By Zia Mian and A.H. Nayyar

Playing the Nuclear Game: Pakistan and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

ince May 2009, Pakistan, largely alone, Yet, a larger set of issues is at play. These include Pakistan’s concerns about has blocked the start of international talks the long-term consequences of the U.S.- Indian nuclear deal and the emerging on a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT) at strategic relationship between the two S countries; the desire of military planners the 65-member Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Pakistan to move from larger, heavier nuclear weapons based on HEU to lighter, 1 in Geneva. The treaty would ban the production more compact plutonium-based weapons; the interest of nuclear production com- of fissile materials for weapons purposes; fissile plex managers in Pakistan in realizing their investment over the past decade in a materials, namely plutonium and highly enriched large expansion of fissile material produc- tion facilities and of the nuclear establish- uranium (HEU), are the key ingredients in ment more broadly in expanding its do- mestic economic and political clout; and, nuclear weapons. Pakistan has prevented these finally, a reluctance in Washington and other key capitals to press Pakistan on negotiations despite having accepted last year a CD an FMCT because of the importance the program of work that included an FMCT. United States attaches to Pakistan’s sup- port for the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

Pakistan’s ambassador at the CD, Zamir a long-running search for strategic parity The Evolution of Pakistan’s Position ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2010 Akram, has indicated that his govern- with India. The most powerful of these Pakistan has historically taken an am- ment may not easily be moved, saying, managers are from the army, which also bivalent position toward a possible “We are not in a position to accept the runs the nuclear weapons complex. They FMCT. It supported the December 1993 beginning of negotiations on a cut-off argue that Pakistan has fallen behind UN General Assembly resolution calling treaty in the foreseeable future.”2 India in producing fissile materials and for negotiations on a “non-discrimina- At the core of the concerns held by insist that this fissile material gap be ad- tory multilateral and internationally and Pakistan’s national security managers is dressed as part of any talks. effectively verifiable treaty banning the

Zia Mian directs the Project on Peace and Security in South Asia at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security (PSGS). He is a member of the core staff of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). A.H. Nayyar is a visiting researcher with PSGS and a member of the IPFM from Pakistan. 17 production of fissile material for nuclear from the deployment of nuclear even to the term FMCT, arguing that “my weapons or other nuclear explosive de- weapons, to cease development of delegation does not agree to the Treaty vices.”3 Having agreed to talk, Pakistan ballistic missiles capable of deliver- being described as a Fissile Material ‘Cut- delayed the start of a negotiating process ing nuclear weapons and any fur- off’ Treaty, implying only a halt in future at the CD by debating the scope of the ther production of fissile material production. We cannot endorse the loose proposed treaty, insisting that the man- for nuclear weapons, to confirm abbreviation—FMCT—in any formal de- date for negotiating the treaty include their policies not to export equip- scription of the Treaty which is to be ne- constraints on existing stockpiles of fis- ment, materials or technology that gotiated by the CD.”9 He proposed instead sile materials. The compromise agreed could contribute to weapons of the label “fissile material treaty,” or FMT, in the March 1995 Shannon mandate mass destruction or missiles capable and a number of other countries and in- for talks at the CD on an FMCT was to of delivering them and to under- dependent analysts adopted this usage. finesse the issue by noting that the man- take appropriate commitments in A CD committee was set up to begin date did not preclude any state from rais- that regard.4 talks on an FMCT in late 1998, but made ing the problem of existing stockpiles as little progress and could not be re-estab- part of the negotiations. India and Pakistan ignored the resolu- lished in 1999. For the following decade, Work on an FMCT, however, did not tion, but under pressure from the United the CD struggled to agree on a program start. In May 1995, the nuclear Nonpro- States, Pakistan acquiesced to the fissile of work. The United States under the liferation Treaty (NPT) was extended material talks.5 Pakistan agreed to negoti- Bush administration shifted priorities to indefinitely and without conditions, ate on the basis of the existing Shannon its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and was raising concerns that the nuclear-weapon mandate, but made clear that it intended ideologically opposed to multilateral arms states might never uphold their obliga- to “raise its concerns about and seek control. At the CD, it insisted talks be con- tion to eliminate their nuclear weapons. a solution to the problem of unequal fined to an FMCT, but without verifica- The following year, the CD pushed stockpiles.”6 Munir Akram, Pakistan’s tion provisions, and rejected demands for through the Comprehensive Test Ban CD ambassador, spelled out his country’s discussions on other long-standing issues, Treaty, despite objections by India, send- concerns in detail, saying, “We believe such as nuclear disarmament, measures ing the treaty to the General Assembly that a wide disparity in fissile material to prevent an arms race in outer space, for approval and opening it for signature. stockpiles of India and Pakistan could and security assurances for non-nuclear- India and Pakistan refused to sign. erode the stability of nuclear deterrence.”7 weapon states. Other states, unwilling to In May 1998, India and Pakistan tested In a later statement, he explained that concede control of the CD agenda to the nuclear weapons. Within weeks, the UN Pakistan assumed “India will transform United States, tied talks on an FMCT to Security Council responded to the tests its large fissile material stocks into nuclear these other topics. by unanimously passing Resolution 1172, weapons” and thus Pakistan needed to In the absence of CD negotiations, which called on India and Pakistan: “take into account both India’s nuclear and taking advantage of the frustra- weapons and fissile material stockpiles.” tion among many non-nuclear-weapon immediately to stop their nuclear Pakistan “cannot therefore agree to freeze states at Bush administration policies on weapon development programmes, inequality,” he said.8 To make clear its nuclear weapons and nonproliferation to refrain from weaponization or position, Pakistan’s ambassador objected and disarmament, Pakistan laid out an expansive vision for an FMCT. In 2006, Masood Khan, Pakistan’s ambassador to the CD, argued that “[a] cut-off in the manufacturing of fissile material must be accompanied by a mandatory pro- gramme for the elimination of asymme- tries in the possession of fissile material stockpiles by various states. Such transfer of fissile material to safeguards should be made first by states with huge stockpiles, both in the global and regional con- text.”10 He explained what this meant:

UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe Photo/Eskinder UN “A fissile material treaty must provide a schedule for a progressive transfer of ex- isting stockpiles to civilian use and plac- ODAY April 2010 ODAY ing these stockpiles under safeguards so that the unsafeguarded stocks are equal- ized at the lowest level possible.”11 In May 2009, for the first time in 10 years, with Pakistan’s assent the CD The Conference on Disarmament meets in Geneva May 19, 2009. Pakistan has objected

ARMS CONTROL T to a work plan that would allow the UN body to proceed with negotiations on a fissile adopted a program of work organized material cutoff treaty. around four working groups, one of which 18 was tasked with negotiating an FMCT on the basis of the Shannon mandate. The other groups were to manage discussions on nuclear disarmament, preventing an arms race in outer space, and security as- surances. In addition, three special coor- dinators were to be appointed to elicit the views of states on other issues. Nevertheless, agreement on a pro- gram of work was not sufficient to allow FMCT negotiations to begin. Pakistan demanded agreement on procedural is- sues, including that “[t]he allocation of time for the four Working Groups should be balanced so that the progress on each issue is ensured” and that “[t]he appoint- ment of Chairs of the Working Groups should respect the principle of equal geographical representation.”12 The ensu- ing dispute over how any talks would be managed, with China, Egypt, and Iran joining Pakistan in expressing concerns, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Commission Energy Atomic Pakistan prevented progress. The CD also failed to agree that the 2009 program of work would carry over into 2010. Pakistan continued to obstruct the start of work at the CD in early 2010. In February, Zamir Akram explained that his country had agreed to the program of work in 2009 in the hope that some of Pakistan’s concerns would be addressed with the start of the Obama administra- Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Munir Ahmad Khan briefs Prime tion. Pakistan now believed that this Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo (far left) on the design of the Khushab reactor in would not be the case, he said.13 Citing a the mid-1980s. January decision by Pakistan’s National Command Authority (NCA), which is treaty because we will not commit sui- India, suggesting that “if bilaterally, the responsible for its nuclear weapons, he cide.”16 For its part, Pakistan is playing U.S. can facilitate a moratorium on fissile said that Pakistan’s position at the CD on a waiting game, arguing that the time is material production or on testing: we are an FMCT would be based on “its national not yet “ripe” for an FMCT.17 very happy to be part of that.”19 security interests and the objectives of It has been estimated that as of 2009, strategic stability in South Asia.”14 The Fissile Material Gap Pakistan had accumulated a stock of Pakistan rejected the CD plan of work Pakistan’s position clearly is determined about two metric tons of HEU for its proposed in early March. A number of by concern about parity with India. On nuclear weapons (enough for about 80 countries associated with the CD Group October 26, 1998, Pakistani Foreign weapons, assuming 25 kilograms per of 21, including Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Minister Sartaj Aziz was quoted as say- warhead).20 Pakistan also has about North Korea, Sri Lanka, and Syria, have ing, “Nuclear scientists have advised the 100 kilograms of weapons plutonium, joined Pakistan in arguing for a more government that there was no harm in enough for about 20 warheads (assuming ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2010 “balanced” program of work, highlight- signing the CTBT and FMCT at this stage five kilograms per warhead) from its reac- ing in particular the need for talks on nu- as we had enough enriched nuclear mate- tor at Khushab.21 Altogether, Pakistan clear disarmament.15 China also did not rial to maintain the power equilibrium may have fissile material sufficient for endorse the CD plan of work. Some states in the region.”18 This would seem to perhaps 100 simple weapons. Advanced may simply be remaining silent about suggest that a decade ago policymakers weapon designs, including those that use their opposition to the treaty and taking in Pakistan believed that its fissile mate- both uranium and plutonium in compos- advantage of Pakistan’s refusal to permit rial stockpiles were sufficient to meet ite warheads, would allow it to produce talks on an FMCT. Israeli Prime Minister perceived needs. Similarly, in 2006, Paki- significantly more weapons from its HEU. Benjamin Netanyahu told President Bill stani Ambassador to the United States Pakistan also has about 1.2 metric tons Clinton in 1999, “We will never sign the Jahangir Karamat, a former army chief, of reactor-grade plutonium in the spent treaty, and do not delude yourselves—no seemed to indicate that Pakistan might fuel from its two nuclear power reactors, pressure will help. We will not sign the consider a bilateral moratorium with but this material is under International 19 Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. reactors. It is estimated that India may fast breeder reactors, the first of which Pakistan is expanding its fissile mate- have accumulated about 700 kilograms of (the 500-megawatt Prototype Fast Breed- rial production capacity and increasing plutonium by 2009, sufficient for about er Reactor) is expected to be completed its reliance on plutonium weapons. Two 140 weapons, and is producing more at in 2011.29 This fast breeder reactor will additional production reactors are under the rate of about 30 kilograms per year.26 consume reactor-grade plutonium as fuel, construction at Khushab.22 Each of these India produces HEU, but this material but will produce weapons-grade pluto- new reactors could produce about 10 ki- is believed to be for its nuclear-powered nium in the blankets that surround the lograms of plutonium a year, if they are submarine fleet and not for weapons. reactor core. If it operates with a reason- the same size as the existing reactor at This would suggest that India and Paki- able capacity factor, the reactor would the site. Satellite imagery from late 2006 stan today have roughly similar holdings be able to produce 90-140 kilograms of shows that Pakistan has also been work- of weapons material. weapons-grade plutonium per year, suf- ing on one new reprocessing plant at its A large disparity in stocks of the ficient for almost 20-30 weapons per New Labs site near Islamabad and anoth- kind emphasized by Pakistan emerges year.30 It is estimated that India may have er at Chashma, presumably to reprocess if India’s unsafeguarded power-reactor 1,000-1,500 kilograms of weapons pluto- the spent fuel from the new production plutonium is included in the accounting. nium by 2020.31 India would not be the reactors.23 Pakistan is expanding its ura- India may have separated almost seven first country to use a breeder reactor for nium processing operations to fuel these metric tons of power-reactor plutonium military purposes; France used its Phénix reactors.24 It is estimated that, by 2020, by 2009.27 Assuming that perhaps 10 breeder reactor to produce plutonium for Pakistan could have accumulated ap- kilograms of such reactor-grade pluto- weapons.32 The experience of many other proximately 450 kilograms of plutonium nium may be sufficient for a weapon, this breeder reactors around the world, how- from the Khushab reactors, enough for would amount to perhaps 700 weapons. ever, suggests that operating a breeder 90 weapons, and more than 2,500 kilo- There are reports that at least one Indian reactor at such efficiency may not be easy grams of HEU, sufficient for perhaps 100 nuclear weapon test in 1998 used pluto- because breeder reactors have proven simple fission weapons.25 nium that was less than weapons grade.28 susceptible to frequent breakdowns and India is producing plutonium for India claims its stockpile of reactor- need long repair times.33 weapons in two dedicated production grade plutonium is intended for fueling Pakistan has explicitly raised the issue of reactor-grade plutonium stocks, with Figure 1: Pakistan’s Khushab Nuclear Site its CD ambassador in February 2010 ex- The newly completed second plutonium production reactor at Khushab pressing a concern that an FMCT might appears to have started operating, with steam coming from several not “include other bomb making mate- cooling towers in this December 2009 satellite image. The first Khushab rials such as reactor grade Plutonium, reactor has been running since the late 1990s. A third reactor is under U233, Neptunium or Americium.”34 construction at the site. Pakistan is also concerned about the implications of the U.S.-Indian nuclear Row of mechanical deal. Signed into law by President draft cooling towers George W. Bush in October 2008, it lifts 30-year-old restrictions on the sale of nuclear material, equipment, and tech- nology to India. The United States and India convinced the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which has more than 40 members, to exempt India from similar international controls. Responding to Image credit: G credit: Image the U.S.-Indian deal, Pakistan’s NCA declared in August 2007 that the agree- ment “would have implications on stra- tegic stability as it would enable India to eoEye via G via eoEye produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from un- safeguarded nuclear reactors.”35 oogle Earth/Image annotation: ISIS annotation: Earth/Image oogle As part of the deal, India is now free to import uranium for its civil program, ODAY April 2010 ODAY easing constraints on uranium availabil- Steam appears ity and enabling India to use more of its to be distorting domestic uranium for its nuclear weap- the view of some ons program. It is estimated that this Second Khushab of the cooling would enable India to produce up to 200 reactor building tower fan blades

ARMS CONTROL T kilograms a year of weapons-grade pluto- nium in its unsafeguarded heavy-water 20 power reactors, enough for 40 weapons on a triad of platforms, the third leg abad’s support for the U.S. war against per year, provided that it can overcome of which is coming into view. In 2009, al Qaeda and the Taliban, but President the associated practical problems of in- India launched its first nuclear-powered Barack Obama has announced that creased rates of spent fuel reprocessing submarine.39 It plans a fleet of three to he intends to begin withdrawing U.S. and faster refueling.36 five, each armed with 12 ballistic mis- troops from Afghanistan in 2011. U.S. India has committed that it will de- siles.40 There have been suggestions by military aid to Pakistan will not contin- clare eight of its indigenously built power former Pakistani officials that the coun- ue at current levels indefinitely, and aid reactors as civilian and open them for try develop its own nuclear submarine likely will be increasingly for civilian IAEA safeguarding by 2014 in a phased and, in the meantime, lease a nuclear purposes and more carefully audited. manner. It is estimated that these eight submarine from a friendly power, i.e., Even if China steps up its assistance, reactors could produce four metric tons China; deploy nuclear-armed cruise Pakistan’s generals believe they cannot

Pakistan’s generals believe they cannot keep up with India in a conventional arms race. They may want more nuclear weapons as a counter, while insisting on conventional weapons controls as a condition for progress on an FMCT.

of unsafeguarded plutonium by then.37 missiles on its diesel submarines; and keep up with India in a conventional India will keep eight power reactors out- continue fissile material production for arms race. They may want more nuclear side safeguards, which together could the “foreseeable future.”41 weapons as a counter, while insisting on produce about 1,250 kilograms of pluto- Another justification being offered for conventional weapons controls as a con- nium per year, not all of which India can a larger fissile material stockpile is In- dition for progress on an FMCT. currently separate.38 All this plutonium is dia’s pursuit of ballistic missile defenses. To compound these concerns, Paki- presumably intended for fueling breeder (China has raised the same point with stan’s generals see an emerging U.S.-In- reactors, but could produce a large num- regard to U.S. strategic missile defenses.) dian strategic relationship. The U.S.-In- ber of simple nuclear weapons. The deal In 2004 the military officer who serves dian nuclear deal forms part of a broader allows India to continue to keep outside as director of arms control and disarma- January 2004 agreement between the safeguards its stockpiles of accumulated ment affairs at the Strategic Plans Divi- United States and India on “Next Steps power reactor spent fuel and separated sion argued that India’s missile defense in Strategic Partnership,” through which power reactor plutonium. Furthermore, program is likely to “trigger an arms the United States committed to help In- India can choose whether any future race” and that Pakistan could build dia with its civilian space program, high- reactors it builds will be declared as mili- more missiles and more warheads, re- technology trade, missile defense, and tary or civilian. quiring more fissile material; develop de- civilian nuclear activities. The Obama coys and multiple warhead missiles; and administration seems as committed as its The Big Picture move to an alert deployment posture.42 predecessor to pursuing this relationship The generals who command Pakistan’s In 2009, India carried out its third test with a view to maintaining U.S. primacy army, dominate national security, and of a missile interceptor.43 and containing China. control nuclear policy and the nuclear More broadly, India’s economy and weapon complex through the Strategic military spending are now so large and A High Price Plans Division, even when there is an growing so rapidly that Pakistan cannot Former senior officials in Pakistan have elected civilian government, see a trou- expect to keep up. In January, India’s De- argued that, in exchange for talks on an ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2010 bling future. Their military mind-sets, fense Ministry announced plans to spend FMCT, Pakistan should receive a nuclear vested interests, and old habits lead them more than $10 billion this coming year deal like the one given to India, with a to find many reasons to continue to seek on acquiring new weapons.44 This was lifting of international restrictions by strategic parity with India and to produce made possible by a 34 percent increase the NSG.45 Pakistani Ambassador to the more fissile material to support a larger in India’s military budget for 2009-2010, United States Husain Haqqani claimed in nuclear arsenal. to more than $35 billion; in Pakistan, it February that “[t]alks between Pakistan One argument Pakistan has raised went up 15 percent, to just more than and the US for cooperation on atomic for building up fissile material stocks is $4 billion. Pakistan has been able to buy programmes are under way and we want the prospect of a large Indian arsenal. major new weapons systems because of the US to have an agreement with us like Zamir Akram claimed in February 2010 the large amounts of U.S. military and the one it had with India on civil nuclear that India was aiming for an arsenal of economic aid that have flowed since the technology.”46 After the U.S.-Indian deal 400 weapons. This arsenal would rely September 11 attacks in return for Islam- was announced in 2005, U.S. officials 21 become a key gatekeeper for managing the import and operation of the many large and very costly power reactors required to meet these energy targets. A large nuclear energy sector would offer Pakistan a means to mobilize and direct additional financial resources, technologies, material, and manpower to the weapons program. Moreover, Pakistan’s current electricity shortage could be addressed much more quickly and more economically by adding natural gas-fueled power plants, which take much less time to construct and re- quire much less capital than comparable Department of Defense of Department nuclear power plants. The managers of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons production complex, the mili- tary’s Strategic Plans Division, have little incentive to begin talks on an FMCT and even less interest in reaching early agree- Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, addresses students ment or acceding to an eventual treaty. As at the Pakistani National Defense University in Islamabad December 15, 2009. noted earlier, the complex is in the midst of a very large expansion. In May 2009, repeatedly said the Indian situation was seriously weakened by the U.S.-Indian The Washington Post reported that the first unique and the United States would not nuclear deal. With Israel having sought of the two new production reactors under extend the same terms to Israel or Paki- a lifting of NSG restrictions to allow it to construction at Khushab may be ready to stan, the other NPT holdouts.47 However, import nuclear reactors and fuel, there come online in 2010.52 An official visit some U.S. analysts have been urging such is a serious danger that the NPT will be to the Khushab site by Prime Minister a nuclear deal as a way to buy greater rendered largely pointless. Pardoning all Yusuf Raza Gilani and senior military and cooperation from Pakistan in the war three states that chose to remain outside nuclear weapons officials in late Febru- against the Taliban and as a way to assure the NPT and develop nuclear weapons ary may have marked the completion of Pakistan of an enduring U.S. commit- would make a mockery of the idea that work on the reactor.53 The prime minister ment.48 For their part, U.S. Department the treaty offers a platform for moving congratulated Khushab engineers for com- of State officials have been cautious to nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, pleting important projects and announced in answering questions about the pos- by ending the distinction between NPT one month’s bonus pay. Work on the third sibility of a nuclear deal with Pakistan. parties and nonparties with regard to Khushab reactor seems to have started in Asked directly in February 2010 if the their access to international nuclear trade 2005-2006 and may be completed in a few Obama administration was considering a and technology assistance, it could make years. If FMCT talks begin and seem to go nuclear deal with Pakistan, State Depart- countries question the value of being a well, there may be international pressure ment spokesman Philip Crowley replied party to the treaty. for a production moratorium, which would “I’m – I don’t know.”49 At a March 24 A nuclear deal for Pakistan would carry involve suspending production at existing press conference with Pakistani Foreign other costs. It would allow the Pakistan sites and halting work on new facilities. Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi after Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) to The large investment made in the new what was dubbed a U.S.-Pakistan Strate- become a much more powerful economic, reactors and reprocessing plants would be gic Dialogue, Secretary of State Hillary political, and technological force in Paki- seen to have been wasted. The Khushab Clinton was asked if the United States stan. PAEC today is responsible for every- reactors, which do not produce electric- would discuss a nuclear deal with Paki- thing from uranium mining to building ity, and the associated reprocessing plants stan. She indicated that the U.S. might and operating plutonium-production would have little if any value for Pakistan’s consider it eventually, arguing “We have reactors and reprocessing plants for the civilian nuclear energy program. a broad agenda with many complicated nuclear weapons program. It also operates Finally, Pakistan sees itself able to block issues like the one you referred to… this two small power reactors: a 125-megawatt progress on an FMCT at the CD because it dialogue that we’re engaged in is help- plant bought from Canada in the 1960s has seen little sign that the United States ODAY April 2010 ODAY ing us build the kind of partnership that and a 300-megawatt plant purchased or other states care about an FMCT or can make progress over time on the most from China in the 1990s. A second 300- even about nuclear weapons in South Asia complicated of issues.”50 megawatt Chinese reactor is under con- beyond wanting to be reassured about the A lifting of the current international struction. Pakistan’s plans call for a very security of Pakistan’s weapons. Ambassa- restrictions on the sale of nuclear reactors large increase in nuclear power capacity, dors at the CD urge Pakistan to allow talks

ARMS CONTROL T and fuel to Pakistan would further strain to 2,800 megawatts, by 2020, reaching to start, and foreign ministries may send the nonproliferation regime, already 8,800 megawatts by 2030.51 PAEC would démarches to Islamabad, but Pakistan sees 22 this as diplomacy as usual and not indica- the United States, has chosen to focus its ENDNOTES tive of an international priority requiring relationship with Pakistan on fighting Pakistan to undertake a serious policy the Taliban and al Qaeda. To get started This article is based on a chapter on Pakistan review or adjust its position. on an FMCT, the United States and other in Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for The view from Islamabad is that the major states, including non-nuclear- Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the stream of high-level officials arriving there weapon states, will need to put it much Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, comes to talk about the Taliban and al Qa- higher on the agenda. A useful first step published in October 2008 and available at eda, Afghanistan, and the tribal areas. The might be for Obama and leaders from www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ key U.S. interlocutors have been Adm. Mi- other countries that want to see an FMCT gfmr08cv.pdf. chael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs to put in a call to Islamabad. of Staff, who has made 14 visits to Paki- Although Pakistan is the most insis- 1. Jonathan Lynn, “Pakistan Blocks Agenda at U.N. Disarmament Conference,” Reuters, stan; Gen. David Petraeus, head of Central tent in wanting stocks to be addressed January 19, 2010, www.reuters.com/article/ Command; and Richard Holbrooke, U.S. in an FMCT, it is not alone. Along with idUSTRE60I26U20100119. special representative for Afghanistan and the Group of 21, countries such as Brazil, 2. Stephanie Nebehay, “Pakistan Rules Out Fis- Pakistan. It is notable that even during Japan, and New Zealand have raised this sile Talks for Now–Diplomats,” Reuters, January Clinton’s recent visit to Pakistan, nuclear issue so that an FMCT can serve both 22, 2010, www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/ weapons issues did not feature on the nonproliferation and disarmament. These LDE60K2D9.htm. public agenda except for the security of states and others wishing to begin work 3. UN General Assembly, Resolution 48/75L, De- Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials. on an FMCT should assure Pakistan that cember 16, 1993, www.un.org/documents/resga. Even Abdul Qadeer Khan seems to have they will work together with Islamabad htm. been forgotten. For now, the United States in insisting that the treaty cover fissile 4. UN Security Council, Resolution 1172, June 6, sees the war against the Taliban as more material stockpiles in an effective way. 1998, www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html. important than the nuclear arms race in This assurance could be strengthened 5. “Ambassador Munir Akram’s Statement in the South Asia, just as the fight against the at the forthcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference on Disarmament on CTBT, FMCT Soviets in Afghanistan was more impor- Conference by states deciding to reaf- Issues,” July 30, 1998, www.fas.org/nuke/control/ tant in the 1980s than stopping Pakistan’s firm the commitment made at the 2000 fmct/docs/980730-cd-pak.htm. nuclear weapons program. NPT Review Conference to the need for 6. Ibid. “[a]rrangements by all nuclear-weapon Conclusion States to place, as soon as practicable, fis- 7. Ibid. When it comes to an FMCT, Pakistan’s sile material designated by each of them 8. “‘Fissile Material Treaty,’ Statement From Munir security managers, predominantly the as no longer required for military pur- Akram, Ambassador of Pakistan,” August 11, 1998, army, have been pursuing business as poses under IAEA or other relevant inter- www.acronym.org.uk/fissban/pak.htm. usual, which for the past five decades national verification and arrangements for 9. Ibid. has meant trying to maintain strategic the disposition of such material for peace- 10. Pakistan Permanent Mission to the United parity with India. Blocking talks on an ful purposes, to ensure that such material Nations, “Statement by Ambassador Masood Khan, FMCT enables them to continue to build remains permanently outside of military Pakistan’s Permanent Representative at the Con- up their fissile material stockpile and to programmes.”55 One possible way for deal- ference on Disarmament: General Debate: ‘Fissile highlight to the international communi- ing with such stocks is offered by the draft Material Treaty,’” Geneva, May 16, 2006, www. reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches06/ ty their concerns about a fissile material FMCT developed by the International statements%2016%20may/16MayPakistan.pdf. gap with India and the consequences of Panel on Fissile Materials.56 India’s current military buildup, espe- It is important for talks on an FMCT to 11. Ibid. cially India’s search for missile defenses, start soon and not be dragged out indefi- 12. “Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, and the consequences of the U.S.-Indian nitely. Among the states still producing Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN: nuclear deal. Holding up an FMCT also fissile material for weapons, Pakistan in Adoption of CD’s Programme of Work,” May 29, 2009, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/ allows Pakistan’s nuclear establishment particular may seek to delay agreement as a speeches09/2session/29may_pakistan.html. to keep open the prospect of a nuclear way to add to its fissile material stockpiles. deal of its own, which, if granted, would States interested in achieving an FMCT 13. Pakistan Permanent Mission to the United

Nations, “Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, ARMS CONTROL TODAY April 2010 give it dramatically greater power and in- should commit at the CD and as part of Permanent Representative of Pakistan at the Con- fluence in the energy sector and civilian the 2010 NPT Review Conference to imple- ference on Disarmament (CD),” Geneva, February economy and the means to channel addi- ment the 2000 review conference decision 18, 2010, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/politi- tional resources to the weapons program. to begin talks on an FMCT and complete cal/cd/2010/statements/part1/18Feb_Pakistan.pdf At the CD, Zamir Akram has claimed them within five years. To create and sus- (hereinafter Akram February 2010 statement). Pakistan has adopted a principled posi- tain real momentum for such negotiations 14. Ibid. tion on an FMCT based on vital national and reach quickly a treaty that Pakistan 15. Beatrice Fihn and Ray Acheson, “The CD interests and declared that “we are ready and other potential holdout states will Debates the Draft Programme of Work,” March to stand in splendid isolation if we have join, however, the nuclear-weapon states 22, 2010, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/ 54 to.” So far, this has been possible be- will need to put nuclear disarmament on cd/2010/reports.html. The Group of 21 at the CD cause it has carried little consequence. the agenda. The NPT review conference includes Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, The international community, led by offers an opportunity to do this. ACT Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic Republic of 23 Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, had time to cool for three years and that India’s ries/2010010153331800.htm. Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, reprocessing plants operate with a capacity factor 45. Asif Ezdi, “US Nuclear Duplicity,” The News, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, North Korea, Paki- of 50 percent. January 25, 2010, http://thenews.jang.com.pk/ stan, Peru, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, 28. George Perkovich claims “knowledgeable print1.asp?id=220571. Tunisia, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Indian sources confirmed” use of non-weapons- 46. Zulqernain Tahir, “Talks Under Way for N-deal 16. Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, “Israel,” grade plutonium in one of the 1998 nuclear With US: Haqqani,” Dawn, February 15, 2010, in Banning the Production of Fissile Materials for tests. George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-con- Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: Uni- tent-library/dawn/the-newspaper/national/12- Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, versity of California Press, 1999), pp. 428-430. talks-under-way-for-ndeal-with-us-haqqani-520- International Panel on Fissile Materials, Sep- Similarly, Raj Chengappa claims “one of the -bi-01. tember 2008, www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/ devices...used reactor grade or dirty plutonium.” 47. See, for example, R. Nicholas Burns and Rob- site_down/gfmr08cv.pdf. Raj Chengappa, Weapons of Peace: The Secret ert G. Joseph, “The U.S. and India: An Emerging Story of India’s Quest to Be a Nuclear Power (New 17. Reaching Critical Will, “Conference on Disar- Entente,” Remarks as Prepared for the House Delhi: Harper Collins, 2000), pp. 414-418. mament: Unofficial Transcript,” Geneva, March International Relations Committee, September 8, 11, 2010, www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/ 29. “Main Vessel of PFBR Installed, Reactor to 2005, www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/dos/ cd/2010/statements/part1/11March_Pakistan. Go Live in Sept 2011,” Times of India, Decem- dos090805.pdf. html (statement by Zamir Akram to the Confer- ber 7, 2009. 48. Stephen P. Cohen, “Addressing the U.S.-Paki- ence on Disarmament). 30. Alexander Glaser and M.V. Ramana, “Weap- stan Strategic Relationship,” June 12, 2008 (testi- 18. “Pakistan Moves Closer to Sign Nuclear Treaty,” on-Grade Plutonium Production Potential in the mony before the Senate Committee on Homeland The Nation, October 26, 1998. Indian Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor,” Science & Security and Governmental Affairs federal finan- 19. “Pakistan Totally Committed to Non-prolifera- Global Security, Vol. 15, No.2, (2007), pp. 85-106. cial management subcommittee); C. Christine Fair, tion, Restraint Regime,” Associated Press of Paki- The amount of plutonium produced will depend “Pakistan Needs Its Own Nuclear Deal,” Wall Street stan, April 9, 2006. on whether both the radial and axial blanket of Journal, February 10, 2010. the reactor, which contain weapon plutonium, 20. International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), 49. Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of will be reprocessed separately from the spent fuel “Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to State, “Daily Press Briefing,” Washington, D.C., in the reactor core. Nuclear Disarmament,” October 2009, p.21, www. February 18, 2010, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr09.pdf. 31. R. Rajaraman, “Estimates of India’s Fissile Mate- dpb/2010/02/136915.htm. rial Stocks,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 16, No. 21. IPFM, “Global Fissile Material Report 2009,”p. 16. 50. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks With 3 (2008), pp. 74-87. 22. Joby Warrick, “Pakistan Expanding Nuclear Pakistani Foreign Minister Makhdoom Shah 32. Mycle Schneider, “Fast Breeder Reactors in Program,” The Washington Post, July 24, 2006; Mehmood Qureshi After Their Meeting,” Wash- France,” in Fast Breeder Reactor Programs: History “U.S. Disputes Report on New Pakistan Reactor,” ington, March 24, 2010, www.state.gov/secretary/ and Status, February 2010, www.fissilematerials. The New York Times, August 3, 2006. Pictures of rm/2010/03/138996.htm. org/blog/rr08.pdf. the third reactor were released in June 2007. David 51. Zia Mian and A.H. Nayyar, “Pakistan and Albright and Paul Brannan, “Pakistan Appears to 33. Thomas B. Cochran et al., Fast Breeder Reactor the Energy Challenge,” in International Perspec- be Building a Third Plutonium Production Reactor Programs: History and Status, February 2010, www. tives on Energy Policy and the Role of Nuclear at Khushab Nuclear Site,” Institute for Science and fissilematerials.org/blog/rr08.pdf. Power, ed. Lutz Mez, Mycle Schneider, and Steve International Security (ISIS), June 21, 2007. 34. Akram February 2010 statement. Thomas (Brentwood, UK: Multi-Science Pub- 23. David Albright and Paul Brannan, “Chashma 35. “Press Release by Inter-Services Public Relations, lishing, 2009), pp. 515-531. Nuclear Site in Pakistan With Possible Reprocess- No. 318/2007,” August 1, 2007. 52. R. Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, “Nuclear ing Plant,” ISIS, January 18, 2007; David Albright 36. Zia Mian et al., “Fissile Materials in South Asia: Aims by Pakistan, India Prompt U.S. Concern,” and Paul Brannan, “Pakistan Expanding Pluto- The Implications of the US-India Nuclear Deal,” The Washington Post, May 28, 2009. nium Separation Facility Near Rawalpindi,” ISIS, September 2006, www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/ 53. Zia Mian, “Pakistan May Have Completed May 19, 2009. site_down/rr01.pdf. New Plutonium Production Reactor, Khushab-II,” 24. David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Robert 37. Ibid. IPFM Web log, February 28, 2010, www.fissile- Kelley, “Pakistan Expanding Dera Ghazi Khan materials.org/blog/2010/02/pakistan_may_have_ 38. Ibid. Nuclear Site: Time for U.S. to Call for Limits,” ISIS, complet.html. Satellite imagery from December May 19, 2009. 39. “India Launches Nuclear Submarine,” BBC, July 2009 has shown steam from the cooling towers 26, 2009. 25. Pakistan could potentially accumulate 2,500- at Khushab-2. Paul Brannan, “Steam Emitted 6,000 kilograms of HEU by 2020. This range 40. Sandeep Unnithan, “The Secret Undersea From Second Khushab Reactor Cooling Towers; reflects the considerable uncertainty about the Weapon,” India Today, January 28, 2008. Pakistan May Be Operating Second Reactor,” ISIS, March 24, 2010. evolution of the number and separative work 41. Tariq Osman Hyder, “Strategic Stability in capacity of Pakistan’s centrifuges, as well as the South Asia,” The News, August 1, 2009. 54. Akram February 2010 statement. limits on Pakistan’s supply of domestic uranium 42. Khalid Banuri, “Missile Defences in South Asia: 55. “2000 NPT Review Conference Final Docu- to feed its enrichment plants and reactors. See Zia The Next Challenge,” South Asian Survey, Vol. 11, ment,” www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_06/doc- ODAY April 2010 ODAY Mian, A.H. Nayyar, and R. Rajaraman, “Exploring No. 2 (2004), pp. 193-203. jun.asp. Uranium Resource Constraints on Fissile Material 43. “India Tests Interceptor Missile,” Agence 56. IPFM, “A Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty: Production in Pakistan,” Science and Global Secu- France-Presse, March 6, 2009. A Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile rity, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2009), pp. 77-108. Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nu- 44. “Armed Forces Modernization on Track: 26. IPFM, “Global Fissile Material Report clear Explosive Devices,” September 2, 2009, Defense Ministry,” The Hindu, January 1, 2009,” p. 16.

ARMS CONTROL T www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ 2010. www.hindu.com/2010/01/01/sto- 27. This assumes the power reactor spent fuel has fmct-ipfm-sep2009.pdf. 24