Wayne Hankey, 9/11 and the History of Philosophy

Animus 11 (2006) www.swgc.mun.ca/animus. 9/11 And The History Of Philosophy Wayne Hankey Dalhousie University [email protected] Introduction There is nothing more significant about a philosophy than how it situates itself within or in respect to the history of philosophy. When it locates itself historically, a form of philosophy defines what philosophy itself is by placing this mode of human living, reflection, speaking, and writing vis-à-vis that in relation to which it emerged and has developed. This placing occurs in respect to genres (e.g. poetry, prose, face-to-face discourse, introspection, writing) and to other representations or imitations of the whole (e.g. most importantly, at least at its origins, to myth and religion and, in more modern times, to what are commonly called “sciences”). Designating its normal setting is also part of this historical placing. It will involve the question put most influentially in our time by Pierre Hadot as to whether philosophy is properly a way of life—as it was indisputably when it began and throughout the Hellenic and Hellenistic periods. As a way of life philosophy was thus carried on both in agora and in monastery, both in prison and in episcopal and imperial curia, both in the Neoplatonic schools headed by a “divine” successor to Plato and in Islamic halqa which took up their studies from the commentaries on the classical philosophical texts produced in the late ancient Neoplatonic and Peripatetic schools. For Hadot, philosophy’s move out of these situations and making the university its normal location was of the utmost significance. In his judgment, the present existence of philosophy as the abstractly theoretical production and manipulation of concepts divorced from life and serving other forms of knowing what is, other determinations of what is to be done, and other powers shaping the self and enabling life is a humiliating reduction and ruinous loss. Such diminished philosophy is hardly separable from paid professional work in the university. Hadot indicates the connection of place and character thus: the university is .. made up of professors who train professors, or professionals training professionals. Education was thus no longer directed toward people who were to be educated with a view to becoming fully developed human beings, but to specialists, in order that they might train other specialists.1 1 Pierre Hadot, “Philosophy as a Way of Life,” in Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault, 270; see also idem, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? Collection Folio/Essais (Paris: Gallimard, 1995) 355-407 at 389. For a description and assessment of Hadot’s position see W.J. Hankey, “Philosophy as Way of Life for Christians? Iamblichan and Porphyrian Reflections on Religion, 3 HANKEY: 9/11 AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Understood in this wide way, when philosophers, whether explicitly or implicitly, construct the historical structure for philosophy and locate their work and that of others within it, they prescribe what counts as reason. In consequence, they may be contributing to decisions which have life or death consequences. It is hard to know whether what our professional philosophers in their university departments do is of much influence and whether they are in fact regarded as professional experts on what ought to be regarded as rational. Nonetheless, they must play some role in shaping what we suppose reason to be and, rigorously delimiting philosophy and excluding from its rationality what may not count seems to be crucial to the activity of the philosophy departments at the dominant universities of the Anglo-American Protestant world. There, many of those who now make our wars received what we are pleased to call a liberal education. Especially since September 11, 2001, some of these, the most powerful of our political leaders, have told us that what they describe as free democratic Christian society is in a worldwide cultural war against what some of them call Islamo-fascism. Indeed, some of them have also led us into dreadfully murderous external wars against parts of the Islamic world and to a universal and never to be ended so-called “war against terror” largely directed against Muslims, which, among other evils, has institutionalised torture in societies which had defined themselves by opposition to it and been destructive of our civil liberties. The necessity of these wars—cultural, shooting, or metaphorical—and of the means employed have frequently been justified directly or indirectly by labelling the Islamic enemy as irrational because Islam itself and its cultural product are irrational. Let me adduce a few recently published articles in the New York Times which manifest diverse aspects and results of this approach. On September 21st, David Brooks, generally supposed to possess access to what is being thought inside the White House, published a column in the Times which began by declaring that the international system was broken. He went on to lament that since 9/11 no consensus had been reached on what is moving the enemies and judged: The core of the dispute is: Do the extremists play by the normal rules of geostrategy, or are their minds off in some mystical sphere that is utterly alien to our categories? Do they respond to incentives and follow the dictates of what we call self-interest? Can they be deterred by normal threats to their security? Or, alternatively, are they playing an entirely different game? Are the men who occupy the black hole that is the Iranian power elite engaged in a religious enterprise based on an eschatological time frame and driven by supernatural longings we can’t begin to fathom?2 Answering these questions has serious consequences because, as he wrote “The definition of the threat determines the remedies we select to combat it…” According to Brooks: Virtue, and Philosophy in Thomas Aquinas, ” Laval Théologique et Philosophique, 59:2 [Le Néoplatonisme ] (Juin 2003): 193-224. 2 David Brooks, “Lessons From U.N. Week,” New York Times, September 21, 2006. 4 HANKEY: 9/11 AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Millions of Americans think the pope [in Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections,” University of Regensburg, Tuesday, 12 September 2006] asked exactly the right questions: Does the Muslim God accord with the categories of reason?...These millions of Americans believe the pope has nothing to apologize for. They regard the vicious overreaction to his speech, like the vicious overreaction to the Danish cartoons, as another sign that some sort of intellectual disease is sweeping through the Arab world. Indeed, while lamenting the diminution of Hellenic rationality within Christian religion and the secularised remains of Christendom, the nub of the Pope’s recent criticism of Islam was to locate its divinity outside rationality.3 A survey article in the New York Times produced in the wake of his lecture, “Across Europe, Worries on Islam Spread to Center,” reported on what seemed to unite the European and the American millions. Evidence was adduced that more Europeans “in the political mainstream are arguing that Islam cannot be reconciled with European values.”4 Although those surveyed often appeared to be thoroughly secularised, they seemed to agree with the Pope that reason was exclusively on their side of the conflict. Although the Islamic reaction to the Pope’s animadversions induced him to more dialogue with Muslims than he previously envisaged, nothing like seems to be happening in Washington (or at Number 10 Downing Street.) On October 17th, Jeff Stein reported in the Times on a remarkable ignorance of the enemy. Stein has been asking “Washington counterterrorism officials”: “Do you know the difference between a Sunni and a Shī‘ite?”5 After what appears to have been a serious investigation, he concluded that: most American officials I’ve interviewed don’t have a clue. That includes not just intelligence and law enforcement officials, but also members of Congress who have important roles overseeing our spy agencies….Too many officials in charge of the war on terrorism just don’t care to learn much, if anything, about the enemy we’re fighting. 3 See Benedict XVI, “Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections,” University of Regensburg Tuesday, 12 September 2006: “…for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality. Here Khoury quotes a work of the noted French Islamist R. Arnaldez, who points out that Ibn Hazn went so far as to state that God is not bound even by his own word, and that nothing would oblige him to reveal the truth to us. Were it God's will, we would even have to practise idolatry.” 4 Dan Bilefsky and Ian Fisher; Dan Bilefsky reported From Brussels, and Ian Fisher From Rome, contributing were Sarah Lyall and Alan Cowell from London, Mark Landler from Frankfurt, Peter Kiefer from Rome, Renwick Mclean from Madrid and Maia De La Baume from Paris, “Across Europe, Worries on Islam Spread to Center,” New York Times, October 11, 2006. 55 Jeff Stein, “Can You Tell a Sunni From a Shiite?” New York Times, October 17, 2006. 5 HANKEY: 9/11 AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY What is reported and opined in these articles raises many questions including, for example, why the Islamic mystical sphere is alien and our own is not? and why we cannot begin to fathom the eschatological time frame and the supernatural longings of the Iranian power elite when some of those in the most powerful places in the Anglo- American world also operate out of an eschatological time frame and supernatural longings? In this paper I shall neither ask nor attempt to answer these or many other such questions.

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