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This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 6 6—5 2 9 FLUGEL, Raymond Richard, 1919— UNITED STATES AIR POWER DOCTRINE: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF WILLIAM MIT­ CHELL AND GIULIO DOUHET AT THE AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL, 1921-1935. The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1965 History, modern University Microîilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan Copyright by RAYMOND RICHARD FLUGEL 1966 THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE UNITED STATES AIR POWER DOCTRINE: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF WILLIAM MITCHELL AND GIULIO DOUHET AT THE AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL, 1921-1935 A DISSERTATION SUmiTTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY RAYMOND RICHARD FLUGEL Norman, Oklahoma 1965 UNITED STATES AIR POWER DOCTRINE: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF WILLIAM MITCHELL AND GIULIO DOUHET AT THE AIR CORPS TACTICAL SCHOOL, 1921-1935 APPROVED BY / i ) f y DISSERTATION COMMI^TCE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS In the course of this study the author incurred substantial obligations to several persons for various kinds and degrees of help. His major professor. Dr. Alfred B. Sears, lent invaluable editorial assistance and steady support during the entire under­ taking. Timely encouragement was given by Dr. Percy W. Buchanan and Dr. John W. Morris, also of the University of Oklahoma, and by Brother Raymond Fleck, C.S.C,, President of St. Edward’s Uni­ versity, Austin, Texas. Mr. Robert Krauskopf of the Office of Records Appraisal in the National Archives provided not only un­ usual archival assistance but initiated the -specific and timely suggestion to pursue this particular investigation in February 1963, at which time several prospective avenues of air power re­ search appeared to be blocked. Miss Marguerite Kennedy, in charge of the Air Force Archives at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and Mr. Frank Meyer, professional archivist, rendered wholehearted cooperation and valuable technical assistance. At the National Archives Mr. John Taylor, head of the Army and Air Force branch, assisted materially in searches for various documents. At the Air Uni­ versity Library Mrs. Louise Fitts kindly aided on numerous oc­ casions in locating and obtaining needed books and other materials. Mr. Ellis Olmstead of Sherman, Texas generously made available ideal working facilities in Austin, Texas during most of the critical writing year, 1964-65. Most important of all, however, have been the encouragement, patience, and understanding of the author’s wife, Norma V. Flugel, for without her help this task could never have been undertaken, much less executed. No rman, Oklahoma R.R.F. July, 1965 1 1 1 CONTENTS Chapter Page PART I: INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL SETTING, 1903-1920 I. INTRODUCTION............. 2 PART II: EARLY POSTWAR AIR THOUGHT IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES II. WILLIAM MITCHELL AND HIS AIR POWER DOCTRINE, 1921 .. 51 III. GIULIO DOUHET AND HIS AIR POWER DOCTRINE, 1921 ..... 73 IV. THE AIR TACTICAL SCHOOL AND ITS DOCTRINE, 1921-1922 ...................................... 93 PART III: THE FORMATIVE PERIOD IN AMERICAN AIR THOUGHT, 1922-1926 V. EVOLUTION OF MITCHELL’S CONCEPTS OF AIR POWER: ATL?iNTIC INFLUENCES, 1921-1923 ............. Ill VI. EVOLUTION OF MITCHELL’S CONCEPTS OF AIR POWER: PACIFIC INFLUENCES, 1923-1925 ................... 13M- VII. EVOLUTION OF OFFICIAL CONCEPTS OF AIR POWER ....... 155 VIII. EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE AT THE AIR TACTICAL SCHOOL, 1923-1926 ......... 183 PART IV: THE ASCENDANCY OF DOUHETIAN DOCTRINE, 1927-1935 IX. FINAL EXPRESSION OF THE THEORIES OF DOUHET AND MITCHELL, 1927-1930 .......................... 203 X. REJECTION OF DOUHETISM, 1928 ................... 220 XI. CONSOLIDATION AND INTEGRATION OF DOUHETISM, 1929-1935 ...................................... 235 BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................... 259 GLOSSARY........................................ .... 267 iv PART I INTRODUCTION AI€) HISTORICAL SETTING, 1903-1920 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION There is much historical evidence to show that the problem of integrating a given weapon within the structure of the military establishment is by no means a recent one.^ Entirely aside from the question of introducing a new weapon, there exists the problem of adequately exploiting it. Much of the difficulty encountered in properly employing an unconventional weapon«~once it has been accepted— .seems to be rooted in man’s innate tendency to retain the familiar in preference to the novel. As Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great theorist of sea power, pointed out: Changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but the interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by . care­ ful study of the powers and limitations of the new . weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the method of using it to qualities it possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will take the pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great ^Air Force ROTC, Evolution of Aerial Warfare (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University, 1959), 1-11, contains a concise historical account. 2 advantage— a lesson in itself of no mean value. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution this age-old dichotomy between the availability of a weapon and its full utilization appeared with increasing frequency. In the Civil War "the North fought with the same weapons available to the South and made slight use of the superior arms within its grasp." The failure of the military in World War I to properly understand the potential of newly introduced weapons such as the machine gun, the submarine, the tank, and, most of all, the air weapon was repeatedly scored during the 1920’s by the Italian air theorist. General Giulio Douhet. He shrewdly observed that "victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.General J. F. C. Fuller, after analyzing instances typifying the characteristic resistance of the military to new weapons, commented in 1926 that "soldiers are mostly alchemists," and concluded that the underlying cause was a lack of systematic, objective method in observing, study­ ing, and evaluating the changes wrought by the technology of war.^ ^Quoted in Air Service Tactical School (ASTS), Air Tactics (Langley Field, Va.: 1922), Section II, 19. ^Irving B. Holley, Jr., Ideas and Weapons (New Haven: Yale, 1953), 10. ^Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (Rome: Air Ministry, 1921), trans. Dino Ferrari (New York: Coward-Me Gann, 194-2), 30. F. C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Hutchinson, 1926) , 22. 4 Almost two decades later. Brigadier General Frank P. Lahm, one of America's pioneer military airmen, agreed that "conservatism has always been the watchword in our recognition and adoption of new implements of war, especially in times of peace.Recently an American student of this ]3roblem concluded that it is "still far from being entirely solved."^ This study is chiefly concerned with the development of doctrine for the employment of the aerial weapon. Here several basic factors are to be noted. First, the air weapon is a multi» use one, susceptible to development for several tactical functions. Secondly, the question of which function to emphasize is related, among other factors, directly to the geographical and military position which a given country occupies vis»a-vis others. Thirdly, in any systematic utilization of the aerial weapon itself, three major phases may be discerned, each of which is related to the other: (1) the technological development; (2) the organizational problem involved in the proper constitution of the parts of the air force and their relationship with each other and the other armed forces; and (3) the question of doctrine or conceptual utilization and employment of the force in a strategic and/or tactical sense. Though all these factors are interrelated, the major treatment here is confined to certain aspects of the evolution of military air power doctrine in the ^Charles De F. Chandler and FrarC: P. Lahm, How Our Army Grew Wings (New York: Ronald Press, 1943), 279. 7Holley, 10. 5 United States from 1920 to 1935, Objectives include (1) identify­ ing the predominant concepts of employment; (2) determining how and from what sources those concepts were derived; and (3) ascertaining how and when they were adopted or.adapted and applied. Within this general frame of reference attention is focused on the personalitj.es, ideas, and theories of William Mitchell and Giulio Douhet— the two most important air pioneers of the period— and their influence on American air power doctrine, particularly as it evolved at the Air Corps Tactical School,® the tap root of doctrinal growth in the United States Army's air arm during the twenties and early thirties. Their much debated interpersonal influence is likewise critically examined.^ Before undertaking any investigation of inter-war doctrinal development, however, it is deemed advisable to obtain some degree of perspective by viewing the problem in its historical context. The general treatment in this chapter is to sketch, ®The Field Officers School (1920) became the Air Service Tactical School in 1923, and in turn the Air Corps Tactical School in 1926. It was moved from Langley Field, Va. to Maxwell Field, Ala. in 1931. g The study of air doctrine during the inter-war period is somewhat complicated by the fact that in practice formulation of doctrine occurred at several levels. Official War Department doctrine was expressed in the Field Service Regulations which were supposed to set the tone for the rest of the service. Then there were the Air Service Regulations, which, though prepared by the Chief of Air Service, were closely aligned with the think­ ing of the General Staff of the War Department, The teachings propounded by the ground and air service command and staff schools were supposedly in conformity with departmental dogma.

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