Expanded Atheisms Implicit Doctrine of Man

by

Raymond Navarro, B.A.

A Thesis

In

Philosophy

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved

Mark Webb, Ph.D. Chair of the Committee

Joel Velasco, Ph.D.

Mark Sheridan, Ph.D. Dean of the Graduate School

May, 2021

Copyright 2021, Raymond Navarro Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to recognize the following people for their generosity in giving of their time and brainpower. A project of this size is certainly a team effort. Thank you to Dr. Joel Velasco, Dr. Mark Webb, and Dr. Amy Flowerree for all the useful comments, guidance and advice.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... ii

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

Restricted Theism (RT)/Exapnded Theism (ET) ...... 2 Restricted Atheism (RA)/ Expanded Atheism (EA) ...... 3 II. PROBLEM OF HELL ...... 5

Problem of Hell (Intramural) ...... 5 Demands of Gods Justice ...... 6 Gods Love/Mans Autonomy ...... 6 Argument from Injustice of Hell (Extramural) ...... 8 Hellish Free-will...... 10 Hardened Heart (unpardonable sin) ...... 12 Similarity/Dissimiliarity of Accounts ...... 12 Athesitic Assumptions ...... 13 III. PROBLEM OF EVIL (EVIDENTIAL)...... 15

Beginning our Journey ...... 16 CORNEA-Rowe and Wykstra ...... 19 Is CORNEA true? ...... 22 God-Justifying Goods-The Relevant Subclass...... 23 Final Analysis – Assumptions Uncovered ...... 27 IV. DIVINE HIDDENNESS ...... 29

What is a NRNB? ...... 30 The Logical Problem ...... 31 The Evidential Problem...... 34 Atheistic Assumptions ...... 36 V. EXPANDED ATHEISM’S (EA) DOCTRINE OF MAN ...... 38

Not Comprehensive ...... 40 Not a package Deal ...... 40 The problem-Conflicting Conceptions of Man ...... 41 VI. CONCLUSION ...... 43

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 45

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

We often hear ‘talk’1 in the philosophy of religion about theism and its various forms— expanded and restricted. But what about atheism, does it too have various forms? I am not referring to atheisms various analogues such as the local/global distinction2 or the friendly/unfriendly versions of atheism3. The question I would like to ask, is whether or not atheism has versions parallel to those of theism, in other words— does atheism have expanded and restricted versions? It is my contention that atheism does in fact have expanded and restricted versions. That much talk of ‘atheism’ is actually talk of expanded atheism and not its slimmer cousin— restricted atheism. Why is answering this important? Because it is the expanded form that is assumed in atheistic argumentation, and it is only the expanded form that includes the necessary assumptions required for the viability of such arguments. In answering the above, I would like to uncover or discover those assumptions included in the expanded atheistic belief set by looking at various atheistic arguments. Using those arguments as means to uncovering those presuppositions so necessary for their efficacy. Let’s begin our journey with Rowesian distinction between restricted and expanded versions of theism. It is this distinction that I hope to use as a model for the restricted and expanded conceptions of atheism.

1 I call it talk, because the vast majority (if not all) of theists are of the expanded variety, while restricted theism is a sort of philosophical abstraction- a philosophical contrivance, allowing philosophers to discuss theism with-out getting entangled in all the theological implications of the various expanded theisms. As such, you would have a difficult time encountering any person calling themselves a “restricted theist”, and even less likely to encounter anything analogous to the traditional churches found in expanded theism. In other words, just like I imagine it difficult in finding the “restricted theist” himself, I imagine it difficult in finding, “The First church of Restricted Theism, First Assembly of Restricted Theism, St. William Rowes Church of Restricted Theism” in your local yellow pages. 2 Draper, Paul, (2017), “Atheism and Agnosticism”, SEP, p.10 3 Rowe, William (1978), “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism”, American Philosophical Quarterly, p.340

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Restricted Theism (RT)/ Expanded Theism (ET) I would like to begin with a citation from William Rowe,

Letting 'O' abbreviate 'an omnipotent, omniscient, omnigood being', standard theism is any view which holds that O exists. Within standard theism, we can distinguish between restricted theism and expanded theism. Expanded theism is the view that O exists, conjoined with certain other significant religious claims, claims about sin, redemption, a future life, a last judgment, and the like . . . Restricted theism is the view that O exists, unaccompanied by other, independent religious claims.4

The above definition of Restricted Theism (RT) seems to be similar to the traditional God of the philosophers or the God of natural theology– one removed from any traditional religious context and absent any additional revelation that those traditions might import. Basically, Restricted Theism (RT) is the three ‘O’s and nothing else5 . While Restricted Theism (RT) seems fairly straightforward, its fuller- figured cousin has a few more curves. This added curviness of Expanded Theism (e.g., Christianity, Islam etc..) is due not only to its more full-orbed doctrine of God, but because of its comprehensive doctrine of man. Expanded Theism (ET) is the three ‘O’s plus every other religious claim imported from a specific tradition. To put it theologically–expanded theism is general revelation bolstered by special revelation, or what we know from a priori reasoning and a posteriori experience plus what can only be gleaned thru scripture. Bottom line— RT is the three O’s, and ET is RT plus every other religious claim learned thru special revelation6.

4 Rowe, William (1990), 'Evil and the theistic hypothesis: a response to Wykstra', in Marilyn McCord Adams (ed.) The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 138-160. 5 Theologically, the three ‘O’s refer to omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, not omni- benevolence. But for the purposes of this discussion, we will take the three ‘O’s to be what is stated above. 6 Every other religious claim might include a more comprehensive doctrine of God, and a thoroughgoing doctrine of man.

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Restricted Atheism (RA)/Expanded Atheism (EA) Using this Rowesian distinction as our model, I would like to apply this distinction to atheism. Letting 'G' abbreviate 'an omnipotent, omniscient, omnigood being', Restricted Atheism (RA) is any view which holds that G does not exist. Now to be clear, restricted atheism is not the view that all conceptions of God do not exist, but only that G does not exist. We can then distinguish between Restricted Atheism (RA) and Expanded Atheism (EA). Expanded Atheism (EA) is the view that G does not exist, conjoined with certain other significant claims about mankind, claims about mankind’s moral disposition, epistemic position, cognitive abilities, and inalienable rights. To restate, RA is the view that G does not exist, unaccompanied by other independent claims; while EA is RA plus other claims about mankind. What are these significant other claims conjoined to atheism? These I hope to uncover and argue make up the implicit doctrine of man assumed by atheistic argumentation. It is these implicit assumptions about the nature of man, that allow for the viability of these anti-theistic arguments. These implicit assumptions can only be gleaned thru a careful study of the arguments which employ those assumptions. In the following sections, those implicit assumptions made by atheism will become quite evident. Let’s begin our discovery of those hidden assumptions by looking into contemporary anti-theistic arguments: the problems of Hell, the Evidential Problem of Evil7, and Divine Hiddenness. Before we begin, a few preliminary remarks are in order. To be clear, the purpose of our discussion of the various atheistic arguments is not an attempt to prove them false, but primarily to expose or uncover the assumptions being used by those arguments. That in the process of attempting to provide viable solutions, these atheistic assumptions are then made to come into the light. These discussions are not

7 After a lot of spilled ink, the logical problem of evil appears to be a settled issue, with theisms critics moving on to more fertile evidential grounds. “that the problem of evil, does not after all, show that the central doctrines of theism, are logically inconsistent with one another.” Mackie, JL, 1982, “The Miracle of Theism” P.154

3 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 intended to be a deep-dive into the detailed nuances of the most sophisticated versions of every argument. Why not? We don’t need to. As the stoics were fond of reminding us, “one can drown in a puddle of water as well as the bottom of the sea”8. In other words, it’s not the depth or level, but the water that kills. Similarly, in our case, it’s the assumptions that (indirectly) kill, and many times they are located right beneath the surface. The purpose behind going deeper, getting into the detailed nuances of each argument, is simply to increase the pressure—pressure to either accept or deny the assumptions, pressure to increase their plausibility or implausibility. But as stated earlier, the purpose of our discussion is not necessarily to delve deep into the plausibility/implausibility of those assumptions, but simply to uncover them and determine how they find their way into the atheistic/theistic debate. So, at whatever level of detail you wish to discuss, the arguments always seem to bottom out at nearly the very same general assumptions—assumptions about epistemic access, cognitive abilities, or moral dispositions etc. It is these hidden or implicit assumptions that allow for the functionality of these arguments. And it is these assumptions that are included in the expanded set of the expanded atheist’s belief set or noetic structure. With that being said, we can now begin our exploration into the contemporary arguments from evil.

8 Becker, Lawrence, (2018) Stoic Virtue: Chapter 6, The Oxford Handbook of Virtue, OUP, p.146

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CHAPTER II PROBLEM OF HELL

Traditionally, the problem has been understood as positing an incompatibility between the existence of a place of eternal damnation and the conception of an all- loving God. Why? Because as was often suggested with the logical problem of evil— if God was omnipotent, He would be able to avoid it; if God was omniscient, He would know how to avoid it; and if He was all-loving, he would want to avoid it. So, either God does not possess the attributes commonly attributed to Him, or Hell does not exist (at least as traditionally understood).

When discussing Hell, there seems to be two possible interpretations of understanding the problem— one specifically for the Christian (intramural—the Problem of Hell) and one that could be used as a criticism by the atheist against the Christian (extramural—the argument from the Injustice of Hell), let’s begin with the intramural.

Problem of Hell (Intramural)9

• G(god) exists (essentially possessing omnibenevolence, omniscience and omnipotence).

• Some people will be consigned to Hell—a place of everlasting torment of which there is no escape.

The intramural10 problem, appears to be simply a problem of hells existence from the start. This is brought about by the apparent inconsistency with the two beliefs described above. In other words, there seems to be an intuition that questions the idea

9 It appears that the following incompatibility could be interpreted in either an issuant or retributivist understanding. With damnation and punishment construed as separation from a loving God, rather than the actual infliction of pain and torture. 10 This is considered an intramural problem, because this problem specifically bears on the Christian who holds both the Doctrine of Hell and a Traditional doctrine of God. This is not a problem for the atheist as the atheist holds neither belief.

5 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 or need for an all-loving god to create hell in the first place. So, our first problem or question becomes, how is it possible for an all-loving G(god) and hell to co-exist? We must keep in mind, as long as there are possible justifying reason(s), the apparent inconsistency/tensions between the idea of an all-loving God and a place of eternal torment can be resolved. I will briefly suggest two possible reasons.

Demands of Gods Justice

Firstly, when addressing charges of incoherence within theism—God creating a rock so heavy he could not possibly lift—type concerns, we discovered that Gods attributes, when properly understood, could resolve many of the incoherence concerns surrounding such a collection of powers. By placing certain logical limitations on such attributes, we learned that there some things God cannot do—create a married bachelor, create a round square, commit suicide and so on. So, in attempting to remedy the intramural problem we can draw on this strategy. It could be the case, that the possibility of a Hell-less world containing both evil and a certain type of creature (free-agents), should be added to the list of things God cannot do. That God, while being all-loving, all-powerful, and all-knowing, cannot simply escape the demands of his own perfect justice without the punishment (of some sort)11 of those who have been judged accordingly. In other words, Hell or something like it, is simply an unavoidable consequence stemming from the combination of Gods limitations and the demands of his own perfect justice. This idea of a place of eternal damnation grounded in Gods perfect justice, conforms to a type of retributivist understanding of Hell, which holds that “the primary purpose of Hell is to serve as a place of punishment for the unrepentant” (Buckareff and Plug:2005).

God’s Love/Mans autonomy

Our second reason, could stem, not from the demands of gods justice, but Gods love for the autonomy of man. In other words, in Gods loving respect for the free-will decisions of his creatures—God concedes to their wishes or desire to be separate from

11 As William Craig is fond of saying “a perfectly just God, cannot just wink at sin”.

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Himself. This understanding conforms to what is referred to as an issuant view of Hell, Hell issues from Gods love and respect for the free-decisions of his creatures. Persons are consigned to Hell, as the consequence of their self-chosen separation from their creator, not as a place of divine retribution12. Zeiss and Holten state the following,

That created persons are essentially free beings is in fact the grounding principle of the explanation of hell13. This implies that hell, properly understood, should not be conceived of as a place to which people are consigned by God, but as a self-chosen condition14

Under an issuant understanding, the reality of Hell is not due to Gods need for restitution, but due to God’s respect for the autonomy of man. The reality of Hell is due not to God, but man.

So, in attempting to answer the question of Hells existence (in the first place), we arrive at two answers— the demands of Gods justice (retributivist understanding of hell) or the demands of God’s love (issuant understanding of hell)— either way these solutions seem to resolve the tensions between the existence of hell and an all-loving God.

Moving on from the issue of hells existence, it does seem likely, that most people don’t have a problem with hell per se, in other words, I believe it’s quite reasonable to believe that most people think moral failings come with a debt, and that one should have to pay that debt while in this life, or the next. And if in the next, I believe it’s reasonable to suggest that most people think or believe— especially in the west15 —that those(bad) people should have to go somewhere, for a little while at

12 Buckareff, Andrei and Plug, Allen, “Escaping Hell: Divine Motivation and the Problem of Hell”, Religious Studies 41 (2005), (pre-publication draft) p.5 13 Zeis, John, “To hell with freedom”, Sophia 25 (1986) pp.43-33 14Van Holten, Wilko, “Hell and The Goodness of God”, Religious Studies Vol.35 No.1 (Mar.1999) p.54 15 According to a congressional report from 1990 to 2005 a new prison opened every 10 days in the Unites States- Kirchhoff, Suzanne, “Economic Impacts of Prison Growth”, Congressional Research Service, April 13, 2010

7 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 least. This seems plausible when taking into account folkloristic ideas of reaping and sowing, biblical ideas about “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”, and non-western religious ideas about karma or cosmic justice. The desire—that evil people get a taste of their own medicine, a sort of divine come-uppance, that there is some sort of retribution after death, where the scales of justice are balanced, seems a universal notion within humanity. It would seem quite counter-intuitive that most desire that evil people after death should simply fail to exist—as though that is punishment enough.

With that being said, if the real problem with Hell stems not from the idea itself, it must stem from the suggestion of ‘good’ people or even ‘moderately evil’ people going there—forever. So, then the real complaint amounts to the charge— that it is unjust or morally wrong for God to punish a finite amount of sin within infinite amount of punishment. It is this Idea, that could be formally developed (and already informally used) into a charge against theism by the atheist—not simply the charge of hells existence (because the atheist believes in neither hell, nor God), but in the apparent inconsistency of visiting (punishing) the finite with the infinite. G (God) in creating a forever place of punishment, seems to violate common sense principles of fairness and justice. This brings us to what I would like to call the Extramural Problem- the Argument from the Injustice of Hell. Simply put, in the Argument from the injustice of Hell, the atheist will play the game and grant (pretend to believe for the purposes of argument) the existence of hell as traditionally understood. This is done in order to demonstrate an incoherence within the theists own system of beliefs (by showing how punishing the finite with the infinite is unjust and immoral).

Argument from Injustice of Hell (Extramural)

• All human sin is finite.

• It is unjust to punish the finite with the infinite.

• Hell is infinite punishment for finite sin

• Therefore, Hell is unjust

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• If Hell issues from God’s justice (or possibly love), then God is unjust

• Hell, issues from God’s justice

• Therefore, God is unjust.

• Injustice is incompatible with a perfectly just God

• Therefore, a perfectly just God does not exist

• Therefore, (Christian, Muslim) God does not exist

Before we discuss the argument, I would like to address a concern that the above argument is not really an argument employed by the atheist against theism. While not considered a formal or traditional argument used to argue against the existence of God, the idea of Hell is often viewed like other problems of evil, in that its supposed existence is seen as incompatible with a loving God, or more relevantly, the concept of hell is used to undermine the existence of a perfectly just God. The argument from the injustice of hell is frequently used informally in conversation, during debates16 and throughout interviews17. The atheist will repeatedly put forward ideas of inconsistency, injustice and exclusivity when discussing the idea of an all- loving God conjoined to the traditional concept of Hell. And it is because many of these supposed inconsistencies have all-ready been discussed and developed (into arguments against the existence of Hell) intramurally amongst theists themselves, the need for the atheist to formally develop these ideas is not required. Simply put, the dirty work or heavy lifting of philosophical reasoning has already taken place, the atheist can simply use the fruits of Christian thought against the Christian. In the hands of the atheist, this traditional understanding of hell—as a forever place of punishment, a permanent inescapable place for the unbeliever— is used to undermine the idea of a

16 William Lane Craig Vs. Raymond Bradley “Can a loving God send people to Hell”- The entire debate focused on the central issue of a loving God and the doctrine of hell. Bradley’s entire project was to undermine the idea of a Christian God by using the doctrine of Hell. By focusing on the idea of hell as an everlasting place of fire and brimstone, Bradley attempted to undermine the idea of a perfectly just God. 17 Closer to truth- Susan Blackmore in discussing arguments against the existence of God.

9 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 perfectly just God (Christian God) and so leaves us with the idea of an imperfectly just God or no God at all.

With that said, I would like to mention a few relevant things about what the Christian tradition (ET) does and does not say about hell. The bible does seem to suggest that hell is a place of eternal torment, and that it will be occupied to some extent forever. However, the bible does not rule out the possibility of a second chance after death. What this might mean is that all who initially wind up in hell, might not remain there forever. In other words, just because you end up there, doesn’t mean you have to stay there18. Consequently, it is because the bible does not rule out the possibility of post-mortem salvation, the possibility of post-mortem free-will then also becomes a viable option. It would then seem that if one can choose to leave hell, then alternatively, one can thru the use of their own free-will choose to remain in hell– forever.

By employing the use of certain atheistic assumptions, the argument appears to point to some type of unfairness or injustice in how God deals with his creatures. Why would a perfect God, punish a finite amount of sin with an infinite amount of suffering? Shouldn’t the punishment fit the crime? How might the theist account for the permanent residency of some of the occupants of hell?

Hellish Free-will

Christian theism (ET) does not rule out the possibility of post-mortem free- will and therefore post-mortem sin. We must keep in mind that all those who wind up in Hell, still possess an unredeemed nature, possessors of original sin, which includes a positive bent towards evil19. As such, while they might not be determined to engage

18 This implies some sort of escapism as suggested by C.S. Lewis, in The Great Divorce. Also recently discussed in Buckareff, Andrei and Plug, Allen,” Escaping Hell: Divine Motivation and the Problem of Hell”, Religious Studies 41 (2005), p. 39-54 19 Original Sin: The idea here is that all the descendants of Adam possess within them the original guilt and pollution of the first sin. Original guilt is understood as our liability to the law, and original pollution refers to an inherent corruption that extends to every part of man’s nature. This state of corruption is not merely a privation, but a positive bent towards evil and sin– it is a sinful state, the fountain from which all actual sin originates.

10 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 in post-mortem sin, they are certainly predisposed to such activity. And if reasonable that we retain freedom to make choices in heaven, why automatically deny that ability in hell? If that is indeed a possibility – hellish freedom— then it certainly seems possible that some might permanently choose hell over heaven. And if this is so, then eternal damnation and punishment would exist forever, but not due to God– but man. In other words, this permanent state of the damned could be the result of post-mortem free-will in conjunction with original pollution, resulting in the continual selection of sin, and along with it— the extension of their stay in hell. Seymour and Adams suggest the following,

On this traditional view free choice ceases with one's entry into hell; one becomes a merely passive recipient of suffering. It is this assumption which gives the argument from justice a foothold. Since the sins of this life are finite, both in seriousness and in quantity, it seems unjust to bear everlasting punishment. We can solve this problem by supposing that the damned have the freedom to sin even after death. If they choose to sin continually, it is fair that they suffer continually.20 One could maintain, for example, that men retain their stature as moral agents in the next life and that some men will be forever punished, not because their deeds on earth deserve everlasting torment, but because after death they continue to offend God in small ways and to suffer a succession of light penalties as a consequence.21

How is it fair or moral that one gets punished for the actions of another? In his essay on original sin Keith Wyma proposes the following, “In creating Adams’s progeny, God could restrict himself to the set of possible humans who would freely have done as Adam did in the circumstances of his temptation and fall. That is, I propose that the humans who exist, and who have existed and who will exist, constitute some subset of those possible humans who would freely have fallen, just as Adam did. Thus, Adam’s rebellion becomes a kind of paradigm for all of us, since his action represents what each of us would have done in his place… there is no point in replaying the fall over and over to the same result.” God simply chose that possible world (this actual world) in which all the descendants of Adam would have performed the same action under the same circumstances. In other words, whether Adam, you, or I, had been placed in the circumstances as the first humans, we would have all done the same as Adam– bit the apple. Wyma, Keith D., “Innocent Sinfulness, Guilty Sin: Original Sin and Divine Justice “in Oliver Crisp (ed.), A Reader in Contemporary Philosophical Theology, (T&T Clark 2009) pp.282-283 20 Seymour, Charles, “Hell, Justice and Freedom”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Apr., 1998, Vol. 43, No. 2, p.78 21 Adams, Marilyn, McCord, “Hell and the Justice of God”, Religious Studies, Dec., 1975, Vol. 11, No. 4, p.433

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Harden Heart (unpardonable sin)

Christian theism does seem to suggest that there is a state from which there is no redemption, a permanent state from which there is no return. The state of a permanently harden heart- brought about by partaking in what is called the unpardonable sin—a sin that sears the mind permanently in a state of hatred towards God. This could be described as a non-free-will state in which those in such a state are simply determined (not free) to act upon their enmity and loathing towards God. If such a state is possible, then it seems reasonable to suppose that those fixed in such a state would be unable and therefore unwilling to accept an invitation to be with God in heaven, and therefore remain permanent residents of hell.

Similarity/Dissimilarity of Accounts

What both accounts for hells permanent occupancy seemingly suggest, is what Jean Paul Sartre is often quoted as saying, “The door to hell is locked from the inside”. Ultimately what the accounts are in agreement on, is that hells permanency for some, rest upon their continual choosing of hell over heaven—the free-will decision by those possessing hellish freedom and the determined decision by those with a hardened heart.

With both post-mortem free-will and the concept of a hardened heart to establish the possibility why there might be permanent residents of hell, inevitably the question becomes—Why would any denizen of hell, who has the ability/possibility to leave, continually choose to be in hell forever than be with God in heaven?

If those who have a fixed disposition of hatred towards god (fundamentally evil persons- hardened) are automatically ruled out from the possibility of escaping hell, then only those still in possession of free-will (accompanied by a bent towards evil) have the possibility of escaping. But why would such persons continually choose hell by continually sinning in hell? It seems reasonable to suggest that most won’t. My feeling is that all who possess hellish free-will might all eventually escape, leaving only those with a fixed disposition. However, those with hellish-freewill might

12 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 eventually themselves become hardened, thru their continual rejection of God while in hell. In other words, those possessing hellish-freewill will either eventually leave hell or eventually reach a state of hardness, in which they transform from a state with the possibility of leaving hell to a state where that is no longer a possibility—they become hardened in hell. As Eleonore Stump once intimated “You can take a man out of hell, but sometimes you can’t take the hell out of a man”22

The Atheistic Assumptions

If the Christian (ET) understanding of man— as persons possessing free-will (pre- and post-mortem) and a positive bent towards evil (original pollution)— together with those affected by unpardonable sin, resolves tensions between an all-loving God, and the idea of infinite eternal punishment, then the question could be asked— from where do those tensions originate? Once again, notice that it is the implicit assumptions concerning mankind, hidden within atheism— (1) that there is no such thing as post-mortem free-will, and as a consequence no such thing as post-mortem sin and (2) that because there is no hellish free-will, then there is no mechanism by which those who initially possess hellish-freewill, might then transform into a state where they no longer possess that freedom. In other words, that there is not a transformative process where one can move from a state of possibly leaving hell to a state where they become hardened towards God and lose all possibility of ever escaping (hell) and (3) that no denizen of hell would be so thoroughly and fundamentally evil enough to continually and everlastingly choose hell over heaven.

Recall, that restricted or a mere atheism—the belief that G does not exist, makes no claims whatsoever about mankind, there is no doctrine of man conjoined with this mere atheism. But when looking into the above argument, the argument seems to turn exactly on these assumptions— (1) the assumption that there is no post mortem free-will and therefore no post-mortem sin and (2) that this free-will could not

22 Eleonore Stump actually suggested that even though a person might want to leave hell and go to heaven (for obvious reasons), that doesn’t mean he wants to be with God. Wherever you place that man, hell will always be inside of him and so goes where he goes.

13 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 be supplanted by a hardening while in Hell, and (3) that no denizen of hell would be so thoroughly and fundamentally evil enough(hardened) to continually and everlastingly choose hell over heaven.

So, it appears we have discovered three of the hidden assumptions being used by atheistic argumentation. We can now add these assumptions to our atheistic set. Let’s continue on with our atheistic ‘dig’ to unearth more hidden assumptions.

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CHAPTER III PROBLEM OF EVIL (EVIDENTIAL)

• If unjustified evil exists, then probably God does not exist

• Unjustified evil exists

• Therefore, probably God does not exist

Now the evidential argument from evil is different from the logical problem, in that it suggests that evil can be used as evidence against the theory that God exists. In other words, much like a scientific hypothesis, in which we deduce expectations from a theory, if we ask– “if God existed, what in fact would we expect to find in relation to evil— more or less?” The critic of theism, proposes that we would see less evil than we in fact see, and that the quantity and types of evil (surplus, horrendous) are evidence against the theory that God exists23. In other words, the evidential arguments from evil do not say that evil and God cannot co-exist, just that certain types of evil suggest that God probably doesn’t exist. As has been pointed out by Feinberg (2004:208), there are many varieties of the Evidential argument from evil, all not synonymous. Whether the evidential argument from evil is cast in terms of probability, gratuitousness, or surplus evil, the debate seems to turn on epistemological issues concerning whether or not we as humans can assign the correct prior probabilities; or whether or not we are in an epistemic position to know whether there are or are not unjustified or surplus evils

23 We do this often in our daily lives, when we see no evidence of something, we often merely assume prima facially anyway, that what we are looking for is not there or doesn’t exist. Think Santa Claus- no evidence of him, flying reindeers or north pole, therefore we assume he doesn’t exist. However, we have to be careful, because as Craig, often says” the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence.” We must always bear in mind the type of entity we are dealing with.

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Beginning our Journey

So, it appears that the key to the above argument, lies in acceptance of the second premise—that unjustified evil exists. But how do we know this? The theist believes we don’t, while the atheist believes that it is just obvious that we do. However, for the argument to work, we don’t need to know that the first premise is true, we just need to believe that it is probably true. And if unjustified evil probably exists, then God probably doesn’t. This appears to be the point of Rowe’s infamous fawn in the woods case—to show that unjustified evil probably exists.

Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn's intense suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be any greater good such that the prevention of the fawn's suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse. Nor does there seem to be any equally bad or worse evil so connected to the fawn's suffering that it would have had to occur had the fawn's suffering been prevented. Could an omnipotent, omniscient being have prevented the fawn's apparently pointless suffering? The answer is obvious, as even the theist will insist. An omnipotent, omniscient being could have easily prevented the fawn from being horribly burned, or, given the burning, could have spared the fawn the intense suffering by quickly ending its life, rather than allowing the fawn to lie in terrible agony for several days. Since the fawn's intense suffering was preventable and, so far as we can see, pointless, doesn't it appear that premise (I) of the argument is true, that there do exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse24. Now both theist and atheist can agree to some extent, that due to man’s creaturely status as metaphysically limited beings, we have cognitive limitations that could potentially play a factor in preventing us from discerning the purpose behind certain evils. In other words, just because the purpose for the evil is beyond our ken, does not mean that there is no purpose or reason.

24 Rowe, William, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism”, American Philosophical Quarterly, p.337

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Now the atheist (Rowe) does seem to admit as much, concerning his much- discussed fawn in the woods,

It must be acknowledged that the case of the fawn's apparently pointless suffering does not prove that [gratuitous evil] is true. For even though we cannot see how the fawn's suffering is required to obtain some greater good (or to prevent some equally bad or worse evil), it hardly follows that it is not so required. After all, we are often surprised by how things we thought to be unconnected turn out to be intimately connected. Perhaps, for all we know, there is some familiar good outweighing the fawn's suffering to which that suffering is connected in a way we do not see. Furthermore, there may well be unfamiliar goods, goods we haven't dreamed of, to which the fawn's suffering is inextricably connected. Indeed, it would seem to require something like omniscience on our part before we could lay claim to knowing that there is no greater good connected to the fawn's suffering in such a manner than an omnipotent, omniscient being could not have achieved that good without permitting that suffering or some evil equally bad or worse. So, the case of the fawn's suffering surely does not enable us to establish the truth of [gratuitous evil].25 However, Rowe then goes onto state the following,

Consider again the case of the fawn's suffering. Is it reasonable to believe that there is some greater good so intimately connected to that suffering that even an omnipotent, omniscient being could not have obtained that good without permitting that suffering or some evil at least as bad? It certainly does not appear reasonable to believe this…we must then ask whether it is reasonable to believe either of these things of all the instances of seemingly pointless human and animal suffering that occur daily in our world. And surely the answer to this more general question must be no…In the light of our experience and knowledge of the variety and scale of human and animal suffering in our world, the idea that none of this suffering could have been prevented by an omnipotent being without thereby losing a greater good or permitting an evil at least as bad seems an extraordinary absurd idea, quite beyond our belief.

What I find interesting is that Rowe suggests (specifically concerning the fawn but generalizable to other instances of suffering), that it is certainly possible, that there could be cases of seemingly pointless sufferings—cases that are beyond our ability to detect or beyond our ability to comprehend the attached goods. However, when

25 Ibid., p.337

17 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 confronted with actual cases of seemingly pointless suffering, it is unreasonable to believe—exactly that—that this possibility is an actuality. That it is unreasonable to believe, that these cases of seemingly pointless suffering—are cases that have attached goods that are beyond are ability to detect. So, for Rowe, it’s possible26 but unreasonable to believe that there are cases of seemingly pointless sufferings—cases that are beyond our ability to detect the attached goods (that are not actually pointless). Why does Rowe believe this? He seems to be using the “seems so, is so” presumption (Wykstra:1984), sometimes called the Principle of Credulity.

PC: If it seems (epistemically) to a subject S that x is present, then it is reasonable to believe that probably x is present27

In other words, if something appears to us a certain way, it probably is that way. If something seems present/absent to us, then it probably is present/absent. This principle certainly has intuitive appeal, as we use this principle often in our daily lives. When we see no evidence of something, we often merely assume prima facially anyway, that what we are looking for is not there or doesn’t exist. Think Santa Claus—no evidence of him, flying reindeers or north pole, therefore we assume he doesn’t exist. However, we must be careful, this principle does seem to have limitations to its application. As William Craig, often says” the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence.” We must always bear in mind the type of entity we are dealing with. For example, if I were to look into a small closet and see no elephant, if would be a pretty safe bet, that there is indeed no elephant. However, if I were to look in that very same closet and see no flea, it’s not such a safe bet that there is no flea. It seems that use of such a principle is highly dependent on the type of entity we are investigating. This brings up issues of whether or not we as man have enough

26 If something is a possibility, then it is an actuality in some possible world. How does Rowe know that this world is not one of the possible worlds, where this possibility is actualized? He couldn’t possibly know that. 27 Martin, Michael, “The Principle of Credulity and Religious Experience”, p. 79

18 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 epistemic access to situations to be able to reasonably believe in the absence/presence of a thing based on our assessment of the cognized situation.

So – Why does a common-sense principle, like the principle of credulity fail in this case? In other words, why is the atheist nor anyone else for that matter, entitled to use the everyday precept of PC, in determining that there are simply no goods attached to certain evils— that there are gratuitous evils? Simple answer, it fails the CORNEA test.

CORNEA- Rowe and Wykstra

This begins discussion of Wykstra’s CORNEA principle-Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access.

On the basis of cognized situation s, Human H is entitled to claim “It appears that p”, only if it is reasonable for H to believe that, given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p were not the case, s would likely be different than it is in some way discernible by her. In a later paper, Wykstra suggests a simpler way to understand CORNEA,

In brief, CORNEA says that we can argue from “we see no X” to “there is no X” only when X has reasonable seeability—that is, is the sort of thing which, if it exists, we can reasonably expect to see in a situation…. fleas unlike dogs, have low seeability: even if they were present, we cannot reasonably expect to see them in this way.

So according to CORNEA, we can use “it appears that p or not p”, if we could reasonably expect ourselves to detect the difference in the differing situations. With our elephant example that’s easy, I think we would all agree that we are able to tell the difference between the situation of an elephant being in our closet and the situation where there is no elephant in our closet. However, in the case of the flea, that’s certainly not the case. Stated plainly, whether or not there is a flea in our closet, it’s safe to assume that the closet would look entirely the same. When I look inside the closet, it would be very hard, if not impossible to distinguish between a closet with only a single flea, and a closet with no flea. So, if that is the case, then the flea case fails to meet the criteria of CORNEA. Therefore, I and anyone else looking inside that

19 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 closet, would not be entitle to use “it appears that p”. And if one cannot use “it appears that p or not p”, then one cannot go onto the second stage of the principle of credulity and suggest that “probably p or no p is present”. Or using the simplified form of CORNEA, if the entity or thing, with which we are dealing, cannot reasonably be expected to be seen in the situation, then CORNEA is not satisfied, and the inductive justification fails.

With this in mind, we can now extend this ‘flea’ case to our case of unjustified evils, because like the flea case, the case from unjustified evils turns on whether or not it is reasonable to expect that we could detect the difference between cases of seemingly pointless (attached goods beyond our ken) and probably genuinely pointless (no good attached at all). But can we? According to Wykstra, the answer is no. Because according to Wykstra, Rowes “it appears that there is no attached good” fails to meet the CORNEA requirement. Why? Because the atheist, when confronted with apparently pointless evil, cannot tell the difference between an instance of evil with attached goods beyond our ken and an instance of evil with no attached goods; between states of seemingly pointless and states of genuinely pointless sufferings. Why? Because they all would look the same. In other words, there would be no discernible difference between a seemingly pointless evil(justified) and a genuinely pointless evil(unjustified) in that both look identical— both look seemingly pointless. Why would both look the same, because just like in the flea case, due to the type of entity we are investigating we are in no epistemic position to reasonably be able to detect or distinguish between the cases.

Another way of putting the problem, is that according to Wykstra (the theist) like fleas, god-justifying goods have low seeability—even if they were present in the situation, we cannot reasonably expect to see them in this way. Formally stated, Wykstra states that Rowes induction fails to meet the Adjunct principle of CORNEA—the reasonable seeability requirement.

If [Rowe]is made aware of good reasons to think that a God-justifying good would not likely be seeable, then conditionally (i.e., “unless [Rowe} defeats

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these with other consideration”), it is not reasonable for [Rowe} to believe that they would likely be seeable. Why does Wykstra believe that Rowes induction fails to meet the reasonable seeability requirement? Or to put it another way—Why does Wykstra believe that god- justifying goods will have low-seeability (like the flea)? The disparity between God’s vision and ours God’s wisdom in comparison to ours is like the difference between an adult human’s wisdom and that of a one-month-old infant. But, if that is so, then if outweighing goods are connected to instances of apparently pointless suffering, we might know of some of them, but it is highly unlikely that we would know what they are in most cases. Hence, for any specific instance of intense suffering, it is reasonable to believe that if an outweighing good attach to it, we have no epistemic access to it…Moreover, the difference between our knowledge and God’s also means that even if an instance of intense suffering were intimately tied to some outweighing Good, there is no guarantee that if we knew about the intense suffering, we would also know the good to which it is tied.28

So, just like in the flea case, and in much the same way, seemingly pointless suffering, will still look seemingly pointless, whether or not there is a good attached. Compensating goods beyond our ken, are simply not the right type of entity to be using with the principle of credulity. Now Rowe goes onto state that Wykstra’s parent analogy gives us no reason what so ever for thinking that God-justifying goods would have low seeability. His claim is that Wykstra is making an inference from God grasps many goods beyond our ken to it is likely that the goods for God permits suffering are beyond our ken, rest on a hidden assumption about the future — “The futurity assumption”— the assumption that god purposed goods often lie in the future. Rowe claims that it is this assumption—that is not expectable under a restricted theism. Wykstra, then goes onto show how this is a plausible assumption on a restricted theism that posits an all- loving, all-knowing God. And the debate continues until today.

28 Feinberg, John, (2004), The Many Faces of Evil, Crossway Book, p.224-225. This was a paraphrased version of Wykstras statement in, “The Humean Obstacle”, p.88.

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Why is all this this important? Because without a criteria, method or ability to distinguish between cases, the cases can be treated all the same. For the theist, this is good news. In treating the cases all the same, it becomes reasonable to believe —of all and every case, that if there are outweighing goods attached to any instance of suffering, we have no access to them. In short, all cases of seemingly pointless sufferings, can be treated as such— seemingly pointless. With this in hand, the theist can now be reasonably skeptical about any conclusions drawn from such an argument, as seemingly pointless sufferings—do not disprove the existence of God.

Is CORNEA True? Now with all this being said is CORNEA true? Well, looking at recent literature, it seems CORNEA has certainly received mixed reviews. The problem with CORNEA is that it seems to undermine a lot of inductive evidence for beliefs that we naturally think are correct—e.g., the belief that we are not a brain in a vat. While CORNEA doesn’t seem to be an appropriate test for all appearance claims—it certainly seems the appropriate test for some—flea case: looking into a room and seeing no flea, doesn’t allow us to infer “there is no flea”; needle case: merely looking at a needle and seeing no HIV, doesn’t allow us to infer “there is no HIV on the needle”; table case: looking into a large cluttered airplane hangar, and seeing no table, doesn’t allow us to infer “there is no table”. It obviously seems correct in these cases. McBrayer in his criticism of CORNEA states the following, If CORNEA is false, what accounts for its initial plausibility? Here I can only offer a suggestion. In virtually every instance in which an example is offered on behalf of CORNEA, the example uses an appears claim that is perceptual in nature. For example, my not seeing any tables in the cluttered hangar is not evidence for there not being any tables in the cluttered hangar because even if there were a table there, my perceptual experience would be the same. The same goes for seeing fleas on a dog, germs in a room, and viruses on a needle. So perhaps something like CORNEA is true when restricted to perceptual appearances but not as applied to metaphorical appearances... 29

29 McBrayer, Justin P. (2009)” Cornea and inductive Evidence,” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers Vol 26: issue 1, Article 5, p.86

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McBrayer while granting the correctness in using CORNEA as a constraint on perceptual appearances, shows reluctance on using them for all metaphorical claims. But suggest that if defenders could isolate the right subclass of appearances— CORNEA or something like it, could then be used appropriately for that class. Still, it does seem that something like CORNEA is behind our reluctance to accept some metaphorical appearance claims as evidence. But as I have shown here, not all metaphorical appearance claims are subject to CORNEA. If it turns out that defenders of CORNEA can isolate the relevant subclass of metaphorical appearances that are subject to the CORNEA constraint, then they might still employ CORNEA against the noseeum argument from evil…30

Could a member of that “relevant subclass” of metaphorical appearances, to which CORNEA correctly applies, be compensating goods tied to the overall plan of a divine creator? I believe Yes. If anything would seem to fit into the relevant class, it seems quite plausible that god-purposed goods would. I will attempt an explanation in the following.

God-justifying Goods- The Relevant Subclass

In an effort to answer the above question, I would like to look at another way in which Wykstra describes CORNEA. In paraphrasing Wykstra, McBrayer writes, Thus understood, CORNEA is a restriction on when any “cognized situation”31counts as evidence. Wykstra concedes as much: “the key idea behind CORNEA is a proposed test for whether some alleged evidence E seriously supports…Some hypothesis H”32

Wykstra continues, The test is this: ask whether, if H were false, E is still pretty much what one should expect. If the answer is “Yes,” then E can’t seriously support H. For example, let H be the hypothesis that there are no HIV viruses on a specific hypodermic needle about to go into your arm, and let E be the datum that on

30 Ibid., p.86 31 According to McBrayer, anything that can serve as evidence—perceptual experience, a belief, a seeming state, etc. 32 Ibid., p.81

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close visual inspection, the doctor sees no such viruses on the needle. Does his seeing no such viruses seriously support the claim that there are none? Using the test, we ask: “if H were false (if there were viruses present), is E (your seeing none) still pretty much expectable?” The answer is “Yes”; the idea behind CORNEA is that E can’t then seriously support H. And here this result seems just right.

CORNEA turns out to be a sensitivity constraint on our evidence used to justify what we are being inclined to believe. It has to be reasonable to believe that there is some evidential connection or evidential support relation between what we see (our evidence) and what we are led to believe (our hypothesis) by that evidence. So, in cases that fail to pass CORNEA, but are nevertheless justifiable inferences— that we are not a brain in a vat, that we are seeing a genuine zebra, that we are in the presence of a mountain, etc., are cases, in which we believe (or is reasonable for us to believe) there are genuine evidential connections between our evidence and what we are led to believe. This is so, even though, in those cases, we cannot discern a difference or are completely unaware that there must be a required difference. In short, those cases are counterexamples to CORNEA, because despite our inability to discern any difference or despite our lack of awareness that there even needs to be a difference, we intuitively believe that there is an evidential connection between our seeing’s(evidence) and what we believe. But what if we were informed that in certain cases, that any and all evidence is useless, completely unusable as justificatory grounds for basing those inferences? Why? Because there is no evidence in these cases to make discernible differences or intuitive connections. I believe that god-purposed goods, are the correct subclass of metaphorical appearances to which CORNEA correctly applies. Why? —God keeps secrets. Christian scripture is replete with verses that suggest as much,

The secret things belong to the LORD our God, but the things revealed belong to us and to our children forever, that we may follow all the words of this law. Deuteronomy 29:29

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It is the glory of God to conceal a matter; to search out a matter is the glory of kings. Proverbs 25:2

What these verses seemingly suggest is that God has secrets—something (knowledge, etc.) that is kept or meant to be kept unknown or unseen by others—either temporarily or forever. What we have to ask is— does God being perfectly loving, powerful, and knowledgeable preclude him from keeping secrets? There is certainly nothing explicitly contradictory about secrets and divine perfection. There seem to be no implicit contradictions either, as long as God has good reasons. Does God owe it to his creatures to tell them everything (if even possible for finite creatures)? Do parents tell their children everything? Do employers tell their employees everything? Do governments tell their citizens everything? I think the most obvious answer is—No. The most loving parents, honest employers and trust-worthy governments do not disclose everything they know. If that is the case, then why must God disclose everything he knows? Does the sovereign creator of the universe owe it to his creatures unlimited access to everything he knows, does, or intends to do? I believe the most reasonable answer is— No. The idea behind this ‘secrecy response’ is that we can track divine reasons as long as those reasons have been revealed. As long as reasons have been revealed (for whatever purpose), we can theoretically detect them—they are discoverable in some sense. However, when divine reasons have not been revealed or completely hidden (temporarily or forever), no appearance states (cognized situation)— perceptual or otherwise— could be used as evidence to justify inferences in these cases. If God keeps secrets, and if a subclass of those secrets includes reasons for the allowance of certain horrendous evils, then in those specific cases, the actual reasons will be completely unavailable for detection by human agents. Human agents won’t detect any reasons, not because there are no reasons, but because those reasons are entirely hidden by God. If one finds themselves in such a situation, no evidence of any kind could be correctly applied to make a justifiable inference from an appearance state(evidence) to a belief(hypothesis).

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CORNEA in these cases, blocks any attempt to use particular inferences as grounds or evidence for a second inference about the existence of God. For example, from seeing no reason for an evil, I infer there are no reasons for that evil (unjustified evil exists), I then make a second inference from unjustified evil exists to God does not. In other words, CORNEA blocks those metaphorical appearance claims that have the sole purpose of attempting to disprove the existence of God. Other metaphorical appearance claims are untouched. In short, if the sole purpose for an inference is to disprove the existence of God—then it must pass the CORNEA test, but since it cannot pass, the inference cannot be used as evidence against the existence of God. It will always fail CORNEA because (1) there will not be a discernible difference in the perceptual state—because the true reasons are hidden and (2) unlike in the brain in the vat case (where we still believe in some intuitive but hidden evidential connection obtaining between our evidence and our beliefs), the intuitive connection is severed once we are made aware that in matters concerning God and his relation to man, he doesn’t tell us everything— God keeps secrets. In a nutshell, if God keeps secrets, why could not some of those secrets have to do with certain horrendous evils in our world, and if so— those specific cases would be ones in which no available appearance state could be used as evidence to justify an inference. Once we truly grasp the idea that God keeps secrets—hides certain bits (or entire swaths) of knowledge, we should be reluctant to make inferences from “I see no god-justifying good” to ‘there is no god-justifying good”. When having possible dealings with the creator and sustainer of all that is— wouldn’t we want to be absolutely certain of our evidential support relations- making sure our evidence supported our hypothesis- before using appearances as evidence against his existence? At most, we should remain agnostic about using appearances of gratuitous evil as evidence against the possibility of an all-knowing, all-powerful, all-loving being. As Michael Rea stated in a recent interview, You’re working with a 3-pound piece of meat between your ears, God is omniscient and perfectly good…might there be goods God can see,

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relationships—causal relationships between good and evil that God can see— that you can’t?33

It certainly seems a possibility that the reason you can’t see those “relationships” is because they aren’t there to be seen— God keeps secrets.

Final Analysis- Assumptions Uncovered Ultimately, this is simply a debate about our ability to detect/comprehend whether or not a compensating good is tied to any instance of evil or suffering. In short, atheistic argumentation assumes that if there are morally sufficient reasons for allowing this type of suffering and pain, we should probably be able to detect those reasons (at least eventually), but because we are unable to detect those reasons, therefore, probably no reasons exist. And if no reasons probably exist for an evil, then it is probably unjustified, and a good God wouldn’t allow the existence of unjustified evils, therefore probably God doesn’t exist. As before, mere atheism (RA) does not suggest anything about mankind’s abilities or limitations, but this argument from evil does. It suggests something about mankind— (1) that because man’s normal everyday cognitive faculties are capable of discerning inextricably complex connections between suffering and goods, man is able to detect, in each and every case, the discernible difference between cases of seemingly pointless sufferings and genuinely pointless sufferings.(2) Mans ordinary mental powers are capable of working at the level of divine omniscience, because if there was a God, we would eventually be able to discern his purposes for allowing certain instances of suffering.(3) If God exists, Man would have access to all divine knowledge related to divine reasons for permitting pain and suffering— God wouldn’t keep secrets from man. While not positing superpowers directly to man, the atheist seems to be sneaking in something quite similar, and calling it normal everyday cognition. Once

33 Closer to Truth- Michael Rea- Skeptical Theism, Sep 12, 2020.

27 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 again, we can now add these assumptions to the growing list of the atheists set of beliefs.

28 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021

CHAPTER IV

DIVINE HIDDENNESS

The Problem of Divine Hiddenness • If a loving God exists, there will be no non-resistant non-believers (NRNB). • NRNBs exist. • Therefore, no loving God exists.

The problem of Divine Hiddenness is a recent addition to the pantheon of arguments against the existence of a loving God, and is now considered one of the most compelling attacks against Christian theism to date. First argued by Schellenberg in 1993, the idea is that there exists this group of people, who thru no fault of their own, do not have a relationship with God. If God were truly loving, he would not allow for the existence of this type of non-believer (he would not ignore, pass over, and always remain open to relationship with those open to such relations), therefore a loving God does not exist. Stated plainly, there is a category of individuals who would willingly and without resistance have a relationship with God, but because God has not made himself more obvious— God conceals or hides himself from there conscious awareness–they fail to believe34 . Because a loving God would not behave in such an unloving manner, God does not exist. Divine Hiddenness suggests an incompatibility between the existence of this category of non-believer and the existence of a loving God. Now the above argument, can like the problem of evil, be taken in both logical and evidential forms. But before we begin our discussion of the two versions, I would like to say a little more about this paradigmatic group of non- believers—the non- resistant non-believer- NRNB.

34 The thought is that belief in God’s existence, is a pre-requisite to having a relationship with God. It’s the belief in God’s existence that God seems culpable for not allowing.

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What is a NRNB35? Following Schellenberg’s characterization of this group of non-believers, the NRNB are usually considered a subclass of non-believer that has “surveyed the evidence (of both Gods existence and non-existence) with exacting and impartial eyes” (Henry :2001). To put it another way, this class of non-believer has ‘adequately investigated’ the arguments for and against, the inductive standards, and anything else that bear on the question of Gods existence. However, despite all their effort, the NRNB reach some sort of impasse—a state of agnosticism, an epistemic parity36 between the belief that G(God) exists and the beliefs that G(God) does not exist. From the theistic perspective, a NRNB is an individual who has found theistic argumentation, evidence and any personal experience of God37—inconclusive. From the perspective of the atheist, God, simply has not done enough to make the NRNB aware of his existence. And it’s because of that failure, on God’s part, that this subclass of non-believer considers themselves— inculpable and non-resistant. Due to this inculpability, the NRNB are seen by both themselves and others as evidence against the existence of an all-loving God. To avoid any confusion, in the following section, the NRNB and the reflective non-believer(doubter) will be thought of as equivalent. However, Schellenberg does suggest the category of NRNB could be viewed in a much broader sense (see footnote

35 The NRNB could also be understood in a much broader sense, including more persons than described in this section. Schellenberg writes, It will not suffice to refute the hiddenness argument if one can show that reflective doubters in the western world today are all resisting belief in God. I think that’s false too, but what makes the relevant premise of the argument clearly true is that the category of non-resistant non-believers the argument can work with is so broad, including not just reflective doubters but also those who have never had a chance to think about God; and not just people living today, but all finite persons capable of believing in God and responding positively to such belief who have ever lived-which of course takes us back very far indeed into evolutionary history. Schellenberg, JL, (2015), The Hiddenness Argument, OUP p. 106

36 Schellenberg seems to stress this idea of agnosticism or parity of belief, to distinguish this class of non-believer from disbelievers who have a settled disposition on the matter, and therefore willfully resistant. 37 Proponents of the existence of the NRNB might deny, that this subclass has had any personal religious experiences with God, this might be used as further evidence of the God’s non-existence.

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35). Keeping this in mind, let’s begin our probe into the Logical argument from Divine Hiddenness (DH).

The Logical Problem While most consider DH to be an empirical or evidential argument, it could certainly be placed in a logical form. Using the above argument, the logical problem of DH suggests that it is a logically impossible state of affairs (like a married bachelor) that both the NRNB and G(God) exist in the same time and place—if G(God) exists, then NRNB does not, and vice versa. At times, Schellenberg appears to hint38 at the logical formulation, when he suggests that particular solutions to DH (those addressing the evidential version)— “miss the mark” (Schellenberg:2005: 204), that they are simply a mis-understanding of what the argument actually asserts—that if God exists there are no NRNB. If God exists, the only type of non-believer is the willfully resistant. In other words, according to the logical version of DH, there cannot be justifying reasons for the existence of the NRNB, because they should not exist at all (assuming God exists). But it seems to me that they (DH critics) have not fully understood the argument. I would suggest that what we see in their writing is a confusion of what my argument actually claims - that if God exists, there is no inculpable non-belief…for what the hiddenness argument actually says is that if God exists, there is never a time when someone inculpably fails to believe (belief is made available as soon as there is a capacity for relationship with God).39

Schellenberg uses his loving parent/ child analogy to try to demonstrate why he believes the above. According to this intuition, an all-loving parent, from cradle to grave, would never put relationship with its child permanently out of reach. And if this is the case with a loving human parent, how much more with an all-loving God. In other words, while there might be times of disconnection or disengagement between

38 I say hint, because Schellenberg’s official claim is that DH is an evidential problem. 39 Schellenberg, JL, (2005) “The Hiddenness Argument Revisited (I), Religious Studies, Vol. 41, No.2 p. 206

31 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 parent and child, this is always within the context of a loving relationship. Schellenberg states,

God would clearly love finite creatures at every time when they exist (2015:44).

Understanding the DH in this way- the logical way, and in an effort to not offer reasons for the existence of the NRNB, the theist might simply deny their existence altogether. Looking at the above argument, the second premise simply assumes the existence of the NRNB as an undeniable fact40. However, there are several versions of expanded theism (e.g., Christianity, Islam) that explicitly state that non-resistant non- believers do not exist. According to these theisms, non-believers are non-believers because they are in fact willfully resistant to God, due to sin effecting their noetic structure and moral disposition41. Many theists accept the idea that thru general revelation, God has made himself known through the things he has made—so that all men are without excuse (Romans 1:20). So according to scripture, if men are unaware of Gods existence, they are culpably unaware. And if belief in God’s existence is a prerequisite to relationship, then their culpability excludes them from this special class of non-believers (NRNB), and places them squarely in the common class of the willfully resistant. It is along these lines, that a reply by Henry (2001) attempts to deny the existence of the NRNB. However, Henry attempts to do so with-out invoking ideas of

40 The theist is well within his rights in denying this claim. Nevertheless, I am referring to Schellenberg’s claim, that denial of the existence of the NRNB, is indicative of only “cultish” theisms. Schellenberg JL, (2015),” The Hiddenness Argument”, OUP. The important point to remember, is that the proponent of hiddenness, only needs the existence of one NRNB, and maintain that throughout the history of mankind, that surely this requirement has been met. 41 Unlike Christianity, Islam does not teach that man is the inheritor of original pollution. However, like Christianity, Islam does teach the non-existence of the NRNB. According to Islam, all non-believers are of the resistant variety.

32 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 the fall or noetic dysfunction42, by endeavoring to show that non-resistant belief itself is highly improbable. According to Henry, one of the factors contributing to the improbability of non-resistant belief, has to do with the real possibility of deception and self-deception by those identifying themselves as NRNB. Recall in our description of the NRNB—the NRNB are a subclass of non-believer who have adequately investigated “the evidence, inductive standards, and beliefs regarding the probability of a proposition on the evidence” (Henry 2001:79). Henry highlights the problems associated with one’s adequate investigational procedures, by raising concerns regarding (1) the nature and scope of one’s investigation and (2) the means of judging or evaluating the adequacy of that investigation. In other words, because the NRNB are conducting this evaluation of themselves by themselves (like the fox guarding the hen house), seemingly intractable issues concerning deception and self-deception arise. In discussing the adequacy of the NRNB’s investigatory procedures, Henry states the following, …a more serious problem bears on whether reasonable non-belief exists: how do we judge the adequacy of a given persons investigation?... Because adequate investigation depends upon standards internal to the agent, whether or not these standards are met is never a matter of simple observation either for the agent or the neutral outsider. After all we can certainly deceive others about whether we have fulfilled our epistemic responsibilities properly, and worse yet we can deceive ourselves through rationalizations, qualifications, and excuses.

Sensitive to deception and self-deception concerns, Schellenberg attempts to guard against these possibilities by suggesting further additional qualities held by the NRNB: “exemplary investigative procedure, great expenditure of time and energy, honesty in other situations, love for truth, rational self-control and crucially, a desire to have the issue responsibly settled” (Henry:2001:80). To these further qualifications Henry writes, After all, one can give the appearance of exemplary investigative procedure without the reality of it. One can seem a generally honest person without being

42 While in agreement with the conclusion of his argument, I am a wary about the idea that this self- deception cannot be attributed to noetic dysfunction (due to the Fall).

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one. One can speak about a love for truth without being committed to truth. In short, the presence of each of these qualities [NRNB attributes], whether individually or jointly, can be both deceptively and self-deceptively instantiated, i.e., not really instantiated at all.43

Stated plainly, Schellenberg’s increasing number of qualifications held by the NRNB, not only continually make smaller and smaller the subclass of NRNB (to the point of improbability), but still fails to avoid the concerns of deception and self- deception. Ultimately, not only is it possible for the NRNB to lie to others about the adequacy of their examination, it is also possible that they NRNB may lie to themselves. This distinct possibility, seemingly jeopardizes the existence of non- resistant non-belief itself. In short, in order for there to be the non-resistant non- believer, there has to be reasonable non-belief, but if there are valid concerns about its existence, there are valid concerns about the existence of the NRNB. Hence, concerns with accepting the conclusion from divine hiddenness—concerns with accepting the conclusion that God (probably) doesn’t exist. Ultimately, the advocate of DH merely assumes the existence of NRNB as an unmistakable fact of the world we live in. Yet as we just examined, the existence of the NRNB is not as uncontroversial as the proponent of DH (atheist) would like to suggest. Whether thru theological tenet, or by philosophical reasoning, the denial of the existence of the NRNB is certainly a route to taken by those skeptical of the conclusions drawn from the hiddenness of God. Let’s begin our investigation onto the evidential version of DH.

The Evidential Problem of Divine Hiddenness

Now the Evidential problem of DH doesn’t state that there is a logical incompatibility between the existence of an all-loving God and the existence of the NRNB, but only that the existence of NRNB would not be what would be expected, if

43 Henry, Douglas, (2001), “Does Reasonable Non-belief Exist?”, Faith and Philosophy, p.81

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God in fact existed. In other words, the NRNB can be used as evidence for the case that God probably doesn’t exist. Looking at the above argument, the first premise clearly suggests that God couldn’t have a morally sufficient reason for failing to make himself more conspicuous to man’s awareness. There couldn’t possibly be a reason of such importance for an all-loving God to conceal his existence from his non-resistant creatures. In concealing himself to some, the argument suggests some type of unjustified prejudice or capriciousness located within the character of God. While there have been a number of replies since its inception, we will briefly mention two (as rejoinders of this type usually follow the logic that God cannot make himself apparent without foregoing some other compensating good), those of Swinburne and Dumsday. In God making himself more conspicuous to man’s awareness, there is the concern that ‘divine conspicuousness’ could have various negative affects—adverse effects on the autonomy of man (Swinburne:2004). This problem mirrors what sometimes can be called the problem(s) of heavenly freedom44—problems concerning the compatibility of free-will and certain states of the believer. The basic intuition, being something analogous to the quote from John Wooden- “The true test of a man’s character is what he does when no one is watching.”45 With the overwhelming presence of an omnipotent being hanging around, who wouldn’t be the slightest bit inhibited. The more recent ‘divine mercy reply’ sees God’s concealment as an act of divine mercy on the part of God– God mercifully remaining hidden in order to limit the moral culpability of those God knows would deny him no matter the evidence (Dumsday:2012). The intuition behind this reply being captured in the verse, “From everyone who has been given much, much will be demanded; and from the one who has been entrusted with much, much more will be asked.” In short, with increased

44 Kittle, Simon, “Some problems of Heavenly Freedom”, (2018), International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 45 Of course, God doesn’t need to watch someone to know their character- this idea simply suggests that when one knows one is being watched their behavior (freedom) is altered in some way, from how they would have acted had no-one been observing.

35 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 blessings (knowledge of God), comes increased responsibility (towards God), this seemingly suggests that with a decrease in blessings, comes a decrease in responsibility. So those persons to whom God chooses to remain hidden, could be a subclass of persons who would never want relationship with God, even if he did reveal himself. For this reason, and as an act of mercy, God remains hidden to limit their moral culpability and therefore their assumed punishment in the afterlife. It is responses like these that Schellenberg directly addresses as “missing the mark”. However, if DH is understood probabilistically, with the NRNB not being seen as logically incompatible with the existence of God, but only as evidence for the improbability of God—offering reasons for their existence wouldn’t be to “miss the mark”. By giving reasons like those of Swinburne and Dumsday the theist is simply following a pattern analogous to that of the evidential problem of evil in suggesting that these are the compensating goods for which an evil—God’s hiddenness— is justified.

Atheistic Assumptions However you wish to understand DH— logical or evidential—the problem loses much of its sting, by either (1) demonstrating the improbability of the NRNB or denying the existence of the NRNB altogether (solutions addressing logical version) or by (2) shifting focus away from the perceived injustice of God, and towards viable reasons (compensating goods) why a loving God might remain not entirely obvious (solutions to the evidential version). Again, observe that the problem arises due to the atheistic assumptions being employed. The anti-theistic arguments make three assumptions that (1) the NRNB’s existence is simply seen as an uncontroversial fact, (2) that there could be no morally sufficient reason for God allowing the existence of such a non-believer—there is no greater or outweighing good attached. At bottom, the atheistic assumptions amount to the claim that— It’s an undeniable/uncontroversial fact that non-resistant non- believers exist (or have existed). Non-resistant non-believers would, given the right

36 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 evidence, experience, or right circumstances, willingly surrender their lives to God and enjoy him forever. In short, the NRNB is an existing subclass of non-believer, that would never reject God to his face (there is no hidden resistance). So, we can now add these final assumptions to the list of the atheists set of beliefs.

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CHAPTER V EXPANDED ATHEISM’S (EA) DOCTRINE OF MAN

So, after a careful study at each of the various anti-theistic arguments, this is what we have learned about the hidden assumptions pertaining to the nature of man within atheistic argumentation. These are essentially (some of) the assumptions making up the Expanded Atheists— Doctrine of Man.

From the Argument of the Injustice of Hell: • Unlike this side of reality, those persons consigned to Hell do not possess Hellish-free-will. The assumption is that there is no post mortem free-will and therefore no post-mortem sin. • Unlike this side of reality, where man can become hardened against God, there is no hardening process in hell, by which man can become fixed in his hatred towards God. While in hell, Hellish-free-will could not be supplanted by a hardening. • That no denizen(man) of hell would be so thoroughly and fundamentally evil enough(hardened) to continually and everlastingly choose hell over heaven.

From the Argument from Evil: • Man’s normal everyday cognitive faculties are capable of discerning inextricably complex connections between suffering and goods, man is able to detect, in each and every case, the discernible difference between cases of seemingly pointless sufferings and genuinely pointless sufferings. • Man’s ordinary mental powers are capable of working at the level of divine omniscience, because if there was a God, we would eventually

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be able to discern his purposes for allowing certain instances of suffering. • If God exists, man would have access to all divine knowledge related to divine reasons for permitting pain and suffering— God wouldn’t keep secrets from man.

From the Divine Hiddenness: • It’s simply an undeniable/uncontroversial fact that non-resistant non- believers exist (or have existed). There are persons who fail to believe in the existence of God, and therefore fail to have a relationship with God and it’s not their fault—God is to blame • Non-resistant non-believers would, given the right evidence, experience, or right circumstances, willingly surrender their lives to God and enjoy him forever. In short, the NRNB is an existing subclass of non-believer, that would never reject God to his face (there is no hidden resistance).

To reiterate, these appear to be some of the implicit assumptions made by anti-theistic argumentation, discoverable only by reflecting on the various arguments from evil. These assumptions can now be added to restricted atheism, to form our newly labeled— Expanded Atheism (EA). What seems apparent is that these assumptions made by Expanded Atheism (EA) are either completely antithetical to those assumed by Christian theism (ET) or entail commitments that the theist would find likely disagreeable. Additionally, it is also quite apparent that these antitheses are absolutely necessary for the efficacy of the above arguments. Before moving on, I would like to address two features about the above list— (1) this list is not intended to be comprehensive and (2) this list is not a package deal. Lastly in the final subsection, I would like to address a difficult problem that arises for anti-theistic argumentation employing an atheistic doctrine of man.

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Not Comprehensive The above list of atheistic assumptions is certainly not comprehensive in nature. Why? Because the above assumptions are only uncovered or discovered when various solutions are proposed to resolve the problems displayed by the argument. In other words, depending on how one wishes to resolve the apparent incompatibilities, different assumptions made by the atheist will then become apparent. In short, different solutions reveal different assumptions. Since we only considered a handful of solutions to the arguments, many other assumptions remain as yet to be unearthed.

Not a Package Deal Recall that expanded theisms share a common restricted theistic core RT, yet are quite different in their expanded theistic set of other religious claims. And it is these other religious claims that help to distinguish the various expanded theisms. For example, while both Christianity and Islam agree on the restricted set of properties possessed by God (the three O’s), they don’t agree on ideas of Jesus sonship, incarnation, original sin etc... In other words, Christianity and Islam share the same core but different auxiliary assumptions concerning everything else—including mankind. Consequently, we have many varieties of expanded theisms sharing a common core of restricted assumptions. Depending on the type of expanded theism you are investigating, different assumptions will be uncovered. In short, there is no single package of additional assumptions attached to restricted theism. Analogously, there is no single package of supplementary assumptions that is common to all expanded atheisms. There can be a variety of expanded atheisms that simply share the common core of restricted atheism—the belief that G(God) does not exist. Just like different expanded theisms will differ on their other religious claims, expanded atheisms will differ on their other irreligious claims. Ultimately what this means, like varied theists, it’s likely that many atheists will only hold to some, but not all the assumptions listed above. What this all means, is that like the expanded theist, the

40 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 expanded atheist also possesses some form of a doctrine of man. However, this creates a problem for any attempt at arguing against the existence of God using the above reasonings in conjunction with a certain understanding of man.

The Problem-Conflicting Conceptions of Man Initially, the atheistic arguments possess a powerful persuasive force. However, after careful reflection on the suggested anti-theistic arguments, one comes to realize that questionable assumptions concerning man are being applied. While certainly valid, the soundness of the arguments is a result not of any agreed upon conception of God, but on a non-agreed upon conception of man. Recall that a mere atheism (RA)—never mentions anything about man— yet we discover that the above anti-theistic arguments are implementing a certain doctrine or conception of man that is necessary for their effectiveness as theistic defeaters. In our investigation we discovered or uncovered (since unlike the theist, the atheist is neither transparent nor explicit in the assumptions about man he is using in his reasoning), that (1) the understanding of man employed by EA, is completely antithetical or likely disagreeable to that assumed by the theist; and (2) EA simply neglects the fact that ET have their own doctrine/understanding of man—which is internally coherent, consistent, and seemingly resolves the problems posed by the arguments from Evil, Hell and Hiddenness. Ultimately, we end up with two completely opposing understandings of man being applied to the above argumentation. It seems obvious that it is impossible to properly explain the interaction between different kinds of things (God and man), by describing only one of those things and its properties (God). Description of the other player(s) and their relevant properties, seems necessary for a true understanding of their relationship. Likewise, it is important to keep in mind, that contemporary anti-theistic argumentation must employ not only an agreed upon conception of God, but an agreed upon conception of man in order to truly be successful at undermining the theistic position. However, unlike the agreed upon conception of God, there is and probably will never be an

41 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 agreed upon conception of man. Why? For the expanded theist relies on special revelation for many of their beliefs about man. Ideas about original guilt/pollution, ideas about accountability to their creator, ideas about being made in the image of God, and as such, in possession of libertarian freedom, etc. For the theist to even begin to consider any doctrine of man, other than the one delivered to them (by God), the atheist would have to provide overwhelmingly strong argumentation concerning mankind—arguments about man’s cognitive abilities, epistemic position, moral disposition, and freedom. And as the history of philosophy has shown, these are virtually irresolvable matters. In the long-term, the prognosis for the atheistic project of disproving the existence of God, under conditions acceptable to the theist—using an agreed upon conception or doctrine of man— seems questionable at best, and outright hopeless at worst.

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CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION

Returning to the question with which we began our discussion—does atheism have expanded and restricted versions? In short—Yes. Atheism like that of theism, has both restricted and expanded versions. Why is this distinction important? Because only under the assumptions made by expanded atheism, is atheistic argumentation made viable. What this means is that a mere restricted atheistic position is an unusable resource for atheistic argumentation. Basically, one cannot hold to a mere restricted atheism and employ atheistic argumentation, since RA does not possess the resources needed for atheistic argumentation to operate. In our study we also learned about the nature of those additional assumptions—that (1) the additional assumptions made by EA concern the nature of man— not God, and (2) the understanding of man employed by EA is completely antithetical (or disagreeable) to those assumed by expanded theism. At bottom, RA supposedly enabled the atheist to argue against a certain conception of God, without getting entangled in commitments about the nature of man. However, as our investigation has shown, such commitments are inescapable. And like that of the restricted theist, the restricted atheist would be a rare breed, as any self-respecting, rationally justified atheist46 would likely rely on something like the above arguments. However, in order to do that, the atheist needs the appropriate conception(doctrine) of man, one provided only by an expanded belief set. Simply put, the only rationally justified atheist is the expanded atheist, as the expanded atheist is the only one in possession of the essential set of beliefs concerning man. So, the overall picture is this, with our exclusion of RA as a tenable position, due to its inability to provide the necessary background assumptions (no doctrine of

46 Since atheism is often not considered properly basic—nothing analogous to the sensus divinitatus found in theism, atheism based on non-argumentation could be plausibly considered irrational. However, it is still possible that there could be atheists that ground their atheism on things other than argumentation.

43 Texas Tech University, Raymond Navarro, May 2021 man) for atheistic argumentation to function, we are left with EA as the only tenable position for the rationally justified atheist. That is to say— the only real atheistic position is the expanded atheistic position (or some variety thereof). To sum it all up, in our attempt to answer our initial question concerning the existence of Expanded Atheism, we showed that atheism(expanded) does indeed have hidden assumptions—an implicit doctrine of man. Those assumptions were uncovered thru our analysis of the contemporary arguments from Hell, Evil and Divine Hiddenness. These assumptions supply the necessary background for the arguments to properly function. Ultimately, any atheist committed to the above arguments, is committed to their assumptions—including those assumptions about man. Being committed to assumptions about man entails a commitment to an expanded set of beliefs, therefore a commitment to expanded atheism. At the end of the day, this means that expanded atheism might not only be a real possibility, but the majority report on atheism.

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