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Russian Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine: Comparative Analysis of Two Cases and Identification of Critical Elements in the Successful Application of Hybrid Tactics

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Russian Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine: Comparative Analysis of Two Cases and Identification of Critical Elements in the Successful Application of Hybrid Tactics CHARLES UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES Institute of Security Studies Master thesis 2020 Albina Starodubtseva CHARLES UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES Institute of Security Studies Albina Starodubtseva Russian Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine: Comparative Analysis of Two Cases and Identification of Critical Elements in the Successful Application of Hybrid Tactics Master thesis Prague 2020 Author: Albina Starodubtseva Supervisor: PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D. Academic Year: 2020/2021 Bibliographic record Starodubtseva, Albina. Russian Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine: Comparative Analysis of Two Cases and Identification of Critical Elements in the Successful Application of Hybrid Tactics. 126 p. Master thesis. Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Security Studies. Supervisor PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D. Bibliografický záznam Starodubtseva, Albina. Ruská Hybridní Válka na Ukrajině: Komparativní Analýza Dvou Případů a Identifikace Kritických Prvků v Úspěšné Aplikaci Hybridní Taktiky. 126 str. Diplomová práce. Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních věd, Institute of Security Studies. Vedoucí diplomové práce: PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D. Abstract After the military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, and the swift, bloodless annexation of Crimea, the international community recognized Russia as an expert on hybrid warfare. However, the ongoing conflict in Donbas unleashed by Moscow during the second less successful hybrid campaign remains a sore point not only for Ukraine but also for Russia which has to cope with costly consequences in order not to lose in the East of Ukraine and more importantly in its undeclared war on the West. This thesis conducts a comparative analysis of two Russian hybrid warfare models: (1) in Crimea; (2) in Eastern Ukraine, and focuses on the following research questions: Why was the Russian hybrid warfare in Crimea more successful than in Donbas? What measures can the state take to improve its ability to face hybrid attacks? The findings reveal that despite the presence of a set of common factors, the different degrees of success and outcomes of both cases are attributable to the fact that successfully employing the full spectrum of hybrid warfare, is actually bound not only to a number of prerequisites but also with specific favorable features of the conflict zone and several critical elements. While hybrid tactics vary depending on country and region, it is built on exploiting the enemy's vulnerabilities, the shortcomings of its political system, governance, economy, military sphere, and society, which, to one degree or another, can be characteristic of any state. Considering the range of domains in which an attacker is waging hybrid warfare, the most exploited fault lines and the inherent weaknesses of the target country, this thesis proposes recommendations for improving the ability of states to face hybrid attacks. Abstrakt Po vojenské intervenci na Ukrajině v roce 2014 a rychlé nekrvavé anexi Krymu uznalo mezinárodní společenství Rusko jako experta v oblasti hybridní války. Probíhající konflikt na Donbasu, který rozpoutala Moskva během druhé méně úspěšné hybridní kampaně, však zůstává bolestivou otázkou nejen pro Ukrajinu, ale také pro Rusko, které musí zvládat nákladným důsledkům, aby neprohrálo na východě Ukrajiny a nejdůležitější ve své nehlášené válce se Západem. Tato diplomová práce provádí komparativní analýzu dvou ruských modelů hybridní války: (1) na Krymu; (2) na východní Ukrajině a zaměřuje se na následující výzkumné otázky: Proč byla ruská hybridní válka na Krymu úspěšnější než na Donbasu? Jaká opatření může stát přijmout, aby zlepšil svou schopnost čelit hybridním útokům? Zjištění ukazují, že navzdory přítomnosti společných faktorů, různé stupně úspěchu a výsledky obou případů přičíst skutečnosti, že úspěšné využití celého spektra hybridní války závisí nejen na určitých nezbytných podmínkách, ale také na příznivých charakteristických rysech zóny konfliktu a několika kritických prvcích. I když se hybridní taktiky v jednotlivých zemích a regionech liší, je postavena na využívání zranitelnosti nepřítele, jeho slabých stránek v politickém systému, správy, ekonomiky, vojenské sféry a společnosti, které mohou být do určité míry charakteristické pro jakýkoli stát. S ohledem na rozsah domén, ve kterých útočník vede hybridní válku, nejvyužívanější zlomové linie a inherentní slabosti cílové země, navrhuje tato práce doporučení pro zlepšení schopnosti států čelit hybridním útokům. Keywords Russian Hybrid Warfare, Hybrid War, annexation of Crimea, hybrid threats, Ukrainian Crisis, Russian war against Ukraine, Conflict in Donbas, Eastern Ukraine, hybrid tactics Range of thesis: 126 pages; 259.023 characters. Declaration of Authorship 1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature. 2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited. 3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree. Prague 24th December 2020 Acknowledgments I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil, Ph.D whose guidance, support, patience, understanding and valuable advice contributed to the writing of this thesis. I am also grateful to the honorable Charles University in Prague and the Security Studies Institute in particular for providing motivation, research opportunities, and inspiration for future research. Finally, I would like to thank my family for support and encouragement throughout my study, especially my mother for never doubting me. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 2 1. CONCEPTUAL LENSES ............................................................................................................ 7 1.1 Hybrid Warfare Concept ................................................................................................... 7 1.1.1 Evolution of the Concept ............................................................................................... 8 1.1.2 Hybrid Warfare Model: Synchronization of means, escalation and main phases ........... 15 1.1.3 Conditions for Hybrid Warfare .................................................................................... 19 1.2 Gerasimov Doctrine ........................................................................................................ 22 2. RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE IN UKRAINE ...................................................................... 24 2.1 First Case: Hybrid Warfare in Crimea ............................................................................. 25 2.1.1 Background ................................................................................................................. 26 2.1.2 Strategic Goals and Requisite conditions...................................................................... 29 2.1.3 Appliction of above-military forms of war ................................................................... 35 2.1.4 Application of non-military means ............................................................................... 40 2.1.5 Application of military means ...................................................................................... 46 2.2 Second Case: Hybrid Warfare in Eastern Ukraine ........................................................... 51 2.2.1 Background ................................................................................................................. 52 2.2.2 Strategic Goals and Requisite conditions...................................................................... 53 2.2.3 Application of above-military forms of war ................................................................. 56 2.2.4 Application of non-military means ............................................................................... 61 2.2.5 Application of military means ...................................................................................... 66 2.3 Economic losses and political consequences for the Russian Federation ......................... 72 3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO CASES AND IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL ELEMENTS IN THE SUCCESSFUL APPLICATION OF HYBRID TACTICS ...................... 79 4. PROPOSED MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE ABILITY OF STATE TO FACE HYBRID WARFARE .................................................................................................................... 88 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 92 BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................... 96 1 INTRODUCTION Following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991, Russian foreign policy inherited many of the characteristics and elements of the old era, including legacy of complicated geopolitics, difficult relationship with the West, great power ambitions, and a diverse toolkit to advance them. Over the years, the Russian leadership has improved the skills in applying these tools while advancing the national interests in the post-Soviet space (Gurganus & Rumer, 2019). To contain the slow decay of its influence and “blocking any prospect of NATO and European Union enlargement in its backyard,” Moscow resorted to using a whole range of means
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