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STATE LIBRARY OF PENNSYLVANIA 3 0144 00379655 4 RETURN THIS BOOK ON OR BEFORE THE DATE INDICATED Class 3 4*0 .2 Book Volume 3* DO NOT REMOVE SLIPS FROM BOOKS. A CHARGE IS MADE IF BOOKS ARE LOST OR DAMAGED. IDENTIFICATION OF BORROWERS IS REQUIRED Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2015 https://archive.org/details/navalhistoryofwo02thom THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR LONDON : HUMPHREY MILFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS The Naval History of the World War THE STRESS OF SEA POWER 1915-1916 BY THOMAS G. FROTHINGHAM CAPTAIN U.S.R. With Maps and Diagrams CAMBRIDGE HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1926 COPYRIGHT, 19*0 BY HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Second Printing PRINTED AT THE HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE, MASS., U. S. A. THIS WORK HAS BEEN COMPILED FROM DATA PROVIDED BY THE HISTORICAL SECTION, UNITED STATES NAVY 73 CL Military Historical Society of Massachusetts THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF REAR ADMIRAL NATHAN C. TWINING, UNITED STATES NAVY. IN HIS UNTIMELY DEATH BOTH IIIS SERVICE AND HIS COUNTRY SUFFERED IRREPARABLE LOSS ACKNOWLEDGMENT In addition to the invaluable help of Captain Dudley W. Knox, U. S. N., Chief of the Historical Section, United States Navy, in conjunction with whom this book has been written, the author desires to express sincere thanks for the assistance of Rear Admiral N. C. Twining, U. S. N., and of Lord Sydenham. These emi- nent authorities have gone over the text, and their con- structive comments and suggestions are here gratefully acknowledged. CONTENTS I. The Siege of the Central Powers 3 II. German Projects for U-Boat Warfare .... 12 III. The Naval Situation . 22 IV. The U-Boat Campaign of 1915 and the Lusitania 36 V. The Military Attempt at the Dardanelles . 45 VI. Disappointments for the Entente Allies ... 62 VII. Italy in the War, U-Boats in the Mediterranean 72 VIII. Germany Forced to Abandon the U-Boat Cam- paign 79 IX. Military Reverses of 1915 85 X. Bulgaria in the War. Serbia Overwhelmed . 90 XI. Defeat at the Dardanelles 97 XII. Situation at the Beginning of 1916 Ill XIII. Renewed Project for U-Boat Warfare . .118 XIV. The Halt Called by the United States .... 126 XV. The New German Naval Strategy 135 XVI. The British Naval Strategy of 1916 144 XVII. The Battle of Jutland — The First Contact . 151 XVIII. The Battle of Jutland — The Battle Cruiser Action 167 XIX. The Battle of Jutland — The German Fleet United 187 XX. The Battle of Jutland — The British Effort to Unite Forces 200 X CONTENTS XXI. The Battle of Jutland — The Evasion of the Weaker Force 213 XXII. The Battle of Jutland — The Failure to Win a Decision 236 XXIII. The Battle of Jutland — The Action Broken Off 250 XXIV. The Battle of Jutland — The Return of the Fleets 263 XXV. The Battle of Jutland — The Causes and Results of the British Failure 271 XXVI. The Effect of the Battle of Jutland upon Germany 278 XXVII. Operations in the North Sea 285 XXVIII. T1ie U-Boats Operating “According to Prize Law” 294 XXIX. The Die Cast by Germany for Unrestricted U-Boat Warfare 302 Appendices: A. Letter of Admiral Jellicoe to the Admiralty, and Approval of the Admiralty 313 B. Opposing Forces at the Battle of Jutland . 318 C. Losses at the Battle of Jutland 321 D. Table of Dates of the World War 324 Index 333 LIST OF MAPS Note as to the Maps. Instead of the usual bulky and cumbersome charts, which are difficult to handle and hard to use with the text, the Historical Sec- tion, U. S. Navy, has prepared diagrammatic maps that will open outside the book, to be available when the text is read. This scheme of maps was used in the author’s “A Guide to the Military History of The World War,” and it has been widely approved in the Services. 1. Situation at Beginning of 1915 11 2. The Dardanelles 110 3. Situation at Beginning of 1916 117 4. Naval Strategy which Led to the Battle of Jutland 166 ” 5. Admiral Scheer’s First “ Swing-Around . 222 6. Admiral Scheer’s Third “Swing-Around” . 231 7. British Chart of the Battle of Jutland . 234 8. The Battle of Jutland 249 9. After the Battle of Jutland 293 THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR CHAPTER I THE SIEGE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS (See Map at page 11) HE early months of the year 1915 had offered T great strategic opportunities to the Entente Allies. Not only had the Teutonic Allies lost the offensive but the Central Powers were practically be- sieged. Their armies were held in a deadlock on in- trenched fronts, and their nations were feeling the relentless pressure of Sea Power in the hands of the Allies. A study of the map will show this siege of the Central Powers. Although the German armies had penetrated into France and Belgium, they had been brought to a standstill, and on the Eastern Front increased forces were needed, as the Austro-Hungarians were so hard pressed that German aid was necessary to prevent a collapse in the southeast. The defeat of the great German offensive had pre- vented any of the hesitating Balkan nations from joining the Central Powers, and the Teutons -were thus cut off from even their Turkish ally. The innate hos- tility of the Italian people against Austria was im- pelling Italy to a declaration of war against her ancient enemy. As a consequence, the Central Powers were surrounded by a ring through which there was no passage. This situation, in itself, had created new strategic objectives. That of the Entente Allies was to constrict 3 4 NAVAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR and press the siege. That of the Central Powers was to break through and raise the siege. These objectives were so unmistakable that they could hardly fail to be the visible motives of the strategy of 1915. The ad- vantage lay with the Entente Allies, and on the surface their plans were promising. They had their own projects to gain the two logical objects of Allied naval strategy, which were emphasized in the preceding volume of this work, control of the Dardanelles and control of the Baltic, and there were supposedly ade- quate military plans for offensives both on the West and in the East. These plans of the Entente Allies, with the approaching entrance of Italy against Aus- tria, were thought to presage the utter defeat of their enemies. On the other hand, the Central Powers were planning to break through and raise the siege by a concentrated joint attack of German and Austro-Hungarian forces against the Russians in the southeast, while the German armies were only to hold their lines on the Western Front. But there was a vast difference in estimating the means necessary to carry out these strategic plans, and this made 1915 a year of tragedy for the Entente Allies and a year of success for the Central Powers. Each of the three nations of the Entente Allies had intrusted its plans and preparations for the coming campaigns of 1915 to the leading soldier of the nation. Joffre had become paramount in France, after his victory of the Marne. Lord Kitchener had been given control in Great Britain. The Grand Duke Nicholas held absolute sway in Russia. Each of these military leaders had so great power in personal control of affairs, THE SIEGE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS 5 that he might truthfully be called a dictator in military matters. Each of these men was the typical soldier of his nation, and each had gained the confidence of his people by his conduct of the war in 1914. Therein lay the causes for the failures of the Entente Allies in 1915, for each of these leaders believed that the height of military efficiency had been reached in the successes of 1914, and each believed that the ensuing operations would be carried out on the same lines. None of them realized that far greater tasks and utterly different conditions would be encountered in 1915. It was evident that the commands of the Allied armies believed they would be able to defeat the armies of the Teutonic Allies by the use of the military means at their disposal. On the Western Front, General Joffre had made his plans for attacks upon the Germans in the region of Arras and Rheims, and it is known that he was confident he would be able to break through 1 the German line . In the southeast, the Russians were supposed to have an assured winning superiority, as the fall of the fortress of Przemysl was inevitable, and the Grand Duke Nicholas’ armies were mistakenly as- sumed to be on the point of penetrating the Carpathians into Hungary. These preparations of the Entente Allies were deemed to be amply sufficient, at the time, and there was then no suspicion of the more efficient preparations of their enemies. In the councils of the Central Powers there had been a different situation. The German 1 “I met Joffre ... as arranged . Joffre’s plan was as follows: He meant to break through the enemy’s line from the south at Rheims and from the west at Arras.” — “ 1914,” Lord French. G NAVAL HISTORY OF TIIE WORLD WAR regime of 1914 had been overthrown, in consequence of the defeat of its supposedly infallible military plan, and the new Chief of Staff, Falkenhayn, had yielded to the Hindenburg-Ludendorff influence for a complete change in strategy and tactics. Consequently, in contrast to the artificial German strategy of 1914, which had thrown away the initial military superiority of the Germans, as has been de- scribed in the preceding volume, the German strategy of 1915 was complete, both in preparation and in the tactics employed.

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