Benjamin Cole

SOFT TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: LESSONS FROM BRITISH MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

by Benjamin Cole

Dr. Benjamin Cole is currently a freelance researcher. He received a Ph.D. from Southampton University in 1996. Dr. Cole has previously held research posts in the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Mountbatten Center for International Studies at the University of Southampton.

he leakage and export of bal- attempting to integrate foreign tech- easily overshadowed by the more listic missile technology nologies into an indigenous devel- concrete aspects of missile hard- Tfrom states like Russia, opment program. Because of ware, the soft technology is unques- Ukraine, and China in recent years Britain’s advanced technological tionably more important. Without have heightened concerns about the level and the enormous benefits of sound policy choices, good organi- proliferation of ballistic missiles. its strong links to the United States, zation, skilled personnel and ad- Yet, the precise impact of technol- this also represents one of the best equate financing, no amount of even ogy transfers on the indigenous pro- possible cases for successful tech- the very best equipment can be suf- grams of proliferators is difficult to nology transfer. Therefore, any lim- ficient to create long-range ballistic determine. However, useful obser- its on such efforts identified in this missiles.”2 vations can be discerned from the case study should apply even more This article will test Karp’s the- British attempt to develop the Blue strongly in the case of current sis about soft technology, which sug- Streak ballistic missile system. This proliferators, since these countries gests that so long as a state possesses program, initiated in the mid-1950s, are generally less advanced techno- good soft technology, it should be sought to provide Britain with its logically and do not enjoy special re- able to master all of the technologi- own ballistic missile, a medium- lationships with their suppliers. cal problems of long-range missile 1 range system. Although Britain This case study focuses in particu- development. Consequently, if Karp made considerable progress, it can- lar on the role and importance of is right, control of relevant technolo- celed the program in 1960, for rea- what Aaron Karp calls the “soft tech- gies through the Missile Technology sons described below. nology” of missile development. Control Regime (MTCR) may not Britain received substantial U.S. Soft technology refers to the range be able to prevent proliferation. To technological assistance in this pro- of managerial and technical skills the extent that states can develop the gram, and thus it represents a well- necessary to master new hardware. kind of knowledge and financing documented case study of a state According to Karp, “Although it is emphasized by Karp, and these re-

56 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 Benjamin Cole main uncontrolled by the MTCR, his eration. On the other hand, the case THE HISTORY OF BLUE thesis predicts that efforts to limit study also suggests that transfers of STREAK missile proliferation will not succeed hard technology can have a signifi- In the 1950s, the British govern- in the long term. cant impact on missile programs ment planned for the country’s This article examines three ques- when a state’s overall soft technol- nuclear deterrent to be based solely tions in order to test the validity of ogy is good, even if gaps exist in that on a fleet of strategic V-bombers. Karp’s thesis. First, I examine state’s abilities. These were subsonic jet aircraft spe- whether soft technology helps to This article first outlines the his- cifically designed to carry the large, explain the technological problems tory of the Blue Streak project, dis- first-generation British nuclear Britain encountered in its attempted cussing the reasons behind its weapons. However, intelligence re- assimilation of American technol- initiation and cancellation. It then ports from the early 1950s indicated ogy transfers. If the thesis is valid, provides a detailed analysis of the that future developments in defen- the effect of specific transfers of hard strengths and weaknesses of each of sive guided-weapon systems would technology will depend upon the the four components of soft technol- render the V-bombers increasingly quality of the proliferator’s soft tech- ogy identified by Karp. It starts with vulnerable to Soviet air defenses in nology, and a proliferator’s progress British policy choices, specifically the 1960s. These reports prompted will be primarily contingent upon the design of the Blue Streak sys- British planners to examine the pos- improvements in its soft technology. tem and the development strategy sibility of procuring a ballistic mis- Second, I investigate whether weak- underpinning the British ballistic sile system to eventually assume the nesses in specific areas of British missile program. The next three sec- role of the primary deterrent.3 soft technology account for the main tions then cover the management, Yet, it was not until 1953-54 that technological bottlenecks in the Blue personnel, and finances of the the government’s scientific advisers Streak development program. project, respectively. The article considered it feasible to develop an Karp’s thesis suggests that techno- then outlines an element of British indigenous ballistic missile system logical choke points will vary for hard technology that also proved rel- capable of targeting the majority of each proliferator depending upon the evant: the development infrastruc- population centers in the Soviet particular weaknesses in its soft ture (i.e., tools and test facilities) Union. In 1954, British Minister of technology. Third, I examine within the firms contracted to de- Supply Duncan Sandys secured an whether technology transfers instead velop Blue Streak. Finally, it ana- agreement with the U.S. Secretary compensated for the weaknesses in lyzes how the strengths and of Defense Charles Wilson for U.S. British soft technology. On this weaknesses of British soft technol- technical assistance to a British bal- point, Karp suggests that specific ogy and development infrastructure listic missile program. The Sandys- technology transfers cannot wholly affected the development of Blue Wilson agreement was critical to compensate for weaknesses in a Streak, especially the assimilation of Britain’s decisionmaking process proliferator’s soft technology. technology transferred from the because it addressed Britain’s lack I conclude that the Blue Streak United States. The conclusion then of ballistic missile development ex- case supports Karp’s thesis to a large draws larger policy lessons from the perience and its need for the system extent but not entirely. The case con- case. It finds the implications for within a short timeframe.4 In August firms the importance of soft technol- technology control regimes might 1955, the operational requirements ogy, but it also suggests that in some not be as dire as Karp’s thesis sug- for the Blue Streak system were is- circumstances hard technology can gests. However, it also points to the sued; the development program compensate for weaknesses in soft need to develop new policy instru- aimed to produce an initial deploy- technology. This has two implica- ments to deal with the full range of ment in 1963, with full deployment tions. On the one hand, it highlights materials and knowledge that go into in 1965. Thereafter, it would fulfill the limits of hard technology trans- missile proliferation. the primary deterrent role until 1970. fers. Without adequate soft technol- During the course of its develop- ogy, technology transfers do not ment, the project suffered from necessarily result in missile prolif- missed deadlines, increasing costs,

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 57 Benjamin Cole and technological obsolescence.5 BRITAIN’S SOFT states. Robert Cockburn, the control- These problems prompted some TECHNOLOGY: AN ler of guided weapons and electron- decisionmakers to advocate cancel- ASSESSMENT ics in the Ministry of Supply,9 argued ing the project in favor of either col- that Britain was following an alter- laborating with the United States on Design And Development native form of incremental develop- a more advanced system or procur- Strategy ment strategy. This overlapping ing a complete system from the Since Blue Streak was intended development strategy started with United States. These calls were ini- to fulfill the role of the primary de- the V-bombers armed with stand-off tially rejected, but intelligence re- terrent, it needed to be capable of missiles, progressed to low-level su- ports about the Soviet deployment carrying a one-ton warhead to a personic bombers armed with stand- of SS-3 and SS-4 intermediate-range range of 2,000 to 2,500 nautical off missiles in conjunction with ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in the miles (nmi), with a circular error land-based “flat flying missiles” wake of the Soviet launch of Sput- probable (CEP) of 8,000 feet, and it (i.e., cruise missiles), followed by an nik in October 1957 raised concerns was required to have 95 percent MRBM, and then by intercontinen- about the vulnerability of Blue overall reliability.7 Britain had ex- tal ballistic missiles (ICBMs).10 This Streak to preemption. These con- tensive experience developing and progression implies that the experi- cerns led the Royal Navy to advo- operating small sounding rockets, ence gained from developing stra- cate procuring the Polaris missile such as the Skylark, which were used tegic bombers and cruise missiles from the United States. The uncer- for conducting research in the up- could effectively substitute for (and tainty over Blue Streak’s survivabil- per atmosphere. However, it had is therefore equivalent to) the expe- ity, coupled with increasing never produced a ballistic missile rience that would have accrued from divisions among decisionmakers, system, and these were exacting successfully developing shorter led to the creation of the British technical requirements to meet in range ballistic missile systems. Nuclear Deterrent Study Group to one’s first effort. However, some key elements of bal- examine the long-term options for listic missile design, such as re-en- Karp argues that the development the British deterrent. The group rec- try vehicles and rocket engines, are strategy adopted by a state is a criti- ommended that Blue Streak be can- fundamentally different from air- cal determinant in the success or fail- celed because it would be vulnerable plane and cruise missile design. ure of a project. The most successful to preemption.6 The government ac- These differences raise questions development strategy for ballistic cepted this recommendation and, in about whether Cockburn’s develop- missiles is an incremental one, early 1960, secured an agreement to ment strategy is indeed viable, a which starts with short-range sys- procure Skybolt air-launched ballis- point I will return to once I have tems and gradually builds systems tic missiles from the United States. identified the major problems Brit- with successively longer ranges. The cancellation of Blue Streak was ain encountered. Successful producers such as the confirmed in April 1960, and ever United States, Russia, France, and In choosing a design and devel- since, Britain has relied on the China adopted this approach. How- opment strategy, Britain had the United States to supply it with stra- ever, British requirements forced it major advantage of virtually unre- tegic nuclear delivery systems (al- to dive into the field at the medium- stricted and ongoing access to U.S. though these did not include range ballistic missile (MRBM) technology and experience.11 In par- Skybolt, which the United States ul- level. Significantly, all of the states ticular, it sought continued discus- timately canceled because it had its that have adopted this approach have sion and information on the own technical problems). I now turn failed to develop their systems.8 development of U.S. ballistic mis- to a step-by-step analysis of the vari- sile projects and the supply of ous components of soft technology, The British approach raises ques- sample components. Initially, Brit- in order to assess how they affected tions about the soundness of its ain sought specific information in the outcome of technology transfer development strategy. British engi- six areas: the results of wind tunnel in the case. neers felt that they did not need to tests and the effects of high rates of pursue the same incremental strate- heating; the results of re-entry test gies as the other nuclear weapon vehicle work; the progress of motor

58 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 Benjamin Cole development; the experience of the time, subject the missile to a higher the V-bombers, and had been con- use of the Azusa radar; structural test “g” force, and increase the all-up- ducting research and development results from the Atlas ICBM and weight of the missile (i.e., the weight (R&D) on the Blue Moon and Red Viking sounding rocket programs; of the missile when fueled and ready Rapier cruise missile projects.20 and the results of tests on inertial for launch).16 This decision also These were air-launched systems navigation components.12 The single made the project contingent upon the that would have carried warheads most significant technology transfer successful development of a strong, weighing up to one ton with ranges in this case, however, was the blue- lightweight structure. The designers of 100 and 400 miles, respectively. prints for the North American Avia- recognized that if unforeseen difficul- They were also significantly larger tion (NAA) S-3 engine. Similar to ties prevented the achievement of low than the compact and lightweight the Atlas boosters, this engine was structure weight ratios,17 switching to cruise missile systems of the 1990s. used in Thor and Jupiter, the first a two-stage system might prove nec- In the 1950s, no single British generation of American MRBMs. essary. Thus, the initial design was firm had the necessary expertise or The objective of having the Blue critical, because any changes would spare capacity to develop all ele- Streak missile ready for initial de- involve very long time cycles and ments of ballistic missile technol- ployment in 1963 affected the de- could introduce new sources of ogy. One alternative was to create 18 sign goals. The chief goals were unreliability. an entirely new organization along simplicity; a minimum of risks Given the boldness of the choice the lines of the Manhattan Project (where innovative technology was to start development with an that would oversee design, develop- incorporated, it was paralleled by the MRBM, it would have been hard to ment, and production of the system. development of a simpler version do much better on the design ele- Most of today’s proliferators would that provided a higher assurance of ment of soft technology. Design probably choose this route. How- success); considerable flexibility in choices inevitably involve a series ever, the British believed that this performance goals to accommodate of trade-offs. In this case, the design would remove resources from other possible changes in warhead size, of Blue Streak made the task of de- projects, take longer to establish, and weight, shielding requirements, and veloping the booster relatively be more costly.21 Instead, the Min- counter-measures;13 and a low easier, but it made the tasks of de- istry of Supply contracted with a price.14 veloping the structure and the guid- number of different firms to produce One S-3 engine would provide a ance system relatively more Blue Streak. range of only 1,300 to 1,700 nmi, difficult. Since it was not possible The DeHavilland Propeller Com- which left British designers with to minimize the development prob- pany received the main contract to three options: to increase the power lems of all elements of the missile, develop Blue Streak. Three other of the S-3 by 20 percent; to use twin the British designers made decisions companies were assigned to build motors; or to develop a system with that should not have caused exces- the main subcomponents. The staged motors.15 The designers fi- sive problems for the missile devel- DeHavilland Aircraft Company nally decided to use a single-stage opment effort. (which was another part of the same system incorporating two S-3s, firm as the Propeller Company) was Management which would make possible ranges contracted to produce the missile up to 2,500 nmi. They chose this Several analysts have observed structure; Rolls Royce was con- route because such a system could that success in missile development tracted to produce the engines; and be adapted to incorporate more mo- depends substantially on effective the Sperry Gyroscope Company was tor units if required. management of a project.19 Although contracted to produce the inertial no British firms had ever developed This choice had both positive and guidance system. Other firms were a ballistic missile, Britain had a large negative repercussions. While it re- awarded more minor contracts. Fi- and sophisticated aerospace indus- moved the requirement to master the nally, one government agency, the try that rivaled the best in the world. complexities of missile staging, the Royal Aircraft Establishment at It had plenty of experience develop- use of a twin-engine configuration Farnborough (the RAE), conducted ing large aerospace projects, such as would increase the development research and development on re-en-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 59 Benjamin Cole try. Both the Ministry of Supply and though there was some overlap be- the RAE believed that the manage- the RAE exercised government con- tween the two perceptions, the con- ment structure overall worked well. trol. The RAE acted as a design ini- flict of emphasis was marked. Val Cockburn’s form of incremental de- tiator and approver, monitored how Cleaver, the head of the rocket mo- velopment strategy took advantage the firms were proceeding, and gave tor department at Rolls Royce, con- of the fact that the firms and the requirements to the firms, but it did sidered the dispute to be of Ministry of Supply had previous no detailed design work.22 Despite its increasing importance as the project experience successfully managing lack of missile experience, Britain progressed.23 large aerospace development had honed its management skills Work at the Sperry Gyroscope projects. since the end of World War II in the Company was also hampered by Judging from Britain’s experi- development of a number of large- poor management and coordination. ence, a Manhattan Project-style of scale projects, such as the V-bomb- In 1958, the RAE learned that Sperry management is not necessarily su- ers and other guided-weapons had not designed the inertial navi- perior. Proliferator states appear to projects. Consequently, the firms gation system to be capable of ac- choose this approach only because applied clearly established methods commodating all of the different they lack the existing industrial ca- of management and control to the components that were under devel- pacity and experience that made Blue Streak project. A complex opment at other firms, but for Sperry Cockburn’s incremental approach committee structure oversaw devel- to re-design the platform at that time possible in the United Kingdom. opment of the project: A coordinat- would have entailed significant Rather than the development strat- ing committee met every six months, problems. There were also coordi- egy or management style, the most and under its direction, a set of eight nation problems between De- significant problems in Blue Streak committees were responsible for Havilland and Rolls Royce. The arose from inadequate funding. As more regular and specific coordina- latter company appeared to be ignor- subsequent sections will show, fi- tion of different elements of the sys- ing vibrational forces that were too nance limitations restricted the rate tem. Supplementing this committee small to be of importance for motor at which the firms could develop was a U.S.-U.K. Advisory Commit- design considerations, but that might their infrastructure and build new tee on MRBMs that also discussed be of importance in the overall mis- capital facilities, and this was the operational and developmental prob- sile vibration problem.24 This diffi- main source of difficulties. Before lems. Though complex, the structure culty resulted from the lack of a discussing finance and infrastruc- matched established practice for chance to conduct tests, in part be- ture, though, it is necessary to con- guided-weapons projects. cause of pressure to keep to the sider the third aspect of soft Considering the large number of schedule. technology identified by Karp, the firms involved and the complexity By 1958, delays in the schedule availability of skilled personnel. of the project, it is not surprising that prompted the Ministry of Supply to Personnel problems arose with managing and overhaul the management structure. coordinating the various elements of In particular, the Ministry identified The initial task of the Blue Streak the project. In particular, the firms Sperry as requiring additional con- project firms was to assemble their differed in development philoso- trol and technical support from the engineering teams, but Britain pos- phies concerning the project. Rolls RAE and the Ministry. In addition, sessed very few engineers who had Royce saw the project in terms of the top-level coordinating commit- previously worked on ballistic mis- developing the engineering needed tee would meet every three months; sile projects. Karp argues that large to demonstrate that a satisfactory and a new appointment, the director numbers of skilled engineers are re- propulsion system could be pro- general (ballistic missiles), would quired to design a system, and a vided. In contrast, DeHavilland and make all decisions. Also, more of the skilled workforce is required to build the Ministry of Aviation (which took lower panels would be chaired by the it. He argues that, while shorter over the functions of the Ministry of Ministry.25 Finally, a new progress range systems can be built using Supply in 1959) put the emphasis on committee to meet quarterly was skills acquired in existing enter- the delivery of engines to meet an also proposed. Despite the problems, prises, arbitrarily planned program. Al-

60 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 Benjamin Cole

building larger rockets, such that, at the outset of the project, ent prior experience from the other however, requires infra- structure and talents previ- some believed that their experience British firms. It had neither produced ously unheard of elsewhere in turbine development might enable any of the V-bombers, nor worked in other civilian or military them to improve the design of com- on the superstructure of Blue Moon industries. A labor force proficient in the skills of ponents, which could then be incor- or Red Rapier. Instead, it had pro- fuel mixing, chemical mill- porated into the U.S. design.30 The duced the Comet, the first jet-pow- ing, beryllium fabrication clearest example of convertibility ered airliner. DeHavilland gained and the thousands of other exotic skills of missile mak- from aircraft to missiles was the de- experience engineering large aero- ing cannot be cobbled to- sign—based on some existing Rolls space structures from the Comet, and gether merely by raiding Royce gas turbine engines—of the also developed a number of surface- 26 existing companies. new turbopump for the modified to-air missiles. By 1958, DeHavilland Yet, this is precisely what Britain versions of the S-3 engine developed was still suffering from a shortage of was forced to do, as it quickly at- in Britain, which were designated skilled engineers, but this resulted tempted to assemble the necessary the RZ series.31 At that time in the from a lack of spare capacity within teams to get the project started. United States, NAA was having the firm rather than a skill shortage Rolls Royce, the engine contrac- problems with the turbine develop- within British industry. tor, had extensive experience devel- ment for the S-3 because it lacked The DeHavilland team was aided oping airplane engines, including the the facilities for a complete testing by the large degree of similarity of 32 Avon, used to power the Vickers program. In contrast, Rolls Royce technique between ballistic missile Valiant V-bomber, but it had never already possessed the necessary fa- and aircraft structures. Although bal- previously produced a rocket motor. cilities and proceeded to re-design listic missiles differ because they rely Nonetheless, it rapidly assembled a the turbine. Some design changes, on pressurization for structural integ- team of engineers from both inside including the re-designed turbine, rity, the techniques in riveting and and outside of the firm. Some had were fed back to NAA, but by that welding are very similar, despite re- previous rocket experience, but most time, the United States was engaged quiring modification in some in- had only worked on aircraft en- in developing the next generation of stances.35 Therefore, DeHavilland 27 gines. An exception was Val propulsion technology, particularly managed the switch to ballistic mis- Cleaver, the head of the rocket de- solid propellants. Therefore, only sile development with relative ease. partment, who had worked on the some of the design changes were of Its lack of experience with electron- 33 Sprite, Super-Sprite, and Spectre any use to NAA. ics proved to be a problem, but this rocket engines at DeHavilland until However, the team probably was resolved through a cooperation 28 1955. However, these engines were adapted their skills so easily because agreement with General Electric small, with thrusts between 5,000 Rolls Royce was already working at Company (GEC). DeHavilland mas- and 8,000 pounds. The engines that the leading edge of airplane engine tered the design and development would propel Blue Streak would development, unlike many of problems to such an extent that some have a thrust of 135,000 pounds, so today’s proliferators. Current believed that the structural design the jump in capability was enor- proliferators have encountered dif- was not only superior to comparable mous. ficulties in adapting their skills and U.S. systems, but also lighter.36 Despite never having previously knowledge. For example, when In- In contrast to Rolls Royce and produced a ballistic missile engine, dia procured the Vikas liquid-fueled DeHavilland, building engineering Rolls Royce adapted to the task with engine from France, it had to send teams proved to be particularly dif- ease. The team discovered that aero- 50 engineers to France on a long- ficult at Sperry, the contractor for the space technique is almost directly term assignment in order to master guidance system. One of the princi- 34 transferable from aircraft to missile it. In contrast, British engineers pal concerns at the initiation of the engines. Some of the equations used made only short visits to their coun- project was whether Britain could had to be slightly modified, but they terparts in the United States. develop an inertial guidance system 29 were essentially similar. The level DeHavilland, which was in charge within the project’s timetable. of expertise within the team was of the missile structure, had differ- Sperry had the hardest job of all the

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 61 Benjamin Cole

firms involved in the project because Therefore, the RAE had some exper- duced a V-bomber, while Sperry had a ballistic missile guidance system tise in most aspects of ballistic mis- not worked on the guidance system was a great advance over its previ- sile development except re-entry and for the Red Rapier or Blue Moon ous work; Rolls Royce and guidance. However, because of a cruise missiles. In fact, some firms DeHavilland already had vast ex- lack of spare capacity within the or- with relevant experience were not perience in their respective fields.37 ganization, it had difficulty building brought into the project. These in- Sperry’s experience in developing a large enough team to work on Blue cluded Hawker Siddeley, which had inertial guidance systems for aircraft Streak. Personnel were largely gath- worked on rocket propulsion, and formed the basis for its work on Blue ered from other departments and the Bristol Aeroplane Company and Streak, but its problem was that, al- other guided-weapons or aircraft Vickers, which were developing Red though components of the right level projects.42 Rapier. of accuracy existed for aircraft use, Apart from the actual warhead, Thus, Britain did not attempt to they were not developed for mis- the major technological problem nurture long-term teams within in- 38 siles. Therefore, Sperry faced the concerning the re-entry head was the dustry by applying Cockburn’s strat- task of adapting and developing heat shield, an entirely new area for egy in an ongoing way to the same known techniques and technology to British engineers. DeHavilland de- core set of firms. The British Blue this new field. signed the re-entry head, while the Streak experience proves that it is In 1955, Sperry had only 10 engi- RAE investigated the principles of possible to cobble teams together neers working on Blue Streak, but it re-entry and tested the materials. from other sections of industry, tried to argue that “numbers are not Kinetic heating on re-entry was ini- without the need to establish a necessarily a criterion of progress. tially considered to be the other ma- single, focused, government pro- At this stage of a new project we jor problem facing the project. In the gram. However, the Blue Streak case believe that quality of thinking is 1950s, Britain had only limited suggests the success of such an ap- perhaps rather more important than knowledge of heat transfer at super- proach will be determined by the quantity.”39 By November 1956, the sonic speeds and no knowledge quality of a state’s industrial infra- team had been increased to 32, but 50 about its effects at hypersonic structure, particularly its aerospace was still seen as the ideal.40 Unlike at speeds. Yet, despite the fact that this sector. In contrast to the British ex- DeHavilland, this shortage of person- was an almost entirely new field for perience, current proliferators may nel seems to have derived from a British engineers, the re-entry prob- have problems cobbling teams to- general skill shortage within British lem had been solved by the time of gether because their industrial infra- industry. Blue Streak’s cancellation, again structures are often weak and their Finally, the Royal Aircraft Estab- indicating the ease with which Brit- aerospace sectors are limited. There- lishment had relevant experience for ish engineers adapted to the technol- fore, they are forced to nurture long- 43 its oversight functions, but had less ogy. term teams through Manhattan background for its R&D work on re- Overall, Cockburn’s development Project-style programs. By bringing entry. The RAE had overseen the strategy proved to be adequate for their limited number of skilled en- development of the V-bombers. providing suitably qualified person- gineers together, this should enable Through the Rocket Propulsion Es- nel on all facets of ballistic missile proliferators to maximize the limited tablishment (RPE), it had also un- technology, except perhaps with re- resources that they have at their dis- dertaken considerable development spect to guidance systems. However, posal, assuming that their programs work on the Raven motor used in just because relevant expertise ex- are managed efficiently. Skylark, the Gamma motor that was isted somewhere in Britain did not Finance eventually used in the Blue Steel air- always mean it existed within a launched cruise missile (which had given Blue Streak contractor. In Of the four aspects of soft tech- begun development in 1955), and the practice, at different stages of the nology under consideration, the bud- Black Knight sounding rocket, strategy, specific firms lacked the getary aspect caused the greatest which was built to conduct re-entry necessary expertise in key areas. In problems in this case. The cost of tests for the Blue Streak project.41 particular, DeHavilland had not pro- Blue Streak increased dramatically

62 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 Benjamin Cole during its development. When the nical approaches most likely to work tional resources in the latter stages initial contracts were issued, the es- were developed, and riskier propos- of the project would have had much timated cost of development and de- als that might have proven to be bet- impact. The Ministry of Supply con- ployment was £150 million. By ter solutions in the long term were sidered it unlikely that more money November 1958, this figure had not developed in parallel.47 To accel- would have brought the completion risen to £480 million,44 and the final erate the pace of the project, the gov- date forward.50 However, Rolls estimated cost was £600 mil- ernment could have accorded it Royce argued that limited finances lion.45 The records show that the some form of exceptional priority. curtailed production opportunities project always suffered from This status would have enabled more and slowed the buildup of staff, lead- underfunding, which seriously af- money to be devoted to the program ing to poor morale. It asserted that fected the pace of progress. Due to than previously.48 However, the the removal of financial restrictions the economic circumstances pre- Ministry of Supply believed that the could bring the completion date vailing in Britain at the time, the financing should not be tied too nearer, and would be better value for whole project suffered from extreme closely to the rate of progress, be- the money.51 Although there is some financial limitations. Money-saving cause this would lead to variations difference of opinion about the de- measures were implemented each in the annual rate of expenditure. gree of impact, it is clear that financ- year, even to the point of jeopardiz- These annual variations were likely ing was a serious constraint. Of the ing the future of the project. The to be so large that such an approach four aspects of soft technology as- main example of this was the can- would have drawn resources away sessed here, this was the greatest celing of parallel sub-system devel- from other areas of the defense re- problem area for Blue Streak. opment efforts intended as insurance search and development program. measures, such as the English Elec- This problem could have been DEVELOPMENT tric Company’s inertial guidance avoided if the project were simply INFRASTRUCTURE: AN program. removed from the defense budget, OVERLOOKED FACTOR but the Ministry knew its financial In late 1957, a Ministry of Sup- However, precisely because Brit- control enabled it to maintain tech- ply official assessed the effect of the ish soft technology was in general nological control over the project. government’s unwillingness to com- fairly strong, soft technology did not The Ministry also thought that the mit additional resources to the impose the greatest obstacles in the removal of financial restrictions project. His report stated: Blue Streak case. Instead, certain would lead to the dispersion of sci- The Blue Streak program is aspects of hard technology turned hindered by the apprehen- entific effort. This dispersion might out to be a greater weakness in Brit- sion in the minds of the lead to the development of a better project coordinating firm ain. Specifically, as the project pro- weapon but could extend the devel- and the member firms that gressed, the weak infrastructure of the money necessary to opment time.49 carry on the program will the firms and RAE proved to be the not be forthcoming. The Since the British Treasury was al- primary factor slowing the pace of most telling symptom is ways opposed to Blue Streak on the the project. Despite the high quality unwillingness to build teams. No good chief engi- grounds that it was too expensive, it of its aerospace industry, Britain did neer is going to take high was always slow in approving new not possess all of the specialized in- class men from secure jobs rounds of expenditure. From 1958, frastructure required for ballistic at the risk of having to sack when the project’s likely vulnerabil- them within the year. Sec- missile development. It lacked some tion leaders know that with ity to Soviet IRBMs put its future in machine tools, some testing facili- weak teams serious prob- even more doubt, the prime minis- ties (including a vehicle to conduct lems will remain over- ter wanted the project continued on looked till too late if design trials of re-entry vehicle designs), or construction has gone too the minimum basis necessary for and all of the major capital facilities far. Therefore their actions success. Thereafter, the Treasury (i.e., facilities for static- and flight-test- lack positive drive and the became even more reluctant to ap- project gathers only feeble ing). Soon after the initiation of the momentum.46 prove additional expenditures. How- project, work began on a static-test- ever, there is some doubt about ing facility, a flight-testing facility in As a consequence, only the tech- whether the commitment of addi-

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 63 Benjamin Cole

Australia, and the Black Knight ing facilities. In 1955, the Ministry project. sounding rocket for the re-entry tests. of Supply estimated that it would This history shows that Although work on the test facilities require 18 months to establish the Cockburn’s development strategy always lagged behind what the firms necessary workshops and machin- had not fully equipped British indus- sought, Black Knight was successfully ery. Specifically, Sperry lacked the try to engage in ballistic missile de- completed in time for the series of re- facilities for testing and calibrating velopment. Still, the necessary entry tests in 1959. the accelerometers to the necessary infrastructure was successfully built 58 At the outset of the project, engi- accuracy; thus comparative assess- during the course of the program. neers from Rolls Royce visited NAA ments of the accelerometer were not The rate of buildup was inadequate and reported that they found no un- available until 1958. Similarly, in to keep the project on schedule, but usual manufacturing processes be- 1956, the Ministry identified the lack this was a direct consequence of the ing used in production of the S-3.52 of facilities for testing gyros at RAE government’s unwillingness to pro- As the project developed, most of the as a major bottleneck. RAE also had vide adequate funding. Also, in or- components for the engine could be to request a new centrifuge for test- der to build the complete 59 made from existing machines at the ing accelerometers. As the project infrastructure, Britain needed help firm.53 However, Rolls Royce lacked continued, progress on Sperry’s from the United States. Thus, suc- the machines for producing the tubes Type-B gyro was hampered by its cessful technology transfer of mis- that made up the walls of the thrust inability to make, assemble, and sat- sile components required not only chamber. These machines had to be isfactorily test the prototypes. By good soft technology in the recipi- procured from the United States, al- March 1958, Sperry was being ent, but also complementary provi- though the rigs for forming and braz- forced to consider limited-scale pro- sion of relevant facilities and ing the tubes into thrust chambers duction of some components before equipment. were constructed by Rolls Royce it- their technological evaluation could be completed (thereby incurring the Reports indicate that current self. Rolls Royce also did not have proliferators are facing similar prob- enough testing facilities to be able risk of having to make later modifi- cations). lems in gaining access to the neces- to stay on schedule. Initially, it sary machine tools and testing proved impossible to test all of the It was much the same story at facilities. Proliferators have had to individual components, and conse- DeHavilland, which lacked the nec- expend considerable effort to pro- quently, the first motors were built essary welding equipment to manu- cure such items. North Korea, for without direct testing of some of the facture the missile structure. It was example, has procured spectrum 54 parts, while the fuel injector heads forced to seek assistance from the analyzers from Japan for assessing were sent for testing to the United U.S. firm Convair on its tank-weld- the accuracy of digital guidance 55 States. ing rig, and to procure four welding systems;63 Iran, meanwhile, gained Finally, provision of capital facili- machines from the National Electric access to Russian wind tunnel facili- ties was also inadequate to keep Welding Company in the United ties to conduct some testing of the 60 development on schedule. Rolls States. Lack of testing facilities Shahab-3 system.64 The experience Royce anticipated it could develop also meant that DeHavilland was with Blue Streak suggests that the an engine 18 months before the unable to do all of the necessary in- scarcity of such facilities will sig- static-test facilities for a full engine dividual tests before the first full nificantly inhibit the pace of 61 test would even become available.56 structure test. Nevertheless, proliferators’ missile programs. Comparison with the United States DeHavilland was ready for the first test of the complete structure in shows the paucity of capital facili- ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF 1958, and the first full test of the ties. While in 1959-60 Britain had TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER one and one-half missile test stands structure with two engines running 62 The development of Blue Streak available for static firing, NAA had took place in 1959. Because of the illustrates both the limits and the six for development of the S-3.57 lack of component testing, if seri- ous problems had emerged at that value of technology transfer. With Sperry was similarly hampered by time, they would have seriously af- respect to limits, it turned out that its limited machine tools and test- fected the overall timetable of the no major item of technology or as-

64 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 Benjamin Cole sistance that Britain received from velop a thrust control system for the devoted to thinking about the gen- the United States was directly usable engines that would reduce the prob- eral system.70 As an insurance mea- or applicable to Blue Streak. This lem to 12 g. Stressing the missile to sure, a number of different necessitated varying degrees of re- cope with 12 g would have been rela- components were developed in par- design and development on virtually tively easy. But if the missile had to allel. Hence, Sperry attempted to re- everything to integrate those tech- be designed to experience 18 g, it design its Type-B gyro, which was nologies and components into a would have required a complete re- originally designed for use in fighter completely new system. Despite stress and probably a great deal of aircraft, while it also designed an these difficulties, however, the pro- re-design.67 However, because there entirely new spherical gyro. Sperry gram still benefited from technology was no indication of when Rolls also had access to the American transfer. This section will first out- Royce could solve the thrust control Kearfott T2502 gyro. Finally, line some of the more significant problem, it was decided in the end Ferranti was also contracted to de- development problems encountered to stress the whole missile to with- velop an integrated gyro-accelerom- by each of the major contractors in stand 18 g anyway.68 eter. turn in assimilating U.S. technology. A considerable amount of devel- For the accelerometer, it was de- It will then evaluate the degree to opment work had to be undertaken cided to rely entirely on the devel- which the overall program was ac- by Rolls Royce to improve the S-3, opment of a British component. celerated nonetheless. convert the design to British manu- Options included a single axis ac- To begin with the most significant facturing processes and materials, celerometer, which was a re-design technology transfer, the S-3 engine, and then adapt it to meet the require- of the one being developed for Blue it is clear that assimilating this tech- ments for Blue Streak. Despite this, Steel, as well as a three axis model nology was not easy, but Britain however, the work at Rolls Royce and a string accelerometer that were managed it relatively successfully. ultimately proceeded successfully. designed specifically for Blue From the outset, the S-3 required sig- Using the S-3 as a model, it devel- Streak. As a consequence, Sperry nificant re-design and development oped a family of five engines: the had to design the stable platform to in order to meet British requirements RZ-1 was a direct copy of the S-3; be capable of accommodating any because it was not a fully tested, re- RZ-2 was an anglicized version of of these components. 65 liable, or flyable motor. Moreover, the S-3, modified to fit onto Blue Perhaps the most significant de- the range specifications for Blue Streak; RZ-3 was a simplification of sign problem facing Sperry was Streak would require 180 seconds of the RZ-2, but incorporating addi- stressing the guidance system to powered flight while the S-3 was tional control systems for throttling withstand 18 “g” forces. High accel- only designed for 150 seconds. This and propellant utilization; RZ-12 erations would lead to large reduc- longer flight time also necessitated was a pair of RZ-2s; and RZ-13 was tions in the accuracy of the guidance extensive R&D to solve problems a pair of RZ-3s. The first RZ-12 test- components,71 but re-designing the such as propellant utilization and ing took place in March 1960, and components to cope with such ac- 66 cut-off times. the first motor was ready by Decem- celerations meant increasing their The engine design was restricted ber 1960. The first RZ-3 would have complexity, volume, and weight. By by the missile structure as well. The been ready for DeHavilland by Oc- February 1956, the Type-B gyro had 69 U.S. Atlas only experienced seven tober 1961. only been stressed to eight g.72 and one-half “g” forces during Turning from the engines to the Sperry had mixed success in de- flight, but due to the acceleration that guidance system, it was evident veloping these components. It suc- could be achieved by the twin- from the outset that Sperry would cessfully completed development of engined configuration, Blue Streak face considerable technological the three axis accelerometer by the was likely to experience 18 g dur- problems, and concerns were ex- time of Blue Streak’s cancellation. ing flight. Because 18 g would have pressed about its approach. Nearly However, the Type-B gyro was be- imposed major design and develop- all of Sperry’s engineers were em- ing pushed to its limits to meet the ment problems on the other elements ployed initially on component de- accuracy requirements. By 1958, the of the missile, it was decided to de- sign, and very little effort was Type-B gyro could not meet the

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 65 Benjamin Cole

same specifications as the American cope with the heavier propulsion unit sumptions and details. Therefore, T2502 and was not reliable enough and the higher “g” forces that it Britain conducted its own theoreti- to test satisfactorily. The RAE de- would experience.76 However, de- cal studies, which were comple- termined that there would not be any signing a structure to cope with high mented by U.S. data.78 Initial work dramatic improvement in the behav- “g” forces invariably increases its in Britain focused on heat sinks, the ior of the Type-B within the Blue weight. While DeHavilland had ac- easiest type of heat shield to develop. Streak timetable, so it decided to use cess to U.S. designs, techniques, and This type of shield dissipates some the T2502 in the guidance system.73 data, it could not use U.S. structural of the heat generated by re-entry, and Subsequently, the first models of the test results because the thrust of Blue absorbs much of the rest. The RAE Blue Streak guidance system used Streak and its duration differed from initially studied the properties of the T2502 and the three axis accel- those of U.S. systems.77 This left copper, iron, and various steels. erometer. DeHavilland with significant design However, it quickly became evident Thus, Cockburn’s strategy seems and development problems to re- that an ablative design would have to have failed to produce a pool of solve. to be used. Ablative heat shields dis- skilled engineers who could cope By 1958, it became evident that sipate the heat generated on re-en- with the demands of developing DeHavilland was not sufficiently try through a thin outer layer of the MRBM guidance systems. Never- proficient in electronics and systems shield that burns very slowly, so that theless, it must be acknowledged engineering; thus, the Ministry of very little heat spreads to the inside that the overall design of Blue Streak Supply forced it to work with the of the re-entry vehicle. The RAE had imposed some exacting require- electronics firm GEC. This develop- previously conducted very little ments for a team attempting to de- ment indicates that firms with expe- theoretical work on ablation. But it velop its first missile guidance system. rience engineering large airplane quickly began investigating a range The accuracy being demanded, to- components do not necessarily have of materials such as carbon, quartz, gether with the requirement to stress all of the necessary skills to build a silicon carbide, silicon nitride, and the components to 18 g, greatly com- ballistic missile. Nevertheless, the durestos, as well as a design involv- 79 plicated a task that would have fact that several British electronics ing transpiring water. Full-scale pushed Sperry to the limits of its firms were capable of providing the ground tests of the re-entry shield ability in any case. Yet, even despite necessary expertise demonstrates were impossible because of the mag- this, it was likely that the Type-B that most of the relevant experience nitude of the heat required, although would have been able to meet a re- was readily available. By the time the shield’s aerodynamic properties laxed accuracy requirement of three of cancellation, DeHavilland had were tested in plasma jets and shock 80 nmi CEP. Also, it appeared that fur- manufactured the first structures for tubes. New manufacturing tech- ther development would have en- the planned test-flight program in niques also had to be developed to abled it to meet all the specifications, Australia. weld and form the materials being used into re-entry heads. By 1959, although not within the Blue Streak The RAE also used U.S. data in timetable.74 If Blue Streak had been these techniques appear to have been its work on re-entry. However, some 81 subject to only seven and one-half worked out, and preliminary de- of the Ministry of Supply’s techni- signs were tested on Black Knight.82 “g” forces (like U.S. missiles), or if cal consultants in the academic com- lesser accuracy had been acceptable, Blue Streak was canceled before the munity argued that this data should full program of flight tests had been the engineers at Sperry would have not be used as the sole basis for the had a relatively easier task. completed, but both the heat sink and British program because it arrived ablative head would have been ready As for the missile structure, the in small quantities and was of doubt- for their initial flight tests in mid- work at DeHavilland initially relied ful accuracy. They saw a danger in 1961.83 heavily on access to U.S. accepting U.S. reports when detailed expertise,75 yet this did not meet all support was not made available for In the end, despite the various dif- of DeHavilland’s requirements. The study and evaluation. Britain might ficulties that have been outlined, Blue Streak structure had to be both be misled by U.S. theories because Britain was able to incorporate much lighter and stronger than Atlas to it was ignorant of the underlying as- of the technology transfer from the United States and these transfers did

66 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 Benjamin Cole benefit the program. At the time of British soft technology was weak- guidance technology in order to com- cancellation, Blue Streak was on est in respect to guidance. Consis- plete the Taepo-dong-2 program.85 course for initial deployment in tent with Karp’s thesis, this did However, the limits of technology 1965, meaning the program would prove to be the principal technologi- transfers documented in the Blue have involved a 10-year develop- cal choke point in the program. Brit- Streak case indicate that such trans- ment period. Experts believe that ish engineers were able to bypass fers are not a solution to all of the tech- U.S. assistance pared five years off this problem, however, through the nological problems that proliferators the development time for Blue use of an American gyro. This face. Proliferators must still be able Streak;84 if the United States had not shows, as Karp indeed acknowl- to assimilate these transfers into their been involved, it would have been a edges, that soft technology is not the indigenous programs. 15-year development program. sole determinant of outcomes, as The Blue Streak case also sug- However, if the British government specific technology transfers can gests that relevant hard technology had made additional resources avail- sometimes compensate for weak- comprises more than just missile able to overcome some of the major nesses in soft technology. However, systems or their components. It bottlenecks, the project might have although hard technology transfers shows that machine tools, testing been completed a few years sooner. provided the project with an im- facilities, and the ability to identify, mense head start and the ability to acquire, and use the right materials CONCLUSION overcome some technological choke are other elements of hard technol- points, they could not be used to re- This analysis confirms Karp’s ogy that can hamper the effective- solve all of the problems that Brit- thesis about the importance of soft ness of even good quality soft ish engineers encountered. technology, but it also indicates the technology. For example, British critical impact that hard technology Consequently, the quality of a engineers were able to develop the transfers can have on proliferation. state’s soft technology is one of the re-entry heat shield only because The Blue Streak case clarifies that principal factors that determines the they had access to the necessary more than just soft technology is re- range bracket within which it can materials and development facilities. quired; the transfer of U.S. technol- seriously consider initiating an in- Overall, though, development infra- ogy also helps explain the relative digenous ballistic missile project. structure proved to be one of the success of this project. But the lim- Because the soft technology of the major choke points in the British its of hard technology transfer are current set of likely proliferators is program. Since most would-be also evident. The date of completion poor relative to the British level in proliferators lack an advanced indus- for the project thus really resulted this case, these states cannot adopt trial infrastructure, they have had to from a combination of the excellent the British development strategy acquire the necessary machine tools quality of British soft technology with any reasonable assurance of and other facilities from other states. and the provision of U.S. assistance. success. Instead, these states have This lack of industrial infrastructure Consistent with Karp’s emphasis on had to start their programs with the also means that proliferators will soft technology, this case study Scud-B and other similar short-range probably not produce all of the nec- makes it clear that U.S. assistance systems, before moving on to me- essary materials indigenously. Con- took five years off the schedule only dium-range systems. However, as sequently, while soft technology is because Britain was capable of as- Karp acknowledges, hard technol- the most important factor in success- similating it so effectively. If Brit- ogy transfers can be a critical factor ful ballistic missile development, it ish soft technology had been weaker, in the progress of some projects. is not enough to guarantee success. Britain would have faced greater dif- Technology transfers can enable Instead, hard technology transfers ficulties in assimilating U.S. assis- proliferators to overcome specific are also necessary, in conjunction tance. The result was that all technological bottlenecks caused by with the presence of good soft tech- elements of the Blue Streak missile, deficiencies in their soft technology nology, for proliferators to make except for the guidance system, were or even skip some stages in their progress with their programs. on course for successful develop- development strategies. North Ko- While the third world states most ment at the time of cancellation. rea, in particular, is perceived as re- often identified as likely missile quiring transfers of engine and

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 67 Benjamin Cole proliferators mostly do not possess spreading to proliferators will be 7 AIR 2/14975, Air Staff Requirement, Opera- tional Requirements OR/1139, April 1955. soft technology equivalent to that of difficult. Karp argues that efforts to 8 Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, pp. 66-72. Britain in the 1950s, some have control soft technology transfers 9 The Ministry of Supply was one of the princi- overcome their deficiencies through through government-to-government pal ministries in defense decisionmaking. It was responsible for procurement and oversaw domes- the employment of foreign engi- cooperation should be broadened to tic defense research, development, and produc- neers. Russian technology transfers deal more directly with individual tion. 10 to Iran in the late 1990s proved to ministries and enterprises.88 Such Timothy Raison, “Science, Defence and the Time Factor,” New Scientist, February 27, 1958, be highly successful because they measures have already proved to be p. 102. were supported by large numbers of effective, halting the Russia-India 11 For further details, see Benjamin Cole, “The Development of Blue Streak: An Analysis of the North Korean, Chinese, and Russian cryogenic engine deal in 1993 and Role of Ideas in British Nuclear Weapon Procure- technicians.86 Nonetheless, short- denying India access to Russian pro- ment Policy,” Ph.D. thesis, Southampton Univer- ages of skilled engineers still limit pulsion engineers.89 However, the sity, June 1996. 12 AIR 2/13211, Technical Memo, No.GW243, Iran’s ability to assimilate foreign fact that individual firms, particu- March 1955. technology.87 Most proliferators are larly in Russia and China, are pass- 13 AVIA 65/1427, “A Technical Reappraisal of gradually developing dedicated bal- ing on such expertise without the UK Ballistic Missile Programme Assuming the Availability of a 600lb Warhead,” undated. listic missile research and develop- government sanction indicates how 14 Author’s interview with former Blue Streak ment infrastructures. In turn, these difficult this will be to achieve in engineer (name withheld by request), June 27, 1994. facilities increase and improve the regular practice. Having a better 15 AIR 2/13211, Technical Memo GW243, “A skill levels of their engineers. The understanding of where the main Survey of the Present Position on the Evaluation indications are, however, that most barriers to successful proliferation of the Blue Streak Project,” by the Staff of the RAE, undated. proliferators are still suffering from really arise should help the interna- 16 Ibid. a skills shortage. tional community better target its 17 Structure weight ratios refer to the ratio be- efforts. tween the weight of the unfuelled missile and its To conclude with some policy im- weight when fueled and ready for launch. plications, the Blue Streak case sug- 18 AVIA 54/2141, Notes of First Meeting of A1 Panel, 1/2/56. gests that even if a proliferator 19 Stephen Twigge, The Early Development of possesses good soft technology, its Guided Weapons in the UK (Reading: Harwood, 1993), p. 125; Karp, Ballistic Missile Prolifera- progress can still be constrained by tion, pp. 77-78. control of hard technology. There- 20 Red Rapier was superseded by the Blue Steel fore, one should not conclude that air-launched cruise missile program in 1955, while the Blue Moon requirement was superseded just because soft technology is cru- by Blue Streak. cially important, controls exercised 21 AIR 8/2057, Note by DCAS Pike, Blue Streak 1 By the current conventions of many organiza- by the MTCR will eventually be- and DeHavilland, 13/1/56, sent to PUS, 26/1/56. tions, Blue Streak would even be considered an 22 Author’s nterview with former Blue Streak come irrelevant. Instead, this case intermediate-range ballistic missile. However, at engineer (name withheld by request), June 27, suggests only that control efforts the time of its development, it was referred to as 1994. a medium-range system, so to avoid confusion 23 AVIA 65/597, Cleaver to Philips, 3/12/59. must be careful not to place too that label is used throughout. 24 AVIA 54/2130, 6/6/58. 2 much emphasis on finished compo- Aaron Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation: The 25 AVIA 65/1581, Meeting to Discuss Improving nents and sub-components. Among Politics and the Technics (Oxford: Oxford Uni- the Management, 8/4/59. versity Press, 1996), p. 97. 26 Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, p. 82. 3 elements of hard technology, the Andrew Brooks, V-Force: The History of 27 Author’s interview with Mr. S. L. Bragg (for- control of materials and develop- Britain’s Airborne Deterrent (London: Jane’s, merly head of Performance Section at Rolls 1982), pp. 83-88, 97. Royce), March 1995. ment facilities is just as significant. 4 Peter Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent 28 Ian E. Smith, “Arthur Valentine Cleaver, 1917- Likewise, international control ef- (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 65. 1977,” Journal of the British Interplanetary So- 5 forts also need to be broadened to Humphrey Wyn, RAF Nuclear Deterrent Forces ciety 45 (1992), p. 306. (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1994), 29 Author’s interview with Mr. S.L. Bragg, March include soft technology. However, pp. 373-393. 1995. 6 the fact that proliferators can acquire DEFE 7/1328, BND(SG)(59)19(Final), “Brit- 30 AVIA 54/2132, Upshall to US/LGW, 1/6/56. the skills and competencies required ish Controlled Contribution to the Nuclear De- 31 Arthur V. Cleaver, “The Blue Streak Propul- terrent,” 31/12/59 (This and all subsequent sion System,” paper for the European Symposium for ballistic missile development documentary sources cited come from British on Space Technology, London, June 1961. from basic aerospace technique sug- government records held at the Public Records 32 AVIA 54/2132, Pinkerton to BJSM, 1/6/56. Office, Kew, London. The abbreviations and gests that efforts to prevent the nec- 33 Author’s interview with Mr. David Wright, Oral dates used are those by which the items are listed Historian, British Rocketry Oral History Project, essary skills and competencies from at the Public Records Office).

68 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 Benjamin Cole

April 24, 1998. features which could be amended in future de- Elina V. Kirichenko, and Ryan Gibson, “Russia, 34 Karp, Ballistic Missile Proliferation, p. 80. signs (see AVIA 54/2132, Report on Progress, at the US and the Missile Technology Control Re- 35 Author’s interview with former Blue Streak 31/2/56). gime,” Adelphi Paper 317 (London: International engineer (name withheld by request), June 27, 66 U.S. analysis of cut-off times could not be used Institute of Strategic Studies, March 1998), pp. 1994. because it did not use the same bonker system as 63-64. 36 Author’s interview with Sir James Lighthill Blue Streak (bonkers are small rocket motors in (former head of RAE), October 1993. the re-entry vehicle which are used after the 37 Author’s interview with former Blue Streak missile’s main engines have been shut down and engineer (name withheld by request), June 27, the re-entry vehicle has separated, in order to 1994. nudge the re-entry vehicle towards the correct 38 AIR 2/13206, Notes of Meeting to Discuss the velocity and position in space, prior to re-entry). Requirements for a Medium Range Ballistic Mis- See AVIA 54/2142, Minutes of Sixth Meeting of sile, 16/3/55. A3 Panel, 27/2/57. 39 AVIA 54/2135, Broadbent to MOS, 21/12/55. 67 AVIA 54/2132, Pearce to Serby, 9/1/56. 40 AVIA 54/2127, Record of MOS Visit to Sperry, 68 AVIA 54/2132, CGWL to DGGW, 23/8/55. 9/12/55. 69 AVIA 65/597, Notes of Meeting in DG(BM)’s 41 Dennis J. Lyons, “Ballistic Research Rockets Office, 12/1/60. With Particular Reference to Black Knight,” 70 AVIA 54/2127, Record of MOS Visit to Sperry, Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society 65 9/12/55. (March 1961), p. 175. 71 AVIA 54/2128, Report, “Effect of High Ac- 42 Author’s interview with former Blue Streak en- celeration on Equipment for Project 3000,” 21/ gineer (name withheld by request), June 27, 1994. 6/56. It was estimated that if the gyro was stressed 43 AVIA 54/2145, Minutes of Fourth Meeting of to withstand 12 g, its performance would dete- A7 Panel, 23/10/57. riorate by a factor of four if it was actually sub- 44 CAB 131/20, D(58)63, Ballistic Rockets, 14/ jected to 18 g (AVIA 54/2135, Minute by 11/58. Bostock, 14/2/56). 45 DEFE 7/1328, BND(SG)(59)19 (Final), “Brit- 72 AVIA 54/2141, First Meeting of A1 Panel, 1/ ish Controlled Contribution to the Nuclear De- 2/56. terrent,” 31/12/59. 73 AVIA 54/2136, “Choice of Gyroscope,” W.H. 46 DEFE 13/193, “Observations on the Blue Stephens, 16/6/58. Streak Programme,” W.H. Wheeler, November 74 AVIA 54/2136, Bullard to DG/GW, 6/12/57. 1957. 75 AVIA 54/2130, Letter from MOS to BJSM, 3/ 47 Ibid. 5/56, and letter from Goodwin to Bonser, 26/4/ 48 DEFE 13/193, Letter, Jones to Sandys, 3/1/58. 56. 49 AVIA 65/1427, “Main Events in the Blue 76 AVIA 54/2132, MOS to BJSM, 17/2/56. Streak Programme 1955-58,” 2/4/58. 77 AVIA 54/2130, 6/6/58. 50 PRO, AVIA 65/1427, Letters, Rolls Royce to 78 AVIA 54/2146, Howarth to Leslie, 26/3/56. Cockburn, 17/1/58; and PS/Minister to 79 AVIA 54/2145, Notes of First Meeting of A1 US(LGW), 14/1/58. Panel, 17/10/56. 51 PRO, AVIA 65/1427, Rolls Royce to 80 G.V.E. Thompson, “The Re-entry Problem,” Cockburn, 17/1/58. New Scientist, February 13, 1958, p. 120. 52 AVIA 54/2132, NAA Liaison Group, Progress 81 See AVIA 54/2044, correspondence with Meeting, 11/8/55. Hudswell Clarke and Co. Ltd., 1958. 53 Author’s interview with Mr. S.L. Bragg, March 82 For details, see Andrew Morton, Fire Across 1995. the Desert (Canberra: Australian Government 54 AVIA 54/2127, Pearce to Bullock, 3/12/57. Printing Service, 1989), p. 424. 55 AVIA 54/2133, 6/2/58. 83 AVIA 54/2145, Minutes of Fourth Meeting of 56 AVIA 54/2142, Notes of First Meeting of A1 A7 Panel, 23/10/57. Panel, 1/2/56. 84 Author’s interview with the Rt. Hon. Aubrey 57 AVIA 54/2134, 1/5/58. Jones, former Minister of Supply, April 15, 1993; 58 AVIA 54/2143, Minutes of A3 Panel, 19/9/56. C. J. Bartlett, The Long Retreat (London: 59 AVIA 54/2142, Notes of Second Meeting of MacMillan, 1972), p. 109. A1 Panel, 10/10/56. 85 “North Korea Grasps At Stage Beyond 60 AVIA 54/2130, Povey to Bonser, 27/2/57. NoDong-1,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 19, 61 AVIA 54/2130, “Blue Streak Structural Test 1994, p. 18. Programme,” Notes of Meeting in Structures De- 86 “China Lends Hand With Iran Missiles,” Sun- partment, RAE, 22/11/57. day Telegraph, November 23, 1997, p. 31; “Rus- 62 AVIA 54/2130, Wilkins to Serby, 4/1/57. sia Is Assisting Iran’s Missile Drive,” Jane’s 63 “CIA Confirms Missile Developments,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 1, 1997, p. 3; “Secret Defence Weekly, March 26, 1994, p. 3. Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Missile In 64 “Secret Israeli Data Reveals Iran Can Make Year,” Defense News, October 6-12, 1997, p. 4. Missile In Year,” Defense News, October 6-12, 87 Aaron Karp, “Lessons of Iranian Missile Pro- 1997, p. 4. grams for U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” The 65 AVIA 54/2132, Upshall to US/LGW, 1/6/56. Nonproliferation Review 5 (Spring-Summer In particular, initial analyses of the design and 1998), p. 22. operation of the turbopumps and the fuel injec- 88 Ibid., p. 24. tor head highlighted a number of unsatisfactory 89 Alexander A. Pikayev, Leonard S. Spector,

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1998 69