Volume 11 | Issue 15 | Number 1 | Article ID 3926 | Apr 14, 2013 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus When Democracy is Not Enough: Japan’s information policy and mass politics in diplomatic and economic crisis in the 1930s 民主主義は万能ではない—1930年代の外交、経済危機における 日本の情報政策と大衆政治が示すもの Tomoko Akami general, and the institutionalization of Japanese news propaganda in particular. The history of propaganda has long been In February 1932, the second general election closely intertwined with the development of in Japan after the universal male franchise bill mass communication. In the twentieth century, had passed the Diet gave Seiyūkai, one of the the world experienced two World Wars, the two major parties of the time, a landslide Cold War, its ending (or the beginning of a victory. Japan was facing diplomatic and second Cold War), and numerous territorially- domestic crises, and Seiyūkai promised a confined wars interspersed with peace (or non- greatly expanded electorate economic recovery war periods). Many scholarly works associate and an aggressive China policy. Five months propaganda with war (including the Cold War), earlier, in September 1931, Japan’s Guandong and distinguish public diplomacy from war Army had begun a military incursion in propaganda. Northeast China, and by December it had occupied a large part of the region then known Do the structures and institutions utilized by as Manchuria. The Minseitō Wakatsuki Cabinet the state to disseminate information (including (April–December 1931) fell in December, and news) for foreign policy fundamentally change the new Seiyūkai Prime Minister, Inukai in time of war? A substantial literature holds Tsuyoshi, took over and called for a general that a state’s information policy largely defines election in order to gain a popular mandate for the nature of its political regime. Did liberal his new government. democratic regimes, such as the U.S., Britain, France or Australia, have fundamentallyThere were censorship, coercion and bribery in different information policies from those of the election process, as in many contemporary autocratic or authoritarian regimes? parliamentary democracies of the time. The problem, however, was not limited to these In approaching these issues with respect to anti-democratic actions. Rather, political actors Japan and Manzhouguo, I focus on three global and media organizations were responding to a factors: the development of mass politics in an new political environment created by universal era of universal male suffrage, rapidlymale suffrage and new telecommunication changing mass-communication technologies technologies that fed war fever. For some (especially global cable networks, themonths before that February (even before development of wireless communication, September 1931, but especially subsequently) electronic photo delivery, and news reels), and opportunistic politicians, military officers, and the rise of international public opinion as an media organizations were utilizing not only important factor in international politics in print media, but also the new media of radio 1 11 | 15 | 1 APJ | JF and newsreels to stoke mass nationalism. A was continuing development of state policy and significant majority of voters bought into this institutions for news propaganda in response to jingoism and the package Seiyūkai offered: an two ongoing phenomena: growing mass aggressive China policy sold as a key to political participation as indicated by universal economic recovery. manhood suffrage, and technological changes in mass media and communication. Orthodox Japanese historical accounts tell us that the May Fifteenth Incident of 1932, in The Japanese metropolitan government did, which Prime Minister Inukai was assassinated however, begin a coordinated and systematic by a terrorist attack, marked the beginning of approach to news propaganda during the the end of parliamentary democracy in pre-war Manchurian Crisis, one primarily driven by Japan. The election of February 1932 was, foreign policy concerns, rather than concerns however, equally important because thewith domestic thought control. At the same electorate gave a mandate to the thentime, in the period that is often regarded as the government for the aggression in China. It was beginning of Japan’s diplomatic isolationism, the action that set a course for subsequent full MOFA and other foreign policy elites actively scale war with China in 1937 and then with the sought to engage international public opinion United States, the other Allied forces and their through management of the news for overseas colonies in the region. propaganda. They further emphasized coordination between metropolitan centre, Throughout modern history in Japan (and many Tokyo, and a parallel news institution in other countries), expanded political Japanese-occupied Manchuria in 1931–3. The participation has been no guarantee of the process of unifying news coverage, however, primacy of peaceful alternatives to colonialism met strong oppositions from various stake and war. Party politicians, not only military holders in 1931–5. officers, have frequently led jingoism. Media was also not only the victim of state repression, Key Words: propaganda, international news for it too contributed substantially to war network, international public opinion, mass mongering. Jingoism, after all, sells newspapers politics, media and war, public diplomacy, and magazines and creates broadcast Japanese foreign policy, the Manchurian audiences. Most importantly, many voters Incident supported expansionist policies. Are similar patterns emerging in contemporary Japan, Orthodox international history sees the 1930s indeed, in both China and Japan, at a time of as the period of a ‘dark valley’. The Great mounting territorial conflict? Depression that started with the Wall Street stock market crash of 24 October 1929 spread In February 1932, during a time of economic globally in the early 1930s. While the U.S.S.R., crisis, mass politics undermined moderate almost unaffected by this economic turmoil, foreign policy options. Democracy did not continued its economic expansion, fascism prevent Japan from taking the path to colonial emerged and gained strength especially in expansion and war. Eight decades later, we can Germany and Italy. National unity governments reflect anew on lessons from the 1930s. were formed in Britain and Japan, and even the Abstract: United States opted for greater state economic intervention. Competing for contracting Japan’s information policy did not change markets, empires moved to form bloc suddenly during the Manchurian Crisis in economies. The period was to lead to the September 1931–March 1933. Rather there Second World War, which killed tens of millions 2 11 | 15 | 1 APJ | JF throughout the world. then expanded to Inner Mongolia (Rehe province) in early March 1933. The Guandong In Northeast Asia, the 1930s began with a war Army created Japan’s puppet regime, and ended with a war. What contemporary Manzhouguo (1 March 1932), and then, Japanese called the ‘Manchurian Incident’ unhappy with the League of Nations’ solution (Manshū jihen) started with a railway explosion to the Manchurian Incident, Japan withdrew near Mukden in Manchuria on 18 September from the League on 27 March 1933. 1931. It was planned by the Japanese garrison, the Guandong Army, which was stationed in The Manchurian ‘Incident’ is often understood Manchuria to protect the Japanese leased as a watershed for Japan; domestically, it territories along the South Manchuria Railway marked a shift from the liberal parliamentary and in the southern part of the Liaodong democracy of the 1920s to an authoritarian peninsula. Claiming the explosion was Chinese regime dominated by the military. Externally, provocation, and using this as an excuse to expand its military control to the whole of Japan’s foreign policy changed from Manchuria, the garrison executed a well- internationalist, cooperative diplomacy to planned campaign. isolationism driven by rising nationalism. This led Japan to a second war with China (1937–45) and then to war with the Allied Powers and their colonies in Asia and the Pacific region (1941–5).1 Many works on the state and media in Japan during the Manchurian Incident understandably focused, and continue to focus, on the state’s repression of the media and its thought control. In this view, media organizations were victims of the state’s coercion, which dragged a blinded population into the war.2 These works, however, often neglected the foreign policy aspects of the state’s information Japanese forces enter Mukden during the policy, and thus told only part of the story. This Manchurian Incident chapter examines the state’s information policy during the Manchurian Crisis, which I define as The forces of the warlord of Manchuria, Zhang a diplomatic crisis between September 1931 Xueliang (Chang Hsueh-liang), presented little and March 1933, not as an abrupt change of resistance, although the fighting with other course. It locates the crisis in the continuing Chinese resistance forces was often bitter, development of the Japanese state’s policy and producing many killed and wounded on both institutions for news propaganda as its sides. The fighting in Shanghai (lateresponse to two ongoing phenomena: growing January–early May 1932) was also fierce. The mass political participation, and technological campaign in Manchuria resulted in Japan’s changes in mass media and communication. military occupation of Manchuria (the eastern three provinces)