The Campaign of Santiago De Cuba
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THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA BY HERBERT H. SARGENT., CAPTAIN SECOND CAVALRY, UNITSD STA~ ARMY; COLONBL PlnH UNJ~D STATKS VOLUNTBBR INFANTRY DURING SPANlSH·AMaaICAN WAR: LlaUTBNANT<OLONBL T'WIUCTY-NINTH UNITSD STATQ VOLUNTBBR INFANTRY DUKING OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES; MaMBBR 0' THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOC••TV OF MASSACHUSaTTS AUTHOR OF U NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN " AND U TH. CAM.PAIGN OF MAUNGO" WITH MAPS IN THIlEE VOLUME VOL. I - ........... CHICAGO A. C. McCLURG & CO. 19°7 vCoogle Other Volumes by Colonel Sargent NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAM PAIGN. WITH COMMENTS. Fourlll edition. Crown 8vo, with Maps. '1'50' THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO. WITH COMMENTS. .TlIi,.d edition. Crown 8vo, with Maps. '1.50' A. C. MCCLURG & Co., PUBLISHERS CHICAGO f,1 17 II 53 COPYRIGHT By HERBERT H. SARGENT 1907 Published September 7. IfP1 Entered at Stationers' Hall, London. England ..... ., ..... ~, . ,~ : ::': "', .. ... .', : : •• : .- '1-.. ~,,; THIl l7NIVDSITY paas, CAIIBII.mo.., u. s. A. TO ELIHU ROOT THIS WOIlK IS DEDICATED IN ADMIRATION OF WHAT HE DID FOIL THE IMPILOVEMENT OF OUIL LITTLE AIlMY WHEN HE WAS SItCIlKTAILY OJ' WAIl. 258?77 THE recent Spanish-American War, while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of its own, nevertheless, in its broad analogies, falls into line with its predecessors,evidencing thatunity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginning unto this day. It has, moreover, the special value of illustrating the recip rocal needs and offices of the army and navy, than which no lesson is more valuable to a nation situated as ours is. - MAHAN. AFTER a war one ought to write not only the history of what has taken place, but also the history of what was intended. VON DER GOLTZ. FOOLS say that yoo can only gain experience at your own expense, bot I have always contrived to gain my experience at the expense of others. - BISMARCK. WAR. is a business of positions. - NAPOLEON. PREFACE HOUGH the War and State departments T have kindly aided me in obtaining from the Spanish government valuable data (See Appen dix A.) as to the number of the Spanish troops in Cuba and at Santiago during the campaign, this history is in no sense an official utterance of the United States government. It is simply an honest expression of my personal views. The seventh clause of the II Terms of the Military Convention of the Capitulation at Santiago de Cuba" allowed the commander of the Spanish forces, upon his departure for Spain, to take with him all military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish forces of eastern Cuba. This has made it very difficult for American writers to obtain accu rate information as to the number of men in the Spanish army at Santiago; and especially as to the number in the companies of each organization. Without these records it has been possible to obtain only a few of the orders issued by the Spanish commanders. From the Spanish government's statement (See Appendix A.) I have been able to obtain accurate information as to the number and distribution of the Spanish soldiers in the theatre x PREFACE of operations j but not having had access to the military archives and records of the Spanish army of eastern Cuba, I have found it impossible to ascertain. except in few cases, the exact number of men in the companies of the various organizations at Santiago. But, after all, history at its best can never be more th.an an approximation to the truth. No history is accurate in all details j no historian ca~ describe events precisely as they occurred. "It is," says Blume, "only possible partly to lift the veil which covers the records of war." My thanks are due to Lieutenant Colonel E. J. McClernand, First Cavalry, U. S. Army, and to Lieutenant Commander John M. Ellicott, U. S. Navy, for criticisms of the text of this history before publication j and they are especially due to Charles P. Fountain, Professor of English at the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, who has read critically the entire manuscript of this work. His constant encouragement during the three years I have been engaged in writing this history j his advice. suggestions, and criticisms j and his discussion ofpoints in English construction _ have been exceedingly helpful and valuable. H. H. S. COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS January I, Ic)o7 CONTENTS VOLUME ONE CHAPTER I PAGE THE CUBAN INSURRECTION COMMENTS • CHAPTER II THE DECLARATION OF WAR 32 COMMENTS ••. 34 CHAPTER III THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS 35 COMMENTS ••• 4° CHAPTER IV THE Two NAVIES 44 COMMENTS •• 49 CHAPTER V THE SITUATION OF THE NAVAL FORCES AND THE OUTLOOK FROM A STRATEGICAL POINT OF VIEW 60 COMMENTS. •• •. •. 65 CHAPTER VI THE RESOURCES, THE ARMIES, AND THE COAST DEFENCES 79 COMMENTS • 94 xii CONTENTS CHAPTER VII PAGIl THE SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES, THE PLANS OF CAM:PAIGN, AND THE OUTLOOK FROI( A STRATEGICAL POINT OF VIEW no COMMENTS. •. ••••• 123 CHAPTER VIII THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA AND THE EARLY NAVAL OPERATIONS IS0 COMMENTS. •• 173 CHAPTER IX THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR 209 . COMMENTS ••. '•••••••• 237 MAPS MAP I. CUBA. 2. ATLANTIC OCEAN 3· WEST INDIES 38 4· FORTIFICATIONS AND INTRENCHMENTS OF HAVANA 82 5· HARBOUR OF SANTIAGO 2:24 6. PORT OF GUANTANAMO 23° 7· THEATRE OF OPERATIONS . .. 96 ·... -:.-- :-.. - .... .: - . .- - .. .. : :.: :.: ~.:. :-..:: .::.. ~ .. " : .-~ ~ .. ~ : THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA VOLUME ONE CHAPTER I THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 1 URING the latter part of the nineteenth cen D tury there were two insurrections in Cuba against the Spanish government. The first began on October 10, 1868. On that date Carlos Cespedes, at the head of one hundred and forty Cubans, raised the standard of revolt in the province of Santiago and proclaimed a republic. Though this insurrection, through good leadership and the sympathy of the Cuban people, was prolonged for nearly ten years, its military history is insignifi cant. The insurgents never had more than a few thousand men in the field at anyone time, and their operations consisted merely of a series of guerilla combats, none of which produced any de cisive effect This insurrection, known as the ·Ten Years' War, was brought to an end by the con ciliatory efforts of the commander-in-chief of the 1 See Map 1. .. .. .. :"'i6<~:Uii i:'AM?'.4;GN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA '::'.: . ... ~ ......... Spanish forces in Cuba, General Martinez Campos, who succeeded in effecting, on February 10, 1878, a compromise with the insurgents. This compro mise is known as the treaty of Zanjon. The second insurrection, which resulted in the freedom of Cuba, began on February 24,1895. On that date, in the provinces of Matanzas and Santi ago, several Cuban leaders with small bands of followers rose in revolt against Spanish authority. In the province of Matanzas the insurgents were speedily crushed or forced to surrender, but in the province of Santiago they were successful. They were soon joined by several thousand re cruits; and, having obtained arms, they were able to begin a guerilla warfare against the Spanish troops. When it became known that the struggle for independence was being resumed in Cuba, sev eral of the Cuban leaders, who had been promi nent in the Ten Years' War and had sought safety in exile, at once returned to the island to aid the insurgents. Jose Marti, Maximo Gomez, and Antonio Maceo were among the number. They became the new leaders. Jose Marti assumed the administration of governmental affairs, Maximo Gomez was made commander-in-chief, and Anto nio Maceo received a high command in the army. A little later Calixto Garcia, another prominent Cuban patriot, who was also an exile of the Ten Years' War, returned and was a.ppointed to com mand the forces in Santiago Province. In a short THE CUBAN INSURRECTION 17 time the seriousness of the situation became ap parent even to the home government, and Captain General Martinez Campos, who had been successful in pacifying the Cubans in the Ten Years' War, was sent to Cuba to put down the insurrection. General Campos tried to confine the insurrec tion to the eastern end of the island by a cordon of soldiers stationed along the western border of the Santiago Province. He was, however, unsuc cessful. Though he received within a few months reenforcements to the number of eighty thousand, which increased the total strength of his army to more than one hundred and forty thousand, and though the insurgents sustained a great loss in the death of Jose Marti, who was killed in one of the first fights, nevertheless, Generals Gomez and Maceo were able to break through the cordon and push westward with their forces. General Campos then fell back and attempted to stop the enemy by fortifying a line across the island from Jucaro on the south side to Moron on the north, a distance of about fifty miles. Although he stationed thou sands of troops along the line, it was impossible to hold it against the enemy. With little difficulty Gomez and Maceo were able to cross it, and, as the Spanish troops were acting almost entirely on the defensive and making scarcely any effort to attack and follow the insurgents, the operations of the Cuban generals met with considerable suc cess. By dividing their forces, which consisted of VOL. 1.-2 18 THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA about twenty-five thousand men, into small parties, they were able to intercept convoys, to ambush detachments, and to carry on a very destructive guerilla warfare. In short, the campaign con ducted by General Campos was a failure. Ac cordingly, at the beginning of the following year he was superseded by Captain-General Valeriano Weyler, who arrived in Havana on February 10, 185)6.