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The Israeli-Islamist War

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The Israeli-Islamist War MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES FALL 2006 resumption of the 1991 Madrid peace confer- frontation like Hizbullah or winning elections as ence, aiming to sign peace treaties between Israel in many other cases—is a sign that majorities of and each of Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. That Arab citizens are not content to remain docile in turn would allow Syrian-Lebanese ties to be and dejected in the state of subjugation and normalized, allowing the parties then to focus defeat that has defined them for the past several on cooling down Iraq and Iran. decades. The war in Lebanon is a reminder that One thing is sure, though: the region cannot unresolved political tensions can remain hidden be expected to remain calm while the underlying under the rug for some time, but eventually they issues that anger people remain unresolved. Two burst out with a vengeance. We should expect a key ones from the Arab perspective are Palestine period of years of dynamic political and perhaps and the role of Western armies in the region. military confrontations, as the new and old The strength and assertiveness of the Islamist forces of the Middle East do battle to define its movements—whether through military con- future identity. The Israeli-Islamist War By Martin Kramer, is the Wexler-Fromer Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a Senior Fellow at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem. Who won the summer war between Israel and the name of Arab unity, with the aim of isolat- Hizbullah? ing Israel and building an Arab coalition that Right after the ceasefire, Hizbullah and its could wage war on two or more fronts. Iranian patrons declared the war a “divine vic- The fatal flaw of this strategy lay in the weak- tory,” and the Economist concurred, running ness of pan-Arabism itself. The failure to coordi- this headline across its cover: “Nasrallah Wins nate led Arab states to humiliating defeats in the the War.” Israel sank into a funk of self- multi-front Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967. recrimination. In 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a coordinat- But a few weeks later, Hizbullah leader ed Arab assault on Israel, with partial success. Hasan Nasrallah admitted that if he had it to do But Egypt then opted out of the Arab collective again, he would have avoided provoking Israel by reaching a separate peace with Israel in 1979, in the first place. Now it was the turn of Israel’s and the Arab-Israeli conflict came to an end. government to claim victory. Washington Post The Israeli-Palestinian conflict took its place. columnist Charles Krauthammer chimed in, In this second stage, the Palestine Liberation claiming that Hizbullah “was seriously set back Organization used a mix of politics and “armed by the war,” and New York Times columnist struggle” to open up new fronts against Israel— Thomas Friedman called it a “devastating in Jordan and Lebanon in the heyday of the defeat”—for Hizbullah. fedayeen, in the West Bank and Gaza in the first The question of who got the upper hand will intifada, and in Israel proper in the second. remain contested. But the debate over who won But the Palestinian struggle also stalled as and who lost obscures the deeper significance of the PLO grew sclerotic, inefficient, and cor- the summer war. It marks the beginning of the rupt. Its transformation into the ramshackle third stage in the conflict over Israel. Palestinian Authority only amplified its weak- nesses. The death of its leader Yasir Arafat in An evolving conflict 2004 effectively marked the end of the Israeli- In the first stage, from Israel’s creation in 1948 Palestinian conflict. through 1973, rejection of Israel dressed itself In the third and present stage, the Israeli- as pan-Arab nationalism. In the classic Arab- Palestinian conflict has been superseded by the 8 Israeli conflict, Arab states formed alliances in Israeli-Islamist conflict. There had always been an Islamist compo- victory that eluded Arab states and the PLO? nent to the “resistance” against Israel, but it had Might they make it possible, once more, to wage traditionally played a supporting role, first to the a multi-front offensive against Israel? Might an Arab states, and then to the PLO. It was Islamist coalition achieve greater success, by tap- Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamist revo- ping the self-sacrificial spirit of Islam? lution in Iran, who pioneered an entirely differ- This summer brought the Islamist coalition ent vision of the role Islamism should play into play against Israel in a multi-front war for opposite Israel. the first time. It was not the war Iran would Khomeini rejected the view that Israel had have chosen: Iranian strategy would have become a fait accompli and thereby entitled a deployed the coalition at a moment of Iran’s place in the region. He believed that Islam had own choosing, perhaps closer to the make-or- the power to call forth the sacrifice and disci- break point in Tehran’s nuclear plans. But Israel pline needed to deny legitimacy to Israel and preferred to meet the challenge early, launching ultimately defeat it. a preemptive war against Hizbullah’s missiles, To achieve that goal, Islamists could not rest rockets, and infrastructure. content with a supporting role; they had to push Paradoxically, Israel was not fully prepared their way to the front. By establishing Hizbullah for the war it launched; Hizbullah, surprised by as an armed vanguard in Lebanon, Khomeini the outbreak of war, was nevertheless ready for sought to open a new Islamist front against it. The media then hyped those analysts who Israel, independent of weak Arab states and the drew extravagant conclusions from Israel’s hesi- ineffective PLO. tant performance. Viewers of one American net- In the 1990s, Islamist movements gained work could hear a gushing consultant declare: ground across the Middle East. A Palestinian “Hizbullah is a powerhouse… Hizbullah deliv- Islamist movement, Hamas, filled the vacuum ers the goods… Hizbullah has proven its mus- left by the PLO’s incompetence. Hizbullah cles… Israel is a paper tiger after all… The rules waged a successful campaign to end the Israeli of the Arab-Israeli conflict will have changed for occupation of south Lebanon. But while good.” Of course, it would be easy to make the Islamists rejected peace with Israel and called for opposite case, beginning with the new rules in “resistance,” they could not challenge the pre- Lebanon that constrain Hizbullah. rogative of the Arab states and the PLO to make grand strategy toward Israel. Strengths and weaknesses That is, until this past year. The verdict is still out—this has been the cau- tious refrain of the most serious analysts. But the The Islamist moment war does offer some glimpse into the possible Two developments have put the Islamists in the character of the Israeli-Islamist conflict, by driver’s seat. First, Palestinian elections last win- showing the intrinsic strengths and weaknesses ter carried Hamas to power in the West Bank of the Islamist coalition. and Gaza. Hamas has regarded the elections as a The Islamist coalition is strong in areas of mandate not merely to substitute good govern- ideological discipline and leadership authority. ment for PLO corruption, but to bend The ideology purports to be “authentic,” and Palestinian strategy to the Islamist vision of efficiently mobilizes pent-up resentments gradual attrition of Israel. against Israel and the West. The leaders person- Second, Iran’s nuclear drive under President ify a spirit of defiance that is overvalued in their Ahmadinejad has revitalized the idea that Israel societies, and they command nearly total obedi- can be confronted on the external front. ence. Training is exacting; everyone follows The possible combination of Iranian nukes, orders; no one surrenders. Hizbullah rockets, and Hamas “resistance” has The Islamist coalition also brings together a electrified the Arab-Muslim world. Might the flexible mix of assets, comprised as it is of forces of Islamism, acting in concert, achieve the a state actor (Iran), a quasi-state actor (Hamas), 9 MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES FALL 2006 and a sub-state actor (Hizbullah). They have Hamas. In the summer war, Hizbullah lost its developed innovative weapons systems, from sui- exclusive control of Lebanon’s border with cide bombings to rockets, which go around and Israel, arguably the most significant strategic under Israel’s conventional military strengths. outcome of the war. Without access to Israel’s And if Iran were to acquire missile-launched borders, the Islamist coalition cannot conduct nuclear weapons, they would transform Israel’s a sustained war of attrition against Israel. small size from an advantage (short lines of Moreover, if the coalition uses its rocket arse- defense and supply) into a liability (total vul- nal (its remaining offensive capability), it nerability to one strike). An Iranian nuclear effectively licenses Israel to retaliate with dev- weapon could transform the Israeli-Islamist astating force. conflict into a much more dangerous game, in Absent nuclear weapons, the Islamist coali- which periodic nuclear-alert crises could bring tion is thus likely to remain blocked, unless and about the economic, political, and demograph- until it includes an Arab state that neighbors ic attrition of Israel. Israel. Syria is an obvious candidate for that But the Islamist coalition also has weakness- role, but its present leadership acts as an ally of es. First, its backbone is Shiite. Some Sunnis, the coalition, and not a full-fledged member in including Islamists, see the coalition as a threat it. There are Islamist political movements in to traditional Sunni primacy, as much as it is a Egypt and Jordan that would eagerly join the threat to Israel.
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