Mobilizing Nuclear Bias: the Fukushima Nuclear Crisis and the Politics of Uncertainty 核に纏わる疑念を動員福島原発危機と不確実性の政治学

Mobilizing Nuclear Bias: The Fukushima Nuclear Crisis and the Politics of Uncertainty 核に纏わる疑念を動員福島原発危機と不確実性の政治学

Kyle Cleveland

See the updated and revised version where the U.S. provided technical consultation of this article here. for the nuclear response while striving to maintain a delicate diplomatic balance as they attempted to impose a qualitatively different crisis management response. Because this Abstract crisis had significant implications for Japan's international relations, diplomatic The nuclear disaster in Fukushima which considerations have helped to suppress the followed in the wake of the 3/11 Tohoku complex, often fractious relations between earthquake and tsunami has given rise to one Japan and foreign governments - especially the of the most significant public health crises in United States - whose collective efforts modern world history, with profoundeventually turned the tide from managing the implications for how nuclear energy isnuclear meltdowns to ameliorating their long- perceived. This paper analyzes the most dire term consequences. Based on interviews with phase of the Fukushima nuclear crisis, showing political officials in both the Japanese how the level of risk was assessed by nuclear government and foreign embassies in Japan, experts and state-level actors who worked and nuclear experts and military officers who largely out of view of public scrutiny. In worked the crisis, the paper analyzes how addition to examining how the accidenttechnical assessments drove decision making progression in the reactors was addressed and and were translated into political policy. conveyed to the general public, the paper Keywords: Fukushima nuclear accident, US addresses how the exclusionary zones were Japan Alliance, SPEEDI, Radiation Assessment, determined by Japanese and foreign Meltdown governments in Japan. As the crisis unfolded and efforts to bring the reactors under control Introduction were initially proving ineffective, concerns increased that radiation dispersion wasThis paper analyzes institutional response to unmitigated, and with radiation monitoring by the Fukushima nuclear disaster, looking at how the U.S. military indicating levels significantly experts and key decision-making elites in the beyond TEPCO's conservative assessments, the United States assessed the crisis and set United States broke with Japan, recommending policies as representatives of their an 80km exclusionary zone, and initiating organizations. In particular, it examines two military assisted departures for embassy staff related issues: the reactor meltdowns and the and Department of Defense dependents from dispersion of radioactive fallout, and analyzes Japan. These actions deviated significantly from the political consequences of the divergent Japan's assessments (which had established a interpretations which developed in the first few 30km evacuation zone), creating a dynamic days of the crisis around these issues. The

1 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF framing of these central issues helpedsensitivities and because some of the experts construct the general perception of risk that whose perspectives are represented in this prevailed in this phase of the crisis, and analysis are constrained by organizational provides a reference point against which to obligations that preclude them from revealing measure subsequent views as the crisis evolved their identity, some of the sources remain over the longer term. The paper touches on the confidential. In each case in which the identity differences in perception between various of a source has been withheld, the information foreign governments and examines the political has been verified by independent sources. implications of the crisis for international alliances in Japan. "Meltdown" at Fukushima Daiichi

In addition to examining how the accident In the fitful hours after Japan experienced its progression in the reactors was addressed and largest ever recorded earthquake on March 11, conveyed to the general public, the paper will 2011, the coastline of Tohoku lay in ruins from discuss how the exclusionary zones anda tsunami that swept entire towns out to sea, evacuations from areas in close proximity to resulting in the death of almost 20,000 people. the Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) were As the world stood transfixed by the scale of determined by Japanese and foreigndevastation wrought by the tsunami, Japan governments in Japan. As the crisis unfolded ramped up its disaster management assets to and efforts to bring the reactors under control address this crisis, coordinating its efforts with were initially proving ineffective, concerns foreign governments and humanitarian relief increased that radiation dispersion wasorganizations. While the international significantly beyond what TEPCO wascommunity initially mobilized to offer support indicating, and as a result, the United States for tsunami relief efforts in Tohoku, attention recommended a 80km exclusionary zone and soon turned to the Daiichi nuclear power plant initiated military-assisted departures forin Fukushima. embassy staff and Department of Defense dependents from Japan. These actions deviated In retrospect, the condition of the Daiichi plant significantly from Japan's assessments (which in the most dire phase of the crisis seems had established a 30km evacuation zone), readily transparent, as an unending litany of creating a dynamic in which the U.S.provided bad news has cast the situation in such technical consultation for the nuclear response continuing negative connotations that, like whilestriving tomaintain a delicate diplomatic Chernobyl, Fukushima has taken on talismanic balance as it attempted to impose aconnotations to serve as a symbol of nuclear qualitatively different crisis management dread. But in the first few days of the crisis, response. with little meaningful information being provided amidst the disorienting impact of the This analysis is based primarily on in-depth earthquake and tsunami, and TEPCO offering interviews with diplomats in foreign embassies, assurances that were uncritically passed on by military officials, journalists, nuclear scientists, the government and a docile press, hope and scholars, and examines how their collective remained that the situation could be brought narratives evolved in interaction with public under control. This wishful thinking was soon sentiment as the crisis unfolded. The scope of made irrational by the explosion of the outer the analysis is focused on the reflectivecontainment structure of reactor #1, which was perceptions of actors as they attempted to so powerful (the explosion broke windows 3km make sense of the crisis retrospectively after from the plant) that both plant workers inside the 3.11 disasters. Because of diplomatic the Daiichi complex and nuclear experts

2 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF watching from afar initially believed that the 融 (ろしんようゆう)" and the Western notion of reactor core itself had exploded. a "meltdown," which carried more ominous connotations than the straightforward With the explosion of the reactor #1 building transliteration of the word "meltdown" into there was no doubting the significance of this Japanese.1 crisis, but calibrating the actual risk and danger that this presented to the general The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the public was a moving target, with competing term "meltdown" as including "[1] the risk narratives that developed almostaccidental melting of the core of a nuclear immediately after the initial news reports were reactor; [2] a rapid or disastrous decline or released that the Daiichi and Daini nuclear collapse; [3] a breakdown of self control, power plants in Tohoku were in trouble. In the (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2012), and the first few days of the nuclear crisis theOxford English Dictionary explains that "a information made available to the public was meltdown was originally a catastrophic confusing, contradictory and frustrating.accident in a nuclear reactor, but this literal Despite a massive explosion that destroyed the meaning has been swamped by the figurative outer, secondary containment structure of the sense of 'a disastrous collapse or breakdown'. Daiichi reactor #1 building, soon to be followed The term is now used metaphorically to refer to on the next day by a similar explosion of the a chaotic loss of control, which is derived from reactor #3 building, TEPCO insisted that the the accidents at Chernobyl and Three Mile primary reactor core containment was intact Island, where the reactors "ran away" from and that there were no releases of radiation operator control, releasing significant amounts that posed a threat to public health. Initially, of radiation as a result of their errors. These conjecture held sway, with the foreign media accidents are now widely regarded as being the challenging the Japanese press corps, who did result of institutional failure, and TEPCO's little more than pass along TEPCO'sparsing of the term may have been a way to announcements, essentially serving as a PR skirt the issue of responsibility by placing the agency for the utility. emphasis only on the melting of nuclear fuel, rather than their own loss of control of the By this time, the Japanese and foreign media plant. reportage characterized the situation as dire, even as the TEPCO officials and government Although the term "meltdown" is in common were staging press conferences that offered usage, and was invoked by the press almost platitudes of assurance while conveying facts immediately after the crisis began, within the that contradicted these statements. For the scientific community this term is not reporters who covered the crisis, therecognized as a scientifically meaningful information provided by the utility wasdescription. The term is not included in the incoherent, contradictory and alarming. At the International Atomic Energy Association's 224 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) offices in Tokyo, page "Safety Glossary" which enumerates senior editors debated how to characterize the terminology used in nuclear safety and crisis. When the government spokesman Edano radiation protection, and the term "partial core Yukio conceded on March 13th that one of the melt" is used only once to describe a Level 4 reactors might be in "meltdown," the WSJ "Accident With Significant Off-site Risk," as editors noted that the nomenclature ofindicated by the International Nuclear Event "meltdown" as a label to describe the situation Scale (INES), which charts the levels of was culturally distinct, with different nuances magnitude of nuclear "events". The scale is an of meaning between the Japanese term "炉戸溶 indication of the inherent industry bias of

3 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF technical description, denuded of adjectives or rods melts, drawing off oxygen from the critical phraseology that might be construed as surrounding water and liberating hydrogen, a danger. The International Atomic Energy highly volatile gas. Despite the venting of Association (IAEA) refers to this as "a simple radioactive gases in the Three Mile Island scale, designed for promptly communicating to (TMI) accident, the most ominous threat that the public in consistent terms thesafety the accident posed was a hydrogen explosion significance of events at nuclear facilities" (my that could have blown the reactor out, leading emphasis). to a catastrophic release that would have been much more severe than what actually On May 24, 2011 on the eve of a visit by an transpired. Through intense scrutiny it was IAEA delegation, TEPCO officials announced determined that the infamous hydrogen bubble that their data indicated that three of the that built up inside the reactor #2 building at reactors had in fact experienced meltdowns TMI could not explode due to a lack of oxygen, within hours of the loss of power following the and remedial efforts were able to reduce the tsunami. At this press conference, the issue of size of the bubble until it was no longer a how this was previously characterized was threat. But in Fukushima, the powerful revisited, with TEPCO now claiming that the explosions that destroyed the buildings housing meltdowns could only then be confirmed, and the Daiichi reactors could only have happened that they had previously suggested thisif a core melt was significant enough to release possibility in reactor #1 on May 14, 2011. The high levels of hydrogen gas, and the media coverage of this revelation challenged subsequent explosions were proof positive that TEPCO's motives for revealing this information catastrophic meltdowns had already occurred. months after the fact, suggesting that this was As a result, while the media debated the in deference to international pressure, as a relative chances of a meltdown and quibbled face-saving gesture directed toward the visiting over the nomenclature, the nuclear experts delegation of IAEA ministers. Alternate media who worked the crisis knew early on and independent reporters had been asserting unambiguously that the Daiichi plant was in the possibility of multiple meltdowns from the deep trouble, and mobilized their resources beginning, and while this possibility was accordingly. presented by mainstream press as well, these stories were tempered by Asthe the Daiichi plant's condition rapidly acknowledgement that with no ability to see deteriorated, it became clearly evident that the within the reactors, these scenarios were situation was beyond the control of the TEPCO speculative at best. administrators, which undermined their authority, lending credence to the widespread For nuclear experts, the debate over whether perception that they were not forthcoming with or not meltdowns had occurred was largely a information. Government officials and TEPCO political controversy being played out in the spokesmen claimed that they had been echo chamber of the mass media, as it was withholding this information in order to prevent taken as a given that significant meltdowns had panic in the early days of the crisis, but this started early in the trajectory of the reactor revelation was taken as evidence that officials accident progression (TEPCO would late were deceiving the public and that TEPCO was specify that within 8 hours after the loss of more concerned about protecting its power, meltdowns had occurred). In the investments than it was in ensuring public scientific community it has long beensafety. recognized that at high temperature the zirconium alloy cladding that holds the fuel For the foreign press, the devastation of the

4 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF tsunami was the initial focus of coverage, seen as overwrought. diverting attention from the nuclear crisis, which in the first few days remained opaque, Radiation Plume Politics while the implications of the tsunami were clearly evident. Although major mediaAt Three Mile Island, it was not until three conglomerates such as Reuters, The Wall years after the accident that plant managers Street Journal and the Associated Press had the were able to look into the reactors and determine that the core of reactor #2 had resources to divide coverage between the two melted down. At Fukushima, with a station conjoined disasters, other major media blackout and the plant in disarray as staff organizations such as the New York Times, The frantically tried to recover power, the situation Times of London, the BBC and CNN have in the first days of the crisis remained fluid, scarce resources on the ground in Japan (most with little meaningful information to convey. If of the Asia bureaus for major media outlets the actual situation was unclear to workers have moved from Japan to China in the last inside the plant, it was entirely opaque to those decade), and the senior editors for these outside, including the diplomatic corps at publications were mobilized to the coastland of embassies in Japan and nuclear authorities Tohoku to cover the tsunami. from abroad, who were pressing the Japanese The media followed a pattern that played out in government to provide specific information. In the foreign embassies in Japan as well, in which addition to concerns about what was developing inside the reactors, a central issue nuclear experts in their home countries of risk assessment – and trust - was related to provided consultation for assessing the the spread of radiation disseminating from the situation. But while these authorities may have plant. After a frustrating delay in venting had considerable experience dealing with reactor #1 that pitted Prime Minister Kan nuclear issues, they had virtually no culturally Naoto against a recalcitrant TEPCO contextualized knowledge of Japan, and in the management that was internally divided and short-term had no access to more nuanced local uncooperative, evacuations from nearby the information of what was transpiring at the plant commenced with little government Daiichi plant. Organizational elites, both in the guidance and no information made available diplomatic corps and in the foreign media, that could help guide prefectural authorities in relied primarily on the Japanese mainstream their actions. media for more specific information, tempering this with the widely divergent, often random The Japanese government had established a reports that were filtering out through social computer modeling "System for Prediction of media, which, being less constrained by Environment Emergency Dose Information organizational vetting and mainstream(SPEEDI)" in 1980, following the Three Mile considerations, tended to be more alarmist, Island nuclear accident, and the system amplifying the analysis to interpretations that remained functional throughout the nuclear often were dismissed because they were at the crisis. SPEEDI was designed to provide detailed time unwarranted by the facts (which, after all, computer modeling projections of how weather were not available at that time). In retrospect, patterns dispersed radioactive fallout into the many of these reports have been vindicated by environment. information that has gradually become available as a series of revelations byAs fears about the reactors heightened and disgruntled former industry officials, retired TEPCO prepared to vent reactor #1, on March government authorities and scholars has given 12 the government evacuated four towns credence to views that had previously been located nearby the reactors, increasing the

5 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF evacuation zone from 2km, as decided in the At that time, the people who had evening of the previous day, to 10km (6.2 ways to evacuate had already miles, cf. Table 2). Two of the towns – Futaba evacuated, to Miyagi, or Yamagata and Okuma – were assisted in the evacuation, prefecture. So the 21,000 with the government providing buses to population were all scattered like a transport citizens. Despite this initial support, bee's hive.2 refugees from Namie and Tomoika, who were in evacuation areas initially only 8km (4.4 Because we had no information we miles) from the plant, were thereafter left to were unwittingly evacuating to an fend for themselves with neither direction nor area where the radiation level was support offered by the Japanese government, high so I'm very worried about the and fled northwest, right into the path of the people's health. I feel pain in my radioactive plume, just where SPEEDI, had it heart but also rage over the poor been implemented, would have predicted the actions of the government… It's fallout would go. This scandal firmly linked the not nice language but I still think it Japanese government to TEPCO as corrupt and was an act of murder. What were incompetent on fundamental issues of radiation they thinking when it came to the assessment. Whereas the hapless handling of people's dignity and lives? I doubt the reactors had been attributed to a lack of that they even thought about our 3 regulatory oversight that prefigured TEPCO's existence. chaotic response to the disaster, the SPEEDI scandal was seen as being the result of The New York Times helped break this story in incompetence at the highest levels ofthe foreign media in a critical analysis of how government, betraying a lack of concern for the officials withheld information and the people most at risk from the nuclear disaster. subsequent influence this had on Japanese public opinion toward the government. Onishi Despite having elaborate evacuation plans that Nori, one of the reporters who worked the previously had been coordinated with TEPCO, story, emphasized the qualitative shift in Baba Tomatsu, the mayor of Namie,initially orientation that this brought to Japanese learned of the nuclear disaster by watching it politics: on TV and was bitterly resentful of the lack of consideration that put his village at risk: In the first couple of months after 3.11, the public inclination was to There was no coordination with the still trust what the government Japanese Government. Nothing. was saying and what the media They didn't tell us where to was describing, but that started to evacuate. Nothing. Namie machi breakdown by May, and that was did everything by ourselves. And, reflected in public opinion polls at disappointingly, because we didn't that time. hear anything from the government – no advisories – we The recognition of the meltdown used anything that we had-school was big. When the Japanese buses and such-to move people out government finally acknowledged of the area. People's cars were that there was a meltdown in mid- destroyed by the tsunami so we May, the Japanese people said, placed those people in those buses. "what does this mean?" The

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foreign media had written about and who themselves were not initially aware of the meltdown in the first week of the database because this information was the disaster, and the Japanese compartmentalized in other offices and no one government had criticized the was discussing it. With no one asking the right foreign media for being alarmist, questions to the right people, the information and here they were a few months lay dormant. The SPEEDI data was not initially later saying 'oh yeah, I guess there conveyed to local officials in Fukushima, but were meltdowns.' was known to some Japanese government officials in the Ministry of Education, Culture, That was a key moment, as was the Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), the SPEEDI issue. That breakdown in government office under which SPEEDI is trust toward the government, administered. Although the staff who were toward the media – you never compiling the information for the SPEEDI really saw that before last year. computer modeling had data in-hand by the For the first time, I had many first day of the accident, they withheld the people say to me 'thank God for predictions, claiming a lack of certainty about the foreign media, they are the 4 its accuracy due to incomplete data (the model only ones telling the truth'. depended in part on data from the nuclear plant, but with the power supply down, this was Elements of this story had already been not available to factor into the overall covered in the Japanese media, dating to April, assessment). 2011, when Kosako Toshiso, a former professor Suzuki Kan, the Vice Minister of MEXT, the at the University of Tokyo and member of the agency in charge of radiation assessment, did government's impromptu advisory group on radiation, resigned in protest over thenot know about SPEEDI and learned of it only government's mishandling of SPEEDI, linking it when Hayano Ryugo, a particle physicist and to subsequent arbitrary loosening of radiation Chairman of the Department of Physics at the danger threshold standards. Kosako'sUniversity of Tokyo, approached him to inquire resignation was the first significant crack in the how the SPEEDI data was being utilized and to public façade being maintained by therequest access to the data so that he could run government, and this story increased inan analysis. Minister Suzuki thereafter made th significance as it was associated withinternal inquiries and confirmed on March 19 government deception and collusion. By April, that the system was operative but not being an Asahi Shimbun public opinion poll indicated properly utilized, but in the interim, Professor that only 21% supported the KanHayano began Tweeting about SPEEDI, 5 administration with 60% opposed, and in drawing attention to the issue. response to the question "Do you think the government's dissemination of information Yahoo Japan had recommended Hayano on about the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi their top-page as a person of note shortly after nuclear power plant was appropriate?" only the nuclear crisis began, and thereafter, his 16% answered in the affirmative, with 73% following grew exponentially to reach a saying that it was inappropriate. broader public audience. These Twitter posts also came to the attention of Shikata Noriyuki, With the SPEEDI data, it appears that social who at the time of the nuclear accident was media was instrumental in making the system Deputy Cabinet Secretary for Public Affairs and known outside a small circle of bureaucrats Director of Global Communications at the who were reluctant to act on the information, Prime Minister's Office. Secretary Shikata

7 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF informed Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary they lied deliberately, but their Fukuyama Tetsuro on March 15 and news conferences went on forever, information about SPEEDI was then conveyed they were filled with useless to the U.S. Embassy and military through the information, and they were Ministry of Foreign Affairs. SPEEDI was not unwilling to distill that revealed officially to the general public until information. They knew more March 23, but by then, information about this about this than anyone else, and system was spreading through social networks they could have taken the body of and into the mainstream media. information they had and said 'this is what we think is the most This information flow became an important significant information that you feedback loop, providing information to MEXT need to know – this is the line we officials about their own system. Shikata, who think you should look at'". after being approached had started following Unbelievable amounts of data, and Hayano's tweets, and began consulting with the data would keep shifting: him about technical matters to assess the 'today we have becquerels per accuracy of the scientific data they were square meter 100 yards from the attempting to convey at governmental press plant. Tomorrow, we have conferences. Shikata then asked Hayano to millisieverts per hour a mile away help him inform the foreign media because of from the plant.' Is it getting better his bilingual language proficiency and his or is it getting worse? Their data ability to communicate about technical issues gathering was just all over the clearly and efficiently.6 map.7 It is by now a common belief that the confusion that reigned in the immediate aftermath of the Ironically, while TEPCO was "drowning tsunami and nuclear crisis was due to a lack of journalists with data" (as Christoph Neidhart, information. While this may have been the case the German daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung Tokyo for the general public who lacked access to bureau chief who attended their daily press meaningful information and were relying on conferences put it),8 Hayano's Twitter posts media reports, TEPCO and the Japanese reached a large and diverse audience, and was government had multiple sources of all the more persuasive because of its brevity. information that could have helped Where it not for Hayano, cogently contextualize and explain the efforts they were encapsulating complex technical information taking to address the situation. Rather, TEPCO was initially reluctant to acknowledge the into 100 character tweets and talking with the seriousness of the crisis and instead ofappropriate officials, the information may not explaining the situation, simply provided raw have come out. data without an interpretative frame that would The SPEEDI contretemps, as with the divergent have allowed non-specialists to make sense of interpretations about the condition of the the information and assess their claims. reactors previously discussed, indicates the William Sposato, the Deputy Bureau Chief of complexity of how information develops and is the Wall Street Journal in Tokyo characterized utilized in complex, "normal accidents". The the reaction of many of the foreign journalists who were working the crisis at this time: multiple government and embassy offices, rather than being integrated under a common chain of command as part of an integrated I don't know of an instance where crisis management system, compartmentalized

8 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF information in silos, not only ineffectively state-level political concerns than they were communicating outside their respectiveabout the well-being of their most vulnerable bureaucracies, but often not discussingcitizens. It also raised questions about what important facts even among themselves. The was really transpiring behind the scenes while press helped link these together, as it pushed these entities ineptly attempted to manage the and prodded for information, compelling story and project an increasingly implausible officials to explain their actions and account for facade of control. their policies. Negotiating Risk: International Divergence While the Japanese press attempted to burrow in Radiation Assessment down into the details of the organizational chaos, the foreign press continued to amplify In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, an the crisis, framing it in terms that would appeal unprecedented relief effort comprised of to foreign viewers who were distracted from domestic and international NGOs, unaffiliated the tsunami because of the crisis andcitizen volunteers, and government associated disinterested in the internecine politics of organizations from 116 countries descended on obscure bureaucratic officials. Taken together, Japan to provide disaster relief in the Tohoku these combined into a compelling narrative region. This impressively international arch, as the Japan-based journalists revealed outpouring of support demonstrated genuine bureaucratic ineptitude that provided ahumanitarian concern, and it cast the most grounding in reality to the more critical views unambiguously positive light on the 3.11 crises. that were gaining traction. Lacking contextual While initially these tsunami relief efforts stood perspective, and with scarce information as a salutary example of international available in any case, the foreign press played cooperation, as the nuclear crisis unfolded and up fears of apocalyptic doom. Lackingeclipsed attention on the aftermath of the information about what was really transpiring tsunami, this narrative turned toward one of at the Daiichi plant and living through the confusion, suspicion and deceit, with TEPCO - uncertainty and chaos in those early days after and, by association, the Japanese government - the earthquake, the local press looked for being cast in a negative light, not only by explanation in the actions of specificJapanese citizens, who were increasingly organizational elites, and found little of worth. feeling misled by government authorities, but These views aligned in the assessment of by foreign governments, who were frustrated foreign authorities, who, doubting theby the lack of information being provided by information they were receiving, began to TEPCO and Japanese government officials distrust the leaders who were providing it. about what was actually transpiring at Fukushima Daiichi. The controversy over the SPEEDI data was later compounded by the disclosure that on Because of its long-standing strategic political March 14 this data, which had been withheld alliance with Japan, buttressed by the largest from local Japanese officials and those in the array of military bases outside the continental path of the fallout (the Japanese public did not U.S. and the only forward-deployed nuclear find out until 9 days later), had been released aircraft carrier group in the U.S. military, the in hourly reports to the U.S. embassy and United States was the most significant foreign military who were working on relief efforts in responder in tsunami relief efforts and the area. For many, this hardened views that provided the most meaningful consultation and TEPCO and the Japanese government were logistical support in the nuclear crisis. The U.S. more concerned about vested interests and Pacific Command (PACOM), working in

9 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF coordination with USAID and other federal levels both on the ship and on the shoes of US agencies, was intimately involved in relief servicemen who had temporarily landed on a efforts in Tohoku from the beginning, and Japanese command ship at 50 nautical miles working closely with the Japan Self-Defense from the plant were unexpectedly high, Forces (SDF), were significant first-responders provoking the carrier group to back off from 60 to coastal villages that had been swamped by to 180 nautical miles from the plant. the tsunami. These joint operations in total involved 140 U.S. aircraft, 19,703 personnel In transcribed telephone conversations and over 20 American naval ships, which between U.S. based federal government represented a significant portion of the U.S. 7th officials, nuclear authorities, U.S. embassy fleet Naval Forces. U.S. troops participating in officials in Tokyo and military staff in the Operation Tomodachi (Friendship) worked in Pacific Command (PACOM) made available close coordination with the Japanese Ministry through the Freedom of Information Act of Defense and SDF, a rare moment in the often (FOIA), the U.S. government response to the fractious relations the U.S. military hasnuclear crisis can be seen in real-time as it experienced in Japan. Japanese publicplayed out over the course of the first month of sentiment toward the U.S. soared as a result, the crisis: with 84% of Japanese polled in the Cabinet Office's annual report saying they had friendly feelings toward the United States, the highest ADMIRAL DONALD: (...) Earlier tally by far since the survey began in 1978. this evening, as the USS Ronald These findings were replicated in a poll Reagan was operating off the coast commissioned on June 9 by Japan's Foreign of Japan, we - the ship just arrived. Ministry (84% approval), and in a Pew Global We had given the ship some Attitudes poll (85% approval) taken on June 1, guidance as far as positioning was 2011 which found similar results. concerned to stay clear of the area of the potential plume, basically The U.S. government and military support for told her to stay 50 miles outside of tsunami relief efforts through Operation the radius of the -- 100 miles -- Tomodachi have garnered considerable excuse me -- 50 miles radius attention, but less is known about the role the outside of the plant and then 100 U.S. military played in helping to respond to miles along the plume with a the Fukushima nuclear crisis. With the Sendai vector of 45 degrees. The ship was airport rendered inoperable by the tsunami, the adhering to that requirement and U.S. Navy's Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier detected some activity about two group, parked off the coast of Fukushima, and a half times above normal served as a fueling platform and staging area airborne activity using on-board for tsunami relief, at which time military sensors on the aircraft carriers. So personnel were exposed to radiation emanating that indicated that they had found from the reactors. As the wind was blowing out the plume and it was probably to sea for the first couple of days after the more significant than what we had onset of the crisis, aside from local originally thought. The second communities near the Daiichi facility, thing that has happened is we have servicemen on this nuclear powered aircraft had some helicopters conducting carrier were among the first to be exposed to operations from the aircraft carrier the radiation plume from the explosion of the and one of the helicopters came Reactor 1 building on March 12. The exposure back from having stopped on board

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the Japanese command ship in the Guidelines) or something, how do area, and people who had been on the levels detected compare with -- were on the helicopter who had what is permissible? walked on the deck of the ship, were monitored and had elevated MR. MUELLER: If it were a counts on their feet, 2500 counts member of the general public, it per minute. But I wanted to get would take -- well, it would take you guys on the line and my expert about 10 hours to reach a limit, a on the line so we can get the data PAG limit. and then the proper people notified. MUELLER: Right. For a member of the public. MR. PONEMAN: Okay, I have a couple of questions. Number one, PONEMAN: Right. You mean, at the level you detected? in terms of the level of radiation that you are picking up, what's the MR. MUELLER: Yes sir. But 10 delta between that and any hours, it's a thyroid dose issue. information we have from the Japanese or other sources of what MR. PONEMAN: Okay, but the net the level of radiation would be, of all this is that the amount of given the venting and so forth that release that is detected by these we know has occurred? two episodes whatever you would call them, is significantly higher MR. MUELLER: So -- this is than anything you would have Mueller -- the sample that was expected what you have been taken and then what we detected, reading from all sources? we were 100 nautical miles away and it's -- in our terms it's -- MR. MUELLER: Yes sir. The compared to just normal number specific number we background it's about 30 times detected was 2.5 the times 10 to what you would detect just on a the 88 minus nine microcuries per normal air sample out at sea. And milliliter, airborne, and that's so we thought -- we thought based particulate airborne. It is -- we did on what we had heard on the not take radioiodide samples so I reactors that we wouldn't detect don't know that value, but this is that level even at 25 miles. So it's particulate airborne... much greater than what we had thought. We didn't think we would MR. PONEMAN: Tell me again detect anything at 100 miles. exactly how you picked up these two forms of samples. MR.. PONEMAN: You didn't think you'd detect anything at 100 miles. MR. MUELLER: We have Okay, and then in terms of the automatic detectors in the plant regulations and so forth of people that picked up -- picked up the operating in these kinds of areas, I airborne, and all of our continuous forget some you know, acronym for monitors alarmed at the same it, PAG (Protective Action level, at this value. And then we

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took portable air samples on the order to make sense of this data, the U.S. relied flight desk and got the same value. on Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administrators, who coordinated with the ADMIRAL DONALD: These are Department of Energy and the National normally running continuous Atmospheric Release Advisory Center at the detectors, continuous monitors Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in that run in the engine room all the California, analysis by Naval Reactors' experts time, monitoring our equipment. at their research labs (comprised of approximately 6,000 staff), and an ad hoc MR. PONEMAN: These are collection of loosely affiliated former detectors on the Reagan? government specialists, retired military officers ADMIRAL DONALD: On the Ronald (nuclear engineers), scholars and former NRC Reagan, correct. staff. In order to consolidate these resources into an integrated command structure, the U.S. MR. MUELLER: Yes sir. embassy in Tokyo conceived a "Bilateral Assistance Coordination Cell" (BACC), which MR. PONEMAN: On the Ronald met daily and included all USG agencies. Reagan. They are there because you have got equipment there that Through diplomatic channels, with U.S. you know, it could emit stuff and Ambassador Roos representing the State while you were there, you picked Department, the U.S. attempted to coordinate up stuff that was ambient which its response with the Japanese government. indicated that you actually were in This had started soon after the onset of the the plume? crisis, focusing on tsunami relief efforts as the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) and the MR. MUELLER: That's correct. United States Forces Japan (USFJ) developed joint operations using both U.S. and Japanese MR. PONEMAN: And this was -- military bases as staging grounds for mounting this was 30 times higher than what their operations. With a keen eye on the you would have expected? diplomatic implications of the crisis, state-level actors took pains to highlight mutual MR. MUELLER: Yes sir.9 cooperation, despite frustrations that developed backstage as the power outage at With the Daiichi plant still a black box, and only the Daiichi plant developed into a full-blown spotty data to indicate the radiation dispersion, crisis. Until the U.S. nuclear authorities who the U.S. quickly set up an independent parallel were deployed to Japan were able to establish a process of acquiring data, utilizing their vast working relation with TEPCO, they relied on array of military and governmental resources. information filtered through the Japanese These included the Department of Energy's government, which in the first few days was Atmospheric Monitoring System (AMS), on the scarcely available: the only real-time ground radiation measurement surveys, fixed information the U.S. had access to was a data station radiation monitors, the RQ-4 Global stream on the MEXT website, and second-hand Hawk military drone and classified military reports from NISA and other Japanese surveillance (the Lockheed U-2 high-altitude government agencies. At this time even the reconnaissance aircraft and the P-3 Orion Japanese government did not know how bad maritime surveillance aircraft) and the nuclear the situation was, since TEPCO was aircraft carriers to help with the assessment. In downplaying the magnitude of the crisis even

12 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF while the situation at the Daiichi plant"Rebuild Japan" independent report on the continued to deteriorate. Fukushima crisis by a group of former government officials discusses this issue at Prime Minister Kan would eventually lose his length, and while they note that various parties job to the crisis, as confidence in theindicated that they thought TEPCO was government plummeted, but in the early days signaling total withdrawal, TEPCO officials of the crisis, he was notable for challenging the contest this claim and after careful TEPCO officials, chastening them to be more consideration, the report – and other forthcoming with information, and demanding subsequent governmental and independent action in the face of their intransigence. In June reports -leave this matter unresolved. In 2011 it was revealed that even though he had retrospect, the true intentions of TEPCO ordered them to dump seawater into the remains obscure, but this dispute was reactors, the TEPCO officials defied this order, important because it demonstrated that PM realizing that the saltwater would render the Kan did not trust TEPCO to fulfill their duties, reactors unusable, and the plant a total and it established a dynamic of accusation and loss.The reactors were brought under tenuous distrust between the principal players and control only when Yoshida Masao, the plant organizations at the center of the crisis. manager, ignored orders from his superiors and inundated the reactors. In subsequent reports both governmental and independent panels accused Kan of micro- The conflict between the Kan administration managing the crisis, by intruding on the plant and the TEPCO officials reached an apex on administrators charged with handling the March 15th, when TEPCO's president Shimizu situation, blurring the chain of command and Masataka announced that TEPCO intended to unduly complicating decision-making at the withdraw from the plant due to the increasing worst possible time.Had the situation been radiation exposure to its employees. Kan's under even tenuous control, such accusations insistence that TEPCO maintain operational might seem warranted, but there was scant control at the plant site may have prevented a indication that TEPCO had the situation in much larger catastrophe. When TEPCO asked hand, and even with their active involvement, permission to withdraw from the plant, they the situation continued to deteriorate and may have been indicating that they were appeared to be sliding toward a catastrophic merely relocating to an operational center disaster that threatened the entire country. outside the plant, with a skeleton staff of workers to remain at the Daiichi Facility to Irrespective of the validity of these competing monitor equipment and implement actions that claims, both the Kan administration and the could only be done on-site.10But to Kan, who U.S. government experts who were monitoring had already endured TEPCO's inordinate delay the situation were convinced that TEPCO was in venting reactor #1 and defiance in putting intending to withdraw from the site, and saltwater on the reactors, this alleged strategic exerted considerable pressure on TEPCO to disencampment to a facility off-site was the remain, with Kan essentially requiring them to culmination of conflict that had started within maintain sufficient staff to manage the hours of the plant blackout, and was taken as operation. The implications for this were dire an abandonment of responsibility. for the TEPCO staff, as the magnitude of the nuclear accident was growing more ominous, The question of whether TEPCO intended to with no resolution in sight, and the remaining entirely abandon the plant or only partly staff faced the prospect of lethal doses should withdraw remains unresolved. The March 2012 they remain. Given the stakes involved, and as

13 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF a way to provide legal cover for the reactor cores and they are just implications of consigning plant workers to die melting down, there is nothing on the job, the Japanese government simply containing the release of raised the official threshold standards - the radioactivity. It is an unmitigated, maximum legally allowable dose - for radiation unshielded number. (Confidential workers at the plant. By utilizing deeply rooted communication, September 17, sentimental notions of obligation, the 2012).11 "Fukushima Fifty" (actually there were seventy five workers who remained; the "Fukushima Fifty" was a snappy media created alliteration Within hours of this, the U.S. authorities that helped sell the story) who remained were became convinced that TEPCO was intending enlisted in service of a heroic trope that put a to leave the plant. human face on TEPCO and allowed the The prospect of TEPCO withdrawing from the Japanese government to claim the moral high plant focused everyone's attention, as this ground (at least over TEPCO), while providing would have truly been the nightmare scenario a means of addressing the crisis at the most that alarmist pundits had been suggesting. Had crucial moment. TEPCO withdrawn operational staff from the It was into this fracas that the U.S. and the Daiichi facility, all the reactors and spent fuel other principle players involved in the crisis pools would have eventually melted down, entered as they futilely attempted to glean releasing such severe levels of radiation that information upon which they could make an eventually the staff at the Daini facility (located assessment that would productively orient their 11.5 kilometers south of the Daiichi NPP) actions. Foreign entities who were frantically would also be forced to withdraw, with the trying to gather information saw a demoralizing result being that all the reactors and spent fuel situation: a utility who had lost control of the pools at this plant would also have melted plant, who seemingly were incapable of taking down. Given the fact that the spent fuel pools effective remedial action and who were fighting contain approximately 5 – 6 times more with the Japanese government while the plant radionuclides than a working reactor, this reactors fell like dominos, with no end in sight. would have been orders of magnitude more severe than the Chernobyl accident. It was with On the morning of March 16, a surveillance this in mind that the Japanese government helicopter flying over the Daiichi reactors discussed evacuating Tokyo. Alarmed at this measured 4 sieverts per hour, a reading that possibility, in the U.S. embassy planning began alarmed the U.S. nuclear experts, giving to put thousands of Americans on the decks of further evidence that the spent fuel pool 4 was the aircraft carriers to get them out compromised and the pool was dry. A U.S. immediately. government nuclear expert who was directly involved in the U.S. government's radiation For the U.S. government, this would have assessment of this situation said: jeopardized their ability to maintain the military base structure in Japan in the long term, an unthinkable prospect that would have At 100 meters away it (the compelled them in the short term to fully helicopter) was reading 4 sieverts engage in the task of sorting the reactor crisis per hour. That is an astronomical (despite the prospect of incurring lethal doses number and it told me, what that in the process), in coordination with the number means to me, a trained Japanese Ministry of Defense. Despite PM person, is there is no water on the Kan's rage at TEPCO's defiance, from the

14 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF vantage point of American radiation experts support the Japanese Emergency who were looking at the dramatically rising Responders in a manner that is radiation levels, neither TEPCO nor the appropriate. Japanese government fully appreciated the implications of TEPCO's announced 2) NRC needs to be the primary withdrawal. Although this has not yet been contact with NISA and JNES revealed to the public due to diplomatic because of our long-standing sensitivities, backstage a series of contentious relationship communications passed in short order between 3) Public statements we make the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), the U.S. going forward will have enormous State Department (via U.S. Ambassador Roos), credibility, extreme caution will be the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the necessary Prime Minister's office and TEPCO about the implications of TEPCO leaving the plant. In We have now been asked by Japan response to diplomatic pressure from the U.S., to provide assistance to their along with the recognition of what this might Regulatory authorities and other forebode for the SDF and the American military emergency responders. This was forces in Japan (and therefore the US-Japan undoubtedly an extremely difficult Alliance), Kan flatly demanded that TEPCO decision for the Japanese who had officials remain at the plant. up to this point been among the top nuclear leaders in technical This was an extremely sensitive diplomatic expertise, especially in seismic and moment in the history of US-Japan relations. As tsunami matters. an autonomous state, Japan could not be compelled to heed the U.S. government's The Japanese are now in their desires, even if they were scientifically fourth day of responding to these grounded and pragmatically necessary. From emergencies and will remain the the beginning of the crisis, the NRC, as a U.S. best informed about the current government federal agency whose scientific technical, legal, cultural, and expertise is always modulated against its regulatory issues. NRC can be of political influence, took pains to remain neutral enormous assistance taking into and only offer advice when called upon, serving consideration that we can help as a resource to the Japanese government. The augment their already burdened NRC staff who arrived in Japan were directed staff. We must be sensitive to their to work through the appropriate diplomatic needs and not interfere with their channels and deal cautiously with their decision-making. counterparts in the Japanese nuclear industry. On March 14th, just a day before the U.S. Recognizing that if we interfere, learned TEPCO was planning on leaving the rather than assist, the Daiichi plant, the NRC sent a missive to its staff consequences could be enormous. and other U.S. nuclear experts in Japan that defined the parameters within which U.S. It will be essential to help the agencies were expected to operate in Japan: Japanese maintain trust in their leaders to promote ongoing civil order in response to the nuclear 1) This remains a Japanese crisis. Any inconsistencies or response and NRC's role will be to statements that undermine

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Japanese authority or expertise will niceties than it was about defending their have lasting affects as it could nuclear interests in the region. Had Kan not hamper current emergency efforts forced TEPCO to stay, an entirely different and their future ability to respond political dynamic would have ensued, with the to these issues, long after U.S. government taking on a more central role international assistance recedes. in coordination with the Ministry of Defense Any interactions with the Japanese, and the SDF. Despite having some of the most other nations or public sophisticated military assets in the world, the communication should take this SDF is not a nuclear force: they have neither into consideration. the experience nor corresponding expertise to sort such a complex nuclear disaster. The U.S. It remains crucial that we build Navy, by comparison, owns approximately half upon our long-standing of all the operational hours of nuclear reactors cooperative relationship with the in history (approximately 6200 reactor years of Japanese regulators. The NRC has operation), having been the first military force a vast amount of expertise working to deploy nuclear carriers and submarines - with the Japanese program and laden with nuclear weapons - with all the personal relationships that should expertise that entails. And, they are there: the be used as a basis for infrastructural footprint of U.S. military bases strengthening, rather than shaking in Japan has been the bane of US-Japan public the confidence of the Japanese relations since the Pacific War, but these bases responders. would have provided the U.S. with the necessary resources to mount the campaign, There should be sensitivity to not had it proved necessary. As a result, the U.S. question the past actions, as there would have undoubtedly taken technical lead in will be ample time to learn from the crisis, having the SDF serve as proxy in these experiences. order to protect the notion of Japanese state autonomy and in order to avoid throwing Direct confrontation will also not be helpful. Multiple agency American soldiers on the nuclear pile. The questions and interactions are an Japanese Foreign Ministry and the U.S. State unnecessary distraction. Department were well aware of these political implications and strove to avoid a public The NRC should remain the diplomatic row. By convincing TEPCO to primary representative to remain, the U.S. and Japanese governments communicate with NISA and JNES. were able to have it both ways, with the U.S. Ultimately, our actions should not providing crucial technical consultation but at interfere or distract them. It also an appropriately delicate diplomatic distance remains the best way culturally to that allowed Japan to save face while taking the approach the issue.12 appropriate mitigating actions without the U.S. appearing to be puppet-master over a dependent client state. While the U.S. diplomats and government agencies finessed the need to maintain good In the first week of the crisis, a series of diplomatic relations while taking measures to setbacks upped the ante, making it difficult for protect U.S. citizens in Japan that eventually the NRC to remain in a passive, exclusively diverged from the Japanese response, the U.S. advisory role. Having just arrived in Japan a military was less concerned about political couple of days after the crisis began, and thus

16 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF not being initially privy to the level of disagreement between TEPCO and the Japanese government, they engaged the situation at the worst possible moment, just as TEPCO announced its plans to leave the plant, and only shortly after TEPCO had defied orders to vent the reactors and put water into the cores to prevent the reactors from spinning entirely out of control.

The 16th of March was the longest day of the nuclear crisis. After the reactor #4 building exploded, debate centered on the condition of the spent fuel pool (SPF), which was worrisome because the spent fuel rods that had recently been cycled into storage were especially toxic. The condition of SPF 4 became a major source of contention between TEPCO and the NRC, as the Japanese authorities insisted that water remained in the pool, based on inferred technical information and on a video taken during a helicopter fly-by, which seemed to show reflection off water. The NRC experts were not persuaded: the video was scarcely one frame on a monochromatic screen that could have been a reflection off of materials that had been scattered when the building that contained the pool exploded. And in any case, Table 1. Source: Briefing by NRC Chaiman this was not a firm enough basis to wager U.S. Gregory B. Jaczko to U.S. Senator Jim strategic regional interests and the safety of Webb, June 17, 2011. U.S. citizens living in Japan. Weighing against this optimistic view based on a transient "shimmer" off water that could barely be seen were a number of more objective indicators that led the NRC to believe the pool had either leaked dry or that whatever water remained after the explosion had evaporated from the residual heat from the spent fuel rods. Like the explosions that destroyed the outer containment structures of reactors #1 and #3, the explosion in the reactor #4 building blew the building apart, and with the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) positioned on the top floor, it defied logic to imagine that this pool (which is less robust than we would hope to imagine) would remain intact while much of the building was destroyed. When

17 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF heavy moving equipment was brought in to Huron airplanes and eventually transferred clear a path to put water on the building, the special detector pods that are mounted on the radiation levels on the ground just outside the airplanes to ground teams for vehicle-based structure dropped by approximately 70%, ground surveys. Along with these assets, the indicating that high levels of radiation had U.S. relied on ground surveys by teams of dispersed from the pools. Thermal imagery military personnel using specially equipped from aerial surveillance showed hotspots - what radiation monitoring backpacks in "picket could be fires breaking out in the building - a fences" that were mapped onto the air and seeming impossibility if the pool contained ground vehicle surveys.While this drama over water. Adding to this was the fact that steam the condition of SFP 4 was playing out between had been seen rising from the building initially, the NRC and TEPCO (the first open but later stopped, suggesting that the water in disagreement between the US and Japan), the the pool had evaporated, and when theU.S. continued with their radiation surveys infamous helicopter sorties over the reactors throughout the Tohoku region. The United dropped water on the building, steam flashed States played an inordinately important role in out, which would be consistent with water measuring and compiling radiation data that falling on a hot, dry surface.13 nuclear authorities could use for assessing the Fukushima nuclear disaster. For the U.S., the By this time the TEPCO officials who were organizations that initially played the most pressing the case had lost much of their significant role in assessing the nuclear crisis credibility and despite their protestations and were the NRC, which assigned over 200 staff efforts to maintain a facade of control,stateside and sent a core team of 16 staff to operational staff - hands-on engineers - fearing Japan and Naval Reactors, which administers reprisals from their superiors, privatelymilitary platform nuclear reactors for the U.S. conceded that they too believed the pool had Navy, working in coordination with the U.S. run dry. At best, TEPCO was sending mixed Department of Energy. From the beginning of messages to the NRC, not only about the the crisis, Japan-based foreign embassies and condition of the SFP 4 but also about their their supporting governments overseas sought willingness to share information and resources to establish lines of communication with to develop a coordinated response. After TEPCO via the Japanese government, but they inviting the NRC to join them at theirwere often rebuffed and even when lines of Emergency Operations Center, an invitation communication had been established, there that was acted on by the NRC, who mobilized was little to relate, as even the Japanese staff to set up shop at TEPCO headquarters, government could not attain meaningful senior TEPCO officials then pointedly withdrew information from TEPCO, who continued to the invitation, providing yet more evidence that downplay the severity of the situation. Until a TEPCO was internally divided andworking relationship was developed with disorganized, calling into question theirTEPCO, the only source of real-time meaningful assessments. information available to external entities that would allow for radiation assessment was a live stream of data on the MEXT website from fixed Deploying to Japan from March 14 to March 28, monitoring posts. THE U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration's DOE/NNSA) The U.S. government conducted more Aerial Measuring System (AMS) conducted 100 comprehensive radiation surveys than the survey flights, comprising 525 flight hours, Japanese government at this time, and using UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, C-12 crucially, the data was coalesced into

18 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF integrated databases that could be assessed by the IAEA in 2007, which allowed discretionary their radiation authorities in Japan and abroad. zones to be established within these limits, While TEPCO authorities continued to put what based on the power-rating of the reactor, the increasingly appeared to be an implausibly nature of the accident, and other event-specific optimistic spin on events, dissembled and contingencies. stalled, fought with the Japanese government, Table 2 Governmental Protocols for Fukushima frustrated and confused journalists with Exclusionary & Evacuation Zones Date Time Institutional Exclusionary Zones technically indecipherable data, the U.S. 2011 Authority Evacuations & Departures March 11 19:03 Japanese Cabinet Office Fukushima Daiichi NPP declares nuclear emergency 20:50 Fukushima Government Exclusionary Zone established – 2km distance provided data to its various governmental Prefectural Authority From Daiichi NPP (evacuation facilitated) 21:23 Japanese Cabinet Office Zone established to 3km / 3 – 10km indoor sheltering recommended agencies, shared this data with allies (including TEPCO Fukushima plant administrators order 700 workers to evacuate – the "Fukushima 50" remain (actually 75) the Japanese government) and with TEPCO United States NRC stands up 24hr operations at Rockville, MD Department of State headquarters / crisis team deploys to Japan March 12 05:44 Japanese Cabinet Office Evacuation zone extended to 10km itself. They were not on the same page. 07:45 Fukushima Diana declared emergency Evacuation from Daini to 3km 17:39 Daini evacuation zone extended to 10km 18:25 Daiichi evacuation zone extended to 20km March 13 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. citizen residents in Japan advised to follow Japanese In short proximity to the explosion of the Commission (NRC) government's instructions Japanese Cabinet Office Daiichi exclusion zone extended to 30km reactor #4 building that was believed to March 15 U.S. NRC Exclusionary zone recommended – 20km from Daiichi March 16 U.S. NRC Voluntary exclusion zone extended to 80km (50 miles) March 17 United States Department State Department issues memo declaring it is appropriate for destroy the spent fuel pool, higher than of State U.S. citizens to leave Japan March 21 Department of Defense Voluntary military assisted departures and Potassium Iodide Naval Reactors (USA) (KI) distribution recommended up to 320km (200 miles) from expected readings at the reactor site and Daiichi NPP March 25 Japanese Cabinet Office 20km mandatory exclusion zone established TEPCO's announcement that it was leaving, the April 14 Department of Defense Voluntary departure order lifted, allowing (USA) Department of Defense dependents to return to Japan April 21 Japanese Cabinet Office Daini NPP exclusionary zone modified from 8 – 10km DOE/USFJ radiation surveys measured a April 22 Japanese Cabinet Office 20 – 30km indoor sheltering deactivated (excluding Iwaki city) May 16 United States Department U.S. updates Travel Advisory: highway and train from Tokyo radiation hotspot at 38 kilometers distance of State to Sendai open / Sendai Airport open October 7 United States Department of U.S. citizens recommended to avoid unnecessary travel to from the Daiichi plant that was in excess of US State areas within 20km of the Daiichi NPP

Protective Action Guidelines (PAG). These PAG guidelines are utilized by the U.S. Department In a report written in October of 2011, the NRC of Energy in coordination with the Nuclear provided a more detailed account for why the Regulatory Commission for siting commercial zone was expanded: nuclear reactors and are the fundamental reference point for public health impact during a nuclear disaster (See Table 1) The decision to expand evacuation of U.S. citizens out to 50 miles Based on assessments of this data, which was from the Fukushima Daiichi facility more specific and nuanced than the was a conservative decision that information being provided by the Japanese was made out of consideration of authorities, the U.S. broke with Japan, several factors including an expanding its evacuation zone out from the abundance of caution resulting 20km (12 miles) threshold which it had from limited and unverifiable temporarily shared until these discrepancies information concerning event came to light, to 80km (50 miles). Japan had progression at several units at the already moved the evacuation zone area Fukushima Daiichi facility. The several times in the first few days of the crisis, NRC based its assessment on and incrementally continued to ratchet up the information available at the time response, eventually stabilizing at 30km regarding the condition of the distance from the reactors, with specially units conditions at Fukushima designated non-concentric zones included to Daiichi that included significant incorporate hotspot areas that were over the damage to Units 1, 2, and 3 that radiation threshold standard. These seemingly appeared to have been a result of less conservative zones had been determined hydrogen explosions. Prior to the before 3.11, based on protocols established by earthquake and tsunami, Unit 4

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was in a refueling outage and its matters worse, was that there was entire core had been transferred to complete confusion inside the Kan the spent fuel pool only 3 months administration, no communication earlier so the fuel was quite fresh. with TEPCO, and barely any Radiation monitors showed communication with the significantly elevated readings in bureaucracy. And so the Americans some areas of the plant site which were faced with a situation where would challenge plant crews the Japanese government was in attempting to stabilize the plant. complete chaos, essentially; Based on analysis results, there unresponsive, not providing were indications from some offsite information.15 contamination sampling smears that fuel damage had occurred. There was a level of uncertainty Although the U.S. had dramatically expanded about whether or not efforts to the evacuation zone and recommended to its stabilize the plant in the very near citizens that they stay outside this 50 mile term were going to be successful. radius, this had little meaning outside the Changing meteorological military: there were very few civilian American conditions resulted in the winds citizens living in Tohoku before the 3.11 shifting rapidly from blowing out to disasters and what few remained soon left the sea to blowing back onto land.14 region after the nuclear crisis developed. But for the military, this had implications for their strategic assets in Tohoku, where Japanese Self This report avoids discrepancies between what Defense Force bases are arrayed and linked TEPCO was contending and the U.S.into the USJF as joint task forces, from which assessment, skirting differences between the tsunami relief efforts were being staged. In Japanese government and the U.S. response. In recognition of the threat the nuclear fallout the press, though, such interpretations were posed to troops in this region, the U.S. provided. New York Times reporter Onishi, who distributed Potassium Iodide (KI) to its forces, helped break this story in the foreign press, monitored their troops' exposure to make sure stated: they did not exceed the protective action guideline limits and limited their time within the exclusion zone. U.S. military personnel In the first few days, basically the working in the region were required to submit crux of the disagreement was that GPS data to indicate they had not strayed into the foreign experts who were the exclusionary zone unless specifically tasked assessing the situation had a much to do so. more severe assessment of the seriousness of the accident In association with these near-term protective compared to what the Japanese measures, the Defense Threat Reduction were saying publically. The Agency, working in coordination with Naval American government was getting Reactors, developed a comprehensive information from its experts in the "Tomodachi Registry," which was designed to NRC and also the military that was provide dose estimates for U.S. military sharply at odds with what the personnel in Japan. In consideration of the Japanese government authorities history of open-air nuclear bomb testing that and TEPCO were saying publically, exposed military personnel to high levels of sharply at odds. What made

20 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF radioactive fallout, from the beginning of the recommendation on March 15, 2011 that nuclear crisis the U.S. Navy was concerned to personnel at Yokosuka Naval Base and Naval develop a radiation exposure database that Air Facility Atsugi stay indoors (shelter in- could be used for dose reconstructions of place), and by the authorization on March 16 military personnel and their dependents in for the "voluntary military assisted departures" Japan. Seeking to avoid Fukushimaof government and Department of Defense "Downwinders" who would bring litigation dependents in specified areas. The U.S. against the government and to allay fears of government accounted for its advisories as their families, the U.S. military methodically "best-practices" recommendations made "out of compiled a comprehensive registry that could an abundance of caution, and in order to enable serve as an objective reference point for U.S. government officials and the uniformed assessing radiation exposure during themilitary to concentrate on the tasks at hand" Fukushima nuclear crisis. Since 3.11, two class- (U.S. Department of State 2011). At the action lawsuits have been brought by U.S. embassy and on the military bases, families sailors who served on the USS Ronald Reagan were starting to panic after word filtered out nuclear aircraft carrier during the crisis, but that radiation levels were triggering alarms on these suits have been filed against TEPCO, the carriers, and as they heard their spouses which may be legally vulnerable to such claims relating backstage discussions that were because of their international holdings.16 fraught with tension and uncertainty about the public health implications of the crisis. At the Through the Tomodachi Registry, the U.S. Yokosuka naval base, a delegation of concerned government has provided specific information mothers confronted the base officials, on dose exposures and, irrespective of its demanding that they be more thoroughly designed application, it provides publically informed and be given support to leave, an available radiation measurement readings at eventuality that soon happened, but may have specific rates, and at specific locales. By been accelerated by these public demands. making this information publically available, it Initially the plan to move the D.O.D. stands in stark contrast to how Japan has (not) dependents was conceived as a made radiation data available to its own recommendation with no direct financial citizens. Although MEXT developed a radiation support, but it quickly became evident that this registry and made it available online, after a would reflect class divisions and embitter those meeting of Fukushima prefectural authorities who could not afford the predatory pricing that was convened to discuss this, the Mayor of developed as demand soared (at this time taxis Fukushima raised concerns that it would were charging $2,000 for a ride from Yokosuka provoke fears by an uneducated public and the to Narita airport; plane tickets were going for registry was taken down. Months later, the up to $20,000). IAEA, perhaps as a compensation for this (the director of the IAEA is Japanese) and as a way Thus, while the official stated position to establish its authority in contrast to the maintained that radiation was near background Japanese ministries, made a similar radiation levels in these locations and thus no danger to registry available online. public health, D.O.D. dependents, including the families of embassy officials in Tokyo and at the In its official announcements, throughout the U.S. Consulate in Nagoya were given support crisis the U.S. Embassy continued to assert that (the flights were free of charge) to leave Japan. for those outside the Tohoko region, the Through a mission named "Operation Pacific situation was relatively safe. This position was Passage" approximately 7,800 D.O.D. called into question by the military'sdependents (including about 1,200 families) left

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Japan, the most significant movement of U.S. taking remedial actions in response to a citizens in Japan since the Pacific War. cascading series of setbacks, failing to anticipate events as they developed and only Within the social networks of expats in Japan, begrudgingly accepting help after their efforts the "voluntary departures" were controversial. had proved lacking. The D.O.D. dependents who took advantage of this opportunity to depart without cost were Well into April of 2011, the situation at the labeled "Fly-Jin" (a contraction variant of the Daiichi plant continued to deteriorate. Even Japanese word "Gaijin," a derogatory slang for after water was put on the reactor cores, a foreigner) and were accused of using the radiation continued to plume out of the plant: crisis as an occasion to take a paid holiday for fully three months this water continued to while waiting out the crisis. This label had boil, releasing radioactive steam into the originated on Twitter feeds as a sarcastic pun, environment, while the area around the and came to be used more generally to reactors was turned into a swamp, with describe foreigners who had abandoned Japan contaminated water spilling into the ocean. On out of fear for personal safety. the front side of the accident TEPCO had downplayed the significance of the disaster, but For the government and military authorities even after the actions that would eventually who arranged these departures, the operation prove effective were taken, the situation was a pragmatic compromise that appeased the remained unstable. By the middle of May, 2011 concerns of the panicked citizens under their TEPCO was able to demonstrate that despite protection. But by taking this step, theevidence to the contrary, the water in the SFP government was unambiguously demonstrating of reactor #4 remained intact, but by their own that they did not have confidence that these calculations, it had continued to decrease until citizens were safe in Japan and thus needed to the end of April, coming perilously close to be hastily removed, irrespective of the cost or uncovering the fuel rods (See Table 3). diplomatic implications. This perspective had gradually developed over the first week of the crisis, based on unexpectedly high readings Table 3 coming from radiation surveys, which was compounded by the experience of dealing with the Japanese authorities. At J-Village, the staging ground in Fukushima for the crisis management of the disaster, the U.S. nuclear experts were encountering a chaotic environment, were witness to a lack of coordination among agencies, and were seeing indication that neither TEPCO nor the Japanese government fully appreciated the magnitude of the crisis and had a viable plan to effectively address it. While the U.S. military was recommending that several thousand staff be tasked to work on getting water on the reactors, using heavy equipment in a coordinated response between the military and civilian workers, TEPCO was devoting less than one hundred staff to diverse tasks and were Throughout this time the reactors continuously

22 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF plumed out radiation into the environment. government agencies that were mapping the When seen through the refracted gaze of the plume elsewhere, including at distances much media, it seemed as though the radioactive farther from the plant into the Kanto plain and plumes that escaped the Daiichi plant were Tokyo: the U.S. Embassy is located in Tokyo. severe, but episodic and limited. In fact, the plumes that made their way into theWith an eye on the spent fuel pool #4 and in atmosphere after the venting and hydrogen consideration of alarming hotspot readings that explosions were peak releases, but they were were higher than expected and in excess of merely steps above an already elevated level their Protective Action Guidelines, the U.S. that fluctuated but never stopped. One way to government commissioned a "Supercore" visualize this is to imagine the plume as a analysis of a hypothetical worst-case scenario spotlight that swept back and forth,that might track to Tokyo, and South to the continuously pluming out radioactivity in the military bases in Yokosuka and Yokota. Using direction that light was shone: as the wind the NRC's "Radiological Assessment System for shifted the plume would move, but it never Consequence Analysis" (RASCAL), the National stopped. The plume was unrelenting (and, Atmospheric Release Advisory Center arguably, still is today in another mode, as (NARAC), operated by Lawrence Livermore contaminated water leaks into the ocean), and National Laboratory in California, issued a as this radioactivity has been released into the report on March 20, 2011 concerning Plume environment, it has incrementally distributed Model Dose Projections in the vicinity of the collective, cumulative doses whoseU.S. Embassy in Tokyo. This analysis was based consequences for public health were terrifying on a "Source Term" (the source term is the in the early days of the crisis but may well be known inventory of radionuclides in a given even worse in the long-term. reactor) assuming Daiichi Unit #2 reactor release to the environment, 50% of the total We may never fully know the magnitude of the spent fuel pool from Reactor #3 and 100% of Fukushima nuclear disaster in this early phase the total spent fuel from Reactor #4 being of the crisis. For much of this time, the wind released into the environment. Although this blew out to sea, diffusing the fallout into the air analysis estimated radiation exposure levels of and the water, making it difficult to measure less than 25% of maximum allowable doses for directly and with any certainty. In time we may the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency infer from contaminated seafood the level of guidelines, the NARAC model simulations used contamination, but even this is imprecise, as release times of distinct 48-hour periods of migratory fish and the bias of government time, dating from March 14 and going until ministries inclined to withhold or downplay bad March 18 (multiple confidential sources news, and strict food standards remove2013).17 contaminated foodstuff from the marketplace. Had the prevailing winds blown inland, it would Taken as a snapshot of a moment in time, the have been an entirely different disaster: the numbers were reassuringly well below the plume that rendered the area Northwest of the maximum allowable PAG dose. What this Daiichi plant uninhabitable (where Namie and analysis did not account for, however, was the other evacuated villages are located) was only long-term impact of a continuous release from part of one afternoon on one day. The high multiple reactors. Although RASCAL - as with levels of contamination in these isolated SPEEDI, a comparable system - is an important hotspots are by now well known and much tool used within the U.S. nuclear industry, it measured; what is not generally recognized is has inherent limitations that cannot what radiation monitoring was revealing to accommodate the multiple contingencies of

23 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF shifting weather patterns disseminating fallout Japan. from multiple sources. Basically, the system is a sophisticated weather predictor, and while it On March 21st, shortly after PACOM initiated is considerably more than a best guessthe military assisted departures for D.O.D. estimate, it does not use actual measurements dependents at the bases, a hotspot reading taken in situ where the actual depositions half-way between Fukushima and the Yokosuka reside. Using source-term assumptions, the military base was so high that Naval Reactors, system estimates where a given release will go in this context one of the primary organizations once it is out in the environment, butresponsible for radiation assessment for the ultimately, it is a computer software program Department of Defense, recommended that based on a number of inferential assumptions. military and civilian dependent personnel within a 200 mile (322km) radius be offered KI In the Fukushima nuclear crisis, this system and be included in military assisted departure was useful, but it had inherent limits that could (essentially, the recommendation was to not accommodate a multiple-day, multiple- support KI distribution and evacuations of release scenario. For a single reactor accident D.O.D. dependents up to 200 miles distance such as Three Mile Island, the system can more from the Daiichi Plant). This drove decision accurately model a release such as the venting making at this crucial moment, giving reason of a reactor over a limited period of time, or a for the distribution of Potassium Iodide (KI) and catastrophic release such as the hydrogen further reinforcing the rationale for the military explosions that happened at the Daiichi facility. assisted departures (Yokosuka is 163 miles But beyond such a limited time frame, the from the Daiichi NPP). With only hours before system is overwhelmed: for the Supercore the plume would hit Yokosuka, the debate analysis, NARAC compressed longer-term focused on the immediate necessity of releases into release times of 24 hours, and distributing KI to D.O.D. dependents. completely disregarded food ingestion pathways, which require longer-range analysis While this debate continued, it was determined that includes agriculture areas and different after putting the data through a peer review isotopes. Moreover, the NARAC simulations process and comparing this to the radiation assume only dry depositions and do not factor survey data in Tohoku (extrapolating readings in precipitation, whose ethereal quality and from near the reactors to correlate with more "scrubbing effects" would befuddle anydistant readings as in Yokosuka), that this software program designed to calculateunexpectedly high reading was an numerically precise values. unrepresentative outlier, owing to a measurement error or a transient spike from Alongside NARAC's RASCAL runs, similar random particulate fallout. As had been the atmospheric modeling was conducted by the case with the reactor venting, the hydrogen U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), explosions and the spent fuel pool debate, this and by France, Canada and the Unitedunexpectedly high reading alarmed the U.S. Kingdom,18 but as with the NRC's system, these authorities and provoked them to action. Even agencies all used source-term derivatives and though this particular reading was found to be did not conduct actual on-the-ground radiation in error, it highlighted the prospect of measurement. The U.S. military andexposing, especially, pregnant and lactating Department of Energy, however, continued to females, infants and small children to thyroid compile real-world measurements throughout dose rates above the established DOE the crisis, not only in the Tohoku region, but in Protective Action Guideline threshold. Tokyo and at the military bases throughout

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The fundamental point pushed by the Navy to were implemented at the military bases and the warrant its more conservativeembassies at the height of the crisis recommendations was the cumulative dose emphatically demonstrates two things: that for rates that were accruing over time. Even 10 a period of several days the U.S. government days into the disaster, the situation was believed that departure from Japan was continuing unabated, exposing D.O.D.imminent and secondly, that the situation was personnel and their dependents toso volatile that they thought it prudent to take incrementally accumulating dose rates that immediate action to protect their assets. would conceivably pass the maximum PAG threshold for public health over an extended At this same time, inside the U.S. Embassy in period of time. With this in mind, the U.S. Tokyo a team was tasked to draw up plans to government decided to distribute KI and put tens of thousands of American citizens on support departures because even if the dose the decks of the aircraft carriers to get them rates at this time were still inside the DOE out within hours (there were not a sufficient guidelines, if the exposure rates continued as number of available flights to get such a large measured they would eventually hit and pass number of citizens and Department of Defense the PAG limit, and perhaps continue todependents out quickly if it had proved accumulate even further thereafter. Despite the necessary). The German government and other cost and inconvenience, civilian expats might embassies in Japan have been subjected to find their way to Western Japan to wait out the criticism for moving their diplomatic corps and crisis, or leave Japan altogether, but the embassy operations to Western Japan while military were parked at the bases and not going other foreign embassies held the line in 20 anywhere: in a long-term nuclear event they Tokyo, but backstage and out of view of public faced the prospect of continuous exposure. scrutiny, the U.S. Embassy made specific plans to move to Osaka (two staff from each section As a result of these concerns, the U.S. military were assigned to support embassy functions if in Japan implemented a preconceivedthis were to have proved necessary). This was "Emergency Action Plan," in the U.S. Embassy not unique to the U.S. government: at the same and at the military bases. This plan is invoked time international cooperation was ramping up to protect classified documents that cannot be for tsunami relief, foreign embassies in Japan left behind from disclosure. At the U.S.began to discuss evacuation of foreign Embassy in Tokyo, industrial grade shredders nationals to escape the nuclear fallout while were used continuously for four days,managing the perceptions of their staff and destroying classified documents dating back a Japan-based constituents as the situation decade; at the military bases burn bags were continued to deteriorate with no respite in used to destroy documents and equipment such sight. This was a tricky balance, and it took as classified servers and cryptographyconsiderable finesse to implement procedures machines were physically destroyed.19 As out of line with the Japanese official response ominous as this may seem, Emergency Action while seeking to avoid the diplomatically Plans are commonplace within the military troubling insinuation that these policies were culture: every branch employs this protocol as an implicit critique of the Japanese a means to prevent confidential and classified government's crisis management procedures. materials from being compromised when situations develop that compel departure from In retrospect, the various protective measures a location where military and intelligence taken by the U.S. Government - to distribute KI assets are arrayed. In the Fukushima nuclear to its citizens, to pay for assisted departures of crisis, the fact that Emergency Action Plans D.O.D. dependents and possibly relocate the

25 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF embassy and perhaps leave Japan altogether - industry supporters), as the overall picture that may seem to have been an over-reaction based emerges is one of inadequate preparation, well- on miscalculation. For critics of these decisions intentioned ineptitude, poor communication they may even be seen as a species of ill- and tone-deaf politics. These evaluations, advised panic mongering characteristic of anti- coming from various parties distributed across nuclear activists and tailor-made for the tabloid the political spectrum, map onto anti- press. This was not, however, the way this was government political agendas, lending conceived by the most experienced andcredence to anti-nuclear activists, who had knowledgeable U.S nuclear authorities who anticipated such a crisis. were the most influential voices at the height of the crisis, and whose recommendations were Although the tsunami may well have resulted in translated into policy. With the clarity of greater immediate impact on Japanese society hindsight, the grave concern and subsequent in terms of the environmental and economic political contretemps that accompanied them effects, the meaning and significance of the might have been avoided if the press of events nuclear crisis for Japan remains uncertain. at the time did not compel immediate action. Because this was a uniquely international But from the vantage point of the U.S. military event, projecting fears of radiation exposure and government authorities, the situation at the implausibly far beyond Japan's borders, cultural time was so uncertain, and the stakes of frames of reference came into play, leading to inaction so high, that "getting in front" of the selective perception about the nature of the worst case possibility and being proactive to accident and its presumed effects. The media take these controversial actions was seen, guided these discourses down characteristically ironically, as the most cautious response. narrow paths, filtering information to construct notions of risk, which shaped public perception Conclusion and influenced the action of decision-making elites. The crisis stoked fears of nuclear energy run amok, and the media helped construct a narrative arch that amplified perceptions of As we look to the early days of the crisis, it is risk in the most melodramatic terms. tempting to place a shelf life on panic-oriented risk discourses and fix these frameworks of Given the magnitude of this crisis, it seems that interpretation in time, to conclude that after a in the aftermath of 3.11 all roads run through somewhat hysterical first few weeks, the crisis Fukushima, as scholars attempt to untangle the abated, taking with it these unreasonable web of associations related to this claims. However, over time critical media unprecedented series of events. As a means of coverage has led to a gradual amplification of studying Japan, the Fukushima nuclear crisis risk about nuclear danger that has given affords opportunities to examine cultural traits credence to claims previously taken as an over- that are embodied in institutional structures, reaction and panic. These adjustments have and find expression in public politics. Public happened incrementally as stories have broken policy is based on political discourse, and in in the media that were previously known only this crisis, perception drove decision-making, to insiders, and as various governmentcreating a politics of fear, which has agencies and independent panels havetransformed Japan. The media helped construct submitted reports, all of which reveal more this interpretative frame through its coverage nuanced information about particular episodes of the nuclear crisis, and after a bad start, has in the crisis. This information has provided become more critical of corporate malfeasance ammunition to critics (and little comfort to and political corruption.

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The foreign press has been alarmist and at mainstream sanction through independent times histrionic about the nuclear crisis in reports and interviews with government Japan, but it has brought issues of political officials, but in the first few weeks of the crisis, corruption to the forefront and helped focus the as fears were at their peak, there was still a debate on politics in a way unfamiliar to the highly contentious debate about the magnitude Japanese domestic press. This has influenced of risk. the Japanese media's coverage, which has altered its tone and perhaps even changed its Any notion that these concerns were irrational priorities. The "Kisha-Club" press system in would seem to be unfounded, based on the Japan, whereby reporters pool information and available evidence. Now that the situation has rely on official public statements as the primary relatively stabilized, people in Japan remain basis for their stories, is increasingly being anxious, especially in Tohoku, about important seen as complicit in the nuclear crisis, since it and entirely reasonable concerns related to disregarded critical information when it most health and well being, and those who have counted and failed to hold the authorities been displaced from their homes because of the accountable for their actions. Although the nuclear accident may never return. It is Japanese press echoed the statements made by difficult to overstate the impact this dual crisis TEPCO and the government in the days will have on Japan in this generation. Now that immediately after the crisis began, as more the initial crisis phase has passed, the focus has troubling information leaked out, it gradually turned to reconstruction and reform, but on the aligned with the foreign press on a number of ground in the Tohoku region people face issues central to this experience. These include chronic uncertainty about the safety of food a withering indictment of the collusion between and the long-term effects of low-level radiation the Japanese political bureaucracy and the exposure. The government's initial response energy utilities, questions about thewas discouraging, and the nuclear village, truthfulness of government and industry when all is said and done, may remain spokesmen, challenges to assurances about substantially intact. But social activism is on food safety, and an increasingly criticalthe rise, bringing previously disengaged assessment of the viability of nuclear energy. citizens into political movements that were previously the domain of activists, who are now Now that enough time has transpired for being vindicated by recent events. watchdog agencies to make their assessments and for previously hidden information to come The author wishes to thank Maho Cavalier, out (via investigative journalism and disclosure Drake Crane and Millie Nishikawa for their by disgruntled former employees), the Japanese assistance in the research that helped produce media are retrospectively framing events in the this paper. more strident terms that we have associated with the panic-driven foreign press. By summer Kyle Cleveland is Associate Professor of of 2011, with information in hand that the Sociology at Temple University's Japan Campus reactors had melted down, and formerin Tokyo and was the founding Director of government officials confirming their worst TUJ's Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies fears, a consensus emerged that Japanese (now Associate Director), for which he government authorities, and especially TEPCO, organizes a lecture series, academic did not have control as they had asserted, and conferences and symposia. As TUJ's Study the situation was much worse than these Abroad Advisor, he was involved in the reassurances indicated. This picture gradually university's crisis management, serving as a started to gain focus and achieve official liaison to U.S.-based study abroad providers,

27 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF and at the height of the nuclear crisisWhite House During Fukushima: Managing chaperoned an emergency evacuation flight out Multiple Crises. Foreign Affairs Magazine. of Japan with international students. He is Council of Foreign Affairs. writing a book on the political dimensions of radiation assessment in the Fukushima nuclear Blustein, Paul (2013, September 26). crisis, examining how foreign governments in Fukushima's Worst-Case Scenarios: Much of Japan responded to the crisis. What you have heard about the Nuclear Accident is Wrong. Slate Magazine. Recommended Citation: Kyle Cleveland, "Mobilizing Nuclear Bias: The Fukushima Defense Threat Reduction Agency (2012, Nuclear Crisis and the Politics of Uncertainty," December). Radiation Dose Assessments for The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 7, No. 4, Shore-Based Individuals in Operation February 17, 2014. Tomodachi Technical Report. Dose Assessment and Recording Working Group: Assistant Related articles Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. Defense Threat Reduction Agency: Fort Belvior, This article is part of 3.11 + 3: Special Issue Virginia. on Japan's Triple Disaster Three Years Onedited by Paul Jobin and David McNeill. El-Jaby, Ali (2011, August 10). Fukushima Other articles include: Daiichi NPP Event and Associated Radioactive Source Term - CNSC's Initial Response. David McNeill and Paul Jobin, Introduction Presented at 2011 WNU Summer Institute. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. Philip C. Brown, Call it A 'Wash'? Historical Perspectives on Conundrums ofFackler, Martin (2012, July). Credibility Lost: Technological Modernization, FloodThe Crisis in Japanese Newspaper Journalism Amelioration and Disasters in Modern after Fukushima). Futaba Shinsho. Japan Feickert, Andrew and Emma Chanlett-Avery Shineha Ryuma and Tanaka Mikihito, Mind (2011, March 22). Japan 2011 Earthquake: U.S. the Gap: 3.11 and the InformationDepartment of Defense (D.O.D.) Response. Vulnerable Congressional Research Service.

Yasuhito ABE, Safecast or the Production of Funabashi, Harutoshi (2012). Why the Collective Intelligence on Radiation Risks Fukushima Nuclear Disaster is a Man-made after 3.11 Calamity. International Journal of Sociology. No. 21. The Japan Sociological Society. References Gardner, Eric (2011, March 17). Military Akagawa, Roy K. (2012, February 29).Dependents Voluntary Evacuation from Japan Interview/Yoichi Funabashi: FukushimaAnnounced. Naval Air Facility, Atsugi Japan, Nuclear Crisis Revealed Japan's Governing Press conference. Commander Fleet Activities, Defects. The Asahi Shimbun. Okinawa.

Asahi Shimbun (2011, September 7).Kan: I Grange, Arnaud de La (2011, March 21). The Couldn't Let TEPCO Withdraw from Fukushima Japanese Surprised by the Exodus of French Disaster. Asahi Shimbun Expatriates. Le Figaro.

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Greenpeace International (2012, February). Lyons, C. and Colton D. (2012). Aerial Lessons from Fukushima. Measuring System in Japan. Health Physics. Vol.102, No. 5. Hayashi, Yuko (2011, August 16). How Japan Stumbled in Forecasting Fallout in One Town. Moroney, Jennifer D. P., et. al. (2013). Lessons The Wall Street Journal. from Department of Defense Disaster Relief Efforts in the Asia-Pacific Region. The Rand International Atomic Energy Agency (2007). Corporation: National Security Research IAEA Safety Glossary: Terminology Used in Division. Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency. Nogami, Hidefumi (2013, February 1). Prometheus Trap (3): Japanese Ambassador Itabashi, Hiroyoshi and Hidefumi Nogami Felt Something Not Right Before State (2013, January 28). U.S. frustrated with Japan's Department Meeting. The Asahi Shimbun. initial response to Fukushima. Prometheus Trap: Asahi Shimbun. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2011, March 13). Freedom of Information Act document Izumi, Tanaka (2011, May 1). 20 Millisierverts NRC-944. for Children and Kosako Toshiso's Resignation. Japan Focus. Perrow, Charles (1999). Normal Accidents: Living With High-Risk Technologies. Princeton Kelly, Tara (2011, March 15).U.S. Military University Press. Exposed to Radiation in Japan, though Officials Say Danger is Minimal. Time Inc. Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (2012, March 11). Fukushima Nuclear Accident Kemeny, John G. (1979, October). Report of The Independent Investigation Report. Tokyo: President's Commission on the Accident at Discover 21. Three Mile Island: The Need for Change: The Legacy of TMI. Washington, D.C. Samuels, Richard J. (2013). 3.11: Disaster and Change in Japan. Cornell U. Press. Kingston, Jeff (2011). Ousting Kan Naoto: The Politics of Nuclear Crisis and Renewable Sasakawa Peace Foundation (2012).The Energy in Japan. The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Crisis Focus. Management: Lessons for Japan-U.S. Alliance Cooperation. Kurokawa, Kyoshi (2012, July).The Official Report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Shikata, Noriyuki (2011, April 17). Personal Independent Investigation Commission. The Communication. National Diet of Japan. Slavin, Erik (2011, April 11).Families Kushida, Kenji E. (2012). Japan's Fukushima Frustrated by Lack of Answers from Yokosuka Nuclear Disaster: Narrative, Analysis, and Hospital. Stars and Stripes. Recommendations. Shorenstein APARC Working Paper. Stanford University. Stohl, A., et. al. (2012, March 1).Xenon-133 and Caesium-137 Releases into the Atmosphere Lochbaum, David and Edwin Lyman (2014). from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Fukushima: The Story of a Nuclear Disaster. Plant: Determination of the Source Term, New Press. Atmospheric Dispersion, and Deposition. Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 12.

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Till, John E. (2003). A Review of the Dose for distribution. But as with the SPEEDI data, Reconstruction Program of the Defense Threat with no government directive nor timely Reduction Agency. Committee to Review the intervention by knowledgeable authorities, he Dose Reconstruction Program of the Defense remained - like many prefectural authorities in Threat Reduction Agency, National Research Fukushima - without guidance or support and Council. The National Academies Press. was left to improvise in a chaotic environment.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3 Willacy, Mark (2012, January 20).Japan (2011, October). Expanded NRC Questions and 'Betrayed Citizens' Over Radiation Danger. Answers related to the March 11, 2011 Australian Broadcasting Company. Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami. 4 Onishi, Nori (2012, February 20). Personal Wambach, Jessica (2012). Civil-Military Lessons Communication. Learned in the Response to the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. Liason: A Journal of 5 Hayano, Ryugo (2012, March 3). Personal Civil-Military Humanitarian ReliefCommunication. Collaborations, Vol. 5. Center for Excellence in 6 Disaster Management & Humanitarian Shikata, Noriyuki (2011, April 17). Personal Assistance (COE-DMHA). Communication.

7 Wang, Dean et. al. (2012, November). Study of Sposato, William (2012, February 9). Personal Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Unit Communication. 4 Spent-Fuel. Nuclear Technology, Vol. 180, 8 No. 2. American Nuclear Society. Neidhart, Christoph (2012, February 7). Personal Communication. Weightman, John (2011). Japanese earthquake 9 and tsunami: Implications for the UK nuclear Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2011, March industry: Final Report. HM Chief Inspector of 13). Freedom of Information Act document Nuclear Installations September 2011. Office NRC-944. for Nuclear Regulation. 10 Suzuki, Tatsujiro (2012). Personal Notes Communication.

11 1 Sposato, William (2011, October 22). Media Multiple sources in the USFJ/Pacific Reporting and Risk Management After the Command. Confidential Personal March 11 Disaster. Japan Echo Symposium. Communication. Tokyo: Japan Echo Foundation. 12 Doane, Magaret (2011, March 14).OIP 2 Baba, Tomatsu (2013, July). PersonalAnalysis/Guidance No. 2. Enformable Nuclear Communication. As mayor of Namie, one of the News. towns most affected by the radiation fallout, 13 Baba-san remains embittered toward the Casto, Charles A. (2012, July 7). Personal national government and has threatened Communication. As the lead person tasked with litigation due to the public health implications overseeing the U.S. response in Japan, Casto for his community. At the same time, he fields was uniquely suited for the Fukushima crisis. continuous demands by citizens who blame him At the time of the accident, he was deputy for not providing Pottasium Iodide at the regional administrator of the NRC's Center of crucial moment, even though this was available Construction Inspection, and earlier in his

30 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF career had worked in five units with a General final call and translated this into policy were a Electric Mark 1 design (there are 23 U.S. composite of all available sources of reactors with this Mark 1 design), and he was information. This meta-analysis was plant manager of the Browns Ferry site in complicated by political concerns, Alabama, a three unit site similar in design to organizational priorities and differences in the Fukushima Daiichi plant. After spending 11 perception among the select handful of elites months in Japan working the Fukushima crisis who ultimately made the final determination. as the chief representative of the U.S. 18 government for the nuclear industry and the Beddington, John (2013, February 27). nuclear response team leader, Casto was Personal Communication. As the chief scientific appointed the regional administrator of the advisor to the British government during the NRC's Midwest office, responsible forFukushima nuclear crisis, Sir John regulating 16 commercial power plants in Beddington's briefings at town hall meetings seven states. Before retiring from the NRC in quickly went viral in social media networks to 2013, he received the Presidentialreassure the expat community in Japan that the Distinguished and Meritorious Rank Awards public health risk was not as ominous as the from President Obama, for his contribution to mainstream media was asserting. Alongside the U.S. government during the nuclear crisis. U.K. Ambassador to Japan, Sir David Warren, Beddington's public statements were the model 14 United States Nuclear Regulatoryof diplomatic acumen, but they were based on Commission (2011, October). Expanded NRC source-term analyses and did not track - at Questions and Answers related to the March least publically - with the assessments being 11, 2011 Japanese Earthquake and Tsunami. made by the U.S. military and Department of Washington: U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryEnergy's on-the-ground radiation surveys, Commission. which indicated a more ominous possible outcome. 15 Onishi, Nori (2012, February 20). Personal Communication. 19 Multiple confidential sources in the USFJ/PACOM. This decision was made as the 16 Cooper et al v. Tokyo Electric Powerresult of consultation with nuclear authorities Company, Inc. et al. (2013, April 1). Case in Washington, D.C. (including former military Number: 3:2013dcv00773. California Southern officers with high-level nuclear expertise) who District Court: San Diego Office. Since the comprised an ad hoc group of advisors to the onset of the nuclear crisis, the number of U.S. State Department and President Obama, with Navy plaintiffs against TEPCO has grown, input from the Department of Energy, the claiming personal injury directly related to Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. radiation releases in the first few days of the Pacific Command. The initiation of Emergency crisis. Although the initial case was dismissed Action Plans at the bases and in the U.S. on jurisdictional grounds, no finding was made Embassy in Tokyo was a stepped procedure of on substantive merit, thus leaving open the ascending priority, beginning with destruction possibility of appeal and future litigation. of materials handled by non-essential staff who were allowed to leave as part of Operation 17 Although source term analyses arePacific Passage. As a first step in the potential qualitatively different from those basedwithdrawal of U.S. military and diplomatic staff specifically upon measured radiation levels, the from Japan, this would have escalated to ultimate interpretation of these various sources include documents and materials utilized by used by the organizational elites who made the essential personnel, had they eventually been

31 12 | 7 | 4 APJ | JF required to exit Japan in a worse case scenario. Germany, which compelled the ruling It is important to note that the content and government to accelerate recently announced relevance of these materials specifically to the plans to discontinue the use of nuclear energy. Fukushima nuclear crisis has not beenThese domestic pressures contributed to the established as a matter of public record, due to Tokyo embassy's decision to move to Osaka, their inherent status as confidential and causing some resentment among the other classified materials: the documents may have foreign embassies, who maintained a been comprised of historical documents, intra- diplomatic facade during the first few days of office communication and other materials that the crisis. Fully six months after the crisis are classified, but not necessarily directly (or began, the German Embassy remained exclusively) related to this particular crisis. understaffed due to concerns about the nuclear situation, with ten posts (about one fourth of its 20 Stanzel, Volker (2012). Personaldiplomatic staff positions) remaining unfilled, Communication. As German Ambassador to as existing staff fled to Germany and refused to Japan during the crisis, Dr. Stanzel was return, and prospective candidates refused to embattled by a more strident public than most come while the situation was still uncertain. To of the foreign embassies endured at this time. help allay concerns, the German Embassy The German reaction to the nuclear crisis was installed a full-time radiation expert in the considered an outlier among the other foreign Tokyo embassy (rotating in several experts over embassies, a response that was influenced by the following year). domestic anti-nuclear sentiments back in