasoline, benzine, diesel oil, etc.), iron, manganese, copper, chrome, coal, metal and non-metal minerals.108

It had always been the major goal of the advocates of the GEACPS to make East Asian trade and commerce independent from the West and stop the massive export of goods like chrome to the US. Teodoro A. Agoncillo concluded that the establishment of the GEACPS was nothing but a façade to hide Japanese imperialist ambitions in Asia. He described Japanese efforts to keep the entire trade within the sphere as the ‘economic blueprint’ for member countries. Exploitation of the respective countries’ resources for the supply of Japanese forces was the prevalent goal of the economic policy behind the GEACPS.109 Renato and Letizia R. Constantino concede that the Philippines was a country familiar with American indoctrination which had ‘imbued them with an uncritical faith into the United States’ and made Filipinos lack an awareness of the degree of their economic dependence on the US. According to the Constantinos,

107 Ikehata, “Mining Industry Development and Local Anti-Japanese Resistance,” pp. 127–70. 108 Masaharu Homma, “Notification (January 5, 1942),” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 1, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), p. 3. 109 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941–1945, vol. 2 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1965), p. 481. The Occupation Of The Philippines 127

miseducation had made them believe in American altruism, so much so that they regarded the relations of dependence as beneficial for the country.110

Fukui Masao (1912–?) served as head of the Bureau of Mines within the Industry Department of the Japanese Military Administration in the Philippines. After the war, he became head of the mining bureau in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry before working for various prominent Japanese oil and gas companies. During the Japanese occupation, Fukui was entrusted with the management of the mining industry in the Philippines and the appointment of Japanese companies that engaged in the exploitation of Philippine mineral wealth. In 1994, the “Forum for the Survey of Sources Concerning the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines” interviewed him and his colleague Iwatake Teruhiko (1911–?). Iwatake had belonged to the Ministry for Commerce and Industry since 1934 and served as an advisor to the Military Administration in the Philippines. After the war, he became Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and engaged in studies of East Asia and Southeast Asia at the Graduate School of Social Sciences at the University of Tokyo.111 According to Fukui, the army drafted 300 men into the Administrative Bureau of the Military Administration and appointed about 40 to 50 men who came from either the Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry of Colonial Affairs in Tokyo, to the Industry Department. Fukui describes the exploitation of the Philippine chrome, manganese and copper mines as having been a matter of the utmost importance since Japan could hardly import these ores from elsewhere. The Army Ministry exerted a great deal of pressure on the Industry Department of the Military Administration, as there was a constant demand from the Japanese army for raw materials. Iwatake Teruhiko, who had worked in the Ministry for Commerce and Industry since 1934 and served the Southern Army General Headquarters as an advisor during the war, underlines the importance of the Philippine resources that could be used in Japanese armament production:

Therefore, regarding the importance of copper; in the planning institution where I was before I departed I was concerned precisely with the relation of supply and demand of nonferrous metals and as we did

110 Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, p. 55. 111 Nihon no Firipin Senryōki ni kansuru Shiryō Chōsa Fōramu, “Gunseikanbu sangyōbu ni kinmushite,” in Intabyō kiroku. Nihon no Firipin senryō, ed. Ikehata Setsuho et al. (Tokyo: Ryukei Shosha, 1994), pp. 11–51. 128 chapter 4

material mobilization, the first demand for copper was out of its necessity for munitions, for the bullets of the army’s guns. Also for fuses and stuff like that. Also for artillery and machine guns. There was already an overwhelmingly strong demand from the army. [. . .] Therefore, finally, if we look at the Philippines regarding these nonferrous metals, it was the greatest producing area following Japan itself in the Japanese sphere of influence at that time.112

Following Fukui’s and Iwatake’s statements, the exploitation of Philippine resources played a much more important role in the planning stages of the occupation than indicated in the outline developed by the First Department Research Section of the Army General Staff. On 23 July 1942, the Greater East Asia Construction Council, under the presidency of Prime Minister Tōjō adopted the “Basic Policies for the Construction of Key Industries in the Greater East Asia Sphere.” This policy outline illustrated the importance of the mining industry for the Japanese war effort and the overall concept of the GEACPS:

The construction of mining, industry and electric power in Greater East Asia is to be in accordance with the basic policy for constructing the Greater East Asia economy. The project is designed to ensure that there will be a comprehensive display of the economic power of Greater East Asia, permitting the completion of the autonomous national defense productive power necessary for the defense of Greater East Asia, and the placing of Greater East Asia in a superior position with regard to new world economy. The immediate object of the project is to bring about a speedy increase in the power for conducting the Greater East Asia War. [. . .] For the expansion of non-ferrous and non-metallic industries, special efforts should be exerted in boosting the production of already exploited mines found in different parts of the Greater East Asia Sphere. Furthermore, prospecting for mineral ores for which shortages are antici- pated should get under way without any delay.113

However, Fukui is quite vague when it comes to the question of forced labour:

112 Ibid. 113 Greater East Asia Construction Council, “Basic Policies outlined for East Asia Structure,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 6, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), pp. 107–10. The Occupation Of The Philippines 129

During the war, [labour] was not forced in that area but many people were too proud to work so they may have been made working under threat in that area. However, I am not sure.114

Nevertheless, Fukui concedes that it was necessary to collect people for the exploitation of mines as due to the scarcity of labour, the exploitation of the mines was in danger. Therefore, the Japanese transferred workers and resources from mines where less needed materials were excavated to mines such as the Mitsui copper and several manganese mines.115 In fact, the Japanese Military Administration asked the Philippine representatives for a supply of labour from the very beginning of the occupation. On 7 January 1942, Jorge B. Vargas, then mayor of the city of Greater Manila, was ordered to provide for the

supply of labor, materials and resources and consent to the use of various installations and facilities needed by the Imperial Japanese Forces.116

Regarding the relationship between the Industry Department and the Executive Commission led by Jorge B. Vargas, Fukui explains that the latter was de facto run by the Japanese, in the person of the civil official Shiobara Yū, who had been a member of the Ministry of Home Affairs in Tokyo and who had been sent to the Philippines as an advisor to the Philippine government:

[. . .] In a word, [the Executive Commission] adopted the policy of the Japanese Military Administration’s Administrative Section as a result from this guidance.117

Fukui’s assessment of the degree of political independence of the Philippine Executive Commission is quite similar to that of the Spanish priest Juan Labrador who, as we have seen in the previous chapter, regarded the commission as a ‘puppet government’ acting according to the will of Japanese advisors.118

114 Nihon no Firipin Senryōki ni kansuru Shiryō Chōsa Fōramu, “Gunseikanbu,” pp. 11–51. 115 Ibid. 116 “Minutes of the Interview between the Representative of the Imperial Japanese Forces and Mr. Vargas, Mayor of the City of Greater Manila, on January 7th, the 7th Year of Showa (1942) at the Headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Forces, Manila,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 1, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), pp. 10–11. 117 Nihon no Firipin Senryōki ni kansuru Shiryō Chōsa Fōramu, “Gunseikanbu,” pp. 11–51. 118 Labrador, A Diary of the Japanese Occupation, p. 54. 130 chapter 4

Overall, the economic policy of the Military Administration followed Japanese war needs, but this was only logical and by no means a contradiction to the pan-Asianist doctrine of creating an autarkic Greater East Asia. However, this economic policy meant tremendous hardships for many Filipinos. In 1946, Claro M. Recto (1890–1960), one of the most prominent Filipino politicians of his time, who had served the Japanese Military Administration as well as the Laurel government during the Second Philippine Republic as a member of the Cabinet, described the sentiments of many Filipinos towards Japanese economic policy in the islands:

Everyone who remained in the Philippines during the dark days of the occupation is familiar with the grasping tentacles of the giant industrial octopus which Japan let loose in the country to suck the wealth of the land.119

In the early stages of the occupation, many people were desperately looking for employment. The Bureau of Public Works, which was affiliated to the Executive Commission, had no trouble finding labourers. In Manila, the Japanese installed an employment agency and the Bureau of Public Welfare as well as the Public and Civilian Liaison Office engaged in the recruitment of workers. However, by the end of 1943 there was a substantial decline in applicants. This led to the establishment of the Labor Recruitment Agency by the government of the Second Philippine Republic in April of the following year.120 Pablo Manlapit (1891–1969) was a lawyer as well as a former Filipino migrant worker and labour union leader in Hawaii. He was expelled from Hawaii because of his activities in seeking rights for migrant workers there, and sent back to the Philippines in 1935. During the Second Philippine Republic, Manlapit became a Field Executive Officer of the Recruitment Agency. According to him, between 1 April and 30 September 1944, the Japanese recruited 166,729 labourers from the Philippines. The Japanese army and navy each requested 20,000 workers after the inauguration of the agency. The majority of the workers the Japanese needed immediately were for Manila and Batangas. Shortly afterwards, the army asked for 41,700 more labourers. The recruitment of such a high number of workers proved to be a very difficult task, especially in a time of war. Various issues complicated the recruitment process. One example was ongoing communication problems between the workers and their Japanese employers due

119 Claro M. Recto, Three Years of Enemy Occupation. The Issue of Political Collaboration in the Philippines (Manila: People’s Publishers, 1946), p. 11. 120 Terami-Wada, “The Filipino Volunteer Armies,” pp. 59–98. The Occupation Of The Philippines 131 to a lack of understanding of each other’s language. Severe physical punishments exerted by the Japanese led to a substantial decline in Filipino motivation to work for them. The Japanese also forced labourers to work in areas not indicated in their contracts, and this prompted many Filipinos to refrain from applying for work in Japanese-run factories or mines out of fear they would be separated from their families. Because so many Filipino workers suddenly dis- appeared to work at distant workplaces in many areas of the Philippines under the auspices of the Japanese, many Filipinos even started to believe that these labourers had in fact been recruited as soldiers for the Japanese army. Rumours like this, and the fact that many Japanese employers often refrained from keeping their end of the bargain in terms of working conditions, wages and food supply, made many Filipinos quit their jobs. As counter-measures against these tendencies within the Filipino workforce, the Recruitment Agency employed 54 labour recruitment officers. The number of recruitment officers assigned to each province depended on the demand for labour in the respective regions. The officers negotiated on basic points such as wages, food supply and working conditions in their assigned areas and asked the army and navy to approve the results. The army approved the negotiated improvements for the Filipino workers in April 1944. These improvements included basic wages and allow- ances (which also covered the families of workers who were sent to work in areas distant from their homes), depending on qualification and the region where the worker was employed. The new regulations also included reason- ably priced accommodations for the workers, a minimum of 600 grams of rice daily, 10 hours regular working time per day (plus 10 per cent extra payment per hour for working overtime), medical care, and insurance in cases of illness or death. Manlapit also mentioned that the government of the Second Philippine Republic provided workers with a compensation fund of 100,000 Philippine Pesos, and conducted a ‘house to house campaign’ in which Filipino labourers could make complaints to the recruitment officers. In addition to that, the Japanese paid recruitment fees to people who helped in the recruitment of workers.121 The official outline of the Japanese economic policy designed for the Philippines followed the doctrine of the GEACPS, i.e. making the country part of a self-sustaining economic bloc and ending its dependency on trade with the US. The exploitation of Philippine resources had not been at the top of the Japanese agenda, but as the war proceeded, the economic policy increasingly followed the demands of the Japanese military, which meant that the

121 Pablo Manlapit, “General Report of the Activities of the Labor Recruitment Agency from April 1, 1944 to September 30, 1944,” Historical Bulletin, 11:1 (1967), pp. 74–93. 132 chapter 4

realization of an economic interdependency as the architects of the GEACPS planned it had to be postponed until the successful termination of the war. Since the ‘Greater East Asia War’ was fought in order to realize the idea of the sphere, the temporary exploitation of Philippine goods and labour was not necessarily a contradiction of pan-Asianist principles.

The KALIBAPI-Party One of the most important political instruments for the implementation of the concept of the GEACPS in the Philippines was the Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas (KALIBAPI: lit., “Association for Service to the New Philippines”). The KALIBAPI functioned as the single political party in the Philippines after the Japanese Military Administration had forced all other parties to dissolve. The Japanese appointed the Executive Commission’s Chairman Vargas party leader, but Benigno S. Aquino (1894–1946), who acted as the party’s Director-General, along with Pio Duran as Secretary-General and Benigno Ramos as a member of the executive, were concerned with the day- to-day management of the KALIBAPI. The party was officially inaugurated on 30 December 1942, the anniversary of José Rizal’s death, in order to underline the patriotic approach of the organization. Party members saluted each other by bowing with their right hand on their heart.122 Even though the KALIBAPI functioned as a single political party, it was, according to Aquino, a ‘non-political service association;’ however, at the same time, ‘no person can be employed in the government and any of its institutions unless he is a member.’123 On the party’s inauguration, Vargas pointed to the close connection between the goals of José Rizal who had died for a Philippines freed from Occidental rule and Japan’s war aims:

The mighty Japanese Empire, moved by the generous desire of emancipating and protecting the nations of the Orient, has accomplished what we ourselves sought for long without success.124

The Philippines becoming a member of the GEACPS thus was portrayed as the fulfillment of Rizal’s legacy. Vargas also listed the elimination of bad, Western- implemented habits from Filipino culture, and stated that the party would

122 Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, pp. 75–76. 123 A.V.H. Hartendorp, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, vol. 1 (Manila: Bookmark, 1967), p. 449. 124 Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas (Association for Service to the New Philippines), The KALIBAPI Worker’s Handbook (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1943), p. 17. The Occupation Of The Philippines 133 be ‘dedicated to Rizal’s great humanitarian principle of peaceful cooperation among all nations as brothers.’125 This principle equals the Pan-Asianist leitmotiv of hakkō ichiu, and the ‘esoteric’ pan-Asianist faction made the call for the Filipinos to rid themselves of their Western-imposed weaknesses and flaws. Benigno S. Aquino, too, in his speech on the same occasion put an emphasis on the necessity for the Filipino people to develop a spirit of self-sacrifice for the sake of the Philippine nation, just as Rizal had done:

In Rizal, that patriotic sentiment was the flame, which lighted the path of his whole life. Love of the country and the fate of his brothers constantly engaged his thoughts. For the welfare of all his countrymen, he dared to challenge even death which he knew was hovering menacingly over him. [. . .] The thought of sacrifice for his country, instead of causing him moral torture, produced in him an ineffable assurance.126

This spirit of self-sacrifice, along with a sense of duty towards the state, was exactly what ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianists such as Rōyama127 and Miki Kiyoshi had demanded from the Filipinos. The latter also considered it Japan’s obligation to provide the people of the Philippines with an ‘older brother’s guidance’ in their efforts to contribute towards the formation of the GEACPS.128 This is the kind of guidance that Aquino wanted the KALIBAPI to exercise:

The KALIBAPI aims to aid and guide the Filipinos in the performance of this particular duty. Therefore, the organization of the KALIBAPI is the actual expression of the earnest desire of the Filipino people to serve willingly the cause of all the peoples of Greater East Asia.129

Indeed, Rizal seemed to be the perfect symbol for the virtues promoted by Pan- Asianism. He had visited Japan in the spring of 1888 but stayed in the country for only six weeks. Nevertheless, his brief stint in Japan was commemorated there in the postwar era as an example for the good Japanese-Philippine relations prior to the occupation period. The Pan-Asianists and architects of the KALIBAPI utilized Rizal as a figure who admired Japanese culture and fought Western rule in his country. However, they ignored the fact that Rizal had by

125 Ibid., p. 19. 126 Ibid., p. 20. 127 Rōyama, “Formation of an Independent State,” pp. 131–53. 128 Miki Kiyoshi, Hyōron (3), vol. 15. 129 Kapisanan, The KALIBAPI Worker’s Handbook, p. 21. 134 chapter 4 no means been a Japanophile and that he had also visited various European countries. Rizal had been both a cosmopolitan and a Filipino patriot, rather than an Asianist. As Lydia Yu-José puts it,

. . . the international character of a symbol like Rizal stresses the death of Pan-Asianism, which had turned out to be anti-Europe and anti-West, and was therefore narrow.130

After the party’s inauguration, Aquino, Duran and Ramos toured the entire archipelago to promote the idea of the ‘New Philippines’ and set up KALIBAPI chapters all over the country. The KALIBAPI not only functioned as an organ for the promotion of the concept of the GEACPS, but also as a labour recruitment agency, especially for military purposes.131 The involvement of Ramos and Duran shows that Philippine Asianists actively engaged in the building of this organization. The usual suspects in terms of collaboration with the Japanese did not solely run the KALIBAPI. Camilo Osias (1889–1976), who prior to the Japanese invasion had not been famous for being an outspoken advocate of close Philippine-Japanese cooperation, wrote the preface of The KALIBAPI Worker’s Handbook. This was published in July 1943. Osias was first Assistant-Director-General and later became Aquino’s successor as Director-General of the party. He was a nationalist and prominent figure in the Philippine Commonwealth who had studied in the US. He was elected Resident Commissioner in the United States House of Representatives in 1929.132 In his preface to the Worker’s Handbook, Osias described the purpose of the volume as ‘to give a basic working notion of the KALIBAPI as a people’s movement dedicated to national service.’133 In this way, the KALIBAPI was designed to function as a tool to implement the kind of dynamic movement among the Filipino people towards the creation of the GEACPS that ‘esoteric’ Pan- Asianists such as Rōyama Masamichi had demanded. The oath of allegiance that the people present at the organization’s inauguration ceremony had to swear clearly reflects this. The oath included

130 Lydia N. Yu-José, Filipinos in Japan and Okinawa, 1880s–1972 (Tokyo: Research Institute for the Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2002), pp. 42–43. 131 William J. Pomeroy, The Philippines: Colonialism, Collaboration and Resistance! (New York: International Publishers, 1992), p. 118. 132 Eduardo Bananal, Camilo Osias: Educator and Statesman (Quezon City: Manlapaz Publishing Co., 1974), p. 28. 133 Kapisanan, The KALIBAPI Worker’s Handbook, p. 3. The Occupation Of The Philippines 135

[. . .] to develop the native virtues that will give strength and happiness to the Filipino people; to unite my mind, my heart and my efforts with those of my countrymen in the establishment of a Bagong Pilipinas as a useful unit of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere [. . .].134

The KALIBAPI was also designed to act as a means of educating Filipinos towards ‘re-Orientalisation.’ The organization inaugurated a ‘Labor Institute’ on 3 May 1943 that offered Japanese and Tagalog language classes as well as courses on Oriental and Filipino culture.135 Furthermore, on 18 May 1943, Executive Commission Chairman Vargas approved the amended Executive Order No. 109, in which the establishment of the “Junior KALIBAPI” was decided. This was open to

any Filipino, less than 18 years of age, who likewise believes in the ideals, aims and purposes of the Association and who is of good standing in the community.136

Osias expressed the necessity for the young Filipinos in particular to become aware of the Oriental values that stood at the centre of Japanese Pan-Asianism at the official inauguration of the “Junior KALIBAPI” on 19 July 1943:

Young Filipinos should be proud to become members of an organization intended to produce like-mindedness and to foster the spirit of self-help and cooperation among the young people of today who will become the leaders of tomorrow. [. . .] One of the purposes of the KALIBAPI is to strengthen such virtues as hard work, faith, self-reliance, loyalty, bravery, discipline, and self-sacrifice.137

Within the “Junior KALIBAPI” there was a section for children aged from 7 to 15 years (Kabataang Maghahanda) and one for youths aged from 16 to 18 (Kabataang Katulong). Boys and girls were kept separate.138 Just like Vargas

134 Ibid., p. 12. 135 Ibid., p. 15. 136 Philippine Executive Commission, “Executive Order No. 156. Amending certain Sections of Executive Order No. 109 dated December 4, 1942, so as to authorize the Establishment of a Junior KALIBAPI and the Appointment of an Assistant Director-General and four Directors-At-Large,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 12, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), p. 33. 137 Kapisanan, The KALIBAPI Worker’s Handbook, p. 22. 138 Hartendorp, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, vol. 1, p. 450. 136 chapter 4 and Aquino, Osias referred to José Rizal whom he considered the embodiment of these Oriental virtues. Osias described Rizal as a patriot whose ‘love of country was not selfish; it was of the sacrificial kind.’139 By pointing to Rizal, the initiators of the KALIBAPI wanted to stress their belief that these Oriental values had always been part of Filipino culture but had been merely buried under US-imposed hedonism and superficiality during the years of American rule. The KALIBAPI also played a crucial role in the preparations for Philippine independence as KALIBAPI delegates decided the members of the “Preparatory Commission for the Philippine Independence” at a meeting held on 18 and 19 June 1943. The Philippine Asianists Duran and Ramos were not among the 20 persons chosen to join the commission.140 At a banquet following the meeting on 20 June, Lieutenant General Kuroda Shigenori (1887–1954), who served as the highest commander of the Japanese army in the Philippines from May 1943 to September 1944, addressed the KALIBAPI delegates and members of the Preparatory Commission to highlight the purpose of the KALIBAPI in the process of integrating the Philippines into the GEACPS. Kuroda was not only the Commanding General with the longest term in office in the Philippines; he also, unlike his predecessor Homma and his two successors, Lieutenant General Tanaka Shizuichi (1887–1945) and General Yamashita Tomoyuki (1885–1946), survived the war. Homma and Yamashita were sentenced to death at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials and Tanaka committed suicide when Japan surrendered. Kuroda, however, was sentenced to lifetime imprisonment in 1949 and was eventually sent back to Japan in 1952. Apparently, it was Jorge B. Vargas and Camilo Osias who gave positive statements in his defense. Osias claimed that the General had often ignored orders from Tokyo and had supported the teaching of English instead of Japanese.141 In a strong reflection of Osias’ definition provided in the handbook’s preface, to Kuroda the

KALIBAPI represents a people’s movement on a large scale dedicated to the cause of the New Philippines on the basis of solid unity among social, cultural and economic circles in the Philippines.142

139 Kapisanan, The KALIBAPI Worker’s Handbook, p. 23. 140 Ibid., p. 13. 141 Nakano, “Appeasement and Coercion,” pp. 21–58. 142 Shigenori Kuroda, “Message of His Excellency, the Highest Commander of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines (at the Luncheon Party in Honor of Representatives of the KALIBAPI and the Members of the Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence. June 20th, the 18th Year of Syowa),” in The Official Journal of the Japanese The Occupation Of The Philippines 137

ILLUSTRATION 10 Lieutenant General Tanaka Shizuichi. Source: The Philippines Expeditionary Force Information Department Editors (1943–June) The Philippines Expeditionary Force, Japan: The Philippines Expeditionary Force Information Department Retrieved on 24. Februar 2009.

Similar to Osias, Kuroda put an emphasis on the KALIBAPI being a people’s movement and an instrument of integration that would evoke a sense of Orientalism and Asian identity among Filipinos. It was one of the main duties of the KALIBAPI to propagate the concept of the GEACPS among the Philippine population and make Filipinos become aware of the Philippine role in the sphere. According to the KALIBAPI Worker’s Handbook,

geographical propinquity and biological factors would dictate the Filipinos’ being a part of a great Asiatic system143 and thus a natural part of the GEACPS. This argument resembled exactly the ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist approach of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai and Nishimura Shinji, who had been eager to establish geographical and racial affinities between Japan and the Philippines. At the same time, the Handbook also emphasized the obligations of the Filipinos to put all efforts into the construction of this New Order in which they would be

Military Administration, vol. 13, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), p. i. 143 Kapisanan, The KALIBAPI Worker’s Handbook, p. 50. 138 chapter 4

free to shape their own national destiny and develop their individuality as a nation; that their sovereign and territorial integrity will be respected; and that the wealth and natural resources of the Philippines will be left to the enjoyment of the Filipino people and their posterity.144

This was completely in line with the “Proposed Measures dealing with the Philippine Islands in the Event of War with the United States,” which had been issued by the First Department Research Section of the Army General Staff on 31 March 1941. The Philippines should by no means become subject of exploitation by the Japanese but should contribute to the common prosperity of all Greater Asia. The KALIBAPI’s mission was to foster this spirit of dedication among the Filipinos. Nevertheless, the organization’s growth was rather mod- est. By April 1943, the KALIBAPI counted 550,000 members; the group’s strong- holds were Aquino’s home province of Tarlac and the capital Manila.145 Despite the official inauguration of the KALIBAPI, and despite its not officially counting as a political organization, it did in fact function as a political party, which sought to proselytize Japanese pan-Asianist thought throughout the islands. Its purpose was to convince Filipinos of the concept of the GEACPS and make them aware of their duties towards building the ‘New Philippines.’ The emphasis on Filipinos ‘rediscovering’ their Oriental roots, including virtues such as self-sacrifice and duty towards state and society, strongly resembled the ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianism of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai, whose members were concerned about the high degree of Westernization in the Philippines. At the same time, the KALIBAPI focused on the racial affinities between all Asian peoples, thus following the ‘exoteric’ Asianists of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai. The assumption of the ‘exoteric’ faction that Filipinos would appreciate the idea of the GEACPS automatically, and join the party in great numbers as it represented the ‘New Philippines’ as part of an Asian brotherhood, were never realized. In addition, despite the huge propaganda effort made by the party’s initiators, the organization failed to become a mass movement of the kind the ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianists like Rōyama Masamichi had belived necessary in order for the Philippines to develop the concept of the GEACPS. Thus, the failure of the KALIBAPI exemplifies the failure of both the ‘exoteric’ and ‘esoteric’ pan- Asianist approaches in the Philippines.

144 Ibid., p. 51. 145 Hartendorp, The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, vol. 1, p. 451. The Occupation Of The Philippines 139

The Second Philippine Republic and Reactions to Japanese Claims of “Liberation” By the time the war broke out the Japanese government discussed the question of Philippine and other occupied territories’ independence in connection with negotiating peace with the US. It was not before the 81st session of the Imperial Diet on 11 January 1943 that General Tōjō harshly criticized the ongoing negative influence of exiled Commonwealth president Quezon on the Filipino people and presented a concrete plan for Philippine independence.146 In a speech held at a thanksgiving mass meeting in Lunate (Manila), on 6 May 1943, he renewed his vow. In this speech, Tōjō once more re-emphasized the righ- teousness of the Japanese war aims of liberating Asian peoples from Anglo- American suppression. In contrast to Director-General Wachi, in his address in front of officers the month before, Tōjō had not mentioned any obstacles en route to independence. Tōjō pointed out that he was highly satisfied with the degree of cooperation the Filipino people showed, and therefore, promised them independence at the earliest possible date:

At the 81st session of the Imperial Diet, I reiterated, in the name of the Imperial Japanese Government, the formal declaration, that should the Philippines continue to render further tangible evidence of cooperation, Japan would gladly grant her the honor of independence in the shortest possible time. [. . .] I note with great satisfaction that you are actively forging ahead in your tasks of creating the New Philippines and under the circumstances I am convinced more than ever on the propriety on your early independence.147

It goes without saying that Tōjō was as aware of the difficulties with Philippine resistance as Director-General Wachi had been, but he also knew that he needed to demonstrate to Filipinos that their situation would soon improve. Therefore, he claimed that developments in the Philippines were meeting Japanese expectations. After the war, Claro M. Recto wrote that “there was

146 Hatano, Taiheiyō sensō, p. 122. 147 Hideki Tōjō, “Address by His Excellency, Premier General Hideki Tozyo of Japan, delivered at the Thanksgiving Mass Meeting, Luneta, May 6, 1943,” in Premier Toyzo’s Visit brings the Philippines closer to Independence. A Record of the burning Words which have inspired the Filipino People to new Heights of Enthusiasm in exerting more energetic Efforts in Behalf of their Independence and in making themselves worthy of full-fledged Membership in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, May 5–7, 1943 (Manila: Department of Information, Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, 1943), pp. 1–4. 140 chapter 4 a method in the self-deception”, i.e. there was no alternative to pretending Filipinos were embracing Japanese pan-Asianist policy.148 By the time of the Japanese invasion the Philippines was already a country designated to become independent, and the existence of this American promise of independence marked one of the main weaknesses in the Japanese position of having come as a liberating force to the Philippines. Thus, the government in Tokyo needed to find a way to show Filipinos that the independence that the Americans had designed for them was not genuine, and that the Philippines could only develop into a truly sovereign state within the framework of the GEACPS. In a statement to the press, General Tōjō raised the topic of the American promise of independence:

Not permitting even a semblance of economic self-sufficiency, the United States cleverly fed the Filipino people on promises of a doubtful independence, the granting of which was from time to time delayed.149

Tōjō also held the American policy responsible for the lack of Oriental identity and sense of nationhood in the Philippines. According to him Filipinos were

deprived of such traits as sturdiness and initiative which are indispensable for the creation and development of a nation and thus was held in check the development of a racial consciousness which could run counter the American policy of colonization and encroachment in the East.150

This again was the argument of the ‘esoteric’ pan-Asianist faction that considered a high degree of ‘Westernization’ and ‘Americanization’ the great impedi- ment for the Philippines becoming part of the GEACPS. However, Tōjō was also completely in line with the ‘exoteric’ canon as he stressed the historical ties and racial affinities between the Japanese and the Filipinos:

Centuries ago close commercial relations already existed between Japan and the Philippines and although the geographical proximity and racial and cultural ties of the two peoples may be regarded as acts of Divine

148 Recto, Three Years of Enemy Occupation, p. 19. 149 Hideki Tōjō, “Statement to the Press made by Premier General Hideki Tozyo after the Interview with Chairman Jorge B. Vargas of the Philippine Executive Commission May 6, 18th Year of Showa,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 12, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), pp. xxv–xxvii. 150 Ibid. The Occupation Of The Philippines 141

Providence ordaining collaboration in the development of a peaceful and prosperous East Asia, this was maliciously obstructed by the United States whose history of domination in the East is a history of iniquity aimed to engender among the peoples of the Orient mutual hate and distrust.151

The existence of a racial connection and ancient trade routes between the two countries was Nishimura Shinji’s main argument for a smooth integration of the Philippines into the GEACPS.152 Tōjō, in this official statement, took up this point but also mentioned the high impact of Westernization in the archipelago. While for propaganda purposes the ‘exoteric’ view was still part of the official statements, the exercised occupation policy followed ‘esoteric’ principles. The Japanese adopted their Asianism to the cultural specifics in the Philippines and focused (at least as long as the war proceeded) on a rather limited agenda of their occupation policy in the Philippines: the utilization of the islands for military strategic and economic purposes. After his visit to the Philippines, Premier Tōjō spoke at the 82nd Extraordinary Session of the Imperial Diet, reflecting on the achievements in the occupied territories. Tōjō said that he was more than pleased with the work of Executive Commission’s Chairman Vargas’ work, and claimed that ‘the people in general who have come to understand our true intentions are extending us positive service,’ and that, therefore, the Philippines should be awarded independence ‘in the course of the current year.’153 While this seems to be the same wishful thinking that had been displayed by the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists before the war, Tōjō in fact needed to create the illusion of a cooperative Philippines so he could make the upcoming inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic appear to be a reward for Filipino efforts in becoming a worthy member of the GEACPS. Claro M. Recto has thus described Tōjō’s appraisals of Filipino cooperation as mere propaganda to fulfill the promise of the GEACPS:

The stage was thus set for the fulfillment of Japan’s oft-repeated promise of independence. As the months went by the Japanese government con- veniently found “increasing” evidences of cooperation, no doubt as an excuse to accelerate the promised day. In reality, however, other than the

151 Ibid. 152 Nishimura, Daitōa Kyōeiken, p. 60, pp. 259–64. 153 Hideki Tōjō, “Speech of Premier General Hideki Tozyo at the 82nd Extraordinary Session of the Imperial Diet,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 13, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), pp. xiii–xxii. 142 chapter 4

perfunctory protestations of gratitude and the ironical paeans for the “benevolence and magnanimity” of the “great empire,” there was no such evidences of cooperation. [. . .] Nevertheless, the Philippines simply had to be given her independence. It was so nominated in the bond of the co-prosperity sphere. The Japanese must liberate the country from American domination and proclaim its independence, if they had to kill every Filipino in doing it.154

On 20 June 1943, the Preparatory Committee for Philippine Independence (PCPI) was formed, being chaired by José P. Laurel (1891–1959). The Committee consisted of 20 members, most of them prominent figures of the Philippine Commonwealth. Benigno Aquino and Ramón Avanceña (1872–1957) served as Laurel’s vice presidents. The PCPI drafted a new constitution for the Philippines that was approved on 4 September. Three days later, 117 KALIBAPI delegates ratified the new constitution. This new constitution consisted of a preface and 12 articles, and was issued in both English and Tagalog. It was a tentative constitution as it was supposed to be valid only up to the termination of the war. According to the final article, after the war, the people of the Philippines were to elect the delegates of a constituent assembly that should draft a permanent constitution. There were ten distinctive features of the tentative constitution:

– The president would be more powerful than both the Legislative and the Judicative. – There would be no vice-president. – There was a strong emphasis on duties of citizens rather than on their constitutional rights. – There would be a Council of State as an advisory organ to the president consisting of not more than 20 members. – The Legislative was organized in one single chamber, the National Assembly. – The president could declare war and peace in agreement with two-thirds of the National Assembly. – The president could conclude contracts with foreign nations in agreement with the bare majority of the National Assembly. – To pass laws or unconstitutional executive orders the unanimity of the Supreme Court would be necessary. – The Commonwealth constitution’s article on suffrage would be abandoned. – Tagalog would become the official language in the Philippines.155

154 Recto, Three Years of Enemy Occupation, pp. 15–17. 155 Zaide, Philippine History and Government, p. 362. The Occupation Of The Philippines 143

Article II, Paragraph 9 of the constitution, in particular, exemplified the president’s wide range of powers. It allowed him to rule the country by emergency decrees and declare martial law under certain circumstances (in case of an invasion, turmoil, rebellion, the immediate threat of such events or whenever internal security required it).156 Juan Labrador wrote about the new constitution in his diary:

The new Constitution is neither democratic nor dictatorial. It is a kind of constitutional dictatorship. Officially, the Philippines is a Republic, but in reality it is neither democratic nor representative. The president possesses great powers which no other elective chief of state has. [. . .] Dr. Laurel, who is the principal author of the Constitution and who is generally felt to be the logical choice as the first President of the Republic, had for a long time been an advocate of an authoritative and quasi-dictatorial national leadership. In my conversations with him before the war, he had signified his preferences for strong and energetic executives who alone could curtail the abuses of policies and who alone could effect reforms beneficial to the country. The members of the Constitutional Commission publicly and privately declared that the military authorities did not interfere in the drafting of the Constitution, and they discussed and approved the same without instructions or suggestions from any Japanese advisors.157

Labrador described the new constitution as a ‘constitutional dictatorship.’ As we have seen before, the Commonwealth president Manuel Quezon had already shown some sympathy for a more autocratic political system in the Philippines towards the end of the 1930s158 and the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai had inter- preted this as a signal that Quezon would turn away from the US and towards Japan.159 Even though Quezon was not available to serve as president of the new Philippine Republic, the concept of an autocratic constitution with a strong president as its central figure was eventually realized after approximately 20 months of Japanese occupation. According to Labrador’s memories of his encounters with Laurel before the war, the latter shared Quezon’s vision

156 Gregorio F. Zaide and Sonia M. Zaide, Documentary Sources of Philippine History, vol. 12 (Manila: National Book Store, 1990), p. 4. 157 Labrador, A Diary of the Japanese Occupation, pp. 168–69. 158 Goodman, “Philippine Bushido,” pp. 119–32. 159 Hayashi, “Hitō no seijiteki dōkō,” pp. 30–33. 144 chapter 4 of an autocratic government and seemed the natural choice to become the first president of the new republic. On 25 September 1943, the National Assembly, consisting of 108 delegates, officially elected José P. Laurel president of the Philippine Republic. Half of the delegates were provincial governors and mayors, the other half were KALIBAPI delegates who had been elected before at regional party con- ventions.160 Historically speaking, Laurel was the president of the Second Philippine Republic, succeeding the so-called ‘Malolos-Republic” ’that had survived for only two years and ended with the defeat of the Philippine resistance against the Americans in 1901.161 On 14 October 1943, the inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic, and the end of the Military Administration in the Philippines, was officially declared in front of the Parliament Building in Manila. In his inaugural speech, President Laurel expressed his gratitude to the Japanese liberators and declared that the Philippines now had ‘the opportunity to contribute their share in the common prosperity of the nations of Greater East Asia and of all mankind.’162 Juan Labrador considered this new republic a mere vassal state of the Japanese Empire, and, like other members of the GEACPS, completely dependent on Japan:

Even the most optimistic does not have to wait long to realize that this form of independence is nothing more than another form of dependence. Neither the army nor the navy have shown any indication of returning the buildings they occupied, nor had the number of Japanese military forces invading our streets and plazas diminished, nor were we aware of any government or private enterprises confiscated during the war, which were returned to their owners. [. . .] Officially, the military administration, or the invisible national government, had been dissolved. But we could not ascertain whether another one, more invisible and more mysterious, had taken its place. It was clear that in matters pertain- ing to international relations, the sovereignty of the new government was almost nil not only because it was recognized solely within the Sphere, but also because all the other members of the Sphere were dancing to the tune that Tokyo was playing. An emasculated internal sovereignty, which

160 Zaide, Philippine History and Government, p. 363. 161 Ibid., p. 361. 162 Zaide and Zaide, Documentary Sources, vol. 12, pp. 21–22. The Occupation Of The Philippines 145

did not reach the level of a complete autonomy; a nonexistent or impotent external sovereignty: such seemed to be the independence doled out by Japanese magnanimity.163

The majority of Filipino and Japanese historians share his assessment in regards to the Second Philippine Republic. According to Gregorio F. Zaide, for example,

Japan was not sincere in granting Philippine independence. She ignored the rights of the Filipino people and continued her policy of oppression. The Japanese military authorities forced the people to work in air-fields, army camps, and other military installations. Everywhere they confiscated rice, chickens, sugar, fruits, and other foodstuffs. They occupied private homes, driving away the owners and paying no rents for such occupancy.164

Eizawa Kōji emphasizes the hierarchical structure within the GEACPS that enabled Japan to exert complete control over member states:

As constituting members of the GEACPS, [the member countries] were included in a hierarchical system (kaisōteki chitsujo) with Japan at its top, had to respect the Tennō state as mother country (oya no kuni) and follow its leadership alone.165

From 5 to 6 November 1943, the Greater East Asia Conference (Dai-Ajia Kaigi) was held in Tokyo with representatives of Japan (General Tōjō), Manchukuo (Zhang Jinghui), the Reformed (Puppet) Government of the Republic of China (Wang Jingwei), Burma (Ba Maw), the Provisional Government of Free India (Subhas Chandra Bose), Thailand (Prince Wan Waithayakon) and the Philippines (José P. Laurel) participating. The joint declaration adopted by the participants on 6 November highlighted the usual slogans about stabilizing the region and contributing to world peace by cooperation. Point 3 read, for example:

163 Labrador, A Diary of the Japanese Occupation, p. 177. 164 Zaide, Philippine History and Government, p. 365. 165 Eizawa, Daitōa Kyōeiken, p. 116. 146 chapter 4

The countries of Greater East Asia by respecting one another’s traditions and developing the creative faculties of each race, will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater East Asia.166

This point suggests that the official outline of the GEACPS that was adopted by conference participants promoted the idea of cultural exchange between all member countries, including Japan. During the conference, the Japanese treated the participating heads of state like representatives of truly independent countries; nevertheless, all speeches held at the conference had to first undergo Japanese censorship. Interestingly, however, Laurel was able to avoid such censorship by insisting on an improvised speech.167 In this speech, he widely referred to the promises made by General Tōjō at the same conference before, including “respect for the autonomy and independence of every inte- gral unit”.168 Ricardo Trota José interprets Laurel’s speech as an effort to push forward Filipino rights within the GEACPS despite the fact that Laurel ‘had to mouth phrases which the Japanese expected to hear.’169 This is a very sympathetic assessment of the speech. The Philippine president indeed rephrased those parts of Tōjō’s address in which the General had underlined the specific rights of the respective member states, but it is rather ambitious to claim that this was an act of self-determination for the Filipino people within the sphere. Overall, Laurel was completely in line with the other participants at the conference in promising that the Philippines was ‘determined to carry on and forge ahead until the goal of victory is achieved by the Empire of Japan.’ Laurel clearly pointed out that Japan solely fought the Greater East Asia War for the liberation of Asian peoples and expressed his conviction that ‘God in His infinite wisdom will not abandon Japan and will not abandon the peoples of Greater East Asia.’170 The contents of the speeches delivered during the conference, and the joint declaration of the participants, all featured key aspects of ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianism: racial fraternity of all Asian peoples united in the common struggle under Japanese leadership against Western imperialism. The

166 Toshi Go (Ed.) “Joint Declaration of Greater East-Asiatic Nations,” in The Assembly of Greater East-Asiatic Nations, ed. (Tokyo: The Nippon Times, 1943). 167 Ricardo Trota José, “Test of Wills: Diplomacy between Japan and the Laurel Government,” in Philippines-Japan Relations, ed. Ikehata Setsuho & Lydia N. Yu-José (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003), pp. 185–222. 168 José P. Laurel, “The Awakening of Oriental Consciousness and its Importance,” in The Assembly of Greater East-Asiatic Nations, ed. Toshi Go (Tokyo: The Nippon Times, 1943), pp. 45–52. 169 Trota José, “Test of Wills,” pp. 185–222. 170 Laurel, “The Awakening of Oriental Consciousness,” pp. 45–52. The Occupation Of The Philippines 147 cultural specifics of each country did not play any role. In this regard, Laurel bemoaned the Westernization of his own country, which he believed had adopted a ‘spirit of materialism’ under foreign rule and now needed to become aware again of its ‘Oriental consciousness.’171 The whole conference had the character of a huge propaganda event designed to show the world the unity of the ‘liberated’ Asian nations and their solidarity with Japan while the tide of the war was turning against the Empire. However, it was pure pragmatism that defined actual occupation policy in the Philippines (and Japanese policy towards the formal independent Second Philippine Republic). Only states allied with, or occupied by, Axis Powers recognized the Second Philippine Republic as a sovereign state. Thus, only the Wang Jingwei regime in China, Thailand, Burma, Manchukuo, Italy, Bulgaria, Spain, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia established diplomatic relations with the new republic.172 On 14 October 1943, the same day as the official inauguration of the new republic, Japan and the Philippines sealed a pact of alliance that outlined the future political and economic cooperation between the two countries. Article 2 stated that ‘The High Contracting Parties shall closely cooperate on matters, political, economic, military for the successful prosecution of the War of Greater East Asia.’173 Finally, on 22 September 1944, the Philippines declared war on the US after massive Allied air raids that devastated Manila. However, President Laurel did not pass the declaration to the National Assembly, which was meant to approve a declaration of war (according to the constitution). In addition, he underlined that the Japanese army would draft no Filipinos.174 The short-lived republic never developed an independent foreign policy. Its diplomatic relations were mostly limited to fulfilling Japanese wishes regarding the Empire’s war aims. ‘Real independence’ as well as cooperation and prosperity within the GEACPS had to wait until the successful termination of the war.

Reform of the Education System under the Japanese Occupation One very important aspect of the implementation of Pan-Asianism, and the concept of the GEACPS in the Philippines, was education. The Research Commission in the Philippines, under the leadership of Rōyama Masamichi, dedicated a comprehensive chapter of its report to this issue (the first section of the two-section third volume of the report, “Kyōiku oyobi shūkyō” (Education

171 Ibid. 172 Zaide and Zaide, Documentary Sources, vol. 12, p. 38. 173 Ibid. 174 Ibid., p. 79. 148 chapter 4 and Religion)). The author of this section, Oshima Masanori, demanded that Philippine educational policy, following the country’s independence, had to be future-orientated and help develop a spirit among young Filipinos of being part of an Oriental community. Oshima wrote that he wanted to leave it to Filipino politicians to conduct educational reforms and that he would only provide his opinion on some matters regarding the administrative organization of the future Philippine education system. One of Oshima’s main concerns was elementary school education because he considered young children as being most receptive to the re-Orientalisation measures. He suggested an overall six-year compulsory school education, consisting of a four-year elementary course and a two-year advanced course. Children should enter elementary school at the age of six instead of seven, as had been the case under American rule. Compulsory education to Oshima was ‘a matter of fundamental importance’ as it helped to develop a ‘spiritual unity’ (seishinteki tōitsu) among the ‘rising’ (shuttatsusen tosuru) Filipino people. He pointed out that, so far, only the children of wealthy families who could speak English were allowed to enter school at age five or six, but since from now on Tagalog would function as the national language in the Philippines, this privilege would no longer exist. Oshima expected an increase of pupils advancing to upper classes, and believed that parents should be encouraged to send their children to advanced schools. The curriculum should be adapted to ‘the progress of the times and the circumstances of the locality,’ and finally the compulsory education had to be applied nationwide as a ‘national education’ (kokumin kyōiku). He believed that it was mainly public schools that should be concerned with the enact- ing of this national education, but that private schools could also participate. Regarding the curriculum itself, Oshima put special emphasis on the aspect of ‘moral education’ (dōtokukyō). He considered moral education ‘a central aspect of the people’s general education’ and of special importance for Filipinos on their way to creating an independent state. The greatest responsibility for cultivation of a moral character lay with teaching staff. ‘Moral education’ should not be limited to the classroom or school but be a substantial part of the children’s daily lives, as they were ‘thoroughly affected by both the education at school and by the family.’175 Oshima wanted teachers to extend their influence beyond the institution itself and therefore they had to be at the forefront of the movement towards the formation of the ‘New Philippines.’ This was very much in line with Rōyama’s pre-war assessments of the situation in the Philippines, in which he had emphasized the need for a ‘historical dynamic’ within the

175 Oshima Masanori, Kyōiku oyobi shūkyō, vol. 3 of Hitō chōsa hōkoku, ed. Hitō Chōsa Iinkai (Manila: Hitō Gunsei Kambu, 1943). The Occupation Of The Philippines 149

Filipino people towards the creation of the GEACPS.176 Education should implement this ‘historical dynamic.’* Oshima demanded in the Research Commission’s report that Filipinos concentrate their spirit on the establishment of a new, independent Philippines, abolish ‘evil practices’ (heifū) and reclaim their own destiny. Schoolteachers played a key role in this respect and he expected them to ‘show thoroughly an attitude of personal readiness and responsibility and encourage morals.’ The strong focus on ‘moral education’ would also bring about changes in the curriculum, especially in elementary schools. To allow more time for the teaching of moral values, as well as the national history of the Philippines, Oshima suggested cutting back English lessons. He considered teaching of Philippine national history to be of the utmost importance for Filipino children, enabling them to become aware of their own country’s national character as well as of

the common history of the related countries in the Orient and all their customs and geography. Thus, it is necessary to implement a global consciousness in the national education.

Oshima did not advocate the complete abandonment of English as a foreign language in Philippine schools, and he did suggest having English taught in the upper grades. At the same time, Japanese ‘as the common language of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’ should be taught ‘at least from the last four years of compulsory education onwards.’ According to Oshima, the Philippines still lacked ‘the spirit of a creation plan’ (sōzō kōfu) to establish a truly independent country. This statement again corresponded with Rōyama’s pre-war assessment of Philippine prospects of integration into the GEACPS. Thus, the evocation of such a spirit among Filipino children had to be one of the main targets of school education. Schoolteachers therefore needed extensive training and the provision of a large amount of teaching material. Oshima considered school as scarcely prepared to function as an institution for the implementation of this spirit towards building a ‘New Philippines.’ He emphasized once more the necessity of re-educating Filipinos on the need to appreciate the value of labour and ‘fostering the germ of the spirit that is dedicated to invention.’ Science, to Oshima, did not mean merely memorizing documents but using and utilizing them creatively. He praised the Filipinos’ skills when working with their fingers, which was comparative to that of the Japanese, but he also bemoaned the ‘loss of a nature of free creation’ because of the country’s history. According to Oshima, in Japan the creativity of children had been

176 Rōyama, Tōa to sekai, p. 373. 150 chapter 4

fostered, and this had been a prerequisite for the formation of an independent country. If the Filipinos continued on their way of education, they could ‘not become a self-sufficient, independently creating people.’ He called on parents and teachers to position themselves favourably towards educational reforms as he considered the family and school most formative for Filipino children.177 During the years of the Military Administration in the Philippines, educational reform was certainly on the agenda of the Japanese rulers. In a speech on 19 May 1942, Major-General Hayashi Yoshihide (1891–1978) sketched the purposes of a new Philippine educational policy:

It shall be the cardinal spirit of educational renovation in the Philippines to cultivate and promote the spirits of independence, fortitude and man- liness, in lieu of the spirits of dependence and frivolity that have existed in the past. The educational renovation is the only way by which the existing evils may be rectified, characters built, and a sound society reconstructed.178

These were also the core elements of Oshima’s design for educational reforms in the Philippines. One day before this speech, on 18 April 1942, Director- General Hayashi instructed Commissioner of the Department of Education, Health and Welfare, Claro M. Recto, to confiscate books of anti-Japanese and pro-democratic content from universities, schools and public libraries:

All books and publications already published whose content comes within the purview of the following, shall be confiscated after due inspection.

1. Those that are written for anti-Japanese propaganda purposes; 2. Those that propagate democracy and aim at alienating Axis powers from one another; 3. Those that repudiate war;

177 Oshima, Kyōiku oyobi shūkyō. 178 Yoshihide Hayashi, “Speech by Major-General Hayashi. Director-General of the Japanese Military Administration at the first Meeting of the Provincial Governors, City Mayors and Treasurers,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 4, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), pp. xiii–xvii. The Occupation Of The Philippines 151

4. Those that are in contradiction with the fundamental principles of the Philippine educational renovation; 5. Those that are improper in the enforcement of military administration.179

A wide range of censorship was exercised over textbooks. All elements of American history and passages concerned with democracy were eliminated. One example was the chapter “How to vote right” in the Philippine High School Readers Book I.180 The educational guidelines implemented by the Japanese administration followed, from the very beginning, the idea of inculcating Filipinos with a sense of Orientalism and alienating them from their former American overlords. Therefore, elementary schools reopened first, followed by vocational schools, secondary schools and institutions that provided education in agriculture, medicine, fisheries and engineering. The priorities in reopening schools were set by the respective institutions’ usefulness for the Japanese in propagating the concept of the GEACPS. Thus, faculties of law remained closed, as the Japanese did not consider lawyers a necessity under the circumstances.181 At the Second Convention of Provincial Governors and City Mayors on 12 August 1942, Hayashi referred to the reopening of elementary and secondary agricultural schools, and re-emphasized the importance of education for the development of the Philippines. He also stressed the utmost importance of Japanese as the future common language of the GEACPS:

When it is realized that the Japanese language is destined to become the common language between the vast limits of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and that in the reconstruction of the Philippines there will be no other medium than Japanese for the introduction of oriental culture and new knowledge, the importance of acquiring the language will require no further emphasis.182

179 Yoshihide Hayashi, “Instruction (No. 16),” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 4, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), p. 4. 180 Yoshihide Hayashi, “Instruction No. 49,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 6, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), pp. 1–10. 181 Agoncillo & Alfonso, History of the Filipino People, pp. 462–63. 182 Yoshihide Hayashi, “Address by the Director-General of the Japanese Military Administra- tion on the Occasion of the Second Convention of Provincial Governors and City Mayors, Manila, August 12, 1942,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 6, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Mili- tary Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), pp. xxvi–xxxiii. 152 chapter 4

On 24 July 1942, Military Ordinance No. 13 declared Japanese and Tagalog the official languages in the Philippines. However, the Japanese did not completely ban English, instead allowing it to be used “for the time being.”183 All these measures were in line with the suggestions Oshima made in the following year in the report of the Research Commission. Juan Labrador, who was teaching at Santo Tomas University, was convinced that the Philippines was ill prepared for such a significant step as changing the official language:

With one stroke of the pen, Spanish was banished, and English was sentenced to death as official language. I do not believe the Filipinos have attained even a mediocre proficiency in spoken Japanese. Those who are able to write in that language are very few indeed. We are just waiting for the order that Japanese be taught in our school.184

The inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic saw a manifestation of the Military Administration’s educational policy. The constitution pre- scribed Tagalog as the official language and furthermore, only Filipino teachers were allowed to teach Tagalog as well as Philippine history. Thus, for the first time in Philippine history, foreigners were prohibited from teaching the history of the country at schools. Philippine history was no longer taught from a foreign perspective.185 The strengthening of the Filipino national character was one of the main pillars of the educational reforms enacted by the Japanese administration. The Philippine Executive Commission’s Department of Education, Health, and Public Welfare established, for example, a “Section on the Preparation of a Graded Word List in the National Language” on 1 July 1942. This section would, apart from compiling a Philippine language-Japanese-English-dictionary and preparing teaching materials in Tagalog, ’prepare handbooks on the habits and character traits of Rizal for use in the proposed Kabataang Maka-Rizal or Rizal Youth Movement’ and ‘prepare briefs on the character traits of Philippine heroines.’ There were supposed to be two divisions within the Rizal Youth Movement: one for children aged nine to thirteen and one for youths aged

183 Masaharu Homma, “Military Ordinance No. 13 (July 24, 1942). Military Ordinance concerning Official Languages for Public Use,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 6, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), p. 14. 184 Labrador, A Diary of the Japanese Occupation, p. 125. 185 Agoncillo, Filipino Nationalism, p. 232. The Occupation Of The Philippines 153 fourteen to twenty.186 Though named “Rizal Youth Movement,” the organization would later be renamed the “Junior KALIBAPI.” Nevertheless, in May of 1944, the “Junior KALIBAPI” was re-baptized the “Rizal Youth”, serving the same purposes as its predecessor.187 In order to make the schoolteachers familiar with the new educational guidelines, the administration organized conferences and founded a “Normal Institute” in Manila to train teachers according to the new teaching requirements. One main purpose of this institute was to produce capable teachers of Japanese for elementary and intermediary schools. Japanese was added to the curricula at Philippine schools in a fairly careful way. In elementary schools, for example, 20 minutes per week were reserved for training in Japanese, while in secondary and agricultural schools pupils were supposed to spend 40 minutes learning the language. Tagalog was taught twice a week for 40 minutes at secondary schools and it was supposed to be taught at elementary schools as early as possible. At schools where quali- fied teachers were available, in 5th and 6th grade, Tagalog training took the time slot that English lessons had done in the curriculum in the past. Private schools were allowed to reopen as long as they adhered to the same principles as public schools. The authorities banned teachers of ‘enemy nationalities’ from the schools and excluded religion from the curriculum.188 However, in a compromise with the Vatican, the JMA revised its decision regarding the complete abandonment of religious instruction.189 On 8 November 1943, the National Education Board filed a report and addressed it to the new president Laurel. In this report, the Board came up with several suggestions regarding education at public and private schools and the teaching of languages. The report recommended that in order to realize the separation of state and religion, only Filipino laymen would be appointed heads of schools, colleges and universities. This was very much in line with the recommendations made by the Research Commission on the Philippines. In addition, the Board recommended that teachers had to obtain a license before they be allowed to teach. The idea was to test their ‘good moral character.’ A teacher had to prove that ‘he

186 Claro M. Recto, “Report of the Commissioner of Education, Health and Public Welfare,” Historical Bulletin 11:5 (1967), pp. 409–51. 187 Office of Stretegic Services, Research and Analysis Branch. “Japanese Attempts at Indoctrination of Youth in Occupied Areas,” Current Intelligence Study No. 3, 23 March 1945, pp. 1–7. 188 Recto, “Report of the Commissioner,” pp. 409–51. 189 Takefumi Terada, “The Religious Propaganda Program for Christian Churches,” in The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction, ed. Ikehata Setsuho & Ricardo Trota José (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), pp. 215–46. 154 chapter 4 or she sincerely believes in the educational policies of the State.’ The Minister of Education, Health, and Public Welfare would directly supervise these exami- nations. The latter should also define ‘a code of professional ethics for teachers’ that would function as a moral basis on which teachers in the Philippines had to operate. This code

should be based on the relations between the teachers or the school officials and the pupils, parents, fellow members, the community and the nation.

The Board also suggested both a Filipinization and secularization of the teaching staff at schools, colleges and universities. Native Filipinos should teach the national Filipino language, character education and social science. Members of the clergy were not supposed to teach any other subject but religion, music, drawing and domestic science. The children should learn Japanese starting from 5th grade in elementary school, while Tagalog as national language was part of the curriculum in all grades at all schools. Furthermore, it was necessary to establish a basic dictionary for Tagalog to ease the proliferation of the language as a unifying feature among all Filipino citizens.190 The demand for an extensive ethical code that should apply to people of all social origins at the schools was very similar to Oshima Masanori’s idea of moral education and spiritual development of the Filipinos. In addition, he shared the concept of placing education into the hands of Filipinos, as well as the idea of not teaching Japanese to Filipino children immediately upon their arrival at elementary school. Overall, the Research Commission agreed with the educational policies applied during the Military Administration and the Second Philippine Republic. The basic idea behind Oshima’s concept of Philippine education was the strengthening of Filipino nationalism so that Filipinos would become aware of their Oriental identity. Given this awareness, public support for the concept of the GEACPS could then be achieved. Oshima as well as the Military Administration and the administration of the Second Philippine Republic shared the conviction that education, especially at elementary and secondary schools, played a crucial role in the building of a ‘New Philippines’ based on pan-Asianist principles. The administrators gave Tagalog priority over Japanese, as it was indispensable as a means of integration. Furthermore, they did not completely ban English, but marginalized it in the curricula to make room for Tagalog and Japanese. The education policy during the Japanese occupation was thus very much in line with the ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianism of Rōyama Masamichi and the Shōwa

190 Jorge Bocobo, Franciso Benitez and M.V. de Los Reyes, “Report and Recommendations of the National Education Board,” Historical Bulletin 11:5 (1967), pp. 451–55. The Occupation Of The Philippines 155

Research Association, as the Japanese authorities placed much emphasis on Philippine circumstances and accepted that it would take some effort to turn Filipino youth into ‘true’ Orientals. Educational policy in the Philippines followed pragmatic thought or, as the Constantinos put it, the Japanese used education as a vehicle to achieve their long-term goals, just as the Americans had done before them.191

Religion, the Spanish Legacy and Treatment of the “Overseas Chinese” during the Japanese Occupation The Philippines was the only country within the GEACPS where the majority of the population was Catholic. By 1939, 78.8 per cent of Filipinos were of the Catholic faith while 91 per cent of the population were Christians.192 This made the implementation of Pan-Asianism and the promotion of the idea of the sphere extremely complicated in the archipelago. The Filipinos, as Christians, often felt superior towards the non-Christian Japanese. According to Renato Constantino, Filipinos ‘had adopted the Western attitude of looking down upon their Asian neighbors.’193 Religion thus played a crucial role in what the Japanese saw as the alienation of Filipinos from their Oriental roots. Therefore, the Japanese needed to gain influence over Filipinos via the institution of the church. To this purpose, the Japanese Army General Staff established a Religious Section consisting of clergy and both Protestant and Catholic laity and sent it to the Philippines along with the first landing troops. In March 1942, Taguchi Yoshigorō (1902–1978), bishop of Osaka, joined the Religious Section. The bishop intended to influence Japanese occupation policy according to the wishes of the Vatican.194 Spanish priest Juan Labrador summed up the purpose of the Religious Section as follows:

The mission of the Commission on Religion seems to be two-fold; first, to enable the religious authorities in the Philippines to take up matters with the military authorities through the Commission; second, to make propaganda and create an atmosphere favorable to the New Regime.195

191 Constantino & Constantino, The Philippines: the Continuing Past, p. 67. 192 Takefumi Terada, “The Religious Propaganda Program for Christian Churches,” in The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction, ed. Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo Trota José (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), pp. 215–46. 193 Renato Constantino, The Second Invasion. Japan in the Philippines (Quezon City: Karrel, Inc., 1989), pp. 41–42. 194 Takefumi, “The Religious Propaganda Program,” pp. 215–46. 195 Labrador, A Diary of the Japanese Occupation, p. 61. 156 chapter 4

Labrador himself was a typical representative of the Philippine clergy dominated by Europeans at the time of the Japanese invasion. The dominance of foreigners in the Philippine clergy had caused much resentment among the Philippine population and had even fostered nationalist movements. Bishop Taguchi strongly advocated a ‘Filipinization’ of the clergy as this was ‘closely related to the innovative measures for realizing the important principle of Asia for the Asians.’This ‘Filipinization’ should follow the example of the Filipino- run Executive Commission. At the same time, Taguchi suggested installing Japanese advisors to Filipino bishops, as they would also need to understand the significance of the Greater East Asia War.196 In general, the Japanese Military Administration guaranteed religious freedom to all Filipinos; however, under supervision of the Bureau of Religious Affairs. Article II of Executive Order No. 4 by Executive Commission’s Chairman Vargas defined the role of the Bureau as follows:

All religions or religious organizations or orders heretofore existing or which may hereafter be established shall enjoy freedom of religion and worship, shall be free to preach their doctrines, and their religious rights shall be respected so long as they observe public order and good social manners. Accordingly, the Bureau of Religious Affairs shall have power of supervision over all religious organizations or orders in the Philippines, and after due investigation shall give authorization for the organization and establishment hereafter of other religious corporations or orders.197

Despite this liberal approach, Catholicism provided a substantial obstacle to the re-Orientalisation of the Filipinos. For this reason, secularization of education remained an important aim of the Japanese. In the report of the Research Commission, Rōyama Masamichi praised the efforts of the representatives of the Philippine ‘Malolos Republic’ after the end of the Spanish rule in the islands to cut back the influence of religion leaders on politics and education. Rōyama conceded ‘a lack of confidence in moral education at the schools’ and a dissatisfaction with the teachers responsible for this field of education. He called for the promotion of a ‘religious awareness,’ while moral education had

196 Takefumi, “The Religious Propaganda Program,” pp. 215–46. 197 Jorge B. Vargas, “Office of the Chairman of the Executive Commission. Malacanan Palace. By the Chairman of the Executive Commission, Executive Order No. 4,” in The Official Journal of the Japanese Military Administration, vol. 1, ed. The Bureau of Publicity, The Department of General Affairs, The Japanese Military Administration (Manila: Nichi Nichi Shimbunsha, 1942), pp. 68–79. The Occupation Of The Philippines 157 to be conducted from a non-religious standpoint. Otherwise, ‘every religious church and Sunday school’ would implement its own way of moral education in the country.198 Rōyama clearly wanted to constrain the influence of any religious organization on public education, as this would hinder the promotion of pan-Asianist ideas in the Philippines. The National Education Board followed in its recommendations shortly after the inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic the same principles as Rōyama. In general, only Filipino non-professionals could become head of a university, school or college. The purpose of this secularization of educational institutions was to ‘strengthen the spirit of nationalism in private education, and to enhance the separation of church and state.’199 As hinted in the previous chapter, Rōyama Masamichi was well aware of the strong position of the Catholic Church in the Philippine Islands. The ‘Filippinization’ of the clergy was one of Japan’s major attempts to remove Western influence in the archipelago and strengthen Filipino nationalism. The clergy was forced to sell large amounts of property, and education in private schools was secularized, i.e. the state controlled the curricula and contents of textbooks. It was religious orders which ran most private schools, and the majority of faculty in these institutions were non-Filipino clergy. The Military Administration ordered the removal of non-Asians from the teaching staff, which led to the temporarily closing of some schools and an almost complete change of the faculty personnel.200 Nevertheless, the Japanese Military Administration was fully aware of the Catholic Church’s strong impact on Philippine society and therefore sought cooperation with the institution. Overall, the Catholic Church was willing to cooperate with the Japanese in the Philippines. Even though the archbishop of Manila, the Irish-born American national Monsignor Michael J. O’Doherty (1874–1949), showed some reluctance in working closely with Japanese Colonel Narusawa Tomoji who was in command of the religious section, his superiors in Rome forced him to cooperate. In December 1943, Pope Pius XII (1876–1958) sent a message to the Filipino people in which he showed appreciation for the upcoming establishment of the Second Philippine Republic and the Japanese motives.201 As much as the Catholic Church was willing to co-exist with the new rulers of the Philippines, the Japanese administrators knew that it was impossible to gain influence in Philippine society without the clergy. Instead of sup- pressing Catholicism or Christianity in the islands, they pursued the same

198 Rōyama, Kyōiku oyobi shūkyō. 199 Bocobo, Benitez and de Los Reyes, “Report and Recommendations,” pp. 451–55. 200 Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, p. 73. 201 Ibid., p. 71. 158 chapter 4 strategy as they had done in fields such as administration and education, by removing foreigners from the level of seniority and replacing them with Filipinos. The underlying idea was to foster Filipino nationalism and thereby make the Filipino people become more receptive to the pan-Asianist concept of the GEACPS. The Japanese military even utilized Catholicism to highlight the Filipino mission towards the establishment of the GEACPS. On the 39th anniversary of the fall of Mukden in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Chief Of Staff of Japanese forces in the Philippines, Kuroda Shigenori, quoted the Bible to underline that those Filipinos who hoped for the Americans to return were in fact betraying their country:

Therefore, those who hope and pine to this day that the Americans should return are not true Filipinos nor are they good believers of the Holy Bible. There is a passage in the scripture in which Jesus Christ says, “You are the salt of the earth.” If the salt loses its property of saltiness, it will be cast away as useless. If the Filipinos are beneficial to the world it is because they are Filipinos.202

Use of the Bible to emphasize the necessity for Filipinos to turn against the Americans and rediscover their own national identity shows that the Japanese military fully recognized the power of Christianity in the Philippines and the impossibility of its extinction in the archipelago. Even though the great majority of the Filipinos were Catholic at the time of the Japanese invasion, there was also a significant number of Muslim Filipinos living in the southern main island Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. By the time the war had broken out, the Hiripin Kyōkai (Philippine Society) in Japan had worked out plans on how to deal with the Philippine Muslim population. The organization suggested a placation policy quite similar to the treatment of the Christian majority. This approach was widely adopted by the Japanese Military Administration and General Homma became vice chair and a board director of the Hiripin Kyōkai to underline the close cooperation between the Japanese military in the Philippines and the organization. There was, however, a debate within the military on the question of Mindanao. One faction favoured a separation of Mindanao from the rest of the Philippines to make better use of the strategically important southern island. This rift went even through the Research Commission, where the agricultural scientist Itō Chōji wanted to turn Davao into a Japanese ‘national colony,’ placing his plan in the Commission’s report. Nevertheless, such plans for partition did not find

202 Shigenori Kuroda, “The Mission of the Filipino People,” Pillars 1:5 (1944), p. 11. The Occupation Of The Philippines 159 majority support in the military or in the Research Commission. The government in Tokyo, and the Military Administration in Manila, intended to govern the Philippines with the help of the old Commonwealth elites and these were all nationalists who strictly opposed a separation of Mindanao. Rōyama Masamichi, as the central figure of the Research Commission, along with its chairperson Murata Shōzō (1878–1957) who later became the Japanese ambassador in the Second Philippine Republic, also did not support Ito’s idea. Their overall fear was that Japan would lose its credibility in granting the Philippines independence if it separated a part of the archipelago to serve its own national interests. The Military Administration did not launch any particular propaganda activities in Mindanao to convince the Muslim population of the benefits of the GEACPS. Indeed, the Religious Section of the Department of Information did not operate in the southern main island. Only towards the end of the war, when the strategic importance of Mindanao increased even further, did the government in Tokyo send delegates of the Dai-Nippon Kaikyō Kyōkai (Greater Japan Islam Association), who arrived in the Philippines on 14 July 1944. Among these delegates was Okamoto Jingo, a former chairperson of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai. Okamoto and his team intended to conduct fieldwork in Mindanao to investigate the perspectives of winning over the Muslim population there, but the war situation made it impossible for them to accomplish their mission and they returned to Japan.203 The handling of the religious question followed the ‘esoteric’ strategy of adapting Pan-Asianism to the cultural specifics of the Philippines. It was obviously the long-term strategy of Rōyama to weaken the influence of the church by educational reforms. These would lead to a slow and subtle alienation of the Filipinos from Western culture, including Christianity. Both the Military Administration and the government of the republic adopted this position. The approach of the Japanese Military Administration in dealing with Catholicism exemplifies the predominant role of ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianism in Japanese occupation policy. The Japanese accepted that they could not remove the impact of the Catholic Church from the Philippines in the short term, and instead adapted their Asianism to this Philippine specific. Of course, Catholicism embodied the Westernization of the islands and could hardly survive as a state religion in a country that was supposed to be part of the GEACPS. The long-term strategy of the Japanese was thus to enforce the separation of state and religion (a process the Americans had already initiated) and to drive the Catholic Church out of those fields that influenced and shaped the society: administration and education. It is highly hypothetical as to whether this

203 Kawashima, “Japanese Administrative Policy,” pp. 99–125. 160 chapter 4 strategy would have had a chance to succeed if the GEACPS had lasted longer. The fact remains that Catholicism is still omnipresent in the archipelago even today, and this must raise serious questions about whether Orientalism would ever have served as a substitute for Christianity in the Philippines. However, the Japanese were arguably left with no alternative in the Philippine conditions but to attempt to gradually diminish the influence of the church, especially by removing clergy from the academic bodies. The role of the Catholic Church in the Philippines even influenced Spanish-Japanese relations. Despite the political affiliations between Tokyo and Madrid, the Japanese considered the Spanish occupation period a major factor in the alienation of the Filipinos from their Oriental roots. In addition, the Spanish conquistadors had first been responsible for the spreading of Christianity in the islands. Thus, the Japanese considered the remaining Spaniards in the Philippines Westerners rather than allies.204 In the report of the Research Commission, Takeuchi Tatsuji was responsible for the section detailing Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines. According to Takeuchi, the proliferation of Catholicism was equal to the extension of Spanish power itself and Spain’s dominating motive for conquest and settlement of the Philippines was, from its very inception, religious propagation. Takeuchi listed four main reasons for the rapid success of Catholicism in the Philippines. First, the administrative structure of the native population was completely underdeveloped and thus the well-organized Catholic Church could easily strike roots in this environment. Second, Takeuchi praised the skills of the Spanish missionaries who, unlike the militarists, had studied local customs and even adapted some of the Catholic rites to the native culture. Third, priests had brought a great amount of expertise in various fields to the Philippines or as Takeuchi described it, ‘the science of Western civilization then known.’ The final point was the close interrelation between religion and education. In the 17th century, the conversion process of the great majority of the Philippine population had ended and the main interest of the Catholic Church, from that time on, had been to preserve the status quo. During this period of ‘colonial stagnation,’ friar priests, as landowners, exploited the rural population and showed sentiments of ‘racial superiority’ towards native farm- ers. Even though these friars were objects of hate and disgust among many Filipinos, they had not brought the Catholic Church as an institution into question. Nevertheless, according to Takeuchi, the behaviour of these friars, along with the land-owning question, heavily contributed to the developments

204 Rodao, “Spanish Falange in the Philippines,” pp. 3–27. The Occupation Of The Philippines 161 that eventually led to the Philippine Revolution. Overall, Takeuchi assessed the Spanish administration of the Philippines as ‘under the constant dominance of the church’ and ‘thoroughly religious in character.’ He named it the ‘greatest contribution’ of the Spanish administration that, by means of Catholicism, it had succeeded in uniting the formerly highly diversified Philippine population and therein enabled the Filipinos to develop a national character. The negative effect of Catholicism was its ‘encouragement of a consumptive life centering upon the church and religious rituals [which] obstructed a healthy development of the saving habit among Filipinos’ and hindered the development of a middle class. Takeuchi criticized the lack of separation between church and state during Spanish rule, and argued that this had led to the denial of human rights to the Filipinos and corruption in the government. Takeuchi blamed this defect of the Spanish administration for the Filipino habit of ‘regarding abuses of privilege by office-holders as natural and unavoidable.’205 Takeuchi was very pragmatic in his evaluation of the Spanish administration of the Philippines. On the one hand, he appreciated the unifying function of Catholicism for the Filipino people, while on the other he criticized the negative aspects of religious interference in administrative matters. Takeuchi positively highlighted how early Spanish missionaries had studied local customs and even adapted their Catholicism to Philippine circumstances. This kind of flexible response resembles the ‘esoteric’ pan-Asianists’ approach to adapt Japanese Asianism to strike roots in the islands. Takeuchi’s emphasis on education, as a means of religious indoctrination during the Spanish period, was in accordance with the recommendations of the Research Commission to secularize teaching staff at private schools. He was obviously aware of the great obstacle that Catholicism represented to the implementation of an Orientalism-based agenda in the Philippines and he knew it would take a very long time to implement Orientalism as a unifying feature that could replace Catholicism in this country. As well as their views of Spain and the Spanish legacy in the Philippines, the Japanese administration in the Philippines also looked with great suspicion at the Chinese minority in the islands. Even though the Chinese were, according to both ‘esoteric’ and ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist ideas, the first natural ally of Japan in creating the New World Order following the principle of ‘one script, one race’ (dōbun dōshu), those Chinese who lived and worked in Southeast Asia were largely regarded as collaborators and supporters of the Chiang Kai- shek regime. Kageyama Tomoji, of the Japanese Information Department

205 Takeuchi, “Survey of Spanish Rule in the Philippines,” pp. 1–27. 162 chapter 4 in the Philippines, accused the Chinese community in the islands of sabotage of Japanese business and trade in the archipelago since 1932 during the ‘undeclared’ Second Sino-Japanese War. He claimed that only the Japanese countermeasures had been able to limit the influence of the Chinese on the Philippine economy.206 In Kageyama’s point of view the ‘overseas Chinese merchants in the South Seas’ (Nan’yō kakyō) were agents of the Chiang government and supported by the US. In its efforts to win over the Chinese in the Philippines, the Americans promised to support Sergio Osmena (1878–1961), who Kageyama described as having ‘the blood of Chinese overseas merchants in his veins’ (kakyō no konketsuji), to become the next Philippine president. The Chinese in the South Seas utilized American support for the creation of an ‘economic empire’ in the region.207 Kageyama also accused the Chinese in the South Seas of supporting the creation of an anti-Japanese ‘pan-Malayan peoples movement’ (Han-Mare minzoku undō) together with the US and ‘the Jews.’ The purpose of this movement was, according to Kageyama, to foster fears in the region of an expansionist Japanese policy in Southeast Asia.208 Kageyama’s negative assumptions about the Chinese community in the Philippines reflect the overall scepticism of Japanese Pan-Asianists towards the capability of the Chinese people to understand the motives of the Japanese mission in Asia. They suspected especially Chinese living abroad of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and the Americans, thereby betraying their own people. This resentment greatly affected the treatment of Chinese nationals in the Philippines by the Japanese military. A large number of both Chinese and Japanese immi- grants lived in the region around Davao in Mindanao. When the Japanese invaded the island, there were mass killings of Chinese residents and plundering of shops run by Chinese. The Japanese army recruited ‘uncooperative Chinese’ for forced labour in Japanese military projects and the Japanese generally suspected the Chinese of sympathizing with the guerillas. The constant maltreatment of Chinese residents led many members of the Chinese community to support the anti-Japanese resistance.209 The Japanese never applied the principle of dōbun dōshu to the Chinese residents in the Philippines. Obviously, the mistrust of the Japanese administrators outweighed their ideological convictions in the case of the Chinese community.

206 Kageyama, Hiripin no zenbō, pp. 182–83. 207 Ibid., pp. 249–50. 208 Ibid., pp. 258–59. 209 Shinzo Hayase, “The Japanese Residents of Dabao-kuo,” in The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction, ed. Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo Trota José (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), pp. 247–87. The Occupation Of The Philippines 163

Pan-Asianism and the Soldier in the Field The official outline of Japanese occupation policy in the Philippines was based on the principle of liberating a fellow Asian people from American imperialist rule. However, to what degree did this ideology reach the Japanese soldiers who interacted with the Filipinos on a daily base and who were in charge of the implementation of the occupation policy? There is a vast amount of literature on the atrocities commited by members of the Japanese army against the Philippine population during the occupation period. Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Oscar M. Alfonso, for example, paint the picture of the Japanese occupation in the darkest colours:

No one, during the darkest days of the occupation, could sleep soundly. Everyone was waiting for the hour he would be arrested and tortured. There was no safety; there were only fears of the unknown. Nobody could be sure that he would not meet disaster in any of the streets, for the Japanese sentries, strategically placed at most street corners, slapped men, women, and even children for failing to bow to them. [. . .] Slapping was a common sight. A Filipino was slapped for not bringing his resi- dence certificate with him. He was slapped for not bowing properly to the sentry. He was slapped for not being understood by a Japanese sentry. He was slapped for having a face the Japanese did not like.210

Juan Labrador as an eye witness of the maltreatment of the Filipinos by the Japanese, wrote in his diary on 12 March 1943:

I never thought the Oriental imagination could be so fertile to be able to invent such refined and painful torments. There are three classes of offenses which the Japanese punish with unusual rigidity; thievery and looting, traffic violation, and disrespect for agents of the law. Thieves and looters are kicked or dealt with saber blows. Recidivists, or those who rob military installations, are made to walk on their knees and whipped, or their heads tied behind the head which is placed between the legs all tied up, and then hurled rolling against the wall, like a human ball. Traffic violators are tied to a tree or post and kept there under the sun in public view for two days. In a few cases, when two infractors are caught at the same time, they are made to deal blows on each other until they are both hurt and exhausted. [. . .] Those who fail to salute the sentries posted in

210 Agoncillo and Alfonso, History of the Filipino People, p. 471. 164 chapter 4

many strategic places are made to bow twenty times or more and if the performance is not satisfactory, the infractor is given saber blows.211

Labrador nevertheless also mentioned that Japanese deliquents were treated in the same way.212 In particular, slapping was the utmost humiliating punishment for the Filipinos and it severely damaged the credibility of the Japanese from the beginning of their rule in the archipelago.213 Claro M. Recto, who had become Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Laurel administration in 1943, even wrote a letter to Lieutenant General Takaji Wachi on 15 June 1944, in which he officially protested against the ongoing gross ill-treatment of Filipino citizens by Japanese soldiers. In this letter, Recto was very clear on the impossibility of winning over the Filipinos for the newly established Second Philippine Republic, should these kinds of atrocities continue:

The practice, for instance, of slapping Filipinos in the face, of tying them to posts or making them kneel in public, in the heat of the sun, and then beating them up—this upon the slightest fault, mistake or provocation, or without any other reason than failure to understand each other’s language, is certain to create resentment on the part not only of the victim but also of the members of his family, his friends and the general public. [. . .] Thousands of cases have been reported of people being either burned alive, killed at the point of the bayonet, beheaded, beaten without mercy, or otherwise subjected to various methods of physical torture, without distinction as to age or sex. [. . .] In my hometown alone, Tiaong, Tayabas, over one hundred were summarily executed during the ‘zonifi- cation’ of the people there shortly before the inauguration of the Republic. [. . .] One other thing which constitutes a source of mounting dissatisfaction among the people, particularly in the City of Manila, is the fact that many of them have been and are being ordered to evacuate their homes so that the same may be occupied by personnel of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy.

Recto even went so far to blame the Japanese for the increasing guerilla activities:

211 Labrador, A Diary of the Japanese Occupation, p. 76. 212 Ibid., p. 77. 213 Agoncillo and Alfonso, History of the Filipino People, p. 471. The Occupation Of The Philippines 165

It is doubtful whether those who are engaged in such activities are pro- American by conviction. In the first place, they have no real understanding of the basic issues involved in the present war between the United States and Japan. [. . .] The main reason why many of them have turned ‘guerrillas’ and bandits is not the desire that America should win the war, but simply because of the cruel treatment that they or their relatives, friends and countrymen had received at the hands of the Japanese and their fear that if they go out of hiding and live normal lives, they will be punished or put to death.

A very important point is that Recto accused the Japanese for their lack of understanding of Philippine culture:

While in other countries the exaction of collective responsibility may be justified, in the Philippines it is hardly so, because for hundreds of years the Filipinos have been individualistic; and Spaniards and Americans have further developed their racial trait.214

This frank criticism of the Japanese incapability to deal with Philippine culture at the same time raised the question whether the Philippines would fit into the GEACPS. Apparently, at least the common soldiers in the Japanese army did not care too much about the ideological framework set by the GEACPS. Kinbara Setsumi (1901–1976) graduated from military college in 1926 and served in the War Ministry Bureau of Medical Affairs until 1943. He was promoted to colonel and became Section Chief of the bureau of Medical Affairs before he went to Sumatra in 1943 and then to Indochina, where he stayed until the Japanese surrender. After the war, he served in the Japanese Self Defense Forces as a physician. In the Summary of the Journal of the War Ministry Affairs, Kinbara archived overall 35 volumes of military records. On 12 February 1942, a report of the Regional Legal Affairs Bureau stated the following:

Within the Tomi shūdan (25th Army), there are 123 cases of deserting under enemy fire, three cases of rape and three cases of looting. [. . .] In the area of the Philippines, there is also a fair amount of cases of rape (14 men) and six cases, in which a woman was assaulted by a non- commissioned officer.215

214 Zaide and Zaide, Documentary Sources of Philippine History, vol. 11, pp. 62–64. 215 Suzuki Yuko, Yamashita Yone, Tonomura Masaru, Nihongun “ianfu” kankei shiryō shūsei (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2006), p. 308. 166 chapter 4

On 2 May 1942, a report of the Chief of the Troop Office (heimukyoku) indicated that there were cases of rape committed by Japanese soldiers in the Philippines, but played down the number at the same time by comparing it to the Sino-Japanese War:

In the Philippines, there were relatively many [cases] compared to other regions. However, one must say that if compared to the Second Sino- Japanese War, they were few.216

On 9 May 1942, the Chief of the Regional Legal Affairs Bureau gave an exact number of crimes committed by the Japanese army in the Philippines. He, too, regarded the number as comparatively low compared with the war against China:

The number of crimes committed by the Southern Army counts 237 cases. In general, this is few compared to the Second Sino Japanese War. Regarding the 14th Army, rape occurs often. Women are made to devote themselves to Japanese.217

Yano Masami (born in 1920 in Nibugawa, Ehime Prefecture) held the rank of a private first class when he landed in Luzon as a cook in the Second Tank Division, 4th Combat Engineer Battalion, on 2 August 1944. Before coming to the Philippines, he served for three years in Manchuria. In his wartime memoirs, Yano described himself as someone who had only small ambitions regarding a career in the army at the time the war broke out. However, after four years of duty as an active soldier, he had lost most of his reservations against the military and to a certain degree even enjoyed the company of his comrades. Yano wrote down his memories as a POW immediately after the war and estimated his account to be ‘95% correct.’218 On 28 September 1944, Yano and his division arrived in the city of Gaban, San Miguel, approximately 70 kilometers north of Manila. Yano soon took a keen interest in the young women of the village and even learned Tagalog to be able to communicate with them. Since he was in charge of supply, he had to purchase foodstuffs on the market every day and thus established contacts with the natives. Yano described his encounters in Gaban as follows:

216 Ibid., p. 308. 217 Ibid., p. 308. 218 Yoshimi Yoshiaki, Kusa no ne no fashizumu: Nihon minshu no senso taiken (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1987), p. 195. The Occupation Of The Philippines 167

The citizens are kind, the young women possess character and now, I am really blessed like if I was living in paradise.219

In his diary entry from 3 November 1944 Yano recalled:

I take Hirose with me and go to the house of (one of the beautiful women from the marketplace) Lucene. Several young women of the village come gathering and shout noisy “Yano! Yano!” We take out our guitar and Hirose, my comrade in arms, plays it. [. . .] When we are humming in a low voice as (Hirose is playing) “Kage wo shitaite”,220 Lucine asks us to sing. When we start to sing, they are moved either by the characteristic mournful melody of this tune or somehow or the other by insufferable- ness. They are filled with emotions, and tears will come running. I wish for freedom and I want to be a native.221

However, besides Yano’s very positive memories of the relations between the soldiers of his unit and the native Filipinos, there also had been atrocities in the region. On 9 November 1944, the Japanese army destroyed a ham- let completely after two Japanese soldiers had been attacked on San Miguel Highway. Potatoes, rice, animals and clothes were confiscated and two men who were reaping rice were eventually killed on 13 December. Yano even followed the warrant officer’s order and stabbed an old woman, who had been left behind by the fugitives, to death. He described the growing brutality of the Japanese soldiers as being connected to their growing desperation in the face of the increasing attacks by the American Army. According to Yano, there was no other way to organize food but to steal it from the natives. Crimes against, and killings of Filipinos became a common sight. During a food requisition on 23 January 1945, Yano witnessed the rape of a woman who held a baby in her arms. A few days later, on the 28th, the soldiers fed themselves in the house of an elderly couple and the warrant officer killed both of them afterwards with his sword.222 Hamano Kenzaburō (born 1911) was in charge of the news department of the Philippine Expeditionary Corps and the squad leader of the battlefield

219 Ibid., p. 198. 220 “Kage no shitaite” was a popular song written by Japanese composer Masao Koga (1904–1978) in 1931. It became a hit song in the following year when performed by singer Fujiyama Ichirō (1911–1993). 221 Yoshimi, Kusa no ne no fashizumu, pp. 198–99. 222 Ibid., pp. 199–200. 168 chapter 4 propaganda shock troops. In 1979, Hamano published his wartime diary under the title Senjō, Ruzon haisen nikki (Battlefield, Luzon Defeat Diary). In his diary, Hamano described the growing hatred the Japanese soldiers felt for the Filipinos, even the children. He described how the concept of a “New Philippines” had become absolutely irrelevant to him and his comrades:

Filipinos are people who belong to the enemy side. Upon executing a military operation, we cannot stop. Even when we see the ‘children that drive the Japanese army nuts,’ we cannot help but to be driven by the brutal feeling of wanting to shoot them dead. Now it is not a deceitful feeling. I say it again. Let us make the Philippines scorched earth! Let us shoot the anti-Japanese Filipinos dead! The newborn Philippines is after that.223

Hamano, who was an intellectual educated at Waseda University, obviously was aware of the ideological background of the Japanese efforts in the Philippines, but it had completely lost its meaning to him under the battle conditions. The warrant officer of the 103rd Division Quick Firing Squad, Maeda Takejirō, kept a detailed frontline diary of his time in the mountains of Luzon. He described the requisition of food and clothes from the native Filipinos as a matter of the Japanese soldiers’ own survival. His entry from 28 July 1945 reads as follows:

We are less than seven men, we force our way through the jungle on the hills back from the seashore, looking for the footprints of the natives who were forced to take refuge and it takes five hours until we catch up with them. We discover that there is smoke from cooking in the valley, launch a surprise attack and apart from 38 guns, we take the opportunity to gain a few more things at that time. Finally, it comes that we can cook a complete meal for everybody.224

In the wake of defeat and struggling for survival every day, the Japanese soldiers were by no means concerned with any ideas of liberating a fellow Asian people. Even though some soldiers, like Yano Masami, used to have friendly relations with many Filipinos, they did not hesitate to steal from them, rape or even kill them. Nevertheless, it should not go without mentioning that in

223 Ibid., p. 200. 224 Ibid., pp. 200–201. The Occupation Of The Philippines 169 the last months of the war the brutalization of the soldiers did not only lead to atrocities against the natives. As Yano described in his diary, the Japanese became afraid of their own comrades. Rucksacks and food provisions were regularly stolen. On 22 June 1945, Yano caught a group of fleeing soldiers who had stolen food, clothes and blankets and killed them with a sword. On the same evening, Yano and his comrades even ate the flesh of the sergeant who had led the group of thieves.225 Throughout the entire occupation period, Japanese soldiers showed both a lack of understanding and interest in Filipino culture and this ignorance largely contributed to the failure of the occupation policy. Towards the end of the Japanese rule in the Philippines, it became most apparent that the idea of the GEACPS did not only fail to establish roots among most Filipinos, it also failed to win the hearts and minds of the Japanese soldiers. While civilian officials in the Foreign Ministry and the Greater East Asia Ministry were mostly convinced of the concept of the GEACPS, the field commanders of the army were most of all concerned about the welfare of their troops and the success of their military missions. As David Steinberg puts it, the concept of winning over the Philippine population by establishing friendly relations with the natives became more irrelevant to them the nearer the American re-invasion drew.226 Despite the growing indifference of the Japanese soldiers to the concept of the GEACPS, at least in the case of Yano Masami there was still a strong feeling of responsibility towards the Japanese nation. Throughout the massive suffer- ings during the last days of the war, Yano repeatedly thought about surrender, but his sense of duty kept him from doing it. As one of his superiors committed suicide, Yano found it a ‘meaningless’ death as it held ‘no benefit for the nation’ and he himself decided to continue fighting.227 Nevertheless, when he finally learned of the Japanese surrender, it was a great relief. Later, during his time in an American internment camp, Yano completely fell from grace with his former beliefs and instead sympathized with his former enemies. In his diary entry from 7 November 1945, he wrote:

I am discussing with Mr. Murakumo (a newspaper journalist and civilian in military employ) the country Japan will be after our return. The soldiers think it will be a state of the United States of America. I do not

225 Ibid., pp. 202–203. 226 David Steinberg, “Jose P. Laurel: A ‘Collaborator’ Misunderstood,” The Journal of Asian Studies 24:4 (1965), pp. 651–65. 227 Yoshimi, Kusa no ne no fashizumu, p. 203. 170 chapter 4

understand, but it seems good. Again, I am fed up with the war and if I look at the equipment of the American Army and the living standard of the soldiers, I get the feeling that this is good. They seem to possess big heartedness and freedom.228

On the event of his repatriation to Japan, Filipinos were throwing stones at the Japanese soldiers. They were called ‘burglars’ and the Filipinos wished them death. In his wartime memoir, Yano described this as the moment when he became aware of the heavy guilt he and the Japanese nation carried on their shoulders:

As I try to consider ourselves to have become inhabitants of the Philippines since our landing in San Fernando, I cannot stop thinking about the greatness of our guilt. We piled up all sort of guilt like murder, arson and robbery. It was not their war, so why did we cause them so much harm? Why did we come to this foreign country and fight? We really seem to be sinners.229

Of course Yano Masami can hardly represent all Japanese soldiers who fought in the Philippines. However, it is interesting to see that while he felt a strong sense of duty to his country until the final days of the war, the concept of the GEACPS did not seem to have any meaning to him. In the beginning of his stay in the Philippines, Yano took a keen interest in the young Filipino women and sympathized with the natives he interacted with, but he did not refer to them as ‘fellow Asians’ or to himself as a ‘liberator.’ Later, during the days of retreat, Yano did not hesitate to kill Filipino civilians if he was ordered to do so. He felt responsibility for the Japanese nation, but not for the idea of liberating Asia. A soldier who reflected on the meaning and purpose of the GEACPS in his wartime memoirs was Fujioka Akiyoshi. Fujioka was first assigned to the 37th Osaka Field Artillery Gunners Regiment in 1940, but sent home in November 1942 after he had fallen sick. After his recovery, he was drafted into the Osaka Field Artillery Regiment on 17 June 1944. Like Yano, Fujioka wrote down his memories in form of a diary after the war in an American internment camp. Being a graduate from Osaka Commercial College (Ōsaka Shōka Daigaku), he would have had the privilege to become an officer, but out of solidarity with the common soldiers he chose not to take this opportunity. Therefore, he was a private first-class when he fought in the Philippines. Already when he took

228 Ibid., p. 204. 229 Ibid., pp. 204–205. The Occupation Of The Philippines 171 part in the Japanese campaign in China from 1940 to 1941, Fujioka doubted the official Japanese propaganda when he faced the cruelties committed by his army: ‘What the heck have we come to do? Is this the holy war of the Imperial Army?’230 On his arrival in Luzon on 17 July 1944, Fujioka became assigned to the 55th Independent Mixed Brigade. The equipment of the troops was extremely poor. Although they were an artillery battalion, they had neither guns nor cannons and instead had to carry bamboo spears. The battalion was based in a suburb of Manila, but the soldiers hardly went to the capital, because it had become too dangerous. The hostility of the native Filipinos towards the Japanese was obvious and Fujioka wrote in his diary entry from 1 September 1944:

The true character of the progress of the circuit of Philippine independence and the GEACPS the Imperial Headquarters is talking about was withdrawal of all cultural elements, life’s struggles and antipathy. With a worthless piece of paper, we repay them with military scrip, by which we rob and exhaust this country’s wealth and what is important to us is to drink a cup of coffee. When I see the infinite antipathy, which is showing in every single Filipino’s eyes, my heart suffers. However, whatever my thoughts might be and in what way my conscience might be in distress, it seems an unchangeable fact that I am one of the imperialistic agents.231

Fujioka claimed after the war that it was his socialization in the ‘liberal, social- istic atmosphere influenced by Taishō Democracy,’ that made him and many other graduates from Osaka Commercial College disagree with the Japanese war aims. Furthermore, he and his fellow students were not convinced by the anti-American and anti-European propaganda, because they

carried the feeling that Japan was a country that had to follow their example and learn by observation.

Fujioka, however, believed that only his generation, which came of age during the relatively short period of Taishō Democracy, truly differed in its perception of the war.232 On 4 October 1944, Fujioka and his battalion landed in Jolo, an island located between Mindanao and Borneo. On Jolo, they were confronted with

230 Ibid., p. 213. 231 Ibid., p. 215. 232 Ibid., p. 215. 172 chapter 4 the so-called Moros, people of Muslim belief, who had already resisted the Spaniards and the Americans (until 1913) throughout the past centuries. The Japanese troops’ equipment was by no means sufficient and the fighting was severe. Fujioka described the utmost brutality of the Moros, who had killed about 1,000 Japanese soldiers within less than one month after the Japanese landing. They would not only take the weapons and clothes from the dead soldiers, but also their golden teeth and even their livers. Fujioka remembered the Moros as brave, but also as a ‘brutal race.’233 Fujikoka’s description of the loss of morale and discipline among the Japanese troops resembles the account of Yano Masami. They fought about the scarce food provisions, and sick and dead soldiers were plundered. Malaria took its toll on the troops and many of the sick were left behind, as the others were not able to carry them. Fujioka’s company had diminished from 35 to 13 men and they sought refuge at a mountain site. The food supply situation became even more dramatic there as Fujioka recalled in his diary:

On the day of our arrival we raided the homes of the natives and were able to get one cow. From the next day on, the natives counterattacked and when we went out for requisition, we were ambushed, only our sacrifice became larger day by day and hunger came chasing us. Moreover, [. . .] when it rained, fire did not burn and when we were sleeping while our entire bodies got wet, our abdomens became cold and bad health was spreading. [. . .] We attended a gathering with the commanding officer and as a result, we raided the private houses at the foot of the mountain that night, as otherwise all of us would have died from starvation. The order was that by the end of the day we had to make it until the end of the jungle, take advantage from nightfall and each group had to launch a surprise attack. The minute we went out into the jungle, each group ran towards its appointed house. The vicinity was dark and we were far away from where we believed were private houses. [. . .] Of our valley river unit, too, the centre of the vanguard fired light machine guns and rushed into the private houses, but when we raided them, we found them empty, with nothing left inside. The cows had also been taken out. Caught by surprise, we aimlessly wandered around inside and from below, the natives started shooting at us.234

233 Ibid., p. 216. 234 Ibid., pp. 217–18. The Occupation Of The Philippines 173

Fujioka remembered that he was filled with joy when he learned about the Japanese surrender and he willingly turned himself over to the American troops. It took some effort to convince the other surviviors, but eventually they all surrendered. During his internment at Zamboanga, Mindanao, Fujioka, who had considered himself ‘one of the henchmen of imperialism’ from the beginning, wrote down an incident in his diary that occurred on 5 December 1945. A Japanese sergeant scolded a navy chief petty officer who had insulted a Formosan volunteer soldier as ‘Chinese slave’ by saying:

Do you know whose responsibility it is that today by the Filipinos, no, by all East Asian peoples we must be called ‘idiots’? Did we try to reflect on the foolishness of the ‘universal brotherhood (hakkō ichiu)’ of East Asia that we came to praise when we cannot even embrace this pitiful Formosan?235

Yano Masami, Hamano Kenzaburō and Fujioka Akiyoshi were soldiers who, following their own accounts, did not believe in the Japanese war aims when the war ended. Hamano and Fujioka had both undergone higher education and they knew about the official agenda of the GEACPS. However, at least when defeat became inevitable, slogans like ‘Asia for the Asians’ and the creation of a ‘new Philippines’ was of absolutely no importance to them. Fujioka even condemned the Japanese war aims from the very beginning. Yano claimed that he had maintained friendly relations with the Filipinos, but he did not seem to have any political or ideological motives for his interest in the native people. During the last months of the war, when the retreating Japanese soldiers had to struggle for survival day by day, Yano, Hamano and Fujioka did not hesitate to kill innocent civilians. The threat posed by the guerillas and the hatred they received from the natives after the Japanese surrender made these soldiers become aware that the Filipinos had stood on the enemy side all the time. These three soldiers are of course by no means representative of the entire 14th Army, but their accounts support Steinberg’s claim that the idea of winning over the population had lost its meaning towards the end of the war. According to Osamu Kuno, in Meiji Japan a small elitist group used the ‘exoteric’ ideology to manipulate the masses. The common soldiers, who interacted with the Filipinos on a daily base, should have propagated the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianism to win the native people over to the concept of the GEACPS. However, the indoctrination of the Japanese soldiers themselves was not sufficient. They lacked conviction of the official Japanese motives in the Philippines and of the idea

235 Ibid., pp. 219–20. 174 chapter 4 of the GEACPS. In that sense, regarding the lack of acceptance of the concept even among the Japanese troops, Takeuchi Yoshimi’s assertion of the sphere as an ‘empty slogan’ proves true.

The Kempeitai in the Philippines The Japanese Military Police (Kempeitai) played a crucial role in the admin istration of the Philippines. The Kemepeitai was responsible for fighting Philippine guerilla activities and, due to the actions taken against the guerillas and their possible supporters, became feared by the Filipino people. Even after the inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic, the Kempeitai continued to chase and arrest people without any authorization by the Philippine government. Official complaints made by the Philippine government to the Japanese army did not show notable results.236 From the second half of 1944 the Kempeitai started secretely hoarding rice in Manila and was only willing to turn it over after massive protests by the Philippine administration.237 During the occupation period, the strength of the Kempeitai in the Philippines was 829 men.238 Most of these men who landed in Lingayen on 20 December 1941 had served in Manchukuo before and were now allocated to 30 branches and detachments throughout the islands.239 Mark Felton writes in his 2009 book Japan’s Gestapo. Murder Mayhem and Torture in Wartime Asia that

the Japanese occupation of the Philippines was one long catalogue of brutality, much of it stemming from the behaviour and activities of the Kempeitai.240

Felton compares the Kempeitai not only to the Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police) of Nazi Germany, but describes it as having been even more powerful, influential and brutal than its German counterpart:

236 Trota José, “Test of Wills,” pp. 185–222. 237 Ricardo Trota-José, “The Rice Shortage and Countermeasures during the Occupation,” in The Philippines under Japan: Occupation Policy and Reaction, ed. Ikehata Setsuho and Ricardo T. José (Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999), pp. 197–214. 238 Raymond Lamont-Brown, Kempeitai. Japan’s dreaded Military Police (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1998), p. 35. 239 Ibid., p. 52. 240 Mark Felton, Japan’s Gestapo. Murder, Mayhem and Torture in Wartime Asia (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2009), p. 136. The Occupation Of The Philippines 175

The crimes of the Kempeitai rival those of Germany’s Gestapo in their breadth and savagery, and in many cases the Kempeitai went much further down the path of pure evil.241 The tentacles of the Kempeitai power stretched into every unit of the Japanese army, every prison camp, every conquered city, every battlefield and every atrocity committed by the Japanese in the name of their divine Emperor. The cruelty of the Kempeitai was legendary, and its reputation as one of history’s most blood-soaked organizations is richly deserved. Extreme barbarity and sadism was virtually the organization’s creed, and its operators were happy proponents of these tenets on innumerable occasions.242

Felton also credits the recruitment of the so-called ‘comfort women’ to the Kempeitai, which was ‘yet another example of the actions of an organization completely devoid of morals, scruples or humanity.’243 Overall, Felton’s book describes the Kempeitai as the incarnation of evil, a force that symbolized the brutality and cruelty of the Japanese occupation regimes during the Pacific War. Originally, however, the main task of the Kempeitai in the Philippines was to protect Filipino citizens from Japanese atrocities. On 10 May 1943, the JMA issued the “Ordinance for Immediate Prosecution of Japanese Criminal Acts.” This ordinance advised the Kempeitai to arrest Japanese residing in the Philippines who maltreated Filipino citizens. The first crime listed that justified arrestment was ‘sensless face slapping.’244 The ordinance was in line with the “Kempeitai Instructions for the Area of the ‘Visayas,” issued by the Commanding officer of the Kempeitai in the Philippines, Nagahama Akira (1895–1947), on 15 November 1942. According to Nagahama, the so-called Greater East Asia War was also a ‘war for construction’ and he emphasized the necessity of winning over the native population to achieve the Japanese war aims:

This construction war (kensetsu sen) for sure is a characteristic of the present war and the success or failure of the construction war for sure is what determines the final victory in this Greater East Asia War. Therefore, while we crush the enemy’s war potential in armed conflict, at the same time it is absolutely necessary that we cultivate our war potential in the

241 Ibid., p. 7. 242 Ibid., p. 11. 243 Ibid., p. 100. 244 Hayase, “The Japanese Residents of Dabao-kuo,” pp. 247–87. 176 chapter 4

construction war. Moreover, in the construction war, the cooperation of the native people is absolutely necessary. Without this, we cannot possibly secure the Philippine goods. In that case, by what means do we gain the cooperation of the native people? (1) Promotion of the Japanese spirit by expelling America (2) Willingness to recognize that the Japanese surely must be a people who grab the hands of the Filipinos and mutually cooperate with them is an absolutely necessary requirement in the construction war in the Philippines.245

The emphasis on the need to understand the Filipinos and win their support resembles the report of the Research Commission on the Philippines. Just like Rōyama Masamichi, Nagahama bemoaned the Japanese lack of understanding of the Filipino culture and customs. This lack of understanding and the repeated misbehaviour of the Japanese troops he made responsible for the poorly developing relationship between the Filipinos and the Japanese:

There might be numerous reasons for this; however, the commander has the two following points on his mind and these are (1) The Japanese army does so-called absurd things and frightening things. (2) The Japanese army’s improper understanding of the Philippine national characteristics.246

Nagahama concluded that the misbehaviour of the Japanese army was a consequence of the soldiers’ not understanding the Filipino culture. Therefore, the Japanese soldiers and expatriates in the Philippines needed to develop the awareness that Japan was fighting a race war (minzoku sen) and learn to understand the ‘national character’ (minzokusei) of the Filipino people. This ‘national character’ differed from that of the Chinese and the Filipinos would react very sensible towards physical punishments. According to Nagahama, the ongoing experience of colonisation had made the Filipinos ‘extremely anxious’ and ‘embrace a feeling of dread.’ Therefore, severe punishments like beheading or shooting with an MG in front of the whole company without a martial law council and torturing to death had to be stopped. The same went for arson, lootings, rape and slapping, as this was marked in the Filipinos’ ‘racial characteristic as the severest insult,’ whereas it was not a big deal for the

245 Yuko et al., Nihongun “ianfu” kankei shiryō shūsei, p. 376. 246 Ibid., p. 376. The Occupation Of The Philippines 177

Japanese. The ‘insufficient study of such national character’ led to widespread anti-Japanese sentiments among the Philippine population and put the success of the Japanese administration policy in the Philippines at stake, as the Filipinos would turn towards America again if the Japanese did not learn how to cope with their culture and mentality.247 Nagahama admitted that there were severe differences between the ‘national character’ of the Filipinos and that of the Japanese and demanded thorough investigation of Philippine culture and customs. On this matter, he shared the viewpoint of the ‘esoteric’ Pan- Asianists like Rōyama. Nagahama was fully aware that the Kempeitai needed the cooperation of the population to work effectively against the guerillas and fulfill its task to ‘maintain public order.’ He therefore emphasized the aspect of ‘cultivation’ when doing investigations. Even the manner of dying of those sentenced to death should be ‘cultivated’ and even more so the people who were innocent or who had committed minor offenses should undergo cultivation so that they became loyal cooperators with the Kempeitai. In this connection, Nagahama recommended the use of mass propaganda since that had already shown fruitful results in Manila. In Nagahama’s words, ‘the great goal is the establishment of public order’ and the application of military law by the Kempeitai was a means to this end. Referring to Qi zong Qi qin and Zhuge Liang (181–234),248 who had served Liu Bei (161–223),249 it was possible to ‘rule barbarians with barbarians.’ In the Philippines, this meant that some Filipinos had to be re-educated by the Kempeitai and then sent out to re-educate their fellow citizens. Only ‘those persons whose true redemption is difficult’ would have to face punishment under military law.250 The utilization of Filipinos to propagate the concept of the ‘new Philippines’ was of utmost importance to Nagahama. The Kempeitai should remold the Filipino mindset to sweep out the pro-Americanism and anti-Japanese resentment among the population. Education had to stand above punishment. The main task of the Kempeitai was the maintenance of public order. Nagahama stressed the importance of closely observing the ‘enemy bandits’ who were secretely undermining the Japanese efforts in the Philippines. The

247 Ibid., pp. 377–78. 248 Zhuge Liang (181–234), chancellor of the state Shu Han during the Three Kingdoms period. He is famous for his great skills as a strategist. 249 Liu Bei (161–223), warlord in the late Han Dynasty and founder of the state Shu Han during the period of the Three Kingdoms. Liu Bei symbolizes the ideal, benevolent ruler and is also known for his political philosophy. 250 Yuko et al., Nihongun “ianfu” kankei shiryō shūsei, pp. 378–79. 178 chapter 4

Kempeitai therefore should cooperate with the army and undertake all necessary measures to establish a spy network throughout the archipelago:

Regarding the Kempeitai assigned to the Nara Army Corps, it becomes the subject of the military police to form three search regiments led by warrant officers or master sergeants, one consisting of approximately five military policemen, two to four interpreters, five assigned infantrymen and ten to twenty pro-Japanese Filipinos. For a period of approximately ten days, we enforce the search for the heads of the bandits in an extremely wide area and arrest them as an appropriate example.251

Nagahama stressed the importance of the Kempeitai taking the lead in fighting the guerillas to prevent the army from committing atrocities like arson. The measures of the Kempeitai had to be ‘educational’ in kind and Nagahama expressed his expectation that ‘people who fall in the hands of the Kempeitai entirely convert into pro-Japanese.’252 The task of the Kempeitai was on one hand to observe and to discipline the Japanese army and on the other to establish an effective spy network all across the islands. One key element in the plan Nagahama had envisioned for the Kempeitai was to win over the native population for the struggle against the guerillas. Therefore, he considered the acquisition of knowledge on Philippine culture and customs a necessity for the effective administration of the archipelago. Nagahama’s outline for the activities of the Kempeitai in the Visayas from December 1942 resembled in many ways Rōyama Masamichi’s conclusions laid down in the report of the Research Commission on the Philippines a few months later. In reality, however, the Kempeitai never succeeded as an intermedia- tor between the army and the native population. The organization of the Kempeitai until the final stages of the occupation proved to be rather ineffec- tive. Nagahama could not exert power over Kempeitai detachments outside Manila until August 1944 and therefore was only considered chief of the military police in Manila until then. The other detachments were under control of army garrisons so that in fact the army controlled the Kempeitai instead of the other way around. In some areas, especially where the cooperation of the local population was needed for intelligence gathering, the Kempeitai sanctioned violent behaviour of Japanese troops against civilians, but in many cases it simply ignored the atrocities or even helped to cover them up.253 Furthermore,

251 Ibid., p. 380. 252 Ibid., p. 380. 253 Lamont-Brown, Kempeitai, p. 53. The Occupation Of The Philippines 179 ongoing guerilla activities and the strong grasp of the guerillas on the local Philippine authorities turned the main task of the military police, the maintenance of public order, nearly into a mission impossible. The espionage groups of the guerilla units worked highly effectively and sabotaged the efforts of the Kempeitai.254 Nagahama ordered to bring down Filipino guerilla leader Pabling Jornacio, a man whose unit was responsible for various acts of sabotage against the Japanese. Throughout the campaign, the Kempeitai committed massive atrocities against the civilian population in the searched areas, especially in Eastern Laguna and Eastern Rizal.255 The Kempeitai often arbitrarily decided who was a guerilla and who was not. For example, on 16 December 1944, all male residents aged 15 and above from Imus, the capital city of the Cavite province, were gathered at the local church. There, a masked spy pointed at the men he identified as guerillas. The supposed guerillas were then beaten up and executed at the cemetery. Those who escaped death were given a lecture by a Kempeitai officer in the church:

We are Japanese Military Police officers who came from Manila, a far place. We came here although we know that we have Japanese soldiers in Imus, Cavite because we were told that there were many guerillas here. We have taken “our man” and now we warn you to behave well. You should not join the guerillas. You should help us maintain peace and order. Now, we will let you go. Proceed to your houses directly, but remember that we will come back if we find out that there are more guerillas in this locality. The punishment for them will be more severe.

Afterwards it came to atrocities against the families, especially the wives, of the suspected guerillas.256 Most of the Kempeitai members did not speak English or any Filipino language and therefore depended on an interpreter. This led to inevitable misunderstandings and the arrestment and execution of often innocent people.257 The Japanese fear of the guerillas and the severe measures taken by the Kempeitai to get them under control certainly damaged the credibility of the Japanese motives in the Philippines more than anything else. Nevertheless, apart from closely observing the various guerilla units and their espionage groups, the Kempeitai was concerned with propaganda

254 Felisa Arellano Syjuco, “The Kempeitai in the Philippines” (Master’s thesis, University of the Philippines, 1984). 255 Lamont-Brown, Kempeitai, pp. 53–54. 256 Arellano Syjuco, “The Kempeitai in the Philippines.” 257 Ibid. 180 chapter 4

ILLUSTRATION 11 Officers and men of the Cooper’s Unit, Southern Mindoro Guerrilla Force, Bolo Area, 6th Military District based in San Jose, Mindoro. Source: Public Domain.

measures to convince the Filipinos of the concept of the GEACPS. Whilst condemning the American rule in the islands and emphasizing American atrocities during the early stages of the US rule in the Philippines, the Kempeitai aimed to convince the Filipino people that the concept of Greater East Asia was the better alternative to ongoing dependence on the US. At the same time, this concept should by no means look like a concept of seclusion;258 obviously, the heads of the Kempeitai were aware of the difficulties of turning the Filipinos into an ‘Asian’ people. Nagahama himself advertised Filipino cooperation with the Japanese in the newspaper The Manila Tribune. In an article from 24 January 1943, he was eager to point out that the relationship between the Japanese and the Filipinos was not one of conquerors and conquered. On the contrary, there must be no racial discrimination and both peoples were in fact brothers. The hostile attitude of some Filipinos to the Japanese was a result of American propaganda and if the Filipinos were willing to accept that they had erred in succumbing to American influence, the Japanese would for- give them their past offenses.259 Nagahama was a man who acted on conviction. Even when he was tried for murder, torture and mass maltreatment after Japan’s surrender, he firmly believed that the policy he was responsible for had

258 Ibid. 259 Ibid. The Occupation Of The Philippines 181 been justified. He was sentenced to death on 11 March 1946.260 The engagement of the Kempeitai in general and Nagahama Akira in particular exemplify the failure of Japanese Pan-Asianism in the Philippines. The Kempeitai used propaganda measures that were typical for ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianism, but at the same time shared the precautions of the ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianists regarding the cultural specifics of the Philippines. Nagahama firmly believed in the Japanese mission to build a ‘new Philippines’ and emphasized the need to win the trust of the Filipinos. However, the measures taken by the Kempeitai against the guerillas show that Nagahama and his subordinates completely underestimated the difficulty of this task. Instead of protecting the population from atrocities by the Japanese army, the Kempeitai itself generated fear of and hatred against the Japanese among the native people.

Conclusion In general, the outline of the Military Administration’s policy reflected the Pan- Asianism of the realist, ‘esoteric’ faction of the Shōwa Research Association. General Homma was completely aware of the difficulties in making the Philippines part of the GEACPS and demanded the development of a spiritual movement towards the establishment of the sphere among the Filipino people. In this way, he strongly resembled Rōyama Masamichi. The ‘culturalist,’ ‘exoteric’ faction of Pan-Asianism represented by the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai had no real impact on the Japanese Military Administration’s occupation policy in the Philippines. In its announcements, the Military Administration emphasized the necessity of the Filipinos recovering their Oriental roots, as it was aware of the ongoing sympathy the population had for the Americans. In the planning for the occupation, the army and navy knew that the implementation of the idea of the GEACPS in the Philippines would not become a self-fulfilling prophecy as the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists had predicted. Therefore, the military sought advice from the ‘esoteric’ faction, and this ‘esoteric’ stream of thought was indeed reflected in the policies adopted by the Military Administration during the first 20 months of the occupation (i.e., until the inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic). The economic policy followed Japanese war needs but as the Empire officially waged the war to serve the purpose of liberating Asia and establishing a GEACPS, this meant no contradiction to the principle of kyōzon kyōei in the eyes of the Japanese rulers. The great purpose of creating an ‘Asia for the Asians’ justified the temporary exploitation of Philippine resources, as the country would benefit from a Japanese victory in the Greater East Asia War. The ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianism showed only in the

260 Lamont-Brown, Kempeitai, p. 146. 182 chapter 4 propaganda measures of the Military Administration. While the government in Tokyo and Japanese administrators in the Philippines became fully aware of Philippine hostility to the Japanese occupation, they used ‘exoteric’ terminology to justify their cause and persuade the Filipinos. This system of a small, ‘esoteric’ elite using this ‘exoteric’ ideology to control and manipulate the masses is the same as that which Osamu Kuno described in his analysis of the Meiji state in Japan. In this way, J. Victor Koschmann’s application of Kuno’s terminology of Japanese Pan-Asianism works perfectly for the Japanese occupation policy in the Philippines. ‘Exoteric’ Pan-Asianism had become a façade, as it was clear to the Japanese administrators that they would need to adapt this ideology to Philippine conditions. The KALIBAPI was an instrument which implemented the concept of the GEACPS in Philippine society and was an attempt to create a public movement towards the establishment of a ‘New Philippines’ as part of the sphere. This was the kind of ‘historical dynamic’ that Rōyama Masamichi had demanded as a precondition for the integration of the Philippines into the GEACPS prior to the war. Educational policy followed the same idea. The main purpose of educational reforms conducted during the occupation was to foster Philippine nationalism via Filipinization and secularization of academic bodies. It was believed that this would create a base for the establishment of a new self- image amongst Filipinos, and make them gradually come to appreciate the concept of the GEACPS. Educational policy, as well as the handling of religious affairs by the Japanese Military Administration during the short-lived Second Philippine Republic, took into account the cultural and historical specifics of the Philippines while promoting the concept of the sphere. This adaptation of Pan-Asianism to Philippine circumstances followed the ‘esoteric’ stream propagated by Rōyama Masamichi and the Shōwa Kenkyūkai. The Second Philippine Republic was, by the time of its inauguration and until its end after less than two years of existence, nothing more than a Japanese vassal state. As was the case with economic policy, its foreign policy followed Japanese war interests, and diplomatic relations were limited to the Axis powers and other members of the GEACPS. One can only speculate as to whether the status of the Second Republic would have changed should there have been a successful termination of the Pacific Campaign for Japan. Throughout the war, the Philippines was a country with the status of a ‘semi-autonomous protectorate’ as Yabe Teiji had envisioned in 1941. The Second Philippine Republic as a ‘New Philippines’ within the framework of the GEACPS was a country under construction and it remained an unfinished project until the end. The Japanese tried to govern the Philippines through the old elites during the Military Administration and relied on large parts of the old Philippine The Occupation Of The Philippines 183

Commonwealth administration when it came to the establishment of the republic. The way in which the Japanese attempted to deal with Philippine Catholicism shows the pragmatism of their occupation policy. Tokyo had no illusions about how deeply rooted the Catholic Church was in Philippine society and therefore followed the recommendations of the Research Commission about cooperating with the church and gradually diminishing its influence by secularization of academic bodies. The Japanese considered Catholicism a product of Spanish rule, and despite its positive effects in terms of nation building in the Philippines, they saw it as a source of alienation for the Filipino people from their Oriental roots. Therefore, the Japanese regarded Spaniards with suspicion even though the Franco regime was politically close to the Axis Powers. The Chinese living in the Philippines were not treated according to the principle of ‘one script, one race’ as the Japanese suspected them to be supporters of the US and the Chiang Kai-shek regime in China. While the Japanese viewed Spaniards with suspicion because they considered Spanish rule to have been one of the reasons for the Westernization of the islands, they mistrusted the overseas Chinese because the latter had been ‘poisoned’ by Western influence. The concept of ‘one script, one race’ and the idea of the GEACPS did not reach the hearts and minds of most Japanese soldiers. Towards the end of the war, even the commanders, who had knowledge of the ideological aims of the Japanese administration, showed no effort to win over the Philippine population. The common Japanese soldiers continuously showed lack of understanding for the Filipinos and their behaviour indicated that they did either not understand or were indifferent to the idea of Pan-Asianism. The often- violent attitude of the Japanese soldiers undermined the Japanese ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist propaganda. The Japanese Military Police, the Kempeitai, was originally supposed to function as an intermediate between the military and the native population. However, in its attempt to preserve ‘peace and order’ by fighting the guerillas, it became more feared by the Filipinos than the Japanese army itself. Those who were in charge of its implementation, i.e. the soldiers and the Military Police, poorly executed the official agenda of winning over the Filipinos to the concept of the GEACPS. However, the agenda most of all fell on deaf ears among the majority of the Philippine population due to the fact that most Filipinos had willingly adopted the American administrative policy, especially during the years of the Philippine Commonwealth from 1935 on. Despite the widespread sympathy for the US among Philippine society, there were certain Filipinos who actively promoted the idea of Pan-Asianism in the islands. Their motives and the influence of Philippine Asianism on Philippine society in general will be examined in the next chapter. Chapter 5 The Filipino Perspective

The Japanese victories in the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War had been a source of inspiration for many revolutionary leaders in colonised countries throughout Southeast Asia. However, as discussed in the second chapter of this book, the official stance of Japanese foreign policy at that time did not allow for active support of independence movements in this region out of fear that this would risk open confrontation with the Western Great Powers. The first section of this chapter will look at the Filipino independence fighters who lived in Japanese exile, often for many years, and sought support from the Japanese government as well as pan-Asianist groups. The second section will focus on the Philippine branch of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai, the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai (Philippine Greater Asia Society) and two Filipino intellectuals who were closely affiliated with this organization: Benigno Ramos and Pio Duran. In secondary literature on the Japanese occupation of the Philippines and Japanese-Philippine relations, these two men usually play only subsidiary roles, while the old Commonwealth elites who collaborated with the Japanese (most of all José P. Laurel, whose relationship with Pan-Asianism will be examined in the third part of the chapter) are afforded much of the focus. The purpose of this sub-chapter, however, is to look at the motives of Philippine Pan-Asianism and examine how far it interacted with its Japanese counterpart. The third section of this chapter highlights the activities of the Department of Information in the Philippines and the involvement of Philippine Asianists in these activities. Finally, in the last section, the reaction of the Philippine population to Pan-Asianism and the Japanese rule will be researched in connection with the impact of the preceeding years under American rule in the islands on the Filipinos.

Filipino Revolutionaries and Japanese Pan-Asianism

In the latter part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, the Japanese authorities suspiciously observed those foreign revolutionaries who sought assistance from Japanese Pan-Asianists in Japan, even if such individuals became Japanese nationals during their time in exile, such as José Ramos (1856–1921), who lived in Japan from 1895 to 1900. Ramos was convinced that only a revolution could bring the Philippines independence. To that purpose,

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��6 | doi ��.��63/9789004305724_006 The Filipino Perspective 185 he decided to seek support in Japan. He quickly gained proficiency in the Japanese language and acted as an interpreter for fellow Filipino revolutionaries who came to Japan. Ramos returned to Japan in 1905 where he married a Japanese woman. It is highly likely that throughout the following years, during which he frequently travelled between Japan and the Philippines, Ramos engaged in revolutionary activities using business commitments as a cover- up. Back in the Philippines, Ramos had difficulties in earning a living as the authorities suspected him of being a Japanese spy. During the Japanese occupation, The Tribune celebrated Ramos, as ‘one of the greatest Filipino patriots’ who had fought for the cause of Philippine independence throughout his life, and who had found assistance from people like Konoe Atsumaro (1863–1904), who allowed him to stay in Japan out of admiration for his ardent patriotism.1 One of the Philippine revolutionaries who had made use of Ramos as an interpreter was Mariano Ponce. As described in chapter two of this book, Ponce was able to gain support from the Japanese Pan-Asianist Miyazaki Tōten and the politician Nakamura Yaroku but the weapons and ammunition destined for the Philippines had sunk along with the Nunobiki-Maru. Ponce also engaged in propaganda activities in Japan to make the cause of the Philippine independence movement popular among the Japanese public. One of his books dealing with the Philippine independence issue was translated into Japanese and published in Japan in 1901. Just like Jose Ramos, Ponce married a Japanese woman who accompanied him back to the Philippines in 1907 and lived there until she died in 1942.2 Ramos and Ponce were primarily concerned with their native country’s independence. They both lived in Japanese exile after the failed First Philippine Republic and tried to gain support for their cause from Japan—the only country in Asia they considered capable of resisting Western dominance in the region. However, at that time, the official political agenda in Japan was to avoid confrontation with the US and the great majority of Japanese Pan-Asianists mainly focused on the creation of a Japan- led Sino-centric bloc. Therefore, the political influence of the Filipino revolutionaries’ Japanese sympathizers was not sufficient to shift public attention about the Philippine struggle for independence. Neither Ramos nor Ponce had a vision of the Philippine role in a possible Greater Asia under Japanese leadership. As a fellow Asian country, Japan simply seemed to them to be the natural ally to overcome Western colonisation. Nonetheless, it would be far-fetched to refer to such activists as ‘Pan-Asianists.’

1 Yu-José, Filipinos in Japan and Okinawa, pp. 26–27. 2 Ibid., p. 27. 186 Chapter 5

The same is true for Vicente Sotto (1877–1950), a protagonist of the next generation of Philippine revolutionaries who looked to Japan as a natural ally in seeking to achieve the goal of immediate and complete independence for the archipelago. Sotto was a trained lawyer but later pursued a career as a journalist and political activist. As a politician, Sotto was elected representative of his home district in Cebu, in the Philippine House of Representatives. In 1946, he became senator and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance. In his early life, Sotto had become engaged in the cause of Philippine independence and had published various newspapers that clearly opposed the American administration of the Philippines. In 1907, Sotto was exiled to Hong Kong where he founded the newspaper The Philippine Republic as a platform for the advocacy of immediate restoration of the First Philippine Republic (the so-called Malolos Republic). For the same purpose Sotto established in 1929 the “Philippine Independence League,” followed by the “Philippine Civic Union,” an organization that also published a weekly newspaper under the title of Union. Like Mariano Ponce and Jose Ramos, Sotto sought to win Japanese support for the re-establishment of the republic. Sotto was convinced that Japan would show no interest in invading the Philippines in the case of an American retreat from the islands. Indeed, on the contrary, he believed that the American presence in the Philippines had even increased the possibility of a Japanese invasion as the archipelago was serving as an American military base (and this was threatening to Japan). The Austrian author and ethnographer Ferdinand Blumentritt (1853–1913), who was a close comrade of José Rizal, also influenced Sotto.3 Japanese ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianist Nishimura Shinji, in his 1942 published book Daitōa Kyōeiken also referred to Blumentritt in his description of the ethnic origins of the Filipino people.4 However, contrary to Nishimura, who tried to establish a racial kinship between the Filipinos and the Japanese people, Sotto mainly looked to Japan as a role model for a developed Asian country that had successfully emancipated itself from the West. In August 1937 the Chief of Staff of the Taiwan Army Corps, Major General Ogisu, published an article in Union in which he bemoaned the weakness of the Orient due to the lack of unity among the Orientals. Only Japan was, in his view, capable of establishing this unity. In regards to the Philippines, Ogisu pointed to the special relationship between Japan and the islands built on ‘racial similarity’ and geographical proximity.5 Even though these were exactly the same

3 Grant K. Goodman, “Japan and Philippine Radicalism: The Case of Vicente Sotto,” Solidarity 5:6 (1970), pp. 47–53. 4 Nishimura, Daitōa Kyōeiken, p. 259. 5 Goodman, “Japan and Philippine Radicalism,” pp. 47–53. The Filipino Perspective 187 arguments that had been espoused by the Japanese ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists, Sotto himself was not so much an Asianist, but like José Ramos and Mariano Ponce, a Philippine nationalist who saw in Japan a natural ally. Sotto’s attitude towards Japan had changed by the outbreak of the Pacific War. The passing of the Jones Act and the Tydings-McDuffy Act, which had nurtured Philippine hopes for independence, coupled with an aggressive Japanese policy in China and the Japanese alliance with Nazi-Germany and fascist Italy contributed to this change of heart. Sotto even proposed that Filipinos resist a Japanese invasion and fight alongside the Americans if the latter were willing to keep their promise of complete independence for the Philippines in 1946. This change of attitude might also have taken place because of Sotto’s growing awareness that he would only play a minor role in a future Philippine government under Japanese rule as the Japanese government (and also pan-Asianist organizations as the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai) had started approaching the old Filipino elites and tried to win them over to the concept of the GEACPS.6 Another prominent Filipino revolutionary leader who sought refuge in Japan after the end of the First Philippine Republic was General Artemio Ricarte. In Japan, Pan-Asianists like Gotō Shinpei supported Ricarte, and the latter adopted some of their slogans: for example, he called for the formation of an “Oriental Union.” Gotō helped Ricarte settle in by arranging a teaching position for him at a private school. Like Sotto, Ricarte was eager to gain assistance from the Japanese authorities for the cause of Philippine independence. His efforts were not successful, however, as the Japanese government had no desire to seek a confrontation with the US over the Philippine independence issue.7 During his over 25 years in Japan, influential figures from the Philippine Commonwealth, such as Roxas, Osmena and Quezon, frequently visited Ricarte. He also established contacts with other Asian revolutionaries such as the Indian leader Rash Behari Bose (1886–1945), though his focus remained the removal of the American flag from the Philippines. Therefore, despite his contacts with Japanese Pan-Asianists, Ricarte did not take part in the Pan- Asiatic Conferences held in Nagasaki in 1926 and Dalian in 1934.8 During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, the Japanese Military Administration attempted to utilize Ricarte for propaganda measures but since he had lived abroad for many years, his audience hardly knew him. Therefore, he did not play a crucial role in the Japanese occupation policy and died from malaria

6 Ibid. 7 Goodman, “General Artemio Ricarte and Japan,” pp. 48–60. 8 Yu-José, Filipinos in Japan and Okinawa, p. 32. 188 Chapter 5 when, together with the troops of General Yamashita, he tried to escape the American re-invasion in April 1945.9 Artemio Ricarte, Vicente Sotto and José Ramos were not Pan-Asianists, even though they were close to Japanese pan-Asianist groups during their stay in Japan and shared some of the latter’s views. Their main concern was the goal of immediate Philippine independence, and Japan (and especially the ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist organizations there) was the obvious choice when looking for allies. All three men were ardent nationalists who shared some of the Japanese pan-Asianists’ notions regarding the colonisation of Asia by the Great Western Powers. They also accepted Japan as a role model for emancipation from the West, but they did not advocate the establishment of a regional bloc under Japanese leadership. In a way, the Philippine revolutionaries exiled in Japan resembled the Japanese nationalists of the Meiji era. These were concerned with the South Seas out of nationalistic interests and the same goes for the interest the Filipino revolutionaries took in Japan. Nevertheless, there were some Filipino intellectuals who were ‘real’ Pan-Asianists and who actively promoted the concept of an Asian bloc under Japanese leadership. The organization that gave many of these intellectuals a political home was the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai. The following section will deal with arguably the two most ardent proponents of pro-Japanese Asianism who were affiliated to this group: Benigno Ramos and Pio Duran.

Filipino Pan-Asianists

Benigno Ramos was educated as a schoolteacher but found his way into politics in the 1920s after he had moved to Manila from his hometown of Bulacan. As a member of the Nacionalista Party, he was a close ally of Manuel Quezon but became alienated from him in 1930 due to his involvement in a teachers’ strike that caused Quezon to ask Ramos to resign from his post in the Senate. From that time on, Ramos functioned as Quezon’s antagonist in Philippine politics, which led to the formation of the Sakdal movement, and eventually the establishment of the Sakdal Party in 1933. A newspaper called Sakdal that Ramos published after his resignation from the Senate instigated the Sakdal movement. Ramos used this newspaper as a vehicle for his radical political views and harshly attacked the Quezon government for its devout attitude towards the Americans. Like the revolutionaries of the First Philippine Republic, Ramos demanded the immediate and complete independence of the Philippines from

9 Goodman, “General Artemio Ricarte and Japan,” pp. 48–60. The Filipino Perspective 189 the US. The term Sakdal means ‘to protest’ or ‘to accuse’ in Tagalog. This suitably describes the movement’s purpose, which was to protest against the social and political circumstances of the Philippines in the early 1930s. Therefore, a great many of the Sakdal movement’s followers, and later Sakdal Party members, were recruited from the rural areas of the Philippines where peasants and labourers often lived under very miserable conditions. Nevertheless, some urban intellectuals joined the movement along with followers of revolutionary leaders like Ricarte.10 Benigno Ramos travelled to Japan in late November of 1934 and originally intended to proceed from Yokohama to San Francisco, but then decided to stay in Japan. There he established contacts with pan-Asianist groups like the Kokuryūkai, as well as the intellectual, journalist and political activist Matsumoto Kunpei (1870–1944), who also supported pan-Asianist ideas. According to the American Ambassador to Japan, however, Ramos failed to gain any material support from these groups.11 Even if this were true, however, the ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist faction in Japan received Ramos very well. In June 1935, Ramos published an article in the monthly journal of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai that was most likely translated into Japanese by one of his Japanese friends who had also helped him with the translation of his article for Free Filipinos, published on 1 April of the same year. In his article for Dai-Ajiashugi, Ramos condemned American rule in the Philippines, claiming that the ‘degree of sly’ the Americans showed towards the Filipinos was unequalled in the modern colonial states. As the Americans knew that they illegally possessed the Philippines, they sought to ‘buy off’ the Filipinos from the very beginning of the occupation by entrusting them with a certain amount of administrative rights. In Ramos’ view, those Filipinos who participated in the government were strictly obedient to their American overlords and were traitors to the idea of Philippine independence. Ramos also criticized some Japanese newspapers, which had praised Manuel Quezon as a statesman despite his negative attitude towards Japan. Ramos did not consider Quezon and his allies as true patriots and bemoaned the fact that these papers accepted Quezon as the ‘patron’ (onjin) of the Philippines. Ramos referred to an interview Quezon had given to the Japanese newspaper Nichi Nichi Shimbun, in which he stated that he did not fear a Japanese invasion in the event of Philippine independence from the US. According to Ramos, however, Quezon was ‘hiding his heart’ by making such statements as he had, in fact, demanded an American military presence in the Philippines after independence, as existed in some parts of Latin America. In Ramos’ view, the continual foreign rule in the Philippines over the

10 Terami-Wada, “The Filipino Volunteer Armies,” pp. 59–98. 11 Yu-José, Filipinos in Japan and Okinawa, p. 35. 190 Chapter 5 centuries had made the Filipinos lack any consciousness about their own national identity and the country had so far failed to develop its own national character. Only an independent country had any chance whatsoever to develop such a national identity, and as long as the Philippines remained under American rule, there was no hope for such a development. Finally, Ramos pointed to the necessity for the Philippines to become aware of its Oriental character as an independent country:

We do not stop hoping for a liberation that must revive our independent lives where our people can enjoy peace and prosperity and the Oriental culture that has been snatched away from us.12

The Dai-Ajia Kyōkai also enabled Ramos to get in touch with the Nippon Seisantō (Great Japan Production Party), under leadership of Kokuryūkai founder Uchida Ryōhei. Uchida signed a petition addressed to the American president asking him to grant immediate independence to the Philippines. However, in the early 1940s, when Pan-Asianism was at its peak of popularity in Japanese politics, this organization failed to become an influential political force in Japan.13 By 1936, Ramos had become heavily involved in the activities of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai and even sought to become an official member of the organization.14 The Japanese Consul General in the Philippines from 1939 to 1940, Yoshida Tan’ichirō, criticized the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai for its support of Ramos as he feared that the US would feel provoked by it and delay Philippine independence even further. After his return to the Philippines, Ramos was sentenced to jail for staging a rebellion and was only released by the Japanese in April 1942. Despite his affiliations with various Japanese pan-Asianist groups and his open support for the Japanese administration in the Philippines, the Japanese did not reward Ramos with a position in the Executive Commission; he received only a post in the executive of the KALIBAPI. However, this did not stop him from continuously supporting the Japanese in their attempt to administer the archipelago. He ordered members of the Ganap Party, the follow-up organization to the Sakdalistas, to help the Japanese in fields such as labour recruitment, the building and maintenance of infrastructure, and the supply of foodstuffs. It was only towards the end of the Japanese presence in the Philippines that the Japanese repaid Ramos for his ongoing efforts by making him head of the

12 Benigno Ramos, “Hitō ni okeru Beikoku no fuhai tōchi to warera no yōkyū,” Dai-Ajiashugi 3:6 (1935), pp. 22–29. 13 Yu-José, Filipinos in Japan and Okinawa, p. 36. 14 Ibid., p. 37. The Filipino Perspective 191

Kalipunang Makabayan ng mga Pilipino (MAKAPILI, Nationalist League of Filipinos). In order to provide assistance in the fight against the approaching American troops and Filipino guerilla units, the Japanese army inaugurated this MAKAPILI movement. Ramos died in the mountainous areas of Northern Luzon during a battle involving MAKAPILI.15 In contrast to activists such as Vicente Sotto, Benigno Ramos never fell from grace with the Japanese. He remained a loyal supporter of the Japanese administration in the Philippines until the end, even though the Japanese largely ignored him for most of the occupation. Even though the Philippine independence issue was the major motivation for Ramos’ political activities, his close ties with the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai in particular, together with his commitment to support Japan until the very end, proved that he was convinced of the pan- Asianist ideology of the ‘exoteric’ stream. Ramos believed that Filipinos had to rediscover their Oriental heritage in order for the Philippines to become a truly independent country, and that Japan was the natural patron of the archipelago in this regard. Benigno Ramos was not the only Filipino intellectual who promoted pan- Asianist thought and supported the Japanese during the occupation. On 8 July 1934, the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai (Philippine Greater East Asia Society) was inaugurated as an offshoot of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai. The main objectives of this organization were the propagation of Greater Asianism, the promotion of friendly relations among all Asian nations, research on the conditions of the various Asian countries, and the establishment of frequently held pan- Asian conferences. On the Japanese side, Mochizuki Otogorō and Imamura Chūsuke were the central figures in the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai, while the most prominent Filipinos were Pio Duran and José P. Laurel.16 There is some quite miscellaneous information on Mochizuki. Both Lydia Yu-José and Grant K. Goodman describe him as a public works contractor, but while Yu-José writes that he had come to the Philippines in 1910, Goodman dates his arrival in the Philippines to 1918. According to Yu-José, Mochizuki became president of the Manila Japanese Club in 1935 and served as the first president of the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai.17 Goodman, however, claims that he was only vice- president of the Japanese Association of Manila (most likely the same organization as the one that Yu-José refers to as the “Manila Japanese Club”) and was

15 Ibid., p. 40. 16 Grant K. Goodman, “Japanese Pan-Asianism in the Philippines: The Hirippin Dai Ajia Kyōkai,” in Studies on Asia, ed. Robert K. Sakai (Lincoln, Nebraska: Nebraska Press, 1966), pp. 133–43. 17 Yu-José, Japan views the Philippines, p. 185. 192 Chapter 5 not re-elected to this position due to financial difficulties. Referring to Consul General Uchiyama Kiyoshi, Goodman argues that Mochizuki’s engagement in the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai would have helped him to build up reputation again within the Japanese community.18 The Consul General was suspicious towards the organization. He ctiticized that among its members, there were no renowned persons like ‘influential people of banks, trading companies etc.’ and he was irritaded by a critical remark towards the consulate by Imamura on the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai’s inauguration ceremony.19 I introduced Imamura in the third chapter of this book as an advocate of ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianism who had emphasized the geographical, ethnic and historical connections between Japan and the Philippines and who was convinced that the Philippine independence movements would embrace Japanese leadership in their struggle to overcome the American rule in the islands.20 To Imamura, the Hirippin Dai- Ajia Kyōkai was not a political organization in the first place, but was designed to ‘achieve an all-Asian cultural unity.’ The invasion of fellow Asian countries was not necessarily part of the pan-Asianist agenda, but in some cases, such as Manchukuo, it was seen as a necessity for the sake of peace in Asia.21 Even though the majority of the Japanese community in the Philippines agreed with the outline of the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai, there was also a fear that this somewhat radical organization would evoke fears of a Japanese invasion among the Filipinos. When Matsui asked Imamura to establish the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai he told him that

for the adaptation work of a certain policy cooperation with the Consul General and a careful, sound development are desirable.22

Therefore, he and Mochizuki asked Kimura Atsushi for support, but the Consul General refused as he considered the organization premature. His successor, Uchiyama Kiyoshi, was even more concerned about the activities of the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai. In a letter to the head of the Taiwan Foreign Affairs Section in March 1936, Uchiyama expressed his thoughts about the members of the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai and their goals. He criticized that the organization’s members did not have any friendly ties with the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and that there were

18 Goodman, “Japanese Pan-Asianism in the Philippines,” pp. 133–43. 19 Matsuura, Daitōa Sensō wa naze okita no ka, p. 303. 20 Imamura, “Firipin dokuritsu mondai,” pp. 46–51. 21 Goodman, “Japanese Pan-Asianism in the Philippines,” pp. 133–43. 22 Matsuura, Daitōa Sensō wa naze okita no ka, p. 304. The Filipino Perspective 193

few educated people invited by this association and a general observation is that many who enter the association do not have correct understanding of the doctrine.23

When on 15 August of the same year, Satō Taisuke, commercial school professor from Taipei, who was a core member of the Taiwan Greater East Asia Society, accompanied Mochizuki on a visit to Uchiyama, the latter refused to support the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai. He pointed out that the Americans had already granted independence to the Philippines for the near future and an association that fiercely demanded an immediate withdrawal of the US from the archipelago might cause suspicion. The involvement of personalities like Matsui Iwane in the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai also heightened these fears. Consul General Uchiyama urged the representatives of the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai to refrain from actively propagating Pan-Asianism in the islands, describing the Philippines as a country that already almost possessed independent status by 1936. Nevertheless, it was still dependent on the US and therefore it was not wise to promote pan-Asianist slogans throughout the transition period of the Commonwealth. The Consul was convinced that Japan should be very cautious in advocating its own Pan-Asianism in the Philippines and should instead let Filipinos develop their own version of Asianism. When it came to Pan-Asianism, he argued for focusing on Sino-Japanese relations first, and believed that the Japanese government would not support pan-Asianist activities in the Philippines for the time being. After the meeting with Mochizuki and Satō, Uchiyama pointed out to Foreign Minister Arita that, in the long run, Filipinos needed to be convinced that Japanese Pan-Asianism was not a mere disguise for the Empire’s ambitions to occupy the country. Just like his predecessor Kimura, Uchiyama considered the Pan-Asianism of the Hirippin Dai- Ajia Kyōkai premature and he demanded from Matsui Iwane and the other leading figures of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai to make sure that the organization would be moderate with its activities in the Philippines at least until the end of the American-Philippine trade conference.24 Uchiyama’s caveats concerning the ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist stance of the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai was more than reasonable, as many Filipinos were satisfied with the development of their country under American rule within the framework of the Commonwealth. However, this did not stop the activities of the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists in the Philippines. Arguably the most ardent Filipino supporter of this ideology (and member of the Hirippin Dai-Ajia

23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., pp. 304–305. 194 Chapter 5

Kyōkai) was the lawyer Pio Duran. Duran was born in 1900 in Guinobatan, Albay province, in the Bicol region of Luzon. For his high school education, he moved to Manila where he also attended the University of the Philippines, earning three degrees (Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Laws and Master of Laws). After graduation, Duran established himself as a successful lawyer and busi- nessperson. In the 1930s, he showed open support for Japanese Pan-Asianism and actively promoted the idea of Japanese leadership in the liberation of Asia. In his 1935 book, Philippine Independence and the Far Eastern Question, Duran was eager to allay the fears of his fellow citizens that in the event of Philippine independence Japan would invade the islands. He accused the Occidental powers of applying double moral standards when, for example, justifying the seizure of India and Egypt but condemning the recognition of Manchukuo by Japan.25 The Philippines had to turn towards Japan, which Duran considered the natural leader of the Orient. Furthermore, Japan was ‘the only country in the world that can adequately defend the Philippines from foreign invasion.’26 Duran largely blamed the US and the other Occidental powers for being selfish, greedy and racist. The Americans would treat the Filipinos ‘in the same manner they treat the negroes in the United States’ and had turned the country ‘into a despised and despicable appendage of an Occidental country.’27 While the Americans would always prevent assimilation of the Filipinos into the American body politic and American society, under the guidance of Oriental powers like China or Japan, within a hundred years the Filipinos would be assimilated into society by inter-marriage as the Malays, Mongols and Ainus had done before them in Japan. Thus, Duran concluded for the future of the Filipinos: ‘Our children’s children will become citizens of the mightiest Empire or Republic in the Orient, if not the world.’28 Duran’s argument was certainly well in line with the Japanese ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists, whereas some advocates of the ‘esoteric’ stream, like Yabe Teiji, strictly opposed any racial mixing between the Japanese and other Asian peoples, as this would lead to the decline of the Japanese Empire.29 Furthermore, Duran assumed that Filipinos ‘would rather see their country under the sovereignty of an Oriental nation than owe allegiance to a Western power!’30 He was

25 Pio Duran, Philippine Independence and the Far Eastern Question (Manila: University of the Philippines Press, 1935), p. 123. 26 Ibid., pp. 125–26. 27 Ibid., p. 147. 28 Ibid., p. 152. 29 Totsuka, “Kaigunshō no ‘Daitōa Kyōeiken-ron’,” pp. 81–97. 30 Duran, Philippine Independence, p. 153. The Filipino Perspective 195 convinced that only a pact of alliance with Japan could grant the Philippines enduring independence. Japan, as an Oriental country, would not break such a treaty as a ‘consequence of Oriental zeal in fulfilling engagements.’31 Pio Duran, like Nishimura Shinji and the Asianists of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai, emphasized the strong bond of a common Asian identity that tied the peoples of Japan and the Philippines together:

I hope sufficient interest may be aroused in both countries to awaken them to the fact that they belong to the brotherhood of the Far East and that Nature has decreed that they be linked together by geographical ties which no power or will of man can break.32

It is more than questionable that a majority of the Filipinos would have preferred the rule of an Oriental power like Japan to the American administration. During World War I, 6,000 Filipinos voluntarily joined the US Navy and 4,000 Hawaii-based Filipinos did the same. Overall, 25,000 Filipino soldiers fought alongside American troops during the war in Europe.33 Duran’s fellow citizen, Carlos P. Romulo, described the Filipino as the ‘cosmopolite of the Orient’ to whom the Japanese was an ‘alien.’34 Duran did not ignore this overall positive attitude of the Philippine population towards the Americans, which Renato and Letitzia R. Constantino ascribe to the ‘subtle techniques of American domination.’35 Like his fellow Japanese ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists, Duran called for an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Quoting Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen, he described Pan-Asianism as the tool with which to emancipate the Oriental peoples from the West. Duran also referred to those people in the Orient who had succumbed to Occidental materialism and ‘would prefer the white man to his oriental brother, knowing full well that the former treats the colored peoples with scorn and contempt.’36 Duran admitted that there was probably no other country in the Orient where one could find more people of this kind. While the other Oriental countries like China, Japan, India, Siam and Malaya had preserved their original culture, in the Philippines one could find

31 Ibid., p. 154. 32 Ibid., p. 164. 33 Gregorio F. Zaide and Sonia Z. Pritchard, History of the Republic of the Philippines (Manila: The Modern Book Store, 1983), p. 279. 34 Romulo, I saw the Fall of the Philippines, p. 35. 35 Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, p. 41. 36 Duran, Philippine Independence, p. 167. 196 Chapter 5

an adulterated Orientalism which fits neither with the setting in the East, nor with the background of the West.37

For that lamentable state of affairs, however, it was not the Filipino people who were to blame. Rather it was their leaders, who had abandoned Orientalism for Westernization. In another article titled “Time for a Back-to-the-Orient- Movement in the Philippines” that was published in the Philippine Herald in the same year, Duran referred to these people as ‘racial renegades.’38 This article is in large parts identical to the chapter on Asiatic Monroeism in Philippine Independence and the Far Eastern Question. The best way to reverse the alienation of the Philippines from its Oriental culture was, in Duran’s view, a rapprochement between the Philippines and its Asian neighbours by means of an Asian Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine had successfully worked as a means of integration in the Americas and contributed to peace and stability. If it were possible to apply such a doctrine in the Orient and in Europe, the world would be divided into three hemispheres, i.e. the Americas, Europe and Asia. The US would be the natural leader in the Western hemisphere (North and South America), while England and France were responsible for the maintenance of peace in Europe and Japan would take the leading role in Asia. The installment of such continental Monroe Doctrines would minimize the possibility of war and mark a milestone on the road to world peace.39 Duran was completely convinced that Japan was the only possible leader in Asia that could put Monroe Doctrine into action. Regarding the Philippines, he did not believe that the country was capable of defending its territorial integrity after independence and therefore had to rely on a powerful country as a guarantor. The only country for that role was Japan, whose “unswerving policy of assuming responsibility commensurate with exercised authority does not admit of a supposition that she would risk war to defend the Philippine Islands.”40 Duran saw the application of an Asian Monroe Doctrine and the re-orientation of the Philippines towards Orientalism as a necessity for its future survival as an independent country:

Her geographical proximity with the other Oriental countries should convince even the most confirmed skeptic that her national life will be irresistibly linked with theirs and that with them the Philippines will rise

37 Ibid., p. 171. 38 Duran, “Time for a Back-to-the-Orient Movement,” p. 2. 39 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 40 Duran, Philippine Independence, p. 185. The Filipino Perspective 197

or fall in the impending conflict of the Pacific Ocean. The time is now ripe for us to join hands with them in the formulation of a Monroe Doctrine for the Orient. Cultural and geographical considerations suggest it. Our national safety calls for it. Our racial pride demands it. To adopt another course would lay our shores open to attack by our brothers of the Orient and, what is more, would justify the charge of our being traitors to the high cause of the colored races in the East.41

Hardly any Japanese Pan-Asianists belonging to the ‘exoteric’ school of thought could have formulated a stronger plea for the creation of a Japanese-led Oriental bloc that would include the Philippines as a natural part of it. Therefore, it is no surprise that Duran joined the Philippine branch of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai after its inauguration. In December 1936, the main points of a speech that Duran presented as a representative of the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai in front of members of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai on 17 November 1936 were reprinted in Dai- Ajiashugi under the title “Firipin ni okeru Dai-Ajiashugi undō” (The Movement towards Greater Asianism in the Philippines). In this speech, Duran pointed to the origins of a pan-Oriental movement in the Philippines, which had led to the formation of a Pan-Oriental Association (Han Tōyō Kyōkai). This movement, however, fell into a state of rest until 1934, the year of the foundation of the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai. Just as he had done in his publications of the previous year, Duran conceded that the Philippines had become a Westernized country in the course of Spanish and American rule:

In a country like the Philippines throughout the past 350 years, all human power was exhausted in the political shackles of Spain and the US. The natives were legally and illegally de-Orientalized and Western culture was implemented. One can say that today [the Philippines] is racially and materially not an Oriental nation and rather resembles the West.42

This is exactly the same conclusion that Carlos P. Romulo came to when he described the unconditional loyalty of Filipinos to the Americans approximately seven years later. However, Duran of course did not consider this pro- Americanism an achievement (as Romulo did); rather, he saw it as a defect that had to be remedied. Duran mentioned in his speech three historical events by which Japan had ‘awakened’ the apparently sleeping Filipinos: the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese plea for racial equality at the

41 Ibid., pp. 213–14. 42 Pio Duran, “Firipin ni okeru Dai-Ajiashugi undō,” Dai-Ajiashugi 4:12 (1936), pp. 35–38. 198 Chapter 5

League of Nations and the Japanese demand for equal naval strength with the Great Western Powers. Duran addressed his Japanese audience with the words that ‘Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War was not only your country’s victory but that of all Asia’ and stressed how ‘abnormally proud’ the Filipino people were of the bravery Japan had shown in challenging the Western powers. In this regard, he was positive about the preconditions for a re-Orientalisation of the Filipinos and declared the foremost goal of the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai to ‘clean sweep the false propaganda’ that Japan would invade the Philippines as soon as the Americans left the islands. Duran also begged his Japanese audience for the support of the mission of the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai by stressing that if re-Orientalisation of the Filipino people in this central part of Asia failed, it was more than likely that these Orientals would turn towards collaboration with the West for good.43 Pio Duran was a Pan-Asianist through and through. He inseparably linked the issue of his own country’s independence to Japanese leadership in an integrative Oriental body just as the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists in Japan had envisioned. Duran’s membership of the Philippine Greater Asia Society was thus a logical consequence of his politics. Moreover, unlike Benigno Ramos, the Japanese did not overlook Duran after they had seized the archipelago in December 1941. Duran became a member of the Executive Commission, and from December 1942, he served as Director of General Affairs of the KALIBAPI. In 1944, very likely under pressure from the Japanese, the Second Philippine Republic President Laurel gave him the post of Inspector for Martial Law in his Cabinet. Finally, together with Ramos, Duran took part in the formation of the MAKAPILI in late 1944. He remained completely loyal to the Japanese, even when it must have become clear to him that Japan would lose the war. As Vice-Executive General of the MAKAPILI, he delivered a speech at the inaugural ceremony of the organization on 8 December 1944. In this speech, he more or less openly criticized President Laurel as an opportunist who had made the most of the Second Philippine Republic but who was not willing to fight for its defence.44 Duran’s close affiliation with the Japanese led to his immediate imprisonment after the American re-invasion of the Philippines. In the course of new Philippine President Roxas’ proclamation of amnesty, however, Duran was released after only a short time in jail and continued to pursue a political career in the postwar Philippines.

43 Ibid. 44 Terami-Wada, “The Filipino Volunteer Armies,” pp. 59–98. The Filipino Perspective 199

The Department of Information and Philippine Asianists

Despite the overall reluctance of Japanese government officials to support the activities of ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist organizations in the Philippines, there were some exceptions. Kageyama Tomoji had worked together on several occasions for the Information Bureau (the successor of the Propaganda Corps) and had established contact with Benigno Ramos before the war. Kageyama, who spoke Spanish, was Ramos’ interpreter during the latter’s stay in Japan and the two men met again when Kageyama himself came to the Philippines after the Japanese invasion. Kageyama was very sympathetic to Ramos and his Sakdalistas and repeatedly criticized the Japanese military for the way his Filipino comrades were treated.45 Shortly before the Pacific War broke out, Kageyama had published an extensive volume dealing with the role of the Philippines in the upcoming war and the political and social situation in the archipelago. In the book, entitled Hiripin no zenbō—Beikoku kyokutō shinshutsu no kyoten (All about the Philippines—The Basis for the American Advance into the Far East), Kageyama emphasized the strategic importance of the Philippines as a stepping stone for American expansion into the South Seas but also analyzed the attitude of the Filipino people towards the Japanese. He praised Pio Duran as a true friend of Japan and advocate of the ‘New Order for East Asia,’ who had even named his son after Tōgō Heihachirō. Kageyama bemoaned that the Philippine authorities, due to American-imposed fears of Japan, oppressed the pro-Japanese activist Duran.46 Kageyama distinguished between three groups of Filipinos: those who desire ‘true independence’ (makoto no dokuritsu); those who desire the Philippines to be a vassal state (zokkoku) of the US like it was at the time of his writing; and those who desired independence but preferred to maintain the status quo out of fear of the Americans. The first group, according to Kageyama, was represented by the Sakdalistas under the leadership of Benigno Ramos; the second group consisted of the Philippine establishment, including the political elite and the government of the Commonwealth, which acted solely out of egoistic motives; and the third group consisted of almost all other Filipinos. While the first group that Ramos recruited consisted mainly of ‘revolutionary patriots’ (kakumei shishi) who belonged to the Tagalog ethnic group, the second group was minority of about 1.5 million people, and the members of the third group came from the lower social classes. Following Kageyama, the first and third group together accounted for about 15 million people and 90 per cent of the Philippine population. Kageyama was convinced

45 Ibid. 46 Kageyama, Hiripin no zenbō, p. 257. 200 Chapter 5 that this great majority of the Filipino people would eventually support ‘complete independence’ for their country and thus take sides with the Japanese who fought for the Filipinos out of ‘racial sympathy’ (minzokuteki dōjō). He considered the Philippines ‘geographically’ and racially a natural part of the GEACPS.47 Kageyama was clearly an advocate of ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianism who was convinced that there was a close geographical and ethnic connection between Japan and the Philippines. This connection would guarantee the support of the Philippine majority for the concept of the GEACPS. Therefore, he set high hopes in Filipino Asianists such as Duran and Ramos playing an important role in the propagation of pro-Japonism in the islands. However, even the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai had lost their faith in the political impact of Ramos on Philippine society before the war and the Japanese administrators did not give him an influential position during the Japanese Military Administration. Kageyama was one of the few ‘exoteric’ Japanese Pan-Asianists in the Philippines who sought close cooperation with Filipino pan-Asianist groups. Another, however, was Colonel Inuzuka Koreshige (1890–1965). Before coming to the Philippines in 1943, Inuzuka had served as head of the Japanese Navy’s Advisory Bureau on Jewish Affairs and had shown himself to be a proponent of anti-Semitism. However, while Kageyama criticized the settlement of Jewish refugees in the Philippines as ‘forethought for the establishment of a Jewish state’ (Yudaya kokka kensetsu no enbō) initiated by influential Jewish groups in the US,48 Inuzuka strongly advocated Jewish settlement in Japanese- controlled regions of Asia. Even though Inuzuka’s motive was to separate Jews in such regions from other peoples so they could not ‘harm’ them, he saved a great number of Jewish lives. Inuzuka had joined the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai before the war, and it was in that organization that he befriended Pio Duran and Benigno Ramos. Inuzuka showed great appreciation for the writings of Duran and, like Kageyama, he acted as a protégé of Ramos while the latter stayed in Japan. He harshly criticized the Military Administration for largely ignoring Filipino Asianists and even distributed several pamphlets that praised the achievements of Benigno Ramos and the Ganap Party while at the same time criticizing the influence of the old Philippine elites in the administration of the Second Philippine Republic. Inuzuka blamed the Japanese authorities for being ill-prepared at the time of the invasion and thus unaware of the national character of the Philippines. Therefore, the old Philippine elites were able to deceive the Japanese by pretending that they were cooperating, while in fact

47 Ibid., pp. 268–69. 48 Ibid., p. 251. The Filipino Perspective 201 they opposed the Japanese rule.49 The Department of Information played a key role in Japanese attempts to evoke a sense of Orientalism among the Filipinos. Kageyama Tomoji and Inuzuka Koreshige were affiliated with this institution, as was Lieutenant Mochizuki Shigenobu (1910–1944). Mochizuki, trained in Chinese philosophy at the University of Tokyo, came to the Philippines as a member of the Propaganda Corps in January 1942. He pursued the goal of form- ing a new Philippine elite that would govern the future Philippines according to pan-Asianist principles. For that purpose, he started teaching Filipino prisoners of war in the newly founded New Philippines Cultural Institute. His teachings there centred on Oriental values, such as self-sacrifice for the sake of the country, and emphasized the necessity of ridding Philippine society of the American-imposed bad habits of individualism and materialism. The GEACPS was the only means by which the Philippines could truly become an independent country.50 Like Kageyama and Inuzuka, Mochizuki was very critical about the great number of former Nacionalista-Party members in the new Philippine government. He suspected them of secretly resisting the Japanese while his students at the Cultural Institute and patriots such as Duran or Ricarte possessed a ‘true Filipino spirit’ and worked towards the re-Orientalisation of their country.51 At the Cultural Institute, not only POWs were trained; university students who were less than 30 years old were also eligible to take classes there. The institute was subordinate to the Department of Information, and while Mochizuki was the main instructor, the body was headed by Colonel Saito Jirō, the head of the Information Department. The first group of trainees to join the institute consisted of 62 male students who were educated for a period of three months from September 1943 onwards. After graduation, these students worked for institutions like the Department of Information, the KALIBAPI, broadcasting companies and the Philippine administration. A second group of trainees underwent instruction in the institute from April to August of 1944, but when Mochizuki was killed by anti-Japanese guerillas, this effectively spelt the end of the New Philippines Cultural Institute.52 Besides these educational efforts, graduates of the Cultural Institute set up the “New Leaders Association” (NLA) or in Japanese Kunibashirakai (Association of Pillars of the Nation). Pio Duran was elected chair of the NLA on 23 October 1944 and the association was officially inaugurated on 3 December 1944. It pursued the same goals as the Cultural Institute, namely fostering Philippine patriotism and supporting

49 Terami-Wada, “The Filipino Volunteer Armies,” pp. 59–98. 50 Yu-José, Japan views the Philippines, pp. 164–65. 51 Terami-Wada, “The Filipino Volunteer Armies,” pp. 59–98. 52 Terami-Wada, “The Cultural Front in the Phillippines”. 202 Chapter 5 the Japanese in their defence of the islands against the American re-invasion.53 The Japanese name of the organization resembled the title of a monthly magazine named Pillars, published by the Cultural Institute. The first issue of this magazine was published in December 1943 and included contributions from its honorary editor Iwao Kume, Lieutenant Mochizuki and various Filipino writers. Mochizuki’s contribution was a reprint of his speech he had given at the graduation ceremony of the Cultural Institute’s first trainee group. In this speech, he set out his expectations of the graduates, asking them to refrain from striving for luxury and comfortable living, and to develop instead a spirit of self-sacrifice:

By considering ‘self’ as if it were not existing, shall I say, when you begin from zero, all delusions disappear instantly and the way clears out as though you view a plain on a bright sunny day with bright light shining forth brilliantly. When you stand under such clear and unmixed mentality, all the true aims and purposes of Japan and the Philippines, and the future of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere become clearly defined.54

Mochizuki’s speech was the opening article of the newly established magazine and thus virtually defined the outline of this publication. Pillars was meant to be a means of re-education of the Filipino people and a platform for those Filipinos who shared the Japanese vision of the GEACPS. One of the most prominent former Commonwealth politicians in the Philippines who did not leave the country during the Japanese occupation was Benigno S. Aquino Sr. (1894–1947). Aquino had been Secretary of Agriculture in the Cabinet of President Quezon since 1937 and served during the Japanese Military Administration as Director-General of the KALIBAPI, and assistant chairperson of the Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence. Within the Commission, Aquino also functioned as Commissioner of the Interior. After the inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic, Aquino became the Speaker of the National Assembly and held this position until the end of the republic. After the war, he was charged with treason but died of natural causes before the start of his trial. In a short contribution for the first issue of Pillars, Aquino described the Philippine affiliation to the Orient as a

53 Terami-Wada, “The Filipino Volunteer Armies,” pp. 59–98. 54 Shigenobu Mochizuki, “Infinite Strength,” Pillars 1:1 (1943), pp. 3–4. The Filipino Perspective 203

historical and geographical fact. As men of the East, we were born in the infancy of the world, as men of the East, we shall die in the consumma- tion of the ages. No human artifice or subterfuge can alter even in the minutest manner this immutable and incontrovertible fact.55

In the previous year, Aquino delivered a speech in front of Filipino USAFFE officers at the POW Camp Stotsenburg, where he tried to talk them out of their pro-American convictions. Aquino was eager to point out that no one could blame these Filipino soldiers for fighting alongside the Americans but they should now reconsider their attitude. In line with the official announcements of the Military Administration, Aquino urged the officers to take part in actively restoring peace and order after their release from captivity by convincing their families of the futility of any further resistance. He even called it an act of patriotism to cooperate with the Japanese. Aquino then lectured on the history of Occidental domination of the Orient, and spoke of Japan as the “country called by destiny to save the Orient from occidental colonisation”. He recommended taking the opportunity that the GEACPS offered:

The Filipino nation has to comprehend that its fate depends on itself alone. We have come to the crossroads and it depends upon our ability and upon our courage to choose the right way. Let us bear in mind that in this respect, the leaders of the Japanese Empire have laid out, in a clear and unmistakable manner, the political course for the nations that they are vindicating in Greater East Asia, a course diametrically opposed to that of the white colonizers; for, while the latter signifies subjugation and exploitation, the former is directed to the elevation of the oriental race and the liberation of the oriental people.56

The Japanese Consulate in Manila had considered Aquino to be one of the few pro-Japanese members of the National Assembly even prior to the war. On 29 March 1945, Aquino, along with President Laurel and Camilo Osias, left the Philippines for Japan with Ambassador Murata.57 Indeed, he seemed convinced that the Philippines was better off in a Japanese-controlled entity like the GEACPS than as an independent country that might continue to be part of

55 Benigno S. Aquino, “Undeniable Fact,” Pillars 1:1 (1943), p. 21. 56 Benigno S. Aquino, “Speech delivered by the Commissioner of the Interior, Honorable Benigno S. Aquino before the Officers of the USAFFE in Camp Stotsenburg, Papagna, on July 31st, 1942,” (Lecture, Papagna, 31 July 1942). 57 Nakano, “Appeasement and Coercion,” pp. 21–58. 204 Chapter 5 an American-dominated hemisphere. However, he had not been a flamboy- ant advocate of Japanese-inspired Pan-Asianism before the war in the manner of Benigno Ramos and Pio Duran. The magazine Pillars frequently quoted Osias and Jorge B. Vargas to underline the need for re-Orientalisation in the Philippines. A constant point of reference therein was again José Rizal, the ultimate national hero of the country. Vargas is quoted under the headline “For Racial Dignity” as saying:

The whole meaning of Rizal’s life can be found in his death. When he fell here before the bullets of his executioners, he was paying the price for his unshakable belief in the worth and dignity of the Oriental. He was the symbol of the Filipino race, rebelling against Occidental tyranny and exploitation, rising irresistibly to take its proper place in the world, and resolve to secure it at whatever cost.58

Osias also emphasized Rizal’s will to self-sacrifice, a value the Japanese Pan- Asianists wanted the Filipinos to develop: ‘Great in life, great in service, great in sacrifice, was Rizal the Filipino, the Oriental, the world citizen good and wise.’59 The entire magazine reads like an advertising brochure for ‘exoteric’ Japanese Pan-Asianism. All articles and contributions, either by Japanese or Filipino authors, stressed the need for the Oriental identity of the Philippines to be restored, and argued that Filipinos would eventually appreciate their country being part of the GEACPS. An article by one S. Matsukawa titled “Filipino Reorientation Made Easy” and published in the second issue, in February 1944, exemplifies this perfectly. Matsukawa largely admitted that the Philippines had been estranged from the Orient throughout the long years of Western rule in the islands. However, the close affiliation with the US in particular was not due to a cultural proximity but to the fact that the Filipinos did not want to belong to an underdeveloped part of the world, namely the Orient. This ‘inferiority complex’ made many Filipinos consider America the country they referred to as their home, while the Spanish colonisation, and especially the adoption of Christianity, had also shaped Filipino culture. However, according to Matsukawa, the process of Westernization had ultimately affected only a minority of the Filipinos. He referred to

58 Jorge B. Vargas, “For Racial Dignity,” Pillars 1:1 (1943), p. 28. 59 Camilo Osias, “The Great Filipino and Oriental,” Pillars 1:1 (1943), p. 29. The Filipino Perspective 205

the relatively few living in the cities and more specifically to the mestizo population. [. . .] I believe the vast majority of the Filipinos are still fun- damentally Malayan or Oriental in culture.

This conclusion resembles the assessment of Kageyama, who had been convinced that only a small elite group in Philippine society would appreciate American domination, while the majority in fact desired complete independence. Matsukawa assumed that, culturally, most Filipinos were still Orientals; they only desired to be part of the American hemisphere because they wanted to escape the Orient, which they considered ‘the slum of the world’. Matsukawa described this mindset of Filipinos like Carlos P. Romulo, who was an ardent advocate of Philippine pro-Americanism, as ‘an unrealistic attitude and not quite adult’. The assumption that the Orient was underdeveloped was wrong according to Matsukawa as with reference to the GEACPS, ‘the only real element of poverty we have found within the Sphere has been the poverty in the will to develop it.’ Matsukawa then came to the somewhat ambitious conclusion that the Greater East Asia War had already reversed this development of Westernization and pro-Americanism:

I do not see the need to go to the extent of reporting the result of a nationwide poll to prove something that approximates a self-evident truth. For if there is anyone who disagrees with me that the Filipinos are no longer confused as to whether or not their country is situated in East Asia, then I would say that it would be tantamount to saying they have never heard, either of the Greater East Asia War or that the Philippines is already an independent country.60

Matsukawa pretends in his article that all the positive prewar assumptions of the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists in Japan had come true in the Philippines, thanks to the war itself and the inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic. Yet his complete ignorance of reality exemplifies the complete failure of “exoteric” Pan-Asianism in the Philippines. Nevertheless, a substantial number of Filipino intellectuals cooperated with the Japanese and helped to propagate the concepts of Pan-Asianism and the GEACPS. Apart from the ‘usual suspects’ like Duran and Ramos, there were also contributions in Pillars from authors who strongly condemned Japanese rule in the Philippines after the war. Arguably, the most prominent

60 S. Matsukawa, “Filipino Reorientation Made Easy,” Pillars 1:2 (1944), pp. 21–46. 206 Chapter 5

example for this is Gregorio F. Zaide (1907–1988). Zaide became one of the most renowned Philippine historians after the war and was, amongst other things, president of the Philippine Historical Association. In his 1983 volume The Philippine History and Government, he praised American rule in the islands and described the Japanese occupation as a period of suppression and agony for the Filipino people:

The United States, after destroying our First Republic and independence, imposed her rule over the country. Fortunately, for our people, her rule which lasted from 1898 to 1946 was benevolent. Unlike Spain, she did not oppress our people. On the contrary, she trained our people in self-government and prepared them for ultimate independence. [. . .] For three years (1942–44) our people agonized under Japanese occupation. They suffered terribly, but they were unconquered and hopeful that General Douglas MacArthur would someday return to liberate them, as he had promised when he escaped to Australia in March, 1942. And General MacArthur did return in October, 1944 and liberated them in July, 1945.61

In May 1944, at a time when the tide of the war had clearly turned against Japan, Zaide wrote an article for Pillars in which he emphasized the various Asian influences on Philippine culture coming from India, China and of course, Japan. Zaide praised the positive impact of Japanese-Philippine trade relations on the development of Philippine industries and even highlighted how beneficial Japanese-Filipino marriages were for the country as they eventually produced ‘better Filipinos.’ He concluded that the Philippines needed to further turn towards Japan and foster Orientalisation:

With the present close intercourse between Japan and the Philippines brought about by the Greater East Asia, the Filipinos will surely assimilate more cultural influences from Dai Nippon. Inspired and encouraged by Japan, they are now awakening to the vital problem of cultural renaissance in order to revive the magnificent traits and virtues of their Asian forebears. They are gradually returning to the fold of Mother Asia. Realizing their mistakes in the past in slavishly aping their Occidental dominators, they are now fully aware of the immutable fact that they are an Oriental race, with a rich heritage of Oriental culture.62

61 Zaide, Philippine History and Government, pp. 284–86. 62 Gregorio F. Zaide, “Asian Influences on Filipino Culture,” Pillars 1:5 (1944), pp. 8–11. The Filipino Perspective 207

There is no evidence that Zaide or any other author who contributed to Pillars was forced by the Japanese or the government of the Second Philippine Republic to do so. Zaide’s article reads like the propaganda of the ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists from the Japanese and Philippine branches of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai, while his postwar assessment of the Japanese occupation is completely negative. After the war, the great majority of the Philippine intelligentsia—like Zaide himself—did not want to remember any of their pro-Japanese or pan- Asianist sentiments during the occupation period. It is not the purpose of this chapter to deal in great length with the question of collaboration in the Philippines during the years of the Japanese rule in the islands. Nevertheless, some consideration has to be given to José P. Laurel, who became the first (and only) president of the so-called Second Philippine Republic and remained a controversial figure in postwar literature on the occupation. The majority of Filipino historians followed Laurel’s own argumentation that he cooperated with the Japanese to make the occupation less dreadful for his fellow citizens and therein only fulfilled his patriotic duty. Gregorio F. Zaide exculpates the entire Philippine elite that cooperated with the Japanese in the following way, for example:

Realizing the precarious situation, they obeyed the order. They were compelled to do so in order to protect our people who were then at the mercy of the conquerors.63

Given his own involvement in collaboration with the Japanese, it is not surpris- ing that Zaide refrains from blaming Laurel for serving as Philippine president by the grace of Japan. Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Oscar M. Alfonso even praise Laurel for his role in the administration of the Second Republic:

It is to the credit of Laurel and his colleagues in the government that, faced with what appeared as insurmountable tasks, they remained loyal to the people and worked hard to soften the impact of the Japanese occupation on the moral and physical nerves of the Filipinos. It is easy to criticize and condemn him and his colleagues from a distance of 10,000 miles where there had not been any semblance of war, but those who remained knew better. Millions of those who suffered and confronted death face to face and survived were and are grateful to Laurel and his colleagues. They may have committed some mistakes, which were inevitable under

63 Zaide, Philippine History and Government, p. 356. 208 Chapter 5

the circumstances, but their loyalty, patriotism, and unselfish devotion to duty were beyond reproach.64

Agoncillo also dedicated his account of the Japanese occupation, the two- volume The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941–1945, to the memory of Laurel, a

Nationalist, Statesman, Educator, and Patriot whose invincible courage and dedication to his country and people, during a time of crisis, saved the Philippines from complete destruction.65

Renato and Letizia R. Constantino take a less emotional stance when asserting Laurel’s motives for collaboration with the Japanese. According to them, he and the other Commonwealth elites were simply used to serve an occupation regime. Cooperation with the Japanese came naturally to them. Furthermore, they did not want to risk their social status.66 Only scarce mention is ever made in the literature on Laurel and his behavior during the war of the fact that he had been a founding member of the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai during the Japanese occupation. David Steinberg correctly points out that the Japanese by no means forced Laurel into office. The Japanese left the families of former Commonwealth leaders like Carlos P. Romulo or Sergio Osmena who had fled along with the Americans in peace. People such as Manuel Roxas or José A. Santos, who stayed in the Philippines, avoided taking any position in the new government. Laurel, who was severely wounded after an attempted assassination, could easily have done the same. According to Steinberg, Laurel intended to take advantage of the Japanese occupation and his own position to enact educational, political and societal reforms that he believed were necessary for the Philippines. For example, in 1943, he spoke of the need of the Filipino’s ‘spiritual rejuvenation’ to meet the requirements of the ‘New Order.’67 The Japanese Military Administration in the Second Military Order from 17 February 1942 used exactly the same term-‘spiritual rejuvenation’68—and on 31 July 1942, Homma Masaharu in his “Address to the Filipino People” stated,

64 Agoncillo and Alfonso, History of the Filipino People, p. 469. 65 Agoncillo, The Fateful Years. 66 Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, pp. 111–12. 67 David Steinberg, “Jose P. Laurel: A ‘Collaborator’ Misunderstood,” The Journal of Asian Studies 24:4 (1965), pp. 651–65. 68 Constantino and Constantino, The Philippines: The Continuing Past, p. 68. The Filipino Perspective 209

‘the times strongly call for a great spiritual revolution.’69 Many of the reforms Laurel had in mind were in keeping with the official Japanese agenda. In his inaugural speech as Philippine President on 14 October 1943, Laurel emphasized the importance of Filipino citizens fulfilling their duties to the state,70 an expression which bore a strong resemblance to the demands made by Rōyama Masamichi. Overall, Laurel showed great admiration for Japanese culture and the Japanese way of life, and wanted to implement certain elements of this lifestyle in Philippine society. He also appreciated the idea of a ‘constitutional dictatorship’ as practiced in Japan and envisioned such a model for the Philippines. Laurel actively engaged in the drafting of the Second Republic’s constitution and was a strong proponent of giving up the American-induced principle of a ‘Balance of Power,’ wanting to shift more rights to the Executive instead. Following the Japanese model, the constitution emphasized the duties of the citizens more than their rights, and Laurel himself wanted to seize as much power for the president as possible. This, however, does not make a Pan- Asianist of him. Laurel was just like Mariano Ponce, José Ramos and Vicente Sotto: he was, most of all, a Filipino nationalist who wanted to overcome his country’s dependence on the US. The Japanese occupation he considered a necessary transition period after which the Philippines could emerge as a new, independent country. Laurel did not believe in the sustainability of the GEACPS and believed that Japan and the US would come to a kind of negotiated peace. He wanted to make sure that the Philippines would be ripe for independence and he tried to enact those reforms he found necessary for that purpose. Finally, yet importantly, Laurel also wanted to ensure that he himself would be in a strong position after the return of the former Commonwealth government to the postwar Philippines.71 In a way, Pio Duran was correct in his criticism of Laurel: the latter indeed tried to take advantage of the Japanese occupation without being a true advocate of the GEACPS and the New Order as propagated by Japan, despite his sympathy for Japanese culture. Laurel was never willing to serve the Japanese loyally until the very end as Duran and Benigno Ramos were. The Japanese occupation offered him the chance to step out of the political shadow of Manuel Quezon and re-shape the Philippines politically and socially in a way he found favourable for the country.

69 Masaharu Homma, “Address to the Filipino People,” pp. xv–xx. 70 Steinberg, “Jose P. Laurel,” pp. 651–65. 71 Ibid. 210 Chapter 5

Filipino Response to Pan-Asianism and the Japanese Rule

Pan-Asianism never became a mass movement in the Philippines. Certainly the misbehaviour of the majority of the Japanese troops and the resulting mistrust of the Filipinos in the officially declared motives of the Japanese contributed to this failure. In Chapter 4, some Japanese soldiers’ wartime memories were analyzed, and in this section, we will look at some Filipino accounts of the Japanese occupation. The utmost negative assessments of Filipino scholars like Zaide and Agoncillo were already highlighted in the previous chapters. One remarkable book that stands out in the Filipino literature on the Japanese occupation is Philippine-Nippon Tales. A Collection of Incidents showing the sunny Side of the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, edited by Alfonso P. Santos in 1978. While on one side the author aims to show that not all Japanese soldiers were cruel killers, he also does not fail to depict the overall brutality of the Japanese rule. The human behaviour of the Japanese protagonists in the narrated stories is in so far remarkable as it proved to be exceptional for Japanese soldiers at that time. Many of the stories edited in the book highlight the bahaviour of one particular Japanese soldier in contrast to the brutality of his fellow compatriots. Flora M. Pagaduan from Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, starts her story titled “Not all of them were bad” with the words: ‘Generally, the Japanese occupation forces were brutal. But there were some exceptions.’ She then narrates an encounter with a Japanese officer who seemed to be well educated and who took a sincere interest in teaching the Filipino children in her village about his country at school. Pagaduan remembered that the Japanese tried to win over the native population by officers teaching the Japanese language and inviting the local people to learn about Japan. She is quoting this particular lieutenant saying:

You know, child, so many of us may become cruel in the end, but, remember, there are those who care for your welfare.

The lieutenant seemed aware of the brutality of many of his comrades and Flora M. Pagaduan believed that his motives went beyond the Japanese propaganda.72 Another story titled “An Exceptional Japanese Officer,” narrated by Nancy Flores Navarro from Santa Cruz, Manila, describes how a Japanese soldier

72 Alfonso P. Santos, Philippine-Nippon Tales. A Collection of Incidents showing the sunny Side of the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines (Quezon City: National Book Store, Inc., 1978), p. 71. The Filipino Perspective 211

brutally attempted to rape a young Filipina, but a Japanese officer came to her rescue and severely punished the soldier. The story ends with the words:

This incident showed that there were some gallant gentlemen among the Japanese, for that officer was surely one of them. His chivalrous act served to prove that even among brutes, there is always an exception.73

The exceptional character of the Japanese officer’s behaviour is emphasized already in the title of this story and the narrator leaves no doubt that the overall perception of the Japanese army by the Filipino people was mostly negative. Yet another story tells how a Filipino doctor was arrested by the Japanese, because they suspected him to be a guerilla. The Japanese captain tortured the doctor to make him confess, but the doctor refused. Finally, just before he was supposed to be killed, the Japanese commander came and rescued the doctor.74 Like in many other stories edited in Santos’ book, a lot attention is given to the general misbehaviour of the Japanese to point at the exceptional goodness of one particular Japanese who did not resemble his comrades. Another aspect that needs consideration is that many Filipinos lived in the area of tension between supporting the guerillas and fear of the Japanese. Many stories edited in Philippine-Nippon Tales describe situations in which Filipinos had to fear for their lives because they were suspected to be aiding or to have aided guerillas. On the other hand, many Filipinos, especially in the rural areas, feared the guerillas as much as the Japanese. Some guerilla units executed civilians whom they suspected to be collaborators and in some cases, guerillas killed disliked people under the pretence of resistance.75 It proved difficult for the Japanese to recruit Filipino workers in areas with a strong guerilla presence. The Mankayan copper mine in northern Luzon employed about 10,000 Filipino workers at times and the operating company, Mitsui, established a kind of commercial area around the mine, in which the miners and their families could purchase all sorts of goods necessary for their daily lives. Before late 1943, the mine did quite well as there were hardly any guerilla activities in that part of Luzon until then. However, when the supply situation worsened and fewer Japanese military personnel were present at the mine, guerilla activities increased and heavily contributed to the closing of the facility.76 The motives for Filipino men to join a guerilla unit differed. Many wanted to take revenge

73 Ibid., p. 100. 74 Ibid., pp. 148–49. 75 Agoncillo and Alfonso, History of the Filipino People, p. 471. 76 Ikehata, “Mining Industry Development and Local Anti-Japanese Resistance,” pp. 127–70. 212 Chapter 5 on the Japanese for crimes committed against themselves or their families; others considered armed resistance to be their patriotic duty. Solidarity with the former American overlords was another motive. In 1943, guerilla leader Tomas Confesor wrote a letter to a collaborator and explained his motives:

There is a total war in which the issues between the warring parties are less concerned with territorial questions but more with forms of government, ways of life, and those that affect even in the very thoughts, feelings and sentiments of every man. [. . .] For as people, we have been living during the last forty years under a regime of justice and liberty regulated only by the universally accepted principles of constitutional governments. We have come to enjoy personal privileges and civil liberties without much struggle, without undergoing any pain to attain them. They were practi- cally a gift from a generous and magnanimous people-the people of the United States of America. Now that Japan is attempting to destroy those liberties, should we not exert any effort to defend them?77

In his memoirs Under the Shadows of the Kempi (1945), Pedro M. Giminez expressed his admiration for to Confesor:

Governor Tomas Confesor of Iloilo considered to be the foremost guerilla leader, is a credit to our people.78

Confesor, quite similar to Carlos P. Romulo, appraised the values the Americans had taught the Filipinos over the past forty years and as a schoolteacher, he certainly passed on these values to his students. During the years under American rule, especially before the Commonwealth, many American teachers taught at Philippines schools. By means of education, the American administrators intended to leave a lasting impact on Philippine society and soon Filipino teachers like Confesor, who had fully inheritated the American canon of values, helped them reach their goal. Therefore, reforms in education became important for the Japanese (see Chapter 4) as the overall pro-American attitude of most Filipinos was also a result of the American-imposed education system in the archipelago. Despite the repeated atrocities of the Japanese army against the Philippine population, it was arguably the massive impact of the 43 years of American rule in the archipelago that contributed the most to

77 Zaide and Zaide, Documentary Sources of Philippine History, vol. 12, pp. 49–50. 78 Giminez, Under the Shadows of the Kempi, p. 52. The Filipino Perspective 213 the failure of Pan-Asianism in the Philippines. How did it come to this positive perception of American rule among the Philippine population?

The Jones Law and first Steps towards Independence After their victory in the war against Spain, the US undertook efforts to appease the Filipinos and convince them of the benefits of the American rule in the islands. Despite the fact that the American reforms of the education system led to a substantially higher literacy rate among the Philippine population, nationalist Filipino historians like Renato Constantino describe the American education system as a means of colonial policy:

Given the economic and political purposes of American occupation, education had to be consistent with these broad purposes of American colonial policy. The Filipinos had to be trained as citizens of an American colony. The Benevolent Assimilation proclamation of President McKinley on December 21, 1898 at a time when Filipino forces were in control of the country except Manila, betrays the intention of the colonizers. [. . .] Despite the noble aims announced by the American authorities that the Philippines was theirs to protect and guide, the fact still remained that these people were a conquered nation whose national life had to be woven into the pattern of American dominance. Philippine education was shaped by the overriding factor of preserving and expanding American control. To achieve this, all separatist tendencies were dis- couraged. Nay, they had to be condemned as subversive. With this as the pervasive factor in the grand design of conquering a people, the pattern of education, consciously or unconsciously, fostered and established certain attitudes on the part of the governed. These attitudes conformed to the purposes of American occupation.79

Constantino’s essay is not a critique on the American occupation policy in the first place; it is rather a criticism of the Filipinos themselves, who, in his opinion, had willingly accepted their role as colonised people. The election of the Democrat Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924) as 28th President of the US marked a turning point in US-Philippine relations. The Democratic Party had expressed anti-imperialist views since 1900 and demanded in 1912 independence for the Philippines as soon as a ‘stable government’ would be established.80 Even

79 Constantino, “The Miseducation of a Filipino,” pp. 39–65. 80 Roy Watson Curry, “Woodrow Wilson and Philippine Policy,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41:3 (1954), pp. 435–52. 214 Chapter 5 though Wilson did not intend to grant independence immediately (as many Filipino nationalists demanded), he expressed his conviction that the US would withdraw from the islands as soon as the preconditions for an independent Philippines existed. Wilson sent a commission led by Professor Henry J. Ford to the archipelago that investigated the situation in the Philippine Islands for about two months. Ford reported the widespread wish for immediate independence among the Philippine population and the formation of radical nationalist groups, such as that led by General Ricarte. The Partido Nacionalista under Osmena, which demanded independence, was much more influential than the Federalists who favoured further administration of the islands by the US. Ford therefore recommended stronger participation of Filipinos in the government. The Partido Nacionalista had formulated its main goal of immediate Philippine independence in its “Independence Platform” upon its inauguration in 1907:

The attainment of the immediate independence of the Philippine Islands to constitute it into a free and sovereign nation under a democratic government, without prejudice to the adoption in due time of any form of guarantee which would be convenient to the interests of the Filipino people and suitable to the circumstances.81

In the US, meanwhile, the newly appointed Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garisson (1864–1932), together with the law officer Felix Frankfurter (1882– 1965), who later became Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court, formulated the cornerstones of the future Wilsonian policy towards administration of the Philippines. The recommendations made by Garisson/Frankfurter included the appointment of a new Governor General to the islands and the retainment of American control over the executive. Wilson spoke to Philippine Commissioner Quezon, who also favoured the appointment of a new Governor General and finally, on 25 August 1913, Francis Burton Harrison (1873–1957) took office.82 In his book The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence (1922), Harrison described the reforms inducted by the American administration as highly appreciated by the Filipinos:

Long-standing grievances which they whished to remove were now in their hands of settlement. Above all, the new policy was a recognition of

81 Quoted in Agoncillo, Filipino Nationalism, p. 248. 82 Watson Curry, “Woodrow Wilson and Philippine Policy,” pp. 435–52. The Filipino Perspective 215

their political rights and race dignity, for which they showed immediate gratitude.83

As much as President Wilson’s plan to grant the Philippines independence at the earliest possible date found appreciation among the populace, some leading Filipino politicians felt uneasy with this rapid development. Manuel Quezon feared that, if the Philippines became independent in the near future, Japan would fill the gap caused by the American withdrawal from the islands. He therefore preferred Philippine self-government under American rule to complete independence. Quezon even tried to persuade President Wilson through Frank McIntyre, head of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, of a more tentative policy towards Philippine independence. Quezon avoided informing Harrison of this as he was convinded that the Governor General was a stern advocate of immediate Philippine independence. Quezon’s main demand was that a referendum on Philippine independence would be held as soon as the male literacy rate had reached 75 per cent. This would delay the entire process definitely. Simultaneously, the American Congressman William Atkinson Jones (1849–1918) drafted a roadmap to Philippine independence. Already in 1912, Jones had introduced various bills concerning the issue of Philippine independence to the Congress, but without success. Jones’ new bill was introduced to the Congress on 11 July 1914. It promised Philippine independence as the eventual goal and, upon suggestion by Quezon, the American President possessed final veto authority of insular legislation. During the debate in September, the opposition expressed the same concerns as Quezon had done before: American withdrawal from the archipelago would invite Japan to capture the islands.84 Eventually on 29 August 1916, President Wilson signed the final draft of the bill and thereby turned it into a law. The legislature consisted of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The Supreme Court and lower courts were staffed with both American and Filipino judges. The law included furthermore an extension of the Bill of Rights and the definition of Filipino citizenship. On 16 October 1916, the first legislature under this new law began, seeing Quezon as President of the Senate and Sergio Osmena elected House Speaker. The Nationalist Party had won a landslide victory in the preceeding elections and therefore controlled both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Governor General Harisson organized a cabinet on 11 January 1917 and on 16 October of the same year a Council of State was established.

83 Quoted in Agoncillo, Filipino Nationalism, p. 257. 84 Watson Curry, “Woodrow Wilson and Philippine Policy,” pp. 435–52. 216 Chapter 5

Already by 1921, 96 per cent of the Philippine Government members were Filipinos.85 Upon signing the bill into a law Wilson said:

I hope and believe that this law will be sufficient proof to the Filipinos of our real intention. This measure means a very satisfactory forward movement in our policy of giving them genuine self-government and the control of their own affairs.86

Shortly before his term as President of the US ended, Wilson recommended independence for the Philippines in a speech before the Congress on 2 December 1920. He expressed his conviction that the political situation in the Philippines allowed the grant of independence to the Filipinos:

[. . .] I respectfully admit that the condition precedent having been fulfilled, it is now our duty to keep our promise to the people of those Islands by granting them the independence which they so honorably covet.87

Even though Wilson’s appeal to the Congress was not successful at that time since the majority of the House belonged to the Republican Party, it underlined his firm conviction that the Philippines deserved independence at the earliest possible date. Wilson’s policy laid the groundwork for the administration of the Philippine Islands in the following years and the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935. As Roy Watson Curry summarizes it,

Wilson’s course, on the whole a moderate one—but braced by the firm belief in the ultimate objective—had threaded its way toward the day of independence.88

Wilson’s policy eventually paved the road for the amicable relations between the Americans and the Filipinos in the following years.

The Philippine Commonwealth Many Filipinos shared Woodrow Wilson’s opinion that their country deserved immediate independence and nationalist movements in the Philippines gained strength in the 1920s. Even Manuel Quezon, who had inofficially opposed early

85 Zaide and Zaide, Documentary Sources of Philippine History, vol. 11, p. 169. 86 Quoted in Watson Curry, “Woodrow Wilson and Philippine Policy,” pp. 435–52. 87 Quoted in Zaide and Zaide, Documentary Sources of Philippine History, vol. 11, p. 191. 88 Watson Curry, “Woodrow Wilson and Philippine Policy,” pp. 435–52. The Filipino Perspective 217 independence out of fear of a Japanese invasion, now responded positively to the demands of the nationalists by saying:

I prefer a government run like hell by Filipinos to a government run like heaven by Americans.89

During the time between the inauguration of the Jones Law and the establishment of the Commonwealth, a number of Philippine independence missions travelled to the US to negotiate with the American government. None of them was successful until in 1931, a mission led by Sergio Osmena and Manuel A. Roxas went to Washington. The economic depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s had changed the attitude of many former opponents of Philippine independence in the Congress and among various economic interest groups. The import of Philippine duty free goods and the immigration of Filipino labourers who worked for cheap wages created fears of economic disadvantages and increasing unemployment rates. Therefore, independence would turn the Philippines into an ordinary country that had trade relations with the US and this seemed very attractive to many lobby groups in America. The so-called “Osrox Mission” thus was successful in negotiating the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill, which ultimately granted the Philippines independence after a transition period of ten years. The law, however, failed to pass the Philippine legislature as Quezon opposed it with all his political power. He feared that he would loose his leading position in Philippine politics if the achievement of independence would be associated with Osmena or Roxas. Quezon then travelled himself to the US to negotiate a new independence law. Eventually, Quezon was successful and the so-called Tydings-McDuffie Bill90 was approved by the Congress and signed by American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (1882– 1945). Apart from a few amendments, the Tydings-McDuffie Bill was identical with the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill and the Filipino people finally accepted it in a plebiscite. Gregorio F. Zaide summarizes the stages of the Tydings-McDuffie Bill, which should lead to Philippine independence as follows:

(1) the acceptance of the law by the Philippine Legislature; (2) the calling of a constitutional convention composed of Filipino delegates to draft the new Constitution of the Philippines;

89 Renato Constantino, The Philippines: a Past Revisited (Quezon City: Tala Publ. Services, 1975), pp. 329–30. 90 Named after the American authors of the bill, Senator Millard E. Tydings and Congressman John McDuffie. 218 Chapter 5

(3) the submission of the new charta to the American President and his approval; (4) ratification of the new charta by the Filipino electorate; (5) election of Commonwealth officials; (6) inauguration of the Commonwealth; and (7) proclamation of Philippine independence and establishment of the Republic on July 4, 1946.91

The Filipino delegates to the Constitutional Convention then worked out a draft for the constitution of the Commonwealth, which was accepted by Roosevelt on 23 March 1935. The Philippine Commonwealth was officially inaugurated on 15 November 1935 and should cease to exist on 4 July 1946, when the Philippines would become fully independent. During the transition period of the Commonwealth, the Philippines was a semi-independent country, but the government was almost entirely run by Filipinos. Only in the fields of currency and foreign relations did the Americans stay in charge. Manuel Quezon became the first president, Sergio Osmena the first vice-president of the Commonwealth.92 In his first inaugural address, Quezon did not fail to thank the US for their fruitful rule in the Philippines during the past almost four decades:

The Filipinos look back with gratitude to the Day when destiny placed their land under the beneficent guidance of the people of the United States. [. . .] It is my hope that the ties of friendship and affection which bind the Philippines to America will remain unbroken and grow stronger after the severance of the political relations with her.93

Throughout the following years, Quezon kept loyal to the US. During his visit to Japan in 1937, together with the American ambassador to Tokyo, Joseph Clark Grew (1880–1965), Quezon attended a dinner hosted by Japanese Foreign Minister Arita Hachirō (1884–1965). Grew later remembered that Arita made advances to Quezon for the development of “closest cultural and economic relations” between the Philippines and Japan, but that Quezon emphasized that to the Philippines close relations with the US would always be the first priority.94

91 Zaide and Zaide, Documentary Sources of Philippine History, vol. 11, p. 320. 92 Agoncillo, Filipino Nationalism, pp. 31–33. 93 Quoted in Zaide and Zaide, Documentary Sources of Philippine History, vol. 11, pp. 411–12. 94 Agoncillo, The Fateful Years, vol. I, p. 56. The Filipino Perspective 219

Quezon’s attitude reflected the sentiments of the majority of the Philippine population. With the inauguration of the Commonwealth, the final stage in the development of the Philippines to an independent country had been reached and resistance against the Americans had vanished. Similar to his colleague Constantino, Angelito L. Santos harshly criticizes his fellow countrymen for having succumbed to the American propaganda:

The heroic persistence of the resistance movernent to the American Occupation well into the first two decades of the 1900s bears witness to the fruition of this systematic propaganda effort. Eventually, however, the process of renewal was stopped dead on its tracks by the “pacification” propaganda launched by the new American order’s “psy-war” experts at the turn of the century. Within the four decades that followed the Katipunan post-colonial culture was completely erased from the hearts and minds of “miseducated” or Americanized Filipinos.95

Like Constantino, Santos uses the term ‘miseducated’ to describe the Filipinos’ transformation by the American rule into a people deprived of their national identity. Nevertheless, he argues that the Japanese occupation, despite the hardships the Filipinos had to endure, triggered a new sense of nationalism among the Philippine population:

The policy of anti-American cuItural repression of the “cultural cleans- ing” which the Japanese Imperial Army administration pursued for three “long” years, allowed the survivals, the remnants, of the Kapitunan culture to grow new roots in an otherwise barren landscape. That the new cultural shoots drew sustenance from the cesspool of the occupation forces’ propaganda activities was inescapable. Nonetheless, the nationalist culture was reborn and, like a magical beanstalk, shot up to beclouded skies during this period.96

Santos and Constantino both shared their utmost negative assessment of not only the years under Japanese administration, but also of the American rule in the Philippines. However, it is rather questionable if the Japanese occupation had caused a revival of Philippine nationalism. The inauguration of the Commonwealth made the Philippines the first colony in Asia that would be

95 Santos, “Gleanings from a Cruel War,” pp. 5–63. 96 Ibid. 220 Chapter 5 guaranteed independence and the US was the first Great Power that voluntarily gave up one of its colonies.97 Simultaneously, Japan began its colonial expansion. When the so-called “Marco Polo Bridge Incident” turned Chinese- Japanese hostilities into a full-scale war in 1937, in America and the Philippines fears arose that Japan would also advance into the southeast. This even led the High Commissioner to the Philippines, Paul McNutt, to propose postpone- ment of Philippine independence. Quezon sharply rejected this proposal and the Roosevelt administration did not consider it seriously; however, it clearly showed the connection between American withdrawal from the Philippines and fears of a Japanese invasion consequently. Japan, on the other hand, considered the Philippine immigration law of 1940 as an explicitly anti-Japanese act, whereas the Commonwealth government saw it as a means to express the economic sovereignty of the Philippines.98 Claro M. Recto, as president of the Constitutional Convention, warned in a speech given at the Rotary Club on 23 September 1934 of loosening the economic ties with the US. He expressed his conviction that, on the contrary, it was necessary to enforce economic cooperation with the US, as otherwise other countries would get hold of the Philippines. Renato Constantino takes Recto’s speech as proof of his metamorphosis from a fighter for immediate Philippine independence to a politician who showed “open alliance with and praise for the colonial master.”99 Teodoro Agoncillo, however, interprets the same speech as Recto’s correct assessment of Japanese ambitions in the Philippines and the inauguration of the immigration law six years later as the National Assembly’s hindsight that Recto had been correct.100 Constantino regards Recto as a representative of the Filipino elite that willingly succumbed to American rule, thereby sacrificing its own national identity. Agoncillo, on the other hand, praises Recto’s ‘call for courage, patriotism, and statesmanship.’101 Agoncillo even dedicated the second volume of his study of the Japanese occupation to Recto, honouring him as a ‘patriot and nationalist.’102 Agoncillo and Constantino, along with Gregorio F. Zaide, are the arguably most prominent nationalist historiographers in the Philippines and they both condemn the Japanese rule in their home country. They differ, however, in their assessment of the preceding American administration of the Philippines. Agoncillo’s overall positive attitude towards the

97 Yu-José, Japan views the Philippines, p. 123. 98 Ibid., p. 125. 99 Constantino, The Making of a Filipino, p. 104. 100 Agoncillo, The fateful Years, vol. I, p. 49. 101 Ibid. 102 Agoncillo, The fateful Years, vol. II. The Filipino Perspective 221

American rule and his lenient judgment of the old elites that collaborated with the Japanese reflects public opinion in postwar Philippines. Constantino does not only criticize the collaborators during the Japanese occupation, but also the Filipinos in general for their blind faith in the US. However assessed, the administration policy during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson that eventually developed into the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines stood in sharp contrast to the policies of other Western colonial powers. The relationship between rulers and ruled that emerged from this policy differed remarkably from that in other colonies in the region, for example between the Indonesians and the Dutch. The Commonwealth symbolized the last stage on the Philippine road to independence and the Japanese invasion occurred at a time when the Filipino aspirations for freedom and independence were about to be fulfilled within less than five years.

Conclusion

The Philippine independence movement and the inauguration of the First Philippine Republic (Malolos Republic) in the final years of the 19th century had coincided with Japan’s rise as an industrialized state and Great Power. Therefore, Filipino revolutionaries like Mariano Ponce, José Ramos, Vicente Sotto and Artemio Ricarte looked to Japan as a natural ally in their struggle to end the Western colonisation of their country. However, apart from some moral support from various Japanese pan-Asianist groups, they did not receive much assistance, as the official outline of Japanese foreign policy at that time was to avoid any possible conflict with the US over the Philippine independence issue. The revolutionaries themselves were Filipino nationalists who, in the first place, had no concept of the Philippines being a part of a Greater Asia under Japanese leadership. Japan served as a role model for the emancipation of an Oriental country from the West, but none of the above-mentioned revolutionaries envisioned a New Order for Asia and the world as the Japanese Pan-Asianists did. In the 1930s, Benigno Ramos and Pio Duran appeared on the Philippine political stage. In contrast to the earlier revolutionaries, they clearly supported the idea of Japanese leadership in Asia and joined a Japanese pan-Asianist organization, the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai. This organization also launched a branch in the Philippines to propagate Pan-Asianism in that country and convince Filipinos that Japan did not intend to invade the islands after independence from the US. Since the ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianists of the Shōwa Kenkyūkai were highly critical about the idea of making the Philippines a part of Greater Asia, only 222 Chapter 5

‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists attempted to strike roots in the archipelago. However, Japanese representatives like Imamura Chūsuke and Filipino Asianists such as Duran and Ramos underestimated the extent of pro-Americanism among the Philippine population. Their ‘exoteric’ belief that the just motives of Japanese Pan-Asianism would automatically instigate a grassroots movement in the islands completely failed. Even though Duran (and to a much lesser extent Ramos) were integrated into the administration of the Second Philippine Republic and parts of the Philippine intelligentsia cooperated by publishing pro-Japanese articles in the propaganda magazine Pillars, a popular base for Philippine Asianism could never be established. The president of the new republic, José P. Laurel, sympathized with Japanese culture, but like the revolutionaries of the late 19th and early 20th century, he was first and foremost a Filipino nationalist. He did not believe in the longevity of the GEACPS (the same might be true for scholars like Gregorio F. Zaide) and intended to use the occupation period to strengthen his own position for the time after the war. Even though an ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist movement had existed in the Philippines since the mid-1930s, it never went beyond a rather small elite group of intellectuals who failed to gauge the sentiments of the great majority of the Philippine population correctly. The American administrative policy and the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines had created an environment in which the implementation of a pan-Asianist ideology propagating liberation from Western oppression was impossible. The policy of the 28th American President Woodrow Wilson, in particular, laid the groundwork for the outspoken positive stance of most Filipinos towards the US. Despite the fact that the Americans did not keep their promise to grant the Philippines independence immediately after the end of the Spanish-American War, which led to the Philippine Revolution and the Philippine-American War, the US was successful in not only settling the problem quickly, but also in turning the majority of the Filipinos into proponents of the American rule in the islands. During Woodrow Wilson’s two terms of presidency, Filipinos were allowed a great deal of participation in the government of their country and they were offered a concrete perspective for the complete independence of their country. The relationship between the ruling Americans and the ruled Filipinos was exceptional among the interrela- tions between colonial people and their overlords in Southeast Asia. Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusion

In the introduction to this book, I raised three major research questions in connection with Japanese Pan-Asianism and the Philippines. The first question was about the role that the Philippines played in Japanese Pan-Asianism before the war and the prospect of the archipelago becoming part of the GEACPS in the eyes of Japanese Pan-Asianists. To answer this question, I examined the history and development of Japanese Pan-Asianism. I showed how Pan-Asianism had never been a monolithic ideology but had been constantly subject to change within itself. It went from an idea based on solidarity between Japan, China and Korea to a concept in which Japan was to take the leadership in the liberation of the whole continent, along with the creation of a New World Order. By the mid-1930s, two main factions had developed within the pan- Asianist community: the ‘exoteric’ faction (traditionalists or culturalists) and the ‘esoteric’ faction (rationalists or realists). Their perception of Southeast Asia and their assessment of the chances for an integration of this region into the framework of Greater Asia differed remarkably. This was especially true for the Philippines, an archipelago that was culturally very specific in Southeast Asia. It was the only country in the region with a mainly Catholic population. Furthermore, the impact of Spanish and American colonial rule in the islands was extraordinary strong. There is arguably no other country that could provide a more adequate example to highlight the diverging views within the Japanese pan-Asianist community regarding the establishment of the GEACPS. While the ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist faction in Japan was convinced that Filipinos would appreciate the concept of the GEACPS automatically, as they were just misled Orientals waiting for liberation, the ‘esoteric’ faction emphasized the cultural differences between the archipelago and Japan. In fact, the ‘esoteric’ Shōwa Kenkyūkai opposed the integration of the South Seas region into the GEACPS because they believed that the conditions for such a step did not yet exist. Thus, by the time of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, there was no consensus among the Japanese pan-Asianist community on the question of Philippine membership in the GEACPS. The second research question dealt with the impact of Pan-Asianism on the Japanese Military Administration in the Philippines and the administration of the so-called Second Philippine Republic. First, I examined how both the Japanese army and navy planned the occupation of the Philippines and what role Pan-Asianism played in these early stages of planning.

The Japanese navy and army conducted research on how to administer the regions in the South Seas prior to the war. The Treatise on the GEACPS that a group of intellectuals worked out for the navy did not reflect the ‘exoteric’ pan- Asianist approach of a common cultural heritage and racial affinity between Japan and the Philippines. The treatise was rather shaped by the ‘esoteric’ canon. There was a strong emphasis on Japan’s superior role in the GEACPS and a limited degree of independence for countries like the Philippines. The army, on the other hand, was more amicable to the ‘exoteric’ approach during its planning of the occupation. Its first priority was to win over both the Philippine population and government. The Army General Staff even shared the hope of the Dai-Ajia Kyōkai that Philippine President Manuel Quezon could be convinced to change sides and cooperate with the Japanese in the integration of his country into the GEACPS. As in the first months of the occupation it became apparent that the ‘exoteric’ assumptions would not be fulfilled, the government in Tokyo sent a Research Commission headed by the influential Shōwa Kenkyūkai member Rōyama Masamichi, arguably the most prominent proponent of the ‘esoteric’ pan-Asianist faction in Japan, to the Philippines. The Japanese administrators enacted some of the suggestions of the Research Commission regarding reforms of the clergy and education but the Second Philippine Republic was too short-lived to show any change of attitude amongst Filipinos towards their self-perception as Orientals. In contrast with the occupied regions of the Sino-centric core of Asia, the Japanese did not try to assimilate the population, but simply to reawaken the Oriental spirit of the Filipinos and make them become aware again of their identity as Asians. The ways in which the Japanese administrators dealt with Philippine Catholicism provides a good example of this attempt to adapt Japanese Pan- Asianism to Philippine circumstances. By removing clergy and personnel from teaching positions in private schools and by continuing the secularization of the administrative body that had already begun under American rule, the Japanese intended to weaken the influence of the Catholic Church on Philippine society. This was a long-term goal as it was obvious to the Japanese administrators that they could not remove Catholicism overnight. This very pragmatic approach is typical of the ‘esoteric’ Pan-Asianism of Rōyama Masamichi and the Shōwa Kenkyūkai, and widely followed the recommendations of the Philippine Research Commission under Rōyama’s leadership. Tokyo sent the Research Commission to the Philippines while the occupation of the archipelago was in progress. Furthermore, most of the personnel in the propaganda corps possessed no deep knowledge of the Philippines and relied on the expertise of the few Filipinos who took part in the propaganda efforts. Summary And Conclusion 225

The army and the navy executed their concrete planning for the occupation of the Philippines only a few months prior to the invasion. The hasty preparation of the Japanese military is one possible explanation why the degree of Filipino pro-Americanism (and lack of Orientalism) was underestimated, particularly by the army. Even though it was the ‘exoteric’ stream in Japanese Pan-Asianism that since the mid-1930s had advocated the Philippines becoming part of Greater Asia, the overall conception for the administration of the Philippines and its integration into the GEACPS tended to follow ‘esoteric’ pan- Asianist ideas, especially after it had become obvious that the ‘exoteric’ pre- dictions would not be fulfilled. Only the propaganda efforts of the Japanese, mainly from the Department of Information, reflected the ‘exoteric’ approach. A small ruling elite (the Military Administration along with its Filipino collaborators) that believed in the ‘esoteric’ approach of Pan-Asianism used the ‘exoteric’ approach as a tool to manipulate the population. Osamu Kuno described the same situation in his analysis of the Meiji state in Japan and the example of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines suggests that J. Victor Koschmann was correct to apply Kuno’s terminology to Japanese Pan-Asianism. Furthermore, only a few months into Japanese rule in the islands the tide of the war began to turn against Japan. The occupation policy followed Japanese war needs instead of ideology (even though the exploitation of Philippine labour and resources was justified by the ideological purpose of waging the war for the goal of the establishment of the GEACPS). The soldiers in the field were hardly concerned with the ideological aspects of the Japanese occupation policy and often showed ignorance of Filipino traits and culture. This behaviour led to an increase in atrocities committed by Japanese military personnel against Filipino civilians and consequently, lowered the credibility of the Japanese and their concept of the GEACPS even further. The third question related to Philippine Asianism, its influence on Philippine society and its relationship with Japanese Pan-Asianism. Overall, there was never a popular base for any kind of Asianism in the Philippines. The long years of Western colonisation had left Filipinos with the self-image of an Occidental people, and those revolutionaries who opposed American rule in the archipelago had a strict ‘Philippines first’ mindset. Filipino intellectuals such as Pio Duran and Benigno Ramos, who joined the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai and proposed that the Philippines become part of a Greater Asia under Japanese leadership, completely underestimated their fellow citizens’ degree of Westernization and their unwillingness to reverse this process. Therein they resembled their Japanese ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist counterparts. The ‘exoteric’ pan-Asianist organizations like the Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai never developed 226 Chapter 6 into mass movements, and the KALIBAPI as an institution designed to propagate Orientalism as a unifying feature among all Filipinos failed to turn the people of the Philippines into devoted citizens of the GEACPS. In the postwar literature on the Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia and the occupation of the Philippines, one can distinguish four main approaches. The “façade theory”, propagated by the majority of Western, Filipino and Japanese historians who worked on the Pacific War, says that Pan-Asianism simply functioned as a disguise for Japanese imperialism. A second theory claims that the Japanese army was never willing to implement Pan-Asianism in Southeast Asia since it never had any ambitions in this region. Advocates of the “liberation theory” state that Japan indeed instigated the postwar independence movements in Southeast Asia and blame the incapable Japanese militarists in the occupation regimes for the failed implementation of Pan-Asianism in the Nan’yō. Finally, proponents of the “postwar perspective theory” are convinced that Tokyo granted independence to countries like Burma and the Philippines only to prepare its own case for the time after defeat (which seemed inevitable to them from 1943 onwards). The prewar conceptualization of the army’s occupation policy as well as the official outline of the Japanese Military Administration followed pan-Asianist ideas. Throughout the occupation period, administrators attempted to adapt the ideology to Philippine circumstances. Furthermore, the Japanese treated even allied nationals such as Spaniards and Germans in the Philippines as ‘Westerners;’ they blamed especially the Spaniards for the decay of Oriental values in the archipelago. In this sense, Pan-Asianism was more than a mere façade to hide Japanese imperialist ambitions in the islands. The Japanese militarists were not solely to blame for the failure of this concept in the Philippines. The tide of the war increasingly turned against Japan and ideological aspects became subsidiary to the war needs of the army. Towards the end of the occupation, Pan-Asianism had become an issue of minor importance to the field commanders and common soldiers who interacted on a daily basis with the Philippine population. It is also questionable as to whether or not Tokyo granted independence to the Philippines to prepare its own case for the time after defeat, as both the Japanese army and navy had already envisioned an independent Philippines in their respective prewar plans for the archipelago. The inauguration of the Second Philippine Republic was no ad hoc decision by the government in Tokyo, but had been part of the official outline of Japanese foreign policy since at least 1941. Summary And Conclusion 227

Finally, regarding the claim that Japan largely contributed to liberation movements in Southeast Asia, this does not ring true for the Philippines. Prewar independence movements in the Philippines did indeed seek support from Japan, and some of the Filipino collaborators during the occupation were even ‘exoteric’ Pan-Asianists. However, the majority of the Philippine population was not opposed to American rule by the time of the Japanese invasion, and the archipelago was on the eve of independence. The claim of Filipino nationalist historiographers like Angelito L. Santos that the Japanese occupation gave birth to a reawakening of Philippine nationalism does not seem reasonable. Whilst during the Commonwealth era Filipino leaders aimed at implementing a policy that fostered Filipino national identity, the Japanese invasion evoked a different kind of nationalism. According to Teodoro Agoncillo, this nationalism’s ‘purpose was to make the return of the Americans possible.’1 Therefore, the Japanese occupation period did not trigger any additional independence movements, nor did it change the relationship between the Filipinos and the Americans. The US granted the Philippines independence on 4 July 1946, just as the Americans had promised to do prior to the war. The American administration in the Philippines, especially the forward looking policy under the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, singled out the Philippines from all other countries in Southeast Asia. Rōyama Masamichi’s prewar assumption that the preconditions for the integration of Southeast Asia into the GEACPS did not yet exist held true for the Philippines. For the Japanese Imperial Army marching under the banner of Pan-Asianism, going to the Philippines was never like coming home.

1 Agoncillo, Filipino Nationalism, p. 34.

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Agoncillo, Teodoro 4, 7, 8, 102, 103, 122, 126, Commonwealth of the Philippines 51, 52, 163, 207, 208, 210, 220, 227 55, 56, 72, 78, 91, 95, 96, 101, 104–106, 108, Aguinaldo, Emilio 30, 56, 122, 123 134, 139, 142, 143, 159, 182–184, 187, 193, Ajia kaiki (Return to Asia) 24, 78 199, 202, 207, 209, 212, 216–222, 227 Ajia Kyōkai (Asia Association) 24 Confesor, Tomas 123, 211 Aquino, Benigno S. 132–134, 136, 138, 142, Constantino, Renato 2, 3, 4, 9, 96, 126, 155, 202, 203 195, 207, 213, 219, 220, 221 Araki Sadao 47 Control Faction (tōseiha) 45, 47, 63 Arita Hachirō 218 Croatia 147 Asia: as concept 17 ‘Asia for the Asians’ 4, 5, 33, 37, 119, 156, 172, Dai Ajia Kyōkai (Greater Asia Society) 12, 13, 181 38, 40, 44, 45, 46, 47, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61, 63, ‘Asia is one’ 24, 25, 106 72, 77–79, 86, 101, 108, 137, 138, 143, 159, Asian Monroe Doctrine 15, 106, 195–198 181, 184, 187, 189–191, 193, 195, 197, 200, Asuka era/period 62 207, 221, 224 Australia 34 Dai-Nihon Kō-A Dōmei (Greater Japan Avanceña, Ramón 142 Alliance to Raise Asia) 48 Dai-Nihon Kō-A-kai (Greater Japan Bakufu 19 Association for Raising Asia) 48 Balkan 68 Dai-Nippon Kaikyō Kyōkai (Greater Japan Ba Maw 145 Islam Association) 159 Blumentritt, Ferdinand 186 Date Masamune 19, 20 Bonifacio, Andrés 102 Datsu-A (Leaving Asia) 24, 78 Britain/England 10, 21, 31, 34, 38, 48, 68, 70, Davao 1, 53, 158, 162 71, 73, 74, 80, 99, 110, 112 Dōbun dōshu (one script, one culture/race) Bulgaria 147 24, 33, 39, 42, 44, 62, 75, 76, 85, 161, Burma 4, 5, 10, 48, 63, 68, 71, 75, 112, 114, 117, 162, 183 145, 147 Duran, Pio 7, 15, 48, 72, 106, 132, 134, 136, Burton Harrison, Francis 103 184, 188, 191, 194–201, 204, 205, 209, 221, Bushidō 58, 59, 61 222, 225 Dutch East Indies 67, 68, 69, 71, 79 Cambodia 48 Catholic Church/Christianity: influence in Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere (ECPS, Tōhō the Philippines and in connection with the Kyōeiken) 67, 68, 70 Japanese administration 2, 43, 44, Emperor Meiji 40 98–100, 102, 155–161, 183, 204, 223, 224 Central Asia 32, 35, 36 “Façade theory” 7, 9, 11, 226 Chiang Kai-shek 161, 162, 183 Filipino nationalism 3, 8, 15, 102, 103, China 13, 17, 23n, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31–33, 35, 154, 157, 158, 182, 209, 214, 216, 217, 219, 37–39, 41, 42, 44, 47, 53n, 54, 57, 62, 65, 221, 227 67, 70, 71, 75, 76, 83, 117, 145, 147, 166, 171, First Philippine Republic (‘Malolos 183, 187, 194, 195, 206, 223 Republic’) 26, 30, 56, 122, 144, 156, 185, China Incident 48, 64, 66 186, 188, 206, 221 ‘Comfort women’ 175 First Sino-Japanese War 28, 33, 158, 184 Index 243

Forced labour 128, 129, 131, 145, 162 Haushofer, Karl 70 Ford, Henry J. 214 Hawai’i 21, 34, 98, 130, 195 Frankfurter, Felix 214 Hayashi Kiroku 51–54 (French-) Indochina 35, 48, 62, 74, 79, 165 Hayashi Naoki 56–61, 86 Fuji Shigeta 80 Hayashi Yoshihide 150, 151 Fujioka Akiyoshi 170–173 Hirippin Dai-Ajia Kyōkai (Philippine Greater Fukui Masao 127–129 Asia Society) 184, 188, 191–194, 197, 198, Fukumoto Nichinan 18 208, 225 Fuwa Suketoshi 116, 117 Hirippin Kyōkai (Philippine Society) 158 Hitler, Adolf 58 Ganap-Party 15, 56, 58, 190, 200 Homma Masaharu 91, 92, 95, 112–114, Garisson, Lindley M. 214 118–122, 126, 136, 158, 181, 208 Germany 21, 30, 31, 33, 34, 68, 69, 69n, 70, 73, Hong Kong 112, 186 82, 110, 120, 174, 175, 187 Hu Hanmin 47 Gotō Shimpei 15, 37, 39, 187 Hukbahalap 8 Greater Asianism 7, 12, 32, 33, 35, 36–38, 42, Hungary 147 48, 50, 51, 57, 59, 60, 191, 197 Greater (East) Asia 5, 13, 22n, 25, 32, 33, 34, Imamura Chūsuke 49, 50, 54, 191, 192, 222 37, 38, 40–42, 46, 47, 48, 52, 54, 58–61, 63, Imperial Council (Gozen Kaigi) 80 74, 77, 80, 83, 115, 116, 123, 138, 185, 221, Imperial Way (ōdō) 81, 82, 84 223, 225 Imperial Way Faction (kōdōha) 45, 47 Greater East Asia Conference (Dai-Ajia Inazō Nitobe 59 Kaigi) 145, 146 India 24, 35, 67, 68, 71, 145, 187, 194, 195, Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Economic 206 Sphere (Daitōa Kyōei Keizaiken) 69 Indonesia 4, 48, 117, 221 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Inoue Kaoru 22 (GEACPS, Daitōa Kyōeiken) 1, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, Inoue Tetsujirō 48 12, 14, 16, 31, 40, 41, 44, 45, 53, 61, 63, 64, International Military Tribunal for the Far 66–85, 88–90, 95, 97, 98, 101, 103–113, 116, East (Tokyo War Crimes Trials) 80, 136 118–121, 123, 126, 128, 131–138, 140–142, Inuzuka Koreshige 200, 201 144–146, 149, 151, 154, 155, 158–160, 165, Islam: influence in the Philippines and 169–171, 173, 174, 181–183, 187, 200–205, in connection with the Japanese 209, 222–227 administration 158–159, 172 Greater (East) Asian War 47, 48, 83, 88, 110, Italy 110, 120, 147, 187 124, 128, 132, 146, 147, 156, 175, 181, 205 Itō Chōji 158, 159 Greater Japan 25, 35, 46, 48, 82 Itō Hirobumi 40 Greater Japonism 35, 36, 37, 38 Iwatake Teruhiko 127, 128 Grew, Joseph Clark 218 Iwao Kume 202

Hakkō ichiu (the whole world under one Japanese-American relations 1, 5, 43, 44, 49, roof) 31, 65, 75, 76, 103, 118, 120, 133, 173 51, 52, 139, 185, 190 Hamano Kenzaburō 167, 168, 172 Japanese army 6, 8, 10, 23, 41, 45, 47, 79, 80, Han Ajia Gakkai (Pan-Asia Study 85–91, 94, 108, 115, 125, 127, 128, 130, 131, Society) 46 136, 138, 144, 147, 155, 162–168, 171, Harada Nobutane 19 174–176, 178, 181, 183, 191, 211, 212, 219, 223, Hare-Hawes Cutting Act/Bill 49, 51, 217 224–227 Harrison, Francis Burton 214, 215 Japanese emperor (Tennō) 9, 10, 43, 62, 114, Hattori Tōru 20, 36 145, 175 244 Index

Japanese imperialism 7, 9, 10, 13, 53, 54, 122, Japan’s southward expansion 1, 7, 9, 11, 13, 126, 171, 173 16, 21, 23, 32, 42, 44, 162, 220 and Pan-Asianism 17, 25, 79, 226 Jizon jiei (Self-existence and Self-defense) perception of the Philippines 1, 6, 16–23, 77 80 Japanese leadership in Asia 5, 25, 30, 32, 33, Jones Act/Law 187, 213–217 35–37, 41, 42, 47, 50, 52, 54, 59–62, 66, 74, Jones, William Atkinson 215 75, 76, 81, 83, 110, 111, 114, 120, 122, 123, 145, Jornacio, Pabling 179 146, 185, 188, 192, 194, 196, 198, 221, 223–225 Kageyama Tomoji 161, 162, 199–201, 205 Japanese Military Administration in the Kalaw, Maximo M. 106 Philippines 6, 12, 64, 79, 91–98, 114, 127, KALIBAPI (Kapisanan sa Paglilingko sa 129, 130, 132, 144, 150, 152, 153, 156–159, 181, Bagong Pilipinas) 104, 105, 132–138, 142, 182, 187, 200, 202, 203, 208, 223, 225, 226 144, 182, 190, 198, 201, 202, 226; Executive Commission 91, 94, 112, 114, 123, Junior KALIBAPI 135, 153 129, 130, 132, 135, 141, 152, 156, 190, 198 Kamiizumi Tokuya 35–39, 48, 82 Japanese Ministry of Education 39 Kangaku 25 Japanese nationalism Katipunan (Association) Movement 102 and Pan-Asianism 13, 16–41 Katsuya Tomishige 115 and southward expansion 18, 32 Kawashima Motojirō 38 perception of the Philippines in 16–23 Kempeitai (Japanese Military Police) 116, Japanese navy 13, 20, 23, 78–80, 85, 107, 108, 174–181, 183 130, 144, 164, 181, 200, 223–226 Kimura Atsushi 192, 193 Japanese occupation policy in the Kinbara Setsumi 165 Philippines 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 78, 79, 86–183 Kō-A-Kai (Society for Raising Asia) 24 Philippine collaboration 7, 8, 207–209, Kō-A Sōhonbu (Headquarters for Raising Asia) 211, 221, 225, 227 48 Japanese Pan-Asianism Kodera Kenkichi 29, 32, 33, 34, 42, 77 and nationalism 13, 16–41 Kogaku 25 and imperialism 17, 16–41 Kokugaku 25 development 12, 13, 17, 33; ‘esoteric’ 13, Kokumin Dōmeikai (National Alliance 39–77, 79, 81, 97, 101, 108, 109, 119, 122–124, Association) 24 133, 134, 138, 140, 141, 154, 159, 161, 177, 181, Kokuryūkai (Armur Society) 24, 25, 30, 32, 182, 194, 221, 223–225 34, 35, 189 ‘exoteric’ 13, 39–77, 79, 81, 82, 84–86, 88, Kokutai (national polity) 35, 39, 43, 81, 83 95, 101, 104, 107, 108, 114, 123, 125, 137, Konoe Atsumaro 185 138, 140, 141, 146, 161, 173, 181–183, Konoe Fumimaro 7, 9, 45, 46, 63, 64, 78, 186–189, 191–195, 197–200, 205, 207, 84, 110 222–225, 227 Korea 13, 23n, 24, 31, 32, 35, 38, 41, 42, 67, implementation in the Philippines 75, 114 4, 6, 11, 39, 78, 79, 104, 107, 108, 138, 222, Kōsaka Masaaki 82 223, 226 Kōyama Iwao 73, 80, 82–85 in connection with the liberation/ Kuga Katsunan 19 unification of Asia 5, 77 Kuroda Shigenori 136, 137, 158 perception of the Philippines 12, 13, 16, Kyōzon kyōei (co-existence, co-prosperity) 24–77, 223 53, 59, 74, 81, 82, 106, 181 Japanese propaganda 5, 7, 114–124, 141, 147, 155, 171, 179, 183, 210, 219, 222, 224, Labrador, Juan 94, 109, 129, 143, 144, 152, 155, 225 156, 163, 164 Index 245

Laos 48 Mochizuki Shigenobu 201, 202 Laurel, José P. 106, 130, 142–147, 153, 184, 191, Mongolia 31, 32, 35, 49 198, 203, 207–209, 222 Moros 172 League of Nations 44, 49, 53n, 65, 67, 73, Murata Shōzō 159, 203 198 Mussolini, Benito 58 Liberation of Asia from Western oppression 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 30, 32, 37, 40–42, 47, Nacionalista Party (National Party) 56, 103, 48, 52, 53, 60, 75, 85, 112, 139, 140, 146, 163, 188, 201, 214, 215 166, 170, 181, 194, 195, 203, 227 Nagahama Akira 175–181 “Liberation theory” 9, 11, 226 Nakamura Yaroku 28, 29, 185 Lindholm, Paul 110 Nakasone Yasuhiro 73 Liu Bei 177 Nanjing Massacre 47 Nan’yō (South Seas) 16, 18, 18n, 20, 21, MacArthur, Douglas 91, 206 23, 33, 35, 38, 41, 42, 44, 45, 48, 62, 63, Maeda Masami 95 71, 72, 75, 76, 162, 188, 199, 223, 224, Maeda Takejirō 166 226 MAKAPILI 15, 191, 198 Nanyō Kyōkai (South Seas Society) 23, 53 Malaya 67, 71, 112, 114, 117, 162, 195, 205 Narusawa Tomoji 157 Malaysia 68 Navy Ministry Research Commission Manchukuo 44, 67, 68, 70, 71, 75, 76, 145, 147, (Kaigunshō no Kenkyūkai) 73, 76, 80, 174, 192, 194, 82–85, 107, 111 Manchuria 31, 32, 34n, 35, 41, 49, 50, Navy National Policy Research 52, 62 Committee 13, 14 Manchurian Incident 16, 44 Netherlands 2, 38, 80, 221 Manlapit, Pablo 130, 131 New Order (shin chitsujo) 5, 8, 31, 32, 75, 78, Marco Polo Bridge Incident 220 80, 84, 106, 111, 137, 161, 199, 208, 209, 221, Masaki Kichiemon 52–54 223 Matsumoto Kunpei 189 ‘New Philippines’ 8, 14, 118, 120, 121, 136, 138, Matsushita Masatoshi 73, 80–85, 107 139, 148, 149, 154, 173, 177, 181, 182 Matsui Iwane 46–48, 192, 193 Ni-Ni-Roku Jiken (February 26 Incident) 64 Matsukara Shigemasa 20 Nishimura Shinji 61, 62, 69, 72, 74, 77, 81, 86, Matsunami Niichirō 42, 43, 44 125, 137, 141, 186, 195 Matsuoka Yōsuke 1, 76, 78, 79 Nishitani Keiji 82 McIntyre, Frank 215 Noguchi Hōichiro 113 McKinley, William 213 Nonami Shizuo 49, 52, 54 McNutt, Paul 220 Northward Doctrine (Hokushin-ron) 23, 32 Meiji administration 19, 21, 22, 24, 41, 67 Nunobiki-Maru 26, 28, 185 Meiji era/period 5, 13, 16, 20, 21, 30, 34, 37, 39–41, 65, 79, 108, 173, 188 O’Doherty, Michael J. 157 Meiji Restoration 17, 18, 25, 41, 55 Ogawa Gōtaro 98 Micronesia 44 Okakura Kakuzō/Okakura Tenshin 24, 65, Miki Kiyoshi 117–119, 122, 133 106 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 16 Okamoto Jingo 159 Mitsui 129, 211 Oriental identity 67, 108, 140, 154, 204 Mitsukawa Kametarō 38, 39, 45, 46 Osamu Kuno 39, 40, 77, 108, 173, 182, Miyazaki Tōten 25–30, 185 225 Mochizuki Otogorō 191, 193 Oshima Masanori 97, 148, 149, 152, 154 246 Index

Osmena, Sergio 162, 187, 208, 214, 215, 217, Ramos, José 184–188, 209, 221 218 Rash Behari Bose 187 Osias, Camilo 134–137, 203, 204 Recto, Claro M. 130, 139, 141, 150, 164, 165, 220 Ozaki Hotsumi 63 ‘Re-Orientalisation’ 14, 32, 59, 100, 135, 148, 156, 198, 201, 204 Pacific Ocean 20, 33, 34, 197 Ricarte, Artemio 15, 87, 90, 91, 122, 187, 188, Pacific War 6, 13, 17, 25, 61, 62, 75, 78–80, 86, 189, 201, 214, 221 109, 120, 175, 198, 199, 226 Rizal, José 104, 132–134, 136, 152, 186, 204 Paris Peace Conference 51 Romulo, Carlos P. 3, 4, 195, 197, 205, 207, 212 Paul Yoshigorō Taguchi 117, 155, 156 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano 217, 218, 220 Pearl Harbor 1, 82, 115 Rōyama Masamichi 6, 13, 40, 63–73, 75, 76, Philippine-American relations 78, 81, 84, 97, 100–109, 113, 118–122, 133, impact of American administration in the 134, 138, 147–149, 154, 156, 157, 159, Philippines 2, 3, 4, 51, 55, 59, 61, 89, 176–178, 181, 182, 209, 224, 227 99–103, 112, 113, 121, 126, 127, 136, 165, 180, Roxas, Manuel 87, 90, 91, 187, 198, 208, 217 186, 189, 194, 197, 206, 212–223 Russia 31, 34, 35, 52 impact on Pan-Asianism in the Russo-Japanese War 35, 47, 52, 184, 197, Philippines 6, 9, 12, 15, 193 198 strategic importance of the Philippines for the US 21, 22, 33, 34, 43, 86 Saigō Takamori 67 Philippine-American War 222 Saito Jirō 201 Philippine Asianism 7, 12, 14, 15, 72, 184, Saitō Kenryō 80 199–211, 222, 225 Sakdal movement/party 56–58, 101, 122, Philippine guerrillas 7, 122, 123, 162, 164, 165, 188–190, 199 173, 174, 177–179, 181, 183, 201, 211, 212 Satō Taisuke 193 Philippine independence 1, 4, 5, 8, 12, 14, 15, Second Philippine Republic 6, 12, 14, 79, 130, 28, 29, 42–44, 48–52, 56, 57, 59, 61, 78, 79, 131, 139, 141, 143–145, 147, 152, 154, 157, 159, 86, 87, 90, 97, 100, 103–106, 112, 121–124, 164, 174, 181, 182, 198, 200, 202, 205, 207, 136, 139–142, 144, 145, 147–150, 159, 171, 209, 222–224, 226 184–191, 193–196, 198–201, 205, 206, 209, Second Sino-Japanese War 13, 34, 47, 64, 162, 213–222, 224, 226, 227 166 independence movements 9, 11, 22, 26, Shanghai Incident 53, 53n 30, 32, 50, 52–55, 72, 100, 184, 185, 192, 227 Shiga Shigetaka 20 Philippine Research Commission 7, 64, Shiobara Yū 129 97–109, 113, 119, 121, 147, 149, 152–154, 156, Shishi (patriot) 26 158–161, 176, 178, 183, 224 Shokumin Kyōkai (Colonial Society) 23 Philippine Revolution 102, 161, 222 Shōwa era 22, 33, 41, 50 Pius XII 157 Shōwa Kenkyūkai (Shōwa Research Ponce, Mariano 26–28, 185–187, 209, 221 Association) 7, 40, 44, 45, 63, 73, 75, 76, “Postwar perspective theory” 226 78, 117–119, 138, 154, 155, 181, 182, 221, 223, 224 Qi zong Qi qin 177 Shōwa Restoration 45, 63, 64 Quezon, Manuel 8, 56–61, 78, 79, 86, 90, 91, Siam 28, 29, 50, 54, 75, 195, 95, 101, 104, 106, 108, 139, 143, 187–189, 202, Siberia 36, 37, 54, 62 209, 214–220, 224 Singapore 68, 114 Slovakia 147 Ramos, Benigno 7, 15, 48, 56–59, 101, 132, 134, Sotto, Vicente 186–188, 191, 209, 221 136, 184, 188–191, 198–200, 204, 205, 209, Southeast Asia 1, 2, 5, 6–9, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 221, 222, 225 18n, 21, 22, 23, 32, 33, 35, 38, 42, 44–49, 54, Index 247

62, 69, 75, 76, 81, 97, 102, 104, 105, 109, 117, Tōkyō Keizaigaku Kyōokai (Tokyo Society for 126, 127, 161, 162, 184, 222, 223, 226, 227 Economic Science) 23 Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere (SCPS, Nanpō Tsumura Hideo 117 Kyōeiken) 67, 68, 70 Tydings-McDuffie Act/Bill 51, 187, 217 South Manchuria Railway 37 ‘Southward Doctrine’ (Nanshin-ron) 16, 17, Uchida Ryōhei 28, 30–34, 36, 42 18, 23, 37, 41, 77, 108 Uchiyama Kiyoshi 192, 193 Soviet Union 47, 69, 71 USAFFE (US Army Forces Far East) 15, 115, Spanish-American War 222 116, 203 Spanish Empire 19, 147 Utsunomiya Naokata 96 Spanish influence in the Philippines 51, 59, 97–100–103, 121, 155, 156, 160, 161, 165, 183, Vargas, Jorge B. 91, 94, 95, 114, 129, 132, 135, 197, 204, 206, 223, 226 136, 141, 156, 204 Subhas Chandra Bose 145 Vatican 155 Suganuma Teifu 18 Versailles Peace Treaty 43 Sugimori Kōjirō 54–56, 66 Vietnam 48 Sun Yat-sen 26, 28, 47, 65, 195 Von Ranke, Leopold 82 Supreme Command of the Japanese Imperial Army 5 Wachi Takaji 123, 124, 139, 164 Suzuki Shigetaka 82 Wagemann, Ernst 68 Wainwright, Jonathan M. 122 Tagawa Miritarō 18 Wang Jingwei 145, 147 Tairiku rōnin (Rōnin in the continent) Wang Yang-ming school 25 26, 30 Wan Waithayakon 145 Taishō era 16, 22, 32, 35, 37, 41, 42, 79, 82 Western/American encroachment of East Taishō Democracy 34, 37, 41, 42, 171 Asia 17, 24, 31, 32, 41, 140, 141 Taiwan 31, 37, 43, 114 Wilson, Woodrow 12, 213–216, 221, 222, 227 Taiwan Greater East Asia Society 193 World War I 43, 44, 195 Takagi Sōkichi 73, 84 World War II 6, 64, 77, 82 Takeuchi Tatsuji 97–101, 107, 113, 160, 161 Takeuchi Yoshimi 77, 174 Yabe Teiji 63, 72–77, 80, 81, 83–85, 107, 111, Tanaka Shizuichi 136 112, 117, 119, 182, 194 Tanaka Suiichirō 21, 36 Yamashita Tomoyuki 136, 188 Thailand 28, 54, 59, 67, 68, 71, 74, 145, 147, 195 Yano Masami 166–170, 172, 173 Timor 74 Yano Tōru 16 Tōa Dōbunkai (East Asia Common Culture Yatabe Umekichi 18 Association) 24, 30, 51 ‘Yellow race’ 10, 33, 35 Tōgō Heihachirō 199 Yoin 15 Tōgō Shigenori 78, 79 Yoshida Tan’ichirō 190 Tōhō Kyōokai (Eastern Society) 21 Tōjō Hideki 80, 97, 110–112, 114, 123, 124, 128, Zaibatsu 45 139–141, 145, 146 Zaide, Gregorio F. 145, 206, 207, 210, 217, 220, Tokugawa era 38, 50 222 Tōkyō Chigaku Kyōkai (Tokyo Geographic Zhang Jinghui 145 Soceity) 23 Zhuge Liang 177